Contents · 2012. 6. 8. · 2 Republican Iraq and the Rise of Saddam Hussein 22 3 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 40 ... will return as a the messiah-like Mahdi who will sit in judg-ment

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Contents

List of Maps and Figures vi

Preface vii

1 Inventing the Middle East and Iraq 12 Republican Iraq and the Rise of Saddam Hussein 223 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 404 Building DESERT SHIELD 635 Moving to the Offensive 786 INSTANT THUNDER 1047 The Ground War 1258 Aftermath and Legacies 145

Chronology 166

Notes 169

Glossary and Acronyms 188

Select Bibliography 193

Index 198

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1

Inventing the Middle Eastand Iraq

In the twentieth century, few regions of the world rivaled the MiddleEast in volatility and complexity. The intense diversity of culture, reli-gion, geopolitics, and economics in the region made long-term stabilitydifficult, as forces for progress routinely clashed with those resistant tochange while those who craved power struggled to take it from those whoruled. The imperial designs of Western powers, the existence since 1947of Israel as a Jewish state in a sea of Arab countries, the strategic inter-ests (crude oil) of the United States and the Soviet Union during the ColdWar and Arab nationalism compounded these tensions, and continue todo so in the early twenty-first century. Many hoped the end of the ColdWar would bring opportunities finally to establish lasting peace in thisvolatile region. The predominant faith of the Middle East, Islam, in real-ity served only as a superficial unifier for the region; even the teachingsof Muhammad provided inadequate common ground to resolve troubledrelations between secular and non-secular states, state borders that defiedtraditional tribal and ethnic areas, and historical tensions between Sunniand Shia Muslims.

The Sunni and the Shia

The historical tensions between Sunni and Shia run deep indeed, datingback to the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 CE. In the years follow-ing Muhammad’s death, two major and divergent groups of his followersvied for the position of legitimate political successor to Muhammad aswell as for the Prophet’s religious legacy. Sunni followers of Muhammadbelieved in personal spiritual discovery of God’s will through read-ing and following the Qur’an and other relevant Islamic texts. The

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2 THE GULF WAR, 1990–91

name Sunni originated from the Arabic word as-sunnah, loosely mean-ing “path” or “tradition.” Those that followed the sunnah or “path” ofMuhammad by living the Prophet’s teachings and practices would findenlightenment. The early Sunnis had no use for an ecclesiastic class ofpriests or holy men and established their own mosques led by what wasin essence a lay clergy of scholars who held positions through consensusrather than through any sort of formal appointing process. Sunnis alsorejected the idea of an Imam who served as both religious and politicalleader of the Muslim world. Imams to Sunnis simply led prayers at thelocal mosque or served as caliph but were not the ultimate authoritieson religious matters. Over time, Sunni scholars developed rituals andpractices for the Sunni faithful to follow that became the Shari’a, whichremains the principal handbook of laws for Sunni Muslims.

Shias gravitated to a more clerical if not dogmatic brand of Islam thatunlike the more popular Sunni variant embraced a hierarchy of clergywhom the faithful relied upon to issue spiritual edicts and other pro-nouncements. Their Imams must also have divine authority, a direct linkwith God. While they share many Islamic practices with Sunnis, theirbelief in divine authority is a significant difference from that of theSunnis, who take a more egalitarian approach to practicing their faith.Shias have remained a minority in Islam.

As the majority in this nascent but rapidly growing religion, Sunnischose Muhammad’s father-in-law Abu Bakr to succeed Muhammadas the first caliph, or leader, of the emerging Muslim world. BecauseMuhammad left no clear instructions as to his successor, Sunnis believedthat the caliph should be elected by the Muslim community. Abu Bakrdied in 634 CE to be succeeded by two other Sunni caliphs who ledthe Islamic conquest of what is today Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, achievedmainly under the caliphate of Umar ibn al-Khattab, who was assassi-nated in 644 CE. Umar’s successor, Uthman ibn al-Affan, also met a vio-lent end. Uthman’s excessive practice of nepotism and overt favoritismtoward Islamic elites in Mecca at the expense of the many convertsto the new faith in recently conquered lands created many enemies.In 656 CE, violent protesters against Uthman’s policies broke into hishome to murder the caliph.

Uthman’s successor, Ali ibn Abi Talib, would be the first Shiacaliph. Common Muslims held Ali in high regard as well for his pietyand loyalty to Muhammad as his skill and success as a warrior. Hissometimes outspoken criticism of Uthman’s policies and practices alsoendeared him to many Islamic faithful, especially the insurgents whoultimately deposed Uthman. Ali had been very close to Muhammad and

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INVENTING THE MIDDLE EAST AND IRAQ 3

was himself a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet—Ali had marriedMuhammad’s daughter Fatima. Despite his background and relationshipto Muhammad, Ali’s ascension to the caliphate caused dissension in theMuslim community. His popularity threatened the old guard of Sunnisand their position in Islamic society. Some alleged Ali had been com-plicit in Uthman’s death. Those supporting Ali believed him to be therightful successor to the Prophet who should have been the first caliphupon Muhammad’s death in 632 CE.

Ali’s followers became known as Shias or Shia, a term referring topartisans or supporters of one side or another in some dispute. Shi’ismeventually evolved to describe those who favored Ali and a variant ofIslam different from that of the Sunnis. The Shias have also held firmto their belief that their religious leaders should be descendants of Ali.Ali’s caliphate was short but eventful. An extended civil war broke outbetween Ali and Sunni supporters of Uthman, including Muhammad’syoungest wife A’isha, and this then expanded to include one of Uthman’srelatives, Mu’awiya of Syria, who, like Uthman, was of the Umayyadclan. In 661 CE, Ali was assassinated, opening the door for Mu’awiyato become caliph. Now martyred, Ali was interred in Najaf, which soonjoined Medina and Mecca as the third holiest site in the Shia world.Ali, in the view of many Shias, had given his life for God. Such sac-rifice, for many Muslims, revealed martyrdom as the path to heaven.Ali’s youngest son, Husayn bin Ali, fought Mu’awiya’s son and succes-sor Yazid in a great battle near Karbala in 680 CE, where Husayn and hisfollowers were slaughtered. For Shias, Karbala now became a most holysite, and it remains so today. Along with Karbala, Najaf too became aShia holy site and education center, drawing Shia pilgrims from through-out the Muslim world. By the nineteenth century, Shias dominated thisregion that would become southern Iraq, as they do today.

The succession of the caliphs as well as the legitimacy of reli-gious leaders dominated much of the conflict in the Muslim world. TheSunnis for the most part tolerated the dynastic rule of the Umayyadcaliphs, believing that such toleration was preferable to the violence andupheaval of revolting against a corrupt Umayyad caliph. If familial lin-eage was the best determinant of legitimacy, then the Hashemites hadan advantage because Muhammad himself had been of the Hashemiteclan (Hashemites may hold the title “sharif” as a direct descendant ofMuhammad). The Abbasids, who deposed the Umayyads in 750 CE,traced their Hashemite lineage to one of Muhammad’s uncles, Abbas ibnAbd al-Muttalib. The Fatimids, too, claimed a blood tie, through Ali’swife Fatima.

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Shias often found themselves under threat by the Sunni caliph, whobrutally put down any challenge to their authority. The Abbasids, forexample, assassinated numerous Shia Imams whom they consideredthreats against Abbasid rule. The last of these Imams, the Eleventh, wasmurdered in 874 CE. Those Shias who believe these eleven Imams to bethe true carriers of Muhammad’s message are known as the Twelvers—they believe that the son of the Eleventh Imam, the Hidden or TwelfthImam, will return as a the messiah-like Mahdi who will sit in judg-ment of humankind, much like the return of Jesus Christ in Christiandoctrine. The Twelvers remain the potent religious if not political forceamong Shias. The current Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, for exam-ple, derives his lineage from the original eleven Imams and his directlineage from Muhammad’s family.

Thus began decades followed by centuries of tense rule in the Muslimworld. Umayyad caliphs fell to Abbasids, and so on, while throughconquest Islam spread throughout the Middle East, North Africa, andultimately into parts of southern Europe. The expanse of territory fallingunder Islamic rule contributed to the political and religious decentral-ization of the Muslim world, as caliphs ruled from Cordoba, Cairo,Baghdad, and other cities. The Abbasids, for example, held either polit-ical or religious authority from roughly 750 CE through 1258 CE, duringwhich many of the cultural, scientific, and literary contributions of theMuslim world occurred, leading scholars to consider this period as theGolden Age of Islam.

Such aggressive and dramatic expansion of this relative newcomerto the Western religious world threatened the spiritual hegemony ofCatholic Europe. By the end of the seventh century, the Holy Land layunder Muslim rule, though in their tolerance of Christianity Muslimleaders generously allowed Christian pilgrims to travel unhindered toJerusalem and other sites. Spain and the Byzantine Empire appearedunder threat by advancing Muslim forces. Alarmed, in 1095 CE PopeUrban II declared that the Christian kings of Europe must return the HolyLand to Christian rule. Thus began the First Crusade, which restoredChristian sovereignty over the Holy Land for almost fifty years. Forthe next 150 years, crusading armies of Christian knights battled withMuslim armies for control of the Holy Land. The barbarity with whichthe Christians fought and ruled during their Crusades to destroy Islamleft among Muslims a permanent scar of hatred of the West.

