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REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CV2007-01296
BETWEEN
INSHAN ISHMAEL
Claimant
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Before The Honourable Madam Justice Pemberton
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff: Mr F. Ramsohoye S.C. leads Mr. A. Ramlogan instructed by Ms C. Bhagwandeen
For the Defendant: Mr R. Martineau S.C. leads Mr M. Quamina instructed by Ms M. Ramdass
FACTS:
Mr Inshan Ishmael is an Activist and Businessman. Sometime around January 2007 he
made a call for a “shut down” of the entire country’s operations. This did not sit well
with the authorities. On the night of 24th
January 2007 he was arrested and charged inter
alia with offences under various sections of the ANTI TERRORISM ACT 2005. On
25th
March 2007 Mr Ishmael was informed by the prosecution that the charges were
formally withdrawn. He claims that no explanation was offered for this turn of events.
Page 2 of 30
Mr Ishmael now brings this action for the court to pronounce on the constitutionality of
the various provisions of the Act namely Sections 2, 13, 23, 24, 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37.
His argument is that these sections offend sections 4 (a) and 5 (a)1 of the Constitution
rendering them unconstitutional, illegal, null and void. Further, Mr Ishmael contends that
the entire Act was not passed in accordance with Section 132 of the Constitution.
I had cause to consider these issues in CV2005 – 00150 CHANDRESH SHARMA v
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. Both Senior Counsel have agreed to accept my
interpretation and judgment expressed in that case of course subject to their rights to
appeal on any matters, which do not meet with their favour.
I myself do not have anything to add to that analysis and decision. I have therefore
attached a copy of that judgment to this as “A” and adopt it as the judgment in the case at
bar.
I now order as follows:
(1) That the Constitutional Motion filed on 25th
April 2007 be and is hereby
dismissed.
(2) That the issue of costs be deferred for further consideration on a date to be
notified.
Dated this 9th
day of July 2008.
/s/ CHARMAINE PEMBERTON
HIGH COURT JUDGE
1 CONSTITUTION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Chap. 1:01.
Section 4 enshrines the Fundamental Human Rights.
Section 5 provides for the protection of the Fundamental Human Rights 2 Section 13 deals with exceptions for certain legislation inconsistent with sections 4 and 5.
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“A”
This is a copy of the judgment of CV2005-00150 referred to in the
prefixed judgment.
REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CV 2005-00150
BETWEEN
CHANDRESH SHARMA
CLAIMANT
AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
DEFENDANT
Before The Hon. Madam Justice Pemberton
Appearances:
For the Claimant: Mr A. Ramlogan & Ms. J. Furlonge
For the Defendant: Mr R. Martineau S.C. leading Mr Primus holding for Mr. S. Lalla and Ms A.
Humphrey instructed by Ms D. Dilraj
2005: November 10th
2006: January 26th
2006: March 23rd
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JUDGMENT
[1] The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a democratic state. There are three branches of
Government, the Executive, whose role and function is to have general direction and
control of the Government, which involves conceiving and executing policy for governing3;
the Legislature or Parliament, which makes the laws and the Judiciary which interprets and
applies the law. These institutions are established and buttressed by the Constitution.
Parliament is free to make any laws it considers necessary for effective and good
management of all aspects of life4. This power and responsibility is circumscribed by the
Constitution, the supreme law of the land. Any law that is in collision with the provisions of
the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency5. The Constitution makes
exception for certain legislation. These Acts may be valid if they expressly declare that
they shall have effect in spite of the inconsistency with sections 4 and 5 and Parliament
can show that they are reasonably justifiable in a society that has proper respect for the
rights and freedoms of the individual6. The Executive is also free to make and engineer
policy, but its actions may be questioned by the courts on the grounds of
unconstitutionality or any other types of administrative action7.
[2] The Constitution itself provides that if a person alleges that any of the provisions of
Chapter 1 thereof “has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him” then
he may apply to the High Court for redress8. I shall deal with this more fully later.
[3] The Applicant, Mr Chandresh Sharma is a member of the House of Representatives, for
the Fyzabad constituency. He holds office as Treasurer of the United National Congress,
the Opposition Party in the House.
3 See Secs 74 to 89 CONSTITUTION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CHAP 1:01. ("THE CONSTITUTION") 4 See Sec. 53 of THE CONSTITUTION – "peace, order and good government of Trinidad and Tobago" 5 See Sec 2 of THE CONSTITUTION 6 See Section 13 (1) of THE CONSTITUTION 7 These include actions for Judicial Review or any other reliefs as may be determined by Statute. 8 See Sec. 14 (1)
Page 5 of 30
[4] He professes a concern over certain provisions of the ANTI TERRORISM ACT 2005
(“THE ACT”). Paragraph 4 of his affidavit states:
This Act was assented to on the 13th day of September 2005.
The Opposition did not support or vote for the Act because it was
concerned about the dramatic and drastic nature of same (some)
(sic) of the measures contained in the Act and the possibility that
such powers could be abused and/or misused by the ruling party
to arrest and detain(ed) (sic) political opponents on the pretext
that they are suspected terrorists.
(Emphasis mine).
That is his case.
[5] There is no factual matrix for consideration. In other words, this case is based on the
possibility that the “ruling party” is likely to misuse powers vested under the Act against
“political opponents”. The Act is to be used as a cover. To prevent this sinister motive from
materializing Mr Sharma has moved the Court asking for:
(a) A declaration that the Anti Terrorism Act, 2005 (hereafter called "The
Act") is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void as contravening Sections 4
and 5 of the Constitution;
(b) Alternatively a declaration that Sections 23, 24, 34, 36 and 37 of the said
Act are unconstitutional, illegal, null and void as contravening Sections 4
and 5 of the Constitution.
