Contest Annual Report for 2014

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CONTEST TheUnitedKingdom’s

Strategyfor

CounteringTerrorism:

AnnualReportfor2014

Cm9048


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©Crowncopyright2015

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Contents

The United Kingdom’s Strategy for CounteringTerrorism

Annual Report for 2014

Foreword 5

Part 1 Introduction 7

TheThreatfromTerrorism 7

Part 2 Our response 9

Pursue 9

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 13

Prevent 14International Collaboration 18

Protect 19

Engagement with and Support for ourSecurity Industry 21

Prepare 22

Conclusion 23


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4 CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report


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ForewordbytheHomeSecretary 5

ForewordbytheHomeSecretary

TherewerenosuccessfulterroristattacksinGreatBritainlastyear,but2014wasneverthelessanexceptionallychallengingperiodforcounterterrorisminthiscountry.

InAugustthethreatlevel,whichissetbytheindependentJointTerrorismAnalysisCentre,wasraised,mainlyasaresultofdevelopmentsinSyriaandIraq,wheretheIslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL)hasemergedasthemostbrutalandviolentoftheterroristgroupsoperatinginthatregion.ThebarbaricmurderoftwoBritishandotherhostagesinSyria,apparentlybyanISILmembercloselyconnectedtothiscountry,underlinedthethreatposedbythatgrouptoBritishnationalsoverseasandintheUK.

Aterroristattackinthiscountryisnowhighlylikely.Theseriesofattacksanddisruptedplots

wesawacrossEuropein2014andthisyearshowhowthethreatwefaceischanging.SomeinvolvedpeoplewhohadtravelledtoSyriaandIraq.Othersappeartohaveinvolvedpeopleencouragedbyterroristpropagandatoconductattacksintheirowncountries,oftenusingrelativelyunsophisticatedmethods.

ThepoliceandsecurityandintelligenceagenciescontinuetodoextraordinaryworktodisruptterroristthreatstotheUKandourinterests,butwemustensuretheycontinuetohavethepowersandcapabilitiestheyneed.ThatiswhythisGovernmenthasbroughtforwardlegislationtoaddressanumberofthespecificchallengeswearecurrentlyfacing.Wehavealsoprovidedadditionalfundingforthesecurityandintelligenceagenciesandpolicetoincreasetheirinvestigativeresource;andfortheexpansionofthecrossGovernmentPrevent

programmetotackletheideologythatfeeds,supportsandsanctionsterrorism.

TherecentterribleeventsinParisandCopenhagenservedasatragicreminderthat2015willbenolesschallenging.Whileourstrategicresponsetothechangingthreatwillcontinuetoevolve,Iamconfidentthatthestrategyprovidestherightfoundationforourcounterterrorismwork.

Theresa May MP

Home Secretary


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Part1:Introduction 7

PART1:INTRODUCTION

1.1 InJuly2011,theGovernmentpublishedanewversionoftheUK’scounterterrorismstrategy,CONTEST,andcommittedtoprovidinganannualupdateonourcounterterroristwork.ThisreportcoverstheperiodfromJanuarytoDecember2014.

ThereportdoesnotcoverNorthernIrelandRelatedTerrorism(NIRT),responsibilityforwhichlieswiththeSecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland.TheHomeOfficeleadsonrespondingtothethreatfromNIRTtoGreatBritain.

The threat from terrorism

1.2 Thefrequencyofterrorismaroundtheworldandthenumberoffatalitiesfromterroristattackscontinuetoincrease.In2013(thelatestyearforwhichpublishedstatisticsareavailable)therewerenearly12,000 terroristattacksin91countries–40%morethanin2012.1Justoverhalfofallattacksoccurredinthreecountries:Iraq,

AfghanistanandPakistan.

1.3 InAugust2014,theJointTerrorism AnalysisCentreraisedtheUKthreatlevelto‘SEVERE’from‘SUBSTANTIAL’,meaninganattackintheUKishighlylikely.TheprincipalthreatcontinuestocomefrommilitantIslamistterrorists,notablyinSyriaandIraq.ISILandotherterroristgroupsinSyriaarenowsupportedbyforeignfightersfromtheUKandotherEuropeancountries.About

600 peoplewithextremistconnections

ConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismand

ResponsestoTerrorism(START)–http://www.

start.umd.edu/news/majority2013terrorist-

attacksoccurredjustfewcountries

areamongthemanyBritonswhohavetravelledtotheregionfromtheUK.Manyhavenowreturnedhere.Somearelikelytohavereceivedcombatexperienceandotherterroristrelatedtraining.Terrorismisbeingfuelledbyanunprecedentedquantityofextremistandterroristpropaganda.

1.4 AlQa’idacore,itsaffiliatesandregionalextremistgroupsalsocontinuetoposeathreattotheUKandourinterestsoverseas.AlQa’idaintheArabianPeninsula(AQAP)inYemen,AlShabaabinEastAfrica,

Al Qa’idaintheMaghreb(AQM)aswellasotherterroristgroupsacrossNorthandWest

Africa,haveallcommittedtotryingtoattackWesterninterests.SomeofthesegroupshavepledgedallegiancetoISIL.

1.5 Terroristtacticscontinuetochange. Thoughmanygroupsstillaspiretoconductlargescaleattacks,othersnowadvocateattackswhicharesimple,andcanbeconductedbypeopleactingontheirown.

Kidnapforransomcontinuestobeexploitedbyarangeofextremistgroups,eitherasapropagandatoolorbecausesuchactivityisakeysourceofrevenue.

1.6 TheprincipalterroristthreattoGreatBritaincontinuestobefromIslamistterrorism.However,inFebruary2014therewereseveralattemptedpostalattacksbyDissidentRepublicansonarmyrecruitmentcentresinEngland,areminderthatthethreatfromNIRT

toGreatBritaincontinues.ThereisalsoathreatfromfarrightterrorismacrosstheUK,thoughitremainslowincomparisonwiththeprincipalthreatsweface.

