1

ConvergenceJustificationsWithinPoliticalLiberalism:ADefencePaulBillinghamThisisanAcceptedManuscriptversionofanarticlepublishedinResPublica.Publishedversionavailablehere:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-015-9278-x.Abstract According to political liberalism, laws must be justified to all citizens in order to be

legitimate. Most political liberals have taken this to mean that laws must be justified by appeal to a

specific class of ‘public reasons’, which all citizens can accept. In this paper I defend an alternative,

convergence,modelofpublicjustification,accordingtowhichlawscanbejustifiedtodifferentcitizensby

different reasons, including reasons grounded in their comprehensive doctrines. I consider three

objectionstosuchanaccount–that itunderminessincerity inpublicreason,that itunderestimatesthe

importance of shared values, and that it is insufficiently deliberative – and argue that convergence

justifications are resilient to these objections. They should therefore be included within a theory of

political liberalism, as a legitimate form of public justification. This has important implications for the

obligationsthatpoliticalliberalismplacesuponcitizensintheirpublicdeliberationsandreason-giving,and

mightmake the theorymoreattractive tosomeof its critics,particularly thosesympathetic to religious

belief.

Keywords Politicalliberalism·Publicjustification·Respect·Sincerity

Political liberalsbelievethat lawsmustbe justifiedtoallcitizensbyreasonstheycanaccept.Mosttake

thistomeanthatlawsmustbejustifiedbythesamereasons–byreasonsthatallcitizenscanaccept.In

fact,however,‘therecanbeconvergenceonalawwithoutconsensuswithrespecttothereasonsforthat

law’(Eberle2007,p.435).Whilesometheoristshavearguedthatsuch‘convergencejustifications’should

berecognisedaslegitimateformsofpublicjustification(GausandVallier2009;Vallier2011b,2014),this

remainsaminorityposition,requiringfurtherdefencefromseveral importantobjections. Inthispaper I

defendconvergence justificationsfromthreesuchobjections,pertainingtosincerity,sharedvalues,and

deliberation.

Endorsingconvergence justificationsas legitimatehassignificant implications forpolitical liberalism.For

example, it provides new resources to respond to the common criticism that political liberalism is

inhospitabletoreligiousgroups.1Underconvergence,religiousreasonscanplayarole in justifying laws,

P.BillinghamStAnne’sCollegeandDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford,UKe-mail:paul.billingham@politics.ox.ac.uk

2

and political liberalism’s implications for religious citizens are much less restrictive than is commonly

thought.

Ifurtheroutlinepoliticalliberalismandtheimplicationsofacceptingconvergencejustificationsinthenext

section, before responding in turn to the three objections, which each claim that our theory of public

justificationshouldonlypermitconsensusjustifications.

PoliticalLiberalism,Consensus,andConvergencePolitical liberals believe that the exercise of political powermust be justified to those subject to it, by

reasonstheycanaccept.Mostpoliticalliberalsgroundthisclaimonthefundamentalpremisethatrespect

forpersonsdemandsthatcoercionbe justified to thecoerced.2 If individualswithin liberaldemocracies

aretobeshownrespectasfreeandequalcitizensthenthecoercivelawsthattheyaresubjecttomustbe

justifiedtothem.This iswhatdistinguishes legitimatecollectiveauthorityfrombruteforce.Coercionby

lawis impermissibleunlesseach(reasonable3)citizenisgivenreasonstoaccept it.Thiscanbestatedas

the Public Justification Principle (PJP): L is a justified coercive law only if every reasonable citizen has

reasontoendorseit.4

AsJamesBoettcherandJonathanHarmonnote,makingthisconnectionbetweenrespectforpersonsand

public justification is the ‘standardapproach’withinpolitical liberalism(BoettcherandHarmon2009,p.

8). Forexample, LawrenceSolumwrites that ‘respect for citizensas freeandequaldoesmean thatwe

shouldgiveourfellowcitizensthesortofreasonsthattheycouldreasonablyaccept’(Solum1993,p.736).

GeorgeKloskoarguesthatgovernmentsnotbasingcoercionongroundscitizenscanreasonablyrejectis

‘part of what it means to treat people with adequate respect’ (Klosko 2003, p. 169). Jonathan Quong

concurs: ‘respect forpersons requires that theynotbepolitically coercedongrounds that they cannot

reasonablyaccept’(Quong2004,p.246).Thus,‘respectforpersonsliesattheheartofpoliticalliberalism’

(Larmore1999,p.606).5

Somepoliticalliberals,mostnotablyJohnRawls,applyPJPonlyto‘constitutionalessentialsandmattersof

basic justice’–toquestionsaboutbasicrightsandlibertiesandbasiceconomicandsocial justice(Rawls

1UsefuloverviewsareBoettcherandHarmon(2009);Weithman(1997).2Bird(2014)criticisesthis‘coercion-based’accountofpoliticalliberalism,butitremainsthestandardapproachintheliterature,soIwillassumeithere.Manyofmyargumentscouldbeadaptedsoastoapplytotheoriesthatseesomethingotherthancoercionastriggeringthedemandforpublicjustification.3Thisqualificationisassumedthroughout.Preciselywhatisrequiredforacitizentobe‘reasonable’iscontroversial.Suchacaveatisnecessary,butItakenopositionhereonwhatitentails.4MyformulationofPJPisbasedonGausandVallier’s(2009,p.53),butismoreecumenicalthantheirs.PJPisanecessary,notsufficient,conditionforlegitimacy.Othernecessaryconditionsmightincludedemocraticenactmentandconstitutionality.5Rawlsdoesnotmakethisexplicit,butLarmore(1999,2003)arguesthatrespectisfundamentaltoRawls’sthought.

3

2005, p. xlviii, fn. 23). ForRawls, legal coercion is legitimate ‘when it is exercised in accordancewith a

constitutiontheessentialsofwhichallcitizensasfreeandequalmayreasonablybeexpectedtoendorse’

(Rawls 2005, p. 137). Others, such as Quong, contend that PJP applies to all laws (Quong 2004).

Constitutional essentials must satisfy PJP because coercion must be justified to the coerced, and this

argumentequallyappliestoallothercoercivelaws.ThisisreflectedinmyformulationofPJP.Inthispaper

I assume that PJP must be fulfilled by every coercive6 law, but my arguments for the legitimacy of

convergencejustificationsequallyapplytothemorerestrictedapplicationofPJP.

Political liberals disagree as to precisely what it means to offer citizens reasons they ‘can accept’ (or

‘cannot reasonably reject’), but all agree that citizens need not be offered reasons that they currently

acceptinorderforcoerciontobejustified.Citizensmustbeofferedreasonswhichtheycouldinprinciple

accept,oracknowledgeashavingnormativeforce,undersomelevelofidealisation.Myownviewofwhat

thisinvolveswillemergeovercourseofthepaper.

Thevitalpointforourpurposesisthatmostpolitical liberalsbelievethatPJPexcludesreligiousreasons,

andreasonsderivedfromothercomprehensivedoctrines, fromplayingarolewithinpublic justification.

Crudelyput,theargumentisthatinorderforlawstobejustifiedtoeverycitizentheymustbejustifiedby

reasonsthatallcitizens‘canaccept’(howeverthisisinterpreted)–by‘publicreasons’.Givenreasonable

pluralism,reasonsarisingfromcomprehensivedoctrinesarenon-public,sincetheycannotbeacceptedby

everycitizen.Thus,suchreasonscannotbeusedtojustifylaws.