[6] The grounds state that the Act contravenes Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution and was
not passed in accordance with Section 13 of the Constitution. The Act is in direct
contravention with the rights and freedoms in Section 49 and contrary to Section 5 (1) 10.
Mr Sharma then itemized the particular sections of the Act which he complains about.
[7] APPROACH
9 See Sec. 4 which gives recognition and declares the rights and freedom. 10 See Sec. 5 which protects those rights and freedoms.
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I shall structure this judgment by asking the following questions:
(1) Do the Act or the specific sections complained about contravene Sections 4 and 5 of
the Constitution so as to require that it be passed in accordance with Section 13
(1) thereof?
(2) Is this the type of action contemplated by Section 14 (1) of the Constitution?
[8] ISSUE 1:
What is the nature of the alleged infringement? The infringement as far as I can glean, is
that Parliament erred in bringing into law the Act since it contravened Sections 4 and 5 of
the Constitution and having done so, it was not passed in accordance with Section 13 (1)
of the Constitution. The particular infringements were conveniently listed by Mr Ramlogan
and I reproduce them:
(a) deprivation of personal liberty and the right to liberty other than
personal liberty without due process of law;
(b) the right to the enjoyment of property arising out of the provision
for surrender of documents and restraint and seizure orders in
respect of other property;
(c) the right to equality before the law and the protection of the law;
(d) the right to freedom of thought and expression arising out of
liability of a detained person to interrogation;
(e) the protection from cruel and unusual treatment;
(f) the right to be brought when detained before an appropriate
judicial authority;
(g) the denial of the right to habeas corpus;
(h) the denial of the privilege against self-incrimination;
(i) the denial of the right to know the reasons for detention and
interrogation.
[9] Liberty, Mr Ramlogan says, involves the following:
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(1) liberty of the person from unlawful restraint;
(2) liberty to employ a person’s talents in the pursuits which free men
may undertake without transgressing the common law or Acts of
Parliament which do not infringe the Constitution;
(3) liberty to speak or be silent or to write or otherwise communicate
as one wishes.
No authorities were relied upon for any of these propositions.
[10] Mr Martineau S.C. states categorically that the Claimant is wrong in his constitutional
challenge since the Act does not derogate from the fundamental rights and freedoms
enshrined in Section 4 and does not infringe Section 5. In that case, Section 13 (1) is not
breached since there is no need to invoke its provisions. The Act therefore is not
unconstitutional or inconsistent with the Constitution.
[11] Further the Constitution does not create new or separate rights. Section 5 particularises
Section 4 rights and freedoms11. The rights under Section 4 are not absolute12 and are
circumscribed by “due process of law”. An Act can be described as contravening the "due
process" requirement if it is arbitrary or oppressive or discriminating in its effect13. This Act
does not infringe the "due process" requirement.
[12] ANALYSIS
It is quite possible for me to find that the Act as a whole is Constitutional, but that certain
Sections offend the Constitution. The Act purports to authorize actions taken or likely to be
taken which make provision for the protection of persons within the jurisdiction from the ill-
effects of terrorist activities14. Trinidad and Tobago was a signatory or party to the several
Conventions mentioned at Section 2 (1). As I see it, this Act seeks to import into our
11 See DE FREITAS v BENNY [1976] A.C. 239 and THORNHILL v A.G. [1981] A.C. 61 12 See COLLYMOORE v AG (1976) 12 W.I.R. 5 p. 15 Letter F 13 See LA SALLE v AG OF T & T (1971) 18 W.I.R. 379 14 The Long Title to the Act reads: An Act to criminalise terrorism, to provide for the detection, prevention,
protection, conviction and punishment of terrorist activities and the confiscation, forfeiture and seizure of terrorists' assets.
Page 8 of 30
legislation the international obligations, rights, responsibilities and protections offered
under these Conventions. In other words, this legislation formalizes this State’s inclusion
in the worldwide fight against terror. In the main, the provisions concern the safety of
persons, generally and more specifically on aircrafts, and at sea. It seeks to strip hitherto
protected persons who abuse that protection. It also targets those persons who provide
financially for illicit activities in this arena. The Act is extra-territorial in its scope and
determines the mens rea necessary for the actions to which it extends.
[13] The Act further provides for the seizure and confiscation of terrorist property, which it
defines as proceeds from the commission of terrorist act15, property which has been, is
being or is likely to be used in the commission of a terrorist act or property collected for the
purpose of funding a terrorist act.
[14] The Act creates offences such as the use of property for the commission of terrorist acts,
arrangements for retention or control of terrorist property, dealing with terrorists acts,
soliciting or giving support for the commission of terrorists acts, harbouring persons
committing terrorist acts, recruitment of persons for terrorist purposes, provision of
instruction or training to persons committing terrorist acts, providing facilities in support of
terrorist acts16. Convention offences are also incorporated into our local law. These cover
a wide ambit, and include endangering the safety of maritime navigation, bombing
offences, protection of internationally protected persons and property, offences relating to
fixed platforms (so relevant to our economic survival), nuclear matter or facilities or the use
of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.
[15] Part IV deals with Investigation of Offences and this contains the sections discussed in the
alternative relief. I shall therefore defer discussion.
15 "terrorist act" is defined principally "as an act whether committed in or outside Trinidad and Tobago" which
cause loss or harm or damage to person or property. It also captures acts which are inimical to national security or public safety and catches disruption of emergency services which will affect computer or electronic systems or any services directly related to banking communications, financial services, public utilities to name a few. The requisite intent – "to compel a government or an international …"
16 See Sections 16 – 22 of THE ACT
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[16] Part V empowers the Court with jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising under
the Act. This merely reflects conventional learning in international law. It also mandates
that the Attorney General, upon receiving information that there may be present in Trinidad
and Tobago a person who is alleged to have committed an offence under this Act, the
Attorney General shall:
(a) cause an investigation to be carried out in respect of that allegation;
(b) inform any other foreign State which might also have jurisdiction over the
alleged offence promptly of the findings of the investigation; and
(c) indicate promptly to other foreign States which might also have jurisdiction
over the alleged offence whether to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief a prosecution is intended by the Director of Public
Prosecutions17.
