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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to ¯ y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action Econ 3821 Labor Economics Chapter 3C: Cost Minimization Problem Instructor: Hiroki Watanabe Fall 2012 Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 1 / 113 Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to ¯ y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action 1 Introduction 2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost 3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant 4 Cost Minimization Problem 5 Substitution & Scale Effect 6 Affirmative Action 7 Now We Know Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 2 / 113 Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to ¯ y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action 1 Introduction Agenda When PMP Doesn’t Work Cost Minimization Problem 2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost 3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant 4 Cost Minimization Problem 5 Substitution & Scale Effect 6 Affirmative Action 7 Now We Know Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 3 / 113

Cost Minimization Problem - University of Minnesota Duluthd.umn.edu/~watanabe/econ3821fl12/docs/cmpho.pdf · 3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant 4 Cost Minimization Problem

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Page 1: Cost Minimization Problem - University of Minnesota Duluthd.umn.edu/~watanabe/econ3821fl12/docs/cmpho.pdf · 3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant 4 Cost Minimization Problem

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Econ 3821 Labor Economics

Chapter 3C:Cost Minimization Problem

Instructor: Hiroki WatanabeFall 2012

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 1 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We Know

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 2 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 IntroductionAgendaWhen PMP Doesn’t WorkCost Minimization Problem

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We KnowWatanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 3 / 113

Page 2: Cost Minimization Problem - University of Minnesota Duluthd.umn.edu/~watanabe/econ3821fl12/docs/cmpho.pdf · 3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant 4 Cost Minimization Problem

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Agenda

Question 1.1 (Agenda)

Where does labor demand function come from?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 4 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Agenda

Question 1.2 (Robots Ate My Job)

Listen to Marketplace Audio Clip :National Robotics Initiative to improvemanufacturing and the betting is to create jobs,not take them away, as so often is the worrywith robots.

When exactly do robots eat your job and when theydon’t?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 5 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Agenda

1 To analyze relationship between C and K as inQuestion 1.2 , y needs to be pegged at some constant.

2 If not...Even when robots eat my job, if y is increasing, Iprobably still have a job.Ambiguous result.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 6 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

When PMP Doesn’t Work

Profit maximization problem is intuitive, but1 it is cumbersome when you let C, K and y move at

the same time.2 we can’t use it for some technologies.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 7 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

When PMP Doesn’t Work

Example 1.3 (Case When PMP Doesn’t Work)

Suppose 1 chef bakes 1 cheesecake, 2 chefs bake 2cheesecakes, ... (ƒ (C) = C). If wage is C = 1 andcheesecakes sell for p = 2 apiece, how many chefs willJack hire?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 8 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

When PMP Doesn’t Work

Jack’s output level exceeds Duluth population atsome point.The market is no longer perfectly competitive.We can still pose a question:

Given y, what is the best combination of(∗

C, ∗

K) that can produce y most

cost-effectively?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 9 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Cost Minimization Problem

Problem 1.4 (Cost Minimization Problem)

Given y = y, Jack

minC,K TC(C, K) =CC +KKsubject to y = ƒ (C, K).

(1)

We’re asking “You got to produce y no matter what.Find the combination of (C, K) that is easiest onthe pocketbook.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 10 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Cost Minimization Problem

How do we find the solution?Split (1) in two parts:

1 Minimizing total cost TC(C, K ) =CC +KK .2 Keeping to the asked amount y = ƒ (C, K ).

Do not mix them up:1 TC(C, K ) doesn’t tell Jack how much y he can

produce.2 ƒ (C, K ) doesn’t tell Jack how much (C, K ) will

cost.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 11 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / IsocostSetupTrinity on the Cost SideRelative PriceOpportunity CostComparative Statics

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We Know

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 12 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

Definition 2.1 (Components of Total Cost)1 An input bundle = (C, K) contains C chefs

and K ft2 of kitchen.2 A factor price = (C, K) marks the wage and

rental rate each.3 Total cost of input bundle is

TC(C, K) =CC +KK .

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 13 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

Example 2.2 (Computing Total Cost)

If = (C,K) = (2,1),

TC(C, K) = 2C + K .

1 = (C, K ) = (4,10) will cost TC(4,10) = 18.2 = (C, K ) = (5,10) will cost TC(5,10) = 20.3 = (C, K ) = (4,12) will cost TC(4,12) = 20.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 14 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

We can list the total cost for each = (C, K) allday long.Very tiring.