This argument is fallacious, however, as can be seen by distinguishing between consensus and

convergencejustifications.Aconsensusjustificationoccurswhenalawisjustifiedtoeverycitizenbythe

same reason(s). There is a (set of) reason(s) that all citizens can accept, which justifies the law. A

convergencejustificationoccurswhenalawisjustifiedtoeverycitizen,butdifferentcitizens(orgroupsof

citizens)havedifferentreasonstoacceptit.Thelawisjustifiedtodifferent(groupsof)citizensbydifferent

considerations, and there is no one justifying reason that all accept. Utilitarians believe that the law

increasesutility, Christiansbelieve it is in accordwith theBible, and Scanloniansbelieve it satisfies the

constraints of contractualism. In this way, the law is justified to every citizen, and yet the overall

justificationisbaseduponseveralcomprehensivedoctrines.Religious(andothercomprehensive)reasons

canplaya rolewithinconvergence justifications,aspartof thenetworkof reasons that serve to justify

lawstoeverycitizen.

6Allfuturereferencesto‘laws’shouldbetakentomean‘coercivelaws’.Sometheoristsbelievethatalllawsarecoercive.Itakenopositiononthishere.PJPappliestoallcoercivelaws,whetherornoteverylawiscoercive.

4

Asitstands,PJPisneutralbetweenconsensusandconvergencejustifications.Itallowsbothaslegitimate

formsofpublic justification. It is therefore false to claim that the requirement that lawsbe justified to

every citizen itself excludes religious reasons frompublic justification.AsGeraldGausandKevinVallier

write, ‘even if they are not shared by all, religious reasons can enter into a network of justificatory

relations, crisscrossing and overlapping diverse reasonable viewpoints to secure an overall public

justification’(GausandVallier2009,p.61).7

Under a convergence justification, each citizen is given reasons they can accept for the law, so PJP is

fulfilled, and coercion is legitimised by this fact.8 Every citizen is shown respect as a free and equal

memberof thepolity, since the coercion they face is justified to them.At first glance, therefore, there

appears to be no reason to reject convergence as a legitimate form of public justification. This has

importantimplicationsforpoliticalliberalism.

Two obligations fall upon citizens if only consensus justifications are legitimate.9 First, since there is a

specificsetofreasonsthatmustbeusedwithinpublicjustification,thosethatcanbeacceptedbyevery

citizen, citizens have an obligation to provide such reasonswhen advocating a law. Theymust provide

publicreasonstotheircompatriots,inordertojustifythelawtothem.‘Whencitizensengageinpolitical

advocacy, they have amoral duty to justify their decisions according to public reasons that others can

reasonablyaccept’(Schwartzman2011,p.375).Thisisthe‘public-reason-givingrequirement’.10

Second, citizens should refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons –

unsharedreasons,suchasthosearisingfromtheircomprehensivedoctrines.Mostpoliticalliberalsaccept

whatBoettchercalls‘weakinclusionism’(Boettcher2005,pp.498-500),soholdthatcitizensaremorally

permittedtooffertheircomprehensivereasonsinpublicdeliberation,butonlyiftheyalsooffersufficient

publicreasonsforlawstheyadvocate.11Thus,iftheonlyreasonsacitizenhasforendorsingalawarenon-

publicthensheoughtnotsupportit,sincethesereasonscannotpubliclyjustifylaws.Thisistherestraint

requirement(Eberle2002,pp.68-71).

Thelegitimacyofconvergencejustificationsmakestheseimplicationsforcitizenconductmuchlessclear.

Thereisnolongeraspecificclassofreasonsthatmustbeusedinpublicjustification,sotherecannotbea

public-reason-giving requirement. There can also be no simple restraint requirement, since all of the

7Thisalsoappliestosecularcomprehensivereasons.8Thesereasonsmustbe‘conclusive’,or‘sufficient’,asIexplainbelow.9Someconsensustheoristsarguethattheseobligationsonlyapplytoofficials,nottoordinarycitizens.SeeHabermas(2006);Laborde(2013).10ThistermisfromStearsandHumphrey(2012,p.287).11Rawls’s(2005,pp.462-463)‘proviso’isanexampleofthis.

5

reasons a citizen can accept can be part of a law’s public justification. Even if the only reasons an

individualhasforsupportingalawareonesthatarisefromhercomprehensivedoctrine,thelawmightbe

justifiedtoothersbytheirownreasons.Ifcitizensexercisedrestraintinsuchcasesthensomelawsmight

not be enacted which could in fact be publicly justified.12 ‘Strong inclusionism’, where no restraint is

required,isthuscorrect.Citizensshouldsupportanylawtheywish,appealingtoanyreasonstheybelieve

arerelevanttoitsjustification.13

Theremightbe reasons forus to reject convergence justifications,however.AlthoughPJPallows them,

perhapsthereareargumentswhichshowthattheyarenot legitimateformsofpublic justification. Iwill

consider three. The first is that convergence permits insincerity in citizens’ advocacy, allowing them to

manipulateoneanother.Thesecondisthatthevalueofpublicjustificationpartlyderivesfromtheshared

purposes and unity it encourages in society, which are undermined by convergence. The third is that

convergenceisinsufficientlydeliberative.

Iwilldiscuss,andreject,theseobjectionsinturn.Convergenceisresilienttothem,soshouldbeaccepted

asalegitimateformofpublicjustification,withalltheimplicationsthisbrings.14

TheSincerityRequirementPoliticalliberalismshouldincludeasincerityrequirement,accordingtowhichcitizensshouldnotsupport

lawsthattheyknowotherslackreasonstoendorse.15Thisisimportantbecauseitpreventsmanipulation.

Bettymightbelieve thata law is justified toher,basedon informationthatAlfknowstobe false. IfAlf

supportsthelawdespiteknowingthatitcannotinfactbejustifiedtoBettythenhemanipulatesher.She

acceptsthelawasjustifiedtoher,butiswrongtodoso,andAlfplaysonthisfactinpresentingthelawas

publiclyjustified.Thisisdisrespectful.Itshowsawillingnessforotherstobecoercedinwaysthatcannot

be justified to them, so fails to show adequate respect for them as free and equal. The sincerity

requirementthereforestatesthatAmaysupportlawLonlyiftwoconditionsaresatisfied:16

(i)AbelievesheisjustifiedinendorsingL.

12Thisisnottoimplythateverypubliclyjustifiedlawmustbeenacted,butthattherewillbesomepubliclyjustifiedlawswhicharenotknowntobeso.Awarenessthattheycouldbelegitimatelyenactedislacking.13Theremightbeaminimalproposal-restraintrequirement,statingthatacitizenshouldnotsupportlawssheknowscannotbepubliclyjustifiedandthatarelikelytobeenactedifshesupportsthem.SeeVallier(2014,pp.184-190);Gaus(2009).14Intheabsenceoffurtherobjectionsnotconsideredhere.15Atleastincaseswhereitislikelythelawwillthenbeenacted–seefn.13.Evenwhenthelawisunlikelytobeenacted,itwouldbeinsinceretoclaimthatalawispubliclyjustifiedwhenoneknowsitcannotbejustifiedtosomefellowcitizen(s).Iputthesecomplicationstooneside,sincetheydonotaffectmyarguments.16ThisisbasedonQuong(2011,p.266).Ihaveamended(ii),however.Quong’s(ii)saysthatAmustreasonablybelievethatBisjustifiedinendorsingL.Thisisproblematic,sincecitizensareunlikelytoknowwhethereveryfellowcitizenisjustifiedinendorsingalaw.Instead,therequirementshouldbethattheyshouldn’tsupportlawsthattheyknowcannotbejustifiedtosomefellowcitizen(s).

6

(ii)AdoesnotbelievethatLcannotbejustifiedtoB.

Quong(2011,pp.265-273)arguesthatthisrequirementisnotfulfilledwhenlawsonlyhaveconvergence

justifications.SupposeAlfsupportsLbasedsolelyonRaandBettysupportsLbasedsolelyonRb,where

Ra andRb are reasonsderived from their respective comprehensivedoctrines.Alf rejectsRb andBetty

rejectsRa,sincetheyeachregardtheother’scomprehensivedoctrineasfalse.Alfthereforebelievesthat

LisnotjustifiedtoBetty.AlfrecognisesthatBettybelievesLisjustifiedtoher,butBettydoessobasedon

a falsebelief (Rb). The reasoning fromBetty’s comprehensivedoctrine toRbmightbe flawless, butAlf

rejects Betty’s comprehensive doctrine, so thinks that Rb is false, and is not a reason for Betty. It is

thereforedisrespectfulandmanipulativeforAlftosupportL.Condition(ii) isnotmet,soAlfshouldnot

supportL.17Thesameistrue,ofcourse,ofBetty’sviewofRa.NeitherAlfnorBettycansincerelysupportL

‘becauseeachpersonmustbelievetheotherisnotjustifiedinendorsing’it(Quong2011,p.267).

