Coursebook in Land Ownership-signed

8/18/2019 Coursebook in Land Ownership-signed

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COURSEBOOK ON THE LAW ON LAND OWNERSHIPAND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Atty. Pedro Jose F. Bernardo

This text is for limited and exclusive use, and is intended only for theclass in Land Titles and Deeds taught by Atty. Bernardo at the FEU – LaSalle Joint MBA-JD Program. It is still a work-in-progress. Unauthorizedcopying and distribution is strictly prohibited.


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PART IOWNERSHIP OF LAND IN THE PHILIPPINES


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CHAPTER I

THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUTION

1. THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

The Regalian Doctrine or Jura Regalia is a principle in law that requires persons claimingprivate ownership over land to show incontrovertible title thereto that must be based onsome grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the AmericanColonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic.1 It was initially applied tothe Philippines under the Novisima Recopliacion de Leyes delas Indias,2 which asserted thatthe King of Spain, as the Head of State, and by discovery and conquest, had the supremepower and ownership over anything of value, including the land, waters, and naturalresources in the islands.

“We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royalpredecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crownand patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without properand true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in orderthat after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias,and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,and commons in those places which are peopled, taking intoconsideration not only their present condition, but also their future andtheir probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may benecessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they nowhave and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands mayremain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.”

With the change in sovereignty from the Spanish Crown, to the American colonialgovernment to the present constitutional system of government in the Philippines, theconcept of Jura Regalia was adopted to vest ownership from King to State. This wasinitially expressed in the 1935 Constitution when it asserted that “[a]ll agriculturaltimber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, andother mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of thePhilippines belong to the State. . .”3 At a time when the Philippines was still under theUnited States as a colonial power, the purpose of this provision was to nationalize andthereby assert sovereignty over the use and disposition of natural resources, reservingtheir ownership to the State, and allowing utilization only to citizens of the Philippines.4

1 PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15, cited inseparate opinion of Kapunan, J. in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources.

2 Law 14, Title 12, Book 43 Article XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution.4 Cruz case


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The present 1987 Constitution, like the 1973 Constitution, reaffirms this adherence to theRegalian Doctrine by providing: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or time,wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.”5 Thisownership, according to the case of Lee Hong Hok v. David, reflects the capacity of state to

own or acquire property and is understood under the concept of dominium.

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK , ET AL. v. ANIANO DAVID , ET AL. G.R. No. L-30389, 27 December 1972

FERNANDO, J p:

Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision ofrespondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgmentdismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of respondentAniano David declared null and void. What makes the task forpetitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretensionto ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected byrespondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they mustperforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished byunorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by thegovernment through the appropriate public officials exercising thecompetence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on thepremise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing intoprivate ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such anassumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. Itcannot receive our assent. We affirm.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lowercourt makes clear that there is no legal justification for nullifying the rightof respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grantmade in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision underreview, he "acquired lawful title thereto pursuant to his miscellaneoussales application in accordance with which an order of award and forissuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on June 18,1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which isa portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order ofaward of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent

No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register ofDeeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21,1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the salesapplication of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connectionwith said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in hisfavor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse

5 Article XII, Section2, 1987 Constitution.


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claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration andissuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on apublic land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes underthe operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards providedtherein . . . Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the

validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised withinone year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter thecertificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible . . . In this case theland in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustainedthe public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation. . . .The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action forreconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any fraudcommitted by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for thepurchase of the land involved through his Miscellaneous SalesApplication No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau ofLands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything wasdone in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land werepublished, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were notclandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of theGovernment. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife'sapplication, and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938."

