Cool conflicts in Russia’s near neighbourhood · The Ukraine conflict is . widely described. as Europe’s “forgotten war”, having been displaced from the headlines by other

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BRIEFING PAPER Number 8477, 21 January 2019

Cool conflicts in Russia’s near neighbourhood

By Ben Smith

Contents: 1. Overview 2. Ukraine 3. Georgia 4. Nagorno-Karabakh 5. Moldova 6. What chance of resolution? 7. Further reading

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2 Cool conflicts in Russia’s near neighbourhood

Contents Summary 4

1. Overview 5 1.1 Ongoing destabilisation 5 1.2 International engagement 5

EU 5 Mediation 6 Western response 7

2. Ukraine 9 2.1 Stability remains elusive 9

Sea of Azov 10 2.2 International engagement 12

Mediation framework 12 International Criminal Court 12

2.3 Developments in Ukraine 13 2.4 Western sanctions 14 2.5 Outlook 15

3. Georgia 16 3.1 Conflict 16 3.2 International engagement 16

EU trade 16 EU conflict monitoring 17 Council of Europe 17 NATO 18 International Criminal Court 19 USA 19 Russian recognition 19

3.3 Politics 19 3.4 UK policy 20 3.5 Outlook 20

4. Nagorno-Karabakh 22 4.1 Armenia 23 4.2 Azerbaijan 24 4.3 Mediation framework 25 4.4 Outlook 26

5. Moldova 27 5.1 Transnistria 27

Russian presence 27 5.2 International engagement 28

EU relations 28 NATO relations 29

5.3 UK policy 29 5.4 Outlook 29

6. What chance of resolution? 30

7. Further reading 31

3 Commons Library Briefing, 21 January 2019

Contributing Authors: Nigel Walker

Cover page image copyright Azeri tanks in Nagorno-Karabakh by VartanM. Licensed under CC SA By-2.0 / image cropped.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Azeri_tanks_in_Nagorno-Karabakh.jpghttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:VartanM


Summary For many former Soviet States, being in the vicinity of a resurgent Russia has resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths, as territorial disputes continue and – in some cases – escalate. Although these situations are often termed “frozen conflicts”, for those on the front lines they are far from frozen; significant damage is still being done to their lives.

Despite renewed international efforts for joint initiatives and partnerships to resolve these crises, the great ‘Russian bear’ dominates its near neighbours both militarily and politically and the present Russian leadership sees an interest in keeping the conflicts going.

Indications of President Putin’s determination to consolidate Russia’s borders and sphere of influence as he sees NATO‘s reach extend ever eastward have been seen in:

• the annexation of Crimea and the seizure of Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to enter the Sea of Azov;

• a consolidated military presence in the Georgian territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

• interference in the ethnic and territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in Nargorno-Karabakh; and

• a significant number of troops stationed in Moldova (specifically Transnistria).

Mediation by international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the imposition of sanctions are showing limited successes; ultimately, the conflicts are unlikely to be resolved unless there is systemic change in Russia, which most commentators regard as unlikely.


1. Overview 1.1 Ongoing destabilisation The Ukraine conflict is widely described as Europe’s “forgotten war”, having been displaced from the headlines by other international crises. But for those living in contested areas of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, conflict is far from over. The Ukraine conflict has seen more than 10,000 deaths in four years and the other territorial disputes are continuing to cost lives.

1.2 International engagement EU ‘Eastern Partnership’ is a joint initiative involving the EU and six Eastern European countries: the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. All the Eastern Partnership countries have territorial disputes apart from Belarus (although the Polish Government has complained about the treatment of the many ethnic Poles who live in the west of present-day Belarus).

Source: EU

Relations between these former Soviet States and the EU are an important theme of the conflicts, along with NATO enlargement; in Ukraine it was the Yanukovych Government’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 that sparked the crisis that led to the Russian intervention.

The Eastern Partnership is often criticised for inconsistency in its dealings with different countries and for failing to improve governance standards. However, it was never designed to be a crisis management tool and many commentators argue that an even more robust and consistent approach would not solve these conflicts.

Brexit If the UK leaves the EU, its relationship with the Eastern Partnership countries will also change. The Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship proposes an “ambitious” partnership in foreign policy:

https://www.ft.com/content/5adbd298-a056-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4http://www.comece.eu/eastern-partnership-towards-dialogue-and-stronger-cooperationhttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759021/25_November_Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom__.pdf


… an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and criminal justice, foreign policy, security and defence and wider areas of cooperation.1

Such cooperation with regard to the former Soviet states might mean that the EU’s Eastern Partnership relationships would remain significant in UK policy; it is not clear, though, whether the UK would have any influence over this programme after Brexit.

As a member of the EU, the UK is party to Eastern Partnership trade deals. The UK Government is in negotiations with the Eastern Partnership countries to replicate the effects of those trade deals post-Brexit, but it is not yet clear how those negotiations are progressing. The Department for International Trade said in November 2018:

We have been in constant dialogue with all our trading partners to achieve continuity by replicating the effects of our existing EU trade agreements. They understand this must be primary objective, and securing continuity will be a strong foundation to build on our already successful trading relationship.2

Mediation Each of the ‘frozen’ conflicts has attracted a mediation effort bringing together Western states, international bodies, the former Soviet states in question and Russia.

OSCE

The OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) has played a strong role in the former Soviet states. It is particularly useful because the organisation groups Russia and the former Soviet states with Western European states, including the UK, and the US.

The OSCE has operations in Moldova and Ukraine. There was a mission in Georgia but it was closed in 2008. The OSCE participates in the Minsk Group, which deals with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan.

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE) also takes an interest in the conflicts in former Soviet states, monitoring the Abkhazia/South Ossetia dispute, for example.

The Russian delegation to the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) had its voting rights suspended after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that remains the situation. Russia has withheld its annual payments to the CoE since 2017.

