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Prepared for presentation at the IDEAs Conference on “Reforming the Financial System: Proposals, Constraints and New Directions”, 25-27 January 2010, Muttukadu, Chennai, India

Consumer Credit Instead of Social Wage?:

Jobless Industrial Restructuring and Financialization of Poverty

in Post-Crisis South Korea

CHANG Kyung-Sup, Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University

< Summary >

(1) Introduction = Behind the rosy pictures of the South Korean economy as an internationally conspicuous case of prompt recovery from the recent global financial crisis, grassroots South Koreans in rapidly growing numbers are confronted with their own financial crises, which often force them to react in extreme manners including suicides and familial killing. South Koreans’ poverty is increasingly manifested in terms of financial entrapment ensuing from heavy personal indebtedness to the state (due to unpaid taxes and public insurance premiums), banks, kin members and friends, and, worst of all, private usurers. This is another, increasingly crucial, component of the so-called financialization trend in the contemporary world political economy. (2) Risky Conditions of Economic Recovery: Farewell to Proletariat and Globalized Capital = The Asian (and, for that matter, South Korean) financial crisis of 1997-98 prompted South Korea to undertake, as the economic rescue measure, a paradigm shift in industrial development focusing on technology-intensive sectors such as ICT, semi-conductor, high-end electronics, automobile, heavy machinery, etc., as well as competent heavy industries such as steel and shipbuilding. Behind the enviably swift establishment of its global competitiveness in these strategic industrial sectors, two fundamentally risky phenomena have made the South Korean economy structurally vulnerable – namely, first, radically abandoning or overseas-relocating labor-intensive industries and annulling stable employment conditions (labor market flexibilization), and, second, depending on global financiers and/or speculators for corporate financing and stock value sustenance in such a degree to allow foreigners’ majority ownership of most profitable enterprises. A seemingly inverse relationship between economic growth (and corporate performance) and employment has manifested itself in recent years, making jobless (or, more precisely, job-reducing) economic growth a structural feature of the South Korean economy. (3) Squeezed and Forfeited Market Wage and Neglected Social Wage = The loss or lack of stable and decent jobs among ever-increasing numbers of South Koreans has inevitably led to the stagnation and even decline of wage income across society (in a stark contrast to the

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phenomenally swelling corporate dividends and financial transaction profits accruing to foreign investors). Poverty has seriously expanded both in absolute and relative terms, but the notoriously ungenerous and underinstitutionalized social security system has failed to alleviate the inequalities and destitution to meaningful extents. In fact, South Korea’s Continental European-style social security system predicated upon stable regular employment, as regular jobs are disappearing massively and rapidly, has often led to aggravation of inequalities and destitution. While massive income losses and reductions are destined to cause serious cutbacks in grassroots consumption, the bipolarization of educational spending is particularly worrisome due to its future ramification of potential worsening of the current inequalities. (4) Household Debts as Financialized Poverty: The World’s Highest Savers Have Turned into the World’s Heaviest Debtors = Even after struggling to reduce consumption, South Korean households in rapidly growing numbers and proportions have been entrapped into heavy indebtedness to banks, credit card companies, private usurers, kin members and friends, and even the state (due to unpaid taxes and insurance premiums). Within a decade since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the total debts of South Korean households nearly tripled. In particular, the first few years of the twenty-first century saw South Koreans’ household debts literally exploding. Considering that this was also the period of remarkably fast post-crisis economic recovery, such economic recovery seems to have been in part sustained by South Koreans’ borrowing-based consumption. The extent of South Korea’s household indebtedness, vis-à-vis both disposable income and financial assets, now far surpasses those of most developed countries (including the much troubled US). Not surprisingly, the poorest group shows a particularly high debt-service burden. (For them, even the quality of debt-service is most horrendous because they are often denied by regular banks and thus forced to rely on exploitative private usurers.) Also, according to a recent survey, seven out of ten college students are indebted in a way or another and thus feel very much stressed about it. Since they are confronted with an extremely bleak future in the job market, such indebtedness may not be terminated easily even after their graduation. South Koreans had boasted the status of the world’s highest savers until the moment of the 1997-98 crisis, but it has taken slightly more than a decade for them to become one of the world’s lowest savers. This alone constitutes a serious condition for adopting a different approach to national economic development. (5) Financialization of Poverty as Industrial Policy? = Ordinary South Koreans’ widespread and heavy indebtedness is tantamount to financial firms’ hugely aggrandized market for domestic consumer financing. As far as most individual borrowers pay interests and principals as scheduled, the financial sector sits on a bonanza-like situation. The South Korean government may feel paradoxically satisfied, if partially, with this situation because the tormenting experience of the

