COSMOPOLITANISM VERSUS SKEPTICISM: CRITICAL NOTICE OF GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT, OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009

COSMOPOLITANISM VERSUS SKEPTICISM: CRITICALNOTICE OF GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE:A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT, OXFORD: OXFORDUNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009

CHARLES JONES

University of Western Ontario

1. Introduction

What does Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account set out to do? In short, I thinkthere are four tasks: it outlines a cosmopolitan model of global justice, situatesthe model among opposing views such as John Rawls’ Law of Peoples and DavidMiller’s nationalism, advances positions on some global public policy issues,and directly responds to those who reject cosmopolitanism as either impracti-cal, illegitimate, or both.

This book is an innovative contribution to the ongoing debates amongpolitical philosophers on the question of global distributive justice. Brockaddresses many of the most significant figures in the field—Rawls, Barry, Beitz,Pogge, Held, Kymlicka, Nussbaum, and David Miller—but also discussesothers—Kapstein, Doyal, Anderson, Stiglitz and Charlton, and Keohane—whose work is relevant to the topic but is not often considered alongside the firstgroup. Brock’s book is organized in an original way. Its treatment of publicpolicy issues—global poverty and taxation, basic liberties, humanitarian inter-vention, immigration, and the global economic order—is inserted in betweengeneral discussions of global political theory. The aim is to enable theoreticaland policy discussions to inform each other. One of my tasks, therefore, will beto ask whether this aim is achieved. Brock attempts to link the two conversa-tions in chapter 11, for example, where the case of international recruiting ofhealth-care workers provides the backdrop for an argument about the limitsof priorities to fellow nationals.

This critical notice organizes the discussion into three central topics. I beginby outlining and evaluating Brock’s cosmopolitanism and then address the twoforms of skepticism about cosmopolitan justice identified and rejected byBrock.

2. Brock’s Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism emerges as an attractive theoretical perspective in thecontext of certain global institutional and normative realities. Brock’s startingpoint is contemporary globalization, the familiar process of increasingly globaleconomic, technological, cultural, and informational links beyond borders.Our world is dominated politically by nation-states and economically by tran-snational corporations. Globalization also signifies that goods and people move

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freely within new regional economies and information technologies quickenthe pace of interaction. Beyond states and corporations, the world politicaleconomy includes supranational institutions such as the World Trade Orga-nization associated with a complex interdependence that raises questions fortraditional ideas about state autonomy (p. 9). But our world raises several keyissues of global justice, including the normative questions of resource distribu-tion, human rights, equality of opportunity, and state sovereignty. Brock offersa cosmopolitan account of these issues, guided by a more abstract theoreticalframework. She also broadens the coverage to address the antiglobalizationmovement’s suspicion of cosmopolitan approaches to these issues, includingthe worry that globalized liberal egalitarianism will only shore up global capi-talism (pp. 10–1).

To clarify the role of cosmopolitanism, the first task is to explain what itmeans (pp. 11–3, pp. 315–8). Brock describes three oppositions in the literatureon cosmopolitanism: institutional versus moral, extreme versus moderate, andweak versus strong. First, institutional cosmopolitans support political restruc-turing aimed at creating something approaching a world state, while moralcosmopolitans maintain that “every person has global stature as the ultimateunit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal consideration, nomatter what her citizenship or nationality” (p. 11). The question here is: whatis the relationship, if any, between equal consideration of persons and the scopeof political institutions? Since our global obligations could be met withoutintroducing a global state, moral cosmopolitans need not endorse institutionalcosmopolitanism. Second, extreme cosmopolitans think that justifying ourobligations must proceed by appealing ultimately to cosmopolitan principles,that there is only one set of justice norms, and that these norms apply globally.Moderate cosmopolitans, on the other hand, allow for some morally basic yetnoncosmopolitan principles as well, including special obligations to particularothers. The moderates also accept the possibility of noncosmopolitan norms ofjustice that would cover obligations to associates but not to outsiders (pp. 12–3).The questions here are how may obligations be justified and what is the contentof our obligations of justice? Third, weak cosmopolitans argue that distributivejustice requires the provision of conditions for all persons to lead minimallydecent lives, while strong cosmopolitans favor a more demanding form ofglobal distributive equality. The question here is how much redistribution doesjustice require?