Definition 2.3 (Isocost Line)An isocost line at $c is a collection of all = (C, K)that costs exactly $c.

If = (C, K) is on the isocost line at c, it satisfies

CC +KK = c.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 15 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

Continued from Example 2.2 :

Example 2.4 (Finding Isocost Line)

If = (C,K) = (2,1), what is the isocost at c = 20?

(C, K) = (0,20), (2,16), (10,0) etc.2C + K = 20.K = −2C + 20.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 16 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

0 2 4 6 8 100

4

8

12

16

20

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost at (wC, w

T, c)=(2,1,20)

0 2 4 6 8 100

4

8

12

16

20

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 17 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

Fact 2.5 (Intercepts & Isocost)

The y-intercept denotes the kitchen size whenJack doesn’t hire anyone ( c

K).

The x-intercept denotes the number of chefswhen Jack doesn’t rent a kitchen ( c

C).

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 18 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

00

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Under BudgetOver BudgetIsocostc/w

Cc/w

K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 19 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Setup

0 2 4 6 8 100

4

8

12

16

20

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

(xC, x

K): TC(x

C, x

K)=c

0 2 4 6 8 100

4

8

12

16

20

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 20 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Cost Side

Question 2.6 (Slope of the Isocost Line)

What does the slope of the isocost line imply?

Answer 2.7 (Trinity on the Cost Side)

The following are the same:1 The slope of the isocost line.2 Relative price.3 Opportunity cost.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 21 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Relative Price

One chef buysC

Kunits of kitchen.

1 If you layoff one chef, Jack will save C dollars.

2 With C dollars, Jack can buyC

Kft2 of kitchen at

the market.3 The slope tells Jack the market rate of exchange

between C and K a.k.a. relative price of akitchen in terms of chefs. 1

1Note that the relative price is predetermined in the factormarket and Jack’s technology has no bearing on it.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 22 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Opportunity Cost

Definition 2.8 (Opportunity Cost)

is the best alternative that Jack forgoes or gives up,when he makes a choice or decision.

When Jack hires one more chef, Jack has to give upC

Kft2 of kitchen. 2

2Once again, we do not care why Jack would trade a chef in forkitchen here. It is simply a market matter but not Jack’s technologymatter.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 23 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Opportunity Cost

To sum up, the slope of the isocost line representsthe relative price, andthe opportunity cost of buying (hiring) one unit of C(measured in terms of kitchen size).

Note we do not care which bakery we analyze atthis point. Factor prices are given in advance andthe bakery is a price taker.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 24 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

Question 2.9 (Change in Parameters and BudgetLine)How does the insocost line change when factor pricesand total cost change?

1 Stay put2 Parallel shift3 Rotation (pivotting)4 Combination of parallel shift and rotation

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 25 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

Suppose the allotted expense increased from 1 to100:

CC +KK = 1↓

CC +KK = 100.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 26 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

The intercept changes because ...The slope remains constant because ...

K =−C

pKC +

1

pK→ K =

−C

pKC +

100

pK.

A change in total cost results in a parallel shift.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 27 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

00

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

00

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 28 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

Suppose C increased from 2 to 100:

2C +KK = c↓

100C +KK = c.

The slope changes because ...The horizontal intercept changes because ...The vertical intercept remains constant (why?)A change in price results in rotation.

K =−2pK

C +c

pK→ K =

−100pK

C +c

pK.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 29 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

00

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

00

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 30 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

Exercise 2.10 (Change in Price)

Jack spends $12 on chef (C) and kitchen (K). Theprice is given by (C,K) = (3,2).

1 Draw Jack’s isocost line.2 What happens to the isocost line if C drops to 1?

In particular, consider the change in1 maximum number of chefs he can hire2 maximum size of kitchen he can rent3 his opportunity cost of a chef in terms of kitchen

3 Can we say the rotation of isocost line will result inmore cheesecakes? If not, what additionalinformation do we need?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 31 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

0 2 4 6 8 10 120

1

2

3

4

5

6

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

(wC, w

T, c)=(3, 2, 12)

(wC, w

T, c)=(1, 2, 12)

0 2 4 6 8 10 120

1

2

3

4

5

6

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 32 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparative Statics

While reduced wage expands Jack’s choice set, itdoes not necessarily increase his output level.He may not care for the chef in the first place.