[17] The Act at Part VI provides for information sharing, extradition and Mutual assistance in
Criminal matters. Part VII deals with disclosure and information sharing and Part VIII with
seizure and forfeiture of Terrorist Property. Certain specific questions were raised in
relation to Part VIII which I shall address later. Part IX provides for Miscellaneous Powers.
Section 39 places a duty to disclose information about passengers of aircraft and vessels
on the operator of an aircraft or a Master of a vessel to the Chief Immigration Officer or the
competent authority of a foreign State in accordance with the laws of that State. The Chief
Immigration Officer is not to disclose/use this information except for the purpose of
protecting national security or public safety18.
[18] A complete perusal therefore shows that the Act conforms to classic principles of
identification of a problem – terrorism, the provision of rules/laws to control actions – the
offences created, production of certain behavioural patterns – conformity with good and
civilized behaviour or punishment for deviance. Is this law in conformity with Sections 4
and 5 of our Constitution?
17 See Section 25(3) of THE ACT 18 Section 39(4) of THE ACT – No information provided to the Chief Immigration Officer under subsection (1)
shall be used or disclosed by the Chief Immigration Officer except for the purpose of protecting national security or public safety.
Page 10 of 30
[19] The Drafters of the Act as I see it, sought to observe the Constitutional safeguards at
Sections 4 and 5 by providing:
(1) A definition of the purpose of the Act and the actions, which are likely to trigger an
offence, prosecution and a penalty. Section 4 (b) is of relevance here.
(2) Guidelines for the investigation of offences, under the Act, disclosure and sharing
information.
(3) Section 3119 of the Act specifically recognises and preserves the fundamental right
expressed at 4 (c), which was not raised in the written submissions but is an
outflow from paragraph 4 of Mr Sharma’s affidavit.
In fact, as observed throughout the Act “reasonableness” is mandated. There is no
provision which authorizes the arbitrary exercise of power by any of the State functionaries
or organs. In fact, the sections and structure of the Act speak against this. It is my view
that the Act as a whole has covered the fundamental bases necessary for "a fair system of
justice20.
[20] There was not much submission on the entire Act. Counsel instead focused on the
Sections of the Act, his alternative grounds. In any event, I do not agree that The Act as a
whole is offensive to Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution.
I sections 23 and 24 of the Act together.
[21] SECTIONS 23 AND 24
I shall address sections 23 and 24 of the Act together. Section 23 of the Act states:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) a police officer may, for the purpose of
preventing the commission of an offence under this Act or
preventing interference in the investigation of an offence under
19 Sec 31 of The Act – "Notwithstanding anything in the Extradition Act or the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act, an offence under this Act or an offence under any other Act where the act or omission constituting the offence also constitutes a terrorist act, shall, for the purposes of extradition or of mutual assistance, be deemed not to be an offence of a political character or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives."
20 See Lord Hoffman in THE STATE v BRAD BOYCE Privy Council Appeal No. 51 of 2004 para. 14.
Page 11 of 30
this Act, apply ex parte, to a Judge in Chambers for a detention
order.
(2) A police officer may make an application under subsection (1)
only with the prior written consent of the Director of Public
Prosecutions.
(3) A Judge may make an order under subsection (1) for the
detention of the person named in the application if he is satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is –
(a) interfering or is likely to interfere with an investigation
of;
(b) preparing to commit; or
(c) facilitating the commission of,
an offence under this Act.
(4) An order under subsection (3) shall be for a period not exceeding
forty-eight hours in the first instance and may be extended for a
further period provided that the maximum period of detention
under the order does not exceed fourteen days.
(5) Every order shall specify the place at which the person named in
the order is to be detained and conditions in respect of access to
a medical officer.
(6) An accurate and continuous record shall be kept in accordance
with the Schedule, in respect of any detainee for the whole period
of his detention.
[22] Mr Ramlogan states that Section 23 authorises detention, which is contrary to the common
law which does not give and cannot give power to a judge to make a detention order in the
circumstances outlined there where the subject is not charged or arrested or detained on
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. He opines that Section 23 purports to
abridge the protection from detention which, the common law gave to a person at the
commencement of the Constitution. The provision contravenes the due process of law by
authorizing the detention for which it provides. This detention is outside the process of the
Page 12 of 30
criminal law which, is recognized by the common law or statute and therefore is contrary to
the fundamental rights and freedoms which are expressly declared to have applied in
Trinidad and Tobago prior to the promulgation of the Constitution.
[23] The detention contravenes the right of a free man to devote his time and energy to
peaceful permits such as he cannot do, undertake or pursue while he is in detention. In
other words, his right to liberty other than personal liberty is infringed. The section further
permits the police or other functionaries of the State to cause the detainee to submit to
compulsory interrogation during the entire period of detention. Any activity which may be
undertaken by a person who enjoys freedom without restraint may not be pursued by the
victim in detention. This denial of liberty is a denial without due process of law. He quoted
Fraser J.A.21 to define the scope of the guarantee of liberty and referred me to the
judgment in its entirety to elicit the meaning and scope of “due process of law” as provided
for in Section 4 (a) of the Constitution.