1

http://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countrieshttp://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countrieshttp://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countrieshttp://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countrieshttp://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countrieshttp://www.start.umd.edu/news/majority-2013-terrorist-attacks-occurred-just-few-countries


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Part2:OurResponse 9

PART2:OURRESPONSE

2.1 TheCONTESTstrategyisintendedtodealwithallformsofterrorismandcontinuestobebasedaroundfourmainareasofworkwhichtogetherenableustoreducethethreatswefaceandourvulnerabilities:

• Pursue:theinvestigationanddisruptionofterroristattacks;

• Prevent:worktostoppeoplebecomingterroristsorsupportingterrorismandextremism;

• Protect:improvingourprotectivesecuritytostopaterroristattack;and

• Prepare:workingtominimisetheimpactofanattackandtorecoverfromitasquicklyaspossible.

2.2 Whilethe2011strategyremainsasoundframeworkforourcounterterrorismwork,ourstrategicobjectivesandpriorityactivitieshavecontinuedtoevolvetorespondtochangingthreats.

PURSUE

2.3 ThepurposeofPursueistostopterroristattacksinthiscountrybydetectingandinvestigatingterroristthreats.TherewerenosuccessfulterroristattacksinGreatBritainin2014.However,atleastthreemajorterroristplots2inthiscountryweredisruptedoverthe

2 DGSecurityServicespeechtoRUSI,January

2015–https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/aboutus/

whoweare/staffandmanagement/director-

general/speechesbythedirectorgeneral/

directorgeneralsspeechonterrorism-

technologyandaccountability.html

courseof2014.InthetwelvemonthstoJune2014,therewere239terrorismrelatedarrestsinGreatBritain;82peoplewerechargedwithterrorismrelatedoffencesand29withotheroffences.32ofthepeoplechargedwithterrorismrelatedoffenceshavealreadybeenprosecuted;29ofthesehavebeenconvicted.Overallnumbersofterrorismarrestshaveincreasedbyaroundathirdsince2010,withasignificantincreaseinarrestsrelatingspecificallytoSyriaandIraqto165in2014.

Therewere13 terroristconvictionsrelatedtoSyriaandIraqin2014.

2.4 Atthestartof2014,ourPursueobjectiveswereto:

• ensurethatcounterterrorismpowersremaineffectiveandproportionate;

• improveourabilitytoprosecuteanduseimmigrationandnationalitypowersagainstpeopleforterroristrelatedactivity;

• increasecapabilitiestodetect,investigateanddisruptterroristthreats;

• ensurethatconfidenceintheworkofpartneragenciesismaintainedthrougheffectiveoversight;and

• workwithothercountriesandmultilateralorganisationstoenableustobettertackle

thethreatswefaceatsource.

https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.htmlhttps://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.htmlhttps://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.htmlhttps://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.htmlhttps://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.htmlhttps://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/%20who-we-are/staff-and-management/directorgeneral/speeches-by-the-director-general/%20director-generals-speech-on-terrorismtechnology-and-accountability.html


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10 CONTESTTheUnitedKingdom’sStrategyforCounteringTerrorism–AnnualReport

Effective and proportionate counter-terrorism powers

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act

2.5 MeasuresintheCounterTerrorismandSecurityActstrengthenourPursuepowersandcapabilitiestotacklespecificthreatsrelatingtoSyriaandIraq,includingprovidingadditionalmeanstodisruptthetravelof

foreignfighterstoandfromtheregion,aswellasimprovingourabilitytomanagethemontheirreturn.TheActalsoincludessignificantmeasurestostrengthenaspectsofourPreventandProtectwork.Moredetailonthe

Actisprovidedonpage13.

Prosecution for terrorist offencescommitted overseas

2.6 Wehavealsointroducedmeasuresin

theSeriousCrime(SC)ActtoenableustoprosecutetwomoreterroristoffenceswhencommittedoverseasandstrengthentheadmissibleevidencefortheprosecutioncaseinSyriaandIraqrelatedcases.

Immigration and nationality powers

2.7 Immigrationpowersprovideanimportanttoolindisruptingterroristactivity,wherewecannotprosecuteandconvict

peoplesuspectedofterrorismincourt.In2014wecontinuedtouseimmigrationpowerstodeprivedualnationalsofBritishcitizenshipon‘notconducivetothepublicgood’grounds.Weexcluded15foreignnationalsfromthiscountryonnationalsecuritygroundsand15ongroundsof‘unacceptablebehaviour’including‘hatespeech’.Wehavealsousedproscriptionpowers:theHomeSecretaryproscribed11 terroristorganisationsin2014,sixofwhich

areinvolvedintheSyriacrisis,includingISILanditsaffiliates.Atthetimeofpublication,thereareatotalof11proscribedgroupslinkedtoSyria.

Capabilities to detect, investigate anddisrupt terrorist threats

Additional funding to tackle the terroristthreat relating to Syria and Iraq

2.8 TheGovernmenthasrespondedtotheincreaseinthethreat,particularlyinrelationtoSyriaandIraq,byprovidinganupliftincounterterrorismfunding,primarily

for2015/16.InNovember,thePrimeMinisterannounced£130mofadditionalcounterterrorismfunding,themajorityforfurtherinvestigativeresourcesforthesecurityandintelligenceagenciesandpolice.

Interception and communications data

2.9 Communicationsdata(thewho,where,whenandhowofacommunicationbutnotitscontent)isavitaltoolintheinvestigation

ofcrimeandsafeguardingthepublic.Interceptionofthecontentofcommunicationsisalsocriticaltothepreservationofnationalsecurityandforthepreventionanddisruptionofseriouscrime.Rapidchangesintechnology,andincreasinguseofinternetcommunicationsbysocietyingeneralaswellasgreaterawarenessoftheopportunitiesitpresentsforthecriminalcommunity,meandataisnotalwaysavailabletothepoliceandsecurityandintelligenceagencieswhenitis

neededtoinvestigatespecificterroristrelatedactivity.Withoutaction,crimesenabledbyemailandtheinternetwillincreasinglygoundetectedandunpunished.Asaresult,activitytopreservetheabilityofthesecurity,intelligenceandlawenforcementagenciestoobtaincommunicationsdataandtointerceptcommunicationswithintheappropriatelegalframeworkhascontinuedtobeahighpriority.