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2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outrightrejection, of the well-known distinction in public law between thegovernment authority possessed by the state which is appropriately

embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own oracquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. Theformer comes under the heading of imperium and the latter ofdominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to landsheld by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it mayprovide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. DeanPound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval erabetween such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as acorollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was concerned, therewas a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, a

case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied theuniversal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown . . ." Thatwas a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted bythe present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state assuch rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served toconfirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leadingcase of Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decreescited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in


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these words: "We having acquired in sovereignty over the Indies, and alllands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royalpredecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crownand patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without properand true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us,

in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking intoconsideration not only their present condition, but also their future andtheir probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may benecessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they nowhave and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands mayremain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that "as tothe unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the solepower of legislation is vested in Congress, . . ." They continue to possessthat character until severed therefrom by state grant. Where, as in thiscase, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was theresult of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land isundeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that theproperty in question was ever acquired by the applicants or theirancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or bypossessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition ofpublic lands, the property must be held to be public domain." For it iswell-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private personswithout any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is

indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or anyother mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatementof the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "Theapplicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northernportion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and therebeing no showing that the same has been acquired by any private personfrom the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is andremains part of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment oferror is devoid of merit.

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WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costsagainst petitioners-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.


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The application of the Regalian Doctrine on the ownership by the State of the publicdomain implies that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domainmust be able to show title from the State according to any of the recognized modes ofacquisition of title. Thus, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within privateownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such presumption,

incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESv. ALEXANDRA LAO G.R. No. 150413, 1 July 2003.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This petition for review assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment 2 of the RegionalTrial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No.TG-719.

On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the RegionalTrial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for theregistration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad.452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousandthree hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential DecreeNo. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from thesiblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, whoinherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the landfrom her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto

Perido by transfer.

In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to herunder the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, alsoknown as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessor's open,public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possessionand occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty(30) years.

At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the followingwitnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land

by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified onrespondent's purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria;and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her applicationfor registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed ofAbsolute Sale 3 dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoriain her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property,and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as herpredecessors-in-interest.


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On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:

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The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this applicationfor registration and thus places under the operation of Act141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known asProperty Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand threehundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported byits technical description now forming part of the record ofthis case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the nameof ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married toNELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, thecorresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of theSolicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketedas CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate courtaffirmed the judgment of the trial court. 6 Hence, this petition for review

raising the following errors:

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In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondentwas able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that shemet the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notoriouspossession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and(b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject ofher application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.

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Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the landsubject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land ofthe public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in ourConstitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which isthe source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands notappearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong


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to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified oralienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of theinalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption,incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable.

In De Ocampo v. Arlos, it was held that:

. . . a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 ofthe Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands ofthe public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified andconsidered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof inthe concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripeninto ownership and be registered as a title. Verily,Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act by specifically declaring that the latterapplied only to alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain.

In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate governmentagency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable anddisposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submittedthe survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which containedno information regarding the classification of the property. Thesedocuments are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the landsought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification

stating that the land is open for disposition because no opposition to herapplication was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. Sheclaims that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the publicdomain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to privateownership.

As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had theinitial obligation to show that the property involved is agricultural. Beingthe interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the landbeing registered is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on themere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of

the public domain. Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar , we held:

It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule thatafter an applicant files his application for registration, theburden shifts totally to the government to prove that theland forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The rulingin Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title.


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The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming thepresumption that the land sought to be registered formspart of the public domain.

Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of

no moment because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,mistake or error of its officials or agents.

It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and itsconversion into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or otherpurposes requires an express and positive act from the government. Itcannot be presumed; but must be established by convincing proof.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Thedecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over LotNo. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which wasdocketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional TrialCourt of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESv. LUDOLFO V. MUÑOZ G.R. No. 151910, 15 October 2007

AZCUNA, J p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the August 29, 2001Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as wellas its January 29, 2002 Resolution, which affirmed the October 3, 1997Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13,granting the application for land registration of respondent Ludolfo V.Muñoz.

The following facts prompted the present controversy.

On June 14, 1996, respondent filed an Application for Registration of Titleof a parcel of residential land before the RTC of Ligao, Albay containingan area of 1,986 square meters situated, bounded, and described asfollows: xxx

In his application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgageor encumbrance of any kind affects his property and that no other personhas an interest, legal or equitable, on the subject lot. Respondent further


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declared that the property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executedby the spouses Apolonio R. Muñoz and Anastacia Vitero on November18, 1956, and that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest havebeen in possession thereof since time immemorial for more than 70 years.