Immediately after making these distinctions, Brock explains why cosmopoli-tanism need not conflict with widespread beliefs in special attachments toparticular groups such as families, friends, and cultural, religious, or nationalcommunities. In this context, she describes the “two central ideas” to whichcosmopolitans are committed: “first, the equal moral worth of all individuals,no matter where they happen to be situated on the planet and what bordersseparate them from one another; second, that there are some obligations thatare binding on all of us, no matter where we are situated” (p. 15). In light of thethree distinctions earlier, Brock wants to defend a cosmopolitan view that ismoral and moderate. Institutions of global governance need to be reformed,but this should stop well short of a world state: for this reason Brock labels her

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cosmopolitanism “quasi-institutional” (p. 316). She finds the “weak–strong”distinction unhelpful because it elides more enlightening contrasts betweenrelational and distributive conceptions of equality: distribution matters, but it isneither the most important issue nor the basic respect in which we should beconcerned with equality. At bottom, she emphasizes a distinction betweencosmopolitans, who aim for equality between individuals, and statists such asJohn Rawls, who favor equality among states or peoples.

Brock’s moderate cosmopolitanism affirms the equal moral worth of allindividuals regardless of location or political affiliation and recognizes dutieswith global scope. One problem raised by this view is that it requires us toidentify as cosmopolitan some theorists, such as David Miller, who explicitlyreject what they identify as core cosmopolitan premisses.1 On the one hand,then, Brock’s description includes as cosmopolitan just about anyone whothinks and writes about global political philosophy; on the other hand, shethereby threatens to divert our attention from some of the more difficult andcontroversial points of contention between her view and that of some nation-alists like Miller. We will see that this weakness in her approach is somewhatlessened by the fact that she tackles head on the nationalist argumentsthemselves.

Brock conceives her own favored theory of global justice as a “realisticutopia,” the idea of “a normative account of what we can reasonably hope forin justice at the global level, which takes people as they are now, is workableand applicable to ongoing social and political arrangements, and, importantly,is one that could be realized in the near future” (p. 40). The idea of a realisticutopia is John Rawls’, but Brock’s version of it is more ambitious and, arguablyat least, truer to the egalitarian impulse that guided Rawls’ earlier work.

To clarify her own position, Brock evaluates the cases for and against the sortof cosmopolitanism inspired by Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, that is, the view thatRawls’ famous principles of justice should be global in scope.2 By way of aglobal hypothetical contract argument that follows Rawls in using a “veil ofignorance,” Brock argues for secure basic liberties and basic needs protectionsinstead of the difference principle, and she rejects global equality of opportu-nity while favoring “genuine opportunities for people to secure decentlives” (p. 63). Beyond liberties and needs, Brock emphasizes “fair terms ofcooperation in global institutions” (p. 119).

Why reject the difference principle? Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenhe-imer pioneered experiments in various countries to see what happens whensubjects are forced by a veil of ignorance to choose principles of incomedistribution.3 Brock cites this evidence in support of her basic needs minimumaccount because it turns out that people favor a maximum average incomewith a guaranteed floor over three other options: a maximum floor income (akinto Rawls’ difference principle), a maximum average income (akin to John

1. Miller (2007).2. For Rawls’ principles, see Rawls (1971), chapter II. For examples of the globalizing move—a

move that Rawls himself rejects—see Barry (1973) and Beitz (1979).3. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992).

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Harsanyi’s view), and a maximum average with a range constraint that limitsallowable income inequality.