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1997 financial crisis led it to yearn for a globally competitive sizable financial industry in the national economy. The swift establishment of globally viable consumer and investment banks became a new industrial policy of the still self-consciously developmental state of South Korea. Remaining keen to overseeing the aggrandizement of the organizational sizes of South Korean banks, the South Korean government radically relaxed regulations over banking practices. Most financial firms, ranging from major banks to specialized credit card companies to corporate usurers, did everything to capitalize on such relaxed regulatory environment as they cunningly approached wage-deprived and socially unprotected South Koreans. A lending and borrowing spree began with the credit card industry during the very first few years of the 21st century, which only resulted in a double jeopardy of a massive number of credit defaulters pushing credit card companies near financial insolvency. The next stage was the housing loan scheme, which involved a staggering proportion of South Korean families and individuals. The housing prices hiked in proportion to the increase of housing loans, and the higher housing prices in turn allowed larger amounts housing loans. This process enriched some families and individuals and all banks, but critically damaged the interest of those who had yet to buy new homes (i.e., younger generations without rich parents). The South Korean bubble in the housing market coexisted with the American bubble. Thus, the South Korean government did everything to fend off the potential impact of the American sub-prime crisis on to the South Korean housing market (as well as the South Korean financial market) because it would automatically destabilize the financial market as well. The most recent stage seems to involve non-bank financial firms (even including corporate and individual usurers), whose seductive advertisements have inundated (cable) televisions and city streets. While these are less honored or acceptable partners to the developmentalist government, their function of circulating credits, no matter how exploitatively, through South Korea’s disadvantaged and alienated social groups is not openly rejected. Through, or despite, this perplexing process, South Korean banks kept making record-breaking amounts of earnings and profits, mostly through interest-reaping, until the global financial crisis of 2008-09. However, this was not the kind of financial industrial performance the South Korean developmental state envisaged in the global economic competition. Above all, the capacity building for advanced investment banking was anticipated. However, even the hitherto existing function of lending to local industries (except major chaebol-affiliated firms) has declined seriously in favor of safer consumer loans. The actual owners of these banks – in particular, foreign shareholders who now constitute overwhelming majority owners of most supposedly South Korean banks – feel just fine with the current situation, especially because the windfall dividends they reap. Another irony here is that the foreign financiers eagerly invited by the South Korean developmental state into the local banking industry prefer, for obvious reasons, less developmentally oriented banks. (6) Financial Reforms as Neoliberal Populism: Financial Citizenship Instead of Social Citizenship?

