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COP 21 Support Network (COP21 SN)
What does success look like
for COP21?
Three Pathways to Agreement in Paris
1
Contents
What does success look like for COP21? 5
Introduction 5
COP21 5
What is the COP21 Support Network? 7
Essential context 8
Purpose of the document 9
Summary of recommendations 9
General considerations 15
Should there be a distinct long-term goal for ocean acidification? 16
What is the agreed upper limit for global warming (ie the Parties’ ‘long-term goal’)? 16
Is there scientific consensus on the reduction pathway to the long-term goal? 17
Are the Parties on track to agree a reduction pathway consistent with the long-term goal? 19
Three pathways to agreement in Paris 22
Pathway 1 (‘strong’) 22
Pathway 2 (‘hybrid’) 23
Pathway 3 (‘soft’) 24
Pathway outcomes 25
Essential elements of a successful outcome for COP 21 26
1. Supplementing the distinction between developed and
developing countries with indicative, sliding scales of needs
and commitments 26
2. Clarifying the long-term goal 30
3. An agreed emissions reduction pathway to ‘operationalize’
the long-term goal 32
4. An agreed carbon budget, per capita shares of which would
provide an indicative baseline for the assessment of INDCs 35
2
5. Annual reviews of aggregate performance against
progression indicators defined by the long-term goal 37
6. A mechanism for reviewing and adjusting national emission
reduction commitments 38
7. Principles for financial and technical assistance incentivizing
donor generosity and beneficiary efficiency 41
8. A mechanism for upholding commitments under the
agreement 47
9. A commitment to carbon pricing 49
10. Incorporation of a ‘B Plan’, i.e. provision for the timely
ratcheting up of measures as required 52
Why mitigation and carbon pricing measures are key to
effective adaptation 53
Conclusion 54
Annex 1: Background Q & A 56
Aren’t ‘the facts’ of climate change open to question?
What is the connection between climate change and ocean acidification? 57
What changes have occurred to date? 58
What is causing the changes? 58
What impacts have there been to date? 59
What is the projection for future change? 62
What are the likely consequences if actual emissions follow a high emissions scenario? 62
2 degrees 63
3 degrees 63
4 degrees 64
5 degrees 65
Will tackling emissions undermine economic growth? 67
Can the market support a transition to clean energy? 69
3
How should resource be divided between ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’? 69
Does geo-engineering present an alternative to cutting emissions? 70
4
What does success look like for COP21?
Introduction
COP 21
‘COP 21’ is the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). It will take place in Paris between 30 November and 11th
December 2015.
Although the Parties have met annually since 1994, COP 21 is not ‘just another’
meeting. Many saw COP 15, held in Copenhagen in 2009, as the last moment for
governments to agree legally binding commitments to tackle climate change.
Infamously Copenhagen failed to deliver: emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
have continued to rise, with worsening consequences for both global warming and
ocean acidification.
2 years later in Durban (COP 17) the Parties agreed to:
launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all
Parties.
COP 21 is the culmination of that process. Any agreement will take effect only from
2020. After Copenhagen there is hesitation to talk again in terms of ‘last chance’.
Given the need for emissions to peak within years (the draft text for Copenhagen
proposed 2020), and to be cut dramatically by 2050, it should be clear to everyone,
however, that time is running out.
There are reasons to be optimistic in the build up to Paris, including the bilateral
discussions between the Heads of State of the US and China, the two largest emitters
of GHGs. In November 2014, Barrack Obama and Xi Jinping issued a joint statement1
promising a commitment:
1 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change
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… to reaching an ambitious 2015 agreement that reflects the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different
national circumstances.2
The danger, however, is that COP21 produces an agreement primarily of good
intentions, insufficient to convince capital investment of a departure from business
as usual. The model being adopted in the run up to COP21 is one in which countries
volunteer ‘nationally determined’ emission reduction commitments (‘INDCs’).
Without a mechanism for aligning aggregate INDCs to the long-term goal (i.e. limiting
average warming to below 2 degrees Celsius), providing a clear and strong signal to
investors, such an agreement risks leaving the world on track to 4 degrees warming
over the course of this century.
Such temperature rises would cause devastation, most immediately to many of the
world’s poorest and more vulnerable populations. As recent research has
demonstrated3, climate change operates as a ‘threat multiplier’, increasing the risks
from other stressors. Climate change, for example, contributed to the worst drought
in Syria’s history (between 2007 and 2010), which in turn contributed to the
outbreak of civil war. A successful outcome from COP21 can only be one, which
establishes and upholds an aggregated emission reductions pathway consistent with
the long-term goal.
Realising such an outcome depends on three interconnecting factors:
1. Political will and ambition, in particular from leading emitters of CO2
(including US, China, EU, India, Russia, Japan);
2. Legal creativity in support of the negotiating process, including the
development of proposals for a fair and transparent framework for
evaluating ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’; and
3. Public and civil society support for a legally binding agreement aligning
aggregate commitments to the ‘long-term goal’.
2 Arguably the significance of the statement was largely symbolic, similar text having been previously agreed by the Parties at COP 20, held in Lima.3 Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought, PNAS vol.112, no. 11, Colin P. Kelley et al., 3241–3246, doi:10.1073/pnas.1421533112
6
With much of the discussion in advance of Paris focusing on 1) above, there is a risk
that insufficient attention is paid to 2).
What is the COP21 Support Network?
COP21 SN is a network of independent lawyers and academics providing pro bono
assistance in support of a successful outcome from Paris. The intention is to progress
the argument beyond the widely recognized need for a ‘strong’, ‘ambitious’ legally
binding agreement, and to support State Parties and all stakeholders in identifying
exactly what that entails. Specifically it aims to:
a) Identify the critical issues for COP21:
b) Develop proposals to assist with resolution of these issues; and
c) Engage with civil society, the media and policy-makers accordingly.
As a professional network all proposals are independent and formulated with
reference to clearly articulated goals. Its main purpose is to support the UNFCCC’s
‘ultimate objective’ to:
achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.
COP21 SN is led by Tim Crosland, a Barrister, with a Masters in International Human
Rights and Environmental Law, and specialist interest in the development of informal
networks to support governance of the global commons. Previously he helped
develop the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative (CCI), a multi-stakeholder
programme to support the rule of law in cyberspace, and led country projects in
Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Botswana (see, for example:
http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/law-ministers-adopt-cybercrime-
recommendations-botswana-meeting; and http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-
news/19918-ghana-commonwealth-sign-mou-on-cybercrime.html).
He is currently taking a sabbatical to support the development of COP21 SN and a
charitable organization, COROL (Climate and Ocean, Rule of Law).
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Essential context
Over the course of 21st C there is a high risk that average global warming will reach 4 degrees Celsius.
Temperature rises on this scale would
Depress economic growth and increase poverty
Cause food and water scarcity
Leave large parts of the world uninhabitable
Cause mass migrations of peoples
Cause national and international conflict.
CO2 emissions are acidifying the oceans, further jeopardizing food security and economic well-being.
The IMF estimates that global subsidies of fossil fuels currently amount to $3.5 trillion p/a (ie $10million per second).
Urgent, coordinated political action is required to limit warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees (the ‘long-term goal’).
International leaders first agreed to take action to limit greenhouse gases (GHGs) in 1992 (the UNFCCC).
In the absence of a treaty setting binding emissions limits and mechanisms directing the market to invest in clean energy, GHG emissions have continued to rise, driven by economic and population growth.
Following failures to reach consensus on meaningful mitigation actions at COP3 (Kyoto) and COP15 (Copenhagen), COP21 needs to deliver.
The agreement should provide, inter alia, for:
Clarity regarding the long-term goal An agreed emissions pathway to the long-term goal A fair, adjustable mechanism for aligning INDCs to the agreed pathway An incentivized scheme linking financial assistance to commitment
targets, generating reliable and substantial funding to support developing countries for mitigation and adaptation planning and implementation
Direction of the market through carbon pricing.
The essential elements of the agreement might be expressed in a form that is ‘strong’, ‘soft’ or ‘hybrid’. The essence of a ‘soft’ agreement is one in which Parties exercise exclusive determination over their financial and mitigation commitments.
In the event of a soft agreement, the Parties should address the questions: ‘What if doesn’t work? What if it fails to send a clear and strong signal to capital investors? Would we have time to negotiate a whole new agreement? Or should we provide for a ‘B Plan’ within the original agreement?’
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The current negotiating text includes all proposals made by member states. It is long and complex and reveals differences of approach regarding many of the principles of an agreement.
The ‘essential elements’ proposed in this document aim to address the primary concerns of all Parties: on the one hand it proposes a mechanism that ensures equitable and flexible commitments for all Parties; on the other a scheme that would generate the funding required to support developing countries in implementing commitments (making responsibility dependent on the materialization of such support).
Purpose of this document
196 states have ratified the UNFCCC. Key documents are made available in the six
different languages of the UN. However the working language in negotiations is
English. The negotiating text includes a wide variety of proposals from the different
Parties. Given the inherent complexity of the subject matter, additional resources
may assist the Parties in focusing on the essential elements of an agreement to fulfill
the Convention’s ultimate objective. The co-chairs’ additional tool of 24 July is an
invaluable resource, but it is beyond its remit to provide commentary or to focus on
essential elements. This document aims to provide a common resource for all those
participating in COP 21, whether directly or indirectly; and is intended to be used in
conjunction with the Geneva Negotiating Text and the co-chairs’ additional tool.
Summary of recommendations
In some negotiations there may be an advantage in leaving to the last the most
difficult negotiating challenges, and building momentum by focusing initially on the
less contentious areas. There is a difficulty, however, in adopting such an approach
for COP21. Party delegations will be unable to make significant commitments unless
the implications of those commitments are clear; and that requires some of the most
fundamental (and most challenging) questions to be answered up front. Will, for
example, Parties be divided into ‘Annex 1, Annex 2 and non Annex 1’ or ‘Annex X and
Y’, or will ‘differentiated commitments’ be demarcated in some other way? Will
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categories be flexible? Will commitments be enforceable? Which comes first:
developed country financial and technical assistance or developing country
reduction commitments? Until such matters are pinned it will be hard to make
substantial progress. Further, given the scarcity of available negotiating time (10
days before COP21), focusing on the less contentious issues first means diverting
energy away from the essential parts of the agreement.
If the bulk of this paper attempts to define ‘what success looks like’ for COP21,
failure can be simply described:
No agreed pathway to the long-term goal.
Uncoordinated voluntary commitments, with no clear link to the long-
term goal.
No mechanism for adjusting aggregate commitments to align them to
the long-term goal.
No agreement on carbon pricing.
Such an agreement would do little to change the status quo.
This paper sets out the positive case for COP21, identifying the critical issues, which,
if resolved satisfactorily, would provide a platform for sustained progress both at
COP21, and for the UNFCCC process beyond. If the focus is on mitigation measures,
that is not to prioritise them over other critical issues such as adaptation and
remedies for loss and damage arising from climate change; rather it is recognition
that, so far as possible, ‘prevention is better than cure’, and acknowledgement that
adaptation planning requires an understanding of likely temperature rises.
Meaningful mitigation measures, in other words, do not come at the expense of
adaptation planning: they provide the platform for it.
One significant area on which agreement will need to be reached is the development
of a scheme that shares fairly the burden of reductions (consistent with the concept
of commitments that are ‘nationally determined’). Dividing the Parties into fixed
camps (whether ‘developed and developing’; ‘Annex 1, Annex 2 and Non Annex 1’;
or ‘Annex X and Y’) has had an unintended polarizing effect on negotiations, and this
is an opportune moment to reassess the merits of such schemes. Historic
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responsibility, equity and capability could be better reflected if the distinction
between developed and developed countries were supplemented with indicative,
adjustable sliding scales of need and responsibility. Resolving this issue up-front (for
example, with reference to a notional per capita CO2 allowance) would pave the way
to an easier negotiating process; and provide a clear mechanism for linking INDCs to
the long-term goal.