On November 7, 1996, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through theOffice of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on thefollowing grounds:

(1) That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have beenin open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto(Sec. 48[b], C.A. 141 as amended by P.D. 1073).

(2) That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s receipt/s ofapplication/s, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do notconstitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the lands acquired for or his open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in theconcept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. Saidmuniment/s of title as well as the title do not appear to be genuineand that the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicatethe pretended possession of application to be of recent vintage.

(3) That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish titleor grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed tofile an appropriate application for registration within the period of six(6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. From

the records, it appears that the instant application was recently filed.

(4) That the parcel applied for is part of the public domain belonging tothe Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

(5) That this application was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the periodset forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073 and therefore, is filed out of time.

In respondent's Answer to Opposition, he professed that the land inquestion is a residential lot originally owned and possessed by PaulinoPulvinar and Geronimo Lozada. Sometime in April 1917, Pulvinar sold

his share of the unregistered land to the spouses Muñoz and Vitero,respondent's parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his remainingpart to the parents of respondent. Thereafter, the ownership andpossession of the property were consolidated by the spouses anddeclared for taxation purposes in the name of Muñoz in 1920.Furthermore, it was stated that during the cadastral survey conducted inLigao, Albay in 1928, the land was designated as Lot No. 2276, as perSurvey Notification Card issued to Muñoz dated October 2, 1928. Finally,


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respondent contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of application,the land taxes for the property had been fully paid.

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During the trial, respondent was presented as the sole witness.Respondent, who was 81 years old at that time, testified that he acquiredthe property in 1956 when his parents donated the same to him. Hepresented as Exhibit "H" 9 Tax Declaration No. 048-0267, evidencing thepayment of realty taxes for Lot No. 2276 in 1997. A Certification from theOffice of the Municipal Treasurer 10 was likewise introduced by therespondent showing the payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to theyear 1997. He further declared that the property is a residential land withimprovements such as a house made of solid materials and fruit-bearingtrees. In 1957, respondent told the court that he constructed a concretewall surrounding the entire property. Respondent also narrated that hegrew up on the subject lot and spent his childhood days in the area.

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On June 16, 1997, the trial court noted a Report submitted by the Directorof Lands, which informed the court that as per records of the LandManagement Bureau in Manila, Lot No. 2276, CAD-239 is covered by FreePatent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero.

The RTC rendered a Decision dated October 3, 1997 granting theapplication for registration. xxx

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot because: (1) the notice of initial hearingwas not timely filed; (2) the applicant failed to present the original tracingcloth plan of the property sought to be registered during the trial; and (3)the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable anddisposable.

Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. Theappellate court explained that there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with asmandated under Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Furthermore,

the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subjectproperty did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on theapplication in question. Lastly, the CA ruled that respondent need notadduce documentary proof that the disputed property had been declaredalienable and disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once beencovered by free patent application; hence, this alone is conclusiveevidence that the property was already declared by the government asopen for public disposition.


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The petitioner, through the OSG, raises the following grounds for thepetition:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THETRIAL COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THECASE.

II.PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENTEVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLEPROPERTY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

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Anent the second issue, petitioner stresses that in proving the alienableand disposable nature of the property, there has to be a certification fromthe Department of Environment and Natural Resources and CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO).

The CA is of the opinion that respondent need not adduce documentaryproofs that the disputed property has been declared alienable anddisposable because of the fact that it had once been covered by FreePatent Application No. 10-2-664 in the name of respondent's mother,which was unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities. TheCA declares that this is proof enough that the property was declared bythe government as open for public disposition. This contention was

adopted by the respondent both in his Comment and Memorandum filedbefore the Court.

Notwithstanding all the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argumentof respondent that the subject property was already declared alienableand disposable land.