PACE sent monitors to Ukraine in November 2018. They discussed political developments, the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections and the Ukrainian Government’s progress in fighting corruption.3

1 Political Agreement, 25 November 2018, Department for Exiting the European

Union. 2 HC Written question – 185693, 7 November 2018 3 Ukraine: monitoring visit by PACE rapporteurs, PACE press release, 15 November

2018

https://www.osce.org/mghttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759021/25_November_Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom__.pdfhttps://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/commons/2018-10-30/185693http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=7268&lang=2&cat=3


NATO enlargement

In June 2018 the UK Government reiterated its support for NATO enlargement to include Georgia and Ukraine:

The UK supports NATO's 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO, and continues to support NATO's Open Door policy, under which all European democracies are entitled to pursue NATO membership. The UK supports Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations and closer integration with NATO. We acknowledge the significant progress made by Georgia on reform and its continued commitment to NATO and international security.4

NATO’s newest member is Montenegro, which joined in 2017. Although this might suggest that membership could be a realistic prospect for the former Soviet states on the borders of the Russian Federation, it is not likely to happen. Since the Georgia war in 2008, large NATO member states – led by France and Germany – have resisted moves to start the membership process, as allowing Ukraine or Georgia to join NATO would mean committing to defending them.

The US used to be more enthusiastic but, with the Trump Administration’s policy of “America first”, such enthusiasm has probably waned.

EU

The EU has a significant role in many of these mediation efforts. Consequently, while the UK has not played a leading role in the frozen conflicts, Britain’s planned departure from the EU will inevitably impact the part the UK can play.

Western response The West has broadly criticised Russian interference in its near abroad, arguing that Russia should not have a sphere of privileged interest.

Sanctions

Sanctions against individuals responsible for the Russian conflict strategy in its neighbourhood have been imposed by the US and the EU, and by some allied countries such as Australia.

The sanctions are widely thought to be having some effect on the Russian economy, holding the value of the rouble down and discouraging foreign investment and growth-promoting reforms.

It seems unlikely, however, that those effects will lead to a change of policy in Russia. The depreciation of the rouble has kept government revenues up (exports are priced in US dollars so a weak rouble means more roubles in Government coffers). The Russian Government has also pursued a fiscally conservative policy, keeping foreign currency and gold reserves high and the budget deficit low, so as to be able to withstand any financial crisis. Sanctions (along with measures such as the UK’s Unexplained Wealth Orders) have also reduced capital flight from Russia.

4 Written question - HL7962, 1 June 2018

https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/Pages/russia.aspxhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0032018-criminal-finances-act-unexplained-wealth-orders/circular-0032018-unexplained-wealth-ordershttps://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/lords/2018-05-17/HL7962


EU East StratCom Task Force

Russian disinformation campaigns are blamed by many in the EU for worsening the crises in former Soviet states. As part of the EU Action Plan against Disinformation, a Task Force was set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns, following a request from the European Council in 2015. These campaigns are targeting EU Member States and conflicts areas such as Syria, as well as Eastern Neighbourhood countries, according to the action plan. The task force aims for:

• Effective communication and promotion of EU policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood;

• Strengthening the overall media environment in the Eastern Neighbourhood and in EU Member States, including support for media freedom and strengthening independent media;

• Improved EU capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities by external actors.

In December 2018, the EU announced its intention to increase the Commission’s budget to tackle disinformation from €1.9 million to €5 million.5

5 A Europe that Protects: The EU steps up action against disinformation, European

Commission Press release, 5 December 2018

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_enhttps://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_enhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6647_en.htm


2. Ukraine

Map courtesy of University of Texas

2.1 Stability remains elusive The Ukraine conflict is estimated to have cost more than 10,000 lives (civilian and combatant), with 25,000 wounded, since it started in 2014.6 There are also around 1.5 million internally displaced persons in government-controlled areas, according to the Social Policy Ministry of Ukraine.7

Russian attempts to assert control over Ukraine are nothing new, however, as argued recently in a paper for Chatham House:

For decades, the Kremlin has sought to use its influence to deter Ukraine’s Westernization and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia has adapted its toolbox of destabilization techniques – from trade blockades to vicious disinformation – to developments inside Ukraine.8

The main tool has been the annexation of Crimea and the quasi-occupation of the eastern regions around Donetsk and Luhansk. Both sides in the conflict are barred from using air strikes, tanks and heavy weaponry under the terms of the 2015 Minsk II ceasefire agreement. This has led to a battle of infantry, where soldiers fight in abandoned buildings and trenches using grenades and sniper fire.

The conflict has left Ukrainian GDP significantly lower than before the crisis.

Russia is also spreading disinformation, presenting the conflict as a war of oligarchs, in which President Poroshenko has an interest in prolonging the hostilities.9

6 Ukraine crisis: Five soldiers killed in clashes in east, BBC News Online, 23 August

2018 7 More than 1.5 million internally displaced persons from temporarily occupied

Donbas and Crimea have been registered in Ukraine, Ukrinform, 25 June 2018 8 Mathieu Boulègue, Orysia Lutsevych and Anaïs Marin, Civil Society Under Russia’s

Threat: Building Resilience in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Chatham House, November 2018

9 Ibid.

https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia16/ukraine_sm_2016.gifhttps://www.ft.com/content/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7dehttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45287889https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/2487223-more-than-15-million-idps-registered-in-ukraine.htmlhttps://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/2487223-more-than-15-million-idps-registered-in-ukraine.htmlhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdfhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdf


On 31 August the leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic was killed in an explosion in a café in Donetsk. Moscow blamed the Ukrainian Government, while Kyiv said that it was the result of turf wars in Donetsk. Several separatist leaders have died in murky circumstances.