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= The policy programs presented by the current South Korean government (under Lee Myung-Bak) in its self-declared move to jungdosilyong (middle road and pragmatism) include various forms of preferential access to finance for poor people and legal-economic rescue of financial defaulters. Considering its adamant neglect or rejection of worker rights and social securities, such finance-related social protection initiatives are quite remarkable. For instance, Misogeumyung (the microfinance program designed to help poor people denied access to regular bank loans) has been institutionally designed and financially organized by the central government in a manner highly reminiscent of the Park Chung-Hee’s high developmental state-ism. Major business groups (chaebol) and banks seem to have been practically ordered to donate huge amounts of seed money and operate microfinance programs. Also, the “employment-pending repayment tuition loans” program for college students has been rather dramatically promoted and approved in such a short period. Credit defaulters are offered publicly arranged rescue programs including “pre-workout”, “individual workout”, “debts adjustment”, and “individual rehabilitation”. Borrowers of excess-interest loans are eligible for transfer to low-interest loans of public organizations. Individuals with low credit-rating may apply for small emergency livelihood loans arranged by the government. Self-employed entrepreneurs without defaulted loans may apply for government-underwritten small business loans. While these programs themselves often alienate poor people by demanding difficult requirements, they nevertheless constitute a politically framed set of rights to finance. Their function may consist more in popularly legitimating the neoliberal economic order (under which the supposed beneficiaries of these protective financial programs have been sacrificed or alienated) than in seriously reforming the financial system, but bringing finance under the political epistemology of citizenship is nevertheless a highly interesting development. (7) Conclusion: High-Debt Corporate Model to High-Debt Household Model = The Asian (and South Korean) financial crisis and the neoliberal economic restructuring measures to its rescue have replaced industrial enterprises with households as the most indebted subject of the national economy. When industrial enterprises aggressively operated on the basis of excessive borrowings from state-controlled banks, their financial default was often prevented or pardoned for state-ist developmental purposes. When individuals have to survive on the basis of excessive borrowings from privatized (and often foreigner majority-owned) banks, their financial default hardly becomes a public concern. However, as the sheer number and proportion of such financial defaulters already account for a crucial part of the national economic population as well as the national political constituency, they collectively constitute a fundamental public concern. This problem is well acknowledged even by the currently incumbent ultra-conservative government of Lee Myung-Bak, which thus has devised and implemented various programs for financial access and rescue designed to promote social and economic integration for those sacrificed and alienated under the neoliberalized economic system. Since no one (even within the Lee government) expects that

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these programs can fundamentally alleviate social and economic devastations ensuing from the labor-abandoning neoliberal system, they will remain mostly as an apologetic political gesture in an unprecedented troubled economic era for an increasing majority of South Koreans.

< Illustration 2-1 (Figure) > Quarterly GDP and Employment Rates.

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< Illustration 2-2 (Figure) >

Source: 금융감독원 전자공시

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< Illustration 2-3 (Figure) > Non-regular Employees by Year and Firm Size

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< Illustration 2-4 (Old Table) > Foreigner Shareholding in Major South Korean Companies (2006 end; unit: %) (Source: www.heraldbiz.com (Herald Business), 23 April 2007) ----- Company Share by the Restriction on Share by Difference Biggest holder(A) foreign ownership foreigner(B) (B-A) (reason)

1 Samsung Electronics 15.94 47.24 31.4

2 POSCO 4.74 59.34 54.6

3 KB 5.46 84.32 78.86

4 KE 53.89 40(public) 75.48(30.2) -23.69

5 Shinhan Financial 9.06 60.96 51.9

6 Woori Financial 77.97 9.95 -68.02

7 SK Telecom 23.10 49 100.00(49) 25.9 (communication)

8 Hyundai Motors 26.11 41.86 15.75

9 Hynix 9.16 20.19 11.03

10 Hyundai Heavy Machinery 23.27 22.32 -0.95

11 LG Phillips 70.78 50.53 N/A

12 KT 7.99 49 97.40(47.7) 39.71 (communication)

13 SK 15.65 45.27 29.62

14 Hana Financial Holdings 9.62 80.64 71.02

15 Shinsegye 29.61 42.85 13.24

16 Lotte Shopping 68.89 21.83 -47.05

17 Korea Exchange Bank 64.62 80.37 N/A

18 LG Electronics 34.82 35.53 0.71

19 KT&G 10.33 54.08 43.75

20 Samsung Fire Insurance 18.44 53.77 35.33

21 Industrial Bank of Korea 57.69 21.04 -36.65

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22 LG Card 22.93 1.39 -21.54

23 S-Oil 35.23 48.66 N/A

24 SK Networks 40.59 49 2.09(0.01) -40.58 (communication)

25 Hyundai Mobis 33.49 45.35 11.86

26 Daewoo Ship Building 31.26 34.07 2.81

27 Daewoo Construction 32.54 11.78 -20.76

28 NHN 10.47 56.82 46.35

29 Doosan Heavy Machinery 41.39 20.22 -21.17

30 LG 49.61 30.14 -19.47

Note: Share by foreigners was as of 30 March 2007.