Petitioner is correct when it remarked that it was erroneous for theappellate court to assume that the property in question is alienable anddisposable based only on the Report dated May 21, 1997 of the Director ofLands indicating that the "land involved in said case described as Lot

2276, CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 ofAnastacia Vitero."

It must be pointed out that in its Report 26 dated March 6, 1997, the LRAstated that:


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“3. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcelof land subject of registration is already covered by land patent,previously approved isolated survey and is within forest zone.

WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the

same parcel of land and the issuance of titles for lands within the forestzone which have not been released and classified as alienable, theforegoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court with therecommendation that the Lands Management Bureau, Manila,Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, LandsManagement Sector and Forest Management Bureau, all in Legazpi City,be ordered to submit a report to the Court on the status of the landapplied for, to determine whether or not said land or any portion thereof,is already covered by land patent, previously approved isolated surveyand is within the forest zone and that should the instant application begiven due course, the application in Cad. Case No. 53, Cadastral RecordNo. 1404 with respect to Lot 2276 be dismissed.”

Noteworthy is the fact that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRAattested that the land subject of this proceeding is alienable or disposable.

For clarity, applications for confirmation of imperfect title must be able toprove the following: (1) that the land forms part of the alienable anddisposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (2) that they havebeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either sincetime immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, remainsto this day the existing general law governing the classification anddisposition of lands of the public domain, other than timber and minerallands. 29 Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classifylands of the public domain into "alienable and disposable" lands of thepublic domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable andoutside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes thePresident to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession."Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open fordisposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited andclassified."

Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands ofthe public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any assertedright to ownership of land. Therefore, all lands not appearing to beclearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or releasedas alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the Stateremain part of the alienable public domain.


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As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquiredby private persons without any grant, express or implied, from thegovernment; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title topublic land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any

other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the landsubject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant mustestablish the existence of a positive act of the government such as apresidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislativeact or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from theGovernment that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.

In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from theproper government agency to prove that the land subject for registrationis indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate, whichrespondent failed to secure, could have evidenced the alienability of theland involved.

Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of thealienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Courtcannot approve the application for registration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, thedecision dated August 29, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CVNo. 58170, as reiterated in its resolution of January 29, 2002, isREVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration filed byrespondent Ludolfo V. Muñoz is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

2. LIMITATIONS ON, AND EXCLUSIONS FROM, THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

a. Constitutional Limitations

By virtue of the State’s power of dominium over the public domain, it could therebyexercise its rights of ownership, which include the power to exploit, develop andalienate such natural resources. The Constitution, however, provides for specificlimitations to such power of dominium. These are enumerated in Sections 2 and 3 ofArticle XII.


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“SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resourcesare owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all othernatural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,

and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control andsupervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharingagreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at leastsixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Suchagreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms andconditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights forirrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than thedevelopment of water power, beneficial use may be the measure andlimit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagicwaters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its useand enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of naturalresources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, withpriority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-ownedcorporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-

scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditionsprovided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth andgeneral welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shallpromote the development and use of local scientific and technicalresources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into inaccordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.”

“SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,

forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands ofthe public domain may be further classified by law according to the useswhich they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shallbe limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations maynot hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for aperiod not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more thantwenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred


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hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, anddevelopment, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the

Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domainwhich may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditionstherefor.”

These constitutional limitations on the State's power to alienate agricultural lands of thepublic domain is intended to prevent monopoly and foreign control of our naturalresources, as well as to enable the government to control the exploitation, developmentand utilization thereof for the benefit of all.6 Thus, with reference to the RegalianDoctrine and applied to lands of the public domain, these Constitutional provisionsprovide that while no public land can be acquired or held by private persons withoutany grant, express or implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable landsof the public domain may be the subject of such grant. Furthermore, the grantees ofsuch land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the citizenship requirementsprescribed by the Constitution. Similarly, the Constitution provides for restrictions onthe size or area of public land that may be transferred to or held by qualified persons,subejct to further regulation by Congress. These Constitutional restrictions can thereforebe summarized, as follows:

(a) Only agricultural lands of the public domain are alienable.