We also need to know Jack’s technology as well ashis cost structure to understand his hiring decision(to be discussed in the next section).

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 33 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / IsoquantIsoquantCobb-Douglas Production FunctionTrinity on the Technology SideComparison to Relative Prices

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We Know

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 34 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

Recall Problem 1.4 :

minC,K TC(C, K) =CC +KKsubject to y = ƒ (C, K).

Liz has to produce y.Which combination = (C, K) will produce y mostcost-effectively?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 35 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

Definition 3.1 (Production Function)ƒ () describes the relationship between quantity ofinputs = (C, K , · · · ) and quantity y that canproduce.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 36 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

Definition 3.2 (Isoquant)

The isoquant at an input bundle = (C, K) is acollection of all input bundles that producey = ƒ (C, K).

If an input bundle y = (yC, yK) and z = (zC, zK) areon the same isoquant, then they produce the samenumber of cheesecakes.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 37 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

Liz hires left-handed chefs L and right-handedchefs R to produce cheesecake y = ƒ (L, R).Each chef (lefty or righty) bakes 1 cheesecake.Her production function is

y = ƒ (L, R) = L + R.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 38 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

Question 3.3 (Isoquant)

Trace isoquant at (L, R) = (0,4) and (2,6) of aproduction function

y = ƒ (L, R) = L + R.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 39 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isoquant

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Left−Handed Chefs xL

Rig

ht−

Han

ded

Che

f xR

(xL, x

R): f(x

L, x

R)=y

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Left−Handed Chefs xL

Rig

ht−

Han

ded

Che

f xR

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 40 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Cobb-Douglas Production Function

The most commonly used production function isCobb-Douglas production function:

ƒ (C, K) = CbK,

where > 0 and b > 0.E.g., ƒ (C, K) = CK .Isoquant at (C, K) = (1,10)?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 41 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Cobb-Douglas Production Function

10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1009 0 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 908 0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 807 0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 706 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 605 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 504 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 403 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 302 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 201 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

K \C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 42 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Cobb-Douglas Production Function

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x T (

ft2 )

Isoquants {x: f(x)=y}

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Chefs xC

Kitc

hen

x T (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 43 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

Just like the slope of the isocost line has themeaning (recall trinity),the slope of the isoquant carries two importantmeanings.

Fact 3.4 (Trinity on the Technology Side)

The following are the same:1 The slope of isoquant curve.

2 Marginal rate of technical substitution.

3 Ratio between MPC and MPK .a

aYou can forget this one. Proof is left at Appendix .

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 44 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

Definition 3.5 (Marginal Rate of TechnicalSubstitution)If Liz hires 1 chef, she can maintain the currentproduction level y even if she reduces K by ft2. This is called her marginal rate of technicalsubstitution (MRTS).

1 chef replaces MRTS ft2 kitchen without takingany toll on the ongoing production level y.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 45 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

E.g., if ƒ (4,10) = ƒ (5,6), then Liz can give up 4 ft2in exchange for 1 chef.

She will still get the same number of cheesecakes.Her MRTS at (4,10) is 4.

If ƒ (8,4) = ƒ (9,3),Her MRTS at (8,4) is 1.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 46 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

The slope of isoquant represents themarginal rate of technical substitution.Take Question 3.3 .Slope of isoquant is −1.How many right-handed chefs R can Liz lay off ifshe adds one left-handed chef to payroll withoutinterfering production?It’s 1 as well.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 47 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Left−Handed Chefs xL

Rig

ht−

Han

ded

Che

f xR

(xL, x

R): f(x

L, x

R)=y

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Left−Handed Chefs xL

Rig

ht−

Han

ded

Che

f xR

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 48 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

Question3.3 is a rather extreme case.MRTS usually varies depending on the input bundle.Consider two bundles:

= (C, K) = (1,29384720396)y = (yC, yK) = (3240894603,1).

MRTS at is pretty large (why?)MRTS at y is pretty small (why?)