[24] He concludes that in relation to the detention itself the procedure established under
Section 23 enabling physical restraint cannot be effected without a contravention of due
process of law since at the heart of the contravention is a denial of physical liberty without
charge or hearing. This is a denial of other civil liberties while the detention lasts. He
further questions the interrogation allowed under the Act. The detention is also
characterized as cruel and unusual punishment, a denial of a hearing and other protection
including the right of Counsel as well as the denial of the right to habeas corpus. For good
measure Mr Ramlogan further stated that Section 23 makes no provision for impugning the
detention order. An order under Section 23 is effectual (effective) as soon as it is made.
[25] Mr Martineau emphatically disagrees with Mr Ramlogan’s interpretation of the meaning
and effect of Section 23 in light of Section 4 and 5 of the Constitution. The reasoning
which supports his conclusion that any detention Order made pursuant to Section 23 does
21
See FRASER JA in LA SALLE & ORS v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO (1971) 18 WIR 379
Page 13 of 30
not violate the fundamental rights and freedoms or the provision for the protection of those
freedoms can be summarized as follows:
(1) Section 23 established a regime under which detention orders can be
made which ensures that Section 4 (a) the due process requirement is observed.
(2) The presence of due process therefore removes the detention from being
arbitrary.
(3) The requirement for the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions and
the role of the Judge satisfied the protection of the law requirement in Section 4
(b).
(4) Further the length of the period of deprivation – 48 hours in the first
instance is one accepted as being within the limits of the Constitution.
(5) A combination of 2, 3 and 4 ensures that Section 5 (2) (a) is not violated.
(6) There is no violation of Section 5 (2) (b) since detention by order of a
Judge for fourteen days is neither cruel nor unusual. Judges do inflict on persons
by Order detention for even longer periods without such detention being
considered cruel and unusual.
(7) Section 5 (2) (c) is not isolated since the Section does not speak to a
removal of an individual’s right to be informed promptly and with sufficient
particularity of the reason for his detention. It does not deprive him of his right to
retain and instruct without delay a legal adviser and to hold communication with
him. It does not deprive him of his right to be brought promptly before an
appropriate judicial authority. In fact, the section is premised on the detainee’s
case being reviewed after forty-eight hours and there is nothing to prevent a Judge
requiring the detainee to be heard. Section 23 of the Act does not deprive a
detainee of a remedy by way of habeas corpus.
(8) With respect to Section 5 (2) (d), the Section does not authorize any
public authority to compel the detainee to give evidence or deprive him of the
protection against self incrimination.
(9) Section 5 (2) (b) is not violated since it does not deprive the detainee of
any right to procedural protection.
Page 14 of 30
(10) With respect to the claim that the Section is at variance with the Common
Law, the case of DALLISON v CAFFERY22 gives a clear exposition as to the
detention of an individual by the police without being charged with an offence.
Further the Common Law never placed a specific time limitation as to how long an
individual can be detained by the police without being charged for an offence.
What is of crucial importance is that such detention must not be for a longer period
than is reasonably necessary.
(11) In addition, one must consider the purpose and intention of Section 23 in
determining this issue. Section 23 of the Act is found in Part IV of the Act under
the heading “Investigation of Offences”. Section 23 states that its purposes is to
prevent the commission of an offence under the Act or to prevent the interference
with an investigation of an offence under the Act. These are important
considerations to be taken into account in determining the length of time an
individual can be detained.
[26] Mr Ramlogan countered that the circumstances in which a person may be arrested and
detained at common law in respect of the commission of an offence are known. Section
23 of the Act is intended to add to those circumstances and to avoid resort to the common
law to support the denial of liberty. The Act in so far as it allows grounds for detention of
person other than common law grounds is a contravention of section 4 and any particulars
in section 5 where matters covered by section 4 are given greater particularity.
[27] Mr Ramlogan then sought to defend further his position that the Director of Public
Prosecutions and the Judge ought not to be involved in the detention process in this way.
He opined that the references to the Director of Public Prosecutions and to a Judge are
part of the machinery for a detention which is constitutionally unlawful. The Director of
Public Prosecutions performs an executive function under section 23. The Judge does not
hear the person affected by his order which is prima facie an order in breach of the rules of
natural justice. Further the question of habeas corpus is irrelevant to the constitutionality
22
DALLISON v CAFFERY (1964) 2 AII E.R. 610, 617 B – D per Lord Denning
Page 15 of 30
of section 2323. In the event that the section is used, a victim may seek habeas corpus.
That is not the purpose of these proceedings which are intended to prevent section 23
being used at all by a declaration of its unconstitutionality.
[28] SECTION 24
That section provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a police officer of the rank of Inspector or above may,
for the purpose of an investigation of an offence under this Act, apply ex parte to
a judge in chambers for an order for the gathering of information from named
persons.
(2) A police officer may make an application under subsection (1) only with the prior
written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(3) A judge may make an order under subsection (1) for the gathering of information
if he is satisfied that the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions
was obtained and -
(a) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence
under this Act has been committed and that –
(i) information concerning the offence; or
(ii) information that may reveal the whereabouts of a person
suspected by the police officer of having committed the
offence,
is likely to be obtained as a result of the Order; or
(b) that –
(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence under this
Act will be committed;
(ii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has
direct and material information that relates to the offence
referred to in subparagraph (i); or
(iii) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has
direct and material information that may reveal the
23 even though this was raised by Mr Ramlogan
Page 16 of 30
whereabouts of a person who the police officer suspects may
commit the offence referred to in subparagraph (i); and
(iv) reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the
information referred to in subparagraph (ii) or (iii) from the
person referred to therein.
(4) An Order made under subsection (3) may –
(a) include conditions or terms which the judge considers reasonable;
(b) order the examination on oath of the person named in the order;
(c) order the person to attend at a time and place fixed by the judge, for the
purpose of being examined; and
(d) order the person to bring and produce any document or thing in his control
or possession for the purpose of the examination.
