Contents€¦ · Latin American phenomenon but spread in the twentieth century to Africa and parts of Asia. By the 1960s, military dictatorships had become so common that the study

Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Exhibits vii

Preface to the Third Edition ix

List of Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1Studying non-democratic regimes: why and how 1Modernizing non-democratic rule: the three phases 6Democratically disguised rule 8

1 Theoretical Approaches 13The totalitarian-authoritarian approach 14The ‘military regime’ and ‘one-party state’ approaches 25The personal-rule approach 32Approaching complexity: semis, hybrids and less-than-democratic rule 33The rationalization of politics 39

2 Monarchical and Personal Rule 41Ruling monarchies: past 42Ruling monarchies: present 50Presidential monarchy and personal dictatorship 56Establishing personal rule 60

3 Establishing Military Rule 68The forensic framework 70Motive 73Means 77Opportunity 79Indirect and military-supported regimes 82

4 Establishing One-Party Rule 86Motive 88Means 92Opportunity 98Theorizing the forensic calculus of usurpation 101

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5 Consolidation, Legitimacy and Control 106Seeking legitimacy 108Electoral and ideological legitimation 110Strengthening control 117Military dictatorships’ strengthening of control 121Party dictatorships’ strengthening of control 128Personal dictatorships’ strengthening of control 132

6 Non-Democratic Governance 140Policies 140Institutions 149Party policy-making institutions 156Military policy-making institutions 159Personalist policy-making 163Performance 166

7 Governance and State-Building 172Policy-implementing problems 173State-building successes 178State-building failings 184State failure and destroyed dictatorships 192State disintegration through democratization 201

8 Democratization and Rationalization 206The ‘third wave’ of democratization 207Transitions from dictatorship 211Reversals, hybrids and double movements 218Rationalization rather than democratization 222

9 A New Phase and Format: Disguised Dictatorship 225The semicompetitive-elections disguise 225The historical evolution of this disguise 229Dictatorship’s twenty-first-century format 235The new format’s governance implications 241Democratizing disguised dictatorships 246

Conclusion 255Summing up 255Looking to the future 256

Further Reading 258

Bibliography 260

Index 281

vi Contents


Introduction

Studying non-democratic regimes: why and how

The simplest definition of non-democratic regimes is ‘rule by other meansthan democracy’, which is taken from the definition of war as ‘politics byother means’ (Clausewitz, 1984 [1832]: 87). Like war between or withinstates, non-democratic rule appears outdated and yet continues to be afactor in world affairs that requires close attention and careful analysis.However, political science’s main reason for studying non-democraticregimes is that they show why and how a modern state might be ruled byother means than representative democracy. Many states in the past havebeen ruled ‘by other means’, some still are and more may well be in thefuture.

Studying non-democratic regimes reveals another similarity between warand ‘rule by other means’ – their diversity. The diversity of war ranges froma primitive guerrilla insurgency to a state’s use of nuclear weapons againstanother state. Similarly, non-democratic regimes ‘display a bewilderingdiversity: from monarchies to military regimes, from clergy-dominatedregimes to communist regimes, and from seeking a totalitarian control ofthought through indoctrination to seeking recognition as a multipartydemocracy through using semicompetitive elections’ (Brooker, 2008: 102).Monarchical rule was prevalent centuries before representative democraciesappeared in human history, and a few ruling monarchies still survive in theArab world.

Military regimes emerged in the nineteenth century as a predominantlyLatin American phenomenon but spread in the twentieth century to Africaand parts of Asia. By the 1960s, military dictatorships had become socommon that the study of military coups and countercoups, reforms andrepressions, juntas and civilianizations, became a growth area in politicalscience. New areas of study and new concepts were also required to study thecommunist regimes, which emerged in the twentieth century and pioneered anew range of dictatorships in which one political party, such as the commu-nist party, would have some kind of monopoly and would be the regime’s‘official’ party. By the 1960s, political scientists were describing these regimeswith the new concept of a one-party state and its subsidiary concept of anAfrican one-party state. The latter clearly distinguished the examples emerg-ing in decolonized Africa from the communist examples and from the twodefunct fascist regimes, which in the 1930s–40s had shown what horrorsdictatorships were capable of domestically and internationally. To describesuch extreme cases as Hitler’s fascist regime, political scientists developed

1


the concept of totalitarianism, which highlighted these personal dictator-ships’ desire for total control of state and society through ideological indoc-trination and enforcement by the political police. In the 1960s politicalscience added the new concept of authoritarianism to describe the manynew examples of a non-totalitarian, less ideological and less personalizedversion of modern dictatorship, such as rule by the military through a junta(council) of its senior commanders.

In the 1970s–90s a global wave of democratization greatly reduced thenumber of non-democratic regimes but actually increased their diversity –and the problems that political scientists have in categorizing them. Thisnew age of democracy produced not only democracies, but also many exam-ples of democratically disguised dictatorship and many examples of less-than-democratic regimes that political scientists now tend to termdemocratic/authoritarian hybrids. Some examples of the competitive-authoritarian variety of hybrid regime are difficult to distinguish fromdemocratically disguised dictatorship. And the latter has caused classifica-tory problems, too, because its democratic disguise of supposedly competi-tive multiparty elections can be used by personal, one-party or even militarydictatorships.

Non-democratic regimes are indeed in the midst of an important period intheir historical evolution – another reason why they are still studied by polit-ical scientists. During this period they are experiencing not only a continuingdecline in the number of long-established regimes inherited from the previouscentury but also a rise in the number of democratically disguised dictator-ships and authoritarian hybrids. In fact, just as the 1920s–50s was the ‘total-itarian era’ that saw the rise to power of communist and fascist totalitarianregimes, the 1990s–2010s will likely be viewed as the era in which disguiseddictatorships and authoritarian hybrids rose to power.

From early in this era there have been warnings about the rise of democ-ratically disguised dictatorship. For example, a historical study of one-partystates warned that in the twenty-first century the dictatorships wouldpursue a strategy of camouflaging their non-democratic rule with the trap-pings of multiparty democracy. This ‘resort to camouflage will produce anew and perplexing challenge for the democracies – how to prevent thetwenty-first century from being the century of pseudo-democracy’ (Brooker,1995: 256). The change in strategy from one-party state to democraticdisguise was displayed even earlier in the experiment with the two strategiesthat took place in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution. The victoriousrevolutionaries initially experimented with the one-party-state model thathad been widely used by secular revolutionaries in recent decades (Brooker,1997: 146). The new Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was given an effectivemonopoly by eliminating or forcing underground all other parties except anally of the IRP. As in a typical one-party state, the IRP controlled through itsmembers or sympathizers the elected Presidency, the Cabinet of Ministers,

2 Non-Democratic Regimes


the elected parliament and the elected provincial governments. Yet in 1987the IRP was dissolved and, after an interim period of no-party/multi-factionelections, the Iranian regime adopted the image of multiparty competitiveelections that has served it well for more than a quarter of a century (Ibid.:148–50).

The rise of the authoritarian hybrids, too, might well have been identifiedearlier but it was obscured by the multitude of ‘transitional’ flawed orlimited democracies that were produced by the 1970s–90s global democra-tization. As the dust settled, however, it became increasingly apparent thatsomething more permanent and authoritarian was emerging, and nowlarge-scale academic studies of authoritarian hybrids are appearing. Onesuch study included Russia and many other examples in its hybrid category,labelled ‘competitive authoritarianism’, which was acknowledged to be abroad category that ranged ‘from “soft,” near-democratic cases … to“hard,” or near-full authoritarian cases’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 34).Furthermore, the authoritarian hybrid is now viewed as not merely a transi-tional stage on the road to democracy but instead as a potentially stableform of governance. And even if an example of this mixed form is indeed ‘intransition’, it may well be moving in an authoritarian rather than democra-tic direction. For example, by 2012 Russia appeared to be a transitionalhybrid that was moving in an authoritarian direction and was perhaps onthe road to disguised dictatorship.