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 49 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Trinity on the Technology Side

I.e., Liz prefers a balanced combination of twoinputs rather than something extreme.This tendency is called convex technology.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 50 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Comparison to Relative Prices

Notice the difference:Relative price is ft2 that Liz has to sell (give up) tohire one more chef to keep to her budget c.Marginal rate of technical substitution is ft2 Lizcan give up to hire one more chef whilemaintaining output level y.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 51 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization ProblemIsocost Curves Meet IsoquantTangencyTo Find the Exact Solution

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We KnowWatanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 52 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isocost Curves Meet Isoquant

Definition 4.1 (Long-Run Cost MinimizationProblem)Liz chooses the input bundle = (C, K) that costs theleast while maintaining the production level, i.e.,

minC,K TC(C, K) =CC +KKsubject to ƒ (C, K) = y.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 53 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isocost Curves Meet Isoquant

How does Liz make her hiring and investmentdecision?i.e., how do we find Liz’s optimal number of chefsand size of kitchen ∗ = (∗

C, ∗

K)?

Consider a case whenOutput requirement ƒ (C, K ) = CK = 150.Factor price (C,K ) = (3,2).

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 54 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isocost Curves Meet Isoquant

0 5 10 15 200

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost Lines

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Chef xC

Kitc

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x K (

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Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 55 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isocost Curves Meet Isoquant

0 5 10 15 200

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10

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30

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isoquant at y=150

0 5 10 15 200

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25

30

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 56 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Isocost Curves Meet Isoquant

0 5 10 15 200

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=150

0 5 10 15 200

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100

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 57 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Tangency

Condition 4.2 (Tangency Condition)

For standard technologies, the isocost line is tangent toisoquant at the optimal bundle, i.e., they share thesame slope at ∗.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 58 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Tangency

What does tangency condition imply?The slope of isoquant denotes MRTS:

ft2 of kitchen Liz can give up to hire one morechef.

The slope of isocost line denotes relative price(opportunity cost):

ft2 of kitchen Liz has to give up to hire onemore chef.

Liz’s idea of the chef’s worth coincides withlabor market’s idea of the chef’s worth whenshe chooses the right amount.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 59 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Tangency

What if tangency condition is not met?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 60 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Tangency

0 5 10 15 200

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=150

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100

110

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 61 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

Where exactly is the isocost line tangent toisoquant?We need two conditions to find the point oftangency:

Condition 4.3 (Finding the Solution)

For standard production functions, the solution can befound using

1 tangency condition and

2 output requirement

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 62 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

Problem 4.4 (CMP)

minC,K TC(C, K) = 3C + 2Ksubject to ƒ (C, K) = CK = 150.

MRTS at (C, K) is−KC

.3

The relative price is −32 .

3In what follows, I’ll get you MRTS unless it is too obvious.Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 63 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

Tangency condition:

−KC

=−32⇒ K =

3

2C. (2)

There are lots of bundles (C, K) satisfying (2).

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 64 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

0 5 10 15 200

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=150

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 65 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

To pin down the solution, use output requirement:

CK = 150.

Conclude ∗ = (10,15).

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 66 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

Exercise 4.5 (UMP)Liz is asked to produce y = 3 according to herproduction function ƒ (C, K) = C +

pK . Factor price is

given by (C,K) = (2,1). His preferences arerepresented by (C, K) = C +

pK .

1 Write Liz’s cost minimization problem.2 What is the tangency condition in this example?

(MRTS at (C, K) is −2pK).

3 Which bundle does Liz choose?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 67 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

To Find the Exact Solution

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.50

1

2

3

4

5

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=3

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.50

1

2

3

4

5

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

x K (

ft2 )

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 68 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale EffectSubstitution EffectScale EffectGross Substitutes & Complements

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We KnowWatanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 69 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

Getting back to Question 1.2 .

Example 5.1 (Substitution & Scale Effect)

Liz produces cheesecake y with a production function

ƒ (C, K) = CK ,

where C is a number of chefs and K measures thekitchen equipment. The marginal rate of technical

substitution at (C, K) is MRTS(C, K) =−KC

. She was

asked to produce y = 100 cheesecakes. Factor price is(C,K) = (4,1).

1 Suppose C = 4↘1. Should she invest more or less inK?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 70 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

Split the price change in three progressive stages:1 Original: O2 Transitional: T3 Final: F

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 71 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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2040

60 80

100

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160180

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100

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160180

Chef xC

Kitc

hen

Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 72 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chef xC

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Equ

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Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100

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Chef xC

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Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 73 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

Liz used to choose O =

OC

OK

=�

520

.

Now she chooses T =�

1010

.