In order to be publicly justified, laws must be justified to every individual. To defend convergence

justificationsfromthisobjection,onemustarguethatitispossibleforRbtobeareasonforBetty,andfor

Alftobeabletorecogniseitassuch,eventhoughitisnotareasonforAlf,whobelievesittobefalse.Alf

thus believes that L can be justified to Betty, by Rb, so condition (ii) is satisfied and Alf can sincerely

supportL.

Charlesaccepts theTorahasauthoritative, andon thisbasisbelieves itwouldbewrong forhim toeat

pork.18DeborahrejectstheauthorityoftheTorah,sodoesnotbelievethatCharleswouldbewrongtoeat

pork.Nonetheless, shemightaccept thatCharles’s Jewish faithgiveshim a reasonnot toeatpork.Not

eating pork is justified to him, given his beliefs. Deborah accepts that Charles has a valid reason, even

thoughshebelievesitisfalse.Itisrationalforhimtoactonthisreason,givenhiscomprehensivedoctrine.

Thisappearstobethekindofcaseweneed.

This example involves a conception of reasons and justification which Quong explicitly rejects:

‘justificationrequiresmorethanimpeccableinferences–italsorequiressoundpremises’(Quong2008,p.

5).DeborahbelievesCharles’spremisesarefalse,socannotbelieveheis justifiedinbelievingheshould

noteatpork.However, this conflates rational justificationandsoundness.AsEberleargues, ‘soundness

hastodowiththeobjectiveadequacyofanargumentforagivenconclusion;rationalityhastodowith

whethersomeargumentappearstobesoundgivenacitizen’sevidentialsetandgiventhatshehasgone

about evaluating that argument in the appropriatemanner’ (Eberle 2002, p. 62). Eberle here identifies

17Forsimilararguments,seeBohmanandRichardson(2009,pp.269-270);Audi(1997,pp.135-136).Schwartzman(2011)isafulldiscussionofsincerityinpublicreason.18Quong(2008,pp.5-6)givesasimilarexample.

7

twoaspectsofrationaljustification.First,itprimarilyconcernsthemannerinwhichoneformsabelief.It

requiresonetosubjectone’sconvictionstocriticism,seekgoodevidence,andrespondtothatevidence

appropriately, changing one’s beliefs where appropriate. Second, rational justification depends on the

beliefs and experiences one already has, since these are the only bases on which one can evaluate

evidenceandreasons.

Givenhisexperienceandavailableinformation,Aristotlewasrationallyjustifiedinbelievingthatthesun

orbited the earth, just as I am rationally justified in believing the reverse. Aristotle might have used

impeccable reasoning, but he applied it to false premises and thus reached a false conclusion.

Nonetheless,hewasjustifiedinhisbelief.Quong’sstatementthatjustification‘requiressoundpremises’

impliesthatIcannotregardAristotle’sbeliefasjustified,butthisissurelyincorrect.

WecanrefertoEberle’sconceptionofjustificationas‘openjustification’.Toopenlyjustifyaproposition

to John,onemust ‘showthat it canbeproperly inferred fromJohn‘spresentbelief-valuesetconjoined

withadequateinformation,reasoningabilityandsomedegreeofbeliefcoherence’(Vallier2011a,p.112).

John’s belief-value set is the set of all his beliefs, experiences, goals etc.19 A proposition is not openly

justified tohimsimply ifhebelieves it.Afterall,hemighthavereasonedbadlyor lackeasilyattainable

relevant information, or his belief-value setmight containplain contradictionswhichpreventhim from

believing the proposition in question.We should correct for thesemistakes, imputing to agents easily

attainable relevant information and correcting any obvious errors in their reasoning. This ‘moderate

idealisation’formsthe‘admirablyrational’versionofanagent(Vallier2011a,pp.211-284;Gaus2011,pp.

232-257).20Alawisjustifiedtoanagentwhentheiradmirablyrationalcounterparthasreasontoaccept

it;inotherwords,whentheagentisopenlyjustifiedinacceptingreasonsthatjustifythelaw.

Otherswilloftenrecognisethatabelief isopenly justifiedtoanindividual.Deborahcanappreciatethat

Charles’sbeliefregardingporkisinferablefromhisbelief-valueset.Inthisway,thebeliefisintelligibleto

her.Sheregardsitasmisguided,butcanrecognisethatitprovidesareasonforhim:itisopenlyjustified

tohim.

Quongcanacknowledgethatopenjustificationisalegitimatetypeofjustification.21Buthecontendsthat

public justificationrequiresthatwebelievethatothersareactually justifiedintheirbeliefs,‘justifiedfull

19Eberlecallsthisone’s‘evidentialset’.20Thereisclearlyambiguityintermslike‘easilyattainable’empiricalinformationand‘obviouserrors’inreasoning.Differentspecificationsofthesetermsgivedifferentlevelsofidealisation.Theprecisespecificationsdonotmatterformyargumenthere.21AtonepointQuong(2011,p.142,fn.11)explicitlysaysthatindividualscanbejustifiedinbelievingfalsehoods,iftheyreasonblamelesslybutreachfalseconclusionsduetotheirlimitedepistemicsituation.

8

stop’,ratherthanmerelyopenlyjustified.Thisisbecausesincerityattachestoactualjustification.Evenif

AlfrecognisesthatBettyisopenlyjustifiedinendorsingL,basedonRb,hecannotsincerelybelievethatL

is justifiedtoBetty.FromAlf’spointofview,LcannotbejustifiedtoBetty,sinceBetty’sonlyreasonfor

endorsingLisRb,whichAlfrejects.Ifanotherismerelyopenlyjustifiedinendorsingalaw,thenIconsider

them to be unjustified, so cannot sincerely support the law. I will argue that this is incorrect; the

requirementsofsincerityandrespectcanbefulfilledbyopenjustification.

Openjustificationinvokesaninternalistconceptionofwhatitisforanindividualtohaveareason:reasons

arerelativetoone’scurrentbelief-valueset.CharlescanthereforehaveareasonincircumstancesCthat

Deborahlacks,giventheirdifferentbelief-valuesets.Charleshasreasonnottoeatpork,sinceheaccepts

theauthorityoftheTorah,whereasDeborahdoesnot.StevenWallrejectsthisinfavourofanexternalist

conception, according towhich all individuals in the same circumstanceshave the same reasons to act

(Wall2010,pp.134-135).These reasonsare those thatwouldbeacceptedbya fully rationalagent:an

agent who knows all relevant factual information, reasons flawlessly, and knows of all the evaluative

considerationsthatapplyandtheirrelativeweights.Inthissense,Charlesmightnothavereasontorefrain

fromeatingpork– i.e. if theTorah isnot in fact theauthoritativewordofGod.22Thequestionforus is

whatkindofreasonsarerelevanttopublicjustification.Theanswermustcomefromwhatisrequiredby

respectforpersons,thevalueunderlyingpoliticalliberalism.

Respect for persons requires us to offer explanations for coercion that are addressed to the coerced

individual(s): reasons they can accept. An externalist conception of reasons prevents this. According to

externalism,AlfcansupportlawLaslongashebelievesthatheiswarrantedinbelievingLtobejustified

and that a fully rational version of Bettywould also believe this. Thus,WilliamGalston claims thatwe

respectothersbyofferingthem‘asexplanation,whatwetaketobeourtrueandbestreasons’(Galston

1991,p.109).Wepresentthetruthasweseeit,andthisisenoughtojustifycoercion.