The OSCE monitoring Mission to Ukraine reported in December 2018 a total of 220 civilian casualties since 1 January (43 deaths and 182 injuries).10 There are mines and unexploded ordnance in areas close to the front lines, making Ukraine one of the most mine-affected countries in the world.11

Sea of Azov On 25 November 2018 Russian border patrol ships attacked and seized three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to enter the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea through the Kerch Strait. 24 Ukrainian personnel are in Russian captivity.

Source Ukrainian official and media sources/BBC

The move was a dramatic escalation and looked like a Russian attempt to gain full control over the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

The Ukrainian Government announced a State of Emergency in areas of Ukraine close to the Russian border. Ukrainian President Poroshenko called for NATO to send warships to the Kerch Strait to protect freedom of navigation.

As a result of the Azov incident, President Trump cancelled a planned meeting with President Putin of Russia during the G20 meeting in Argentina.

On 5 December 2018 the US military asked the US State Department to notify Turkey of possible plans to send a warship into the Black Sea in response to the incident. A 1936 treaty requires states that have no Black Sea coast to notify the Turkish authorities of any such move 15

10 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Status Report 24 December 2018 11 The Halo Trust, Ukraine

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46381166https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/407795?download=truehttps://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/europe-and-caucasus/ukraine/https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi3nemgmovfAhUnyIUKHYQtCsQQjRx6BAgBEAU&url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46381166&psig=AOvVaw0DhLYSrAjBYg0tiH4P7Znw&ust=1544185698993817


days in advance.12 On 6 January 2019 the US Navy announced the arrival of an expeditionary unit in the Black Sea.

The Sea of Azov incident was a clear indication that the Ukraine conflict, while out of recent headlines, is still live and could escalate further.13

Box 1: Ukraine conflict background

After the Maidan demonstrations brought down the Pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych in February 2014, unmarked Russian troops took over important institutions in Crimea and installed a pro-Russian government in the peninsula. A referendum on Crimea’s future took place and Russia annexed the territory in March of that year. At around the same time pro-Russian demonstrations were held in the Donbas (the south eastern region of Ukraine), and armed conflict between separatists broke out – helped by Russian special forces on the one hand and Ukrainian official troops on the other. After several months of heavy fighting, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire was signed. After many breaches of its terms, the Minsk Protocol was succeeded by the Minsk II package, which was somewhat successful in reducing the level of violence, particularly in reducing the use of heavy weaponry. The Donbas conflict remains live, however.

Disinformation

The Kerch Strait incident was preceded by claims in the Russian media about Ukraine having infected the Sea of Azov with cholera, and the British and Ukrainian secret services trying to ship a nuclear bomb to blow up the new Russian bridge between Russia and Crimea.14 Earlier stories included one about Ukraine dredging the Sea of Azov to allow for a NATO fleet to be stationed there.

Source: Ukrainian official sources/BBC

12 US makes preparations to sail warship into Black Sea amid Russia-Ukraine tensions,

CNN, 5 December 2018 13 For discussion of Russian tactics of “escalation control”, see the Commons Briefing

Paper Russian foreign and security policy, 5 July 2016 14 Julian King: Russian info war preceded Ukrainian ship seizures, Euractiv, 11

December 2018

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/us-navy-warship-to-enter-black-sea-to-support-allies-and-partners.htmlhttps://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42741778https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/05/politics/us-navy-black-sea-russia-ukraine/index.htmlhttp://researchbriefings..parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7646https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/julian-king-russian-info-war-preceded-ukrainian-ship-seizures/


2.2 International engagement Mediation framework The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in 2014, following a request from the Government of Ukraine backed by a decision of all 57 OSCE member states (including Russia).

This monitoring mission is an unarmed civilian mission led by Ertugrul Apakan, a Turkish diplomat. It is present on the ground in all regions of Ukraine, reporting on the situation in Ukraine and facilitating dialogue between the parties to the crisis.15

Dialogue is conducted in the Trilateral Contact Group, composed of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE and created in 2014.

The Russian, Ukrainian, German and French foreign ministers met in Berlin in June 2018 to discuss a ceasefire for Ukraine and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in the Donbas area. Russia and Ukraine failed to agree the plan, despite both expressing support in principle.

The Chief Monitor told the OSCE Permanent Council in November 2018 that further measures to strengthen the ceasefire needed to be agreed by the Contact Group. He said that many civilians in eastern Ukraine faced a fifth winter without security and without such basics as electricity, gas and clean drinking water.16

In November 2018, the UK Government set out in a Parliamentary Answer its position on the conflict and the Ukraine Minsk Process:

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have deliberately violated a number of international agreements and commitments including the 1997 Russia-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship. We continue to work with international partners to support Ukraine as it deals with the ongoing impact of Russia’s aggression against it.

We need to be very clear about where the fundamental problem lies. It is Russia which created this conflict, Russia which supplies weaponry and personnel to the separatists, and Russia which refrains from using its considerable influence on the separatists to get them to comply with their Minsk commitments.

We fully support diplomatic efforts through the Minsk Process. It is imperative that Russia abides by its commitments under the Minsk Agreement and withdraws its forces from all of Ukraine, including Crimea.17

International Criminal Court A preliminary investigation is under way into the events of the Maidan protests and other events since February 2014. Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute giving the ICC permanent jurisdiction over acts committed in Ukraine. But the country did lodge declarations with the

15 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 16 Lasting peace requires political solutions, says OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine, OSCE

press release, 30 November 2014 17 HC Written question – 188773, 15 November 2018

https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/407795?download=truehttps://www.osce.org/participating-stateshttps://www.osce.org/participating-stateshttps://www.icc-cpi.int/ukrainehttps://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukrainehttps://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/404807https://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/commons/2018-11-06/188773


ICC giving it temporary jurisdiction over events since the Maidan demonstrations in 2013/14.