It is certainly interesting and relevant that people overwhelmingly reject thedifference principle when put into an analog of the Rawlsian original position,but I think the choices of experimental subjects are not decisive if they aremissing key information about the effects of their choices. Consider one impor-tant piece of evidence relevant to the choice between the guaranteed minimumand the guaranteed limit on the extent of income inequality. Richard Wilkin-son and Kate Pickett, in their book The Spirit Level (but also in other works overmany years), have argued that social inequality itself makes people in a societyworse off than they would be in a more equal society.4 Income differences arelinked to status differences and to higher levels of stress, feelings of inferiority,and sickness. In short, experimental subjects who are aware of this epidemio-logical research on the badness of inequality itself would, I presume, be lesslikely to opt for the guaranteed minimum income and more likely to beconcerned about the range of inequality their society should allow (the samepoint affects the plausibility of Brock’s position in the global context at p. 222).

One might reply to this objection by pointing out that experimental subjectsexplicitly seek to balance competing considerations, most prominently basicneeds protections on the one hand and preservation of incentives on the other.Would the inequality-limiting option not dampen incentives to productivity bylimiting the upper level of income? In response to this reply, I think one shouldallow that this dampening might occur (although evidence would need to beforthcoming in support of it), but then point out that a similar problem couldafflict the guaranteed floor proposal. After all, any decently high guaranteedincome floor would have to be funded through a progressive tax regime withsimilar incentive-dampening effects (again, assuming one accepts that sucheffects are significant). As far as incentives go, both proposals are in the sameboat so they must sink or float together.

Brock’s central value is not basic income; instead, it is basic needs. She isalready well-known for her work on needs, and here, she explains how theyshould be understood (as including both material and social needs), why theymatter (as conditions of human agency), and how existing empirical measurescan inform us about whether needs are being met. The agency rationale forneeds links Brock’s view to the most prominent fellow traveler, namely,Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to global justiceand development.5 In addition, Brock points out that basic human rights arebest defended by appealing to agency-supported basic needs.

For Brock, equality means determining what would be agreed at a hypo-thetical global conference of randomly chosen persons. In short, it meansenabling people to have decent life prospects, including meeting basic needs,protecting basic freedoms, and securing fair terms of international cooperation(p. 299). It does not mean globally equal incomes or even global equality ofopportunity. Specifically, Brock defends a modified—and globalized—version

4. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009).5. Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000).

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of Elizabeth Anderson’s “democratic equality.”6 The core aim is for people tostand as equals in relation to one another, for each to participate in democraticdiscussions as speaker and listener whose claims are neither more nor lessimportant than anyone else’s. This implies securing the Senian capabilitiesrequired to produce social equality in the context of an economic system of“joint production” that emphasizes the cooperative character of the divisionof labor (pp. 301–3). We should promote a global democratic discussion wherepossible, according to Brock, but we may refer to her main normative thoughtexperiment—along with deliberative polls—to reach conclusions about thedemands of global justice.

Brock emphasizes several senses in which globalizing the democratic equal-ity view generates puzzles or problems. For instance, which community do wehave in mind when we say that people should stand to others in relations ofequality? For a cosmopolitan like Brock, “the community of human persons”should have a special place in thinking about justice. This is, I think, related toBrock’s claim that moral inclusion and rights possession should not depend ondetermining a person’s role in the global economy (pp. 306–9). Responsivedemocracy at the global level requires interest protection for all rather than anagency conception that demands the unattainable goal of universal inclusion ina single global conversation. Brock’s view supports international institutionsaimed at collecting taxes, monitoring the recruitment of health-care workers,promoting press freedom, and punishing violators of international criminal law(pp. 309–11).

3. Normative Skepticism about Cosmopolitanism

Brock introduces two kinds of skeptical response to cosmopolitanism: thefeasibility skeptic doubts that any cosmopolitan model can be practically real-ized, and the normative skeptic supports nationalism and its associated goodsagainst the cosmopolitan’s alleged antinationalism (p. 4). She thinks bothskeptics can be answered. Does she succeed on this score? Let us begin with thenormative skeptic.