This fails to respect people as they are, with their current beliefs and values. Others might believe

themselvestohavenoreasontoacceptthelawasjustified,sincethebeliefs,informationorreasoningwe

baseourjustificationuponarerejectedbythem,orbeyondtheircomprehension.Coercioninterfereswith

others’capacitytoactbytheirownlights.Wecannotjustifythissimplybyappealingtoourownreasons,

butmustengagewiththecoercedperson’sviewpointandseektoofferreasonstheycanaccept(Eberle

2002, pp. 98-99). Further, it is not enough to say that theywould accept this reason were they fully

rational.EvenifwecanplausiblyclaimthatafullyrationalandinformedversionofBettywouldacceptthe

reasonAlf offers to justify L, this explanation fails to addressBetty. Justification is offerednot toBetty

22Andifallotherargumentsagainstmeat-eatingaremistaken.Iamnotendorsingthisviewhere.

9

herself, but to a non-existent radically idealised Betty, whomight have very different beliefs to actual

Betty.Moderate idealisation is necessary, to correct for obvious errors in reasoning or a lack of easily

attained empirical information. Any changes this makes to citizens’ belief-value sets are epistemically

accessible to them, imputing reasons they could themselves recognise if theyengaged in a respectable

amount of deliberation (Gaus 2011, pp. 244-257).Radical idealisation, justification basedonwhat fully

rationalagentswouldaccept,lacksthesefeatures,soisunacceptable.

Quong’s interpretation of the sincerity requirement takes things in the opposite direction: Alf can only

justifylawstoBettyusingreasonsthatBettyacceptsandthatAlfalsobelievesaresound.Sharedreasons

are needed for public justification. This also fails to respect people as they are, since it denies the

relevanceofthefactthatotherscanhaverationallyjustifiedbeliefsbaseduponconsiderationswereject.

It is not insincere for Alf to recognise that from Betty’s perspective L is justified by Rb, which Betty is

openlyjustifiedinacceptinggivenherbelief-valueset,eventhoughAlfhimselfrejectsRb,sinceit isnot

openly justified by his belief-value set. This simply reflects the fact that Alf’s belief-value set does not

determinewhat is (openly) justified toBetty. Accepting this fact is necessary if political liberalism is to

adequatelyrespectpluralism.People’sdifferentcomprehensivedoctrinesmeanthattheyhavedifferent

values and beliefs – different evaluative standards – which give rise to different internalist reasons,

reasonsopenlyjustifiedtoanindividual.Citizensmustrecognisethesereasonsiftheyaretorespectone

another as agents holding to different conceptions of the good. This does not require believing these

reasonstobetrueintheexternalistsense,23butitdoesmeanbelievingthemtobeopenlyjustifiedtothe

individualconcernedandthattheycanjustifylawstothoseindividuals.Notdoingthisexpressesaformof

disrespect.ContraQuong,respectingourcompatriotsmeansthatsincerityattachestoopenjustification:

we can sincerely believe that another is justified in endorsing a lawwhenwe recognise that they are

openlyjustifiedindoingso.24

Imagine a society deciding whether to implement a safety net providing income to the long-term

unemployed. A Nozickian might support this law based on her belief that without it the long-term

unemployedwould be in aworse position than in the state of nature prior to appropriation, violating

Nozick’s version of the Lockean proviso (Nozick 1974, pp. 174-182). A Rawlsianmight support the law

becausehebelievesitcontributestothefulfilmentofthedifferenceprinciple(Rawls1999,pp.52-73).A

Christian might support it because it is in line with Biblical injunctions to help the poor (such as

Deuteronomy 14:28-15:11 and Isaiah 58:6-10). There is thus a convergence justification for the law.

23i.e.Alfdoesn’thavetobelievethatRbwouldbeacceptedbyafullyrationalindividual.PresumablyAlfbelievesthathisreasonsaretrueinthissense,sincehebelieveshiscomprehensivedoctrineistrue,buthecannotbelievethatreasonsarisingfromothers’comprehensivedoctrinesaretrueinthissense.24AsVallier(2011b,p.262)writes,‘onlybyembracingconvergencecanpublicreasonliberalstrulyrespectreasonablepluralismandindividualliberty.’

10

Importantly, each individual believes that the law is actually justified, each for their own reasons.

Condition (i) ismet.Theyalso caneach recognise thatothersareopenly justified inendorsing the law,

since they can recognise that others have reason for doing so from within their belief-value sets, so

condition (ii) ismet.There isno insincerity involved in themeachadmittingthese facts,andsupporting

thelawonthisbasis.25

Ifthisisright,whycan’twegofurther?VallierandGausbotharguethatthereasonswhichjustifythelaw

toothersmustbeintelligibletoustolegitimatelybepartofapublicjustification(Vallier2011a,pp.145-

147;Gaus2011,pp.289-292).Wemustbeabletorecognisethattheyarereasonsforthem,thattheyare

openlyjustifiedtothemgiventheirbelief-valueset.Ifjustificationisperspectival,however,thenshouldn’t

wesimplyacceptothers’word?IfBettyclaimsthatLisjustifiedbyreasonRbthenmaybethisshouldbe

enough forAlf, even ifAlf cannotunderstand this claim, sobelieves that the lawcannotbe justified to

Betty.PerhapsAlfdoesnotunderstandhowRb justifiesL,orhowRbcanbeinferredfromBetty’sother

beliefs, or how it is supported by the evidence that Betty points to. But Betty believes the law to be

justified,sothisisenough.

Thisdoesfall foulofthesincerityrequirement. IfBettyacceptsRbduetoempirical informationthatAlf

knowstobefalse,thenitisinsincereforAlftoclaimthatRbjustifiesLtoBetty.Ifamodern-dayAristotle

believedthatthesunorbitedtheearththenitwouldbedisrespectfultojustifycoerciontohimbyappeal

tothisbelief,sinceweknowit tobeempirically false. It isno longerpossibleforanagenttobeopenly

justified in believing that the sun orbits the earth. There is easily attainable empirical evidence that

conclusivelyprovesthatthisisnotthecase,andthusnoadmirablyrationalagentbelievesit.

Similar considerationsapply in caseswhereAlf rejectsBetty’s reasoning toRb fromBetty’sbelief-value

set,orfromRbtoL.IfAlfcannotunderstandthisreasoning,orcanseeobviousflawsinit,thenhecannot

sincerelyholdLtobejustifiedtoBettybasedonit.HebelievesthatamoderatelyidealisedBettywould

notacceptRb–RbisnotopenlyjustifiedtoBetty,socannotjustifyLtoher.Alfmightwellberightabout

this.OritmightbethatBettyisopenlyjustified,butforsomereasonAlfcannotrecognisethis.Ineither

case, claiming that a law is justified to someone based on their word even though one cannot

comprehend how this is the case fails to take them seriously as a personwho should not be coerced

lightly. If one believes that a law cannot be justified to another then imposing it upon them is

25Forsupportfor‘adhocjustification’,wheredifferentcitizensareoffereddifferentreasonsforalaw,seeWolterstorff(1997,pp.106-107);Swaine(2009,pp.191-193);Stout(2004,pp.72-73);Eberle(2007,pp.434-435).

11

disrespectful. This iswhy theremust be an intelligibility requirement; onemust recognise that a law is

openlyjustifiedtoanotheragentinordertosincerelyclaimthattheyarejustifiedinendorsingit.26

Convergencejustificationscanfulfilthesincerityrequirement.AslongasRbisintelligibletoAlfandRais

intelligible toBetty, they canboth sincerely support L,despite lacking shared reasons.27 L is justified to

bothindividualsbyreasonstheyaccept,andtheycaneachrecognisethatLisjustifiedtotheother,sothe

sincerityrequirementisfulfilled.

