Copyright Robert Thibadeau, Worshop on Trust Infrastructures, 11-2001 1 Welcome. Workshop on Trust Infrastructures Robert Thibadeau School of Computer

Copyright Robert Thibadeau, Worshop on Trust Infrastructures, 11-2001 1

Welcome. Workshop on Trust Infrastructures

Robert Thibadeau

School of Computer Science

Carnegie Mellon University

[email protected]




BADTRANS B (new version, Nov 24, 2001, first report) If the .scr or .pif attachment is opened, the worm displays a message box entitled, "Install error" which reads, "File data corrupt: probably due to a bad data transmission or bad disk access." A copy is saved into the WINDOWS directory as INETD.EXE and an entry is entered into the WIN.INI file to run INETD.EXE at startup. KERN32.EXE (a backdoor Trojan), and HKSDLL.DLL (a valid keylogger DLL) are written to the WINDOWS SYSTEM directory, and a registry entry is created to load the Trojan upon system startup. HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\kernel32=kern32.exe

Once running, the Trojan attempts to mail the victim's IP Address to the author. Once this information is obtained, the author can connect to the infected system via the Internet and steal personal information such as usernames, and passwords. In addition, the Trojan also contains a keylogger program which is capable of capturing other vital information such as credit card and bank account numbers and passwords. … main problem reports are coming from home users…


First two Workshops in a Series..

.. of Workshops in response to the need for better industry, government, and academic communication with regard to critical issues in planning and deployment of systems of trust.

…could we have averted the security disasters of cable modems and dsl?

The workshops are educational and it’s our intent to have the key participants shape them.

More than one or two? Too many issues. First is overview of all trust infrastructures, second is first focused on one subset: National ID Cards.


“CMU Security Workshop Series”

• Security? Shamos: Any security problem where a computer is involved…

• Any trust problem where a computer is involved …

• Educational : We Look at Deployable Solutions and Identify the Hard Problems

• Results: Better products, better service, better standards, better research

• Goal: Products, services, standards, and research that greatly improve computer-related trust – fulfilling an educational role


Method

• First Part: Review Deployable Solutions and some Interesting new Research

• Keep Notes on Hard Problems that seem to be revealed : HANDOUTS!

• Plenary and/or Breakout on what participants identify as the Hard Problems and discussion on How these can be Addressed.


Program Agenda 8:30am Introduction to the CMU Workshop Series Dr. Robert Thibadeau, 9:00am Keynote, The View from the Front Lines Simon Perry, Senior VP Security, Computer

Associates10:00 Platform Security: Securing Applications with Firmware Dr. Robert Baldwin, Principal

Security Architect, Phoenix Technologies10:15 Platform Security, Intel Protected Access Architecture Luke Girard, Principal IPAA

Architect, Intel10:30 Coffee break 10:45 User Authentication Katherine Hollis, Director, Global Information Assurance, EDS11:00 Platform Security David Grawrock, Senior TCPA Architect, Intel11:15 O/S Security John Doyle, Director Business Development, Harris Corporation11:30 Platform Security Dr. Len Veil, CTO, Wave Systems12:00pm Policy Control Tommy Wang, CEO, Interlytics12:15 Intelligent Firewall Technology James Joyce, CEO, TechGuard Security12:30 Risk Management Shawn Butler, Ph.D Student, CMU12:45 Lunch 1:45 Two sides to the story Dr. Geoffrey Strongin, Principal Security Architect, AMD2:00 Trust Structure Interplay Allen, Executive VP, Wave Systems2:30 Hard Problems Agenda3:00 Agenda Breakouts4:30 Break 4:45 – 5:30 Next Steps, Robert Thibadeau, Carnegie Mellon, John Bourgein, IMA6:30 Cocktails & Dinner, Wyndam Hotel Sponsored by AMS and Intelytics


Today and Tomorrow Workshop Team

John Bourgein – Chief Cook and Bottle WasherRobert Thibadeau – Trust Infrastructure Guru

Mike Shamos – National ID Card Guru

SponsorsSchool of Computer Science, CMU

Institute for Software Research International – ISRIRobotics Institute

eCommerce Institute

AMS & Intelytics Dinner at Wyndam

TomorrowWorkshop on National ID Cards

Sponsor : AMS


Workshopon Trust

Infrastructures

Theme : The Interplay of Trust Infrastructures


Trust Infrastructures?