As a moderate cosmopolitan, Brock affirms global moral obligations to allpersons but at the same time recognizes more local basic obligations toparticular others. In the global justice debates, her central opponents arenationalists who share some aspects of moderate cosmopolitanism while under-playing the normative priority of global duties of justice. Brock addresses thisdispute by answering liberal nationalists like David Miller and Yael Tamir onthe question of duties to outsiders and by explaining how democracy is bestconceived in cosmopolitan rather than liberal nationalist terms.7

Brock’s view is that that there is not yet a plausible liberal nationalist accountof our duties to non-nationals (p. 249). For her (p. 270n5), a liberal nationalistis someone who defends nationalism by showing that it is compatible with

6. Anderson (1999).7. Miller (2007) and Tamir (1993).

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liberal values. But one could conceive of stronger links between the two strandsof thought, which would count as alternative conceptions of liberal national-ism. For instance, one could maintain that a defensible nationalism requires acommitment to liberal values, or that liberalism, properly understood, presup-poses some circumscribed communal attachments characteristically associatedwith shared nationality. Brock’s criticism of liberal nationalism seems to havesome sympathy with the first of those views but is skeptical of the second,especially when interpreted so as to justify national partiality.

Yael Tamir’s liberal nationalism gets outlined and criticized first; DavidMiller then gets the same treatment. Tamir defends both the value of culturalmembership and the importance of individual autonomy and human rights.Cultural membership is necessary to provide a “context of choice” for indi-viduals to pursue valuable lives (p. 250). National membership can be a corepart of personal identity so—since nations are cultural communities—individuals have a right to culture and to national self-determination, where thelatter is understood not as a territorial claim to a state but as a normative claimof individuals to secure membership in their nation (p. 252).

Of course, for Tamir, there are global obligations, but feelings of concern forfellow nationals generally trump moral obligations to outsiders. Tamir also saysthat each nation has “a global obligation to assure equality among all nations.”8

So Tamir’s version of liberal nationalism does not have a consistent position onthe moral defensibility of priority for fellow nationals (cf. Brock, pp. 254–5).And she also fails to justify her view that national deliberation about what to doshould take place in isolation from an international conversation on goals andcooperation in pursuit of those goals (p. 255). In short, according to Brock,Tamir’s normative premises are inconsistent with each other and her practicalproposals are unnecessarily limited and therefore unlikely to achieve the globalgoals she herself supports.

David Miller conceives of nationalism as a legitimate part of a person’sidentity.9 Nations themselves are ethical communities within which conationalsare assigned justified special duties not owed to outsiders, and national com-munities have claims to political self-determination. For Miller, a nation is acommunity of belief that extends through history in which conationals performactivities together, share a public culture, and lay claim to a common territory.Miller accepts universal human rights: every human being has basic rights topersonal freedom, bodily integrity, and a minimum amount of resources, butthe duties correlative to these rights attach, in the first instance, to their fellownationals rather than to all other human beings regardless of communitymembership.

Brock questions Miller’s claim that we should reason about duties to helpothers in need by considering the community membership of the needy personsin question. For Brock, obligations to meet the needs of nonmembers are neverlegitimately assigned a back seat to obligations to members. In her view,Miller’s favoring of the national welfare state over global duties is incompatible

8. Tamir (1993, p. 162).9. Miller (1995) and Miller (2007).

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with his own list of states’ international obligations. The charitable interpreta-tion is that Miller has shown us how a national welfare state might be justifiedif the world were to come much closer to meeting the global obligations it nowfails to meet. As things now stand, however, national welfare in a world ofglobal deprivation is a fundamental injustice of the first importance.

We need not deny a role for liberal nationalist attachments, but Brock thinksthis role must be a secondary part of a cosmopolitan framework that protectsthe basic needs and liberties of everyone and ensures fair terms of internationalcooperation (p. 265). When judging the legitimacy of moral and legal rules, theguiding value should be impartiality. She points out that this does not precludespecial concern for one’s associates, but she rejects as question-begging theliberal nationalist strategy of beginning with cultural or national attachments.The point of a theory of distributive justice, after all, is partly to evaluate thedefensibility of taking a nationalist perspective when considering who shouldget what and to whom duties should be assigned.