However, there are good reasons to continue giving prominence to theolder versions of non-democratic rule, even if they are now extinct or rare.They still rule a significant proportion of the world’s population, with theChinese communist regime alone ruling one-quarter of humanity, and theyremain a source of international tension and concern, such as the tensionarising from the rebellion against the Syrian regime and the constantconcern about the political stability of oil-rich Saudi Arabia. They have alsoplayed a crucial role in modern history, as much of the political history ofthe previous century was centred upon fascism and communism’s ideologi-cal, political and military challenges to democracy.

Another reason for giving prominence to the older versions of non-demo-cratic rule is that they have been the background from which democracieshave emerged. Whether by elders, chiefs, monarchs, aristocrats, empires,military regimes or one-party states, non-democratic rule has been the normfor most of human history. Many democracies have inherited importantinstitutional legacies from a non-democratic past and sometimes from as farback as the monarchical era’s contribution to state-building, representativegovernment and the rule of law. Even the democratizing process or transi-tion through which non-democratic rule becomes democratic may haveimportant legacies that help or hinder the new democracy for decades.

Furthermore, the older versions of non-democratic rule provide interest-ing comparisons and contrasts with democracy. For example, there are

Introduction 3


similarities between a parliamentary democracy’s cabinet government and acollegial communist dictatorship’s politburo (political bureau) or a collegialmilitary dictatorship’s junta (council). But there are also marked differencesbetween a presidential democracy’s one-person executive and the personalrule of an absolutist monarch or a totalitarian dictator. The most funda-mental contrast in governance is of course the different opportunities andmethods for changing the government. ‘Changes of chief executives indemocracies occur consequent to elections or other regularized procedures,but under most dictatorships the only way that a ruler can be changed is bya coup’ (Przeworski et al., 2000: 212). And resorting to a coup or otherpolitical violence to change the ruler is typical of the older versions of non-democratic rule, as is resorting to violence to implement the regime’s domes-tic or foreign policies.

This tendency to employ violence to implement their policies means thatthe older versions of non-democratic rule epitomize a crucial contrast withdemocracy – rule by ‘other means’ includes the use or threat of violence.While the democratically disguised dictatorship tends to limit and disguisethis aspect of its rule, the older versions of dictatorship have starkly revealedthe truth that ‘these regimes kill people’. The worst examples of violence,such as the Nazi regime’s genocide and wars of conquest, have been perpe-trated by the older versions of non-democratic rule and therefore theseregimes provide an important reminder of a crucial contrast betweendemocracy and rule ‘by other means’.

But giving prominence to the older versions of non-democratic regimealso highlights the diversity of the phenomena that fall under the headingof ‘non-democratic’ regimes. It includes: (1) the historical evolution ofvarious regime types, forms and features over the centuries as well as (2)the stages and aspects of a particular regime’s life-cycle development overmerely decades or even a few years. The historical evolution has extendedfrom feudal monarchies to totalitarianism and now to democraticallydisguised dictatorships; the life-cycle development extends from theregime’s establishment through such means as a coup or revolution to itsdemise years or decades later through such means as a negotiated or revo-lutionary transition to democracy. Furthermore, this historically andthematically vast area of research and analysis has produced a similarlyvast and diverse range of theoretical approaches as political scientists havefocused upon particular types, forms, features and stages within the ‘non-democratic’ area of political science.

This book has therefore adopted a mixture of theoretical, historical anddevelopmental perspectives. Its description of non-democratic regimes islargely developmental – analyzing the establishment, consolidation, gover-nance and demise of the main types of dictatorship. But the description ofregimes begins and ends by studying two crucial milestones in the historicalevolution of non-democratic rule: primeval monarchical rule and contem-



porary disguised dictatorship. In addition, these eight chapters are precededby a survey of the various theoretical approaches that political scientistshave adopted in their analyses, categorizing and research in this area ofpolitical science.

The survey of theoretical approaches presented in Chapter 1 is not only abroadly-based theoretical introduction to the area but also shows that thenon-democratic regimes have been the subject of some of the most impres-sive and renowned theorizing in the history of political science. ThenChapter 2 begins the book’s description of the regimes by focusing onmonarchy as the ‘ancestral’ type of regime in the historical evolution of non-democratic rule. The chapter looks back as far as the feudal monarchies, butalso describes some ruling monarchies that have survived into the twenty-first century. It then examines the historical evolution of a monarchical-liketype of dictatorship, namely the presidential monarchy and other versionsof personal rule by a dictator. Finally, the chapter shifts from a historical toa developmental perspective by describing how these personal dictatorshipsare established. Chapters 3 and 4 continue with this developmental perspec-tive by analyzing the establishment of military and one-party rule, such asby means of a military coup or party-led revolution.

The consolidation stage in the development of these three types of dicta-torship – personal, military and one-party – is described in Chapter 5. Itfocuses on the key features of regime consolidation, namely seeking legiti-macy and strengthening control over state and society. Consolidatedregimes’ governance is described in Chapters 6 and 7. The former is mainlyconcerned with policies and policy-making, while the latter is mainlyconcerned with policy implementation and state-building and with ‘bring-ing the state back in’ to the study of non-democratic rule (Evans et al.,1985). The examination of state-building failings also leads on to the nextchapter’s description of the final stage in a regime’s development – its demisethrough democratization.

However, Chapter 8 is concerned not only with democratization’sdestruction of a regime, but also with the 1970s–90s global wave of democ-ratization and its effect upon the historical evolution of non-democraticrule. The return to a historical perspective continues in Chapter 9, with itsdescription of the new phase in the evolution of non-democratic regimesthat has emerged since the global wave of democratization. This phase isassociated with a new format – democratically disguised dictatorship – thathas become prevalent among the surprisingly large number of dictatorshipsthat continue to exist in our present ‘age of democracy’. In fact the best wayof achieving a coherent overview of non-democratic regimes is through ahistorical perspective that focuses on the three phases and formats that haveevolved during the modernization of non-democratic rule – a modernizationwhich began in the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth andnow twenty-first centuries.

Introduction 5


Modernizing non-democratic rule: the three phases

It has long been the conventional wisdom that non-democratic rule hasbecome a political anachronism. In particular, it now seems hard to believethat hereditary monarchy could have ever been accepted as a legitimate wayof governing and not have provoked constant bouts of armed rebellion, suchas that of the American colonists against King George III, against the verynotion that political power can be inherited like a piece of family property.But the anachronistic nature of non-democratic rule does not mean that it isdoomed to extinction. Political anachronisms can continue to survivethrough continual modernization, whether they be non-democratic rule,hereditary monarchy, or even armed rebellion.