(5) An Order made under subsection (3) may be executed anywhere in Trinidad and
Tobago.
(6) The judge who made the order under subsection (3), or another judge of the
same court, may vary its terms and conditions.
(7) A person named in an order made under subsection (3) shall answer questions
put to the person by the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of Public
Prosecution's representative, and shall produce to the presiding judge
documents or things that the person was ordered to bring, but may, subject to
the ruling of the judge under subsection (8), refuse to do so if answering a
question or producing a document or thing would disclose information that is
protected by the law relating to non-disclosure of information or privilege.
(8) The presiding judge shall rule on every objection or issue relating to a refusal to
answer any question or to produce any document or thing.
(9) A person shall not be excused from answering a question or producing a
document or thing on the ground that the answer, document or thing may
incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or proceedings.
(10) Notwithstanding subsection (9) any –
(a) answer given;
(b) document or thing produced; or
(c) evidence obtained,
from that person shall not be used or received against him in any criminal
proceedings other than in a prosecution for perjury.
Page 17 of 30
(11) A person may retain and instruct counsel at any stage of the proceedings under
this section and counsel so retained may attend and represent the person named
in the order when he is being examined.
(12) The presiding judge, if satisfied that any document or thing produced during the
course of the examination is likely to be relevant to the investigation of any
offence under this Act, shall order that the document or thing be given into the
custody of the police officer or someone acting on the police officer's behalf.
(13) Subject to subsection (8), nothing in this section requires the disclosure of any
information which is protected by privilege.
[29] From this Mr Ramlogan extrapolates that the section offends the right of the subject in that:
(a) The right to liberty and the enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived
thereof except by due process of law by the obligation to submit to questions and
the production of documents;
(b) Equality before the law and the protection of the law is breached;
(c) Allowing for arbitrary detention for purposes of questioning;
(d) Deprivation of freedom of thought and expression;
(e) Violation of the protection against unusual treatment by the involuntary submission
to detention while being questioned;
(f) The right to be brought before an appropriate judicial authority when detained is
infringed;
(g) The denial of the right to habeas corpus while being detained for questioning;
(h) The denial of the protection of the law by the requirement to answer without the
privilege against incrimination;
(i) The denial of a right to challenge the order made ex parte by any form of
procedure thereby depriving the subject of the order of procedural protection which
is guaranteed by the Constitution.
[30] Mr Martineau countered that the provision allows functionaries to exercise great flexibility
in dealing with the application. The fact that the Judiciary is involved at this stage ensures
observance of an individual’s rights under Sections 4 and 5. There is nothing in Mr
Ramlogan’s arguments that show a departure from due process. The existing laws of the
Page 18 of 30
land permit the making of orders by Judges for persons to give evidence and be examined.
In so far as section 24 requires this to be done24, it is not unconstitutional since the right to
freedom of thought and expression as it existed at the commencement of the Constitution
was already subject to the making of such orders by Judges. Further, section 24 does not
deal with detention and so section 5(2)(a) of the Constitution is not engaged. It does not
deny the right to habeas corpus by implication or otherwise. In any event, there can be no
such implication since courts would interpret legislation in a manner that does not infringe
fundamental rights. The Section does not violate the protection against self-incrimination
because section 24(10) provides that any answer, document or evidence of the person
cannot be used or received against him in any criminal proceedings other than in a
prosecution for perjury25. Section 24 cannot be said to deprive a person detained of the
procedural provisions which Mr Sharma says are absent. It is not a case of deprivation. In
addition, the validity of section 24 orders can be challenged, for example, on the ground of
constitutionality.
[31] ANALYSIS
The provisions of the sections are clear. The words are unambiguous. There is no need to
import any other interpretations especially those which may be nefarious. An unbiased
reading will produce the conclusion that all the Constitutional safeguards have been
observed. There is explicit recognition of the due process requirement of both sections.
The role, responsibility and function of police officers, the Director of Public Prosecutions
and the Judge are clearly spelt out and are in keeping with respect for rights, freedoms
and privileges of individuals.
[32] Further, there is no denial of the right to habeas corpus nor is there any abrogation of a
person’s right to appeal from an order made by the Judge. The Judge is required to
consider the case before him fairly and impartially. I associate myself with the Learned
Judges in RE BAGRI26 when they say: “A failure on the part of a hearing judge to exercise
24
see section 24(4) and (7) of the Act (infra) 25 See Re BAGRI 240 D.L. R. (4th) 81 26 RE BAGRI (supra) para. 89
Page 19 of 30
his or her discretion in this manner will constitute reviewable error”. Nowhere is this right
of appeal or review abrogated or taken away entirely. The right to impugn any order made
by the judge remains intact. I therefore have no doubt that Mr Sharma’s challenge against
these sections fails.
[33] SECTION 34 provides:
34. (1) Any customs officer, immigration officer or police officer who
has reasonable grounds to believe that property in the possession of any person
is –
(a) intended to be used for the purpose of a terrorist act;
or
(b) terrorist property,
may apply to a judge in Chambers for a restraint order in respect of that property.
(2) ……………..
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a restraint order made under
subsection (1), shall be valid for a period of sixty days, and may, on application,
be renewed by a Judge of the High Court, for a further period of sixty days or
until such time as the property referred to in the order is produced in court in
proceedings for an offence under this Act in respect of that property whichever is
the sooner.
(4) A Judge of the High Court may release any property referred
to in a restraint order made under subsection (1) if –
(a) he no longer has reasonable grounds to suspect that
the property has been, is being or will be used to
commit an offence under this Act; or
(b) proceedings are instituted in the High Court for an
offence under this Act in respect of that property
within one hundred and twenty days of the date of the
restraint order.
(5) …………….