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<Illustration 3-1 (Old Table)> Individual vs. Corporate Disposable Income Growth (Source: Yoon Jin Ho, 2005, p.115)

(unit:%) 1980~1989 1990~1996 2000~2003

Economic growth 8.7 7.9 5.6

Individuals 9.9 6.6 0.3

Corporations 6.1 4.3 62.6

< Illustration 3-2 (Figure) >

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< Illustration 3-3 (Figure) >

Source: Bank of Korea; Ministry of Labor

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< Illustration 3-4 (Figure) > Dividends Paid to Foreign Stockholders (in trillion won; or in about 0.9 billion US dollars)

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< Illustration 3-5 (Table) > Ten South Korean Firms with Largest Amounts of Foreigner-Paid Dividends (February 2008) ------------------------------------------

Firms Dividends % of

Paid to Total

Foreigners Dividends

(billion won)

------------------------------------------

S- Oil 714.4 55.1

KB (bank) 670.2 81.3

Samsung Electronics 552.7 47.2

POSCO (steel) 426.3 56.4

Korea Exchange Bank 364.4 80.7

SK Telecom 354.2 51.9

KT (Korea Telecom) 251.1 61.6

Shinhan Financial 207.3 33.4

KT & G (tobacco) 192.4 56.5

KE (Korea Electric) 134.4 28.8

------------------------------------------

Note: 1 billion won is about 0.9 million US dollars

< Illustration 3-6 (Old Figure) > The Proportion of Relative Poor (Earning Less than 50% of Median Income) Before and After Public Transfers

Source: Gu In-Hoe (2006)

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< Illustration 3-7 (Figure) > GINI Before and After Taxes and Public Transfers

Source: Gu In-Hoe (2006)

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< Illustration 3-8 (Old Figure) > Percentages Benefiting from Social Insurances and Fringe Benefits (as of August 2005)

98.0 98.3

81.6

98.2 96.3

80.6 82.3

32.8 33.4 30.7

19.6 17.5 14.6 15.9

Nationalpension

Healthinsurance

Unemploymentinsurance

Retirementallowance

Bonus Extra- hoursurpayment

Paid vacation

Regular employed Non- regular employed Source: Yoon, Jin-Ho et al. (2005), Figure 4.

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< Illustration 4-1 (Figure) > The Trend of the Total Volume of Household Debts

Source: Park Chang-Gyun(2009)

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<Illustration 4-2 (Figure)> Periodic Trends of Total Household Debt Change Rates

Source: Park Chang-Gyun (2009) < Illustration 4-3 (Table) > Period-specific Factors for Household Debt Changes

Period (quarter/year)

Average annual change of household debts (in %)

Major events, policies, trends

Post-crisis contraction/recovery [~ 4th/1999] 5.91% Post-crisis depression and financial market

disorder

Explosive growth [1st/2000 ~ 4th/2002] 32.52%

economic recovery, low interest regime established, financial deregulation and paradigm change

Stable growth after credit card crisis [1st/2003 ~]

9.45% credit card crisis, financial soundness regulation strengthened, credit appraisal system strengthened

Source: Park Chang-Gyun (2009)

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<Illustration 4-4 (Figure)> Interest Rate Trends(%)

Source: Park Chang-Gyun (2009)

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< Illustration 4-5 (Figure) > Estimated Interest Payments by Households

Source: Shin Yong-Sang (2008)

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< Illustration 4-6 (Figure) >

< Illustration 4-7 (Figure) >

Note: 2009 is an estimate of June Source: Bank of Korea

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< Illustration 4-8 (Figure) > Household Debts vis-à-vis Financial Assets (%)

< Illustration 4-9 (Figure) > Household Debt Annual Increases

Source:

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< Illustration 4-10 (Table) > Households Debt Servicing Capacity Year-end Basis 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Financial Debt/ Financial Asset 37.9 40.9 46.5 45.0 43.9 42.9 44.0 43.4 48.1