2.10 TheDataRetentionandInvestigatory

PowersAct(DRIPA),whichreceivedRoyal AssentinJuly2014,wasemergencylegislationintroducedintoParliamentinresponsetoaEuropeanCourtdecision


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Part2:OurResponse 11

inApril2014whichmadetheEUDataRetentionDirective(DRD)invalid.TheUK’spreviousdataretentionregimewasbasedontheDRD.DRIPAprovidesalegalbasisonwhichdomesticcommunicationscompaniescancontinuetoretaincertaintypesofcommunicationsdata.The

Actalsomadeclearthatanycompanyprovidingtelecommunicationsservicesto

customersintheUKmustcomplywiththeirobligationstoundertakeinterceptionorprovidecommunicationsdatainresponsetolawfulrequests,irrespectiveofwherethosecompaniesarebased.Itclarifiedthedefinitionofacommunicationserviceprovidertoputbeyonddoubtthatitincludesthoseprovidinginternetandcloudbasedservices.DRIPAdidnotextendpowers;insteaditprovidedexistingpowerswithaclearlegalbasis.ProvisionsintheCounter

TerrorismandSecurityAct(seepage13)alsoprovideimportantnewcommunicationsdatacapabilities.ButneitherDRIPAnorthelater

Actaddressedthewidercapabilitiesofthepoliceandsecurityandintelligenceagenciestoaccesscommunicationsdata.ThiswastheareatheDraftCommunicationsDataBillsoughttoaddress,buttherewasnocoalitionagreementandthereforenomajoritytotakethisBillthroughParliament.

2.11 ThePrimeMinisterhasmadeclearthattheissueofcommunicationsdatawillneedtoberevisitedaftertheelection.TheGovernment’sdeliberationswillbeinformedbythefindingsofareviewoftheoperationandregulationofinvestigatorypowerswhichtheIndependentReviewerofTerrorismLegislation,DavidAndersonQC,is nowundertaking.ThereviewwasestablishedbyDRIPAandrequirestheIndependentReviewertoconsidersuchmattersas:

currentandfuturethreatstotheUK;thecapabilitiesneededtocombatthosethreats;theeffectivenessofexistinglegislationand

thecaseforneworamendinglegislation;andtocompleteareportby1May2015.

Terrorist Finance

2.12 TheGovernmentseekstomaketheUKahostileenvironmentforterroristfinancingbyactingagainstfundraisingandthemovementofterroristfinanceinandoutoftheUKandencouragingothercountries

todothesame.Akeytoolinourcounterterroristfinanceresponseisourabilitytodeprivefundstosuspectedterrorists,byfreezingtheirassetsandtheirabilitytoaccessfinance,throughtheUnitedNations

AlQa’idaSanctionsRegime,theEUassetfreezingregimeandourowndomesticlegislation(TerroristAssetFreezingAct2010).

Theseframeworksprohibitmakingfundsoreconomicresourcesavailableto individualsandentitiesdesignatedundertheseregimes.In2014,ninenewdomesticassetfreezeswereimposedonindividualsand,asof31December2014,80accountsofthosedesignatedunderthevariousregimeswerefrozen.

Royal Prerogative powers

2.13 Whereprosecutionisnotpossible,wehavecontinuedtoexercisearangeofpowerstodisruptterroristactivity.UnderRoyal

PrerogativepowersweareabletocancelorrefuseBritishpassportstoindividualswhoseektotraveltoengageinterrorismrelatedactivity.Overthecourseof2014thesepowerswereused24times.

Effective oversight

2.14 Weremaincommittedtoensuringthatpowersandcapabilitiesavailabletothepoliceandsecurityandintelligenceagenciesare

necessaryandproportionateandsubjecttoeffectiveoversight.

2.15 InNovembertheIntelligenceandSecurityCommittee(ISC)ofParliament


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publishedareportontheintelligencerelatingtothemurderofFusilierLeeRigbyin2013.

ThiswasthefirstISCreportpublishedsinceitsremitwasexpandedthroughtheJusticeandSecurityAct2013.Thereportillustratedtherigorouspublicscrutinythatisnowappliedtotheactivitiesoftheintelligenceagenciesinthiscountry.TheGovernment’sresponsewaspublishedinFebruary2015.3

(AnISCreportonprivacyandsecuritywaspublishedinMarch2015,outsidethisreportingperiod.)

2.16 DavidAndersonQC,theIndependentReviewerofTerrorismLegislation,publishedhisfourthannualreportontheTerrorism

ActsinJuly2014.4HehasbeenclearthatweneedtocontinuetoconsidertheUK’scounterterrorismlawsinthecontextoftherapidlychangingthreat.TheGovernment’sfullresponsewaspublishedon12March2015.5

2.17 Asanadditiontothestatutoryoversightarrangements,theCounter

TerrorismandSecurityActincludesapowertoenablethecreationofaPrivacyandCivilLibertiesBoardtosupporttheIndependentReviewerandextendexistingoversightmeasures.

3 GovernmentresponsetotheIntelligenceand

SecurityCommitteeofParliamentReporton

theIntelligenceRelatingtotheMurderofFusilierLeeRigby,published26February2015 –

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/

governmentresponsetoiscreporton-

intelligenceonthemurderoffusilierleerigby4 TheTerrorismActin2013,Reportofthe

IndependentReviewerontheOperationofthe

TerrorismAct2000andPart1oftheTerrorism

Act2006byDavidAndersonQC,publishedJuly

222014–https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.

independent.gov.uk/theterrorismactsin2013-

july2014/ 5

GovernmentresponsetotheannualreportontheoperationoftheTerrorismActsin2013,

published12March2015–https://www.gov.uk/

government/publications/governmentresponse-

totheannualreportontheoperationofthe-

terrorismactsin2013

2.18 Authorisationstointerceptthecontentofanindividual’scommunicationsaresubjecttoindependentscrutinybytheIntelligenceServicesCommissioner,SirMarkWallerQC,andtheInterceptionofCommunicationsCommissioner,SirAnthonyMayQC,whiletheChiefSurveillanceCommissioner,SirChristopherRose,overseestheuseofcovertsurveillance.Eachpublishedannualreports 6

in2014.2.19 Ourworkwithothercountriesandmultilateralorganisationstotackleterroristthreatsisaddressedonpage18.