SharedValuesandSocialUnityA secondobjection to convergence justifications is that they fail to incorporate an important aspect of

publicjustification:sharedvalues.Formanytheorists,oneofthecentralattractionsofpoliticalliberalism

is that it createsapolityunitedbya setofvaluesandprinciples thatall canendorse.StephenMacedo

statesthatpolitical liberalsseek ‘politicalprinciplesthatcanbepublicly justifiedandwidelyaffirmedby

reasonable people in a diverse society’ (Macedo1997, p. 2). Requiring consensus justifications ensures

that citizens justify laws by appeal to values that all can accept, thus creating a polity unified around

shared motivations for political action. Consensus is not simply on each law, but also on the values

underlyingthelaws.

Convergencejustificationslackthisdimension.Lawsarejustifiedtocitizensbydiversereasonsandvalues.

Each accepts laws for her own reasons, which may not be shared by others. While it is likely that

subgroupswithinsocietysharevalues that theydrawonto justify laws, thereneednotbeanypolitical

principles accepted by all citizens. Permitting convergence removes an important aspect of political

liberalism’sappeal.28

26ThispointcanalsobemadeusingSwaine’s(2009,pp.194-196)distinctionbetweeninaccessibleandincomprehensiblereasons.Inaccessiblereasonsareopenlyjustifiedtoanotherindividual,butrelyonexperiencesonelacksorpremisesonerejects.Theyareintelligible;onecanseethattheyareopenlyjustifiedtotheother.Incomprehensiblereasonsaresimplyimpenetrable;onecannotmakesenseofthem.Theyareunintelligible.Appealtoanother’sinaccessiblereasonsisn’tdisrespectful;appealtotheirincomprehensiblereasonsis.27Asareviewerrightlynoted,therearedifficultquestionshereaboutpreciselywhenanother’sbeliefsare,orarenot,intelligible.He/sheofferedacasewhereBettybasesabeliefon‘mysticalperception’ofGod’scommands(onwhich,seeEberle(2002,pp.239-251)).Icannotofferafullreplytosuchcases,butthemostimportantpointtonoteisthatintelligibleopenjustificationdoesnotrequirethatwebelieveothers’basicevaluativestandards,orworldview,tobesound,orall-things-consideredjustified.Quong(2011,pp.271-272)rightlyarguesthatweshouldnotexpectthisofcitizens.Instead,intelligibleopenjustificationcentresonwhetherwecanrecognisethatothers’beliefsarejustifiedtothemgiventheirevaluativestandards.IfBetty’sbeliefinmysticalperceptionispartofabroader,reasonablycoherent,worldview,thenIthinkthatitcanbeintelligible,evenifAlfconsidersitmisguided.UsingSwaine’sdistinction,thebeliefisinaccessibletoAlf,butnotincomprehensible.28Macedo(2010)arguesalongtheselines.Mydiscussiondiffersfrom,butdoesnotcontradict,Vallier’s(2011b)replytoMacedo.

12

Asapreliminaryresponse,Valliernotesthat ‘convergencedoesnotruleoutcommonreasoning; itonly

allows diverse reasoning’ (Vallier 2011b, p. 272). Theories that permit convergence can still encourage

consensus justificationswhereverpossible.Convergence justificationsaresimplyalsopermitted.Shared

values and principles can be as common, and appealed to as often, as ifwe only permitted consensus

justifications,andfurtheroverlaponlawsjustifiedbydiversevaluesisthenalsoencouraged.

Topresstheobjection,onemustthereforearguethatpermittingconvergenceunderminesthebenefitsof

consensus. Society is less unified, sincemany laws are justified by convergence. Further, shared values

themselvesmightbeundermined.Theyarenotnecessaryforjustifyinglaws,soarenolongerthefocusof

politicallife,andarenotencouragedtothesameextent.

Evenifthisweretrue,itdoesnotgiveusreasontofavourexistingconsensus-onlytheories,becausesuch

viewspermittheenactmentoflawsthatarenotjustifiedtoallcitizens.Alawthatisjustifiedbyappealto

valuesthatallcitizensacceptmightnotbejustifiedtoall(Wolterstorff2007,p.150).Citizenscansharea

setofvaluesyetdisagreeonwhethertheygiverisetoreasonssufficienttojustifyacertainlaw.Permitting

the enactment of such laws, as existing consensus theories do, fails to respect all citizens as free and

equal.Thiscannotbejustifiedbypotentialgainsinsocialunity.

Quong’s view provides an example here. Quong (2011, Chapter 6) argues that all reasonable citizens

acceptthreegeneralliberalprinciplesofjustice.Theseare:

(i) Allcitizensshouldbeassignedbasicrightsandliberties.

(ii) Theserightsandlibertiesshouldbegivenspecialpriority.

(iii) Allcitizensmusthaveadequateall-purposemeanstomakeuseoftheirrightsandliberties.

Each citizen also endorses some reasonable political conception of justice,which interprets and orders

variouspoliticalvaluesthatallacceptonthebasisof(i)-(iii).Thisgivesacommonbasisforpublicdecision-

making.Eachcitizencanappealtothebalanceofsharedvalueswithintheirconceptionofjustice,andany

lawthatisjustifiedbysuchaconceptioncanbelegitimatelyenacted.

This view permits the enactment of laws that are not justified to all. Anthony and Belinda both have

reasonsforandagainstlawL,arisingfromtheirrespective(reasonable)conceptionsofjustice,JaandJb.L

hasegalitarianmerits,butwouldalsorestrictfreedomofchoice.Onbalance,AnthonyconsidersLtobe

justified,while Belinda considers it to be unjustified, because Jb places lessweight on equality than Ja

does.BelindabelievesL’srestrictionoffreedomistoogreattojustifythereductionininequality.Shehas

decisivereasontorejectthe law,sothecoercion it involves isnot justifiedtoher.OnQuong’saccount,

however,Lcanbelegitimatelyenacted,sincethereisareasonablebalanceofpoliticalvaluesaccordingto

13

whichitisjustified(i.e.Anthony’s).ThefactthatthelawisnotjustifiedtoBelindadoesnotstopitbeing

enacted.

Quong would respond to such examples by arguing that the law is in fact justified to Belinda in the

relevantsense,bydrawingonhisdistinctionbetween‘foundational’and‘justificatory’disagreements.Ifa

lawisjustifiedsolelybyappealtoaparticularconceptionofthegoodthenthosewhorejectthelawhave

a‘foundationaldisagreement’withthelaw’sadvocates.Theydonot‘shareanypremiseswhichcanserve

asamutuallyacceptablestandardof justification’ (Quong2011,p.193).They lackanysharedvaluesby

whichtheirdisputecanbeadjudicated.Ineffect,thosewhorejectthelawhavebeenofferednoreasons

initsfavour,sinceacontroversialconceptionofthegoodcannotprovideamutuallyacceptablestandard

ofjustification.

Thecaseisverydifferent,forQuong,whenalawisjustifiedbyappealtoareasonablepoliticalconception

of justice, even one that some citizens reject. The disagreement in this case is ‘justificatory’, because

reasonable citizens share a set of values that ‘serve as amutually acceptable standardof justification,’

though they ‘nevertheless disagree about certain substantive conclusions’ (Quong 2011, p. 204). The

values used to justify the law aremutually acceptable, even though the parties disagree on the ‘exact

weightorrankingofthosevaluesorprinciples’(Quong2011,p.207),andthusdisagreeonwhetherthose

valuessupportthislaw.Allcitizenscanrecognisethatthelawisjustifiedbyappealtoaplausiblebalance

ofvaluesthattheyaccept.Itistruethatsomecitizenswillinterpretorweighthosevaluesdifferently,and

thusrejectthe law.Buttheirfreedomandequality isrespected,becausetheirdisagreementwiththose

whoadvocatethelawismerelyjustificatory,notfoundational.Theycanendorsethevaluesusedtojustify

thelaw,soitisjustifiedtothem.29

In my view, this account of what is involved in justifying coercion to an individual fails to fulfil the

requirementsofrespect.Acoercivelawisnotjustifiedtoanindividualwhentheyhaveconclusivereason

to reject it. This is true even if they can recognise that some reasonable interpretation of values they

acceptsupports the law,so theirdisagreementwith itsadvocates is justificatory. IfCharlottecoercively

interfereswithDonaldandoffersajustificationappealingtoavaluethatDonaldaccepts,butwhichinthis

instanceiscompletelyoutweighedwithinhisbelief-valueset,thenCharlottedoesnotshowhimadequate

respect.CharlottemotionstowardrespectforDonald,engagingwithhisperspectivetosomedegree,but

picksoutreasonsfavouringherinterferencewhileignoringthefactthathehasconclusivecountervailing

reasons.Similarly,Belindaisnotshownsufficientrespect ifL isenacted.Accordingtoherconceptionof

29InLister’s(2013b)terms,Quong’sviewappliesthe‘unanimousacceptabilityrequirement’tothereasonsfordecisions,ratherthantodecisionsthemselves.

