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Introduction

Coup d’état is one of the three ways, next to democratic elections and

hereditary succession, of gaining political power in a state. It is the quintessence

of political usurpation. Political power is in this case seized in a violent manner

and, subsequently, it is also preserved by means of violence. Until recently, coup

d’état was one of the primary methods of obtaining political power, especially in

South America and Africa and to a lesser extent also in Asia. Although always

formally illegal and legally inadmissible without any exceptions - a fortiori

publicly violating the constitutional order - it has been used in practice and

generally accepted by those actors of a political game who aspire to become

rulers of a respective country.

While both elections and electoral procedures that are inherent to

democratic competition for political power and the means of gaining political

power based on succession to a throne, which is relevant for absolute

monarchies, have been a subject of interest for researchers and political

observers - and thus have been broadly and thoroughly examined - a coup d’état,

although an important political aspect inevitably connected with the

phenomenon of gaining political power, has been left aside. Certainly, single

coups, often spectacular, accompanied by a special atmosphere and specific

political color, have drawn much attention and have been widely commented on

in the media. These, however, usually attract only short-term attention and bring

about rather superficial evaluations. At times, particular coups have been

described in detail by historians or political scientists. These analyses, however,

have concentrated solely on the course of events, dealing with them mostly from

a factual perspective. Unfortunately, coup d’état itself, as a generic political

phenomenon, has been seldom a subject of deeper reflections, which would not

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be restricted only to an introduction and description of a particular coup and its

induced effects, but would endeavor to examine its essence alone.

Scientific work in the field of political science research, which addresses

the topic of coup d’état, understanding it as a phenomenon having specific

characteristics, is very humble and contains only few valuable aspects.

Moreover, these studies are usually outdated, coming from sixties, seventies or

eighties of the 20th century. To put it simply, concerning the research of coup

d’état, what prevails is a historical perspective that focuses on the uncovering of

facts and events connected with the particular efforts of an illegitimate seizure of

power. On the contrary, there is a lack of studies in the political sciences which

concentrate on the mechanisms of coup d’état.

An aim of the author of this book is to present strictly theoretical political

science analyses of coup d’état or, at least, to put down the bases upon which it

is possible to construct a theory of coup d’état. Such a theory shall firstly

consider the essence of coup d’état as a method of gaining power and,

consequently, address its specificity. The study shall also point out the

similarities and differences existing between coup d’état and other phenomena,

such as revolution, rebellion, civil war and guerilla warfare, which result in the

destruction of an existing political order or its substantial transformation.

Finally, it shall address the mechanisms of coup d’état, which determine its

success or failure. The structure of the book is organized to meet these

assumptions and the following needs of the analysis.

In Poland, there is a certain tradition of coup d’état. A dramatic attempt to

save the independent state at the end of the First Republic (Pierwsza

Rzeczypospolita), which had its climax with the passing of the Constitution on

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the 3rd of May 1791, was conducted in an atmosphere of coup d’état - the

systemic reforms were carried out in a manner strongly violating the existing

legal and institutional order. More than one hundred and twenty years later, two

months after regaining Poland’s independence, a group of right-wing political

activists, led by Colonel Marian Junasztajtis and Prince Eustachy Sapieha,

unsuccessfully attempted to pursue a coup d’état and gain power during the

night from the 4th to the 5th of January 1919. In May 1926, the main protagonist

of the independent Poland, Marshal Józef Pi�sudski, disenchanted by a weak and

ineffective democracy, took over state power using a coup d’état, which took the

form of a short, but intensive, civil war (379 killed, 920 wounded).

On December 13, 1981, the general of the army, Wojciech Jaruzelski,

introduced martial law in defense of a weakening communist regime, by which

he seriously violated effective legal norms, including the Constitution of the

Polish People’s Republic. Jaruzelski’s actions have been presented abroad and

also in Poland as a coup d’état. For example, the famous and recognized

historian Norman Davies, who specializes on Poland, said that the imposition of

martial law was “the best coup d’état in the history of modern Europe.“3

However, to call the imposition of martial law a coup d’état is completely

incorrect, because from the modern point of view we talk about a coup d’état

only if it results in a change of state power and the destruction of the status quo.