The preliminary examination does not mean that a formal investigation has been or will be opened.

2.3 Developments in Ukraine ‘Elections’ in Donbas

On 11 November polls were held in Donetsk and Luhansk separatist-controlled areas. The acting heads of Donetsk and Luhansk areas won their respective contests. The EU responded by adding those who allegedly organised the polls to the list of sanctioned individuals.

Forthcoming Ukrainian presidential election

March 2019 should see new presidential elections in Ukraine. Opinion polls suggest that veteran politician and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko leads the field, with some 17% of voters favouring her. Other candidates, including Petro Poroshenko, come some way behind. Another poll suggested that 74% of respondents did not trust Yulia Tymoshenko, however. This is only slightly better than the nearly 80% who distrust the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko.18

Tymoshenko’s message is nationalist and populist and offers little in the way of concrete policy proposals. While she claims to be pro-EU, commentators suggest that she has a worse record than Poroshenko on supporting reforms recommended by the EU and the IMF that would help Ukraine get closer to the EU.19

A run-off between Tymoshenko or another familiar nominally pro-Western politician and a more pro-Russian candidate might cause an upset if a pro-Russian candidate offered an end to the conflict and to painful market-orientated economic reforms. Such a candidate would enjoy “vast” media support, according to one analyst.20

With a parliamentary election also due in 2019, there will be plenty of opportunities for Russian influence to be deployed. Overtly pro-Russian parties are not likely to gain many votes, according to analysts, but a divided and fractious parliament is nevertheless likely.

Pro-Russian parties have floated the idea of Switzerland-style neutrality as a route to ending the Donbas conflict and could argue that a resolution to the conflict would bring economic renewal.

Strengthening Ukrainian identity?

The Russian strategy of destabilising and undermining the Ukrainian Government shows some signs of success. Nearly half of young Ukrainians are interested in emigrating, according to a recent poll.21 18 Ukraine voters struggle to see change ahead of presidential poll, Financial Times, 12

September 2018 19 Tymoshenko and Hrytsenko showed they are not pro-European candidates, New

Eastern Europe, 18 September 2018 20 Markian Kuzmowycz, How the Kremlin can win Ukraine’s elections, Atlantic Council,

20 November 2018 21 Ukraine Poll: No Clear Frontrunner in Upcoming Presidential Election, International

Republican Institute, 30 November 2018

https://www.ft.com/content/1de24cc4-91b4-11e8-9609-3d3b945e78cfhttp://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/09/18/tymoshenko-hrytsenko-showed-not-pro-european-candidates/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-the-kremlin-can-win-ukraine-s-electionshttps://www.iri.org/resource/ukraine-poll-no-clear-frontrunner-upcoming-presidential-election-0


Trust in politicians is very low, partly because the Ukrainian public is influenced by news media, which is under the control of both Ukrainian oligarchs and Russian interests.

The strategy of undermining the Ukrainian State has a downside, however, in that it could turn Ukrainian opinion against Russia and strengthen Ukrainian national identity.

In 2015-16, Ukrainians were asked whether a strong Russia was necessary to balance the influence of the West. Only 22% agreed, the lowest proportion in any Orthodox-majority country.22

Evidence of strengthening Ukrainian identity was provided in October 2018 when global Orthodox Church leaders in Istanbul recognised the independence of Ukrainian Orthodox worshippers from the Russian Orthodox Church. Religion is an increasingly important identity marker in Eastern Europe,23 and the separation of Ukrainian orthodoxy from Moscow underlined the increasing cultural distance.

Civil society organisations have also sprung up in Ukraine, many of them receiving funding from Western and international sources. Many are providing support to displaced persons.24

2.4 Western sanctions In December 2018 EU Ambassadors agreed to add nine names to the Russia sanctions list for their participation in the “so-called elections” in Donetsk and Luhansk in November 2018 and, later in the month, to extend the overall sanctions regime for another six months.25 That brought to 164 the total number of individuals from Russia and Ukraine who are subject to EU asset freezes and travel bans. 44 entities are also on the list.26

In the weeks before the extension there had been speculation in several sources about the position of the Italian Government of Giuseppe Conte. The Italian Prime Minister had suggested that he might use the Italian veto to prevent the extension. In the event, this did not happen.

These measures and US sanctions against Russia were not enough to prevent the Kerch Strait incident. It was described by one Moscow-based analyst as a show of resolve by the Kremlin to:

…test the West's reaction as to how much use of force could go unpunished and whether sanctions resolve is still there… It is not.27

22 9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Pew

Research Center, 10 May 2017 23 Ibid 24 Mathieu Boulègue, Orysia Lutsevych and Anaïs Marin, Civil Society Under Russia’s

Threat: Building Resilience in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Chatham House, November 2018

25 Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, European Council

26 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

27 ‘Russia shrugs off Western pressure over Black Sea incident with Ukraine’, Washington Post, 27 November 2018

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/10/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe/https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdfhttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdfhttps://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014D0145-20180915https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014D0145-20180915https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014D0145-20180915


2.5 Outlook Many commentators think that Ukraine is unlikely ever to regain control of Crimea. In the Donbas things are not so clear but, in any case, negotiations are likely to drag on unless a new president – more friendly towards Russia – decides to abandon Ukraine’s Westward trajectory and tries to bring the dispute to an end.


3. Georgia 3.1 Conflict Since the war in 2008, which saw Georgian forces indefinitely ousted from the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has consolidated its military presence, with military bases inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The number of casualties is now low. Russian-backed forces, nevertheless, have continued to move the line between South Ossetia and Georgia deeper into Georgia, depriving Georgian citizens of homes and land, and leaving Russian forces and their allies now occupying some 20% of Georgian territory. Russian-backed forces have also gradually hardened the line of control into a border (‘borderisation’), which splits communities.