In the case of non-democratic rule, there have been three phases ofmodernization. The first phase began some two hundred years ago withNapoleon Bonaparte’s use of plebiscites (referendums) to legitimize his mili-tary dictatorship and eventual assumption of the title of Emperor. A militarycommander’s seizure of power was nothing new in world history. TheImperial throne of the ancient Roman Empire had often been fought over bymilitary commanders, and the monarchical title of Emperor is derived fromthe Latin imperator (commander). But Bonaparte had put forward a newanswer to the problem of how to legitimize a military seizure of power; hehad hypocritically adopted the ‘will of the people’ principle espoused by thedemocratic ideology of the American and French revolutions. He had alsopioneered what would soon become a standard justification for militarycoups – claiming that the seizure of power was aimed at rectifying the weak-nesses of the preceding regime. This standard justification would evolve awide range of variations, such as describing military intervention in terms ofan ‘iron surgeon’ having to remove the gangrened or cancerous corruptionafflicting the body politic (Ben-Ami, 1983: 58). The more liberal variationswould emphasize the coup’s aim of introducing democracy or a reformeddemocracy.

Such ‘democratic’ justifications were used by the many military dictatorswho came to power in nineteenth-century Latin America (Rouquié, 1987:32–3). The region had become stalled in a cyclical pattern of alternating peri-ods of democracy and dictatorship, with each period lasting about 20 years(Seligson, 1987: 3–4). And in the twentieth century the ‘democratic’ justifi-cations for military coups would be used not only in Latin America, but alsoin other areas of what became known as the Third World, which becamemuch more extensive after the decolonization of Asia and Africa in the1940s–60s. In some areas and times the coups were frequent, partly becauseof countercoups by soldiers discontented with an existing military govern-ment and partly because a military regime might peacefully return power tocivilian politicians only to be re-established a few years later through a newcoup by a newly discontented military. Such instability meant that the aver-



age life of military regimes was only about five years (Nordlinger, 1977: 139).So it is perhaps not surprising that rule by the military or its leader was themost common form of non-democratic regime in the twentieth century andoutnumbered the new forms of non-democratic rule that appeared with thesecond phase of modernization.

The second phase of modernization of non-democratic rule was similar tothe first in paying homage to democracy and involving rule by an organiza-tion or its leader. But the regime included a new form of organization – apolitical party – and added an ideology to create the distinctively twentieth-century format of non-democratic rule, the ideological one-party state,which politically and militarily rivalled democracy for much of that century.It first appeared when a communist dictatorship emerged from the October1917 revolution in the former Russian Empire, which was renamed theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics or ‘Soviet Union’. The new dictatorship’sMarxist-Leninist ideology espoused not only a form of socialism, but alsoleadership by the Communist Party over state and society. During the1920s–30s, though, communism was overshadowed by the emergence offascist dictatorships, Mussolini’s Fascist regime and Hitler’s Nazi regime,whose nationalist/racist ideology espoused personal dictatorship by the partyleader. The second-phase modernized dictatorships continued to pay homageto (their interpretation of) democracy and went through the motions ofplebiscitary (non-competitive) elections to (powerless) parliaments, as isdescribed in Chapter 5. But they also declared that the multiparty competi-tive kind of democracy was outmoded and had been replaced by a new kindof democracy characterized by a united will of the people, with communistsclaiming the ‘popular will’ was led by the communist party and fascistsclaiming it was embodied in the fascist leader. In a sense the second-phasedictatorships had turned the tables on democracy by arguing that it was theanachronistic political system and that they were the wave of the future.

Furthermore, this open political rivalry was accompanied by a militaryrivalry that in the fascist case soon became open warfare – and seemed brieflyto be very successful warfare. By the middle of 1940 Nazi Germany seemedset to conquer or control the whole of Europe and to lead its Axis alliance toworld domination. At that time US policy-makers found ‘it was not too diffi-cult to envision a future in which the United States … holding on to a politi-cal system that seemed ineffective and anachronistic, would find itself, atbest, a single island in a hostile sea; at worst, it would battle alone against anAxis invasion of the American hemisphere’ (Christman, 1992: 246).

Although the Second World War instead led to the destruction of thefascist regimes, it also led on to a huge expansion in the number of commu-nist dictatorships. By the end of the 1940s they had been established through-out Eastern Europe and in China and North Korea. The only major additionsto the ranks of communist regimes in the 1950s–60s were North Vietnamand Cuba, but Africa was producing many examples of a new variant of the

Introduction 7


ideological one-party-state format. This new variant of the format becameknown as ‘the African one-party state’ and enjoyed good prospects until the1960s–70s spread of military dictatorships through the Third Worlddestroyed the majority of these African one-party states as well as manynewly established democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America – so that theThird World came to be dominated by various versions of military dictator-ship. On the other hand, these military regimes in many cases adopted thesecond-phase format by acquiring an ideology and official party, such asNasser’s Arab Socialism and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in Egypt or NeWin’s Burmese Socialism and Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) inBurma. Furthermore, the key point is that by the 1970s the countries of theThird World were predominantly under non-democratic rule and in combi-nation with the Second World of communist dictatorships had relegateddemocracy to being, if not an outmoded, then a somewhat unusual form ofrule.

But already a wave of democratization had emerged and in the 1980s–90sit would sweep away most military and party dictatorships, including theSoviet Union superpower. So only a few years after these first-phase andsecondhase modernized non-democratic regimes had reached their numericalpeak they seemed doomed to extinction. Yet a small minority managed tosurvive this massive change in the political climate, and did not go the way ofthe dinosaurs. Similarly, ruling monarchies managed to survive into the nextcentury – in fact nearly all the world’s remaining monarchies survived theglobal wave of democratization – just as alligators and other evolutionaryhangovers from the age of reptiles survived into the age of mammals.

More importantly, the new ‘age of democracy’ produced a rapid adapta-tion: democratically disguised dictatorship. The new non-democraticregimes that began to appear carefully avoided not only military dictator-ship, but also the second phase’s format of ideological one-party state.Instead they claimed to be democracies and, specifically, multiparty compet-itive democracies – there was no mention of a different and better kind ofdemocracy. Clearly the long-term future of non-democratic rule, includingany hope of reviving its global prominence, lay in avoiding open rivalry withdemocracy and adopting an ‘if you can’t beat them, (appear to) join them’approach. So the shift to using a democratic disguise should be viewed as thethird phase in the modernization of non-democratic rule, whose third-phaseformat is the democratically disguised dictatorship.

Democratically disguised rule

The third-phase format has already undergone such significant evolutionaryvariations that the key question now is not so much ‘what do you mean bydemocratically disguised dictatorship’ but rather ‘what sort of democrati-



cally disguised dictatorship do you mean?’ However, semicompetitive elec-tions are used by all variations of third-phase, democratically disguiseddictatorship (and are described in more detail in Chapters 5 and 9). The useof semicompetitive elections as a disguise for modern dictatorship can betraced back to the series of military and then civilian regimes that emergedfrom Mexico’s 1910–17 revolutionary era and ruled the country until 2000.The Mexican regimes pioneered the key semicompetitive formula for deal-ing with political opponents, namely ‘you can be a party; but not a govern-ment’, and also the key role of opposition parties in semicompetitiveelections: ‘to put up enough of a fight to make the ruling party’s victory lookcredible’ (Whitehead, 1994: 337; Cornelius, 1987: 32). In fact the use ofsemicompetitive elections always has to strike a balance between projectingan image of competitive elections and of ensuring that opponents do notexploit the opportunity of elections to take over power from the governmentor regime.

The third-phase dictatorships have already evolved a safer form ofsemicompetitive election, in which the ‘opposition’ is provided by puppetparties or candidates that are phoney, not genuine, competitors with theregime’s party or candidate. As is described in Chapter 9, the basic variantevolved in the 1990s in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia butsophisticated mixtures of phoney and genuine competition soon emergedin Azerbaijan and Belarus in the 2000s. Yet even these more sophisticatedvariants still had to find the appropriate trade-off between the politicalsafety of using phonies and the democratic credibility of facing up togenuine competitors.