(b) Only Filipino corporations and citizens, whether natural-born or naturalized,may hold agricultural lands of the public domain; provided, that:

(i) Filipino corporations can only lease agricultural lands of the publicdomain for a period of twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand (1,000) hectares in area; and,

(ii) Filipino citizens can lease agricultural lands of the public domain in anarea not to exceed five hundred (500) hectares, and own not more thantwelve (12) hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

b. Ancestral Lands

It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian Doctrine, the

Supreme Court held that the doctrine did not intend to strip the natives of theirownership of lands already belonging to them before the Spanish conquest. This wasthe ruling in the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909), wherethe United States Supreme Court ruling upon an appeal from the Court of First Instanceof the Province of Benguet, said:

6 Heirs of Gamos, et al. vs. Heirs of Frando, et al., 447 SCRA 136 [2004].


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“[W]hen, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been heldby individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed tohave been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest andnever have been public land.”

Consequently, such land, if not owned by the State at the time of the Spanish conquest,could not have been ceded by Spain to the United States through the Treaty of Paris, andlater, to the Philippine Government by the time of the Commonwealth.

MATEO CARINO v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an application to the Philippine court of land registration for theregistration of certain land. The application was granted by the court onMarch 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the court of first instance of theprovince of Benguet, on behalf of the government of the Philippines, andalso on behalf of the United States, those governments having takenpossession of the property for public and military purposes. The court offirst instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon groundsof law. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court (7 Philippine,132 ), and the case then was brought here by writ of error.

The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in erroris an Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more thanfifty years before the treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899 [30 Stat. at L. 1754], asfar back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the

land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintainedfences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of thecountry, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date.His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle,and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognizedas owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land fromhis father, in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title,however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royaldecrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps,information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be

occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated,-a purpose that hasbeen carried out by the Philippine government and the United States. In1901 the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgagelaw, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however,establishing only a possessory title, it is said.

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We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below,-namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of thegovernment, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had titleto all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permitprivate titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the

Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, requiredregistration within a limited time to make the title good; that theplaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was notalways, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain,and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government isbound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so farcorrect that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at thedate of the treaty of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is notto be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It istrue that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudaltheory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the generalattitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitledto the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization withthemselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute,and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spainasserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against theinhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain hadsuch power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question ofstrength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insistupon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, andhow far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.

The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the SolicitorGeneral, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never wasbrought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. Itseems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not havegranted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly theplaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have madehis title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technicalposition of Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United States,he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the presentgovernment seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount

to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island ofLuzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards wouldnot have permitted and had not the power to enforce.

The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the whiterace in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shownto the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites inAmerica was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the


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reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, wesuppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramountnecessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands isto do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. Bythe organic act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. at L. 691, all the

property and rights acquired there by the United States are to beadministered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable tosuppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regardto what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what itwill claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodyingthe safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extendsthose safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in saidislands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equalprotection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quotedfrom, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare inthe next breath that 'any person' did not embrace the inhabitants ofBenguet, or that it meant by 'property' only that which had become suchby ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants neverhad heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, bynative custom and by long association,-one of the profoundest factors inhuman thought,-regarded as their own.

It is true that, by the government of the Philippines is empowered toenact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands wheresome, but not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issuepatents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands actuallyoccupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this

section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where theoccupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had notcontinued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as togive rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at thatdate. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every nativewho had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all thewilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from theprovision that we have quoted as to the administration of the propertyand rights acquired by the United States, such land and property as shallbe designated by the President for military or other reservations, as thisland since has been. But there still remains the question what property

and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.

Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go nofurther than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is andought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back astestimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under aclaim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the


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same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have beenpublic land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity inthe Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought notto carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even

beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it isunnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wildtribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power andinclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yetsanctioned the same course as the proper one 'for the benefit of theinhabitants thereof.'