Moscow has now recognised the regions as independent states. Both regions have signed treaties with Russia incorporating their troops into the Russian army. South Ossetia is also recognised by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria.

Box 2: Georgia conflict background

Many ethnic Russians lived in the northern regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, along the Russian border. After Georgia’s independence from the collapsed Soviet Union in 1991, war broke out, after which separatists retained control of many areas of South Ossetia. Conflict in Abkhazia broke out in 1992 and settled into an uneasy truce shortly afterwards. In 2008 tension between Georgian official forces and breakaway forces in South Ossetia escalated into a full-blown war, after Georgian forces responded to Ossetian provocation and Russian troops joined the battle. A ceasefire was agreed with French assistance in August 2008, leaving Abkhazia and South Ossetia – plus some extra Georgian territory – in the hands of Russian-backed separatists.

3.2 International engagement EU trade Georgia received visa-free travel status with the European Union in 2017 and signed an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU in 2014.

Georgian Prime Minister Bakhtadze met with Jean-Claude Juncker, EU Commission President, in November 2018 to discuss Georgia-EU relations. Foreign affairs and security High Representative Federica Mogherini said that the Association Agreement was improving the lives of Georgians:

Our Association Agreement is bringing tangible benefits to Georgian and EU citizens alike and gives us a framework to cooperate even more closely. Whether it is enhancing Georgia's resilience to hybrid threats, providing support and facilitating access to finance for small and medium enterprises, investing in transport infrastructure, or giving young Georgians more

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/georgia/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/georgia/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/georgia/index_en.htm


opportunities to come to Europe, either to study or travel, we are determined to continue to deliver concrete, positive results.28

Source: University of Texas

EU conflict monitoring The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia created after the 2008 peace deal, brokered by the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, provided for the EU to monitor the lines of control. The EUMM organises regular meetings and has set up an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, including a telephone hotline, to address events that could result in violence.

Russia does not, however, permit the EU’s monitoring mission to enter the disputed territory, saying that, contrary to the EU’s interpretation, this had never been agreed. The EUMM Georgia therefore monitors the situation on the ground from Georgian-controlled territory, along the administrative boundary lines marking territory controlled by the Georgian authorities and Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively. It does not host mediation talks, since Russia has already recognised the sovereignty of the breakaway regions.

The EUMM does try to minimise the impact on people living near the lines and facilitate dialogue between the participants in the conflict. In December 2018 its mandate was extended to 2020.

In its most recent update, the EUMM described the situation as “relatively stable”.29

Council of Europe Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999 and has ratified many of the CoE’s conventions. The CoE’s action plan for Georgia 20017-19 aims to help Georgia continue its work to protect human rights at home:

28 High-level meeting continues to bring Georgia and the European Union closer

together, European Commission press release, 21 November 2018 29 The 90th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting takes place in

Ergneti, European Monitoring Mission in Georgia, 18 December 2018

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to continue the support of Georgia in domestic implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights as well as to further assist the country in bringing its institutions and practices in line with the Council of Europe standards.30

The CoE has no formal role, however, in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, although it takes a general interest. In November 2018 the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly issued a statement from monitors in Georgia condemning the “borderisation” of the line dividing South Ossetia from Georgia-controlled areas:

These illegal actions by the Russian Federation undermine stability in the region and split families and people. We call upon the Russian authorities to cease these actions and to allow free movement of people across the administrative boundary lines with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.31

Map based on Caucasus regions map.svg by Peter Fitzgerald, Creative Commons

NATO Georgia became a Partner for Peace with NATO in 1994, not long after independence. After the “Rose Revolution” deposed Eduard Shevardnadze in 2003, Georgia moved quickly to build on that initial relationship and at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest existing NATO members announced that Georgia would in due course become a full member. Despite US enthusiasm, Georgia was not awarded a

30 Action Plan for Georgia 2016-2019, Council of Europe 31 Monitoring rapporteurs condemn ongoing ‘borderisation’ in Georgia, PACE press

release, 26 November 2018

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Membership Action Plan at the Bucharest summit, which would have set out clear steps to membership, with France and Germany reportedly arguing against this.

Russia had warned that if Georgia’s eventual NATO membership was cleared at Bucharest, “the next day the process of real secession of these two territories from Georgia will begin”.32

Georgia has not progressed from that point, although NATO describes Georgia as “one of the Alliance’s closest partners”.

Following the August 2008 conflict, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly bolstered its institutional relationship with the Georgian Parliament by creating the Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary Council (GNIC).

International Criminal Court In January 2016, the International Criminal Court was authorised to open an investigation into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 2008.33

USA The US considers Georgia a strategic partner and dedicated $127 million in assistance to Georgia in 2017. US policy is to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration:

The United States is committed to helping Georgia deepen Euro-Atlantic ties and strengthen its democratic institutions. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and does not recognize the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, currently occupied by Russia, as independent.34

Russian recognition In August 2008 Russia officially recognised both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, six months after the West had widely recognised the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. The vast majority of UN member states do not recognise the regions’ independence, although Syria added its recognition in 2018.

3.3 Politics On 28 November 2018 a new president was elected in Georgia: the former French diplomat and Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili is the first female head of state in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Zurabishvili had only scraped through the first round, which unnerved the ruling Georgia Dream party. Zurabishvili officially stood as an independent but she had the full backing of the governing Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. The NATO/OSCE observer mission concluded that she had an undue

32 ‘Russia warns against Georgia NATO membership’, Reuters, 11 March 2008 33 International Criminal Court, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15 34 U.S. Relations With Georgia, US Deprtment of State, June 2018

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htmhttps://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htmhttps://www.nato-pa.int/liste-des-membres?field_committees_target_id=7046https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2018/284739.htmhttps://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2018/284739.htmhttps://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2018/284739.htmhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-georgia/russia-warns-against-georgia-nato-membership-idUSL1185178620080311https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgiahttps://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm


advantage.35 For example, in November, the party announced that a charitable foundation controlled by Ivanishvili would write off the debts of 600,000 people. This was widely viewed in Georgia as blatant vote-buying. The observers also found that there were incidents of violence, poor coverage in the private media and inadequate control of campaign expenditure.36 The opposition candidate did not accept the result.