As the dynamic of conflict between Christians and Muslims becameentrenched, so too did conflict between Sunnis and Shias within theMuslim world. In 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks, thus

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finally putting to rest the Christian Byzantine Empire, which had sur-vived the fifth-century collapse of the western half of the Roman Empire.The Ottomans established a Sunni empire that stretched from Istanbul(their new name for Constantinople), to Mesopotamia (much of mod-ern Iraq), to North Africa. Conflict with Shias, now ensconced in Persia(modern Iran), raged for three centuries, as Sunni Ottomans tried toinvade Shia Persia while Shia Persians attempted to conquer Sunni-dominated Mesopotamia. Sunni Ottomans desecrated Shia shrines inKarbala and Najaf, while Shia Persians executed thousands of Sunnisin Baghdad. In 1733, Shia Persians laid siege to Baghdad, during whichover 100,000 Sunni inhabitants starved to death. In the nineteenth cen-tury, Ottomans assaulted Karbala, where they allegedly slaughtered over30,000 Persian Shias. The memory and oral tradition of these massacreslong outlived those who witnessed them, regardless on which side onemay have been.

As the Ottoman Empire became less dogmatic and more bureau-cratic by the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman leaders found it morebeneficial to the empire to maintain internal stability than to let theSunni–Shia blood feud continue unabated, as it had by this point forcenturies. Without question Sunnis continued to dominate governmentpositions throughout the empire, but the Ottomans made efforts to sep-arate ethnic groups as much as possible to maintain order and stability.In what is today Iraq, the Ottoman Turks established provinces centeredaround Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra for the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shias,respectively.1

The Imperial Powers

During the nineteenth century, the region returned to prominence forEuropean powers, which finally began taking full advantage of the areaas a natural conduit to imperial possessions in Africa and the Far East.The British-built Suez Canal, followed later in the twentieth century byrailroads across what is today Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, provided commer-cial access to the Middle East and beyond, but only if Western powerssecured the area from often ambitious and warring tribes through milita-rized imperial rule. The Ottoman Empire, too, stood in the way of thesegrand schemes. Great Britain, France, and to a lesser extent Germany,invested varying degrees of blood and treasure in the region, as they viedfor influence in the area, even within the Ottoman Empire. For theseimperial players, trade and empire, then later oil, drove the “great game”

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in this increasingly important part of the world. In the early twentiethcentury, bureaucrats in European foreign offices developed the idea ofthe Middle East as a distinct part of the world to differentiate the areafrom the Far East (China) and the Near East (the Ottoman Empire, thenlater Turkey). US Naval Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan may have coinedthe term in 1902, but some scholars suggest that “Middle East” had foundits way into common usage in the West before that time. In its originalform, this Eurocentric notion of a “Middle East” generally included themostly arid region from Morocco in the west, across Mesopotamia andPersia, all the way to Afghanistan in the east.2

So important had the Middle East become that during World WarI the region became a significant theater of the war. In part because theOttoman Empire allied with Germany but more so because of compet-ing imperial interests in the region, Great Britain and France used theoutbreak of war as an excuse to drive the Ottomans out of the MiddleEast. The Ottomans, quite naturally, relished the opportunity to do thesame to the British and French for the purpose of retaining control ofthe region. While the scale of fighting in the Middle East during the warnowhere near approached that of the Western Front in Europe, the bel-ligerents expended significant resources and personnel in these difficultand complex desert campaigns.

British and French post-war plans for the Middle East ran counterto Arab desires for independence and freedom from Western imperial-ism. The still present suspicion of the West among many peoples of theMiddle East is understandable considering the ambitious game of empireplayed by the Western powers and their near-constant meddling in Mid-dle Eastern affairs through much of the twentieth century and beyond.Great Britain in particular had definite plans for the area after the defeatof the Ottoman Empire. An interdepartmental working group, estab-lished by Prime Minister H. H. Asquith in 1915, outlined for the Britishgovernment its goals for the region. Known as the de Bunsen Committee,the group included Sir Mark Sykes, a member of the House of Commonsand a frequent traveler to the Middle East, and General H. H. Kitchener’sspecial representative on the committee. As the only member of thede Bunsen Committee with personal experience in the region, Sykesheld sway over the group and became one of the British government’sprincipal Middle East hands. He had earlier been one of the strongestsupporters of the Ottoman Empire within the British government, butunder Kitchener’s influence, Sykes abandoned that position completelyto become the principal proponent of a British-dominated Middle East.The committee’s report, delivered to Asquith in June 1915, proposed that

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the Ottoman Empire be divided with little regard to Ottoman administra-tive boundaries into five provinces: Syria, Palestine, Armenia, Anatolia,and Jazirah-Iraq. The committee also proposed a road built from Haifaon the Mediterranean to Iraq and possible linking with the port at Basra(which the British occupied in 1915), along with British oversight ofthese five semi-autonomous provinces, which would give Britain unfet-tered control of the region and along with the Suez Canal unhinderedaccess to India.3

To facilitate the political side of these plans, the British governmentestablished an Arab Bureau based in Cairo upon which Sykes wouldexercise great influence. With the failure of the British Dardanelles cam-paign in 1916, Sykes, Kitchener, and representatives of the British For-eign Office had to seek another military means to defeat the Ottomans.With defense of the Suez Canal occupying a significant part of Britain’slimited forces in the region, the British sought allies to join their fightagainst the Ottoman Turks. Early in the war, Great Britain made assur-ances to Hussein bin Ali, the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca who claimeddirect lineage from the Prophet Muhammad, of the creation of anindependent Arab state existing amid British and French-controlled ter-ritories. Correspondence between the British High Commissioner inCairo, Sir Edward McMahon, and Hussein indicated British support foran Arab state that would include parts of Syria, including Damascus.McMahon recognized such a state would anger the French but was will-ing to accept such a risk for greater British objectives in the region. Still,McMahon cleverly left vague British commitments that might conflictwith French interests, suggesting that the Arabs would have to be con-tent with a territory in the Hejaz known simply as “Arabia.” Hussein, too,recognized the potential conflict with French interests and went so far asto warn McMahon that if necessary his forces would fight France forcontrol of Damascus. In exchange for British support, Hussein promisedto lead an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, who reportedly plannedto depose Hussein at the end of the war. Hussein, perhaps, had noth-ing to lose in his dealings with McMahon, which became known as thecontroversial McMahon–Hussein Correspondence.4

The idea of an Arab revolt was nevertheless not new, nor was theconcept of some sort of Arab state. The Arabs as a whole, however, werenot unified in their own objectives, nor were they all behind the idea ofan Arab state ruled by Hussein. An independent Arab kingdom may havebeen wanted by Hussein, but many in Syria wanted their own autonomyand were extremely wary of French and British intentions. The Arabs inIraq, too, wanted independence and feared possible annexation by India.

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Despite these divisions, however, the Arab Bureau remained convincedthat an Arab revolt would best serve British purposes.5

French interests in the region centered on Syria. An odd allianceof French political, commercial, and religious interests kept the con-cept of a French presence in the Middle East at the forefront of Frenchpolitics. The face of this “Syria Party” in the French Senate was Pierre-Etienne Flandin, a young and ambitious politician who believed Francehad both a historic and cultural mandate in Syria that dated back tothe Crusades. Claiming France had been instrumental in developingthe “France of the Near East” for centuries, Flandin and his support-ers proposed a single French-controlled state consisting of both Syriaand Palestine. The “Syria Party” claimed the region held great potentialeconomic wealth, so much so that France could ill afford to let GreatBritain gain control of it. Moreover, controlling Damascus, one of theholiest cities in the Islamic world, would also give France a significantstrategic edge in the region, so argued Flandin and his adherents. Flandinand the “Syria Party” found their champion in the French governmentin François Georges Picot, a staunch colonialist in the French ForeignMinistry.

For British and French forces on the one side, and Ottoman forces onthe other, the various tribes across the region were the key components oftheir war strategies. Money, in the form of gold, proved most crucial inbuying tribal allegiance to one side or the other. While building an actualarmy of various Arab tribes ultimately fell short of British and Frenchexpectations, using bands of Arab fighters as guerrillas to destroy rail-roads and attack enemy outposts proved especially effective against theOttoman Turks. For example, a unique British officer, T.E. Lawrence,made famous by reporter and promoter Lowell Thomas as “Lawrenceof Arabia,” proved particularly successful at organizing Arab guerrillaraids against Turkish outposts along the Hejaz railway during the lastyear and a half of the war. For Great Britain and France, organizing andarming the Arabs came at more than a financial cost. Bucking British andFrench imperialism and the harsh rule of the Ottoman Turks, a varietyof Arab nationalist movements gained momentum during the war. Orga-nizing Arab forces to fight the Turks now involved the risk of having tofight those same forces later. Both Great Britain and France offered Arabtribes veiled pledges of pseudo-independence and dangled promises topowerful Arab families to enthrone them as the new royal families ofpost-war Arabia, all in exchange for revolting against Turkish rule. Whilemilitarily effective from the Allied viewpoint, the so-called Arab Revoltof 1916 revealed the deep fissures among the Arab tribes, leading many

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Social-Darwinist Westerners to conclude that the peoples of the MiddleEast had little capacity for self-governance.6

The Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, however, undercut Arab aspi-rations and took the “great game” to an entirely new level from thatof the de Bunsen report and the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence.Negotiated by Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot without Arabinput and publically unknown until released by the Bolsheviks in Russiain late 1917, the document divided the Middle East between Franceand Great Britain, with some concessions to the then Imperial Russia.An embarrassing revelation for both the British and French governments,the agreement gave France direct control over an area covering Beirut tothe south and Adana to the north while ensuring French influence overa large swath of territory from Damascus in the south, Aleppo to thenorth, and Mosul to the east. Great Britain would gain direct controlover much of modern Iraq, including Baghdad and Basra, and modernKuwait, while maintaining a sphere of influence from the Egyptian bor-der to the west, north to Amman, then south and east toward Baghdadand the Persian Gulf. Both France and Great Britain acknowledged thepossibility of an independent Arab state existing within their designatedareas of influence though not in their zones of direct control.