She traded in 10 kitchen appliances for 5 chefs totake advantage of cheaper labor:

ΔS := T − O =�

1010

−�

520

=�

5−10

.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 74 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

Definition 5.2 (Substitution Effect)

Substitution effect ΔS is a difference between O

(the original choice) and T (the transitional choice),where

1 O is a solution to

minC,K TC(C, K) =OCC +KK

subject to ƒ () = y.

2 T is a solution to

minC,K TC(C, K) =FCC +KK

subject to ƒ () = y.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 75 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Substitution Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chef xC

Kitc

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Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Isocost at 40Isocost at 20Isoquant at y=100

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Chef xC

Kitc

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Equ

ipm

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K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 76 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

Liz used to spend $40 (=OCOC+KOK )

Now she spends only $20 (=FCTC+KTK)

With the extra $20, she can produce more.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 77 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chef xC

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Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100Isoquant at y=400

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Kitc

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K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 78 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

With extra $20, she can produce y = 400cheesecakes.

F =

FC

FK

=�

2020

.

She increased the scale of production withcash savings from reduced labor cost.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 79 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

Definition 5.3 (Scale Effect)

Scale effect Δ is a difference between F (the finalchoice) and T (the transitional choice), whichmeasures the change in hiring and capital investmentplan due to cash savings from reduced labor cost.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 80 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chef xC

Kitc

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Equ

ipm

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K

Isocost at $40Isocost at $20Isoquant at y=100Isoquant at y=400

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Chef xC

Kitc

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Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 81 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

Total effect Δ:

Δ = ΔS + Δ .

In Example 5.1

Δ =�

5−10

+�

1010

=�

150

.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 82 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Scale Effect

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

Equ

ipm

ent x

K

Isocost at $40 (wC=4)

Isocost at $20 (wC=1)

Isocost at $40 (wC=1)

Isoquant at y=100Isoquant at y=400

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Chef xC

Kitc

hen

Equ

ipm

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K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 83 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

How does wage reduction affect investmentdecision?

1 ΔSK< 0.

2 ΔK> 0.

Which one exceeds which?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 84 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

Definition 5.4 (Gross Substitutes & Complements)

If C È leads to1 K È , chefs and kitchen equipment are gross

substitutes.2 K Î , chefs and kitchen equipment are gross

complements.

Remark1 If ΔS

Kis larger than Δ

Kin magnitude, inputs are

gross substitutes.2 If Δ

Kis larger than ΔS

Kin magnitude, inputs are

gross complements.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 85 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

In Example 5.1 , kitchen equipment is not a grosssubstitute or gross complements of chefs:

ΔSK+ Δ

K= −10+ 10 = 0.

In general, cross-price effect is absent forCobb-Douglas production function.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 86 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chefs xC

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Equ

ipm

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K

IsocostO

IsocostT

IsocostF

Isoquant

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Chefs xC

Kitc

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Equ

ipm

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K

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 87 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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IsocostO

IsocostT

IsocostF

Isoquant

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Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 88 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Gross Substitutes & Complements

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 400

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Chefs xC

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Equ

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IsocostO

IsocostT

IsocostF

Isoquant

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Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 89 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative ActionBackgroundHiring Decision & Affirmative ActionCMP for Color-Blind LizCMP for Discriminatory LizPotential Backfiring

7 Now We Know

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 90 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Background

Discussion 6.1 (Affirmative Action & HiringDecision)Take a listen to Marketplace Audio Clip .

Irani says private industry would be better offvoluntarily hiring lower-caste employees.

1 What are the economic benefits of making hiringdecision based on the caste?

2 Can affirmative action plans backfire?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 91 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Background

Affirmative action programs are intended toencourage firms to hire underrepresenteddemographics in terms of

1 race2 ethnicity3 gender.

E.g., requiring Jack to hire one black worker forevery two workers hired.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 92 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Background

Definition 6.2 (Types of Firm)1 Liz is color-blind if race does not enter the hiring

decision2 Liz is discriminatory otherwise.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 93 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Hiring Decision & Affirmative Action

Example 6.3 (Affirmative Action & CMP)

Liz hires white labor W and black labor B for theproduction of 30 Rock. Factor price (wage) is(W,B) = (1,1). Liz has to produce 100 episodes.

1 How does color-blind Liz make her hiring decision?2 How does discriminatory Liz make her hiring

decision?3 How does affirmative action affect two Liz’s profit?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 94 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Hiring Decision & Affirmative Action

Assume W and B are not perfect substitutes.They may contribute to the production differently:

Different educational attainmentDifferent previous occupations

Suppose that Liz has a convex technology:

ƒ (W, B) = WB.