Financial Debt/ Individual Disposable Income 76.8 87.4 120.9 117.3 113.2 120.0 128.4 135.5 139.8

Financial Debt/ GDP 56.9 64.1 72.5 71.8 69.6 74.2 79.1 82.1 78.3

Note: 1) 1993 SNA is used for the data after 2002 and 1968 SNA for the data before 2002. 2) Index-based year, series are used in GDP and disposable income. Source: Yoo Gyeong-Won (2009)

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< Illustration 4-11 (Table) > Debt to Income Ratio by Income Quintile (Indebted Households)

Income Quintile Total 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5Q

Debt (10,000 won, A)

3,489.9 1,972.8 2,243.1 2,610.6 3,831.2 6,016.2

Annual Household Income (10,000 won, B)

3,802.2 1,100.1 2,173.3 3,085.8 4,144.8 7,226.5

Debt to Income Ratio (A/B)

0.9 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8

Source: Yoo Gyeong-Won (2009)

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< Illustration 4-12 (Table) > Proportion of Savings in Disposable Income among OECD Member Countries (%)

1988 1998 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010

South Korea 25.2 24.9 10.7 4.4 2.8 5.1 3.2

USA 7.2 4.3 2.3 -0.4 1.8 5.4 6.5

Japan 13.5 12.4 8.9 10.6 2.7 3.3 3.2

Germany - 10.1 9.2 10.6 11.4 12.5 12.5

France 8.6 12.5 12.0 11.8 11.9 13.2 13.4

Italy 24.3 12.4 8.9 10.6 9.3 11.2 10.1

UK 4.9 7.0 5.1 4.9 2.0 5.1 5.1

Canada 12.3 4.9 4.7 1.2 3.7 5.1 5.1

Australia 6.3 1.9 2.8 -2.9 2.6 5.4 3.4

Austria 9.0 8.2 8.4 9.4 13.0 13.7 13.0

Belgium 11.9 15.6 14.0 10.8 8.3 10.2 10.4

Denmark -1.2 0.0 -1.9 -2.8 0.6 5.0 5.0

Netherlands 10.3 10.8 6.6 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.4

Norway -1.2 5.8 5.2 12.4 2.0 4.6 4.3

Portugal - 9.4 10.0 9.1 7.3 10.0 10.9

Spain 11.0 14.0 11.2 10.4 12.1 14.1 13.6

Sweden -1.8 3.6 3.2 7.9 12.1 15.6 16.3

< Illustration 5-1 (Figure) > Composition of Household Debts by Lending Institutions

Source: Park Chang-Gyun (2009)

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< Illustration 5-2 (Table) > Credit Cards Use by Year

Total number of credit cards (1000)

Number of credit cards per economically active person

Number of credit card accepting places (1000)

Total amount of credit card use (except card loans) (100 million won)

One payments (100 mil won)

Divided payments (100 mil won)

Cash advances (100 mil won)

‘90 10,384 0.6 586 126,046 30,068 23,163 72,815

‘91 12,099 0.6 766 133,671 41,331 24,610 67,730

‘92 14,705 0.8 948 156,778 51,358 28,610 76,962

‘93 19,401 1.0 1,400 268,344 69,427 53,219 145,698

‘94 25,314 1.2 2,055 409,284 109,586 79,164 220,534

‘95 33,278 1.6 2,760 515,817 150,492 101,025 264,300

‘96 41,113 1.9 3,461 630,328 203,460 122,783 304,085

‘97 45,705 2.1 4,257 721,153 243,207 138,593 339,353

‘98 42,017 2.0 4,649 635,567 206,695 101,613 327,259

‘99 38,993 1.8 6,192 907,825 302,289 124,050 481,486

‘00 57,881 2.6 8,611 2,249,082 555,949 239,974 1,453,159

‘01 89,330 4.0 12,627 4,433,675 1,283,527 473,554 2,676,594

‘02 104,807 4.6 15,612 6,229,084 1,920,044 732,077 3,576,963

‘03 95,517 4.1 16,949 4,805,436 1,906,716 504,157 2,374,563

’04.6 88,330 3.7 17,500 1,791,784 904,348 211,536 675,900

Source: Chung Chan-Woo (2005)