Negotiating the agreement had been an extremely sensitive process.In London, the well-established Picot and experienced Arthur Nicolson,who was soon replaced by the inexperienced Sykes, began their delicatetalks in November 1915. Picot went to London intent on gaining Frenchcontrol of as much Mediterranean coastline of the Ottoman Empire aspossible and a Lebanon expanded beyond its current 1915 conception.As for Syria, Picot realized directly that ruling such a vast swath of ter-ritory would quickly exhaust French resources if not patience. Instead,Picot favored indirect French rule through Arab puppet governments.To achieve his intentions, Picot tried to convince his British counter-parts that he wanted direct control over all of Syria. Through faintcompromise, he could “settle” for his true objectives.

For the British, Sykes, working under the direction of Kitchener,wanted the French to indeed have direct control over all of Syria. TheBritish rightly feared the expansionist tendencies of the then ImperialRussia, which would certainly gain some territory from the partitionof the Ottoman Empire. Having France control a line of territory fromthe Mediterranean east to Mesopotamia would establish a French bufferzone between the British and Russian spheres of influence in the MiddleEast. Sykes was even prepared to sacrifice British claims on Mosul toget this French protective belt into the final agreement. The British also

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wanted the French to support an Egyptian offensive and an invasion ofthe Ottoman Empire through the port of Alexandretta. For his part, Sykessincerely believed British demands were in sync with Arab hopes for anindependent state. In reality, Kitchener and the British used their supportof Arab interests to promote their own.

The final 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement reflected what both Sykes andPicot actually wanted. The British desire for a cordon sanitaire syn-chronized perfectly with French desires to have influence over Syria.On the military end, Kitchener had to settle for Acre and Haifa in placeof Alexandretta to use as ports for his campaign against the Turks. Thus,neither France nor Great Britain controlled the area they loosely calledPalestine. For the Arab nationalists, the Sykes–Picot Agreement left littledoubt that Great Britain and France intended to solidify if not expandtheir imperial hold on the Middle East.7

The Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 complicated mattersfurther by openly promising British support of a Jewish homeland inPalestine, a concept which irritated both the French and the Arabs.The brainchild of British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour, the docu-ment (actually a letter from Balfour to leading Zionist Lionel WalterRothschild) gave a dramatic boost to the Zionist movement both inEurope and in the United States, even though it called for a “nationalhome” rather than an actual independent state in Palestine for the Jewishpeople. American Zionists such as Louis Brandeis had pressured Pres-ident Woodrow Wilson to be more outspoken in his support of themovement. In a meeting with Wilson in Washington in April 1917,on the heels of the US declaration of war against Germany, Balfourbroached the idea of the United States administering Palestine ratherthan the international oversight of the territory called for in the Sykes–Picot agreement. Wilson, along with his erstwhile advisor “Colonel”Edward House, demurred, not wanting to get involved in what both menfeared would be a fertile place for war among imperial powers. Wilson,however, did support Balfour’s idea of support for a Jewish state, andpublically said so in September 1918. Those against the declaration, suchas William Yale, warned that a Jewish state could only be establishedthrough war and if successfully created would then have to survive amida people violently opposed to its existence.8

The Birth of Modern Iraq

Both the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, theformer intended to be a secret division of spoils and the latter a public

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statement of policy supporting the Zionist movement, gave Arab peo-ples plenty of cause to question British and French intentions and doubttheir promises of independence and self-rule. Ultimately, the collapseof the Ottoman Empire and post-war settlements decided the fate ofthe peoples in the region. These and other settlements created muchof the modern Middle East, including the modern state of Iraq. By theearly 1920s, only Iran (formerly Persia), the Kingdom of Hejaz (consol-idated in 1932 under a monarchy ruled by the House of Saud to becomeSaudi Arabia), and Yemen obtained true independence. The remainingstates, owing their borders to the arbitrary actions of distant Britishand French bureaucrats drawing maps to reflect their nations’ respectiveinterests, fell under either the new League of Nations mandate systemor direct British or French colonial administration as established by var-ious agreements concluded following the war to deal with the demiseof the Ottoman Empire. Negotiated separately from the Versailles set-tlement of 1919, in these talks Great Britain, France, Italy, sometimesJapan, and the Ottoman Empire and its successor spent much of 1920through 1923 deciding the fate of the Turks while pursuing their ownimperialist ambitions in the region. First in London, then San Remo,then, so it seemed at the time, finally at Sèvres, the Western powersfilled their plates at the Ottoman buffet. The San Remo agreement ofApril 1920 implemented much of what Sykes and Picot had agreed toin 1916. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded in August 1920 to carve upwhat remained of Anatolia, recognized the Kingdom of Hejaz and thecreation of an independent Armenia, turned over control of the OttomanEmpire’s finances to the Western signatories, and confirmed the “zone ofinfluence” for France over Syria while declaring Kurdistan’s fate wouldbe decided by referendum. Great Britain’s “zone of influence” had beenlargely determined by the San Remo agreement in April 1920. WhileOman and Kuwait fell under direct British rule, Palestine, Trans-Jordan,and Iraq became British mandates under the League of Nations mandatesystem.9

Outside of Egypt, Iraq became the principal focus of British atten-tion in the Middle East. British forces first entered Baghdad in 1917,remaining there for the duration of the war and then beyond. Britishbureaucrats replaced Sunni bureaucrats, breeding resentment toward theBritish among the Sunnis due to the resulting increased unemployment.Having expected liberation after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,the people of Baghdad found themselves again lorded over by anotherforeign imperial power. This time however, in the new state of Iraq,the British established a constitutional monarchy in 1921 under the sonof Sharif Hussein, Prince Faisal, whom the French had ousted as king

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of Syria in 1920. At a March 1921 conference in Cairo, British Colo-nial Secretary Winston Churchill, with the approving nod of Faisal’sfriend and comrade-in-arms T.E. Lawrence, handpicked Faisal to beKing of Iraq, believing correctly that Faisal’s pro-British sympathiesand Hashemite roots both served British interests and assuming incor-rectly that this gave Faisal legitimacy among the diverse peoples in Iraq.Because he was an outsider, Faisal was proclaimed king through a clearlyrigged referendum that gave him 96 percent of the votes. Now king,Faisal had to govern, under the watchful eye of a British high com-missioner, a new mandate state whose borders included Kurds, ShiaMuslims, and Sunni Muslims.10

Oil had much to do with the way Great Britain chose to administerPalestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. In the 1910s, the British Royal Navyconverted from coal to oil to fuel its mighty fleet. Coal had been plentifulfor the Royal Navy, as Great Britain, like the United States, had a seem-ingly endless supply of coal within its own shores. The shift to moreefficient oil, however, presented a potentially debilitating problem—Great Britain, unlike the United States, had no oil. From oil fields in Iran,and now Iraq, Great Britain needed secure pipelines and transportationroutes to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and across to the Mediterraneanto provide fuel for the Royal Navy, the backbone of the British Empire.To the British, constitutional monarchies under their tutelage providedthe best chance for security and stability.11

The concept of an independent Kurdish state had fallen by the way-side in the rush of mandates and monarchies following the WorldWar I settlements. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne formally ended theOttoman Empire and replaced the now defunct Treaty of Sèvres. In theLausanne agreement, however, the new Turkish government largelyconfirmed the stipulations the Ottomans had agreed to in the Treatyof Sèvres. When drawing the borders of the new Iraq, Great Britainincluded much of the Kurdish region in the new state because of theimmense oil reserves near Mosul. This, however, left the Kurdish peo-ple divided among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Kurdish nationalists, bridledunder Ottoman, then British, and now Hashemite rule, understandablyclamored for self-determination, so much so that the Iraqi governmentmaintained only nominal control of the Kurdish region of northern Iraq,sometimes referred to as Kurdistan. Open rebellion by the Kurds oftenrequired the Iraqi army to use brute force with the occasional help ofBritish forces, especially the Royal Air Force. Such regional and eth-nic nationalism as that of the Kurds made unifying a national Iraq quitedifficult.12

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Under Ottoman rule, Kuwait had been part of the Basra administra-tive district governing much of the southern region of what was now thenew Kingdom of Iraq. Under the local rule of the al Sabah family sincethe 1700s, the port of Kuwait had been only nominally under Ottomancontrol. The al Sabahs courted British protection in the 1890s, when aproposed railway from Berlin to Baghdad exposed further German influ-ence on the Ottoman Empire and German desires in the region.13 Nottrusting Ottoman assurances, the al Sabahs sought protection elsewhere.Ever eager to extend influence in the region to maintain the link betweenthe Suez Canal and India, the British eagerly concluded an agreementwith the al Sabah emir in 1899. In 1913, Kuwait City and its strate-gically located port gained mutual recognition as a semiautonomousenclave through an agreement with both Great Britain and the OttomanEmpire, but when hostilities erupted between the Western powers andthe Ottoman Empire in 1915, the British quickly brought Kuwait underits sole protection.