14

justice,L isobjectionable,andthusit isnot justifiedtoher,evenif it is justifiedaccordingtoadifferent

reasonablepoliticalconception.

OurunderstandingofPJPshouldincludea‘conclusivityrequirement’.Citizensmusthavesufficientreason

to endorse a law, so lack decisive reasons to reject it, in order for its imposition upon them to be

legitimate. Sincehis view lacks such a requirement,Quongpermits coercion that is not justified to the

coerced.Thesameistrueofalltheoriesthatclaimthatappealto(aplausiblebalanceof)sharedvaluesis

sufficienttofulfilPJP.

WemightamendQuong’saccounttoincludeaconclusivityrequirement,byholdingthatinorderforalaw

tobepublicly justifiedall citizens’political conceptionsof justicemustendorse it.Allmustendorse the

lawonthebasisoftheirreasonablebalancesofpoliticalvalues.Butthisaccountstillfailstotrulyrespect

citizens,duetoitsdismissalfrompublicjustificationofvaluesthatacitizenacceptsbutarenotsharedby

allothers.Basedsolelyonherpoliticalconceptionofjustice,EricaviewsLasjust,buthercomprehensive

doctrinegivesherdecisivereasonstorejectLandconsideritunjust.OnQuong’sview,onlysharedvalues

count,andallreasonablecitizensrecognisethispriorityofpoliticalvalues.However,itisnotunreasonable

for Erica to object to L based on the fact that it is ruled out by her comprehensive doctrine.30 It is

disrespectful toclaim thatL is justified toherby sharedvalues,whenher fullbelief-valuesetgivesher

conclusivereasontorejectL.31

Inmyview,therefore,lawsmustbeconclusivelyjustifiedtoeachcitizenonthebasisofallofherreasons,

taking her full belief-value set into account.32 Convergence justifications achieve this, while existing

theoriesthatrequiresharedvaluesdonot.

The‘conclusivityrequirement’mightseemtohaveundesirableimplications,however.Perhapsfew,ifany,

lawswillbeconclusivelyjustifiedtoeverycitizen,andthusconvergencepoliticalliberalismwillleadtoan

ultra-minimalstate,oreventoanarchism.Ifaninterpretationofwhatrespectforpersonsdemandswith

regard to the justification of coercion inevitably rules out almost all laws as illegitimate, then that

interpretationissurelyimplausiblystrong.

30NotethatEricaisnothereimposinghercomprehensivedoctrineonothers,orarguingthatitprovidesreasonsforthem,merelythatitprovidesreasonforhertorejectL.31GausandVallier(2009,pp.62-65)callarefusaltoallowreligiousreasonstoactatdefeatersthe‘errorofsymmetry’.32IamdrawingontheinternalistunderstandingofreasonsthatIdefendedintheprevioussectionhere.IfQuong’sinterpretationofthesincerityrequirementwascorrect,thensharedvalueswouldbenecessaryforpublicjustification.Myargumentsinthissectionthusdependonthesuccessofmyargumentsintheprevioussection.

15

Whethertheconclusivityrequirementdoeshavesuchimplicationsdependsonhowitisinterpreted.Ifa

citizenmustconsidera lawtobethebestpossible lawinorderfor it tobeconclusively justifiedtoher,

thenwewillcertainlygetanarchisticresults.Nolawwouldbeconsideredoptimalbyeverycitizen.Thisis

an implausible interpretation of conclusivity, however.Muchmore plausible isGaus’s (2010b, pp. 195-

197) claim thata law is conclusively justified toa citizenwhen,according toher (moderately idealised)

belief-value set, it is an improvement on having no law on this issue. Thismeans that she prefers this

coercive law to facing no such coercion, and thus it is justified to her. The conclusivity requirement is

violatedwhencitizenshavedecisivereasonstorejectlaws,suchthattheyviewalawasbeingworsethan

havingnosuchlaw.

The implications of this view ultimately depend upon the beliefs and values of citizenswithin a polity.

Respect for citizensmeans that lawsmust be conclusively justified to them on the basis of their own

belief-value sets, and therefore it is thosebelief-value sets that determinewhat laws are, and arenot,

publicly justified. There are good reasons tobelieve that this viewwouldnot have anarchistic, or even

ultra-minimalstate,implications,however,giventhemanygoodsthatareachievedbysocialcoordination

throughlaw(seeGaus2011).33Gaus(2010a)arguesthattheconvergenceviewhasa‘classicalliberaltilt’,

renderingillegitimatelawsimplementinghighlevelsofredistribution.WhileIlackspacetoshowithere,I

believe that his arguments for this conclusion are flawed, and Gaus’s own view in fact permits more

redistributionthanherecognises.34

Sofarinthissection,Ihavearguedthatexistingconsensus-onlyviews,whichdonotincludeaconclusivity

requirement, fail to adequately respect citizens as free and equal. Quong’s distinction between

justificatoryandfoundationaldisagreementdoesnothavethenormativesignificancethatheclaims,so

cannotrebutthisobjection.Ihavealsobrieflyexplainedmyunderstandingof‘conclusivity’,whichfollows

Gaus’s,andwhyIdonotthinkitleadstoanultra-minimalstate.

ThereisonepoliticalliberalviewthatIhavenotconsidered,however,whichendorsesconclusivitywhile

also seeking to maintain the importance of shared values. According to this view, laws must be

conclusivelyjustifiedtoallcitizensbytheirownbelief-valuesets,andmustalsobejustifiedbyappealtoa

reasonablebalanceofsharedvalues.35

33Ilackspacetodefendthisclaimhere.Thequestionoftheimplicationsofconvergencepoliticalliberalism,giventhisunderstandingofconclusivity,isanareainwhichmoreworkisneededfromdefendersoftheview.34Forargumentstothiseffect,seeLister(2013a),Baccarini(2013,pp.40-49).TheimplicationsofconvergencepoliticalliberalismdependontheprecisespecificationofPJP.Forcriticaldiscussion,seeLister(2013b,pp.81-101).Gaus(2010b)repliestosomeofLister’sarguments.35Notheoristhasendorsedthisview,asfarasIamaware.

16

Theimplicationsofthisviewintermsofwhatlawsarepubliclyjustifiedareprobablyverysimilartothose

ofconvergencepoliticalliberalism.Mostlawsthatareconclusivelyjustifiedtoallcitizenswillhavesome

plausiblejustificationusingsharedvalues.Anadvocateoftheviewwouldarguethatitachievesahigher

level of social unity that convergence political liberalism, however, due to requiring appeals to shared

values. Thisensures that citizens can recognise common reasons for laws, soareunitedaround shared

politicalpurposes.

Thisargumentismistaken,however.Themerefactthatlawsarejustifiedbyappealtosharedvalues, in

additiontobeingconclusivelyjustifiedtoall,doesnotincreasesocialunity,becauseformanycitizensitis

notthosesharedvaluesthatactuallyjustifyparticularlawstothem.Imightrejecttheinterpretationand

weightingofsharedvaluesthatisusedtosupportapubliclyjustifiedlaw,whilenonethelessendorsingthe

law,becauseitisconclusivelyjustifiedtomeonthebasisofmyfullbelief-valueset.WhileIdonotthinkit

is justified by shared values, I have other, comprehensively-based, reasons to endorse it. The law is

justified to all, but there is no consensus on the values that underlie it, so no deeper social unity is

achievedbytheappealtosharedvalues.