More generally the paper proposes ‘10 key elements’ to an agreement that would
serve the ultimate objective of the Parties by aligning aggregate commitments to the
long-term goal:
1. Supplementing the distinction between developed and developing
countries with indicative, sliding scales of needs and commitments
(promoting equity and flexibility).
2. Clarifying the long-term goal (i.e. the relationship between the 1.5 and 2
degree Celsius targets; and the distinct objective of limiting ocean
acidification).
3. An agreed emissions reduction pathway to ‘operationalize’ the long-
term goal.
4. An agreed carbon budget, per capita shares of which would provide an
indicative baseline for the assessment of INDCs (the principle of
‘contraction and convergence’).
5. Annual reviews of aggregate performance against progression indicators
defined by the long-term goal (providing accountability and
transparency regarding the efficacy of the agreement; and an early
warning system of risks to the Convention’s ultimate objective).
6. A mechanism for reviewing and adjusting national reduction
commitments.
7. Principles for financial and technical assistance incentivizing donor
generosity and beneficiary efficiency (generating a minimum annual
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payment of $100billion into the Green Climate Fund from 2020, rising to
$200billion p/a by 2030, supporting both mitigation and adaptation).
8. A mechanism for upholding commitments under the agreement.
9. Commitment to carbon pricing.
10. A ‘B Plan’, i.e. provision for the timely ratcheting up of measures as
required (i.e. without the necessity of negotiating a new legal
instrument).
The paper analyses each of these elements with reference to three different
pathways to agreement:
Pathway 1 delineates the core of a ‘strong’ agreement for Paris: one likely to prevent climate change and ocean acidification exceeding the long-term goal. It would establish a clear emission reduction pathway, based on IPCC AR5; a global carbon emission ‘budget’; a mechanism for ensuring aggregated INDCs were aligned to the long term-goal; and a mechanism that would generate the financial support required by developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation (i.e. at least $100billion p/a from 2020 rising to $200 billion p/a by 2030). It would further direct the market towards investment in clean energy through carbon pricing. It would establish a sanctions regime, applicable to all Parties, for breach of commitments (including, for developed countries, risk of exposure to legal liability for loss and damage attributable to climate change).
Pathway 2 is a compromise between the ‘strong’ option of Pathway 1 and the ‘soft’ option of Pathway 3. It splits into two sub-pathways, 2A (‘hybrid/strong’), and 2B (‘hybrid/soft’). Pathway 2A is, essentially Pathway 1, postponed to 2025. It makes clear to investors that strong action to enforce deep cuts will be taken, but it gives Parties additional time to make preparations. Pathway 2B, begins as a soft agreement, but provides for a ratcheting up of measures in the event that aggregate emissions are failing to align to the long-term goal.
Pathway 3 delineates the elements of a ‘soft’ agreement to facilitate cooperation between the Parties in pursuit of the long-term goal. Parties would agree to submit INDCs; to review aggregate effect against the long-term goal; and to take appropriate measures where aggregate INDCs were failing to align to the long-term goal. Parties able to do so would agree to provide financial and technical assistance to Parties needing support for
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climate change mitigation and adaptation. The development of indicative, baseline scales for reductions and contributions, and the establishment of an advisory panel, would help create pressure towards ambition. There would however, be no provisions for imposing commitments on Parties, and consequently no sanctions regime in the event of breach.
In relation to each of the nine steps, the paper provides:
Commentary;
Proposed text appropriate to the strong, hybrid and soft pathways to
agreement outline above;
Links to the Geneva Negotiating Text, and the co-chairs’ ‘additional tool’,
published 24 July.
Annex 1 to the Paper summarizes the scientific and economic background to the
negotiations, distilling the key conclusions of recent research (in particular the
findings of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)4).
Specifically it:
a) Highlights the IPCC conclusion that, without additional efforts to reduce
GHG emissions, the projected range for warming by 2100 is between 2.5
and 7.8 degrees Celsius;
b) Summarizes research into the current impacts of warming (including its
contribution to civil war in Syria) and the projected consequences of
future rises;
c) Summarizes research showing that the transition to clean energy, far
from compromising sustainable economic growth, is essential to it; and
4 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a scientific body established by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988, under the auspices of the UN. It aims to acquire insight into all aspects of climate change, such as the risks, consequences and options for adaptation and mitigation. The IPCC itself does not conduct research nor does it keep climate-related data, but studies and assesses the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide and publishes reports about it. The IPCC is not just a scientific body, but also an intergovernmental organization. Membership is open to all states, which are members of the UN and the WMO. The IPCC currently has 195 countries as members, including the Netherlands. AR5 provides the scientific underpinning to COP21.
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d) Focuses attention on ‘the other CO2 problem’ i.e. ocean acidification,
which likewise demands drastic reductions of CO2 emissions.
General considerations
14
If COP 21 is to tackle climate change, it is not enough for the Parties to agree to limit
warming to a specific level (more or less, that has already been done). Nor is it
enough to bind countries to their own self-determined emission reductions. COP 21
must agree a framework for yoking the two together, i.e. a transparent, accountable
mechanism for ensuring that aggregate reductions support the long-term goal.
In terms of scope, the Parties should agree to bring ocean acidification squarely
within the UNFCCC mandate. In 1992, when UNFCCC was agreed, ocean acidification
was not yet understood: the ultimate objective of UNFCCC is framed exclusively in
terms of ‘the climate system’; and ocean acidification is referred to in AR5 is if it
were simply a symptom of climate change5.
This blurring of the issues is unhelpful and potentially misleading: the mitigation
pathways for climate change and ocean acidification need to be considered
separately so that a common pathway can be found. Indeed there is, in one respect,
an inverse relationship between the problems: the more CO2 the ocean absorbs, the
less goes into the atmosphere. Further, proposals for ‘solar radiation management’
would have no impact on ocean acidification (see section on ‘geo-engineering’
below). It becomes necessary to emphasize that tackling CO2 emissions is a war on
two separate fronts.
It would, of course, be counter-productive to develop a new treaty process to cut
CO2 emissions to prevent ocean acidification; the COP21 agreement should include
the prevention of ocean acidification a specific objective, removing any concerns
around mandate.
Should there be a distinct long-term goal for ocean acidification?
The long-term temperature goal, expressed in degrees Celsius, does not work as a
limit for ocean acidification (which should be expressed in terms of pH or percentage
increase). There is a complex inter-relationship between the two phenomena.
Warming waters, for example, absorb less CO2, whereas decreasing salinity arising
from ice-melt has the opposite effect.
5 See AR5, SPM, 1.1, ‘Observed changes in the climate system … ocean uptake of CO2 has resulted in acidification of the ocean …’
15
Ultimately a distinct goal, with a distinct pathway, should be agreed for limiting
ocean acidification; ensuring that the Parties afford it separate consideration. Since
the Parties will not have a sufficient evidential basis for agreeing a threshold at Paris,
the first step should be to commission a robust and comprehensive scientific
assessment, for example a Special Report of the IPCC.
What is the agreed upper limit for global warming (ie the Parties’ ‘long-term goal’)?
In the course of COP 15, held in Copenhagen in 2009, the AOSIS countries (the
Alliance of Small Island States) and the Least Developed Countries argued that
warming should be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The resulting Copenhagen Accord,
however, committed only to a limit of 2 degrees,6 with an agreement to review the
position by 2015 (with specific reference to a 1.5 degree threshold).7 The 2012 Doha
meeting (COP 18) established a ‘structured expert dialogue’ (SED) in furtherance of
this review. The resulting report, published on 4 May 2015, concludes:
The SED has shown that limiting global warming to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels would significantly reduce the projected risks of climate change, allowing, in the light of Article 2 of the Convention, the adaptation of many ecosystems, protecting food production and enabling economic development to proceed more sustainably. However, the SED has also illustrated that, in some regions and vulnerable ecosystems, high risks are projected even for warming above 1.5 °C [emphasis added]. We are therefore of the view that Parties would profit from restating the long-term global goal as a ‘defence line’ or ‘buffer zone’, instead of a ‘guardrail’ up to which all would be safe. This new understanding would then probably also favour emission pathways that will limit warming to a range of temperatures below 2 °C. In the very near term, such aspirations would keep open as long as possible the option of a warming limit of 1.5 °C, and would avoid embarking on a pathway that unnecessarily excludes a warming limit below 2 °C.8
2 degrees, in other words, should not be regarded as a ‘safe’ limit. High risks are
projected in some regions even for warming above 1.5 degrees.
Is there scientific consensus on the reduction pathway to the long-term goal?
AR5 provides the Parties with the scientific assessment of the requirement:
6 FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, para. 17 ibid. para. 128 FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, p. 33
16
scenarios likely to maintain warming below 2 degrees ‘are characterised by 40 to 70% … GHG emissions reductions by 2050 compared to 2010, and emissions levels near zero or below in 2100.’9
A limited number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit warming to 1.5 degrees by 2100 … these … are characterised by … 2050 emission reduction between 70% and 95% below 2010.10
If, in other words, Parties are committed to a long-term goal of limiting warming to
between 1.5 and 2 degrees, and to acting on the basis of the science, it follows that
they should commit to reducing GHG emissions by at least 70% by 2050 (the least
ambitious intersection between scenarios limiting warming to 1.5 and 2 degrees),
and by nearly 100% by 2100.
AR5 also emphasises the importance of taking early action:
Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over the 21st century to below 2 degrees C relative to pre-industrial levels. It will require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050; a much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this period; a larger reliance on [Carbon Dioxide Removal] in the long term; and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts11.
Usefully AR5 also expresses the requirement in terms of a ‘carbon budget’:
Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming to
less than 2 degrees C relative to the period 1861-1880 with a probability of
> 66% would require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic
sources since 1870 to remain below about 2900 GtCO2 … About 1900 GtCO2
had already been emitted by 201112.
As of 2011, therefore, the total ‘budget’ remaining for emissions was about 1000
GtCO2. Expressing the requirement in these terms provides a basis for determining:
9 IPCC AR5, SPM 3.410 AR5, SPM 3.411 See AR5, SPM, 3.4; see also TR, 3.4: ‘GHG emissions in 2030 lie between about 30 GtCO2-eq/yr and
50 GtCO2-eq/yr in cost-effective scenarios that are likely to about as likely as not to limit warming to
less than 2°C this century relative to pre-industrial levels.’
12 AR5, SPM, 2.1
17
a) annual / periodic global emission limits;
b) notional per capita emission rations; and
c) annual / periodic country emission rations (expressed as a share of the
global ration).
While AR5 does not provide a clear target for 2030, the UN Environmental
Programme (UNEP) does. UNEP has been issuing annual reports about the
“emissions gap” since 2010. The gap is the difference between the desired emissions
level in a certain year and the level of emissions anticipated for that year based on
the reduction goals pledged by the countries concerned.
The “executive summary” of the 2014 UNEP report includes the following text:
“6. What about the emissions gap in 2030?(…)This report estimates that global emissions in 2030 consistent with having a likely chance of stayingwithin the 2 °C target are about 42 Gt CO2e.
As for expected emissions in 2030, the range of the pledge cases in 2020 (52–54 Gt CO2e) was extrapolated to give median estimates of 56–59 Gt CO2e in 2030.
The emissions gap in 2030 is therefore estimated to be 14–17 Gt CO2e (56 minus 42 and 59 minus 42). This is equivalent to about a third of current global greenhouse emissions (or 26–32 per cent of 2012 emission levels).
As a reference point, the gap in 2030 relative to business-as-usual emissions in that year (68 Gt CO2e) is 26 Gt CO2e. The good news is that the potential to reduce global emissions relative to the baseline is estimated to be 29 Gt CO2e, that is, larger than this gap. This means that it is feasible to close the 2030 gap and stay within the 2°C limit.”13
Are the Parties on track to agree a reduction pathway consistent with the long-
term goal?
13http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport2014/portals/50268/pdf/EGR2014_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf
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If Paris is to deliver an agreement providing reasonable confidence that catastrophic
global warming will be averted, the Parties must agree to measures to align emission
reductions the long-term goal. Announcing a commitment to limit global warming to
between 1.5 and 2 degrees, without agreeing reductions consistent with that goal,
would undermine the credibility of the agreement as a whole. It would fail to send
the necessary signal to capital markets. Further, agreeing only to the goal, without
the steps to get there, risks causing confusion - in particular for adaptation planning.