6 ReportoftheIntelligenceServices

Commissionerfor2013,TheRtHonSirMarkWaller,published26June2014–http://

intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_

HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_

Accessible.pdf

2013AnnualReportoftheInterceptionof

CommunicationsCommissioner,theRt

HonSirAnthonyMay,published8April

2014–http://ioccouk.info/docs/2013%20

Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20

Accessible%20Version.pdf

AnnualReportoftheChiefSurveillance

Commissioner,theRtHonSirChristopher

Rose,published4September2014–https://

osc.independent.gov.uk/wpcontent/

uploads/2014/09/AnnualReportoftheChief-

SurveillanceCommissionerfor20132014laid4-

September2014.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigbyhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigbyhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigbyhttps://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013http://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttps://osc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Annual-Report-of-the-Chief-Surveillance-Commissioner-for-2013-2014-laid-4-September-2014.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttp://iocco-uk.info/docs/2013%20Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20IOCC%20Accessible%20Version.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttp://intelligencecommissioner.com/docs/40707_HC304IntelligenceServicesCommissioner_Accessible.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-the-annual-report-on-the-operation-of-the-terrorism-acts-in-2013https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/the-terrorism-acts-in-2013-july-2014/https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigbyhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigbyhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-report-on-intelligence-on-the-murder-of-fusilier-lee-rigby


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COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY ACT 2015

FollowingtheincreaseintheterroristthreatlevelinAugust2014,thePrimeMinisterannouncednewlegislationtoensurethatthepolice,andsecurityandintelligenceagencies,havetheappropriatelegalpowersandcapabilitiestheyneedtotackleSyriaandIraqrelatedterroristthreats,includingtheabilitytostoppeopletravellingtofightintheregion.

TheCounterTerrorismandSecurityAct2015addstoexistingpowersby:disruptingtheabilityofpeopletotravelabroadtofight,andtoreturnhere;enhancingourabilityto

monitorandcontroltheactionsofthoseintheUKthatposeathreat;andcombatingtheunderlyingideologythatfeeds,supportsandsanctionsterrorism.

TheActcontainsthefollowingmeasures:

• Temporary Passport Seizure:providingthepolicewithanewpoweratthebordertoseizetemporarily(initiallyfor14days,extendablewithcourtpermissiontoamaximumof30)thepassportsandothertraveldocumentsofoutboundindividualssuspectedofintendingtotraveltoengageinterroristrelatedactivity;

• Temporary Exclusion Order:temporarilydisruptingthereturnofaBritishcitizensuspectedofinvolvementinterroristactivityabroad,ensuringthattheirreturnismanagedbythepolice;

• Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMS):thelegalthresholdforimposingaTPIMnoticehasbeenraisedtothe‘balanceofprobabilities’.Theregimenowincludespowersto:relocateasubject,restrictasubject’straveloutsidetheareawheretheyreside,requireasubjectnottomeetwithorganisationsorotherpersonsspecifiedandprohibitsthemfromacquiring/holdingafirearmslicense,offensiveweaponsor explosives.ThemaximumsentenceforbreachingaTPIMtravelmeasurehasbeenincreasedfromfivetotenyears;

• Internet Protocol Resolution:amendingDRIPAtoimprovelawenforcementagencies’abilitytoidentifywhichdeviceorindividualisresponsibleforsendingacommunicationontheinternet;

• Border Security:enhancingaviation,shippingandinternationalrailsecurity,withprovisionsrelatingtopassengerdata,authoritytocarry(i.e.‘nofly’schemes)andsecurityandscreeningmeasures;

• Prevent:creatingadutyonarangeofGovernmentorganisationsworkingwiththepublic,includingthepolice,localauthorities,prisons,schoolsanduniversities,topreventpeoplebeingdrawnintoterrorism;

• Channel:puttingChannel–ourexistingvoluntaryprogrammeforpeopleatriskofradicalisation–onastatutorybasis,toensureitisdeliveredconsistentlynationwide;


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• Amendments to Terrorism Act 2000:amendmentsregardingmeasurespreventingreimbursementofransompaymentsmadetoterroristorganisations;andthescopeofthepowerforexaminationofgoodsatornearports;and

• Privacy and Civil Liberties Board:toenablethecreationofaboardtosupporttheIndependentReviewerofTerrorismLegislationonprivacyandcivillibertiesissues.

ThelegislationwasintroducedtoParliamenton26November2014andreceivedRoyal Assenton12February2015,havingreceivedcrosspartysupport.Themeasuresarenowbeingimplementedbythepolice,MI5andothers.Urgentsecondarylegislationrequiredfor

somenewpowerswillbeconsideredbyParliamentinMarch,priortotheGeneralElection.GuidancetothemanyorganisationsaffectedbythenewPreventdutywaspublishedforconsultationon18December2013.RevisedguidancewillbepublishedinMarchfollowingtheapprovalofParliamentthroughtheaffirmativeresolutionprocedure.


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PREVENT

2.20 ISILandsomeotherterroristgroupsareincreasinglytryingtoinspireloneactsofterrorism(mainlyinnonIslamiccountries)andtoencourageyoungpeopletojointerroristgroupsoverseas.Theirtacticsmakepreventativeworkevenmoreimportant.Wecontinuetoimplementthemainaspects

ofthestrategypublishedin2011butthechangingnatureofthethreathasrequiredachangeinemphasis.

2.21 OurkeyobjectivesunderPreventhavebeento:

• respondtotheideologyofextremismandterrorismandthethreatswefacefromthosewhopromoteit;

• preventpeoplefrombeingdrawnintoterrorismandensurethattheyaregivenappropriateadviceandsupport;and

• workwithspecificsectorswheretherearerisksofradicalisationwhichweneedtoaddress.

2.22 In2015wemadeasignificantstepbyplacingPreventonastatutoryfooting;thiswillincreasetheconsistencyofitsdeliveryacrossEngland,WalesandScotland.

Challenging extremist and terroristideology

Restricting access to and the availabilityof terrorist material

2.23 ISILisusingsocialmediainanunprecedentedquantityandfrequency,includingpersonalisedmessagesfromUKandotherforeignfightersandpropagandafromtheorganisation.Removingterrorist

materialremainsahighpriority.Adedicatedpoliceunit–theCounterTerrorismInternetReferralUnit(CTIRU)–continuestorefercontentwhichbreachesUKterrorism

legislationtothecommunicationindustry.Ifcompaniesagreethatitbreachestheirowntermsandconditions,theyremoveit.