The election confirmed the ascendancy of the Georgian Dream party, in power since 2012, when it toppled the then President Mikheil Saakashvili. Many observers say that the real power lies with Georgia Dream’s billionaire backer. The Georgian Dream Party is generally somewhat less pro-Western than the opposition.

The post of president is now largely ceremonial since constitutional changes in 2017 boosted the Prime Minister’s power. The Prime Minister is Mamuka Bakhtadze of the Georgian Dream party, in post since June 2018.

Asked in 2015-16, 52% of Georgians agreed with the statement “a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West”.37

3.4 UK policy In January 2018 FCO Minister Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon answered a question on the UK’s position on Georgia:

My Lords, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary discussed Georgia with Foreign Minister Lavrov in Moscow. The UK is a staunch supporter of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Last year we supported two UN resolutions on Georgia’s breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia using OSCE statements to call out Russian activities; we have funded secondees to the EU monitoring mission and contributed to NATO and other international efforts to build Georgian resilience to Russian pressure.38

3.5 Outlook The recent presidential election cast some doubt on the willingness of those in power to accept genuine democratic competition. Bidzina Ivanishvili, described as Georgia’s “de facto leader”,39 is concentrating power in his own hands and is prepared to go to some lengths to keep it.

Dramatic changes in foreign policy are unlikely, especially if Ivanishvili cements his hold on power further. Even with dramatic change in Georgian policy, many analysts think that Georgia is unlikely to regain control of the breakaway regions, now that their independence has 35 Opposition rejects Georgia presidential poll result, urges protests, Reuters, 29

November 2018 36 International Election Observation Mission, Georgia – Presidential Election, 28

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, NATO/OSCE/CoE, European Parliament, October 2018

37 9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Pew Research Center, 10 May 2017

38 HL Deb 10 January 2018, cc186-9 39 Kate Mallinson, Georgia’s Presidential Campaign Damages Its Democratic

Credentials, Chatham House, 10 December 2018

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been recognised by Russia and ethno-demographic change has taken place within them.


4. Nagorno-Karabakh


Nagorno Karabakh, the Azerbaijani territory claimed by Armenia, is different from the other conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood because the area does not contain many ethnic Russians and does not share a border with Russia. While there is talk about other disputed territories – such as South Ossetia – merging with Russia, that is not an option for Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has the highest overall death toll of any of the conflicts in the region, with over 30,000 dead since 1991.40

Box 3: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict background

The conflict over Karabakh predates the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia; inhabitants had already voted on whether the territory, legally part of Azerbaijan but with a large Armenian population, should unite with Armenia. As the Soviet Union collapsed and independence beckoned for the two former Soviet states, the conflict escalated into a full-scale war. A ceasefire was agreed in 1994 and for a while the region was relatively calm. But Azerbaijan, unhappy with the status quo leaving a large

40 ‘Azerbaijan toddler killed in Nagorno-Karabakh shelling’, BBC News Online, 5 July

2017

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amount of its territory outside its control, increasingly spent its hydrocarbon wealth buying arms. The conflict heated up gradually, with the worst recent year being 2016.

4.1 Armenia


Russia has tended to side with Armenia in the conflict, despite the ousting in May 2018 of the pro-Kremlin Armenian President, Serzh Sarkisian, after massive demonstrations. In December 2018, Nikol Pashinyan won decisively in parliamentary elections and will now need to improve the Armenian economy. He has also raised international expectations of re-invigorated talks on Nagorno-Karabakh.

In September 2018 the Armenian Prime Minister confirmed that Russia would continue to supply Armenia with weapons, financed by Russian loans.41 Russia has also, however, supplied Azerbaijan with weaponry. In January 2019, Russia announced that it would raise the price of gas it sells to Armenia by 10%,42 the latest in a series of ups and downs in Armenian relations with Russia.

41 ‘Pashinian: Moscow To Continue Supply Of Weapons To Yerevan’, Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 September 2018 42 ‘Russia raises gas prices for Armenia in the new year’, EUrasianet, 3 January 2019

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Armenia and the EU

In spite of Armenia’s closeness to Russia, the EU and Armenia signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017. Priority areas for cooperation are:

• strengthening institutions and good governance

• economic development and market opportunities

• connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate action, and

• mobility and people-to-people contacts.

Armenia and NATO

Armenia participates in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and has an Individual Partnership Action Plan. It has contributed to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, but there are no plans for Armenia to join NATO at present.

NATO has no direct role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

4.2 Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has been President of Azerbaijan since 2003, taking over from his father, Heydar, who was president for the preceding decade. Azerbaijan has significant reserves of oil and gas, representing a large proportion of government revenues. The oil and gas wealth makes Azerbaijan much richer than its rival over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.


Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and the West, respectively, are complicated. While Russia is culturally close to Armenia and there are

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many Western critics of Azerbaijan’s record on democracy and human rights, both Russia and the West are interested in Azerbaijani hydrocarbon wealth,43 which could help Europe depend less on Russian gas.

Azerbaijan and the EU

Azerbaijan is widely criticised for oppression and corruption, although it is far from being alone in this.44 A priority of the EU’s Partnership programme is strengthening political institutions and spreading good governance. This includes “the fight against corruption, public administration reform and capacity building for combating crime and terrorism”.45 Priorities also include: economic development, energy cooperation and climate change, mobility and people to people contacts.