(6) An appeal from a decision of the judge made under this
section shall lie to the Court of Appeal.
Page 20 of 30
[34] Mr Ramlogan interprets this as allowing a Judge to make a restraint order on suspicion or
belief and that suspicion on reasonable grounds equals belief. No authority was cited for
this proposition. The time limits imposed by Section 34 were still branded unconstitutional
since seizure under the section for any time was unlawful. Again no basis for that
conclusion was advanced.
[35] In answer, Mr Martineau took me to the ALLEYNE FORTE CASE. The Privy Council, in
dismissing this appeal, held that "a court investigating an alleged infringement of the right
to property recognized by section 4(a) of the Constitution was concerned to see whether a
fair balance was struck between the requirements of the community and the protection of
the fundamental rights of the individual"27. The Privy Council also held that since the
appellant could by legal proceedings thereafter challenge the lawfulness of the removal of
his vehicle, his right under section 4(b) to the protection of the law was not infringed. As
far as the time limits were concerned, Mr Martineau’s contention was that the section was
based on the Common Law principles set out in GHANI v JONES28.
[36] ANALYSIS
Mr Ramlogan’s submissions were novel but did not grab my attention as conforming to the
clear provisions of the sections or the law as it stands. The due process element has not
been infringed, the individual’s right to protection of the law remains intact and the time
limits imposed by the Common Law observed to the letter. Again successful challenge of
this section on the ground of unconstitutionality is elusive.
[37] SECTIONS 36 and 37
These Sections provide:
27 LEARIE ALLEYNE FORTE v THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO [1998] I.W.L.R. 68; 71H
– 72A 28 [1970] 1.Q.B. 693
Page 21 of 30
(1) Where on an ex parte application made by the Director of Public
Prosecutions to a judge in chambers, the judge is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that there is in any building, place or
vessel, any property in respect of which an order of forfeiture may be
made under section 37, the judge may issue –
(a) a warrant authorizing a police officer to search the building,
place or vessel for that property and to seize that property if
found, and any other property in respect of which that police
officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that an order of
forfeiture may be made under sections 37; or
(b) a restraint order prohibiting any person from disposing of, or
otherwise dealing with any interest in, that property, other than
as may be specified in the order.
(2) On an application made under subsection (1), the judge may, at the
request of the Attorney General and if the judge is of the opinion that
the circumstances so require –
(a) appoint a person to take control of, and manage or otherwise
deal with, the whole or a part of the property, in accordance
with the directions of the judge, and
(b) require any person having possession of the property to give
possession thereof to the person appointed under paragraph
(a).
(3) The power to manage or otherwise deal with property under subsection
(2) includes in the case of perishable or rapidly depreciating property,
the power to sell that property; and in the case of property that has little
or no value, the power to destroy that property.
(4) Before a person appointed under subsection (2) destroys any property
referred to in subsection 3, he shall apply to a Judge of the High Court
for a destruction order.
(5) Before making a destruction order in relation to any property, the judge
shall require notice to be given, in such manner as the judge may direct,
to any person who, in the opinion of the judge, appears to have an
interest in the property and may provide that person with a reasonable
opportunity to be heard.
Page 22 of 30
(6) A judge may order that any property in respect of which an application
is made under subsection (4), be destroyed if he is satisfied that the
property has little or no financial or other value.
(7) A management order under subsection (2) shall cease to have effect
when the property which is the subject of the management order is
returned to an applicant in accordance with the law or forfeited to the
State.
(8) The Director of Public Prosecutions may at any time apply to a Judge of
the High Court to cancel or vary a warrant or order issued under this
section.
37. (1) The Attorney General may make an application to a judge of the High
Court for an order of forfeiture in respect of terrorist property.
(2) The Attorney General shall be required to name as respondents to an
application under subsection (1) only those who are known to own or
control the property that is the subject of the application.
(3) The Attorney General shall give notice of an application under
subsection (1) to the respondents named in the application, in such
manner as the judge may direct.
(4) Where a judge is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the
property which is the subject of the application is terrorist property, the
judge shall order that the property be forfeited to the State to be
disposed of as directed by the judge.
(5) Where a judge refused an application under subsection (1), the judge
shall make an order that describes the property and declare that it is not
terrorist property.
(6) On an application under subsection (1), a judge may require notice to
be given to any person not named as a respondent who in the opinion
of the judge, appears to have an interest in the property, and any such
person shall be entitled to be added as a respondent to the application.
(7) Where a judge is satisfied that a person –
(a) has an interest in the property which is the subject of the
application; and
Page 23 of 30
(b) has exercised reasonable care to ensure that the property is
not the proceeds of a terrorist act, and would not be used to
commit or facilitate the commission of a terrorist act,
The judge shall order that the interest shall not be affected by
the order made under subsection (4) and the order shall also
declare the nature and extent of the interest in question.
(8) A person who claims an interest in property that has been forfeited and
who has not been named as a respondent or been given notice under
subsection (6) may make an application to the High Court to vary or set
aside an order made under subsection (4), not later than sixty days after
the day on which the forfeiture order was made.
(9) Pending the determination of an appeal against an order of forfeiture
made under this section, property restrained under section 37 shall
continue to be restrained, property seized under a warrant issued under
that section shall continue to be detained, and in any person appointed
to manage, control or otherwise deal with the property under that
section shall continue in that capacity.
(10) The provisions of this section shall not affect the operation of any other
provision of this Act respecting forfeiture.
[38] Mr Ramlogan’s view is that these sections allow the seizure of property called terrorist
property and that is unconstitutional. Section 4(a) is contravened since these sections
allow the forfeiture of that property to the state without guilt. This is at variance with the
Common Law. Mr Ramlogan alludes to the application of the civil standard in this process
which he states contravenes an entrenched rule of the standard of proof required in
Criminal Law. Section 37 is of a penal nature and the operation of Section 36 is largely
dependant upon section 37. The dealing which section 36 allows is in substance the
confiscation of property without compensation and without a criminal offence being proved
to have been committed by the victim of the confiscation.