Brock allows that people will have strong attachments to their conationals,but she argues that there are clear ways in which these attachments shouldbe limited (p. 274). Compatriot favoritist appeals to gratitude, reciprocity,identity, or solidarity all fail to affect the premise that basic obligations do notdiminish with distance (pp. 275–82). When it comes to determining “ourlegitimate national aspirations,” Brock cites the examples of recruitment ofhealth-care workers and the international taxation and accounting regimes.She argues for the necessity of universal labor and tax codes aimed at sat-isfactorily protecting the interests of everyone (p. 290). Within this globalregime of justice—but only within this regime—it is acceptable to favor one’scompatriots as long as each country is contributing its fair share to theregime’s maintenance.

I think Brock does a decent job of pointing out the flaws in both Tamir’s andMiller’s versions of liberal nationalism. But does her account of global justicetake due account of legitimate nationalist concerns about authentic democ-racy? The global reach of interest-affecting phenomena suggests the need forinstitutions of global governance (short of world government). Brock outlinesDavid Held’s “cosmopolitan democracy,” the best-known version of globaldemocratic political arrangements that go beyond the prevailing view that thenation-state is the main locus of democracy. One of Brock’s main goals is toexplain the failure of Will Kymlicka’s liberal nationalist objections to Held’stheory.10 Kymlicka accepts the need for global political institutions and foreffective recognition of human rights, but he is skeptical of cosmopolitanprojects to the extent that they can never reproduce that trust and solidaritymade possible by shared national identity. Brock thinks that given the basicimportance of interests, rights, and global collective problems, we can and mustpromote a collective identity beyond the nation; in fact, she says, sometimes thenation-first mentality is often the key obstacle in the way of cooperative solu-tions to global problems.

10. Held (2004) and Kymlicka (2001).

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Global democracy is desirable and possible so long as we realize that it canbe conceived in two ways and that, according to Brock, only one of those waysmeets the relevant ethical criteria. Here, Brock uses Daniel Weinstock’s dis-tinction between an agency model that emphasizes participation in globaldecision-making and an interest model that aims to “enhance the realization ofpeople’s interests” (p. 105).11 Agency concerns fail to include all those affectedby decisions (e.g., future generations) and can fall short in important cases—such as avian influenza or climate change—where the average citizen lacks theexpertise or motivation (or both) to make the best decisions. Brock concludes,therefore, that we should aim for global interest-protection and that when thisraises worries about trusting decision-makers, we should ensure accountabilityof both institutions and those fulfilling roles.

The agency–interest distinction is instructive, but it does not solve theproblem of conceiving democracy at the global level. First, it deals withthe difficulty of ensuring effective participation beyond nation-states by sever-ing the link between democracy and participation. This might be too high aprice to pay for keeping one’s democratic credentials. Second, a key reason forpreferring the interest model of democracy is the unwillingness or inability ofcitizens to choose wisely and fairly. Since this reason applies not only to globalpublics but to national citizen bodies too, we have an argument for underem-phasizing participation across the board. Brock’s case can be judged successful,therefore, only if she can provide further argument for the claim that democ-racy itself is best understood on the interest model.

4. Feasibility Skepticism about Cosmopolitanism

In the final chapter, Brock directly addresses the so-called skeptical feasibilityconcerns about the cosmopolitan philosopher’s project of global justice. Shehelpfully classifies these worries into four categories—goals, transition, mea-surement, and motivation—and responds briefly to each one.

Goals

What should be the goals of global justice anyway? Brock argues that there isalready widespread agreement about aiming to meet basic needs, guaranteebasic freedoms, ensure fair terms of global cooperation, and support the insti-tutions necessary to reach these substantive goals. In the book’s policy-orientedchapters, she sets out several more specific aims: reforming the global taxregime, securing press freedom, protecting the physical security of individuals,altering migration policies to benefit the world’s worst-off people, and promot-ing global economic justice rather than economic growth as a fundamentalgoal. While this list of goals is clear, I think the jury is still out on the questionof whether meeting them would be sufficient for achieving justice. It is one

11. Weinstock (2006).

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thing to say that equality should be understood in relational rather thandistributive terms, but this does not eliminate the worry that Brock’s owndistributive goals are too weak and that something like equality of incomeand wealth or equality of capabilities would bring us closer to globally justarrangements.