NATO

Azerbaijan is a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. Azerbaijan has an Individual Partnership Action Plan and has participated in NATO-led peace-keeping operations. There are no plans for Azerbaijan to join NATO at present.

4.3 Mediation framework The worst period of the Karabakh conflict was ended by the 1994 ceasefire agreement. Two years earlier the OSCE had already formed the Minsk Group, with Russia, France and the US co-chairing the institution.

The Minsk Process continues to be the framework for the OSCE’s efforts to find a peaceful solution.

The Azerbaijani and Armenian leaderships met on the fringes of a Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Dushanbe,46 Tajikistan, in September 2018 and made a commitment to reduce tensions.

The Minsk Group co-chairs toured the region at the end of October 2018, visiting Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, acting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the de facto authorities in Nagorno Karabakh. They confirmed that violence was subdued since the Dushanbe commitment and welcomed the plan to improve communications between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.47

The EU also appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Georgia in 2003, presently Mr Toivo Klaar, who works to facilitate 43 In 2017 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development lent Azerbaijan

$500 million for a gas pipeline 44 Azerbaijan: torture, impunity and corruption highlighted in new anti-torture

committee publications, Council of Europe press release, 18 July 2018 45 Partnership Priorities between the EU and Azerbaijan reinforce the bilateral agenda,

EU External Action Service, 11 July 2018 46 For more on the Commonwealth of Independent States see the Common Briefing

Paper Russia’s Military Posture, April 2009 47 Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, OSCE press release, 2

November 2018

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dialogue between the countries of the region and the EU. The EU representative does not have a formal role in mediation over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

4.4 Outlook An OSCE voluntary arms embargo is in place for Nagorno-Karabakh on “forces engaged in combat”. Several OSCE member states have violated it, allowing an arms race to develop between Armenia and Azerbaijan, one that Azerbaijan is winning.

There remains significant tension along the line of contact and there are several dozen deaths most years, although the level of violence fluctuates. Since the flare-up of 2016, when 220 died, violence has decreased.

In December 2018, the OSCE Minsk Group released a statement welcoming the “significant decrease in ceasefire violations and reported casualties” since September 2018.

Russia has outlined its support for Armenia in the dispute, while Turkey is close to Azerbaijan. Relations between Russia and Turkey are stable at present, led by practical collaboration over Syria. Russo-Turkish relations are historically difficult, however; the possibility of increased tension between the two historic rivals is another reason why the Karabakh conflict is one of the most dangerous in the former Soviet states.

The sweeping political changes in Armenia could help give new impetus to the peace talks, but Yerevan’s tricky relations with the Kremlin will not make that easy. While the Azeris and the Armenians appear to be interested in de-escalation at present, the Azeri side, particularly, may see little advantage in granting concessions when Nagorno-Karabakh is legally part of Azerbaijan.

The official aim of the Minsk negotiating process is to agree a special status for Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Political debate in both countries is highly nationalistic, presenting an obstacle to the necessary concessions.


5. Moldova 5.1 Transnistria Transnistria (or Trans-Dniester, Transdniestria) is named after the River Dniestr. The territory is a thin sliver of Moldovan territory on the eastern (Ukrainian) side of the river, while most of Moldova is on the western side, bordering Romania.

Box 4: Transnistria conflict background

Transnistria proclaimed its independence from Moldova in 1990 and reaffirmed this in a referendum in 2006, in which a plan to join Russia in due course was endorsed. Armed conflict broke out in 1990 between Moldovan official forces and pro-Transnistrian forces supported by Russian elements. A ceasefire was agreed in July 1992 leading to mediation led by the OSCE.

Russian presence Russian troops, originally stationed in the Transnistria as peace-keepers, remain in the breakaway territory. The 1,500 troops, formerly members of the Soviet 14th Army, have become an obstacle to peace talks. In June 2018, the UN General Assembly urged Russia to withdraw its troops unconditionally from Moldovan territory.

A further Russian contingent – estimated to be about 420 soldiers – form part of the Tripartite Peacekeeping Force, agreed by Moldova as part of the 1992 Cease Fire Agreement with Russia.48

The Moldovan Government has called for complete Russian withdrawal and the West is concerned about the Soviet-era arsenal in the territory. The UK Government says that the

Source: Salto-Youth Eastern Europe & Caucasus Resource Centre

48 HC Written question – 65779, 7 March 2017

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presence of Russian troops against the will of Moldova breaches Russian undertakings:

Continuing to station the 8th OGRF Brigade in the Transnistria region without the consent of the Republic of Moldova places the Russian Federation in breach of commitments it entered into at the 1999 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Istanbul Summit. We fully support calls for the Russian Federation to remove from the territory of the Republic of Moldova those elements of its armed forces and munitions which do not have host nation consent.49

In August 2018 Russian troops and Transnistrian separatist fighters took part in joint military exercises simulating an attack over the Dniester into the rest of Moldova. The exercise showed that, despite the positive comments coming out of the 5+2 meeting in May, the situation remains tense.

62% of Moldovans agreed with the statement “a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West”.50

5.2 International engagement The mediation framework for the Transnistria conflict is provided by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, which coordinates meetings of the 5+2 Group. The 5+2 format includes representatives of Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the EU and the United States. The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova is Claus Neukirch of Germany, appointed September 2018.

In November 2017 an important bridge over the Dniester was opened, marking an achievement for the mediation process.

The most recent meeting of the 5+2 was held in Rome in May 2018, where the parties committed to resolve by negotiation a list of problems by the end of 2018.51

September 2018 saw the beginning of the implementation of an agreement to allow Transnistrian-registered vehicles to travel internationally.52

EU relations The EU-Moldova Association Agreement entered into force in July 2016, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Moldova-EU trade has increased significantly in recent years, achieving 18% growth in 2017. Since 2014 Moldovans with a biometric passport can travel visa-free to the Schengen area.