2.24 Onthekeyissueofremovingmaterialofthiskind,ourcooperationwithsocialmediaplatformsisworkingwell.Thevolumeofunlawfulcontentremovedbyinternetcompanieshasincreasedsignificantlyto46,000piecesin2014.Contentrelatingto

SyriaandIraqnowrepresentsaround70%oftheCTIRUcaseload.InMarch2014welaunchedanewwayforthepublictoreportterroristmaterial;publicreferralshavetripledsincethen.Weareencouragingotherstatestoadoptthisapproach,possiblyusinganewfacilityatEuropol.

Disrupting propagandists

2.25 Radicalisationdoesnotonlyhappen

online.Effectivepreventiondependsuponandneedstobecoordinatedwiththedisruption,andwherepossiblethearrestandprosecutionofpeopleengagedinradicalisationanddistributingterroristpropaganda.WehavealsocontinuedtousethepowersavailabletotheHomeSecretarytoexcludepropagandistsfromthiscountryandtoproscribeorganisationswhichprovideaplatformforextremistandterroristideology.Wecontinuetoworkclosely

withlocalauthoritiesand,inparticular,withfurtherandhighereducationtoensurethatextremistspeakersarenotallowedtooperateunchallengedinthesesectors.

2.26 WehavealsobeenworkingwiththeinternetindustryintheUKtoseewhethertheirfilteringproductsprovideaneffectivetoolfortheircustomerstoprotectthemselvesandtheirchildrenfromcontentwhichisnotillegalbutisextremistandwhichcanhaveaharmful

impactonvulnerablepeople.


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Prevent people from being drawn intoterrorism

2.27 OurfocusinthisareaisnowonpreventingpeoplefromtravellingtoSyriaandIraqinconnectionwithextremistandterroristactivity;and(wheretherearenogroundsforprosecution)managingtheriskfromthosewhohavereturned.

2.28 Communityorganisations,localauthoritiesandthepolicearetrainingfrontlinestaffwhomaycomeintocontactwithpeopleconsideringtravel.Weareprovidingparentsandyoungpeoplewithadviceandmentoringforvulnerablepeople.WehavedirectedourprojectstorespondtothethreatinSyriaandIraq.Forexample,wehavetrainedfrontlinestaffinover120schoolsinpriorityareastoaddresstheriskoftravel.Manycommunitybasedorganisationsinthiscountryandoverseashave

takenaleadindevelopingtheirownresponsetoterroristpropaganda.Wheretheydonothavethemeanstodosowehaveprovidedsupport.InJulytheHomeSecretarybacked‘FamiliesMatter’,anationalcampaignledbyacommunityorganisationaimedatdeterringyoungpeoplefromtravellingtoSyriaandIraqandencouragingfamilymembersofthosewhomightbeabouttotraveltoseekhelp.

2.29 Literaturesettingoutthedangers

oftravelhasbeenwidelydistributedtomosques,travelagents,portandmoneytransferbureauxacrossthecountry.TheCharityCommissionhasdisseminated200,000leafletsand30,000postersinfivelanguagesonhowto‘supportSyriasafely’bygivingtoregisteredcharities,andhasalsoissuedadvicetoapproximately40,000 charitiesandotherinterestedpartiesabouttherisksofconductingconvoystoSyria.

2.30 Wherespecificconcernshavebeenraisedandindividualsconsent,themultiagencyChannelprogrammecanprovidetailoredsupport,topeopleidentified

asatriskofradicalisation.Therehavebeenover2000referralstotheChannelprogrammesinceApril2012;hundredshavenowbeenofferedandhavereceivedsupport.

2.31 TheCounterTerrorismandSecurity Act,placedChannel(inEnglandandWales)andthePreventProfessionalConcernsprogramme(inScotland)onastatutoryfooting.Channelprogrammesalreadyexistin

everylocalauthorityareaandinmostareasthelocalauthorityandotherpartnersalreadyworkeffectivelytogethertosupportpeopleatriskofradicalisationandgettingdrawnintoterrorism. Placingtheprogrammesonastatutoryfootingintendstosecureeffectivelocalcooperationanddeliveryinallareassothatpeoplevulnerabletobeingdrawnintoterrorismaresupportedinthebestpossibleway.

2.32 Ofthemorethan600peoplewithextremistconnectionswhohavetravelledtoSyriaandIraqaroundhalfhavenowreturned.

Theagenciesandthepoliceareresponsibleforassessingthethreatthattheymayposeandforinvestigatingpeoplewhohaveormayhavebrokenthelaw.Whereprosecutionisnotappropriate,asamatterofcourseweconsiderpreventativeoptionsincludingreferralstoChannelorotherformsofsupportmechanisms.Forpeoplewhohavereturned

fromSyriaandIraqourPreventworkiscloselycoordinatedwiththeoperationalactivityofthepoliceandagencies.

Working with sectors where there arerisks of radicalisation

2.33 Preventactivityinlocalareasreliesonthecooperationofmanysectorstobeeffective,includinglocalgovernment,health,education,prisons,youthjustice,immigration

andcharities.WehaveanetworkofdedicatedPreventcoordinatorsin30priorityLocalAuthorityareasandaresupportingimportantprojectsinafurther14areas.More


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than180localprojectshavebeendelivered,includingeducation,internetsafety,andworkwithfamilies,reachingover55,000peoplesinceearly2012.

2.34 ButlocalcooperationonPreventhasnotalwaysbeenconsistentacrossthecountry.InlinewiththerecommendationsoftheExtremismTaskForce(ETF),setupbythePrimeMinisteraftertheterroristmurderof

FusilierLeeRigby,theCounterTerrorismandSecurityActprovidesforanewstatutorydutyoncertainbodies(includinglocalauthorities,thepolice,prisons,probationproviders,schools,collegesanduniversities)tohavedueregardtotheneedtopreventpeoplefrombeingdrawnintoterrorism.Thestartingpointforallauthoritiesspecifiedinthedutywillbetoproduceanassessmentoftheriskofradicalisationintheirarea,institutionorbodyand,whereariskhasbeenidentified,todevelopanactionplantoaddressit.

