COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: FROM LA VIOLENCIA TO PLAN PATRIOTA

Román D. Ortiz

Manager

December 18, 2006

Contents

I. Colombia‟s Military Tradition.

II. Confronting La Violencia: The birth of Colombian Counterinsurgencystyle.

III. Colombia‟s Modern Insurgents.

IV. The deficiencies of the Colombian style: the Lleras Doctrine.

V. The deficiencies of the Colombian style: Looking for the decisive battle.

VI. Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine.

VII. Developing a nation-wide COIN capability.

VIII. Conclusions.

Colombian Military Tradition - I

• Colombian Army was a very young institution:

The army became truly national and a professional general staff was setup in the 1910‟s.

Scarce time and operational experience as unified structure anduntested officer corps

Organizational youth made it maleable to change.

• Colombia‟s military at the turn of the 20th century had limited experience in:

Internal security operations: Bananeras strike supression, 1928.

External defense: War with Perú over Leticia, 1932.

Colombian Military Tradition - II

• Military professionalization were carried out under de guidance of severalChilean military missions:

Prussian tradition in the Army‟s organizational culture.

Doctrinal influence of Jomini and Moltke: Victory through decisivebattle.

Confronting La Violencia - I

• La Violencia was sparked by the assassination of liberal party leader JorgeEliécer Gaitán on May 9th, 1948.

• Conservative Government success in restoring order in urban centerspushed radical liberal militants to the countryside, where they organizedinto guerrillas.

• The government‟s inability to put a stop to political violence set the stage fora bloodless coup by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953.

Confronting La Violencia - III

• Rojas‟ campaign combined for the first time in Colombia the key elements ofcounter-insurgency:

Military:

Operational concepts (cordon and search operations),

Creation of irregular warfare training center.

Army growth from 15.000 to 36.000 b/w 1950 and 1955,

Police forces unification

Creation of intelligence agency

• Economic and social assistance channeled to theaters of operation to erode theguerrillas‟ social support.

• An amnesty offering for the guerrillas.

• Sectarian violence decreased significantly during the Rojas era.

Colombia‟s Modern Insurgents

• Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) founded in 1964 and inspired onErnesto Guevara‟s Foco strategy.

• Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) founded in 1966embraces the Vietnamese version of People‟s Warfare (InterlockingWarfare).

• Ejército de Liberación Popular (EPL) founded in 1968 followed theorthodox Maoist concept of People‟s War.

• Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19A) founded in 1973 and based on CarlosMarighella‟s concept of urban guerrillas.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style: The Lleras Doctrine I

• In 1958, the newly-installed civilian government, under Alberto LlerasCamargo, put forth a new doctrine of civil-military relations:

The military was not to interfere in civilian matters.

Civilians were not to interfere in security issues.

• Though understandable given the recent transition from a military regime,the Lleras doctrine meant a great difficulty in implementing a counter-insurgency strategy understood as an integrated political-military effort.

• Templer: “The shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of thetrouble and the other 75 per cent lies in getting the people of this countrybehind us”.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : The Lleras Doctrine II

• The Lleras doctrine caused the removal of General Alberto Ruiz Novoa fromcommand of the military by president León Valencia in 1965.

• Ruiz Novoa had designed to implement a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy, the Plan Lazo, based on two principles:

Need of resolving social grievances.

Irregular warfare operational concepts.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : The Lleras Doctrine III

• The Plan Lazo brought about a set of innovations.

Military:

Operational concepts (“area control”).

Local intelligence networks.

Small infantry units specialized in counter-guerrilla.

Psychological operations.

Social development:

Social programs organized through a national civic-military actionboard with permanent regional branches.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle I

• Near-impossibility of pursuing a comprehensive counterinsurgencycampaign because of:

Lleras Doctrine which blocked the possibility of a political – military

integrated strategy.

The lack of resources to sustain a nation-wide campaign.

The trend to search victory through a decisive battle following doctrinal

principles based on Jomini and Moltke views of war.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle II

• Given the near-impossibility of pursuing a comprehensive campaign, themilitary opted for the pursuit of tactical victories designed to provokestrategic consequences.