At a meeting in May 2018, discussions between the EU and Moldova focused on reform in Moldova. Moldovan and EU representatives

49 HC Written question – 65779, 7 March 2017 50 9 key findings about religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe, Pew

Research Center, 10 May 2017 51 Protocol of the official meeting of the permanent conference for political questions

in the framework of the negotiating process on the Transdniestrian settlement, 29-30 May 2018

52 OSCE Mission to Moldova welcomes start of “licence plate” agreement implementation by the Sides, OSCE press release, 1 September 2018

https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldovahttps://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/392987https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/392987https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4011/EU-Moldova%20relations,%20Factsheethttps://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/commons/2017-02-27/65779http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/10/9-key-findings-about-religion-and-politics-in-central-and-eastern-europe/https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885?download=truehttps://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885?download=truehttps://www.osce.org/chairmanship/392231https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/392231


acknowledged the reform steps already taken and “underlined the importance of sustained and full implementation”.53

Election and EU guidelines

Under Moldova’s Association Agreement, political reforms are encouraged in return for access to the EU market. In June 2018 Moldovan courts annulled the result of the election for the capital Chisinau’s Mayor; the vote had been won by a pro-reform opposition politician. The annulment was described by Freedom House, an NGO working on human rights and democracy, as a blow to Moldova’s democracy. Attention is now focused on the 2019 parliamentary election, which has already been postponed by the ruling Democratic Party from December 2018 to February 2019.

NATO relations Moldova collaborates with NATO on a range of issues under the auspices of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme but is constitutionally neutral, ruling out membership.

Much of the cooperation involves initiatives to strengthen Moldovan capacities in defence and security. At the request of the Moldovan Government, a civilian NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau was set up in December 2017, but NATO has no formal role in the Transnistria conflict.54

5.3 UK policy The then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, said in 2017 that the UK welcomed the continuation of the 5+2 talks and called for the parties to engage with each other in working groups to resolve problems, including telecommunications, legal authentication of university diplomas and ecology. He said the UK wanted a peaceful settlement based on Moldovan sovereignty:

The UK remains committed to supporting a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the Transnistria unresolved conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for the Transnistria region.55

5.4 Outlook Transnistria is among the more hopeful of the conflicts in Russia’s near neighbourhood. Analysts think the likelihood of a serious outbreak of violence is low, and mediators are having some success in building confidence. The situation is, however, vulnerable to developments in Ukraine.

53 Moldova: continued EU commitment drives trade growth, EU External Action press

release, 4 May 2018 54 Relations with the Republic of Moldova, NATO, October 2018 55 HC Written question – 65805, 17 March 2007

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6. What chance of resolution? The conflicts in the former Soviet States are cool rather than frozen. James Nixey of the Chatham House think tank argues that the ‘frozen’ label is convenient for the West, since Europe is overstretched and not confident in its ability to change the situation, while President Trump tends to agree with President Putin that the great powers should dominate their smaller neighbours.

Russia out of OSCE and the CoE? Nixey argues that the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe should be strengthened and that this means that Russia needs to leave:

A strengthening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe’s body politic – which would necessarily include the expulsion of Russia for sabotage, as well as fresh financial and human resources – would lend new impetus and respect to those tarnished organizations.56

According to Nixey, Eastern Partnership should also no longer include countries that have no intention of reforming, such as Belarus and Azerbaijan.

But he goes on to concede that the conflicts are not likely to be resolved unless there is systemic change in Russia (which is unlikely) as well as in most of the smaller states involved.

Many in Europe would be reluctant to remove Russia from the last remnants of post-Cold War cooperation with the West in return for such uncertain gains. For centuries, Russian strategy has been to defend its fundamentally vulnerable borders by dominating its neighbours. Even with wholesale change in Russia, that thinking will not change.

56 James Nixey, Contours of Conflict and Prognosis in the Eastern Neighbourhood, Chatham House, December 2018

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7. Further reading Commons Briefing Papers

Look ahead to 2018 NATO Summit, 18 June 2018

Sanctions against Russia - in brief, 12 April 2018

Georgia 2016, 28 September 2016

Russian foreign and security policy, 05 July 2016

UK Military Assistance to Ukraine, 20 May 2015

Sanctions over the Ukraine conflict, 11 March 2015

Russia and the Council of Europe, 05 March 2015

Ukraine: towards a frozen conflict?, 09 September 2014

http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8341http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8284http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06938http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7646http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN07135http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06951http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06953http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06978

BRIEFING PAPER Number 8477 21 January 2019

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1. Overview1.1 Ongoing destabilisation1.2 International engagementEUBrexit

MediationOSCECouncil of EuropeNATO enlargementEU

Western responseSanctionsEU East StratCom Task Force

2. Ukraine2.1 Stability remains elusiveSea of AzovDisinformation

2.2 International engagementMediation frameworkInternational Criminal Court

2.3 Developments in Ukraine‘Elections’ in DonbasForthcoming Ukrainian presidential electionStrengthening Ukrainian identity?

2.4 Western sanctions2.5 Outlook

3. Georgia3.1 Conflict3.2 International engagementEU tradeEU conflict monitoringCouncil of EuropeNATOInternational Criminal CourtUSARussian recognition

3.3 Politics3.4 UK policy3.5 Outlook

4. Nagorno-Karabakh4.1 ArmeniaArmenia and the EUArmenia and NATO

4.2 AzerbaijanAzerbaijan and the EUNATO

4.3 Mediation framework4.4 Outlook

5. Moldova5.1 TransnistriaRussian presence

5.2 International engagementEU relationsElection and EU guidelines

NATO relations

5.3 UK policy5.4 Outlook

6. What chance of resolution?7. Further reading

Documents

Cool conflicts in Russia’s near neighbourhood · The Ukraine conflict is . widely described. as Europe’s “forgotten war”, having been displaced from the headlines by other