Thenewdutydoesnotchangethe2011Preventstrategy,butisintendedtoensureitsconsistentandeffectiveimplementation.TheeffectwillbetoestablishahigheranduniformstandardforourPreventworkacrossmoresectorsinallpartsofthecountry.

2.35 TheETFalsoconcludedthattheCharityCommissionrequirednew,strongerpowerstostoptheabuseofcharities.AdraftProtection

ofCharitiesBillwhichwouldstrengthentheCommission’spowershasbeensubjecttoprelegislativescrutiny.WehavealsoincreasedfundingtoimprovetheCommission’sabilitytotackletherisksfromextremistandterroristabuseinthecharitablesector.

2.36 TheeffectofeventsinSyriaandIraqhasbeentosignificantlyincreasethenumberofarrestsforterroristrelatedactivityinthisandotherWesternEuropeancountries.

Numbersinprisonforterroristrelatedactivity(thoughsometimesforshortsentences)arerising.

2.37 AsofFebruary2015therewere201terrorismrelatedoffendersincustody andafurther53underprobationsupervision.Buttherearealsoaround600prisonerswhohavegivencauseforconcernbecausetheyhaveexhibitedextremistbehaviourswhichcouldindicatethattheyarevulnerabletoextremistmessagingorthattheypresentariskofinfluencingorradicalisingothers.

TheNationalOffenderManagementService(NOMS)hascontinuedtotackleextremistbehaviourboththroughtargeteddisruptiveactivityandinterventions;andthroughstandardanddedicatedoffendingbehaviourprogrammes.Lastyeararound750offendersalsocompleted‘Tarbiyah’,acoursedesignedtoprovideprisoners withabetterunderstandingofIslam.

Dealing with extremism

2.38 The2011PreventStrategymadeclearthatpreventingterrorismrequireschallengingextremist(andnonviolent)ideasthatarealsopartofterroristideology.AndPreventalsomeansinterveningtotrytostoppeoplemovingfromextremistgroupsandbehaviourintoterroristrelatedactivity.ButextremismcancausemanyotherharmsapartfromterrorismandthiswasclearlyillustratedduringtheyearinthesocalledTrojanHorse

episodewhereindividualswhoespoused,sympathisedwithorfailedtochallengeextremistviewsgainedinfluenceoverasmallgroupofschoolsinBirmingham.


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INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Internationalcollaborationacrosseveryareaofourcounterterroristworkisvitaltooursuccess.ThescopeandcontentofcollaborationhasalsochangedwiththedevelopingthreatinSyriaandIraqandinparticularthemovementofthousandsofforeignfightersfromEurope.

Thecoreofthiscollaborationistheexchangeofoperationalinformationbyandbetweenagenciesandpolicing.WearecontinuingtobuildsecurityandjusticecapacityoverseasincountrieswhereUKinterestsaremostatriskfromterrorism,includingthroughJustice

andHumanRightsPartnerships.OurtraininghashelpedotherstatestodisruptterroristplanninglinkedtotheUK,aswellasimprovingtheevidentialandhumanrightsstandardsofcounterterrorisminvestigationsoverseas.

TheUKhashadaPreventprogrammeforlongerthanmanyofouroverseaspartnersandhastakentheleadinpromotingthePreventconceptandidentifyingkeyPreventprojects.ManyothercountriesnowhavePreventprogrammes;wearesharingideasandexpertiseandlearningfromoneanother.SomeaspectsofourPreventwork(notablyactivitywithsocialmediacompanies)maybebestdealtwithinpartnershipwithourallies.TheUKiscoChairoftheGlobalCounterTerrorismForum(GCTF)‘CounteringViolentExtremism’groupandprovidestechnicalassistancetotheGCTFPreventrelated‘HedayahCentre’

intheUnitedArabEmirates.InSeptemberthePrimeMinistersetoutarangeofUKproposalsandinitiativesforadditionalactionagainstextremismwithintheUN,includingafoundingdonationtotheGlobalCommunitiesEngagementandResilienceFund.

FollowingrecentterroristattacksinEuropeweareattheforefrontofEuropeanworktocollectandsharemoreinformationaboutpeopletravellingtoSyriaandIraq(notablythoughPassengerNameRecords)andtodomuchmoretocontrolthemovementoffirearmsacrossEurope.WeareworkingwithcountriesinEurope,theMiddleEastandNorthAfricatodeveloptheircounterterrorismexpertise,infrastructureandlegislation.Thisincludesenhancingemergencyresponsecapabilitiesandaviationscreening.Someofthisworkisconductedinclosecollaborationwithourownexpertsecurityindustry(page21

refers).WecontinuetousetheUNandEUsanctionsregimestohelpdisruptterroristorganisationsandindividuals,aswellastosendoutstrongpoliticalsignalsinternationally.Forexample,workingwiththeNigeriansinthewakeoftheChibokschoolgirlskidnapping,wesuccessfullydelivered,undertheUNAlQa’idaSanctionsregime,thepoliticallysignificantlistingsofBokoHaramandAnsaru.

WehavealsosecuredaUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutiononactionagainstISILandsupportedtheresolutiononforeignfighters.Theseresolutionshaveprovedcrucialinsettingafirmbasisforsubsequentcoalitionaction,andourfocusisnowonpressingfortheimplementationofpracticalmeasures,undertheseagreements,tohelpdisruptflows

offinance,peopleandmaterieltoISIL.


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PROTECT

2.39 Throughout2014wehaveseenapersistentterroristthreattoaviation.Bordersecurityandbordersystemsplayacrucialroleindeterringanddisruptingterroristactivity,includingthethreatposedbyreturningforeignfighters.Inaddition,theattackswhichwehavewitnessedinrecent

months–mostnotablyinParis–havehighlightedthechallengeswenowfaceinprotectingbusyurbanareas(knownas‘crowdedplaces’),certaincommunitiesandindividualsandhaveagainrequiredachangeinourapproach.

2.40 In2014,ourProtectobjectiveswereto:

• strengthenourbordersecurity;

• reducethevulnerabilityofourtransportnetwork;

• increasetheresilienceofourcriticalinfrastructure;and

• improveprotectivesecurityforcrowdedplacesandpeopleatspecificriskfromterrorism.