Another aspect of disguised dictatorship that has evolved new varia-tions is the answer that it gives to political science’s classic regime-catego-rizing question of ‘who rules?’ Like the second phase’s ideologicalone-party state, the third-phase format of disguised dictatorship can beused by virtually any type of ruling organization or individual – a party,military, party leader, military leader and so on. But in recent years therehas been a tendency for the format to be associated with rule by civilian‘presidential monarchs’ (see Chapters 2 and 9) who are constantlyreelected President and in one case have even completed a hereditarysuccession from father to son.

The ‘who rules’ issue also helps provide an answer to that awkwardquestion: ‘how do you tell the difference between a disguised dictatorshipand an authoritarian hybrid?’ This question arises even when dealing withstatistical analyses that require a sample or the total population ofdisguised dictatorships. And there is a danger of overestimating the preva-lence of disguised dictatorships if they are not distinguished from author-itarian hybrids when tallying the number of regimes that havesemicompetitive elections. For example, Brownlee pointed out:

Introduction 9


Authoritarianism with elections is today the modal form of autocracy,more than twice as common as fully closed, exclusionary authoritari-anism … A third of the developing world’s governments permitconstrained pluralistic competition but prevent the regular rotation ofelites. (2007: 25)

It is very likely that some authoritarian hybrids were included in his assess-ment that one-third of the countries in the developing world were ruled byregimes with semicompetitive elections, and that these regimes were twice ascommon as authoritarian regimes that did not employ semicompetitive elec-tions. Similarly, some hybrids were probably included in his assessment that‘from 1975 to 2000 forty-four states introduced limited multiparty electionsunder conditions of continued autocracy’ (Ibid.). So a line needs to bedrawn between authoritarian hybrids and disguised dictatorships by identi-fying a defining characteristic that clearly distinguishes the democraticallydisguised dictatorship from a hybrid mixture of dictatorship and democ-racy.

Drawing a line and identifying a defining characteristic in theoreticalterms is relatively straightforward if it applies the concept of non-democra-tic rule that appears in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In their analysis of howpersonal, military and one-party rule are established, these chapters concep-tualize the process as a seizure or misappropriation of power and an expro-priation of public offices/powers. And Weber argued that the appropriationof power or powers originated even further back in history – in the primevalshift from ‘patriarchalism’ to ‘patrimonialism’ that became the basis formonarchical rule. In patriarchal communities a particular individual ‘isdesignated by a definite rule of inheritance’ to govern but after the shift topatrimonialism the members of the group are ‘treated like subjects.Previously the master’s authority appeared as a preeminent group right,now it turns into his personal right, which he appropriates in the same wayas he would any ordinary object of possession’ (Weber, 1978 [1920]: 232).By appropriating power and making it an inherited possession this primevalmonarchical rule became the first milestone in the historical evolution ofnon-democratic rule. In more modern times an appropriation of power hasinvolved public offices/powers being expropriated, thieved, notably througha seizure of power by coup or revolution or through misappropriation ofpower by parties or presidents that have been elected to public office. It hasoften been a theft of public offices/powers that were publicly owned by thepeople of a democracy, with particular individuals being designated to holdpublic office not by ‘a definite rule of inheritance’ but by a definite rule ofelection.

Such designation by a rule of election was identified by Schumpeter in the1940s as the defining characteristic of democracy. His still very influentialtheory of democracy had marked resemblances to Weber’s unfinished



theory of democracy (see Preface) but was much broader and systematic.According to Schumpeter’s definition, democracy uses electoral competitionto designate the individuals who will have the public offices/powers with the‘power to decide’. He defined ‘the democratic method’ as an ‘institutionalmethod for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire thepower to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’,specifically ‘free competition for a free vote’ (1974 [1942]: 269, 271). Heintended this to be a realistic definition of democracy which included cases‘that are strikingly analogous to the economic phenomena we label “unfair”or “fraudulent” competition or restraint of competition’ (Ibid.: 271). Butpolitical science now has a less tolerant attitude towards cases of markedlyimperfect electoral competition, and they are likely to be categorized insteadas examples of the earlier-mentioned ‘soft’ or ‘near-democratic’ end of thebroad range included in the hybrid competitive-authoritarian category.

However, it is the other end of the range – the ‘hard’ or ‘near-full author-itarian’ end – that poses the crucial problem of distinguishing betweenhybrid authoritarianism and the regimes that in this text are described asdisguised dictatorships. Describing a defining characteristic in practical,real-world terms at this end of the range is no less problematic than at thedemocracy/near-democratic end. Even experts on the hybrid category ofcompetitive authoritarianism acknowledged that there were borderlinecases, such as Azerbaijan and Singapore, which they had judged ‘insuffi-ciently competitive’ to be included in their sample but ‘that arguably couldbe included’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 34). A different sort of borderlineproblem arises when using the appropriating characteristic – in practical,real-world terms – to draw the line between such a sample and the disguiseddictatorships.

In practical terms the defining characteristic of democratically disguiseddictatorships is that they ‘won’t give up their ill-gotten gains without a fight’ –they will not relinquish their expropriated public offices/power without astruggle outside the electoral arena. Their semicompetitive elections are guar-anteed by measures that prevent the regime from ever being dispossessed byelectoral means alone. For example, the elections will be rigged before or afterthe vote count or a judicial intervention will prevent the electorally victoriousopposition from assuming power. The opposition therefore cannot takepower by electoral means alone but only by supplementing or replacing elec-toral struggle with ‘other means’, such as civil war, street protests or interna-tional political and economic pressure. So there is a real-world – and readilyunderstood – criterion for assessing whether a regime should be categorized asnot some form of hybrid but instead a dictatorship that has adopted the third-phase format of hiding behind a democratic disguise.

The third-phase format of democratically disguising dictatorship is acentral concern of Chapters 8 and 9, with their focus on non-democraticregimes’ adaptation to the dramatic democratizing change in the world’s

Introduction 11


political climate. But this evolutionary perspective is much less significant inearlier chapters, which prefer a developmental, life-cycle perspective and arefocused on regimes’ emergence, consolidation, governance and democrati-zation. And neither perspective greatly aids navigation through the diversetheoretical approaches surveyed in Chapter 1 which, instead, adopts a ‘whorules’ (types) and ‘how do they rule’ (forms) perspective that occasionally re-emerges in later chapters.



abdicated transitions 213Abdullah, King 55abjectly failed states 199, 201absolutist monarchy 46–7absolutist personal rulers 66administrative apparatus, party 151, 157administrative bureaucracy 178–9administrative rationalization 222–3advocacy coalition 155Afghanistan 199, 201, 203Africa 79–80, 82

democracy-preventing resource curse251

military regimes and economic crisis168

neopatrimonialism 138state-building failings 187–92sub-Saharan 242, 243term limits 241‘third wave’ of democratization 208,

210African one-party states 1, 7–8, 87, 93–4,

99, 115performance 168policy 149

African socialism 116, 149African ‘weak state’ 173–4agency/structure perspective 102–3Alawite sect 136–7Alchian, A. 31Aliyev, H. 238Aliyev, I. 238Alliance (Malaysia) 232ambiguous one-party regimes 232–4American revolution 49anti-competitive state systems 189–92, 193anti-personalist transitions 214–16‘Arab anomaly’ 208, 209Arab disguised dictatorships 249–50Arab ruling monarchies 50–6Arab Spring 52, 208, 210, 214, 223–4,