• Examples of this type of campaign were:

Anori against the ELN in 1974

Cauca against the M-19A in the late 80‟s

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle III

• Operation Anorí (1973):

Based on massive troop deployments and intelligence gathering, theELN suffered heavy casualties but a small group of guerrillas couldescape and rebuild the organization.

• Military Campaign in Caquetá and Cauca (late 80‟s):

The army‟s presence in Caquetá, Cauca and Valle was strengthenedthrough middle 80‟s and eventually, military pressure forced the groupto the negotiating table during Virgilio Barco administration (1986-90).

Civilian negotiators did not use military pressure to their advantageand the military did not carry out its operations in support of ongoingnegotiations.

The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle IV

• Anorí in 1973 and Cauca-Caquetá in the late 80‟s demonstrated the twomain limitations:

Lack of an integrated political-military strategy.

Military‟s inability to carry out sustained, national-level operations.

• Both campaigns bore results in good measure because the insurgents wereconcentrated in limited geographical areas, allowing the military to locatethem and destroy them.

• When the insurgents put into practice a nation-wide strategy, the militaryproved unable to deliver significant successes.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - I

• Changes in civilian-military relations in the early 90‟s.

• New Constitution drafted in 1991:

Money earmarked for social spending and new wave of decentralizationlimited government ability to develop integrated security strategy.

Restoration of government legitimacy and democratic credibility.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - II

• Civilian appointed as Minister of Defense:

Opened possibility for effective civil-military coordination.

Improved resource management.

Pushed forth joint operational capabilities.

• Elaboration of a national pacification strategy (Estrategia Nacional Contrala Violencia, ENCV ):

Policy framework that integrated political measures, civic actionprograms, counter-finance measures and military efforts to pacify thecountry.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - III

• Successful campaign against the EPL.

The Army launched a successful operation against EPL in Córdoba.

The government could negotiate in a strong position as aconsequence of the military weakening of the EPL.

Better coordination of military pressure and political negotiationgot a demobilization agreement with the EPL in 1992.

The military‟s success had much to do with the insurgents‟concentration of their forces in a limited area.

• The military continued showing two limitations:

It lacked the ability to conduct a sustained, national-levelcampaign.

The government still lacked the ability to consolidate its controlover „cleared‟ areas.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - IV

• The civil-military relations crisis under Samper administration.

Weakness of the president under accusations of corruption.

Attempt of a sector of military to reverse the increase of civilian controlin the elaboration and execution of the security strategy.

The strategic leap of FARC to mobile warfare and the chain of defeatssuffered by the Army in the Southeast weak the political clout ofMilitary.

The Military fails to regain a dominant influence on the elaboration andexecution of the security policy.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - V

• The Pastrana administration: the Lleras Doctrine in geographical mode.

• Pastrana government consider military pressure and political negotiationsas excluding alternatives instead of complementary tools to deal withguerrillas.

• Pastrana administration is skeptical about the ability of military to defeatguerrillas.

• President Pastrana guarantee to FARC a 42.000 km2 safe heaven in ElCaguan as stage for negotiations.

• Free-hand is given to military to act in the rest of the country, if theoperations don‟t interfere in the peace process.

• A geographical mode of the Lleras doctrine: Civilians make peace in ElCaguan and military make war in the rest of the country.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - VI

• The Uribe administration: Toward a comprehensive pacification strategy.

• Strong leadership of the president on the security policy.

• Development of a comprehensive pacification program: DemocraticSecurity and Defense Policy (Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática,PDSD).

• Increase of the role of civilians in the control of the defense budget andpersonal matters.

• Developing the political component of counterinsurgency: programs ondemobilization of illegal combatants and civic action.

• Creation of civilian-military coordination bodies in matters as publicinformation or civic action.

Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - VI

• The remaining challenges in civilian-military relations.

• The empowerment of the Minister of Defense as a critical linchpin in thechain of command charged with the elaboration and control of the securitypolicy.