If the Parties conclude that steps consistent with limiting warming to 1.5 degrees or
2 degrees are not realistic then the long-term goal should be restated accordingly (eg
to limit warming to 2 or 2.5 degrees), forcing Parties to face up to the consequences
of such rises, including for adaptation. Either way aggregate commitments need to
be consistent with the long-term goal.
Of course this does not mean that Parties will in fact agree the necessary measures.
The basic approach for emission reductions is that of ‘intended nationally
determined contributions’ (‘INDCs’), ie countries will assign their own level of
commitments. While the model may serve as a starting point, it seems unlikely, in
isolation, to deliver the reductions necessary to support long-term goal.
INDCs already submitted by countries give an indication of the different approaches,
which may be adopted.
The US has stated it:
intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 per cent below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.
The EU has committed to:
a binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 .
China, the largest emitter of GHGs, has so far announced a commitment only to cap
it emissions by 2030 (ie its emissions will continue to rise until then).
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Russia has stated:
Limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gases in Russia to 70-75% of 1990 levels by the year 2030 might be a long-term indicator, subject to the maximum possible account of absorbing capacity of forests [ie the commitment is to a reduction of 25-30%].
Mexico has expressed its INDC in terms of conditional and unconditional
components. Unconditionally it has committed to reducing 25% of its Greenhouse
Gases and Short Lived Climate Pollutants emissions by 2030; and has stated that:
The 25% reduction commitment … could increase up to a 40% in a conditional manner, subject to a global agreement addressing important topics including international carbon price, carbon border adjustments, technical cooperation, access to low- cost financial resources and technology transfer, all at a scale commensurate to the challenge of global climate change.
Morocco’s commitment is formulated in exclusively conditional terms:
Morocco’s commitment is to reduce its GHG emissions by 32 % by 2030 compared to “business as usual” projected emissions. This commitment is contingent upon gaining access to new sources of finance and enhanced support, compared to that received over the past years, within the context of a new legally-binding agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC.
Ethiopia has stated that it intends to limit its emissions to 145 Mt CO2 e, a 64%
reduction from the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario for 2030.
And Canada, that:
As part of our contribution to a new global climate change agreement, Canada intends to achieve an economy-wide target to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.
One point becomes quickly apparent from these submissions: in the absence of an
agreed pathway, or an indicative approach as to how the remaining carbon budget
should be divided, it is difficult to say whether these various commitments for 2030
either represent equitable contributions (in light of historic responsibility and current
capacity) or whether they are collectively consistent with a pathway limiting
warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees.
20
The essential context for the submission of INDCs is currently missing, i.e:
an agreed collective budget for 2030; and
an indicative scale for allocating the budget between the parties.
There is, in other words, a gulf between the long-term goal and INDCs, which COP 21
must focus on bridging.
Three pathways to agreement in Paris
With less than 4 months to go to COP21 it would be naïve to imagine
that ‘all options are open’ regarding the nature of the agreement.
Nevertheless it is valuable to consider the strengths and weaknesses of
different approaches (if only to emphasise where compensatory
measures may be required).
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Agreement, Pathway 1 (‘strong’)
Pathway description
Pathway 1 proposes the core of a ‘strong’ agreement for Paris: one likely to prevent climate change and ocean acidification exceeding the long-term goal. It would establish a clear emission reduction pathway, based on IPCC AR5; a global carbon emission ‘budget’; a mechanism for ensuring aggregated INDCs were aligned to the long term-goal; and a mechanism that would guarantee the financial support required by developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation (i.e. at least $100billion p/a from 2020 rising to $200 billion p/a by 2030). It would further direct the market towards investment in clean energy through carbon pricing. It would establish a sanctions regime, applicable to all Parties, for breach of commitments (including, for developed countries, risk of exposure to legal liability for loss and damage attributable to climate change).
Defining feature Effective mechanisms, including a sanctions regime, for aligning emission
reduction and financial commitments to the long-term goal.
Pros
Likely to prevent irreversible, dangerous climate change and ocean acidification;
By providing for deep cuts to be made fast, would ease the overall challenge of meeting the long-term goal; and
Would send an immediate and powerful signal to the market, directing capital investment towards clean energy projects.
Cons Revising INDCs in time for 2020 (i.e. to ensure the aggregate aligns to the
long goal) would present political difficulties for Parties committed to preserving national sovereignty regarding emission reductions.
Agreement, Pathway 2 (‘hybrid’)
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Pathway description
Pathway 2 is a compromise between the ‘strong’ option of Pathway 1 and the ‘soft’ option of Pathway 3. It splits into two sub-pathways, 2A (‘hybrid/strong’), and 2B (‘hybrid/soft’). Pathway 2A is, essentially Pathway 1, postponed to 2025. It makes clear to investors that strong action to enforce deep cuts will be taken, but it gives Parties additional time to make preparations. Pathway 2B, begins as a soft agreement, but provides for a transition to a strong agreement in the event that aggregate emissions are failing to align to the long-term goal.
Defining feature Provides for a transition from ‘soft’ to ‘strong’ agreement.
Pros A compromise between a hard and soft agreement;
Contains an ‘A’ plan and a ‘B’ plan;
The prospect of the ‘B’ plan incentivizes parties to make the ‘A’ plan work (‘hybrid/soft’);
Would send a strong signal to the market, directing capital investment towards clean energy projects (‘hybrid/ strong’).
Cons Deep cuts may be delayed at least to 2025, adding to the overall challenge
of meeting the LTG.
Agreement, Pathway 3 (‘soft’)
Pathway description
Pathway 3 provides the heart of a ‘soft’ agreement to facilitate cooperation between the Parties in pursuit of the long-term goal. Parties would agree to submit INDCs; to review aggregate effect against the long-term goal; and to take appropriate measures where aggregate INDCs were failing to align to the long-term goal. Parties able to do so would agree to provide financial and technical assistance to Parties
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needing support for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The development of indicative, baseline scales for reductions and contributions, and the establishment of an advisory panel, would help create pressure towards ambition. There would however, be no provisions for imposing commitments on Parties, and consequently no sanctions regime in the event of breach.
Pros
Easy for Parties to accept a deal preserving absolute national sovereignty over emission reductions.
Some pressure towards ambition may come from:i. transparency regarding annual progression towards long-term goal;ii. indicative scales for INDCS and financial contributions; andiii.recommendations from an advisory panel.
Cons
Does not guarantee the deep cuts required to prevent dangerous, irreversible climate change.
Fails to send a strong and clear signal to capital investments. Lacks hard incentives towards financial and technical assistance.
Defining feature
Allows the Parties to determine their own emission reduction and financial commitments.
Pathway (PW) outcomes
An agreed (but adjustable) emissions reduction pathway consistent with the long-term goal.
A distinct pathway for limiting ocean acidification.
A collective CO2 emissions budget.
An indicative principle for allocating shares of the budget between Parties.
Annual reviews of collective progress towards the long-term goal, facilitating timely correction for projected overshoot.
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Accountability and transparency through annual reports, in clear and accessible language, of progress towards the LTG.
An indicative, baseline scale for financial contributions based on per capita GDP and population.
[PW 1] Guaranteed / [PW 3] Pledged financial assistance from developed to developing countries to support climate change mitigation and adaptation (at least $100billion p/a from 2020, rising to $200billion by 2030).
A mechanism incentivizing donor generosity and beneficiary efficiency.
An independent body or arbitration panel to [PW 1] facilitate / [PW 3] recommend adjustments to aggregate commitments to ensure alignment to the long-term goal.
[PW 2] Provision introduce additional mechanisms, including sanctions, if voluntary cooperation fails to align aggregate commitments to the LTG.
Commitment to carbon pricing, and the establishment of a technical body to make recommendations regarding implementation.
[PW 1] A sanctions regime, applicable to all Parties / Parties in Annexes X and Y, to uphold commitments.
[PW 3] An advisory committee, applicable to all Parties, to monitor and report on compliance with commitments.
Essential elements of a successful outcome for COP21
‘NT’: negotiating text, June 11‘CCT p1/2/3’: co-chair’s tool July 24, parts 1 (draft agreement), 2 (draft decision) or 3 (allocation to be determined).Proposed text for core pathway (purple)Provisions distinct to Pathway 1, (red)Provisions distinct to Pathway 2 (blue)Provisions distinct to Pathway 3 (green).
Element 1: Supplementing the distinction between developed and developing
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countries with indicative, sliding scales of commitment.
It is critical to success that any proposed agreement is perceived to be fair by all
Parties. In particular it must reflect the facts that:
relatively few countries are responsible for the greater part of historic
emissions;
there remain vast resource disparities between countries;
many of the countries most immediately vulnerable to climate change
have contributed to it the least;
without assistance, countries tackling high levels of poverty are
unlikely to be in a position to take all necessary action against climate
change;
requiring the least developed countries to cut emissions may have
disproportionately negative effects on their economic development.
However all these factors could be reflected with sliding scales of need and
commitment reflecting the different circumstances of different Parties. While the
distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries remains important in
general terms, there are difficulties in using the concepts to delimit specific
commitments. Indicative, sliding scales of need and commitment might provide a
more proportionate and flexible approach for assessing contributions, helping to
ease some of the current negotiating challenges. Such an approach would take the
pressure off the precise location of dividing lines. Supposing, for example, countries
included in Annex X are obliged to make financial contributions to the Green Climate
Fund; that the basis for inclusion is per capita GDP in excess of $20,000; and that the
contribution is calculated with reference to a percentage of this excess. The fact that
a country has per capita GDP only slightly in excess of $20,000 will not have an ‘all or
nothing’ consequence, as its expected contribution would be proportionately
modest.
Moreover different scales for different factors would allow for a more targeted and
nuanced approach. In relation to emissions, a sliding scale is proposed using per
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capita shares of a global emissions budget as an indicative baseline (see ‘Element 4’,
below). Similar indicative scales to inform the provision of assistance might be
developed reflecting:
(i) Capacity to contribute financial assistance;
(ii) Capacity to contribute technical assistance;
(iii) Vulnerability to the effects of climate change;
(iv) Need for financial assistance;
(v) Need for technical assistance.
The Parties would not need to determine the detail of the sliding scales at Paris: it
might be enough to agree the general principles, leaving the development of the
scales to a technical body.
Proposed text:
Para. 217:
1) Annex X shall include all countries which, according to the statistics
of the [World Bank / IMF?], have per capita GDP in excess of
$20,000.
2) Annex Y shall include all countries which, according to …, have per
capita GDP between $10,000 and $20,000.
3) Annex Z shall include all countries which, according to …, have per
capita GDP of less than $10,000.
Para. 218:
Annexes X, Y and Z shall be reviewed and updated annually.
See further, elements 4 and 7 below.
- Party bandings in the UNFCCC and current NT
UNFCCC divides parties into 3 groups attracting different sets of commitments.
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Annex 1 Parties consist of countries that were members of the OECD in 1992 with
the addition of countries whose economies were then considered to be ‘in
transition’ (eg the Russian Federation and the Baltic States);
Annex 2 Parties consist only of the OECD members of Annex 1 (eg Greece, Spain,
Turkey).
All other parties are described as ‘non-Annex 1 Parties.’ These include Qatar,
Singapore and Brunei (three of the top five countries in terms of per capita GDP).
Annex 2 Parties are required to provide financial assistance to ‘developing country’
Parties (although this term is not specifically defined) to support their mitigation and
adaptation plans.
The negotiating text currently refers to 3 different sets of groupings across the text:
(i) ‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’ countries;
(ii) Annex 1, Annex 2 and non-Annex 1 Parties;
(iii) Annex X and Annex Y Parties.
The last clause of para. 6, for example, reads as follows:
… which will depend on the extent of financial, technology and capacity- building support provided by [developed country Parties [and Parties in a position to do so]][Parties included in annex Y] to [developing country Parties [and the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy]][Parties not included in annex X].