This isnot tosay that there isdisunity insuchcases,or thatconvergencepolitical liberalismdenies the

valueofsocialunity.Thefactthat lawsareconclusively justifiedtoall itselfachievesavaluable idealof

socialunity,sinceitmeansthatallcanendorsethelawsthattheyliveundertogether.Further,Iamnot

denyingthatsharedvalueswillbeusedto justify laws. Indeed,citizenshaveclearpragmatic reasons to

appealtovaluesthattheysharewithothers inordertopersuadethemofthemeritsofparticular laws.

Appealstobothsharedandunsharedvalueswillbecommon.

The crucial point, however, is that once we recognise that respect for persons requires that laws are

conclusivelyjustifiedtoall,thereisnofurtherbenefitgainedfromalsorequiringthatlawsarejustifiedby

appealtosharedvalues.Sharedvaluesarenotnecessaryforpublicjustification,sincelawscanbejustified

tocitizensbyadiverserangeofreasonsandvalues.Further,requiringappealstosharedvaluesinaddition

to conclusive justificationdoesnotachieveanygreaterdegreeof socialunity,or senseofbeingunited

around shared reasons for political action, since it will often not be those shared values that actually

justify laws tosome,orevenmany,citizens.Thosecitizensconsider the interpretationofsharedvalues

that isused to justify the lawmistaken,although theyendorse the lawon thebasisof their fullbelief-

valuesets.

TheRoleofDeliberation

17

Athirdobjectiontoconvergencejustificationsisthattheyundervaluedeliberation.Theyconfinetherole

ofpublicdiscoursetothediscoveryofreasonscitizensalreadyhave,inordertoidentifywhetherlawsare

justified to them. Deliberation is not necessary for public justification; all that is required is that each

citizenhassufficientreasontoendorselaws.Politicalliberalismshouldincludeagreaterrolethanthisfor

deliberation.Requiringconsensusjustificationsencouragesdeliberationbyobligingcitizenstoshowthat

their common values can support laws. Citizens deliberate together on themerits of each policy from

theirsharedperspective.Convergenceremovesthiscentralroleofdeliberation,soshouldberejected.

Quong levels this criticismatGausandVallier, arguing that their exclusive focuson lawsbeingpublicly

justified gives ‘a slightly impoverished conception of public reason’s value’ (Quong 2008, p. 17). By

engaging in the practice of public reason, deliberating over the justification of laws, citizens manifest

respectforoneanotherasfreeandequal,honouringtheideathateachisowedjustificationforthelaws

theyliveunder.Civicrespectisrealisedbypractisingpublicreasoning,notmerelybyenactedlawsbeing

publiclyjustified.

Toassesthisobjection,wemustidentifytherolesthatdeliberationshouldplaywithinpoliticalliberalism.

Boettcher offers three. First, deliberation enables citizens to understand others’ arguments and views.

Citizens exchange reasons ‘in order to improve their decision-making and better understand their

differentclaims,arguments,andconceptionsofjustice’(Boettcher2007,p.225).Second,deliberationcan

changecitizens’judgments,astheyrecognisetheforceofothers’arguments.Citizens‘shouldbewillingto

revisetheirpoliticaljudgmentsthroughdiscussionanddeliberationwithothers’(Boettcher2007,p.225).

Third,deliberationshouldaimat theachievementof justice,or thecommongood(Boettcher2005,pp.

503-504).

These three aspects of deliberation are indeed appealing. However, it is not immediately clear how

importanttheyareinatheoryofpublicjustification.Theyconcernthewayinwhichcitizensdirectlyshow

respecttooneanother,whereasPJP’simmediateconcernisthatlawsbejustifiedtoeverycitizen.Ideals

ofpublicreasonarealmostalwaysjustifiedbyanappealtotheneedtojustifycoerciontothecoerced,yet

thiscanbefulfilledbyonlylawsthatcanbejustifiedtoeverycitizenbeingenacted.36Themainvaluethat

deliberation appears to have is that itmakes information available as towhat reasons citizens have in

relationtoalaw.Deliberationisausefulwayforallthedifferentreasonsforalawtobeputforward,in

ordertoidentifywhetheritcanbepubliclyjustified.Itisthusameanstoanend:itishelpfulinensuring

thatallcitizensarerespected,byonlylawsthatcanbejustifiedtothembeingenacted.

36And,perhaps,thispublicjustificationbeingpubliclyoffered.

18

Nonetheless, we should certainly also require that citizens directly show one another respect in their

publicinteractions.Ifcitizensaretorespectoneanotherintheirpoliticalconductthentheyshouldindeed

deliberativelyengagewithoneanother,offeringanddiscussing reasons forandagainst laws,andbeing

readytochangetheirviews.Ifapubliclyjustifiedlawisenactedwithoutanydeliberationhavingoccurred

amongthecitizenrythennoindividualhasbeenwrongedbybeingunjustifiablycoerced.Yetdeliberation

remains a central aspect of citizens’ obligations, and something which political liberalism should

encourage. Does a theory permitting convergence justifications by necessity place too little value on

deliberation,sofailtoencourageadequatemanifestationsofrespect?

It might appear so. Under convergence, citizens have laws justified to them by different reasons, so

deliberation need not aim at identifying shared values and reasons. Citizens are not obligated to

deliberatebasedonasharedperspective,ortodemonstratetoothersthattheirsharedprinciplessupport

alaw.Thus,deliberation’sroleisreducedcomparedtowhenonlyconsensusjustificationsarepermitted.

Publicjustificationconsistsmerelyindemonstratingthatdifferentreasonscanbeusedtojustifythelaw

toeachcitizen,giventheirbeliefs-valuesets.

This analysis ismistaken. Convergence shouldnot takepre-deliberative opinions as fixed.Although the

focus is on ensuring that citizens have sufficient reason to endorse laws, this will often be achieved

throughdiscussion.Acitizen’sbeliefscanbechangedthroughdeliberation,causinghertoacceptreasons

shepreviously rejected. Sometimes the lawwill alreadyhavebeen justified toher: her belief-value set

alreadygavesufficientreasonforit,althoughshedidnotrealisethis.Inmanycases,however,herbelief-

valuesetitselfwillbechangedbydeliberation,solawsthatwerenotpreviouslyjustifiedtoherwillcome

tobeso.Persuasioniscrucialtotheachievementofconvergencejustifications.

Ifwepermitconvergencejustificationsthenwecannotexpectanyindividualcitizentojustify lawstoall

other citizens, showing each that they have reason to support a law. Nonetheless, deliberation is

important on a smaller scale. Citizenswhoadvocate a law should seek topersuade those theydirectly

engagewiththattheyhavereasontosupportit.Thiscanbeachievedbyappealeithertosharedvaluesor

to idiosyncratic values thatone’s interlocutorsaccept.Convergencecan thusbemore deliberative than

consensus.Ratherthandeliberationbeinglimitedtothediscussionofsharedvaluesandreasons,citizens

canengagewithothers’comprehensivedoctrinesandseektoshowthattheseprovidereasonsforlaws.

Convergenceallowscitizenstoengagewithallofeachothers’reasons,ratherthanonlywiththosethat

aresharedbyall.Thisencouragesmoredeliberation,ratherthanless.