Computers are Complex Systems

Means You Need

More than One SourceOf Trust

Many Trust Infrastructures participate in the Trust Equation


Examples

• Virus Checkers : Central Source of Trust managed by the Virus Checker Company : Target is detecting malicious Applications and Data

• PKI : Authenticating authorized users and programs managed by a hierarchy of trust based on trap door cryptography.

• Domains : Managing access to programs and data across machines as supplied by an OS and a central Domain Controller.


Cataloguing Trust Infrastructure Products, Standards, & Research

(by Target)

• OS (Windows, Linux, BSD…)

• Device (BIOS, CPU, Video/Audio, Storage)

• User (Biometrics, PKI, Smart Cards, Dongles)

• Applications (Virus Checkers, Call/Code Authentication)

• Server (Secure Email, SSL)

• Content (Copy protection, tamper protection, document authentication)

• Network (VPNs, Firewalls, Proxy Servers, Intrusion Detection, Forensics)

• Enterprise (Central Management Consoles, Risk Measurement)

O1 D2 U1 C3 N1A1 S1 E1


Acronym Scrabble Fun

• A SUN CODE– A “trust infrastructure” puts a

single Bright Light on what is otherwise done in darkness

• CAN DO USE– What CAN the trust

infrastructure DO?

– How can we USE it?

DOES AN CU

USE DOC AN

A CODE NEU

A USE COND

A SUN CODE ;-}

CON USE AD

SOD CAN US

CAN DO USE ;-}

COUNSE AD

ANSUCODE

SUNACODE

USA N CODE

O1 D2 U1 C3 N1A1 S1 E1


Cataloguing Trust SolutionsA SUN CODE

(by target)

Applications – Virus Check, Call/Code Authentication

Server – SSL, Email security

User – Smart Cards, PKI

Network – TCP/IP, VPNs, IPSec, Forensics

Content – Copy/Tamper/Authentication Protect

Operating System – Application Environment

Device – BIOS, Keyboard, Video, Storage, DA

Enterprise – Central Management, Risk


Today’s Workshop Agenda

• What are the Trust Infrastructures?– Let’s listen to some of those that are new but deployable

today.

• What are the Hard Problems?– Where do we need additional sources of trust, but don’t

really know yet how to supply them?

– E.g. Hard Problems

» Personal Privacy

» Enterprise Risk Assessment

» Open Trust: One source of trust relying on another source of trust


Cataloguing Trust SolutionsCAN DO USE

Content – Copy/Tamper/Authentication Protection

Application – Virus Check, Call/Code Authentication

Network – VPNs, Forensics

Device – BIOS, Keyboard, Video, Storage

Operating System – Application Environment

User – Smart Cards, PKI

Server – SSL, Email security

Enterprise – Central Management, Risk

What CAN the trust infrastructure DO?

How can we USE it?What doesn’t the trust

infrastructure do?What can we do about it?


Virus Checkers• Hard Problem : Post-Hoc : Work only after

bad agents are discovered• What can we do? Maybe a trust infrastructure

like intrusion detectors – that can predict new intrusion patterns from existing virus databases? BadTrans is a conventional Spy.

• Hard Problem : Why can’t I just modify the virus checker to delete real code and to avoid my trojan horses?

• What can we do? Maybe a trust infrastructure that constantly, and with certainty, authenticates the virus checker.


Today

• Jot down hard problems and we’ll examine them in the afternoon.

• THEME : Interplay of Trust Infrastructures

• CD of Powerpoint and Digital Videos Documenting Workshop

• White Paper Summarizing Presentations and Results (Thibadeau)


Let’s Begin

Simon Perry

VP Security

Computer Associates

Documents

Copyright Robert Thibadeau, Worshop on Trust Infrastructures, 11-2001 1 Welcome. Workshop on Trust Infrastructures Robert Thibadeau School of Computer