Annexes X and Y refer to new lists of countries to be developed for the new
agreement. Unless prepared on the basis of pre-existing criteria, such as per capita
GDP, attempting to agree such lists would, inevitably consume large quantities of
negotiating time.
NT, para 218, Option 5, proposes an interesting mechanism for updating the UNFCCC
groupings:
1. … the Conference of the Parties to the Convention … may request the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary
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Body for Implementation to review both the per capita greenhouse gas emissions and per capita gross domestic products of Parties and present to it draft decisions on revisions to Annex I and/or Annex II to the Convention;
2. In reviewing and revising Annex I to the Convention, the total amount of greenhouse gases, expressed in carbon dioxide equivalent, emitted by a Party to the Convention since 1750 A.D. shall be added up and divided by the current population of that Party. On the basis of the thus obtained per capita greenhouse gas emissions and population size of each Party to the Convention, the average global per capita emissions of greenhouse gases shall be used to evaluate the status of the greenhouse gas emissions of a Party to the Convention. Each Party to the Convention whose per capita greenhouse gas emissions exceed the global average per capita greenhouse gas emissions shall be proposed to be inscribed in Annex I to the Convention, and the remaining Parties shall not be proposed to be inscribed in Annex I to the Convention;
3. In reviewing and revising Annex II to the Convention, the current per capita gross domestic product of each Party to the Convention shall be compared with the global average per capita gross domestic product. Each Party to the Convention whose per capita gross domestic product is above the global average per capita gross domestic product and whose population size is above half a million shall be proposed to be inscribed in Annex II to the Convention. The remaining Parties shall not be proposed to be inscribed in Annex II to the Convention;
4. The Conference of the Parties to the Convention serving as the meeting of the Parties to this agreement will, as it sees appropriate, review, revise and endorse a draft decision on any revision to either or both Annex I and Annex II to the Convention and present the draft decision that it has endorsed to the President of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention with a request for the Conference of the Parties to the Convention to review, amend as it sees appropriate and approve the proposed amendment or amendments to Annex I or Annex II to the Convention in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention;
5. On the basis of the decision of the Conference of the Parties, the President of the Conference of the Parties shall inform in writing the Depositary of the Convention, the Depositary of this agreement and each Party to the Convention that is to be inscribed in or removed from either Annex I or Annex II to the Convention. The President of the Conference of the Parties shall also report on the outcome to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this agreement;
6. A Party which has been informed in writing by the President of the Conference of the Parties that it is to be removed from Annex I or Annex II to the Convention shall be deleted from the said Annex as of the date of its written notification. A Party that has been informed in writing by the President of the Conference of the Parties that it is to be inscribed in Annex I or Annex II to the Convention shall accordingly be inscribed immediately after two years have passed since it received the written notice.
This text is replicated in CCT, P3, para. 102 (‘Amendment to Annexes I and II of the
Convention’).
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Element 2: Clarifying the long-term goal
Clarity regarding the long-term goal provides the basis for an emissions reduction
pathway and for evaluating progress.
Recognising the diplomatic sensitivities, 1.5 degrees and 2 degrees ought not to be
used as if they were interchangeable: the different goals entail differences in terms
of risk and outcome, particularly for vulnerable and low-lying states, and therefore
imply different adaptation measures.
The Parties can reconcile the two targets by aiming to limit warming to 1.5 degrees,
while committing to keeping it below 2.
The Structured Expert Dialogue (SED), established at COP18 to review the adequacy
of the long-term goal, concluded in May 2015 that ‘in some regions and vulnerable
ecosystems, high risks are projected even for warming above 1.5 degrees Celsius. We
are therefore of the view that Parties would profit from restating the long-term goal
as a ‘defence line’ or ‘buffer zone’, instead of a ‘guardrail’ up to which all would be
safe.’
Proposed text:
Para. 5: All Parties shall take action and cooperate to further implement the Convention in order to reach its ultimate objective … in accordance with their … common but differentiated responsibilities … by achieving an emission pathway consistent with limiting the global average temperature to below
Option a: 1.5 degrees Celsius
Option b: 1.5 degrees Celsius and likely to limit it to below 2 degrees Celsius
Option c: 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels, which entails …
See NT para. 5, opt. 1: ‘… by achieving an emission pathway consistent with limiting the global average temperature to below 2 degrees C or 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.’
See CCT p1, para.3: ‘[[All] Parties [shall][should][other] [enhance mitigation ambition]
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… and cooperate [to ensure that the aggregate level of mitigation [commitments][contributions][actions] increases over time] [with a view] to [achieving long-term emission reductions, in the context of Article 2 of the Convention][stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system], [consistent with][including] holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels …’
- to include specific reference to ocean acidification
In addition to global warming, CO2 emissions cause ocean acidification, threatening
the base of the ocean food-chain and so further jeopardizing food security and
economic well-being. Given the common cause, containing ocean acidification
should be brought clearly within scope as a distinct objective of the agreement.
Proposed text:
Para. 6: The Parties acknowledge ocean acidification as a phenomenon distinct from global warming, also attributable to anthropogenic emissions of CO2. The Parties agree that limiting ocean acidification should be an additional objective of this agreement requiring the establishment of a separate long-term goal …
This objective is not contained in the current NT [what is the methodology for introducing new proposals at this stage?].
Element 3: an agreed emissions reduction pathway
Such agreement is the prerequisite to coordinated, collective action. Without it there
is no reference point for determining either national contributions or for evaluating
collective progress towards the LTG.
Assuming acceptance of AR5, the pathway seems reasonably clear. Emission
reductions of at least 70% by 2050 are required to make it ‘more likely than not’ that
warming can be limited to 1.5 degrees (see above). 70% reductions by 2050 is the
high end of the range for scenarios likely to limit warming to 2 degrees. As the
lowest point of intersection between the AR5 pathways to 1.5 and 2 degrees, a 70%
reduction offers the least ambitious target consistent with both pathways. Roughly
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interpreting AR5, 70% reductions by 2050 would mean a good chance of limiting
warming to 2 degrees, with a fair chance of 1.5.
The pathway should also commit to the year for peak global emissions (recognising
that AR5 is less clear on this issue than was AR4); and to near zero emissions by
2100.
Proposed text:
Para. 5(1): Ensuring that GHGs peak by [2020 / 2025 / 2030] at the latest, are reduced by at least [82% / 70% / 55 %] by 2050 compared to 2010, and reach near-zero emissions by the end of the Century, consistent with the findings of the IPCC …
Explanatory note:
82% is the mid-point of the IPCC AR5 range for a 1.5 degree pathway (ie between 70% and 95% reductions).
70% is the link point between the IPCC ranges for a 1.5 degree pathway (between 70 and 95% reductions) and a 2 degree pathway (between 40 and 70% reductions).
55% is the mid-point of the IPCC range for a 2 degree pathway.
See NT, para. 5, Option 1, 5(1), which proposes 4 different pathways:
Option (a) Ensuring significant global greenhouse reductions over the next few decades or a 40-70% reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions below 2010 levels by 2050 and near zero levels of carbon dioxide and other long-lived greenhouse gases by the end of the century;
Option (b) Ensuring that global greenhouse gas emissions peak by 2020 at the latest, are reduced by at least 50% by 2050 and continue to decline thereafter [reaching near-zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the Century, consistent with the findings of the [IPCC];
Option (c): Ensuring significant global greenhouse gas emission reductions over the next few decades in order to achieve a global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050 / consistent
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with the agreed global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050 / consistent with the agreed global goal, and based on the best available scientific knowledge and equitable access to sustainable development;
Option (d): Ensuring significant and rapid global greenhouse gas emission reductions of at least 70-95% below 2010 levels by 2050 and negative emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases before 2080;]
Comment: The IPCC ranges appear too broad to be adopted as the basis for a well-defined emissions reduction pathway. Rather they allow the Parties some discretion in managing risk: the further up the reduction scale the Parties commit to, the greater the prospects of attaining the goal. The Parties might agree to use the ranges to establish a pathway consistent with both 1.5 and 2 degree LTGs, if both are to be referred to in the agreement. One figure that suggests itself is 70%, the point of intersection in the ranges for 1.5 and 2 degrees.
See also NT, para 17.2, Option 1, sub-option a), eg a) viii:
Ensuring significant and rapid global greenhouse gas emission reductions of at least
70–95 per cent below 2010 levels by 2050 and zero emissions of CO2 and other long-
lived greenhouse gases in the period 2060–2080.
In CCT, the relevant provisions are contained in part three under the useful heading: ‘Operationalising the long-term goal’. Three different options are proposed:
[[In the context of the long-term objective referred to in Article 3 of the draft agreement,] Parties’ [differentiated] efforts [shall][should][other] take the form of:Option 1: PEAKING [A peaking of global [and national] GHG emissions as soon as possible [recognizing that, in accordance with emissions peaking for [developed countries][Parties included in annex X] in 2015, those [countries][Parties] shall aim to reduce net emissions to zero by 2050][with full decarbonization by 2050 for developed countries and a sustainable development pathway for [developing countries][Parties not included in annex X]] … {para 17.2 opt 1, opt(a) iv. and v., opt 1 a. opt (b), and para 17.2 opt 2 GNT}
Option 2: ZERO EMISSIONS: A long-term zero emission sustainable development pathway consistent with [the findings of the best and latest available science][and the findings of the IPCC,] [and] [a global reduction in GHG emissions [to [net] zero][[of at least][ 40–70][50][70–95] per cent below the [1990][2010] level] by 2050 [and a continued decline in emissions thereafter] [and reaching [[near] zero][negative] emissions of CO2 eq. [or below][ and other long-lived GHGs by the end of the century]
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[by [the period 2060–2080][2100]][ a stabilization of the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere at or below 350 ppm of CO2 eq] …{para 17.2 opt 1 a. i. – iii. and vi. – viii. and 17.2 opt 1 c. GNT}
Option 3: EMISSION BUDGET: A global emission budget [informed by national estimates] to be divided among all Parties in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention so as to limit global warming in this century to below 1.5 °C in accordance with the IPCC assessment. The distribution of the global emission budget should be undertaken in accordance with historical responsibilities, ecological footprint, capabilities and state of development.] {para 17.2 opt 1 b. GNT}
Although CCT presents ‘peaking’, ‘zero emissions’ and ‘emission budget’ as different
options, the concepts are mutually supportive and might be used effectively in
combination.
- include provision to revise the emission reduction pathway
The scientific assessment regarding the LTG and corresponding emissions reduction
pathway may change in light of new evidence and research. The agreement should
provide some flexibility for revision.
Proposed text:
Para 7: The collective reductions commitment, as set out in paragraph 5 above, may be revised only:
(i) on the basis of a revised IPCC assessment regarding the pathway to the long-term goal; or
(ii) in the event that all Parties agree to revise the long-term goal (in which case the appropriate pathway will be fixed on the basis of an IPCC assessment).
There is no equivalent text in either NT or CCT, beyond the general provision on
amendment (i.e. NT para. 216).
Element 4: An agreed carbon budget, per capita shares of which would provide an indicative baseline for the assessment of INDCs (the principle of ‘contraction and convergence’)
An emissions budget, expressed in terms of CO2 –eq emissions, is more easily
converted into national allocations than a pathway expressed in terms of global
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emission reductions. According to AR5, the total remaining budget, as of 2011 was
1000 GtCO2. This should be updated and might be better expressed in terms of CO2
– eq.
There is a straightforward formula for splitting the emissions budget between
countries: divide it by global population to give a notional per capita emissions
budget; then multiply the per capita figure by national population. As well as
simplicity this approach offers fairness. For the further developed, high consumption
countries, working with the global per capita average share will demand particularly
severe cuts; for the less developed, low consumption countries, the share will be
relatively generous. Some US researchers14 help make the point: they estimate that
the ‘carbon legacy’ of the average female in the US is 18,500 tonnes of CO2,
compared to just 136 tonnes for a woman in Bangladesh.