249, 250ARENA party 126, 128Arendt, H. 15Argentina 59–60, 159–60, 230–2armies 45, 46Asad, B. 137, 138Asad, H. 58, 136–7, 138, 166assembly of Estates 45

authoritarian hybrid regimes 2, 3, 9–11,256

authoritarianism 2, 14, 19, 20–5autogolpe (self-coup) 58–9, 61–2, 67, 92autonomous military 215Azerbaijan 196, 238–9

Baathism 136–7Bahrain 52bandwagon effect 99bargaining 182–4Barisan Nasional (BN) 232Belarus 239–40belief in democracy 91, 100Ben Ali, Z. El Abidine 236, 252benefice 138Bennett, A. 72, 102, 141Berlin Conference 188blackmail 77Blaydes, L. 249–50Bolivia 95Bolsheviks 94, 96, 98borderline problems 11Bosnian civil war 203Brazil 59, 83, 84, 126, 128Britain 45, 46–7, 49–50, 243

and monarchical rule in the Middle East50–1

broad ideological legitimation 115–16Brooker, P. 2, 30–1, 35, 65, 87, 97–8,

229Brown, N.J. 220Brownlee, J. 9–10, 221, 233Brzezinski, Z.K. 15–17, 19bureaucracy 150–1, 151–4

administrative and state-building178–9

bureaucratic public company 46–8China 153–4, 159military-driven bureacratization 180–1

bureaucratic authoritarianism 23, 24bureaucratic pluralism 175–6Burke, E. 48–9Burma/Myanmar 125–6, 160–3, 196Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)

125–6

Cabinet 28calculativeness 71, 101

281

Index


calculus of intervention/usurpation seeforensic calculus of intervention/usurpation

calculus of voting under autocracy 113Cambodia 148, 234Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 234camouflage 2capacity

intervention 77–8; capacity-reducingfactors 74, 78–9

state 176–8Carayannis, E.G. 155–6Cardenas, President 229Carothers, T. 217cartelization 188, 191, 226Caspersen, N. 197Castro, F. 97–8, 127, 135–6Castro, R. 136Caucasus 238Centeno, M.A. 185, 186–7Central Asia 100–1, 237–8changes of government 4charisma 42–3, 132–3Chávez, President 79Chiang Kai-shek 143Chile 162, 163China 98, 142, 143, 156, 256–7

bureaucracy 153–4, 159bureaucratic pluralism 175–6counterinsurgency failure 195–6Cultural Revolution 147, 164economic liberalization 148–9economic policy 146–7Great Leap Forward 146–7, 164internet 121legitimacy 112, 117NGOs 121performance 170policy-making institutions 156–9revolutionary civil war 96revolutionary dictatorship’s state-

building 182, 183spontaneous movements 118, 156Standing Committee of the Politburo

156–7warlordism 199

civil service 123–4civil supremacy, belief in 74, 76civil war 96–7civilian legitimacy 74, 80–1civilianization of control 124–8Clark, J.F. 81class self-interest 75–6, 89–90closed authoritarian regimes 246coalition, protective 186, 187

coercion 107coercive capability 227–8, 251–2collective action 103–5collective party leadership 158–9communist regimes 1, 7–8, 29, 86–7

class self-interest 90decline in party control 131degeneration into personal rule 62–3,

66democratization 208–9electoral misappropriation of power 93exploitation of opportunity 98–9legitimation 111–12, 115, 117party policy-making institutions 156–9performance 169–70policy 146–9revolutionary seizure of power 96–8strengthening of control by communist

parties 128–30totalitarianism 13, 14, 15–16, 17, 18

competitionmilitary 180–1, 182, 187–8phoney 225, 235–41, 250–1

competitive-authoritarian hybrids 2, 3, 36,37, 226–8, 232–4

competitive electoral authoritarianism36–7, 246

concordance theory of civil-military relations82

consolidation 5, 106–39legitimacy see legitimacyneed to consolidate 107strengthening control see control

constitutional monarchy 47, 49–50constitutional powers 57constraining institutions 150, 162Consultative Council 55control

strengthening 107, 117–39; militarydictatorships 121–8; partydictatorships 128–32; personaldictatorships 132–9

totalitarianism 14–15, 16, 18–20cooption of opponents 249–50coordinated market economy (CME) 38corporate coups 77–9corporate self-interest 73–5, 88, 89, 104corporatism 141–3corruption 138, 187–8, 248–9Council of Guardians 244countercoups 69, 213–14, 215counterinsurgency failure 195–8coups 6–7, 69–70, 74, 77–9, 82, 215

see also countercoupscreeping communism 93

282 Index


creeping-coup autogolpe 61–2crony capitalism 178, 223Crouch, H. 137–8Cuba 97–8, 135–6, 195–6, 208Cultural Revolution 147, 164Czechoslovakia 93

de facto states 197death, transition due to dictator’s 213–14Decalo, S. 79–80decolonization 68

democratizing 98, 99–101decolonizing democratization 93–4degeneration into personal rule 61, 62–7delegative democracy 35democracy 3–4, 10–11

belief in 91, 100comparisons of policy with dictatorship

140–2competitive authoritarianism and 37definition 38economic growth and 170–1

democratically disguised dictatorships 4–5,8–12, 62, 106, 204, 225–54, 256–7

control 139democratization 246–54governance 225, 241–6one-party states 2–3, 87, 226puppet parties 225, 226, 235–41semicompetitive-elections disguise

225–34; historical evolution229–34

democratization 35, 206–22, 256disguised dictatorships 246–54military regimes’ policy of 143reversals, hybrids and double movements

218–22state disintegration through 201–5‘third wave’ of 2, 5, 8, 206, 207–11transitions from dictatorship 206,

211–17democratizing decolonization 98,

99–101demonstration effect 202–3, 207–8Demsetz, H. 31Deng Xiaoping 158–9depoliticizing authoritarianism

(privatization) 22–3destroyed dictatorships 192–201

failure in war 193–8Diamond, L. 34, 218, 245dictated transitions 213, 215direct military rule 26, 28disguised dictatorships see democratically

disguised dictatorships

disintegrationdisintegrated dictatorship 199–201through democratization 201–5

disposition (motives and mood) 70–1diversity 1, 4, 255, 257Doe, President 200double movement 220–2dual-function doctrine 114–15dual military regimes 26, 28–9dynastic monarchies 44, 53–6

Eastern Europe 117, 169, 208–9economic crisis 167–8economic liberalization 148–9, 223economic miracles and disasters 171economic performance 167–71

assessing 170–1economic policy 143–4, 145, 163

communist regimes 146–9Ecuador 78Egypt 114, 125, 126, 144–5, 248–9elections

limited choice 111–13manipulation of 50, 226non-competitive 111, 112semicompetitive see semicompetitive

electionssemi-democracy 35stealing of 227–8

electoral authoritarianism 36–7, 246electoral fraud 248–9electoral legitimation 110–14electoral misappropriation of power 86,

92–4, 100electoralist criterion 81–2electronic dictatorship 257elite cooption 249–50elite/paramilitary units 74, 80England see Britainepistemic communities 155–6Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)

90–1, 99, 196Ertman, T. 45, 46established one-party states 30Estates-General assembly 45, 47Ethiopia 90–1, 196ethnic self-interest 75, 90Europe 191

European bureacratization 179–80European monarchies 44–8, 257European state-building 179–81

Evans, P.B. 172exclusionary one-party states 30expropriated presidential monarchs 250Ezrow, N. 64, 66, 166