[39] These sections are not ultra vires the Constitution and are no more than statutory
enactments of Common Law principles with regard to seizure, detention and forfeiture of
property by the police/executive. There are sufficient safeguards in the Act to ensure the
Page 24 of 30
protection of a person’s rights and interests in property, should that person come into
contact with the law in this realm. Mr Martineau opines that it is not open to Mr Sharma to
challenge these sections on the basis of infringement of section 4(a) and (b) of the
Constitution. He cites the ALLEYNE FORTE CASE29 to support him.
[40] ANALYSIS
Again, language, syntax and grammar do not admit of any meanings but those which are
apparent. Mr Ramlogan cites no authority for his propositions on interpretation of these
sections and gives no reasons as to why and how I should adopt his approach. All I can
say is that sections 36 and 37 do not bear out the meaning ascribed to them by Mr
Ramlogan and therefore are not unconstitutional.
[41] SECTION 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION states:
(1) An Act to which this section applies may expressly declare that it shall
have effect even though inconsistent with sections 4 and 5 and, if any such Act
does declare, it shall have effect accordingly unless the Act is shown not to be
reasonably justifiable in a society that has a proper respect for the rights and
freedoms of the individual.
(2) An Act to which this section applies is one the Bill for which has been
passed by both House of Parliament and at the final vote thereon in each House
has been supported by the votes of not less than three-fifths of all the members
of that House.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) the number of members of the
Senate shall, nothwithstanding the appointment of temporary members in
accordance with section 44, be deemed to be the number of members
specified in section 40 (1).
29 Supra
Page 25 of 30
Since I have found that neither the Act, nor the specific sections complained, do not offend
Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution, I find that it is unnecessary for Parliament to observe
the requirements of section 13. I therefore formally find that Parliament did not infringe the
requirements of section 13 and neither the Act nor the sections stated can be defeated on
that ground.
[42] ISSUE #2
IS THIS THE TYPE OF ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 14 (1) OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
Put another way, has the Applicant brought himself within the purview of Section 14 (1) so
as to entitle him to bring an action for Constitutional relief?
It is useful to reproduce the provision which I do now.
SECTION 14(1):
For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that if any person alleges that any
of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being, or is likely to be contravened
in relation to him, then without prejudice to any other action with respect to the
same matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court
for redress by way of originating motion.
[43] The learning in the area is quite clear, but Mr Ramlogan advanced certain novel
approaches to interpretation and invited me to traverse new ground. The main thrust was
that Section 14 (1) does not only confer jurisdiction where the violations complained about
concern Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. The crux of the matter in this case is that the
Act was passed in violation of Section 13 – by a simple majority when there was need for a
special majority. That is a matter of pure law and on the face of it a violation specific to Mr
Sharma. As a matter of Constitutional principles and public policy, Mr Ramlogan opines,
there is no logic or benefit in allowing that unconstitutional Act to remain part of our law.
There is no need to await an infringement of a constitutional right so as to obtain ex post
facto vindication. The minute the Act was born, in violation of Section 13, it immediately
Page 26 of 30
vested a person with the right to challenge under Section 14 (1). Mr Ramlogan was
adamant that the law as it stands prevents conscious citizens from challenging the Act as
concerned citizens.
[44] Mr Ramlogan then directed me to several cases dealing with sufficient standing, urged me
not to get "bogged down" in rules of technicality and preferred me to look at whether Mr
Sharma has a genuine case to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. He asked me to
sway away from rigid rules restricting Mr Sharma’s access to the court.
[45] Mr Martineau was not at all generous in that regard. Mr Sharma must satisfy the
requirements of the Section 14 (1) of the Constitution for this action to stand. Unless he
can show that, he has no locus. He steered me away from learning in the Judicial Review
cases and advised me that my role was to look at the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the
Constitution, see what it means and interpret accordingly. In relation to the specific
provisions of the Act, Mr Sharma has put no evidence before the court. More particularly,
there is no evidence before the Court as to how the Act or Sections 23, 24, 34, 36 and 37
infringe or authorize the infringement of the provisions of sections 4 and 5(2) of the
Constitution. In the absence of such evidence, I am not in a position to make or grant a
declaration that the provisions of sections 4 or 5(2) of Constitution have been infringed as
alleged.
ANALYSIS
[46] In examining Section 14 (1), one must look at the nature of the wrong either done or
threatened to be done. This is the usual approach taken in cases brought under this
Section30 and indeed in other public law matters31.
30 See DEAN-ARMORER J. in SMALL'S v THE ATTRONEY GENERAL HCA No. 1417 of 2004 31 See RAWLINS J.A. in ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ST LUCIA v MARTINUS FRANCOIS CIVIL APPEAL 37 of 2003
ST LUCIA
Page 27 of 30
[47] In fact, if it is found that the claim in unmeritorious then the courts may not go on to
determine the locus standi issue32. I wish to examine whether section 14(1) of our
Constitution can be utilized in the way advocated by Mr Ramlogan.
[48] Mr Sharma’s entire case is based on the premise that an event may/might occur. He
advances no factual basis to buttress his fears. There is nothing which touches him. Thus
the task of establishing a factual matrix within which we can operate to consider the
constitutionality of the Act has not been embarked upon33.The authorities are clear34. The
position was succinctly stated by Dean–Armorer J. in the SMALL CASE35. The Learned
Judge stated redress under Section 14 must be specific. On that basis, I find that Mr
Sharma's concerns over the Act have not ripened into a cause of action permitting him
recourse to the Court under Section 14(1).