Transition

How will we get from where we are now to where we need to be? In reply tothose who claim we lack specific plans for improving international institutions,Brock has argued (in part II of the book) for measures in well-defined areassuch as taxation, press freedom, and trade arrangements. Skeptics can arguewith the details of her arguments, but one must admit that Brock has outlinedsome specific ways forward that, taken together, embody a picture of thetransition from current global injustice to global justice in the future.

For example, given the short-term goal to alleviate world poverty, in par-ticular the failure of billions of human beings to meet their basic needs, Brockwisely focuses on institutions such as secure property rights and the rule of law onthe grounds that these encourage innovation and investment in education andhealth that help to alleviate poverty. A key institution in need of reform,according to Brock, is the global tax regime. Consider widespread tax evasion,the existence of tax havens, and the practice of transfer pricing. Countless tensof billions of dollars go untaxed, thereby making it more difficult for states—especially weak or impoverished states—to provide the infrastructure necessaryto address their citizens’ poverty.

Brock calls for consistency in the monitoring of resource sales in variouscountries. Who buys how much oil from whom, for what price? These ques-tions are more easily answered in some countries than others so the doublestandard promotes corruption and tax evasion in developing countries wheremore secretive practices are allowed. In short, the global tax regime needs to bemore transparent and more efficient, with international cooperation to botheliminate corporate transfer pricing and harmonize tax rates globally. Brock’sdiscussion here includes a helpful summary and defense of several proposedglobal taxes, including a Tobin tax on international financial transactions anda carbon tax that could be used to pay for global public goods such as peaceand a sustainable natural environment. This is a nice example of Brock’s verypractical approach to political philosophy. Regardless of persisting disagree-ments about the justice of global income inequality, it is possible to hope for aconsensus on quite specific measures aimed at addressing conspicuous policyfailures.

Measurement

How can we measure progress toward the goals of global justice? This questionis answered by pointing to data linked to the goals identified earlier. For

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example, basic needs protection can be monitored by citing data on lifeexpectancy, maternal and child health, freedom from disease, and access tosafe water and shelter. Here, again, an example of her approach is instructive.In chapter 6, Brock defends her commitment to basic liberties both by appeal-ing to her hypothetical contract thought experiment and by describing basicliberty protection as a necessary condition for engaging in “core human activi-ties” such as economic production, family life, and play. She then uses theannual Freedom House reports to describe the extent of basic liberty protection inthe world today. For Brock, the most important institution for protecting basicliberties within states is a free press since it can achieve at least three goals:providing information about what is going on, enabling an exchange of ideas,and offering people the opportunity to participate in decision-making aboutmatters affecting them. Internationally, basic liberties can be protected byinstitutions such as the International Criminal Court, whose role takes on momen-tous importance in societies where basic institutions have broken down due tothe continuing threat—and regular outbreak—of violence.

Motivation

Finally, how can individuals be motivated to pursue global justice and howshould we deal with the status quo bias of existing institutions? Here, Brockgestures toward five answers: self-interest itself takes us a long way; interlockingincentives can promote a virtuous circle of global institutional reform; muchcan be achieved even without universal agreement on the details; what doesnot work in theory often works well in practice (e.g., divided authority answerscertain worries about sovereignty); and we should promote education for worldcitizenship. Brock cannot adequately defend these claims in the five pages shedevotes to them, but they do focus attention on a key issue of global justice andsuggest reasons for optimism about achieving cosmopolitan goals.