Of course there may be good reasons for departing from the formula in particular
cases; but it would provide a useful tool for determining and interrogating INDCs. It
might also be used to create a fixed number of potentially tradable shares, working
to ensure adherence to an aggregate emissions limit.
This approach has previously been proposed under the banner of ‘contraction and
convegence15’. As long ago as 2003, the UNFCCC Secretariat asserted that
‘stabilisation inevitably requires contraction and convergence’16.
Proposed text:
Para.8: All parties shall agree a global emissions budget, based on the conclusions of IPCC AR 5, to be divided among all Parties in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and using, as an indicative baseline starting point, equal per capita shares (i.e. the principle of ‘contraction and convergence’). In proposing their INDCs Parties should justify any departure from the indicative allocation.
NT Para 7, Option 4, proposes a global emission budget to ‘divided among the 14 Paul Murtaugh and Michael Schlax15 See http://www.gci.org.uk/index.html16 See http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/C&C_Janos_Pasztor_UNFCCC.pdf
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Parties’:
A global emission budget to be divided among all Parties in accordance with the
principles and provisions of the Convention, in order to limit global warming this
century to below 1.5 °C consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) assessment. The distribution of the global emission budget should
be undertaken in accordance with historical responsibilities, ecological footprint,
capabilities and state of development.
See also NT, para 17, Option 1, Option b)b) and CCT, P3, para 6, option 3:
Option 3: EMISSION BUDGET: A global emission budget [informed by national estimates] to be divided among all Parties in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention so as to limit global warming in this century to below 1.5 °C in accordance with the IPCC assessment. The distribution of the global emission budget should be undertaken in accordance with historical responsibilities, ecological footprint, capabilities and state of development.] {para 17.2 opt 1 b. GNT}
Element 5: Annual reviews of aggregate emissions against defined progression indicators
Annual progression indicators would bring consistency and transparency to reviews
of progress in terms of the Convention’s ultimate objective. They would provide the
basis for an agreed ‘early warning system’ indicating whether the Parties,
collectively, are:
(i) on track towards the long-term objective;
(ii) off track, demanding an increase in mitigation measures;
(iii) or so far off-track that the long-term goal needs to be reassessed
(with knock-on consequences for adaptation measures).
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Such transparency would be particularly valuable in conjunction with a ‘soft’
agreement.
The Parties would not need to agree the annual indicators themselves. Once the
principle has been agreed, the task of deriving annual indicators from the emissions
reductions pathway might be delegated to an appropriate technical body.
Proposed text:
Para. 25: All Parties to agree to the establishment of annual progression indicators towards the long-term goal and to review progress at each meeting of the Parties, facilitating timely adjustments to mitigation efforts as required.
[for ‘hybrid/soft’ PW 2] Para. 26:
Option A: The Parties shall agree on a system of early warning signals as the basis for invoking para. 202 [i.e. the switch to a strong-form agreement].
Option B: The Parties shall annually consider the necessity of invoking para. 202, on the basis of performance against the annual indicators and the recommendations of [? technical body].
Option C: The Parties agree to invoke para. 202, in the event of overshoot of annual indicators in excess of [x%].
NT Para. 28 proposes that:
The Conference of the Parties shall review the adequacy of the sum of individual commitments by Parties, the relation of the aggregate effort for keeping temperature increases to below 2 / 1.5 °C, and the equity of relative efforts.
Element 6: Review and adjustment of national reduction commitments
There is, of course, no guarantee that the voluntary commitments of the Parties
would combine to put the world on track to the LTG. The probability that they would
not appears to be higher. A ‘strong’ agreement, in which Parties are heavily
committed to the LTG, confronts this prospect and includes a mechanism for making
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adjustments as necessary.
Proposed text:
Para. 175: After their communication, commitments / actions will be subject to an ex ante consideration process in order to:
Assess the adequacy of the aggregated contributions compared with science;
Facilitate the analysis of national mitigation potential and address deficits in the light of the ambition required.
Para. 176: Each Party to go through a consultative period for four to six months after the submission of its intended nationally determined contribution.
Para. 177:
Option A: The Parties agree to establish a technical body to undertake analytical work, examine the adequacy and fairness of commitments and contributions and prepare recommendations.
Option B: In the event that the Parties are unable to agree on the revision of INDCs in order align aggregate commitments to the long-term goal, the Parties agree to submit their proposals to an arbitration panel consisting of [X number of] members, each of whose nomination is agreed by [Y number of] Parties.
[PW 1] Para. 178:
Option A: In the absence of a contrary consensus the Parties shall agree to be bound by the recommendations of the technical body.
Option B: The Parties shall agree to be bound by all findings of the arbitration panel.
[PW 3] Para. 178:
Option A: The Parties shall review and revise their INDCs in light of the recommendations of the technical body
Option B: The Parties shall review and revise their INDCs in light of the recommendations of the arbitration panel.
Para. 179:
The Parties shall publish annual reports on progress towards the long-term goal, in simple, accessible language, enhancing accountability in terms of the ultimate objective of the Convention.
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NT, Part J [[Time frames and process related to commitments / contributions /
Other matters related to implementation and ambition] includes, at para. 175,
options regarding an overall assessment of the adequacy of reduction commitments.
Option 1 states simply:
No ex ante consideration process / no arrangements for further facilitating transparency and clarity [/no consultative process / period].
Option 2 contains a number of sub-options, including the following:
After their communication, commitments / contributions / actions will be subject to an ex ante consideration process / further facilitation of transparency and clarity / a consultative period/process in order to:
Assess the adequacy and[equity][fairness][of the][aggregated contributions][overall effects] compared with science, [as part of the principle-based reference framework] [Option (a)b].
Facilitate understanding of the comparability of effort of the commitments / contributions / actions; and of the global aggregate commitment [Option(a)e];
Address / understand / determine / discuss deficits in the light of the ambition required / facilitate the analysis of national mitigation potential and address deficits in the light of the ambition required [Option (a)f].
NT para. 175.3, option (d) proposes:
Each Party to go through a consultative period for four to six months after the submission of its intended nationally determined contribution.
NT provides at para. 175.4, option (c):
Parties will undertake top-down adjustments on the basis of a global carbon budget.
NT para. 175.4 is supplemented with corresponding procedural proposals, in
particular para 175.5, which states:
The governing body shall develop and adopt modalities and procedures for the ex ante consideration
process / further facilitation of transparency and clarity / consultative period/process by its [X] session:
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…
A technical body / panel / task force to be established that undertakes analytical work, examines the adequacy and fairness of commitments / contributions and prepares recommendations; and/or on mitigation and means of implementation [para. 175.5.d.];
Option 3 is along similar lines but would only provide recommendations to parties
(see para. 175.3):
The aggregate consideration process shall be conducted consistent with science and on the basis of equity, with a view to providing recommendations and informing Parties in adjusting their nationally determined contributions towards enhancing ambition …
Option 4 would establish a two-tier regime exempting developing countries from any
hard pressure in relation to their commitments (see para 175.1.c and para 176.2):
On the basis of the ex ante assessment, each developed country Party shall revisit, revise and increase its commitment on mitigation and provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support, including by putting forward further targets, policies and measures.
176 .2 Developing country Parties are invited to participate in a facilitative process before or after their communication of the enhanced actions:
b. The facilitative process for developing country Parties should be:
i. On a voluntary basis;
ii. Supportive, non-prescriptive, non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty of developing country Parties;
iii. Conducted in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 7, of the Convention.
The ex ante consideration process is set out in CCT P3 at para. 95: Option 1, is for no ex ante process; Option 2 provides, inter alia:
PURPOSE: After their communication, [commitments][contributions][actions] will be subject to [an ex ante consideration process][ further facilitation of transparency and clarity] a consultative [period][process]] in order to: {Opt I para 176 opt 3 GNT / Opt I para 175 opt 2 SCT}
a. Facilitate understanding of the level of ambition and [equity] [fairness] of the [commitments][contributions] … {Opt I para 176 opt 3 opt (a) a. GNT}
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b. Assess the adequacy and [equity] [fairness] [of the] [aggregated contributions] [overall effects] compared with science, ….{Opt I para 176 opt 3 opt (a) b. GNT}
Para 95.4 provides for three options for the outcome from the process:
1. Parties should consider the outcome of the process;2. Parties should revise their INDCs on a voluntary basis; and3. Top down adjustments on the basis of a carbon budget.
Element 7: Principles for financial and technical assistance incentivizing donor generosity and beneficiary efficiency (and generating a minimum annual payment of $100billion into the Green Climate Fund from 2020, rising to $200billion p/a by 2030)
It is one thing for the Parties to make a collective commitment regarding financial
assistance; another for individual contributions to materialize.
There is some ‘chicken-and-egg’ in the relationship between financial and technical
assistance and reduction commitments by potential beneficiaries. Countries
dependent on assistance need to know what is available before making their
commitments; donor countries want to know what assistance will deliver.
An indicative, baseline scale for financial contributions, with a review and
adjustment mechanism, might instil greater confidence in the collective pledge.
Mexico’s INDC suggests a useful way forward, and might be more widely adopted.
Countries requiring assistance might express their reduction commitments in two
parts: (i) the unconditional part (ie what they can do without assistance); and (ii)
what additional commitments they will make with specified additional assistance.
Parties providing assistance should have their contributions centrally recorded and
treated as a relevant factor in the assessment of their reduction commitments. With
central oversight, such a scheme would support the efficient allocation of resources.
It will encourage recipient countries to be both ambitious and realistic in their
commitments with a view to securing initial and follow up tranches of assistance;
and donor countries to be generous and focussed in what they provide.
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Moreover ‘incentivisation’ might operate in both directions if funding were the
trigger for enforceable commitments for developing countries. The donor could be
confident that funding would produce results; the beneficiary that commitments
would not bite unless funding materialised.
Proposed text:
Para. 114: Recognising that many Parties will require financial and technical assistance for both mitigation and adaptation efforts the Parties agree as follows:
1. Parties requiring assistance should express their commitments in terms of unconditional and conditional components.
2. Conditional components should clearly define the work to be undertaken together with the required funding.
3. Following the ex ante review of commitments, and any consequent adjustments, the governing body shall undertake a review of the total funding requirement necessary to meet the Parties’ long-term goal (acknowledging a minimum target of $100 billion per annum for 2020 rising to $200 billion per year by 2030).
4. [The governing body] shall develop an indicative scale for contributions based on a country’s population and per capita GDP17.
5. Where necessary to address any shortfall in relation to the funding requirement, the governing body may PW 3 recommend / PW 1 require contributions from the Parties on the basis of criteria including 4 above.
6. Donor countries may be credited for contributions in excess of the indicative scale in the future PW 3 indication / PW 1 determination of emission reduction commitments (and vice versa).
7. PW1 Where funding is provided to support conditional commitments, such commitments will be enforceable pursuant to [section x] of this agreement; Beneficiary countries may also be credited or rated for the efficient delivery of funded conditional commitments in the allocation of future funding;.
8. To ensure consistency and efficiency, and to avoid duplication,
17 The proposed scheme is as follows: 1) use per capita GDP of $20,000 as a baseline; 2) take 0.5% of per capita GDP in excess of that figure and multiply it by a county’s population. France, for example, has per capita GDP of $42,700, ie $22,700 in excess of the baseline. 0.5% of this figure is $113.7. Multiply that by France’s population of 66 million and the indicative figure for France’s financial contribution would be $7.5 billion.
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climate change funding, pursuant to this agreement, should be managed through the Green Climate Fund.
9. The Parties shall agree a common transparency framework for funding and technical assistance.
In parts of the NT concerning developing country commitments, the dependency on
financial support is clearly articulated.
NT para. 21.5, Option 2, b.ii, for example , states:
[Developing country Parties][Parties not included in annex X], which have been provided with means of implementation, to prepare, communicate and implement a diversity of enhanced net mitigation commitments / contributions / actions in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention …
NT para. 79, Option 3, states that:
[Developing country Parties][Parties not included in annex X], which have been provided with means of implementation, to prepare, communicate and implement a diversity of enhanced net mitigation commitments / contributions / actions in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention
There are proposals that highlight the need for clarity and predictability of financial
support, such as NT para. 84:
[The importance of providing clarity on the level of support, in particular financial support, that will be provided to [developing countries][Parties not included in annex X] to allow for the enhanced implementation of the Convention, in particular with regard to adaptation, to be recognized as a crucial element in creating the necessary conditions for the enhanced participation of developing countries in the global effort to combat climate change and adapt to its adverse effects.]