The borders of Kuwait that evolved out of the post-war agreementscan be attributed to Gertrude Bell, an expert on the region akin to ifnot greater than T.E. Lawrence. Working with Percy Cox as “orientalsecretary” in Baghdad following the war, Bell helped draw the bordersfor Iraq. To maintain Kuwaiti autonomy under British influence, Bellexpanded the tiny emirate at the expense of Iraqi access to the PersianGulf. Bell gave much of the coastline to Kuwait, leaving Iraq with accessto the gulf from Basra via the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which wouldplay a prominent role in the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s. Bell had inessence created a buffer zone between Iraq and the new Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia, drawing boundaries based upon known and suspected oilreserves rather than any concern for tribal territories or religious (Sunnior Shia) differences. Religion entered British calculations only in thatBell and others believed Sunnis to be more reasonable than the oftenemotional and erratic Shias, and to be more reliable to govern underBritish supervision and to maintain control over the immense oil reservesin the region. Once part of the Ottoman province of Basra, Kuwaitunder the al Sabah emirs now stood apart under British rule, not gainingindependence until 1961.14

In Trans-Jordan, Great Britain established Faisal’s brother Abdullahas king. Iraq remained a British protectorate until 1932, when GreatBritain gave Iraq nominal independence through a constitutional monar-chy under King Faisal. Meanwhile, new oil discoveries across the region,including in Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, enhanced the MiddleEast’s strategic importance to the West, especially Great Britain and

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increasingly the United States, which though at the time the largestoil producer in the world nonetheless had several oil companies withinterests in the Middle East.

Iraq’s independence in 1932 initiated decades of political instabil-ity for this artificial state created to serve British interests. King Faisalworked to incorporate Shia and Kurdish participation across the Iraqigovernment to unify Iraq, but tribal tensions and the increasingly strat-ified class structure of this developing country stifled progress. TheNational Assembly became the protector of propertied interests, whilethe Iraqi army devolved into a haven for Pan-Arabists and ideologues.Faisal’s successors instituted policies that further alienated the prop-ertyless classes, while the expected boom from oil revenues failedto materialize until decades later—both exacerbated tensions amongSunnis, Shias, and Kurds, and widened the prosperity gap between thefew elites and the great masses.15

These heated tensions often boiled over into violence and frequentcoups. The British-trained and equipped Iraqi army, for example, quicklyand brutally put down an uprising by Assyrian Christians in Mosulin 1933. King Ghazi, crowned upon Faisal’s death in 1933, sufferedrepeated coup attempts against his governments throughout his six-yearreign. The most serious uprising occurred in October 1936, when reform-ers demanding land redistribution and broader Shia political partici-pation overthrew the government of Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi.A new government under the leadership of Hikmat Suleiman and Gen-eral Bakr Sidqi attempted to implement reforms but lasted only through1937, when Suleiman resigned after reactionary factions in the armymurdered Sidqi.

By 1941, the Iraqi army, in particular the officer corps, had becomea key force in Iraqi politics. Many in the army espoused Pan-Arabismand Arab nationalist ideologies and envisioned Iraq as the historic ifnot natural leader of the Arab world. Supporters of Pan-Arabism hopedto politically unify all Arab countries, an idea that dated back to theArab Revolt. Similarly, Arab nationalists considered all Arab peoplesas a single nation and encouraged Arab history, culture, and language.Both were largely anti-Western and sought a new golden age of Arabculture and Islamic religion. Recognizing the percolating influence ofPan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, no Iraqi politician dared undertakeradical action, especially a coup, without the support of the Iraqi army.The army forced the government of Jamil al-Madfai to resign in 1938,which brought in a new government under the experienced Nuri al-Said,whom many officers in the army believed shared their Pan-Arab vision.

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A consummate politician, al-Said became sovereign in all but name uponKing Ghazi’s death in an automobile accident in 1939. Prince Abdullahacted as regent for the new child king, Faisal II, relying greatly onal-Said for political guidance. Interestingly, before his death, King Ghazihad approved plans for annexing Kuwait, whose exclusion from Iraq byBritish politicians and cartographers had never been fully recognized bythe Iraqi government.16

World War II further complicated Iraqi politics. Great Britain natu-rally expected Iraq to give its full support to the Allies, but al-Said’sgovernment proclaimed neutrality in the conflict while its actions madeit appear pro-German. With al-Said’s electoral defeat in March 1940, thenew government of Rashid Ali al-Gailani came to power with hopes oftaking advantage of the war in Europe to oust the British finally fromIraq. The British, however, recognized Iraq’s strategic value and couldill afford to allow the region to fall into German hands. British pres-sure on al-Gailani initiated a revolt against British interference in April1941. With the support of Pan-Arabist zealots in the army, led by a smallgroup of officers known as the Golden Square, al-Gailani forced PrinceAbdullah and the young King Faisal II, both of whom many Iraqis con-sidered simple stooges of the British, out of Iraq. The British respondedwith military intervention, landing troops originally destined for Malaya,near Basra, in late April 1941. After fighting their way through Ramadi,Fallujah, and other places that would become so familiar to Americansin the early 2000s, British forces took control of Baghdad on May 31,1941. With King Faisal II and al-Said restored to power, the Britishsecured a mostly symbolic Iraqi declaration of war against Germany andItaly. The British army maintained a sizable occupation force in Iraq toensure oil transport and movement of supplies to the southern parts of theSoviet Union and to preserve a presence in Great Britain’s former man-date. Al-Said’s government tried and executed the leaders of the GoldenSquare. Al-Gailani, however, escaped to Germany.17

The end of World War II did not end British influence in Iraq. GreatBritain tried to enhance its power over the Iraqi government through anew treaty, signed in 1948 by al-Said, giving the British until 1973 towithdraw their military forces from Iraq. Though negotiated in secret,the Treaty of Portsmouth sparked violent protests across Iraq, especiallyin the capital city of Baghdad. Pan-Arabists and an increasingly strongIraqi nationalist movement bristled at the prospect of imperial domina-tion, while prolonged poor economic conditions among the vast massesof Iraqis provided explosive fuel for rebellion. Al-Said responded withbrutal tactics, using the Iraqi army and British assistance to put down the

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so-called Wathba Rebellion. Ever the politician, al-Said offered compro-mise to the nationalists by denouncing the Treaty of Portsmouth, an actthat bought him time with his detractors and signaled the weakeningBritish influence in Iraq. Al-Said’s increasingly dictatorial and secre-tive rule, however, only deepened resentment both among rural folk andnationalist elites, and adversely affected his relationship with the army.18

Crisis after crisis erupted in the Middle East, making more difficultthe already daunting set of domestic problems with which al-Said andKing Faisal II had to contend. Support for Arab nationalism drove muchof Iraq’s response to regional issues. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948, forexample, gave Iraq its first real opportunity to perform on the regionalstage. Allied with forces from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and other Arabstates, Iraq contributed 18,000 troops to the Arab fight to destroy theIsraeli state after the Israelis declared independence on May 14, 1948, inanticipation of the expiration of the British mandate over Palestine. Iraqiforces faced the Israelis in May 1948 at Zefat, north of the Sea of Galilee,and then at Gesher, near the Jordan River, but they were beaten back bystiff Israeli resistance in both instances. Just weeks later, the Iraqis heldthe city of Janin for several days in the face of an Israeli offensive. TheIsraelis took the city but lost it to a combined force of Iraqis and troopsof the Arab Legion. Iraqi casualties were substantial, but their sacrificegave Jordon control of Janin, which it maintained until the Israelis retookthe city in the 1967 Six Day War. While Israel survived the brief butintense 1948–49 war, Iraqi forces had made a mixed contribution to theArab cause. They had fought well when attacked and in the broader pic-ture had facilitated Jordan’s occupation of the West Bank of Palestine,but critics charged that the Iraqis lacked initiative and fighting spirit, towhich ground commanders responded that without clear guidance fromtheir superiors in Baghdad, they often simply stayed put in static posi-tions. Poor discipline, lack of tactical skill, and careless maintenance ofweapons and equipments gave the Iraqi high command plenty to improveupon after the war.19

Because of the war emergency, the Iraqi government declared mar-tial law, which helped as well to curtail the remaining Wathba protestsagainst the Treaty of Portsmouth. The war also gave several within theIraqi government the excuse to carry out a pogrom against Jews in Iraq.In addition to curbing civil rights and deporting hundreds of Jews, Iraqiofficials, notably Minister of Defense Sadiq al-Bassam, ordered the tor-ture and execution of untold numbers of Jews suspected of organizingaid and other support for the new state of Israel. International outcryagainst these acts and the Israeli defeat of Arab forces compelled Prince

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Abdullah, as regent, to form a new government, once again relying uponNuri al-Said to act as a “strongman” to bring both Iraqi politics and Iraq’sdiverse population under control through what amounted to authoritarianrule. Such tendencies became the norm for whoever governed Iraq.20