Index 283


factional coups 77–9Fahd, King 55failed states 192–201failure, fear of 74, 76, 91–2, 100Faisal, King 55fascist regimes 1, 7, 29, 86–7

corporatism 142, 143policy 145–6revolutionary seizure of power 94–5,

95–6strengthening of control by fascist parties

130–1totalitarianism 13, 14, 15–16see also Italian Fascist regime; Nazism

fear 33of failure 74, 76, 91–2, 100

feudal monarchies 44–5financial incentives 104Finer, S.E. 26–7, 27–9, 70–2, 73–5, 75–6,

77–8, 79, 80, 81, 103, 108, 123, 144,180–1, 210, 211

First, R. 123–4First World War 194forced growth 169foreign policy 141forensic calculus of intervention/usurpation

68, 70–2, 74, 100theorizing 101–5see also means; motive; opportunity

formal rationality 39–40, 70–1formal rationalization 102, 158–9, 221,

222–4formal rules of the game 150, 162Forrest, J.B. 174France 46, 47

French Revolution 49, 180, 181Franco, F. 127, 135, 214Frantz, E. 64, 66, 166free agent personal rule 64–5Friedrich, C.J. 15–17, 19Fujimori, President 84–5Fukuyama, F. 176, 192FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an

Independent, Neutral, Peaceful andCooperative Cambodia) 234

future 256–7

Gandhi, J. 250Gaza 91Geisel, President 128gender, policy and 141George, A.L. 72, 102, 141Germany, Nazi see Nazismgerrymandering 231, 232, 233–4Gestapo 131, 133

Ghana 93, 190Giustozzi, A. 199–200, 204global standards 155–6goals 27, 28, 30Golkar 126, 236Gorbachev, M. 202governance 5, 140–71

democratically disguised dictatorships225, 241–6

institutions 149–56performance 166–71policies 5, 140–9policy-making see policy-makingstate-building see state-building

Great Leap Forward 146–7, 164Great Terror 134Grzymala-Busse, A. 243–5guerrilla bands 135–6

Hall, P.A. 38, 102Hamas 91Hammond, T.T. 93hegemonic electoral authoritarianism

36–7, 246hegemonic party autocracy 247hegemonic party system 34Helliwell, J.F. 170Herb, M. 44, 51, 52–4, 55–6Herbst, J. 187–8, 188–9, 190hereditary charisma 43Hertog, S. 56Hezbollah 91, 99hierarchies 39Hitler, A. 57, 62, 93, 132, 146

approach to policy-making 164–5SS and Gestapo 130–1, 133

Hough, J.F. 159Howard, M.M. 246Hun Sen 234Hungary 148, 170Huntington, S.P. 27, 28, 29–30, 180,

207–8, 218, 257Hussein, S. 58, 134, 137hybrid regimes (hybrids) 2, 3, 36–9, 256

authoritarian hybrids 2, 3, 9–11, 256competitive-authoritarian 2, 3, 36, 37,

226–8, 232–4democratization 218–20semicompetitive elections 226–8

Ibn Saud 51, 54ideological legitimation 113–17ideological one-party states 7–8, 29, 257

see also communist regimes; fascistregimes

284 Index


ideological self-interest 88–9, 100, 104ideology

absence in authoritarianism 19, 21personalist policy-making 163–4totalitarianism 15, 16, 19

imperialism 145–6implementation bias 175–6implicit bargaining 184implicit pacts 212incentives 146

selective 103–5‘independent’ candidates 238–9, 249indirect limited military regimes 83, 253–4indirect military regimes 26–7, 28, 82–5indirectly coercive control 120individual self-interest 73–5, 88, 89, 100,

104indoctrination/propaganda system 16–17Indonesia 61–2, 124, 126, 236Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) 236informal rules 221

of the game 150, 162informers 119–20inheritance 41, 44, 57inhibiting motives 74, 76–7, 91–2, 100institutional environment 150institutional legacies 3institutionalized bargaining 182–4institutionalized collective leadership

158–9institutions

authoritarianism 24–5constraining 150, 162of governance 149–56policy-making 156–63

insurgency 195–8warlordism 198, 199–200

intensive growth 169interdemocratic peace hypothesis 141internal cohesion 74, 78–9internal threats 185, 186international legitimacy 81–2internet 121intervention see forensic calculus of

intervention/usurpationIran 2–3, 90, 91

Islamic Republic 240, 242, 244Iraq 51, 120, 131, 133–4, 137, 194–5Islamic Republican Party (IRP) 2–3, 90, 91Italian Fascist regime 14, 95–6, 130,

145–6Corporate State 142, 143

Jackson, R.H. 173, 174Jalal, A. 167

Jalalov, A. 238Janos, A.C. 24Janowitz, M. 78Japan 184Jenkins, B. 152Jennings, I. 47Jordan 51, 52, 54Juche, theory of 147–8judicial formalism 177juntas, military 28, 122–4, 127, 151,

159–63, 242

Kalyvas, S.N. 198Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party

(KPRP) 234Kang, D.C. 178Karimov, President 237–8Katz, R. 188Kazakhstan 237Kenya 112–13Khin Nyunt 161Khomeini, Ayatollah 244Khrushchev, N. 63kleptocracy 138, 190Kuntz, P. 227

land reform 144–5Langston, J. 247–8Latin America 6, 59–60, 122, 149

state-building failings 184–7leader

authoritarianism 19, 21–2figure in totalitarianism 15, 17

leadershipcollective party leadership 158–9Leninist model of party leadership

control 129–30Marxist-Leninist theory of 115military 57–8

Lebanon 91legality 108legitimacy 107, 108–17, 246–7

civilian 74, 80–1deficit 247electoral legitimation 110–14ideological legitimation 113–17international 81–2performance legitimacy 81, 109–10,

117Lenin, V.I. 94, 115Leninist model of party leadership control

129–30less-than-democratic regimes 33–9Levitsky, S. 36, 37, 81–2, 217, 219, 227–8,

233, 234

Index 285


liberal market economy (LME) 38liberation, war of 98, 99, 100Liberia 200Libya 253Lieberthal, K.G. 175limited choice elections 111–13limited political pluralism 19, 21Lindberg, S.I. 251Linz, J.J. 19, 20–3, 33, 34Lipset, S.M. 34, 59–60, 109local/regional officials 190local strongmen 174–5, 189Long, H. 59Lukashenka, President 239–40, 251

Magaloni, B. 113, 215, 230, 247, 248–9,252

Magna Carta 43Mair, P. 188majority-rule principle 221Malaysia 90, 100, 186, 232–4, 245management-by-exception (MBE) 153–4manipulation of elections 50, 226Mao Zedong 57, 62, 66, 158, 164maoist-model strategy 96–8‘March on Rome’ 95–6Marcos, F. 84, 178, 252marketization 148–9, 183markets 39

market-like policy-making 154–6martial law 122Marxism–Leninism 115, 116, 117mass organizations 120material incentives 146Maung Aye 161means 104–5

military rule 68, 71–2, 74, 77–9one-party rule 92–8, 100

Medard, J.-F. 138Meerow, S. 251Mendoza, General 78mentalities, distinctive 19, 21Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM)

229–30Mexico 9, 65, 215, 240–1, 248–9

semicompetitive-elections disguise229–30

Middle East 80, 237monarchical rule 50–6

Migdal, J.S. 174–5militarization of political parties 94–5military colonization of civilian state