Strengthening our border security

2.41 OurhighestProtectprioritywasandremainsborderandaviationsecurity.Our

investmentindataanalyticshasimprovedourunderstandingofcomplextravelpatternsandourabilitytoidentifyandaddressthreatstotheUK.Wehavedevelopedbettertargetingtechnologiesthathaveimprovedourabilitytoscrutinisecargoforexplosives,firearms,moneyanddrugs.Wewillcontinuetoinvestinourborderdetectionsystems.

2.42 ThroughthisyeartheNationalCrime Agency(establishedinOctober2013),has

developedamoresophisticatedborderoperation,inconjunctionwithBorderForceandthecounterterroristcommunity.Our

technologyandinformationaddressesmultiplethreats,notjustterrorism.

2.43 Theanalysisofinformationaboutpeopleandgoodsiscentraltobordersecurity.Wenowprocessadvancepassengerinformation(i.e.thebiodataincludedonapassenger’straveldocument)foraround180millionindividualjourneysannually,bothtoandfromtheUK.

2.44 WeareabletocollectsomePassengerNameRecords(PNRisinformationnecessarytoenablereservationstobeprocessedandmayincludehowtravelwasreservedandpaidfor,contactdetails,seatnumbersandtravelitinerary)particularlyforflightsbetweentheUKandoutsideEurope.PNRisveryimportanttothepoliceandsecurityandintelligenceagencies,particularinthecontextofforeignfighters.CollectingPNR

insideEuropeisnotyetonaclearlegislativefooting.AneffectiveEUDirectiveonPNRisthereforeurgentlyneededandtheUKhasrepeatedlylobbiedinitssupportattheEuropeanParliament,theCommissionandtheEuropeanCouncil.TheabsenceofsuchaDirectivecontinuestosignificantlyweakentheEuropeancounterterroristeffort.HomeOffice,PoliceandDepartmentforTransportcontinuetoworkcloselywithairlinestoidentifypotentiallyhighrisktravellers,in

particularyoungandvulnerablepeopleintendingtogotoSyria.

Reducing the vulnerability of the transportnetwork

Aviation Security

2.45 Terroristgroups(particularlythoseinYemenandSyria)remaindeterminedtoattackcivilaviation.Wecontinuetoimprove

UKaviationscreeningcapabilitybyfurtherrollingoutsecurityscannersandexploringnewdetectiontechnology.ButaviationsecurityisnotjustaboutscreeningintheUK;


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wealsorelyonsecurityatairportsoverseas.SinceJuly2014wehavebeenworkingwithanumberofothercountriesandairlinestoapplyadditionalsecurityscreeningofpassengersflyingtotheUK.

2.46 TheCounterTerrorismandSecurity Actextendsthelegalbasisforauthoritytocarry(‘nofly’)schemes,improvestheelectronicconnectivitybetweencarriers

andourbordersystems(sothatwecanprovideinstructionstoacarriertoremoveapassengerpriortodeparture)andestablishesacivilpenaltyforcarriersthatfailtocomplywithrequirementstoprovidedata.

2.47 OurPreDepartureChecksSchemeusestheanalysisofpassengerdatatoidentifyindividualswhoposeaterroristorterrorismrelatedthreatfromflyingtoorfromtheUK.Wehaveagainpreventedasmall

numberofindividualswhoposeathreattotheaircraftitselffromtravellinghere.Wehaveimprovedtheeffectivenessofthepre-departurecheckschemebyoperatingatestingandreviewregime.

Maritime Security

2.48 TheUKNationalStrategyforMaritimeSecurity(NSMS)publishedinMay2014setouttheimportantworkunderwayacross

GovernmenttomitigatesecurityriskstoUKmaritimeinterestsbothathomeandoverseas.

Rail Security

2.49 WearecompletingthefinalstagesoftheinstallationofhostilevehiclemitigationmeasuresatsomeofthemostcrowdedrailwaystationsacrossGreatBritain.Wearealsoworkingcloselywiththerailindustrytoensurethattheyintegrateappropriatesecurityfeaturesandproductsintotheirdesignsaspartoftheirprogrammetoupgradeanddevelopnewstations,suchasBirminghamNewStreetandCrossrail.This

ispartofDfT’smultibillionpoundinvestmentprogrammeintherailnetwork,tohelpreducethevulnerabilityofthenetworkandpotentialimpactofanattack.

Resilient infrastructure

2.50 Wehavestrengthenedcontrolsonaccesstoreadilyavailablehazardousmaterials,ensuringitismoredifficultfor

terroriststousethemtoconductattacks. TheintroductionofanewlicensingregimeinSeptember2014allowsustocheckpeoplewantingtopurchasesubstancesthatcanbemadeintoexplosives.Wehavealsoworkedwithmajorinternetretailerstoencouragemoreresponsibleonlinesalesofhazardoussubstancesandwehavereceivedverysignificantandconstructivesupport.

2.51 Wehaveupdatedourdefinitionof

CriticalNationalInfrastructure(CNI)andhaveaddednewsectors,whichmeansthatwearecontinuingtoaddressourkeyareasofriskandvulnerability.WehaveamorecomprehensiveapproachtoprotectingCNI,lookingatallrisks,fromfloodingtocyberattacktoterrorism.OurmostcriticalsiteshavebeenassessedbyGovernmentandphysicalsecuritymeasuresputinplace.Wearealsoimprovingemergencyresponsearrangementsatkeysitesintheenergy

sector.

Crowded places and people at specificrisk from terrorism

2.52 Wecontinuallyreviewandadaptourapproachtotheprotectionof‘crowdedplaces’,transportsystemsandpublicfiguresinthelightofchangingterroristthreatsandtactics.FollowingtheincreaseinthethreatlevelandrecenteventsinParis,wehave

increasedprotectivesecurity,includingarmedvehiclepatrolsandmorevisiblepolicing.ThepolicehaveincreasedprotectionandreassurancetoJewishandMuslimcommunities.