Enter the United States

As the Cold War intensified in the 1950s, Iraq sought security in multilat-eral defense pacts. While the Arab League provided some assurances andhad been the umbrella organization for fighting Israel in 1948, it existedunder politically fragile circumstances. Established in 1945, the ArabLeague consisted of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,and Yemen. Its member states looked to the Arab League basically asa collective security organization and as a forum to resolve disputesbetween Arab countries. The more idealistic among Arab leaders viewedthe League as a means to unify the Arab world, to coordinate policies,and to build regional economic strength. As a new organization of statesthat had the dichotomous distinction of having little history as indepen-dent countries while having long histories of tribal and ethnic division,the Arab League had Israel to thank for its temporary unity in the late1940s. Still, the Arab League had inherent frailties, as its member statesvied against one another to be the leader of the Arab world. On the onehand, the United States and Great Britain saw the Arab League as a bul-wark against Soviet expansion in the Middle East, which to some Arabsmade the Arab League appear as the tool of imperialist foreigners. On theother, many Pan-Arabists viewed the organization as the spear point forthe creation of a single Arab nation. Several member states, especiallyIraq, feared such lofty visions would come at the expense of their ownnational and regional interests.21

Collective security for Iraq came to fruition, albeit briefly, in the1955 Baghdad Pact. Formally known as the Pact of Mutual Coopera-tion between Iraq and Turkey, the defense agreement culminated severalyears of discussions to establish a NATO-like defense alliance for theregion. From the Iraqi standpoint, such an alliance would likely involveTurkey, and therefore the West; otherwise, according to one Iraqi official,collective security “was meaningless.”22 A collective security arrange-ment for the region also fit nicely with US Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles’ vision of a “northern tier” security cordon to deter Sovietencroachment into the Middle East. For Eisenhower and Dulles, theMiddle East became an important region in the overall US strategy of

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containing the Soviet Union. Dulles, however, found on his 1953 tour ofthe region many Arab states, especially Egypt, less than impressed withthe Soviet threat and still less enthusiastic about any Western-supportedregional security arrangement. Arab focus on Israel and the region’shistorical tension with British and French imperialism, Dulles worried,distracted Arab leaders from what for the US secretary of state wasthe true threat to regional stability—Soviet communism. Dulles did findmore sympathy in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and realized as well that these“northern tier” countries offered a more effective geostrategic barrier toSoviet expansion than an arrangement based around the Suez Canal.Dulles’ “northern tier” threatened both Britain and Egypt’s position inthe Middle East precisely for the same reason—under the US frameworkthe Suez Canal would no longer be the linchpin to regional security andWestern influence.23

Building upon the Turkey–Pakistan defense agreement of 1954, Iraqand Turkey concluded a defense treaty in February 1955 with the bless-ing of Great Britain and the United States. Pakistan and Iran joined themultilateral arrangement later that same year. While the United Statesdid not formally join the pact, the Eisenhower administration stronglysupported the arrangement with funding and military aid. Wanting tomaintain some influence in the region, especially Iraq, Great Britain alsoin 1955 became a signatory to the Baghdad Pact, much to the delightof Dulles, who hoped to use Great Britain as a surrogate in the region,despite British concerns about Egypt and the Suez Canal. Iraq also madeeconomic overtures to Syria and Jordan, raising eyebrows among leadersin Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Iraq’s growing influence, in particular itsstrong support of Arab nationalism.24

The clash between Cold War priorities and nationalism in the MiddleEast, in Egypt in particular, would soon unleash a wave of volatility notseen in the region since World War I. In Egypt, the Free Officer move-ment within the Egyptian army provided fertile ground for rebellion.Gamal Abdul Nasser, a dynamic Egyptian military officer, along withMuhammad Najuib, led a successful coup against Egypt’s King Faroukin 1952. Nasser and Najuib quickly tangled over several issues, but atbase was the simple fact that the egos of neither man could allow sharingpower with the other. Nasser prevailed and quickly established himselfas the self-styled leader of the Arab world, and just as quickly gained theblessing of the United States at the expense of Great Britain, which evac-uated its troops from Egypt in 1954. Dulles played a large role in helpingNasser convince the British to withdraw from Egypt. For Dulles, Nasserrepresented a new type of Arab leader, one that could facilitate the end of

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the British and French colonial presence as well as transition to indepen-dence, and also stand firm against Soviet forays into the region. Each ofthese suited US interests in the region quite well, so thought Dulles, whoinitially believed Nasser could be the foundation for a NATO-like MiddleEast Defense Organization (MEDO). Nasser, however, refused to playstooge for the United States in the Middle East. He balked at joining anyUS-backed regional defense alliance, refused peace negotiations withIsrael, protested the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, and befriendedcommunist states, notably China, all the while enhancing Egypt’s posi-tion as an unaligned regional hegemon, much like Jawaharlal Nehru’sIndia.25

In 1955, Dulles authorized one of his many schemes to exerciseUS influence in the Middle East, in this case a covert plan to weakenEgypt’s, and therefore Nasser’s, influence by subsidizing pro-US gov-ernments in Lebanon and Jordan, perhaps even Syria, and by makingthe Saudi King a sort of “Islamic pope” of the Middle East. After theEgyptian leader’s rejection of Dulles’ offer to mediate tensions betweenEgypt and Israel over lost territories in the 1948–49 war, the US sec-retary of state now had no use for Nasser and even withdrew promisedUS financial support for Egypt’s Aswan Dam project. Nasser, however,remained unmoved in his dreams of Arab glory, as Dulles’ meddlingin the region floundered. In retaliation for the withdrawal of US sup-port for the dam, in 1956 an emboldened Nasser nationalized the SuezCanal, alarming Great Britain and France, which likened Nasser’s audac-ity to that of Hitler’s brazen geopolitical expansion in Europe from 1936through the beginning of World War II in 1939. Nasser went further still,accepting timely assistance from the Soviet Union to continue the Aswanproject.

The United States tried to stay out of the crisis, not wanting toovertly support Nasser’s nationalism nor provide additional life supportfor British and French imperialism in the region. Dulles seemed con-tent to let the British and French resolve the Suez Crisis, but hostilitiesescalated and threatened to get out of control. With French support, inOctober Israel attacked Egyptian forces near the canal, while the Britishand French air forces bombed Egyptian airfields. Focused on the uprisingin Hungary, from Washington President Eisenhower and Dulles watchedin alarm as Israeli paratroopers clashed with Egyptian forces near Sinai’sMitla Pass while Israeli tanks dashed toward Gaza. In a rare act of ColdWar cooperation, the United States and the Soviet Union co-sponsored aresolution in the UN General Assembly that condemned the British andFrench-backed Israeli attacks on Egypt and called for UN peacekeeping

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forces to occupy the Suez Canal. In early November, British and Frenchexpeditionary forces landed in Egypt in an attempt to secure the canal.

Not wanting World War III to begin in the Middle East (or inHungary), the United States put economic heat on Great Britain andFrance while the Soviet Union threatened military intervention to stopthe fighting. US and Soviet pressure, combined with stiff Egyptian mil-itary resistance, forced the Anglo-French forces to withdraw from theSuez Canal. Israel, too, felt the sting of US pressure and withdrew fromGaza and Sinai. The blunder cost Great Britain and France whatever littleclout both declining imperial powers had in the region. The Soviet Uniongained new popularity among Arabs for its firm stand against Britishand French colonialism. Historian Michael B. Oren succinctly assessedthe end of the Suez Crisis for the United States: “Spurred by roman-tic notions of Middle Eastern nationalism and an anti-colonialist creed,the United States had banded with its perennial Soviet enemy againstits European friends and saved an Egyptian dictator whom Dulles hadplotted to depose.” For all its effort, according to Oren, the United States“earned contempt from the Soviet Union, acrimony from the British andthe French, and antagonism from many Arabs.” For the United States,the crisis exposed Dulles’ flawed strategy of simultaneously supportingIsrael while promoting Arab nationalism. Nasser emerged triumphant,having thumbed his nose at the West, denied any thanks to the UnitedStates for saving his regime, and firmly established himself as the leader,in as much as one person could be, of the Arab world.26

Before tangling with Nasser and Egypt, in 1953 Dulles had success-fully co-opted the Nasser-like brief regime of Iranian Prime MinisterMohammad Mossadegh, who had served the young and US-backedShah of Iran, Mohammad Reza, as prime minister, during which timeMossadegh had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The dra-matic act, of course, triggered an intense crisis with the British, whoinitiated a blockade on Iranian oil exports. Popular with urban conser-vatives while detested by many in rural Iran, Mossadegh resigned asprime minister in July 1952 after postponing elections that would haveassuredly ousted him from power. The Shah’s replacement as prime min-ister proved ineffectual, as Mossadegh’s supporters held rallies, stagedstrikes, and caused general unrest in Tehran and other cities. A panickedShah begged Mossadegh to return, promising him near complete polit-ical and military power. Mossadegh exercised his emergency powers toinstitute land reform, nationalize industries, and curb the powers of theShah, while courting the support of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran.He also cut diplomatic ties with Great Britain.