124military competition 180–1, 182, 187–8military countercoups 69, 213–14, 215

military coups 6–7, 69–70, 74, 77–9, 82,215

military disengagement/withdrawal frompower 210–11

military-driven bureaucratization 180–1military juntas 28, 122–4, 127, 151,

159–63, 242military leadership 57–8military-party regimes 30–1, 125–7military policy-making institutions

159–63military presidential monarchies 252–3military regimes 1, 5, 6–7, 8, 66–7, 68–85,

106, 255authoritarianism 20–1democratically disguised 229–30,

253–4democratization 210–11forensic framework 70–2indirect 26–7, 28, 82–5legitimacy 110–11, 114–15, 115–16means 68, 71–2, 74, 77–9motive 68, 70–2, 73–7opportunity 68, 70–2, 74, 79–82performance 167–8policies 143–5policy-making institutions 159–63strengthening of control 121–8;

civilianization of control 124–8;juntas 122–4, 127

theoretical approaches 25–9military service 45military-supported regimes 83–5Millett, A.R. 72misappropriation of power 60–7mobilization

authoritarianism 19, 21, 22–3spontaneous 118, 156totalitarianism 18, 19

Mobutu, President 200–1moderator/guardian military regimes 83,

253–4modernization

and authoritarianism 23–4phases of 6–8

monarchical problem 225, 240–1, 250monarchical rule 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 41–2,

42–60, 209–10personalist policy-making 163present-day 42, 50–6Saudi case 54–6shift from patrimonial family firm to

bureaucratic public company 44–8shift from ruling to reigning 41, 48–50see also presidential monarchies

286 Index


monarchical state-building 179–81modern theories of 180–1

monetarism 144, 163monopoly of violence 192–3

loss of 195–8moral incentives 104, 146Morocco 52, 54motive 67, 104

inhibiting motives 74, 76–7, 91–2, 100military rule 68, 70–2, 73–7one-party rule 88–92, 100, 102

Mubarak, H. 249Mukhabarat 133–4multiparty non-competitive elections 111,

112Munich ‘Beer Hall’ Putsch 95Murray, W. 72Muslim Brotherhood 91Mussolini, B. 57, 62, 66, 96, 130, 132–3,

146

Nagorno-Karabakh 196Napoleon Bonaparte 6Napoleon III 59, 61narrow ideological legitimation 114–15Nasser, G. 165–6nation-building 149, 168National Democratic Party (NDP) (Egypt)

249national interest 104

legitimacy 108, 109military rule 73, 74one-party rule 88–9, 100

National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)(Bolivia) 95

National Union (later Arab Socialist Union)126

nationalist regimes 29China 143

navies 46Nazarbayev, President 237Nazism 7, 255

electoral legitimation 111electoral misappropriation of power

92–3Munich ‘Beer Hall’ Putsch 95policy 145–6policy-making 165strengthening of control 130–1totalitarianism 13, 15, 18–20

necessary/sufficient conditions 103negative (opportunity reducing) factors 74,

79–81neopatrimonialism 138, 139, 173–4, 190,

223

net assessment 72, 76–7, 92, 101net benefits 101networks, policy 154–6New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) 238–9new institutionalism 31–2Nicaragua 97, 214Nicolson, H. 47–8Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell) 14–15, 17,

22–3Nkrumah, K. 190non-competitive elections 111, 112non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

121non-state institutions of governance 151Nordlinger, E.A. 27, 28, 69, 71, 75, 80–1,

167, 210–11North Korea 147–8, 169–70numbers 39–40, 221

O’Donnell, G. 23–4, 35, 123, 211–12,212–13, 213–14

official parties 125–7, 128oil-rich Arab monarchies 52, 53Olson, M. 103–4one-party rule 5, 40, 66–7, 86–105, 255

ambiguous 232–4democratically disguised 252means 92–8, 100motive 88–92, 100, 102opportunity 98–101theorizing the forensic calculus of

usurpation 101–5transition from 215–16

one-party states 1, 40, 106African see African one-party states democratically disguised dictatorships

2–3, 87, 226ideological 7–8, 29, 257; see also

communist regimes; fascist regimeslegitimacy 115, 116military versions 30–1, 125–7policy-making institutions 156–9strengthening of control 128–32; later

declines in party control 131–2structural forms 87theoretical approaches 25, 29–32

opportunity 67, 105military rule 68, 70–2, 74, 79–82negative (opportunity reducing) factors

74, 79–81one-party rule 98–101

opposition parties hampering measures 226, 231, 233puppet parties 111, 112, 113, 225, 226,

235–41

Index 287


Organization for African Unity (OAU) 189organizational leadership 57–8organizational self-interest 89, 100, 104orthodox (Stalinist) communist economic

model 146, 147Orwell, G. 14–15, 17, 22–3Ottaway, M. 36Owen, R. 209

pacted transitions 211–12, 213, 215Page, E.C. 152Pakistan 124Paraguay 236paramilitary/elite units 74, 80Park, President 61parliament 45, 47–8parliamentary democracy 48–50, 243parliamentary kingship 47–8Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) 130Partido Peronista (later Partido Peronista

Masculino) 231Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)

65, 215, 230, 248party administrative apparatus 151, 157party dictatorships see one-party rule; one-

party statesparty policy-making institutions 156–9party politburos 129, 151, 156–7, 162,

242party-state regime 30–1party transitions 215–16patriarchalism 10patrimonialism 10, 43, 137–8, 190

patrimonial family firm 44–6patriotism 108, 109patronage-based punishment 230peace 190–1People’s Action Party (PAP) 232, 233People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 237–8People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 96, 98performance 166–71

African one-party states 168assessing economic performance 170–1communist regimes 169–70military regimes 167–8

performance legitimacy 81, 109–10, 117Perlmutter, A. 24–5, 27, 28Perón, E. 231Perón, J. 59–60, 230–2Persia 51personal-presidential government 28–9personal rule 5, 40, 56–67, 86, 87–8, 255

Burma 161–3declines in party control 131–2degeneration into 61, 62–7

by dictatorship 42, 56–60establishing 42, 60–7military regimes 127presidential monarchy 42, 56–60strengthening of control by personal

dictators 132–9theoretical approaches 31–3

personalist policy-making 163–6, 242–3personalist transitions 213–16personality cult 132–3Perthes, V. 138Peru 84–5, 144, 163–4Philippines 84, 178phoney competition 225, 235–41, 250–1Pinochet, President 162, 163plebiscites (referendums) 6, 111, 112Polanyi, K. 220policies 5, 140–9

African one-party states/socialist regimes149

communist regimes 146–9democratically disguised dictatorships

241–2fascist regimes 145–6military regimes 143–5performance 166–71

policy community 155policy-implementing problems 172, 173–8

China’s bureaucratic pluralism 175–6state capacity 176–8weak state 173–5

policy-making 5institutions 156–63; democratically

disguised dictatorships 242–3;military institutions 159–63; partyinstitutions 156–9

personalist 163–6policy networks 154–6politburos 129, 151, 156–7, 162, 242political parties

military regimes and official parties125–7, 128

opposition see opposition partiespresidential monarchs and leadership of

57–8political police 118–20, 133–4political rationalization 39–40, 221, 222,

256politicization of military, fear of 74, 76populist authoritarianism 23populist presidential monarchies 58–60,

166pioneering 237–40semicompetitive-election disguise

230–2

288 Index


populistic regimes 22post-communist wave of democratization

219praetarian societies 27praetorianism 26preconditions for state-building 186, 187presidency 150–1presidential democracy 49presidential monarchies 9, 40, 42, 56–60,