NT para. 85(b) proposes:
A process for the determination of the level of resources required to keep the level
of temperature increase to below 1.5–2 °C shall be conducted.]
There are also proposals for determining country financial contributions, such as NT
para. 89, Option 1:
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[Scale of resources provided by developed country Parties shall be based on a percentage of their GNP of at least (X per cent) taking into consideration the following][Climate finance provided by developed country Parties shall be based on a quantified target taking into consideration the following][The provision of finance [committed by developed country Parties,] to be based on a floor of USD 100 billion per year] …
And NT para. 119(e):
[Developed country Parties to provide 1 per cent of gross domestic product per year from 2020 and additional funds during the pre-2020 period to the GCF;]]
NT para. 123 recognizes the need for a clear framework for funding:
[Parties agree on a common transparency framework, applicable to all Parties, that shall promote transparency of support by providing information on the delivery, use and impact of support, as well as on the implementation of enabling environments.
The governing body shall elaborate further guidance related to the transparency framework of support while recognizing that it should evolve and improve over time.]
There is an absence, however, of proposals concerning incentivisation, with NT para.
114, Option 2, a partial exception:
[To receive funding from the Green Climate Fund [GCF] for implementation of the
agreement, a Party must:
(a) Be a Party to this agreement, and
(b) Have fulfilled its reporting requirements as described in section I].
CCT P2, para. 29(i), does however propose the development of criteria for access to
the GCF:
i. Regarding issues related to access:i. [There is a need for: the [simplification,] improvement
[,prioritization,] [and rationalization] of access[, including direct access, especially] for the LDCs and SIDS; and/or the harmonization of approval and accreditation processes between various channels and institutions leveraging potential non-climate-specific financing mechanisms and institutions; and/or the operation of all funds under the Convention to be transparent, competitive and based on rules, with operating criteria underpinning rules that are compatible with the requirements of private investors, in order to effectively stimulate co-investment;
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and/or information on how all disbursements include provisions for ‘climate proofing’ measures; and/or arrangements between thematic bodies of the Convention and the GCF to be strengthened;]] {[Proposals for decisions related to anchoring institutions under the agreement] iii, vii. 3. SCT}
CCT, P2 proposes a collective financing goal at para. 31:
SHORT-TERM COLLECTIVE GOAL (TIMING) [Decides that the short-term collective
quantified goal [of USD 200 billion per year by 2030 committed to by
developed country Parties]18 [shall][should] be determined [every five
years starting in 2020 on the basis of a floor of USD 100 billion per year;] {para 89 g. SCT}.
It also proposes regular reviews of financing at para. 30:
TIMING OF FINANCE RELATED REVIEWS [Decides that, with regard to finance-related reviews as set out in Article/paragraph 46 of Part III:
a. [The review of [climate finance][the financial support provided under the agreement] shall be subject to a triennial review;] {para 87 SCT}
b. [The scale of the provision of finance shall be reviewed every [five][four] years;]] {para 89 c. SCT}.
CCT P2 proposes, at para 81, the development of criteria for the pre-2020 period for
determining which countries are in a position to provide financial support:
CRITERIA, MODALITIES AND OPTIONS FOR FINANCE SPECIFIC MATTERS [Decides/requests … [(chapeau with mandate, including any specifications of body and timing, for any further work)] to:
a. [Develop objective criteria to define which Parties are in a position to provide support;] {para 80 SCT}.
It does not, however, propose criteria to assist with the determination of the scale of
that support.
18 NOTE: For provisions on the short-term collective quantified goal see Article/paragraph 47 option 1 f. of Part III.
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CCT P3, para. 47, proposes 2 different approaches to individual country
contributions, the first of which provides a scheme for assessing commitments, the
second of which does not:
QUANTIFIED/INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS
[Option 1: [The provision of finance [committed by developed country Parties,] to be based on a floor of USD 100 billion per year [, and shall take into account the different assessment of climate-related finance needs prepared by the secretariat and reports by other international organizations]][The scale of resources provided by developed country Parties shall be based on a percentage of their GNP of at least (X per cent) taking into consideration the following][Climate finance provided by developed country Parties shall be based on a quantified target taking into consideration the following]: {chapeau of para 89 and a. SCT}
a. Based on an ex ante process to [commit][identify] quantified support [relative to][commensurate with] the required effort [reflected in the adaptation and mitigation goals] and in line with the needs of [developing countries][Parties not included in annex X]; {para 89 b. SCT}
b. [Based on clear burden-sharing arrangements among [developed country Parties][Annex II Parties][Parties included in annex Y] …{para 89 d. SCT}
c. Based on a [clear] road map with individual annual commitments for public funding [from developed country Parties] in the post-2020 period [or][and trajectory and] pathways with annual expected levels of climate finance [towards][for] achieving short-term quantified goals; {para 89 f. SCT}
d. [Based on an agreed percentage formula for the calculation of the contributions of [[Annex I Parties] [Parties included in annex X] and differentiated [developing country][Parties not included in annex X]] [Parties in a position to do so considering evolving capabilities] [all countries in a position to do so] on the basis of GDP or other indicators];] {para 89 h. SCT}
e. [Including aggregate and enhanced [specific] [individual] [commitments] [contributions] by [developed country Parties][[Annex II Parties][Parties included in annex Y], complemented by other Parties in a position to do so] [Parties in a position to do so, considering evolving capabilities] [all countries in a position to do so];] {para 89 e. SCT}
f. [A short-term collective quantified goal [of USD 200 billion per year by 2030 should be committed to by developed country Parties], [which][that] defines [how] the expected, scaled-up climate finance level for the post-2020 period [shall][should] be determined in order to enhance the predictability of the provision of climate finance, indicating specific levels of funding from public sources to be provided[; this goal shall be regularly reviewed, and updated.]] {para 89 g. SCT}
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Option 2: Agreement not to specify [individual][quantified] commitments, quantified targets or specific indicators for the post-2020 period.] {para 89 opt 2 SCT}
Element 8: Upholding commitments
A ‘strong’ agreement is, by definition, one that provides for commitments to be
enforced; a ‘soft’ agreement one, which does not. It is the prospect of enforcement,
as much as enforcement itself, which tends to lead to compliance. In the context of
the agreement, any provisions on enforcement should go hand in hand with
mechanisms for revising national commitments.
A combination of nationally determined commitments with strong enforcement
would be a disincentive to ambition: if you know you will suffer adverse
consequences for failing to meet your targets, you are likely to set those targets low.
In other words traditional enforcement measures should only be introduced in
conjunction with mechanisms for adjusting Party commitments.
A virtuous circle might be created through providing for the enforceability of
developing country commitments only in the event of receipt of adequate funding.
Donors would be more willing to provide funding knowing that it would deliver
enforceable commitments; beneficiaries would only assume binding responsibilities
in the event that suitable funding materialized.
A soft agreement might still include measures to encourage Parties to uphold their
commitments. Significant diplomatic and public pressure might arise from a regime
casting a spotlight on Parties’ performance. Compliance with reduction
commitments might also be used as a criterion for adjusting indicative financial
contributions (and vice versa).
Proposed text:
PW 1, Para. 193: The governing body shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this agreement, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences,
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taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance, building on experience under the Convention and its instruments …
Para. 194: The list of consequences may include, in the case of developed countries, risk of exposure to legal liability for loss and damage attributable to climate change in accordance with a scheme to be developed by …. The conditional commitments of developing countries shall only be enforceable in the event that the requisite funding is provided within the relevant time-frame.
Para. 195: The Parties shall appoint an enforcement panel consisting of [X number of] members, each of whose nomination is agreed by [Y number of] Parties.
Para. 196: All Parties agree to be bound by the rulings of the enforcement panel.
PW 3, Para. 193: The governing body shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to facilitate compliance with the provisions of this agreement, including through the establishment of a Compliance Committee to review and report on the performance of Parties in relation to their commitments.
NT, section K deals with ‘Facilitating implementation and compliance’.
Option I would establish a regime broadly applicable to all parties. Sub-options
include para. 193, Option 2:
The governing body shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this agreement, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance, building on experience under the Convention and its instruments …
Option II, III and V would establish a split regime in which only the commitments of
developed (or Annex 1 and 2) countries would be strictly enforced.
Options IV and VI dispense with an enforcement regime entirely.
CCT P1 proposes three options for enforcement, at para. 42:
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I[The governing body shall[, at its first session,] approve and adopt appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to [promote compliance]
II Implementation shall be strengthened through enhanced transparency
III [No specific provisions required.] {Opt VI SCT}
CCT P3, para 97, proposes two main options for compliance: either a compliance
committee or a Climate Justice Tribunal. In both cases different remits are proposed
for developed and developing countries.
Element 9: Commitment to carbon pricing
The 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York delivered the following ‘action statement’:
Global momentum is building for putting a price on carbon emissions as a necessary and effective measure to tackle the climate change challenge. Approximately 40 countries and more than 20 cities, states and provinces use carbon pricing mechanisms or are preparing to implement them. A growing number of business leaders are standing up in support of a price on carbon as an effective way to incentivize low-carbon growth and lower greenhouse gas emissions that are driving climate change.19
The World Bank has described carbon pricing as ‘inevitable’ for effective mitigation:
The latest report from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change makes clear the importance of putting a price on carbon to help limit the increase in global mean temperature to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels …
The momentum is growing. Pricing carbon is inevitable if we are to produce a package of effective and cost-efficient policies to support scaled up mitigation.20
The IMF recently calculated that fossil fuels benefit from subsidies of $5.3 tn a year,
or $10m a minute, half of which derives from the polluters not paying the costs of
health damage from air pollution21.
19 http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/09/FINANCING-CARBON-PRICING-Caring-for-Climate-Carbon-Pricing.pdf20 http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Carbon-Pricing-Statement-060314.pdf21 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf
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The emerging international consensus on the imperative to price the social costs of
GHGs should constitute an essential element of the agreement.
Further, carbon pricing offers a potential mechanism for Parties to generate funding
for the Green Climate Fund.
Proposed text:
Para. 113:
Option A:
(1) The Parties agree to establish a technical committee to identify an appropriate mechanism for making sure the price of carbon reflects its social cost, and for raising revenue towards investment in clean energy.
(2) In the absence of a consensus to the contrary the Parties agree to be bound by the recommendations of the technical committee.
Option B:
(1) The Parties agree to establish a carbon pricing panel, consisting of [X number of] members, each of whose nomination is agreed by [Y number of Parties]. The carbon pricing panel shall identify appropriate mechanisms for making sure the price of carbon reflects its social cost, and for raising revenue towards investment in clean energy.
(2) In the absence of a consensus to the contrary, the Parties agree to be bound by the recommendations of the carbon pricing panel.
NT contains a number of relevant provisions in Part F (‘Finance’):
Para. 81,1 Option 2:
Parties [are encouraged to mobilize climate finance from a variety of sources …
Encourage policy signals by governments / catalyze policy actions by governments and adjustment or improvement of policies (81.1.b)
Targets the drivers of climate change (81.1.k)
Para. 102:
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[Parties to reduce international support for high-carbon investments, including international fossil fuel subsidies.]
Para. 105, Option 1, d:
The provision of a price signal for emission reductions, including through payments for verified emission reductions.
Para. 106.2:
The use of levies for adaptation funding from any market-based mechanisms
Para. 106.5, Option (a)b:
Encourage the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization to develop a levy scheme to provide financial support for the Adaptation Fund.