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With the US-supported Shah all but deposed, Dulles fearedMossadegh’s regime would cause a domino-like effect to spread nation-alist and anti-Western ideals throughout the Persian Gulf at the expenseof US security interests (oil) and to the benefit of Soviet influence in theregion. Dulles adamantly sought to return the Shah to power and withthe help of Great Britain’s MI-5, Dulles and the US Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) orchestrated Operation AJAX to overthrow Mossadegh.The plot worked, though not without some difficulty in convincing therather spineless Shah to go along with the plan. Kermit Roosevelt,the CIA’s man in Tehran, organized demonstrations and riots againstMossadegh, whose enemies now flocked to CIA contacts to oust the con-troversial prime minister. Ultimately, in August 1953 Mossadegh wasarrested, tried in an Iranian court, and convicted of treason. His deathsentence was later reduced to house arrest for the rest of his life. TheShah returned from exile in Rome to Tehran, where his men embarkedon a brutal crackdown against Mossadegh’s supporters, executing andimprisoning hundreds.

The CIA-sponsored overthrow of Mossadegh ended Iran’s brief flir-tation with democracy and returned Iran to dictatorship under the Shah.The United States had for the first time overthrown a head of state in theMiddle East, a fact that may have inspired Dulles to move against Nasserwhen the Egyptian leader’s anti-US intentions became more clear andthat certainly emboldened similar US plans in places such as Guatemala.For Iranians, the restoration of the Shah by the United States was unfor-givable and seared a deep hatred and suspicion of that country, whichstrongly supported the Shah through to his overthrow by Iranian Islamicrevolutionaries in 1979. The CIA also attempted a coup in Syria in 1956,but failed when Syrian officers recruited by the US Embassy reported theplanned attempt to their superiors.27

US efforts to simultaneously build Arab support for its Cold Warpolicies and support Israel’s right to exist ended in predictable frustra-tion. Each instance had its own negative impact for US interests in theregion. Collectively, however, the damage was much greater, as the neg-ative perception of the United States among Arabs became a natural stateof being. For many Arabs, the United States replaced Great Britain andFrance as the imperious outsider. For many Arab nations, distrust of theUnited States made it all the more easy for them to seek relations withthe Soviet Union and China and to pursue a nonaligned, regional foreignpolicy. Events in Iraq would only add to US disappointment, as a coupfinally ousted the Iraqi monarchy from power.28

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Index

Note: Arabic names beginning with the prefix ‘al-’ are alphabetised under thesubstantive part of the name and not the prefix. Locators in bold type indicatefigures/illustrations.

101st Airborne, 129–30, 137, 151

A-10A Thunderbolt, 119Abbasids, 3Abdullah, King, 13Abu Bakr, 2Acre, 10Adana, 9Afghanistan, 35, 160Agent Orange, 156Aidid, Mohamed Farrah, 158air campaign (INSTANT THUNDER)

aircraft losses and bombs dropped,107–8

and the Battle of Khafji, 120–3Bush’s announcement, 104–5CNN’s live coverage, 107collateral damage, 110–12, 151effectiveness, 126impact on Iraq, 107, 109–10, 115,

131Iraqi expectations, 126objectives, 105–6

AirLand Battle doctrine, 54–5, 57, 59,103, 161

airpower, debates about the use of,96

A’isha, 3Alexandretta, 10

Algiers Agreement, 31, 34Ali ibn Abi Talib, 2all available means, 83, 95Alouette attack helicopters, 31Amiriyah, civilian casualties, 111–12Anatolia, 11anthrax, 31anti-war protests, 93, 111, 155Apache attack helicopter, 59, 137,

142Arab-Israeli War, 16, 73Arab League, 17, 27, 41, 48, 68, 73,

84Arab Revolt, 7–8, 14Arab Union, 22Arab unity, Ba’athist message, 24Arafat, Yasser, 71–2Arens, Moshe, 104Arif, Abdul al-Rahman, 28Arif, Abdul Salaam, 22–3, 27, 29Armenia, 11Arnett, Peter, 104Asquith, Herbert, 6Aswan Dam, 19atrocities, allegations of Iraqi, 47, 90AVF (all-volunteer force), 54, 57, 59,

61, 157, 160–2Aziz, Tariq, 32, 41, 84–8, 124

198

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INDEX 199

B-52 bombers, 53, 107, 125Ba’ath Party, 24–5, 27–31, 33, 86–7,

96, 109, 148baby milk factory, 112Bacevich, A., 158Baghdad, 4–5, 9, 11, 13, 15–16,

22, 24–5, 34, 42, 69, 72, 85–6,94, 104, 107, 109, 111, 124,148–52

Baghdad Pact, 17, 19, 23Bahrain, 66–7Baker, James, 66–7, 81–4, 86–8,

123al-Bakr, Ahmad Hassan, 28–30Balfour Declaration, 10Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al

Saud, 43–5, 50, 85Basra, 13al-Bassam, Sadiq, 16Battle of 73 Easting, 135–6Battle of Khafji, 120–3, 159Battle of Medina Ridge, 137–8BDA (battle damage assessment),

conflicting, 125Beirut, 9, 23, 52Bell, Gertrude, 13Bellini, Gianmarco, 112Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr, 123Biddle, S., 161Big Red One, 132Billiere, Peter de la, 102Bin Laden, 51Black, J., 162Black Hawk helicopter, 59–60Black Hole, 100–1, 118, 139Blair, Tony, 149blue-on-blue incidents (friendly fire),

121, 144Boomer, Walter, 132Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 59Brandeis, Louis, 10Brandt, Willy, 72Bravo Two Zero, 114

building DESERT SHIELDthe Coalition, 63–7linkage, sanctions, and strategic

miscalculation, 68–73sanctions and embargoes, 73–7

bulldozing, of Iraqi trenches, 127–8Bunsen Committee, 6Bush, George H. W., 42–6, 48–50, 52,

63–7, 68, 69–71, 75, 78–81, 82,83–95, 101, 104–5, 106, 112,116–17, 119, 123, 124, 125, 137,139, 145–9, 153, 163, 164

Bush, George W., 44, 150, 152Byzantine Empire, 5

C-130 incident, 122Cairo, 7Camp David, 96, 124Carlucci, Frank, 44Carter Doctrine, 36CAS (close air support), 121, 128,

132Castro, Fidel, 81casualties

civilian, 110–12, 120, 152Iran-Iraq war, 37US military women, 156

ceasefire, 35, 37, 123–4, 139, 141,143, 146, 163

CENTCOM (Central Command), 45,52–3, 58–9, 95, 97, 100, 102,112, 116–17, 125, 128, 131–2,138, 144, 150–1, 159

CENTO (Central TreatyOrganisation), see Baghdad Pact

Chamoun, Camille, 22chemical and biological weapons, 31,

37, 78, 82, 84, 87, 99, 112, 116,128, 156

chemical attack, challenges ofprotecting against, 128

Cheney, Dick, 42, 50, 67, 96, 100–1,104, 112, 148, 152

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200 INDEX

China, 6, 19, 50, 64–5, 70, 76, 81, 83,160, 162

Chubin, Shahram, 34Churchill, Winston, 12CIA (Central Intelligence Agency),

21, 27, 38, 76civilian casualties, 110–12, 120, 152Clark, Rupert, 113Clausewitz, Carl von, 55–6, 61Clausewitzian trinity, 56, 165Clinton, Bill, 149, 153CNN (Cable News Network), 72,

104–5, 107, 112, 157Coalition

Arab participation, 66–7Bush’s recognition of the value of

UN legitimacy, 70casualties and deaths, 144challenges of getting Arab nations

to join, 66contributions to the campaign, 102Egyptian support, 66as key to campaign success, 158members, 102NSD 54 objectives, 106number of contributing nations, 67Saddam’s efforts to undermine, 68Turkey’s involvement, 65West Germany and Japan’s

contributions, 65COBRA forward operations base,

130–1, 134Cocciolone, Marizio, 112Cohen, E.A., 161Coleman, Tom, 91collateral damage, 110–12, 151conscripts/conscription, 99, 126, 131Constantinople, 4–5Cornum, Rhonda, 114, 156Corvette Three, 113Cox, Percy, 13Crowe, William, 90Crusades, 4

CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue),113–14

Cuba, 76, 81, 83Cuban Missile Crisis, 82

al Daawa sect, 32Damascus, 7–9Daoud Khan, Muhammad, 35deception, 130Dellums, Ron, 80depleted uranium, 156Desert Fox (Rommel), 103Desert Rats, 64desert warfare, adjusting technology

for use in, 130desertions, 125–6Diego Garcia, 36, 53Dugan, Michael J., 97Dulles, John Foster, 17–21Dumas, Roland, 95

Eberly, David W., 113–14Egypt, 2, 11, 17–20, 22, 29, 47, 65–6,

75, 85Eisenhower, Dwight D., 17–18, 23embargo against Iraq, 48, 65–7, 70,

73–4Exocet missiles, 37

F-4 Wild Weasels, 115F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighters,

60, 107Fahd ben Abdalaziz, King of Saudi

Arabia, 44, 46–7, 50–2, 67, 68,85, 106, 121

Faisal I, King of Iraq, 11–14Faisal II, King of Iraq, 15–16, 22Fallujah, 15Farouk, King of Egypt, 18Fatimids, 3fedayeen, 152Fields, Jack, 92Fitzwater, Marlin, 104Flandin, Pierre-Etienne, 8

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INDEX 201

flight regulations, changes in, 128food, immorality of using as a

weapon, 77foreign nationals

humanitarian relief for, 76Saddam’s treatment, 69

France, 5, 8–11, 20–1, 31, 64, 71–3,111, 149

Franks, Fred, 131–2, 134–5Franks, Tommy, 150French nationals, Saddam’s treatment

of, 71friendly fire (blue-on-blue incidents),

121, 144fuel requirements, of Franks’

command, 132

al-Gailani, Rashid Ali, 15Gates, Robert, 50Gaza, 19, 71GCFCG (Gulf Crisis Financial