137–8‘Arab anomaly’ and 209democratically disguised 250–2, 252–3populist see populist presidential

monarchiesprimogeniture 44principal-agent relationship 31–2

personal rule 63–6principal-agent reversal 66privatizing authoritarianism 22–3procedural rationalization 40, 64, 158–9,

222, 240process tracing 102proletariat (proles) 22–3, 115propaganda/indoctrination system 16–17protection of liberty 176–7protection pacts 186protection rackets 186Prussia 46, 180–1Przeworski, A. 4, 140–1, 164, 170–1pseudodemocracy 34psychological incentives 104puppet parties 111, 112, 113, 225, 226,

235–41pure ideal types 38

quasi-civilianized military rule 26, 28quasi-economic theory of democracy 152

rationalization 177double movement and 220–2formal 102, 158–9, 221, 222–4political 39–40, 221, 222, 256procedural 40, 64, 158–9, 222, 240rather than democratization 222–4revolutions and bureaucratic 183

Rebel Army 97–8, 136Red Army 129regime-type factors 209–10regional bias 208regional/local officials 190regional self-interest 90–1reigning monarchies 41, 48–50religious social self-interest 90, 91Reno, W. 200–1rentier state theory (RST) 52–3, 251

repeat of past failures, fear of 74, 76representation 52representative assemblies 45repression 118–19, 245–6republics 49resource curse 251reversals 218reverse distinctiveness 141revolutionary dictatorships’ state-building

181–4revolutionary one-party states 30revolutionary party 94, 115, 229–30revolutionary seizure of power 92, 94–8,

100robust competition 243–5Roessler, P.G. 246Rome, ancient 25–6, 56Rosberg, C.G. 173, 174Ross, M.L. 53Roth, G. 33Rouquié, A. 185Rueschemeyer, D. 172rule of election 10–11rule of law 176–7rules 39–40, 221

of the game 150, 162ruling monarchies see monarchical ruleRussia 3, 94, 96, 98, 129–30

Central Committee 129Politburo 129Russian Revolution 182

Russian Social Democratic Labour Party(Bolsheviks) 94, 96, 98

Rustow, D.A. 211

Sabatier, P.A. 155sacking 63–4Saich, T. 118, 121, 142, 159, 175–6Sandinista revolution 97Saud, Prince 55Saudi Arabia 51, 53–4, 54–6Schapiro, L. 18, 19Schedler, A. 36, 227Schiff, R. 82Schmitter, P.C. 211–12, 212–13, 213–14Schumpeter, J. 10–11, 38, 118, 152, 179,

243Schutzstaffel (SS) 130–1, 133Second World War 7, 194sectoral/tribal/family loyalty 136–7,

139secularization 144–5security services 130–1, 133–5selective incentives 103–5semi-authoritarianism 36

Index 289


semicompetitive elections 9, 11, 87, 113democratically disguised dictatorships

225–34; historical evolution229–34

semi-democracy 34–5semistates 195–7shadow state 223sharia (Islamic law) 55shirking 31, 63–4Singapore 100, 186, 232, 233, 245six-point syndrome 16, 19Skocpol, T. 98, 172, 181–2, 183Slater, D. 103, 186, 233, 245social allies 186, 187social incentives 104social policy 141, 143–4, 145–6social self-interest 104

military rule 73, 74, 75–6one-party rule 88, 89–91, 100

socialism 117African 116, 149policy in socialist regimes 149

societal corporatism 142socioeconomic change 120Somalia 119, 201, 203–4Somaliland 203–4Somoza regime 97, 214Soskice, D. 38South Korea 61Soviet Union 7, 8, 17, 93, 117, 165, 169

disintegration through democratization201–2

totalitarianism 18–20Spain 135split-favouring tendency 247–9‘spoiler’ phoney candidates 239–40spontaneous mobilization 118, 156Stalin, J. 57, 62, 66, 132, 134–5, 164, 165state-building 5, 172–205, 245

failings 184–92modern theories of monarchical

180–1policy-implementing problems 172,

173–8revolutionary dictatorships 181–4state disintegration through

democratization 201–5state failure and destroyed dictatorships

192–201successes 178–84

state capacity 176–8state corporatism 142state-imposed imperfect competition

226state institutions of governance 150–1

State Law and Order Restoration Council(SLORC), later State Peace andDevelopment Council (SPDC)160–3

state scope 176stealing of elections 227–8Stepan, A. 144strategic approach 217Strayer, J.R. 179Stroessner, General 236subjective/objective perspective 70–2, 103sub-Saharan Africa 242, 243Suharto, President 61–2, 137–8, 236Sukarno, President 61–2sultanism 33, 43–4, 166Sundhaussen, U. 211Sunni Muslims 137surveillance 74, 80Syria 136–7, 253

tacit bargaining 184, 191tacit pacts 212Tanzania 112, 149taxation 52, 246Taylor, C. 200Taylor, R.H. 160–3technology 22–3, 119–20, 121Teorell, J. 217term limits 240–1territorial boundaries 188–9Than Shwe 161Thein Sein 161–3theoretical approaches 5, 13–40

authoritarianism 14, 19, 20–5less-than-democratic rule 33–9military regimes 25–9one-party states 25, 29–32personal rule 31–3rationalization of politics 39–40totalitarianism 13, 14–20, 20–1

‘third wave’ of democratization 2, 5, 8,206, 207–11

Third World 174–5Thompson, M.R. 227Thompson, W.R. 75Thomson, A. 82threat of coup 74, 77Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)

91Tikrit 137Tilly, C. 181, 182–4, 186Titoism 148Tordoff, W. 131totalitarianism 1–2, 13, 14–20, 20–1

decline of the concept 18–20non-presidential 57

290 Index


tradition-legitimated rule 42, 43–4traditional authoritarianism 23transitions approach 206, 211–17

abdicated transition 213dictated transition 213, 215personalist and party 213–16weaknesses of the approach 216–17

tribal/family loyalty 136–7, 139tricurial representation 45Tucker, R.C. 29Tunisia 223, 236Turkey 144–5Turkmenistan 100–126 July Movement 97–8typology of legitimate rule 42–3

United Development Party (PPP) 236United Malays National Organization

(UMNO) 90, 232–4United States 59unrecognized states 197, 203–4usurpation see forensic calculus of

intervention/usurpationUzbekistan 237–8

vanguard party 94, 115Vargas, G. 59, 83, 84Velasco, President 63–4, 163–4Venezuela 78–9veto players 65–6Vietnam 97, 148, 198violence 4

monopoly of 192–3; loss of 195–8state use of 118–19, 255–6under parity 198

vote-rigging 229voting

calculus of voting under autocracy113

rights 48–9

war 1, 191civil war 96–7failure in destroys dictatorship

193–8of liberation 98, 99, 100

warlordism 198, 199–201, 204Way, L.A. 36, 37, 81–2, 217, 219, 227–8,

233, 234weak state 173–5

African 173–4vs local strength 174–5

weakening of state power 98–9, 100Weber, M. 10, 38, 39–40, 42–3, 107, 138,

177, 179–80, 192Western leverage 82Western Sahara 197Williamson, O.E. 39, 71, 101, 150Wilson, A. 235, 250–1

Yemen 253Young, C. 168Yuan Shih-kai 199Yugoslavia 148, 170, 202–3

Zaire 200–1Zakaria, F. 177Zambia 173Zuk, G. 75

Index 291



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Contents€¦ · Latin American phenomenon but spread in the twentieth century to Africa and parts of Asia. By the 1960s, military dictatorships had become so common that the study