Brock’s general strategy for addressing feasibility skeptics is to identify spe-cific policy issues while keeping an eye on the larger national and internationalinstitutional contexts. A good example of her practical approach to normativeglobal issues is her discussion of immigration (chapter 8). Should immigrationbe more open than it is now? Should it be more closed? Brock notes that at thelevel of ideal theory, the jury is still out. On the one hand, if people are entitledto basic needs satisfaction and basic liberties protection, they should be able tomigrate from places where these entitlements are largely denied to placeswhere they are more reliably honored. On the other hand, if cultural integrityis valuable, there may be good reason to limit immigration in the name ofcultural protection.

However, Brock’s main concern here is not ideal theory. She wants toidentify specific policy moves that can improve the prospects, here and now, ofthe worst off people in the world. And she is correct that this goal is bestpromoted in two ways: by improving the governing institutions affecting theworst off and by directly addressing their poverty. Closing state borders withoutregard to these two strategies is likely to perpetuate the despair, while opening

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borders will have mixed results, improving the lives of many who move whilefailing to lift those left behind. As a practical proposal here and now, Brockrecommends allowing more immigration for those seeking employment insome cases and for a limited time (p. 194). While a “brain drain” of skilledpeople harms countries of origin, significant remittances can compensatesomewhat for this harm but have their own costs, such as creating a cycle ofdependence for those who receive them and encouraging neglect of investmentin poor country infrastructure. Brock points to the troubling case of doctorsand nurses from poor countries, who migrate to rich countries but whose homecountry pays their training costs. In effect, the health care of the world’sprivileged people is being subsidized by the world’s poorest. Justice requiresthat there should be some compensation for the benefits received by thosealready relatively advantaged.

Brock’s own approach to immigration encourages us to keep our sights onthe global and the institutional rather than the national and piecemeal. Weshould focus on the reasons why people want to leave in the first place andconsider addressing the underlying problems such as trade restrictions thatkeep poor countries poor. Ultimately, she argues, “the only long-term solutionto widespread poverty in developing countries is broad-based sustainabledevelopment in those countries” (p. 219). This is characteristic of her innova-tive thinking in its combination of big picture concerns with targetedidentification of issues affecting the world’s least advantaged most directly.Unlike some other political philosophers, Brock has done her homework on theempirical background relevant to deciding what to do to advance cosmopolitangoals in the current institutional context. This helps her avert the problemfaced by those who focus more or less exclusively on ideal theory and then runinto the difficulty that implementing that theory is likely to lead to a worseoption than starting with a second-best solution that takes into account theobstacles presented by current political realities. Brock’s work is valuable in itsdirect engagement with policy questions without concern for ensuring thatsome ideal theory gets implemented here and now. Her targeted approach topolicy advances the debate by responding in a straightforward way to feasibilityconcerns, even if readers might disagree with the specifics of her recommen-dations in a given case.

5. Conclusion

Brock’s theoretical position fits within the recognized bounds of recent work inpolitical philosophy on the reasonableness of cosmopolitanism, but it does notadvance the debate much at the level of moral theory. Her view is distinctiveand important, however, both in its explicit response to the normative andfeasibility skeptics and in her use of informed description of several policy areasto provide the means to respond to those skeptics. Even if specific argumentscan be questioned, the general effect is to render moderate cosmopolitanismmore plausible and skepticism less attractive. And her own cosmopolitan per-spective is helpfully set against some of the dominant theories in the literature,

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including Rawls’ account in The Law of Peoples.12 In response to the normativeskeptics, she describes the key arguments, and main flaws, associated withdominant forms of liberal nationalism. This sets the stage for her interest modelof global democracy; but some problems with this model remain, especially therole it assigns to participation. In response to feasibility skepticism, we are givena helpful typology of goals, transition, measurement, and motivation, withseveral detailed accounts of key policy issues and sensible recommendations forboth short-term and longer term solutions.

In sum, Brock provides us with an innovative combination of theoreticalstock-taking and practical proposals. The effect is to clarify one very hopeful—and cosmopolitan—way forward.

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Documents

COSMOPOLITANISM VERSUS SKEPTICISM: CRITICAL NOTICE OF GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT, OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009