Coordination Group), 75Germany, 6, 10, 15, 31, 65, 74, 101–2,

108, 131Ghazi bin Faisal, King of Iraq, 14–15Glaspie, April, 42–3Glosson, Buster C., 100Golan Heights, 28Golden Age of Islam, 4, 51Golden Square, 15Goldwater-Nichols Act, 57–9, 61,

139, 157–8, 161Gorbachev, Mikhail, 71, 82, 124Gorbachev-Mitterrand statement, 71Graham, Billy, 105Great Britain, 5–7, 9–13, 15, 18, 20,

26–7, 63–4, 149Great Game, 5, 9Great Wheel manoeuvre, 103, 132–3Grenada, 57, 60Griffith, Thomas E., 113–14ground campaign (DESERT SABRE)

American/Coalition movementsduring, 129

Battle of 73 Easting, 135–6Battle of al Busayyah, 135Battle of Medina Ridge, 137–8begins, 130–3burial assault, 127–8Bush’s ultimatum, 124ceasefire talks, 141–3CENTCOM’s deception campaign,

103, 130Coalition advance and engagement

with Republican Guarddivisions, 133, 138

flaws in Iraqi plans and capability,138

forward operating base, 130“Highway of Death,” 136–7, 140Iraqi defence plan, 133Iraqi expectations, 126, 133, 138Iraqi surrender and retreat, 136–7logistics, 126–7low American losses, 138preparation, 125–30termination, 138–44time elapsed, 139training in theatre, 127

Guatemala, 21guest workers, Kuwait’s, 47Gulf War Syndrome, 156–7

Haifa, 7, 10, 116Haig, Alexander, 44Hail Mary manoeuvre, 103Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia,

82Halabja, 37HARMs (high-speed anti-radiation

missiles), 115al-Hashimi, Yasin, 14Hatch, Orin, 93Heath, Edward, 72Hejaz, 7, 11helicopter gunships, Iraq’s use to

suppress rebellions, 143–4Hellfire missiles, 137

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202 INDEX

Horner, Chuck, 121House, Edward, 10human shields, 69, 72humanitarian relief, 76–7Humvee, 60Hungary, 19Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca,

3, 7Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan,

45–6, 72–3al-Hussein missile, 116

Ibrahim, Izzat, 46India, 19INSTANT THUNDER, see air

campaigninsurgency, Rumsfeld’s dismissal,

152INTERNAL LOOK 90, 53Iran, 11–13, 18, 20–1, 26, 31–8, 43,

58, 60, 73–5, 98, 113, 115, 129,147–8

Iran Air Flight 655, 37Iran-Iraq War, 33–9Iraq

birth of modern, 10–17birth of the Republic, 22–3collective security for, 17coup, 21declaration of martial law, 16drawing the borders of, 13establishment of a constitutional

monarchy, 11independence, 14invasion of Kuwait, see Iraqi

invasion of KuwaitRevolutionary Council, 23withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact,

23Iraq Petroleum Company, 26Iraqi air force, 35, 98–9, 101Iraqi army

anti-state plotting, 22armoured divisions, 98

conscripts/conscription, 99, 126,131

ideology, 14size and equipment, 35

Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitdamage caused by, 47and the defence of Saudi Arabia,

50–3impact on oil prices, 50international condemnation, 47–8,

50, 65prelude to, 40–6and the status of the US military,

54–62threat to American national

security, 79and US-Soviet relations, 49–50

Iraqi Liberation Act, 149Iraqi military

damage done by, 144disbandment, 152

Iraqi navy, 35Iraqi oil

accusations of Kuwaiti theft, 39, 41countries reliant on, 65embargo on, 73–5impact of the air campaign, 109Qassim’s measures, 26revenues from, 30–1

Iraqi propaganda, 72, 84, 111Israel, 1, 16–20, 28, 33, 41, 51–2,

65–9, 71, 83, 104, 116–20

al-Jabir airfield, 132Jackson, Jesse, 72Japan, 11, 50, 65, 102, 107, 141Jenin, 16Jerusalem, 4, 28, 106, 117JFC (Joint Forces Command), 102–3Johnson, Lyndon B., 79Johnston, Robert B., 100Jordan, 5, 16–19, 22–3, 47, 70, 72,

74–5, 111

PROOF

INDEX 203

Karbala, 3, 5Kazzar, Nadhim, 30Keaney, T.L., 160Kelly, John, 46Kerry, John, 93Khafji, Battle of, 120–3Khalid bin Sultan al-Saud, 102Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah,

31–2Kievit, J., 161King Khalid Military City, 36, 98,

127, 129, 160Kirkuk, 24Kissinger, Henry, 90Kitchener, Herbert, 6–7, 9–10Knox, M., 161KTO (Kuwait Theatre of Operations),

100, 125–6, 133, 144Kurdish rebellion, 27Kurds, rebellion, 12Kuwait

Iraqi grievances against, 41Iraqi invasion of, see Iraqi invasion

of KuwaitIraq’s historic claim to, 26–7,

39Saddam’s designs, 38–9

Laden, Osama bin, 51–2Lawrence, T.E., 12League of Nations, 11, 82Leahy, Patrick, 92Lebanon, 9, 19, 22–3Lewinsky, Monica, 149Libya, 72, 74Lindbergh baby kidnapping, 58Linn, B.M., 56, 162logistics, 55, 76, 98, 101, 127, 132Luck, Gary, 127, 130–3Lugar, Richard, 93

M1A1 Abrams tank, 59al-Madfai, Jamil, 14Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 6

Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),102–3, 132–4, 136, 151, 159

Marines, 54, 58, 101, 121–3, 129,134, 136

Markey, Edward, 91Marsh Arabs, 147massacres, in memory and oral

tradition, 5McCaffrey, Barry, 131, 134, 137,

140–1McDermott, Jim, 91McMahon, Edward, 7McMahon-Hussein Correspondence,

7, 9McNamara, Robert S., 56media, 42, 48, 103, 110, 112, 116,

119, 151Medina Division, of the Republican

Guard, 45, 137–8MEDO (Middle East Defence

Organisation), 19Meigs, Montgomery, 137Mesopotamia, 5Metz, S., 161MI5, 21Middle East

coining of the term, 6Eurocentric notion, 6and the Soviet threat, 17–18Sykes-Picot Agreement, 9–10

military actionBush’s expectations, 105objectives, 105–6

Mitchell, George, 92Mitla Pass, 19Mitterrand, Francois, 64Mossadegh, Mohammad, 20–1Mosul, 5, 9, 12, 23mother of all battles, 106mother of all briefings, 139mother of all resolutions, 146Mu’awiya, 3Mubarak, Hosni, 41, 45–6, 66Muhammad Ali, 72

PROOF

204 INDEX

Murray, W.R., 161Mutla Pass, 132, 136My Lai, 44

Najaf, 3, 5, 31, 147Najuib, Muhammad, 18naked aggression, Bush’s reference to

the invasion as, 48, 77, 79Nasiriyah, 112, 129, 151Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 18–23National Victory Celebration parade,

154al-Nayif, Abd al-Razzaq, 28–9NCRC (National Council of the

Revolutionary Command), 27Nebuchadnezzar Division, of the

Republican Guard, 134Nehru, Jawaharlal, 19Nicolson, Arthur, 9no-fly zones, 146–7, 149NSD 54, 105–6nuclear power plant, Osirak, 31nuclear weapons, 31, 38, 84, 106,

109, 161

offensive optionBush’s ‘extra mile’ initiative, 83–8congressional debates, 88–95deciding factors, 78–81requirements, 78Resolution 678, 81–3Schwarzkopf’s plan, 95–103and weather conditions, 97

Ogarkov, Nikolai V., 161oil, 5, 12–14, 21, 23, 34, 36, 39, 41,

46, 48, 65–6, 73–5, 88, 117,134–5

oil embargo, 73–5oil for food programme, 146oil well fires, 134, 135Oman, 67On War (Clausewitz), 55OP PLAN 1002-90, 52–3, 96OPEC, 40, 50, 73–4

Operation AJAX, 21, 58Operation DESERT FOX, 149Operation DESERT SABRE, see

ground campaignOperation DESERT SHIELD, 53–4,

59, 96–8see also building DESERT

SHIELDOperation DESERT STORM

air component, see air campaignground component, see ground

campaignOperation EAGLE CLAW, 57Operation EARNEST WILL, 36Operation INSTANT THUNDER, see

air campaignOperation IRAQI FREEDOM,

149–52Operation JUST CAUSE, 60Operation NIMBLE ARCHER, 36Operation NORTHERN WATCH, 149Operation PRAYING MANTIS, 36Operation PROVIDE COMFORT,

147Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, 149Operation URGENT FURY, 57, 59operational war, 55Oren, M.B., 20Osama bin Laden, 51–2Osirak nuclear power plant, 31Ottoman Empire, 5–7, 9–13

Pagonis, William G., 127Pakistan, 18, 47Palestine, 7–8, 10–12, 16, 72, 106,

124Pan-Arabism, 14, 23Patriot SAM defence system, 60, 116,

118–19, 157Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 70, 94–5Perkins, Karen, 156PGMs (precision-guided munitions),