Further, deliberation is not necessary for public justification on a consensus view either. The state, or

individual citizens, could identify laws that are justified by shared values without participating in

19

deliberation.Aslongasacitizenbelievesthatpublicreasonsjustifyalaw,theycanlegitimatelysupportit

anditcanbelegitimatelyenacted.Deliberationisnotneeded.Thedirectrolefordeliberationarisingfrom

the need for publicly justified laws isminimal, even on a consensus view. Indeed, convergence gives a

needforallthedifferentreasonsthatcitizenshavetobecomeknown,anddeliberationisusefulforthis,

whereasonaconsensusviewonlyalimitednumberofreasonsandvaluesarerelevant,andcitizensmight

knowmanyofthesewithoutengagingindeliberation.More,ratherthanless,deliberationandpersuasion

mightbeneededinorderforconvergencejustificationstobeachieved.

Deliberation has an important place within political liberalism. It is a central way that citizens directly

manifest respect for one another, and persuade one another of the merits of proposed laws. All the

arguments for this equally apply under convergence, and deliberation will still be encouraged if

convergencejustificationsarepermitted.Convergenceallowsatleastasmuchofarolefordeliberationas

consensusdoes.

ConclusionConvergence justifications are legitimate forms of public justification. They satisfy the requirement,

demandedbyrespectforpersons,thatlawsbejustifiedtoeverycitizen,andthethreeobjectionstothem

that I have considered all fail. As I outlined above, this has significant implications for the constraints

applyingtotheconductofcitizens.Theseareimplicationsthatweshouldaccept.Infact,theymightwell

make political liberalismmore attractive tomany of its critics, particularly those defending the role of

religioninpubliclife.

Acknowledgements ThispaperoriginatesfrommyMPhilandPhDresearch,whichweresupportedby

anArts&HumanitiesResearchCouncilStudentship.Fornumeroushelpfulcomments,Iwishtothankmy

supervisor,StuartWhite,andtheaudienceattheOxfordGraduatePoliticalTheoryWorkshop,particularly

Franz Mang and Matthias Brinkmann. This essay was previously shortlisted for the Res Publica

postgraduateessayprize2014.Iowethankstotheanonymousreviewersbothoftheversionofthepaper

thatIsubmittedfortheessayprizeandofearlierdraftsofthisversion.

ReferencesAudi,Robert.1997.Wolterstorffonreligion,politics,andtheliberalstate.InReligioninthepublicsquare:

Theplaceofreligiousconvictions inpoliticaldebate,RobertAudiandNicholasWolterstorff,121-144.London:Rowman&Littlefield.

20

Baccarini, Evlio. 2013. Having a reason and distributive justice in The order of public reason. EuropeanJournalofAnalyticPhilosophy9:25-51.

Bird,Colin.2014.Coercionandpublicjustification.Politics,Philosophy&Economics13:189-214.Boettcher,JamesW.2005.Stronginclusionistaccountsoftheroleofreligioninpoliticaldecision-making.

JournalofSocialPhilosophy36:497-516.Boettcher,JamesW.2007.Respect,recognitionandpublicreason.SocialTheoryandPractice33:223-249.Boettcher,JamesW.,andJonathanHarmon.2009.Introduction:Religionandthepublicsphere.

Philosophy&SocialCriticism35:5-22.Bohman,James,andHenryS.Richardson.Liberalism,deliberativedemocracy,and“reasonsthatallcan

accept”.TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy17:253-274.Eberle,ChristopherJ.2002.Religiousconvictioninliberalpolitics.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Eberle,ChristopherJ.2007.Religiousreasonsinpublic:Letathousandflowersbloom,butbepreparedto

prune.St.John’sJournalofLegalCommentary22:431-443.Galston,WilliamA.1991.Liberalpurposes:goods,virtues,anddiversityintheliberalstate.Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress.Gaus,Gerald.2009.Theplaceofreligiousbeliefinpublicreasonliberalism.InMulticulturalismandmoral

conflict,eds.MariaDimovia-CooksonandP.M.R.Stirk,19-37.London:Routledge.Gaus,Gerald.2010a.Coercion,ownership,andtheredistributivestate:Justificatoryliberalism’sclassical

tilt.SocialPhilosophyandPolicy27:233-275.Gaus,Gerald.2010b.Ontwocriticsofjustificatoryliberalism:AresponsetoWallandLister.Politics,

Philosophy&Economics9:177-212.Gaus,Gerald.2011.Theorderofpublicreason:Atheoryoffreedomandmoralityinadiverseandbounded

world.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gaus,GeraldandKevinVallier.2009.Therolesofreligiousconvictioninapubliclyjustifiedpolity:The

implicationsofconvergence,asymmetryandpoliticalinstitutions.Philosophy&SocialCriticism35:51-76.

Habermas,Jürgen.2006.Religioninthepublicsquare.EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy14:1-25.Klosko,George.2003.Reasonablerejectionandneutralityofjustification.InPerfectionismandneutrality:

Essaysinliberaltheory,eds.StevenWallandGeorgeKlosko,167-189.Oxford:Rowman&Littlefield.Laborde,Cécile.2013.Justificatorysecularism.InReligioninaliberalstate,eds.GavinD’Costa,Malcolm

Evans,TariqModood,andJulianRivers,164-186.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2013.Larmore,Charles.1999.Themoralbasisofpoliticalliberalism.TheJournalofPhilosophy96:599-625.Larmore,Charles.2003.Publicreason.InTheCambridgecompaniontoRawls,ed.SamuelFreeman,368-

393.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Lister,Andrew.2013a.Theclassicaltiltofjustificatoryliberalism.EuropeanJournalofPoliticalTheory12:

316-326.Lister,Andrew.2013b.Publicreasonandpoliticalcommunity.London:BloomsburyAcademic.Macedo, Stephen. 1997. In defence of liberal public reason: Are slavery and abortion hard cases?

AmericanJournalofJurisprudence42:1-29.Macedo,Stephen.2010.Whypublicreason?Citizens’reasonsandtheconstitutionofthepublicsphere.

SSRNe-library.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664085.Nozick,Robert.1974.Anarchy,stateandutopia.Oxford:BasilBlackwell.Quong,Jonathan.2004.Thescopeofpublicreason.PoliticalStudies52:233-250.Quong, Jonathan. 2008. Three disputes about public justification: Commentary on Gaus and Vallier.

www.publicreason.net/wp-content/PPPS/Fall2008/JQuong1.pdf.Quong,Jonathan.2011.Liberalismwithoutperfection.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice, revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

UniversityPress.Rawls,John.2005.Politicalliberalism,expandededition.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Schwartzman,Micah.2011.Thesincerityofpublicreason.TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy19:375-398.Solum,LawrenceB.1993.Constructinganidealofpublicreason.SanDiegoLawReview30:729-762.Stears,Marc,andMathewHumphrey.2012.Publicreasonandpoliticalaction:Justifyingcitizenbehaviour

inactually-existingdemocracies.TheReviewofPolitics74:285-306.

21

Stout,Jeffrey.2004.Democracyandtradition.Oxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.Swaine, Lucas. 2009. Deliberate and free: Heteronomy in the public sphere. Philosophy and Social

Criticism35:183-213.Vallier, Kevin. 2011a. Liberal politics and public faith: A philosophical reconciliation. PhD dissertation,

UniversityofArizona.Vallier,Kevin.2011b.Consensusandconvergenceinpublicreason.PublicAffairsQuarterly25:261-279.Vallier,Kevin.2014.Liberalpoliticsandpublicfaith:Beyondseparation.Oxford:Routledge.Wall,Steven.2010.Onjustificatoryliberalism.Politics,Philosophy&Economics9:123-149.Weithman,PaulJ.1997.Religionandtheliberalismofreasonedrespect.InReligionandcontemporary

liberalism,ed.PaulJ.Weithman,1-37.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress.Wolterstorff,Nicholas.1997.Theroleofreligionindecisionanddiscussionofpoliticalissues.InReligionin

the public square: The place of religious convictions in political debate, Robert Audi and NicholasWolterstorff,67-120.London:Rowman&Littlefield.

Wolterstorff,Nicholas.2007.Theparadoxicalroleofcoercioninthetheoryofpoliticalliberalism.JournalofLaw,PhilosophyandCulture1:135-158.