Thus, coup d’état is not defined by activities which aim to save the existing

political regime, even if they were conducted in opposition to effective laws,

which was the case in Poland in 1981. Jaruzelski’s steps can neither be

understood as a so-called self-coup, which is a very atypical form of coup d’état

- though there are a few, but not primary, similarities. Although the actor of a

self-coup is the head of state who in defense of his interests and political

3 Gazeta Wyborza, 13-14 September 2008.

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calculations focuses on spreading his power and eliminating control, sometimes

drastically violating the law, the essence of self-coup lies in the fact that one

state institution goes against other state institutions, resulting in a change of the

existing constitutional order and political transformations. This was not the case

in Poland in December 1981. General Jaruzelski forced a solution for the

situation based on his power, and it was unanimously accepted by all state

institutions, which saw it as their rescue. A whole governing group thus

identified with the illegal movement of its leader. This group not only preserved

its position, but as a consequence of the neutralization of an anti-regime,

democratic opposition, it also reinforced its position.

After the system transformation in Poland in the year 1989, coup d’état,

unexpectedly, became a frequently used expression and an integral part of

political vocabulary. At times, various politicians, whose political positions had

been weakened or who had been explicitly pushed away from the power

structures, threatened loudly with a coup d’état, claiming themselves to be its

purported victims. Naturally, such statements were not supported by any

arguments, and they represent a flagrant abuse of the term. The fact that

prominent actors of political life at that time often used the term coup d’état

shows, on the one hand, their low level of education which resulted in them

claiming a term they did not understand; while on the other hand, and this is

even more important, it, unfortunately, shows a low level of maturity within the

Polish democratic political system. These reasons together require that an

analysis of the phenomenon of coup d’état not only attract the attention of

researchers, but with regards to Polish political experience, it should become a

necessity. Since, within political competition in Poland, we still encounter the

temptation to resort to coup d’état, though only verbally - but knowing that from

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words to acts it is never too far - then the analysis of this phenomenon is

important also with respect to the refinement of political thought and action.

Coup d’état is not an unknown phenomenon in the context of other

countries of Central and Eastern Europe either. In the Baltics coups d’état have

taken place quite often, some of them successful, some not. Similarly so in

Bulgaria and Romania, while to the contrary in Hungary, where the long-time

dictatorship of Miklós Horthy had effectively controlled political life and nipped

any expression of political opposition in the bud. However, certain signs of coup

d’état appeared in Horthy`s government itself. When, in October 1944, after

Horthy had announced the end of Hungarian participation in the Second World

War, he was removed from his office by the fascist movement Arrow Cross,

which was led by Ferenc Szálasi, who governed the country under the protection

of a German occupation army. Even in Czechoslovakia, which enjoyed the

reputation of an oasis of democracy in the whole region of Central and Eastern

Europe, there was an attempt of a coup d’état, though this was a theatrical

matter. Over the night from the 21st to the 22nd of January 1933, a group of

fascist conspirators, led by Lieutenant Ladislav Kobsinka, tried to organize a

coup d’état in Brno, which ended up being a total disgrace. Speaking of

Czechoslovakia, however, it must be mentioned that the way in which

communists came to power after the Second World War represented a classic

form of coup d’état, which was quite a political rarity in this part of the world.

The author of this book would like to thank several people. These are the

reviewers of the text doc. PhDr. Stanislav Balík, PhD. and prof. dr. hab. Micha�

Choro�nicki. Other assistants include prof. dr. hab. Antoni Dudek, doc. dr. hab.

Artur Gruszczak, dr. Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka, doc. PhDr. Michal Kubát, Ph.D.,

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prof. dr. hab. Zbigniew Rudnicki and prof. dr. hab. Jan Wiktor Tkaczy�ski.

Without their kind support it would not have been possible to have access to

many books, publications and materials necessary for a theoretical examination

of the phenomenon of coup d’état. I am indebted to doc. PhDr. Ji�í Vykoukal

Ph.D. for enabling to publication of the book in English. Moreover, I thank Mrs.

Zuzana Lamošová for her wonderful translation of my work from Czech to

English. Also I am grateful to Mrs. Iwona Bzowska for technical assistance.

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