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< Illustration 5-3 (Table) > Financial Credit Defaulters

Dec 01 Jun 02 Dec 02 Jun 03 Dec 03 Mar 04 Jun 04

All credit defaulters(a)

2,450,303 2,259,517 2,635,723 3,225,168 3,720,031 3,768,317 3,693,643

Credit card related credit

defaulters(b)

1,042,070 1,123,214 1,494,329 1,984,909 2,397,185 2,591,370 2,520,316

(b)/(a) in % 42.5 49.7 56.7 61.5 64.4 68.8 68.2

Source: Chung Chan-Woo (2005)

< Illustration 5-4 (Table) > Profit and Default Rates of Specialized Credit Card Companies

‘00 ‘01 ’02.6 ’02.12 ’03.6 ’03.12 ’04.6

Net profit 9,381 24,870 11,084 △13,698 △30,211 △77,150 △15,131

Total credit 323,228 719,769 936,719 1,002,742 857,315 549,895 417,850

Default rate -

(3.3) 2.5

(3.8) 3.8

(5.1) 6.6

(8.8) 9.5

(12.2) 14.1 (-)

10.9 (-)

Actual default rate(including replacement

loans)

- - - 13.6

(21.6) 25.3

(41.7) 28.3 (-)

25.1 (-)

Note: Figures in Parentheses denote default amounts vis-à-vis corporate assets. Source: Chung Chan-Woo (2005)

< Illustration 5-5 (Figure) > Changes in All Household Loans and Housing Loans of Savings Banks

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< Illustration 5-6 (Figure)> The Share of the “Second Financial Sector” in Household Debts (%)

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< Illustration 5-7 (Figure) > Proportions of Non-Interest Profits of Banks in Selected Countries

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< Illustration 5-8 (Table) > Shareholding by and Dividends Paid to Foreigners among Major South Korean Banks

Source: Korean Financial Supervisory Board

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< Illustration 6-1 (Table) > Donation Sources of Miso Finance (Microfinance) (Source:

Financial Services Commission and Miso Finance Central Foundation, 20 Jan 2010)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total: 534.1 bil won

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dormant (inactive) deposits: 268.2 bil won

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

“Special donations”: 265.9 bil won

6 business groups: 105.0 bil won (Samsung 30.0; Hyundai Motors 20.0; LG 20.0; SK 20.0;

POSCO 10.0; Lotte 5.0)

5 banks: 44.0 bil won (Shinhan 10.0; , Woori 10.0; KB 10.0;, IBK 10.0; Hana 4.0)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

“General donations”: 114.4 bil won

16 banking institutions: 64.4 bil won

3 securities firms: 50.0 bil won

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other: 2.5 bil won

Gangwonland: 20 bil won

3 finance-related organizations with returned wage donations: 578 mil won (Financial Clearing

Board: 530 mil won; Korea Institute of Finance: 24 million won; Korea Life Insurance

Association: 24 mil won)

Seoul Ko-Am Rotary Club: 5 mil won

13 individuals who each donated 0.3 mil won worth of Shinhan Card point.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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< Illustration 6-2 (Table) > Early Examples of Beneficiaries of Miso Finance (Microfinance) Programs (Source: Financial Services Commission and Miso Finance Central Foundation, 18 Jan 2010)

미소금융 초기 지원 사례 (예시)

수혜자 지원내용

박 ◯ ◯

(여,

52 세)

- 남편 건강 문제, 보증 빚 청산 등으로 어려움을 겪고 신용이 하락하여 은행대출이 어려워짐

- 재 기 를 위 해 대 전 에 서 운 영 해 오 던 과 일 판 매 점 시 설 개 선 과 과일 구입 자금을 신청

- 자활의지와 자립가능성이 있어 KB 미 소 금 융 재 단 에 서 5 백만원(연 2%) 지원

이 ◯ ◯

(남,

52 세)