• The empowerment of the Armed Forces General Command as the criticalbody for planning and execution of military operations.

• The development of Joint Territorial Commands

• The rationalization of the Ministry of Defense structure.

• The integration of military operations, civic action programs and publiccommunication strategy at local level.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- I

• Developing a capability for offensive counterinsurgency operations underGaviria administration.

• Intelligence gathering was upgraded from a battalion-level organization to afull brigade.

• Counter-guerrilla battalions were grouped into light infantry mobilebrigades.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- II

• Stagnation in the development of counterinsurgent capabilities under theSamper government:

The US-Colombia military cooperation is paralyzed after the scandalprovoked by the infiltration of drug money in the Samper presidentialcampaign.

The Colombian National Police reduces its presence in the rural areasunder the increasing pressure of the guerrilla.

• Security crisis provoked by a chain of mobile warfare operations launchedby FARC.

• Limited steps for military modernization:

Creation of the Army‟s Aviation Brigade.

Plans for professionalization of the Army.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- III

• The Pastrana Administration: Developing nation-wide power projectiontools

• Development of national plan to modernize military capabilities to confrontFARC mobile warfare operations.

• Reforms were bounded to detect large guerrilla concentrations and counterthem.

• US cooperation was increased through the military component of theWashington-Bogota cooperation scheme Plan Colombia.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- IV

• Main steps in military modernization during Pastrana administration:

Significant upgrades in intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT technicalsystems acquired).

Personnel structure reformed (volunteer force increased from a fewthousand to 55.000 by 2002).

Creation of a division-size rapid deployment force called FUDRA(Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido).

Creation of new Mountain Battalions to control highland strategicpoint.

Launching of a program to increase road security called “PlanMeteoro”.

• Launching of regional search and destroy operations as “Gato Negro” or“Berlin” in 2001.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI

• The Uribe administration: Looking for capabilities to hold after clearing

• Not many conceptual innovations per se, but better organization and moreresources for existing ideas

• Principle of “area control” considered as critical to defeat guerrillas andapplied in key strategic areas of the country (Cundinamarca, Antioquia)

• But the geographical scope of the country makes impossible a systematicapplication of the “area control” concept all over the national territory.

• The strategic culture of the Colombian military incentives the search of adecisive battle to get a quick victory.

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI

• Main military modernization steps under Uribe administration:

Meaningful increase of the armed forces size.

Deployment of National Police detachments in all ColombianMunicipalities.

Creation of the detachments of Peasant Soldiers (SaldadosCampesinos) as local security forces.

Increase of the number of Mobile Brigades and Mountain Battalions.

Increase of the air support and air mobility assets (helicopters andturboprop aircrafts).

Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI

• Launching of an offensive against the strategic rearguard of FARC using adivision-size formation (18.000 soldiers) called TF Omega.

• The goal is to draw FARC into a decisive battle where the Army coulddestroy the guerrilla main force.

• But FARC elude the battle, abandon logistical infrastructure and redeployedits units in other parts of the country avoiding complete destruction.

• In this sense, FARC avoid a frontal confrontation following the principles ofprolonged people‟s warfare.

Conclusions I

• In the case of Colombia, the development of a COIN strategy demanded:

The integration of military, political and social program under civilianleadership.

The amassing of resources to be able to develop sustained nation-wideoperations.

To evolve from a strategy based on the search of decisive encountersdesigned to defeat insurgents to a model of continuous political-military attrition (a war without battles).

Conclusions II

• Colombia resolved the two first issues during the 90‟s and given meaningfulsteps in the direction of developing a strategy of political-military attritionto defeat guerrillas.

• But political imperatives and strategic culture have maintained a trend tosearch victory through a decisive battle.

• Defeating guerrillas –particularly FARC- demands an approach focus on thelong term political-military attrition of insurgents

• Finally, this kind of cultural change are the most difficult to perform inArmy but also the most important.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: FROM LA VIOLENCIA TO PLAN PATRIOTA

Román D. Ortiz

Manager

December 18, 2006