MRTS(W, B) =−BW

.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 95 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Color-Blind Liz

Problem 6.4 (CMP for Color-Blind Liz)Color-Blind Liz solves:

minW ,B TC(W, B) =WW +BBsubject to ƒ (W, B) = WB = 100.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 96 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Color-Blind Liz

Color-blind Liz uses Condition 4.3 .

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 97 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Color-Blind Liz

Color-blind Liz will hire according to Condition 4.2 :

MRTS(W, B) =−BW

Relative Price =−W

B=−11.

Tangency condition:

−BW

= −1.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 98 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Color-Blind Liz

Color-blind Liz chooses CB = (W, B) = (10,10).TC(CB) = TC(10,10) = 20.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 99 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Color-Blind Liz

0 5 10 15 20 25 300

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abor

xB

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100

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55

White Labor xW

Bla

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abor

xB

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 100 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

Let’s say discriminatory Liz prefers to hire whiteand black labor in 4 to 1 ratio.TC(D) = TC(20,5) = 25>TC(CB)

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 101 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

Discriminatory Liz is not profitable.

Discussion 6.5 (Discriminatory Firm’s Profit)

Why?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 102 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

0 5 10 15 20 25 300

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abor

xB

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100

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White Labor xW

Bla

ck L

abor

xB

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 103 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

Discriminatory Liz does not follow Condition 4.3 .Instead, her hiring decision is based on

1 Output requirement2 Feelings

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 104 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

Discriminatory Liz’s MRTS(D) doesn’t match therelative price:

MRTS(D) =−14, relative price = −1.

Discriminatory Liz could have taken advantage ofthe labor market.She will be better off if she trade white workers infor black workers.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 105 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMP for Discriminatory Liz

As a policy maker, we can ask discriminatory Liz tochoose 1 to 1 ratio.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 106 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Potential Backfiring

but then...Do policy makers know MRTS?What if a policy maker imposed 1 to 4 ratio instead?

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 107 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Potential Backfiring

0 5 10 15 20 25 300

5

10

15

20

25

30

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

White Labor xW

Bla

ck L

abor

xB

Isocost LinesIsoquant at y=100

0 5 10 15 20 25 300

5

10

15

20

25

30

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

White Labor xW

Bla

ck L

abor

xB

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 108 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Potential Backfiring

Color-blind Liz will incur a loss of $5 because ofwrongfully executed affirmative action policy.

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 109 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

1 Introduction

2 Minimizing Total Cost / Isocost

3 Keeping to Output Requirement / Isoquant

4 Cost Minimization Problem

5 Substitution & Scale Effect

6 Affirmative Action

7 Now We Know

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 110 / 113

Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

CMPTrinity on the cost sideTrinity on the production sideSubstitution and scale effectsRelationship between capital investment and labordemandAffirmative action

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 111 / 113

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Intro Minimizing TC Keeping to y CMP Sub/Scale Effects Affirmative Action

Appendix

Proof.On the isoquant, the output level remains the same,i.e., dƒ () = 0. Taking the total derivative,

dƒ () = ƒC()dC + ƒK()dK = 0,

which leads to

dK

dC=−ƒC()ƒK()

=:−MPC()MPK()

on the isoquant. �

Watanabe Econ 3821 3C CMP 112 / 113

affirmative action, 91black labor, 94Cobb-Douglas productionfunction, 41, 86color-blind employer, 93convex technology, 50, 95cross-price effect, 86Δ, see total effectΔ, see scale effectΔS, see substitutioneffectdiscriminatory employer,93factor price, 13gross complements, 85gross substitutes, 85input bundle, 13isocost line, 15isoquant, 37marginal rate of technicalsubstitution, 44, 45, 49,59, 70market rate of exchange,22MRTS, see marginal rate oftechnical substitution

opportunity cost, 21, 23,59original bundle, 71output requirement, 62parallel shift, 27price taker, 24production function, 36relative price, 21, 22, 59rotation, 29scale effect, 80shift, see parallel shiftsubstitution effect, 75tangency condition, 58,60, 62total cost, 13total effect, 82trinity on the cost side, 21trinity on the technologyside, 44white labor, 94W, see black laborF, see final bundleO, see original bundleT , see transitional bundleW, see white labor