- 대 전 에 서 포 터 트 럭 에 서 방 석 , 전 기 장 판 등 을 판 매 해 오 던 중 트럭교체를 위해 중고 트럭

구입자금을 은행, 새마을 금고 등에 신청하였으나 대출 받지 못함

- 현장실사 후 KB 미소금융재단에서 5 백만원(연 2%) 지원

정 ◯ ◯

(여,

26 세)

- 작년 6 월 서울의 한 시장 거리에 향수 판매 노점 개설

- 향수 추가 구입 자금 지원을 신청

- 현장실사 후 우리미소금융재단에서 5 백만원(연 2%) 지원

이 ◯ ◯

(여,

36 세)

- 경기 고양시에서 2 개월전 의류소매업 시작하였으며, 재료 구입 및 인테리어 비용 지원 신청

- 무직인 배우자 및 3 자녀 부양 중

- 상품 진열 등 영업력이 좋고 상환 의지도 높다고 판단하여 우리미소금융재단에서 5 백만원(2%) 지원

정 ◯ ◯

(여,

40 세)

- 서울에서 남편, 자녀 3 명과 생활중이며, 2004 년 남편이 친구 대출보증으로 어려움을 겪은 후

본인명의로 중고 오토바이 수리 및 판매점 운영

- 비수기에 가격이 비교적 싼 중고 오토바이 구입자금 신청

- 소상공인진흥원 컨설팅 결과, 사업성이 우수하다고 판단하여 하나미소금융재단에서 1 천 만원(연 4.5%) 지원

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< Illustration 6-3 (Table) > Special Financial Service/Rehabilitation Programs for Poor People (Seomin), not including Microfinance (Source: Financial Services Commission and Miso Finance Central Foundation 18 Jan 2010)

미소금융 이외의 서민금융지원 프로그램 안내

대 상 자 지 원 내 용 연락처 등

2 개이상

금융회사채무자로서

3 개월미만 연체자

프리

워크아웃

연체이자 감면 및

약정이자 30% 감면

3 개월이상 연체자 개인

워크아웃

연체이자, 약정이자 전체 및

원금채권 일부 감면

신용회복위원회

(1600-5500)

자산관리공사 매입 채권의

채무자

신용회복기금,

희망모아 등의

채무조정

연체이자, 약정이자 전체 및

원금채권 일부 감면

한국자산관리공사(1588-

1288)

채무재조정을

원하는 연체채무자

5 억원이하 채무자 개인회생 생계비 제외 소득잔여금

분할상환

대한법률구조공단

(국번없이 132)

신용등급

6~10 등급 전환대출

자산관리공사

(1588-1288) 금리부담을

완화하고자 하는

고금리 이용자 신용등급 관계없음 환승론

등록 대부업체를 포함한

제도권 금융회사 고금리

대출의 저금리 전환 한국이지론

(3771-1119)

제도권 금융회사 대출을 원하는 연소득

2 천만원이하, 신용등급 7 등급 이하인 자 희망홀씨대출

제1금융권에서 1백~2천만원

한도로 대출

(’10.1 월, 8%~19.9%)

한국이지론 (3771-1119), 금융감독원 (3145-8123)

긴급생활자금이 필요한 저신용(6~9 등급)

근로자

저신용근로자

생계비대출

농협, 우리, 국민, 신협 등

500 만원 이내

(’10.1 월, 8.5% 내외)

중소기업청

(국번없이 1357)

9~10 등급

(노점상 포함)

금융소외

자영업자

특례보증

농협, 신협, 새마을금고,

지방은행 등 5백만원 이내

(’10.1 월, 7.3%내외) 연체채무가 없는

자영업자 6~8 등급

(개업 후 6 개월 경과)

영세자영업자

특례보증

농협, 신협, 새마을금고,

지방은행 등 2천만원 이내

중소기업청

(국번없이 1357)

신용보증재단중앙회

(1588-7936)

44

(’10.1 월, 7~8%)

새희망

네트워크

채무조정, 금융지원 등에

관한 정보제공 1588-1288

서민금융 119 맞춤대출(이지론), 채무조정 등

정보제공, 불법금융행위 제보 등 3145-8125 서민금융 전반에 관한

상담을 원하는 자

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