60, 110, 126, 160–1Pickering, Thomas, 70, 81

PROOF

INDEX 205

Picot, François Georges, 8–9, 11Piestewa, Lori Ann, 152PLO (Palestinian Liberation

Organisation), 68, 71–2plutonium, 31pogrom, in Iraq, 16POL trucks, mistaken as Scud

launchers, 117post-war assessment

challenges for the US Military,155–7

Coalition, 158the Cold War, 164–5intelligence, 157, 159kicking the Vietnam Syndrome,

153–5lessons learned, 159–60Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,

149–52post-war tensions, 146–9procurement, 157rebellions, 163, 164RMA, 160–2Safwan ceasefire agreement,

146–7, 163technology, 158, 161the termination, 163–4

Powell, Colin, 43–6, 50, 55–6, 61, 96,100, 152

Powell Doctrine, seeWeinberger-Powell Doctrine

POWs (prisoners of war)number of Iraqi, 133, 144Saddam’s treatment, 112–15

propaganda, 23, 72, 76, 84, 111–13,118

public support, for the war, 153

Qassim, Abdul Karim, 22–7Qatar, 67Quayle, Dan, 71Qurna Marshes, draining, 147Qutb, Sayyid, 51

Ramadi, 15Ras al Khafji, 115, 120Rathbun-Nealy, Melissa, 114, 156RDF (Rapid Deployment Force),

57–8Reagan, Ronald, 36, 44, 49, 66rebellions, Iraqis’ use of helicopter

gunships to suppress, 143–4see also uprisings

Record, J., 163Red Cross, 77regime change

NSD 54’s outline, 106post-war questions, 147–8

Republican Guardthe campaign’s failure to destroy,

159, 163–4CENTCOM expectations, 99Coalition engagement, 133–5, 137coup, 28defeat, 136, 150equipment, 98escape route, 138, 140formation, 27invades Kuwait, 46–7lifestyle, 98Medina Division, 45, 137–8Nebuchadnezzar Division, 134in the path of VII Corps, 131Saddam’s reorganisation, 29Schwarzkopf’s strike plans, 97,

103, 106structure, 98Tawakalna Division, 135–6that put up strong resistance, 134

Resolution 660, 48, 83, 123Resolution 661, 48Resolution 664, 69Resolution 665, 70–1Resolution 678, 82–3, 89, 94, 105Resolution 687, 146Revolutionary Council of Iraq, 23Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah of Iran,

20–1, 58

PROOF

206 INDEX

RMA (revolution in military affairs),Gulf War as, 145, 160–2

Roman Empire, 5Rommel, Erwin, 102–3Roosevelt, Kermit, 21Roquejeoffre, Michel, 102Rothschild, Lionel Walter, 10Rumaila oil fields, 40, 46, 140, 151Rumsfeld, Donald, 36, 152

Sa’d Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah,46

Saddam Husseinaccusations against Kuwait,

40–1birth and family life, 24–5comes to power, 28–32conviction and execution, 152first political assassination, 25and the Iran-Iraq War, 33–9joins the Ba’athists, 25orders incursion into Saudi Arabia,

120; see also Battle of Khafjireaction to Bush’s ‘extra mile’

initiative, 84–5signs of megalomania, 31strategic incompetence, 75terrorist threats, 42and treatment of hostages and loss

of face, 72treatment of POWs, 112–15

al-Sadr, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir,32

al-Sadr, Muqtada, 4Safwan, 142al-Said, Nuri, 14–17, 22–3sanctions

congressional calls for more time,80

impact on Iraq, 75–6unintended consequences, 73

sandstorms, 97–8, 135SAS (Special Air Service),

114

Saudi Arabia, 11, 13, 17–18, 27,40–1, 44, 47, 49–53, 63–9, 72,75, 78, 85, 96, 99–103, 105–7,117–21, 127, 129, 133, 143–4,155, 160

see also Battle of KhafjiScales, Robert, 100Schlesinger, James, 90Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 45, 50–3,

56, 58–9, 95–103, 105, 109–10,112, 115–18, 120–2, 124–6, 128,130, 133–4, 137, 139, 141–4,148, 150–1, 153, 159, 163

Scowcroft, Brent, 50, 85Scud attacks

damage done by, 119–20political impact, 120purpose, 68–9Schwarzkopf’s downplaying of the

military effectiveness of, 118Scud missiles

the hunt for, 116–20Soviet provision, 31

secularism, 26, 32September 11 terrorist attacks, 150Shamir, Yitzak, 117Shatt al-Arab waterway, 13, 33–4,

151Shaw, Bernard, 104Shevardnadze, Eduard, 71, 82Shi’ism, evolution of, 3Shimko, K., 162Sidqi, Bakr, 14Siege of Baghdad, 5Sikorsky, Gerry, 91Sinai, 19–20, 28Six Day War, 16, 28–9slant drilling, 39–40Smith, Rupert, 134Somalia, 155, 158Soviet Union, 1, 15, 18–20, 23, 27,

29, 31, 33–6, 52, 54, 56, 65,70–2, 74, 81, 111, 123, 157–8,160–1, 164

PROOF

INDEX 207

Spector, Arlen, 93Speicher, Michael Scott, 113stealth technology, 60Stevens, Cat (Yusuf Islam), 72Suez Canal, 5, 7, 18–20, 66Suez Crisis, 19–20Suleiman, Hikmat, 14Summers, H., 165Sunni and Shia Muslims, historical

tensions between, 1–5Sykes, Mark, 6, 9, 11Sykes-Picot Agreement, 9–10Syria, 2–3, 5, 7–12, 16–18, 21–2, 24,

29, 66, 85, 113

Tabun and VX nerve gas, 31Tanker War, 36–7Taraki, Nur Mohammad, 35Task Force Normandy, 107Tawakalna Division, of the

Republican Guard, 135–6Technological Utopianism, 158terrorism, 35, 57, 150, 165terrorist threats, Saddam’s threats, 42Thatcher, Margaret, 48thermal imaging, 130, 134–5, 137,

150Third Oil Shock, 74Tiananmen Square, 64, 83Tice, Jeffrey, 114Tiger Brigade, 132Tin Cup Trip, James Baker’s, 67Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 79torture, 16, 30, 115, 156Trans-Jordan, 11–13Treaty of Lausanne, 12Treaty of Portsmouth, 16Treaty of Sèvres, 11–12tribal tensions, 14Turkey, 6, 12, 17–18, 65–6, 75, 107,

113, 147, 149Twelvers, 4Twenty Years’ War, 152–3

UAE, 66–7Umar ibn al-Khattab, 2Umayyads, 3UN Security Council, 37, 48, 63, 69,

71, 81–3, 88, 124, 146, 148, 158UN Security Council Resolutions, see

under Resolutionunconditional withdrawal, Bush’s

ultimatum, 124United Nations, Bush’s recognition of

the value of, 70United States

Arab nations’ distrust, 21freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti

assets, 48and the invention of the Middle

East, 17–21involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait

dispute, 42–6reaction to the birth of the Iraqi

Republic, 23Saddam’s terrorist threat, 42War Powers Resolution, 79–80, 89,

94uprisings

British experience, 14Hungary, 19Iraq, 23–4, 28Iraq’s use of helicopter gunships to

suppress, 143–4Kurds, 37–8, 146–7Shia, 33, 147US encouragement, 163

uranium enrichment programme,Iraq’s claim, 109

Urban II, Pope, 4US military, restoration of public

image, 54use of force

Bush’s approval and explanation,105

Bush’s argument, 81the case for, 79

PROOF

208 INDEX

use of force – continuedlack of congressional support for,

80public opinion, 89resolution language compromise,

82–3Security Council objections, 83

USS Cole, 158USS Stark, 37USS Vincennes, 37Uthman ibn al-Affan, 2

Vietnam Syndrome, 60–1, 86, 105,120, 153–5

VII Corps, 101, 103, 127, 129–32,134–5, 137, 141

VIII Corps, 131

Waldheim, Kurt, 72war

Bush prepares Congress and theAmerican public for, 84

US opinion polls, 85war-making authority, 92, 155War Powers Resolution, 79–80, 89, 94Warden, John A., 96, 100, 115Wathba Rebellion, 16weapons of mass destruction, 38, 101weapons systems, Iraq’s

modernisation, 31Webb, James, 90

Weinberger, Casper, 44, 60–1Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, 60–1,

105, 158West Bank, 28, 71Westmoreland, William, 153Wetzel, Rob, 112White House Fellows program, 44Wilson, Woodrow, 10Wise, Robert, 91Wolfowitz, Paul, 43, 50women

POW experiences, 114–15Qassim’s work on behalf of, 26in the US military, 51, 151, 155–6

World War I, 6, 12, 18, 39, 56, 58, 96World War II, 15, 19, 25, 37, 53,

56–8, 102, 108, 110, 165

XIII Corps, 130, 135XVIII Airborne Corps, 53, 101, 127,

130–3

Yazid, 3yellow ribbon syndrome, 153–4Yemen, 11, 17, 81–3Yom Kippur War, 29Yugoslavia, 31, 76, 155Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens), 72

Zaun, Jeffrey, 112

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Contents · 2012. 6. 8. · 2 Republican Iraq and the Rise of Saddam Hussein 22 3 The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 40 ... will return as a the messiah-like Mahdi who will sit in judg-ment