[49] One can approach the issue by asking another question:
DID PARLIAMENT ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN PASSING THIS ACT IN
CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
Can one raise the issue of constitutionality of an Act in this way? Must there be some
purported action taken under the offending Act for a right of approach to the court under
Section 14(1). This approach was also grazed by Mr Ramlogan in his attempt to locate
himself on Section 14(1). My thinking though is that either way, the dicta of Dean-Armorer
J. is telling and resonant. One cannot pronounce on an Act of Parliament qua Act. The
right to bring an action only arises when the State, the Executive purports to put into effect
the provisions of an Act by doing something and such employment leads to a breach of or
a likely breach of the fundamental provisions set out at Sections 4 and 5.
32 Infra 33 DELZOTTO v CANADA 1999 169 D.L.R.4th Series 130; LASALLE v THE ATTORNEY GENERAL supra; 34 BANTON & ORS v. ALCOA MINERALS OF JAMAICA INCORPORATION & OTHERS (1971) 17 W.I.R. 275;
GORDON v MINISTER OF FINANCE (1968) 12 W.I.R. 416 35 CLIVE LANCELOT SMALL v THE ATTOREY GENERAL supra
"Applicants are required to show their locus standi ….."
Page 28 of 30
[50] OTHER ISSUES
I am moved to make some comment on the issues of procedure raised by Mr Ramlogan.
First, Section 14 (1) mandates the procedure to be used for coming to this court for relief
under the Constitution. This is acknowledged in the CPR at Part 56.1 (1) (b), 56.7 (2)36
and 56.7 (4) (c)37. This is the sole issue of relevance of the Mc CLEOD38 case to the
matter at bar and the matter must now rest.
[51] Secondly, on the issue of the use of declaratory relief, I would refer to settled legal
principles when this relief can be used. A person can use the vehicle of declaratory relief
when he has a personal legal right or interest which an alleged illegal action or decision
threatens to infringe or has infringed39. For clarity and to put the matter beyond doubt I
shall reproduce the words of the Learned Lord Diplock:
"But the jurisdiction of the court is not to declare the law generally
or to give advisory opinions; it is confined to declaring contested
legal rights, subsisting or future, of the parties represented in the
litigation before it and not those of anyone else……."
36 See prov. Of CPR 37 56.1 (1) This Part deals with applications –
(a) ………………. (b) By way of originating motion under s. 14(1) of the Constitution; (c) ………………. (d) ……………….
56.7 (1) …………………………… (a) ……… (b) ……… (c) ……… (d) ………
(2) The claim form in an application under section 14(1) of the Constitution shall serve as the Originating Motion mentioned in that section and shall be headed "Originating Motion".
(3) ……………………… (4) The affidavit must state -
(a) ……………….. (b) ……………….. (c) in the case of a claim under s 14(1) of the Constitution, the
provision of the Constitution which the claimant alleges has been, is being or is likely to be breached.
38 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO v MC CLEOD (1984) 32 W.I.R. 450 39 See Lord Diplock in GOURET V UNION OF PORT OFFICE WORKERS (1978) AC 435
Page 29 of 30
[52] This case is exactly the kind that is frowned upon. The court must use its scarce
resources to settle real disputes, disputes based on action causing harm or likely to cause
harm to persons. We cannot engage in speculation and conjecture. We are not here to
facilitate pre-emptive strikes. We will however deal relentlessly with illegal and improper
actions but only when the need to do so is premised on some factual foundation.
[53] Thirdly, procedural rules can never alter or change substantive law. The Over-riding
Objective in the Rules serves the purpose of reducing to writing a "statement of principle
which the court must seek to give effect when it interprets any provision or when it
exercises any discretion specifically granted by the rules"40. It is not meant to be used as
a slip rule to heal wounds as and when they appear in the litigation process. It cannot
create substantive rights to bring actions.
[54] At the start of this matter, Mr Ramlogan sought to amend his case by including discussion
of Section 32 and 33 of the Act. His main basis was so that all the provisions can be put
before the court to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. This was resisted.
[55] I decided that there was no usefulness in allowing the amendment since there was no
ambiguity in the proceedings as filed and arguments on these sections could be
successfully and economically included in his challenge of the Act in its entirety. Whilst I
had the discretion to allow the amendment I used the overriding objective more specifically
those paragraphs speaking to saving expense, time and expedition as aids to the exercise
of my discretion conferred under the Civil Proceedings Rules.
[56] CONCLUSIONS:
My findings and conclusions may be summarized as follows:
40
See Saunders C.J. (Ag.) in THE TREASURE ISLAND COMPANY & DAVID SIMS v
AUDUBON HOLDINGS LIMITED, NORMAN ISLAND SERVICES COMPANY LIMITED
AND VALARIE SIMS Civil Appeal 22 of 2003 (British Virgin Islands).
Page 30 of 30
(1) THE ANTI TERRORISM ACT, 2005 does not offend sections 4
and 5 of the Constitution;
(2) More particularly, Sections 23, 24, 34, 36 and 37 of the Act are
not in violation of sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution.
(3) There was no need for Parliament to observe the provisions of
section 13(1).
(4) Mr Sharma does not have locus standi under section 14(1), of the
Constitution.
(5) This is not a matter amenable to declaratory relief.
(6) The Over riding Objective Part 1 Civil Proceedings Rules cannot
be used as a "slip" rule.
(7) The application by way of Fixed Date Claim Form for declarations
of unconstitutionality must therefore fail.
ORDER
o Fixed Date Claim Form dismissed.
o Costs in the sum of $14,000.00 to be paid by Claimant to Defendant.
CHARMAINE PEMBERTON
HIGH COURT JUDGE