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ENGAGEMENT WITH AND SUPPORT FOR OUR SECURITY INDUSTRY

FollowingrecommendationsinourWhitePaper‘NationalSecurityThroughTechnology’,in2012,wehavestrengthenedourrelationshipwithoursecurityindustry.DomesticallywehavetakenstepstoputtheUKattheforefrontoftheglobalsecurityexportmarket,includingby:

• appointingaseniorresponsibleofficerroleofDirectorofSecurityIndustryEngagementforthesecurityindustry,locatedintheHomeOfficeandworkingcloselywithUKTI;

• launchingaSecurityExportsStrategyinFebruary2014;

• establishingaSecurityandResilienceGrowthPartnership(SRGP)inMay2014withtheaimofestablishinganewapproachtotheinnovation,promotionanddeliveryofUKsecuritycapabilities;and

• launchingtheSecurityInnovationandDemonstrationCentreinDecember2014to provideafacilityforGovernmenttoworkwithindustryonthedevelopmentofinnovativeresponsestosecuritychallengesandshowcaseproductstopotentialcustomers.

FurtherworkwillincludethecreationofaUK‘securitybrand’(i.e.ahallmarkofexcellenceintheUKsecurityindustrytoprovidereassurancetocustomers)andanonline‘exportsportal’toprovideUKcompanieswithreadilyaccessibleinformationonoverseasmarkets(e.g.politicalandregulatoryenvironments)tohelpthemdobusiness.

UKcounterterroristworkishighlyregardedoverseas.Wearefrequentlyapproachedforadviceandassistance.Wherepossiblewewanttohelp,eitherthroughaGovernmentassistanceprogrammeorinpartnershipwithoursecurityindustry.Wehave:

• signedsecuritymemorandumsofunderstandingorsimilaragreementswithfivecountries(SaudiArabia,Qatar,Kuwait,BahrainandBrazil)tobroadenanddeepensecurityrelationshipsbetweenourrespectivecountries;

• progressedsimilaragreementswithtwofurthercountries(JapanandMexico);and

• developedopportunitiesfortheUKsecurityindustrytosupportfutureOlympicandParalympicGameshosts(BrazilandJapan)indeliveringasecuregames.


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PREPARE

2.53 RecentterroristattacksinParis,OttawaandSydneywereastarkreminderofthelevelofdamageanddestructionthatcanbecausedbyanindividualorsmallgroupandthemultiplechallengeswhichtheycanposeforouremergencyresponse.Sowecontinuetoreviewandadaptourresponse

capabilitiestoaddressnewtypesofthreat.Wehavelonghaddetailedplansforourresponsetoarangeofincidents,includingfirearmsattacksandarewellprepared.ButwemustbeabletodealwithrelativelyunsophisticatedattacksbypeoplewhomayhavereturnedfromSyriaorIraq,ormaymerelyhavebeeninspiredbyeventsthere.

2.54 In2014,ourpriorityPrepareobjectiveswereto:

• continuetobuildgenericcapabilitiestorespondtoandrecoverfromawiderangeofterroristandothercivilemergencies;

• improveourpreparednessforthehighestimpactrisksintheNationalRisk

Assessment;and

• improvetheabilityoftheemergencyservicestoworktogetherduringaterroristattack.

Building capabilities

2.55 Throughout2014wehavereviewedUKpreparednesstothewiderconsequencesofmajorcivilemergenciestoensurethatwehaveidentifiedandresolvedanygapsinourresponse.Wehavefoundthattherearehighnumbersofappropriatelytrainedstaffandotherspecialistassetstorespondtoalargenumberofcasualties,while

thetelecommunicationsystemsusedbyemergencyrespondersintheUKalloweffectivecommunicationsinmostresponsescenarios,andeveniffailureshouldoccur

therearefallbacksystemsinplacethatallowtransmissionofinformationtocontinue.

Preparing for the highest impact risks

2.56 InDecemberweagreedanewprogrammetostrengthenourcapabilityforrespondingtoincidentswherechemical,biologicalorradiologicalmaterialsareused. Wehaveputmoreemphasisonlife-

savingactivitybythosewhoarefirstonthesceneofanincident,followedbymoreworkbytrainedandequippedcontaminationspecialists.Thisnewapproachreliesonfewerspecialistemergencyrespondersbutmoreeffectivelyprotectsthepublic.

The emergency services

2.57 SincethefindingsoftheCoroner’sInquestintothe7/7attacksinLondon,we

haveimprovedthejointresponseoftheemergencyservicestoanymajororcomplexincident,includingterroristattack,ensuringtheyworktogethereffectivelytosaveasmanylivesaspossible.OurJointEmergencyServicesInteroperabilityProgramme(JESIP)concludedinSeptember2014.JESIPtrainedover11,000prioritypolice,fireandambulanceservicepersonnel,notablytoimprovecrucialareasofcommunicationbetweentheservicesandcontributetomoreeffectivejoint

decisionmaking.TheemergencyservicesarealreadysuccessfullyapplyingJESIPprinciplesinarangeofnonterroristincidents.

2.58 TheJESIPprinciplesofeffectivejointworkinghavenowbeenappliedtoourwellestablishedcapabilitiestorespondtoterroristattacksusingfirearms.Wehaveimprovedourpolicefirearmscapabilityoverthelastthreeyearsandthiscapabilityhasbeentestedinliveincidentsandisexercisedregularly,

includingscenariosthataresimilartorecentoverseasincidents.


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Conclusion 23

CONCLUSION

TheGovernmentcontinuestoinvestinourcounterterroristworktoensurethatitremainsfullyeffective.Wearesatisfiedthatisthecase.

CONTESTcontinuestoprovideasoundframework,buttherapidchangeintheextentandtypesofterroristthreatwefacehasmeantthatmuchofourworkhashadtochangetoo.Thatprocesshasbeensetoutclearlyinthisreportandwillcontinue.

Wehavetakenactiontoensurethatlawenforcementagencieshavethepowersandcapabilitiestheyneedtorespondeffectively.WehaveincreasedthescaleandimpactofourPreventwork.Wehavecontinuedtostrengthenourborderandaviationsecurity,bothoverseasandintheUK.Wehaverevisedthewaysouremergencyservicesworkfollowinga

terroristattack.Wehavedevelopedourinternationalcollaboration.

Aterroristattackinthiscountrymaywellbe‘highlylikely’forsometimetocome.However,wehaveaworldclasscounterterroristeffortsustainedbyhighlycapable,expert,committedanddedicatedpeopleinandoutsideGovernment.Weareinthebestshapetodealwiththechallengeswenowface.


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IS N 978 1 4741 1687 9

Documents

Contest Annual Report for 2014