And most specifically, para 113 bis:
a. All Parties to commit to cooperate in leveraging private finance and/or to mobilize / utilize public funds and means to facilitate and encourage private investment in accordance with their capabilities, recognizing that private-sector financing is complementary to, but not a substitute for, public-sector financing where public finance is needed …
b. A tax on oil exports from [developing][Parties not included in annex X] to [developed countries][Parties included in annex X][Parties in a position to do so, considering evolving capabilities][all countries in a position to do so] to be established;
c. An international renewable energy and energy efficiency bond facility to be established;
d. The phasing down of high-carbon investments and fossil fuel subsidies.]
CCT P3 proposes at para 52(a):
[Parties [are encouraged] to [take steps to] [reduce][eliminate] [international support][public incentives] [for][phase down] high-carbon investments[, [including][and] international fossil fuel subsidies];] {paras 102, 103 and 113 bis d. SCT}
Element 10 (PW 2 only): incorporation of ratcheting up measures.
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In the event the COP21 agreement commences on the basis of voluntary
commitments, and it subsequently emerges that these are insufficient to deliver on
the Convention’s objectives, an internal mechanism for introducing additional
measures would be more economic that renegotiating the agreement as a whole.
Given the highest of stakes, it seems prudent to incorporate a ‘Plan B’.
Proposed text:
Option 1 (Pathway 2A), Para. 202: From 2025 this agreement shall be amended as follows:
In para. 114(5) the word ‘require’ will replace ‘recommend’;
In para. 114(6) the word ‘determination’ will replace ‘indication’;
Para 178 shall be revised to read ….[ie PW 1 text]
And Para 193 shall be replaced with the following … [ie PW1 text].
Option 2 (Pathway 2B), Para. 202: This paragraph shall take effect only pursuant to a decision under paragraph 26 above:
In para. 114(5) the word ‘require’ will replace ‘recommend’;
In para. 114(6) the word ‘determination’ will replace ‘indication’;
Para 178 shall be revised to read ….[ie PW 1 text]
And Para 193 shall be replaced with the following … [ie PW1 text].
Why mitigation and carbon pricing measures are key to effective adaptation
There are three reasons for focussing on the essential proposals for aligning emission
reductions to the long-term goal:
(i) Logically, in the context of a comprehensive international regime,
they are key to all other measures, including funding and adaptation.
An agreed emissions pathway provides the basis for assessing the
adequacy of aggregate INDCs; and hence understanding of
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requirements for financial assistance. The adaptation measures
necessary for 4 degree warming are different from those required for
2 degrees; and the decisions with respect to mitigation today,
determine the climate change risks for the second half of the century.
(ii) A clear approach to mitigation and carbon pricing would incentivise
and generate funding for mitigation, adaptation and other measures.
(iii) An ambitious, legally binding and enforceable agreement on
emissions, in combination with measures on carbon pricing, is key to
sending a clear and strong signal to the markets, steering essential
capital towards investment in clean energy.
Conclusion
The Parties to UNFCCC have been meeting for more than 20 years. With just 5
months till COP21 they are yet to agree the foundational principles for an
agreement.
With so much at stake there is a risk the scale of the challenge becomes
overwhelming; a risk that can be managed with structure and focus. The emphasis
should be on laying the foundations for future cooperation. If nothing else is
accomplished in Paris, an agreement, which effectively aligns aggregate emission
reductions to the long-term goal; which generates reliable and substantial funding to
support developing Parties in planning and implementing appropriate mitigation and
adaptation plans; and, which imposes some form of carbon pricing, could be
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regarded as a success. It would provide the platform for future resolution of other
inter-dependent matters.
It should be relatively easy to agree the long term-goal (aiming for 1.5 degrees, with
2 degrees as the limit). The IPCC has outlined a ‘carbon budget’ consistent with that
goal. The real challenge is to agree how the burden of emissions should be shared
between Parties given the vast differences in resources and circumstances.
The historic UNFCCC approach of separating the Parties into fixed bands overlooks
the graduation between parties across a range of variables. It causes unfairness and
antagonism. Fixed bands should be supplemented with indicative sliding scales of
need and commitment, promoting equity and flexibility.
If opposition to such a change is most likely to come from developing country
Parties, then the quid pro quo should come in the form of reliable and substantial
financial commitments from developed countries. Conditional commitments would
only be binding if the requisite funding materialised in good time, incentivising donor
generosity and beneficiary efficiency.
From the point of view of donor countries, carbon pricing may prove a key
mechanism for generating the necessary funding.
At this stage the prospects of the Parties entering into a ‘strong’ agreement,
containing effective mechanisms, including a sanctions regime, for aligning emission
reduction and financial commitments to the long-term goal, appear remote. That
being the case they should be realistic about the prospects of a ‘soft’ agreement, and
address the question, ‘What happens if it doesn’t work?’ To avoid finding themselves
in a situation demanding the negotiation of a whole new instrument, the Paris
agreement should contain provision for a ratcheting up of measures (not just
commitments) should the initial approach prove inadequate to meet the
Convention’s ultimate objective.
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Once such steps are taken the task of agreeing mechanisms to align INDCs with long-
terms goal becomes manageable and the prospects for a successful outcome, which
applies the break to runaway climate change and ocean acidification, turn brighter.
Annex 1: Background Q & A
Aren’t ‘the facts’ of climate change open to question?
Inevitably experts approach climate change from a variety of political perspectives
and differ on points of details. As evidenced by the reports of the IPCC, however, in
relation to the following key conclusions there exists a broad scientific consensus:
Global warming greater than 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius risks
irreversible damage to human and natural systems;
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We are currently on track for warming in the region of 4 degrees
Celsius before the end of the century;
Averting potentially catastrophic climate change requires urgent,
coordinated political action.
There are two main factors contributing to the illusion of doubt.
First, discussion of climate change has been politicized. Some argue it demonstrates
fundamental failings in the political system, a view, which provokes a mainstream
political and media backlash. Climate change becomes associated with a contentious
combination of ‘green’ positions (such as challenge to the goal of economic growth
and opposition to nuclear energy and genetically modified food). Public opinion is
divided, eroding the mandate for determined action.
Second, there is the immense lobbying and advertising power of the fossil fuel
industry, which muddies the waters and finds ingenious ways to market itself as
‘green’.
If the second factor is inevitable, the first is unfortunate. The consequences of GHG
emissions (both global warming and the acidification of the ocean) present
challenges which are fundamentally technical in nature, similar in kind to the threat
to the ozone layer from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The 1987 Montreal Protocol22,
succeeded in phasing out CFC production, averting fatal damage to the ozone layer.
The threats from GHGs are capable of being addressed through a similar process.
Climate change, as an issue, must be separated from broader, more intractable
political debates. All those who recognize the need for urgent, coordinated political
action should strike for the center ground.
What is the connection between climate change and ocean acidification?
Ocean acidification is a phenomenon distinct from global warming, sometimes
referred to as ‘the other carbon dioxide problem’, or, more colorfully, as ‘global
warming’s evil twin’. The ocean currently absorbs about half of the CO2 emissions 22 i.e. to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
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from burning fossil fuels, limiting the impact on global warming, but increasing ocean
acidity. Seawater is depleted of the carbonate minerals that many sea creatures,
from corals to plankton, use to build their shells or skeletons. This undermines the
base of the ocean food chain, threatening the health and prosperity of all those who
depend on the sea for sustenance and income.
IAP, the global network of science academies, issued a statement on ocean
acidification in 2009, with the following headline messages:
At current emission rates models suggest that all coral reefs and polar ecosystems will be severely affected by 2050 or potentially even earlier;
Marine food supplies are likely to be reduced with significant implications for food production and security in regions dependent on fish protein, and human health and wellbeing;
Ocean acidification is irreversible on timescales of at least tens of thousands of years;
Even with stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm, ocean acidification will have profound impacts on many marine systems. Large and rapid reductions of global CO2 emissions are needed globally by at least 50% by 2050.23
Although different problems, global warming and ocean acidification have a common
cause: anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
What changes have occurred to date?
Climate change
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea
level has risen. Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer than
any preceding decade since 1850. Over the period 1880 to 2012, the planet, as a
whole, has warmed by 0.85 degrees Celsius24.
23 http://www.interacademies.net/10878/13951.aspx24 See AR5, SPM, 1.1
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Currently GHG concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere are higher than at any point
in at least the last 800,000 years25; and rising fast.
Ocean acidification
The pH of ocean surface water has decreased by 0.1, corresponding to a 26%
increase in acidity26. This is probably more acidic than at any point in the last 20
million years27.
What is causing the changes?
Climate change
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere absorb and retain energy from the sun.
As their presence increases so the planet warms up (and vice versa). GHGs have
determined the fate of the other rocky planets in the solar system. Venus is too hot
for life, having suffered a runaway greenhouse effect: its oceans boiled away and
most of its carbon ended up in the planet’s atmosphere as a blanket of carbon
dioxide. Its mean surface temperature is now 462 degrees Celsius. The reverse
happened on Mars, which began life warm and wet with abundant water before its
carbon dioxide became trapped in carbonate rocks28. Its mean surface temperature
is now -63 degrees Celsius.
AR5 attributes the rise in concentrations of GHGs to ‘anthropogenic … emissions
since the pre-industrial era.’29
Ocean acidification
When CO2 is absorbed in water, carbonic acid is formed, which then dissociates into
hydrogen ions, increasing ocean acidity.
25 ibid. 1.226 ibid.27 C. Pelejero et al, 2010, ‘Paleo-perspectives on ocean acidification’, Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 25,6, 332-428 Such carbonates were conclusively identified by the Mars Spirit Rover. See R Morris et al., 2010: ‘Identification of Carbonate-Rich Outcrops on Mars by the Spirit Rover’, Science, 23 July 2010, vol 329, no 5990, pp. 421-429 AR5, SPM1.2
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What impacts have there been to date?
Climate change
AR5 SR 1.3.2 and 1.4 provides a summary of current impacts. Below are some
excerpts:
In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human
systems on all continents and across the oceans.
In many regions changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering
hydrological systems, affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality
(medium confidence).
Glaciers continue to shrink almost worldwide due to climate change (high
confidence), affecting runoff and water resources downstream (medium
confidence).
Increases in the frequency or intensity of ecosystem disturbances such as
droughts, windstorms, fires and pest outbreaks have been detected in many parts
of the world and in some cases are attributed to climate change (medium
confidence).
Oxygen minimum zones are progressively expanding in the tropical Pacific, Atlantic
and Indian Oceans, due to reduced ventilation and O2 solubility in warmer, more
stratified oceans and are constraining fish habitat (medium confidence).
Since AR4, several periods of rapid food and cereal price increases following
climate extremes in key producing regions indicate a sensitivity of current markets
to climate extremes among other factors (medium confidence).
It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe,
Asia and Australia. It is very likely that human influence has contributed to the
observed global scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature
extremes since the mid-20th century. It is likely that human influence has more
than doubled the probability of occurrence of heat waves in some locations.
It is likely that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm surges)
have increased since 1970, being mainly the result of mean sea level rise.
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Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts,
floods, cyclones and wildfires, reveal significant vulnerability and exposure of
some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability (very
high confidence). Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of
ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, damage to
infrastructure and settlements, human morbidity and mortality and consequences
for mental health and human wellbeing. For countries at all levels of development,
these impacts are consistent with a significant lack of preparedness for current
climate variability in some sectors.
Recent research offers more specific examples. On May 9, 2015, The Economist
reported on work at Oxford University demonstrating the relationship between
climate change and particular extreme weather events. One example given is the
Australian heat wave of 2013 (‘the angry summer’), described as ‘virtually
impossible’ without climate change. The article concludes:
Worryingly, the risk of an extreme event seems to rise exponentially as mean
temperatures creep up. The probability of a heat extreme is twice as great at 2°C
of warming than at 1.5°C.
Research from Columbia University illustrates how climate change acts as a ‘threat
multiplier’, for example in relation to matters of national and international security.
Drying and drought in Syria from 2006 to 2011—the worst on record — had a
devastating impact on agriculture, causing many farming families to migrate to the
cities. This influx, the researchers conclude, added to existing social stresses
(including refugees from Iraq), which erupted into civil war30.
The international security consequences of climate change have recently been
considered in a report of the US Department of Defence31:
The National Security Strategy, issued in February 2015, is clear that climate change is an
urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural
30 Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought, PNAS vol.112, no. 11, Colin P. Kelley et al., 3241–3246, doi:10.1073/pnas.1421533112
31 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/150724-Congressional-Report-on-National-Implications-of-Climate-Change.pdf
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disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water.1 These
impacts are already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are
projected to increase over time.
Ocean acidification
The interaction of different stressors (such as global warming, ocean acidification
and reduced levels of oxygen) makes it difficult to attribute specific observed
consequences to ocean acidification. However, coral reefs, probably the world’s
most important oceanic habitat, are already in decline almost everywhere, with as
much as 27% having already been lost32.
What is the projection for future change?
Climate change
The UN projects that global population will reach 9.2 billion by 2050; while the OECD
predicts that the global GDP will quadruple by the same date33. Population and
economic growth mean increasing energy consumption and will, without corrective
action, drive levels of emissions ever higher.
AR5 concludes that, without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond
those in place today, by 2100 the average global temperature will have increased by
3.7 to 4.8 degrees Celsius compared to the period 1850-1900. When natural climate
uncertainty is factored in the range expands to 2.5 to 7.8 degrees Celsius34. The
actual emissions scenario that will be realised is, of course, a product of our own
decisions.
Ocean acidification
32 http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Coral/33 http://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-outlooks/oecdenvironmentaloutlookto2050theconsequencesofinaction-keyfactsandfigures.htm34 AR, SPM, 3.4
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Ocean acidification is projected to rise by 100-150% by 210035.
What happens if actual emissions follow a high emissions scenario?
Climate change
It’s impossible to say with certainty - we have no experience of such temperatures. A
planet 4 degrees warmer would be hotter than at any time since the Miocene era
some 25 million years ago (modern humans have only been around for about
200,000 years). Towards the upper end of the range the implications are surely dire.
Paleoclimatology and scientific modelling provide the basis for more detailed
projections. Mark Lynas, a journalist and Research Associate at Oxford University’s
Centre for the Environment, summarised the scientific research in his book, ‘Six
Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet’. The following projections derive from his
work.
2.0 degrees
Two degrees may not sound like much, but it is enough to make most
European summers as hot as 2003, when 30,000 people died from
heatstroke. Extreme summers will be hotter still. Water shortages will
be aggravated as the southern Mediterranean loses a fifth of its
rainfall.
Two degrees is also enough to cause the collapse of the Greenland ice
sheet, which would eventually raise global sea levels by seven meters
(much of the ice-cap disappeared 125,000 years ago, when global
temperatures were 1-2 C higher than now).
This melting will also continue to affect the world's mountain ranges.
In Peru all the glaciers will disappear from the Andean peaks that
currently supply Lima with water. In California, the loss of snowpack
from the Sierra Nevada - three-quarters of which could disappear in
35 AR4. 10.4.2
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the two-degree world - will leave cities such as Los Angeles
increasingly thirsty during the summer. Global food supplies,
especially in the tropics, will also be affected but while two degrees of
warming will be survivable for most humans, a third of all species
alive today may be driven to extinction as climate change wipes out
their habitat.
3 degrees
3 degrees Celsius may be the "tipping point" where global warming
veers out of control, leaving us powerless to intervene as planetary
temperatures soar. Computer model projections show worsening
droughts making Amazonian trees, which have no evolved resistance
to fire, much more susceptible to burning. Once this drying trend
passes a critical threshold, any spark could light a firestorm. And once
the trees have gone, desert will take its place. The carbon released by
the forests' burning will be supplemented by more from the world's
soils. This could boost global temperatures by a further 1.5ºC - tipping
us straight into the four-degree world.
Three degrees alone would see increasing areas of the planet being
rendered uninhabitable by drought and heat. In southern Africa, a
huge expanse centered on Botswana could see a remobilization of old
sand dunes, much as is projected to happen earlier in the US west.
This would wipe out agriculture and drive tens of millions of climate
refugees out of the area. The same situation could also occur in
Australia, where most of the continent will fall outside the belts of
regular rainfall.
In northern Europe and the UK, summer drought will alternate with
extreme winter flooding as torrential rainstorms sweep in from the
Atlantic - perhaps bringing storm surge flooding to vulnerable low-
lying coastlines as sea levels continue to rise. Those areas still able to
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grow crops and feed themselves may find they are besieged by
millions of climate refugees from the south.
4 degrees
When the Earth was last 4 degrees warmer, approximately 25 million
years ago, there was no ice at either pole. Global warming of this
magnitude would eventually leave the whole planet without ice for
the first time in 40 million years, leading to sea rises of 50 to 70
meters.
Collapse would not happen instantaneously – it would take centuries,
probably millennia, to melt all of the Antarctica’s ice. But the
destabilization of both Antarctic ice sheets could yield sea-level rises
of a meter or so every 20 years – far outside the adaptation capacity
for many countries and peoples (resulting in large-scale migrations
and international conflict).
Australia – except perhaps the extreme north and Tasmania – will be
unable to support significant crop production because of heat-waves
and declining rainfall.
In India, with land temperatures soaring to 5 degrees or more above
current levels, it will be too hot for most crops to survive. In western
areas of the subcontinent, already arid areas get drier still,
compounding the water emergency arising from the de-glaciation of
the Himalaya and Karakoram mountain chains, forcing a human
migration of hundreds of millions in search of food and water.
The world’s weather will grow increasingly haywire.
5 degrees
With five degrees of global warming, an entirely new planet would
come into being – one largely unrecognizable from the Earth we know
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today. The remaining ice sheets would eventually be eliminated from
both poles. Rainforests have already burned up and disappeared.
Rising sea levels have inundated coastal cities and are beginning to
penetrate far inland into continental interiors. Humans will be herded
into shrinking zones of habitability by the twin crises of drought and
flood.
To find out what the planet would look like with five degrees of
warming, one must largely abandon the models and venture far back
into geological time, to the beginning of a period known as the
Eocene. Fossils of sub-tropical species such as crocodiles and turtles
have all been found in the Canadian high Arctic dating from the early
Eocene, 55 million years ago, when the Earth experienced a sudden
and dramatic global warming. These fossils even show that breadfruit
trees were growing on the coast of Greenland, while the Arctic Ocean
saw water temperatures of 20C within 200km of the North Pole itself.
There was no ice at either pole; forests were probably growing in
central Antarctica.
The IPCC projections are expressed in less graphic but consistent terms:
‘Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development.’[2.3]
‘Climate change is projected to undermine food security. Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence).’[2.3.1, 2.3.2]
‘Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying competition for water among sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement).’[2.3.1, 2.3.2]
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‘Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence).’[2.3.2]
‘In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scar- city, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas.’[2.3.2]
‘Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement).’[2.3.2]
‘Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence).’[2.3.2]
‘Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). In most scenarios without additional mitigation efforts ... warming is more likely than not to exceed 4 degrees C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.’[2.3]
Ocean acidification
Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and
magnitudes of ocean acidification, with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean
temperature extremes. Coral reefs and polar systems are particularly vulnerable36.
Will tackling emissions undermine economic growth?
36 AR5, SPM 2.3
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Our economies remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Drastic emission cuts, like
any process of significant change, is likely to be painful in a variety of ways. This has
led some to view economic growth and climate change as conflicting policy drivers.
In fact the opposite appears to be true.
As set out above, AR5 tells us that without additional measures to limit GHGs we are
heading for warming of between 2.5 and 7.8 degrees by 2100. Even at the mid-point
of this range (about 5 degrees) the consequences are likely to be so severe as to be
inconsistent with continuing economic growth at any level. On this crude
assessment, the drastic reduction of emissions is the only path available to
sustainable growth.
The conclusion is supported by more sophisticated economic analysis.
In 2005, Gordon Brown, then the UK Chancellor, commissioned Nicholas Stern,
previously chief economist at the World Bank, to prepare a report on the economics
of climate change. The report37 concluded that unchecked climate change would
entail a loss of consumption of between 5% and 20% by 2050; whereas the costs of
tackling climate change would be only 1 %.
If the Stern report proved highly controversial, AR5 likewise concludes that the
transition to clean energy will support continuing high levels of economic growth.
According to AR5, baselines scenarios for growth in global consumption over the
century, ignoring climate change, range from 300% to 900%. Mitigation scenarios
likely to limit warming to 2 degrees reduce this by only a small fraction – 3% to 11%.
In other words global consumption by 2100 might have grown by 297% instead of a
baseline projection of 300%; or 889% instead of a projection of 900%.38
Reference to ‘reduced’ growth, does not, of course imply that growth would in fact
be greater without the transition. The marginal ‘reduction’ is in relation to an
37 See at http://www.wwf.se/source.php/1169157/Stern%20Report_Exec%20Summary.pdf38 See AR5, SR, 3.4
67
economic model for a world without climate change – i.e. a world contrary to reality.
AR5 states ominously that:
Very little is known about the economic cost of warming above 3 degrees C
relative to the current temperature level.39
Such scientific circumspection masks the obvious: any predictions of economic
growth in the context of average global warming towards the top of the 2.5 to 7.8
degree range risk absurdity. The lower projection of 297% global growth by 2100
(assuming action necessary to limit warming to 2 degrees and the most pessimistic
assumption for growth) would, in all probability, represent growth vastly in excess of
the alternative of inaction.
Can the market support a transition to clean energy?
In economics an externality is a cost or benefit that affects a party that has not
chosen to incur that cost or benefit. Unregulated markets with significant
externalities lead to prices that do not reflect the full social cost or benefit of their
transactions and are therefore inefficient.
It has been estimated that for each of the 35 billion tonnes of CO2 currently being
emitted annually is causing $40 worth of damage to the planet, possibly much
more40. The market might be corrected by ensuring such costs were reflected in the
price of fossil fuels.
Unfortunately the opposite is happening: the IMF has recently calculated that global
fossil fuel subsidies amount to $5.3 trillion a year (or $10 million a minute)41.
39 AR5, SR, Box 3.140 Wagner and Weitzman, Climate Shock – The Economic Consequences of a Hotter Planet, Ch 1, p. 23. For uncertainties regarding the social costs of carbon see AR5, WG3, 3.9.4, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter3.pdf41 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf
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With appropriate incentives and disincentives the market would instead be working
to support the transition.
How should resource be divided between ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’?
‘Mitigation’ (reducing the problem) refers to actions to prevent or limit climate
change (eg by controlling emissions or preserving and developing carbon sinks).
Adaptation (adapting to the consequences) is aimed at attempting to make nature,
society and the economy less vulnerable to a changing climate (eg the construction
of flood defences or the relocation of populations).
There can be no general formula for dividing resource between the two. For some
countries (such as low lying island states) adaptation may be an immediate priority.
More generally, however, effective adaptation plans depend on accurate projections
for warming and its consequences. A credible mitigation strategy, focussed on
keeping temperature rises below an agreed limit, provides the basis for adaptation
planning: the greater the success of mitigation efforts, the less the requirement for
adaptation.
Does geo-engineering present an alternative to cutting emissions?
Geo-engineering has been defined as ‘the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the
planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change’42. If the idea is
not immediately attractive, the prospect of increasing climate change demands
serious consideration of all conceivable mitigations.
A leading proposal is to inject sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere where it could
reflect the sun’s radiation, without causing air pollution.
There are, unsurprisingly, a number of concerns about such approaches. AR5
concludes:
42 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, governance and uncertainty, London, 2009, p.1
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Solar radiation management (SRM) involves large-scale methods that seek
to reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system. SRM
is untested and is not included in any of the mitigation scenarios. If it were
deployed, SRM would entail numerous uncertainties, side effects, risks and
shortcomings and has particular governance and ethical implications. SRM
would not reduce ocean acidification. If it were terminated there is high
confidence that surface temperatures would rise very rapidly impacting
ecosystems susceptible to rapid rates of change.43
More specifically scientific modelling suggesting sulphur dioxide injections would
disrupt the Asian and African monsoons.
43 AR5, SPM 3.4
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