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do notdiscover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us thathe does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws citedby the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly thatthe natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of anyroyal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the nativeinhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will.For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de lasIndias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3Philippine, 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seemsproper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm thosewho hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins bythe characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of alltitles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. Thefact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to thepowers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754,cited in 3 Philippine, 546: 'Where such possessors shall not be able toproduce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancientpossession, as a valid title by prescription.' It may be that this meanspossession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted.As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws ofSpain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it wasrecognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain hadonly a paper sovereignty.

The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for theadjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals inthe Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that,for private ownership, there must have been a grant by competentauthority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legaleffects, those who have been in possession for certain times shall bedeemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, isenough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went


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into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very termsof the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require theadjustment or registration proceedings that it described, and in that wayto require every one to get a document of title or lose his land. Thatpurpose may have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to

have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made'for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by privateindividuals.' (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It doesnot appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. InArticle 6 it is provided that 'interested parties not included within the twopreceding articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty andthirty years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the fullownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to beconducted in the following manner.' This seems, by its very terms, not toapply to those declared already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands ofwhich they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, andthreatens that the treasury 'will reassert the ownership of the state overthe lands,' and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. Theapplicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any suchproceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should benoted that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by thereport of the council of state. That report puts forward as a reason for theregulations that, in view of the condition of almost all property in thePhilippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules, on theprinciple that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely allpossession; recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, asadopted in the decree; and then suggests that interested parties not

included in those articles may legalize their possession and acquireownership by adjustment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'whomay prove' possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook theargument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It maybe that an English conveyancer would have recommended an applicationunder the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to conveyto the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessionswere in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be

taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There areindications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient toshow that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. Theeffect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply toestablish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. Theroyal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that werecapable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment hadnot been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the


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withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never wasdisturbed. This same decree is quoted by the court of land registration foranother recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty years as stillrunning against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish lawpresent a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legaltradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice thepossible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congressestablishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon aconsideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justicerequire that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and shouldnot be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whomhe lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almostforgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.

OH CHO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. No. 48321, 31 August 1946

PADILLA, J p:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of aresidential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province ofTayabas, in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of

title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring landsof the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have beenin open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from1880 to the filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent andadds that the lower court committed an error in not declaring null andvoid the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or shouldit not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of thePublic Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may beconfirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he orany of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from theGovernment, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and


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decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, orby possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496).All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either bypurchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to therule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an

occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, forsuch possession would justify the presumption that the land had neverbeen part of the public domain or that it had been a private property evenbefore the Spanish conquest. (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449;53 Law. ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, forthe earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest beganin 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question iswhether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under theprovisions of the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141). Under the provisions ofthe Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree ofregistration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiringlands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to prove title to the lot and has invoked theprovisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to makepronouncement in this case on the nature, character or classification ofthe lot sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act theapplicant's immediate predecessors in interest would have been entitledto a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration;

and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediatepredecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also tohave been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Actfor applicant's immediate predecessors in interest are or constitute a grantor concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right undersuch benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest shouldcomply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. Thecondition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of whichthey had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This theapplicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did nothave any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was

transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, istheir possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors ininterest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for itsregistration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have beendeclared null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for theannulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the


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court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this casewhere the vendors do not even object to the application filed by thevendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration

dismissed, without costs.Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

The doctrine laid down in Cariño was subsequently cited by members of the SupremeCourt in upholding the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8371 or IndigenousPeople’s Rights Act of 1997 (the “IPRA”). In a suit filed by former Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz, the constitutionality of IPRA was assailed on the ground that itdeprived the state of ownership over lands of public domain and natural resourcescontained therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine. The votes were deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the validity of the IPRA was upheld.

ISAGANI CRUZ AND CESAR EUROPA v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES , ET AL.

G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000.

PER CURIAM p:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit forprohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing theconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing

Rules).

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of theIPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to anunlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the publicdomain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, inviolation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of theConstitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestraldomains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;TECcHA

"(2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that ancestraldomains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral andother resources found within ancestral domains are private butcommunity property of the indigenous peoples;


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"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines thecomposition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the

indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of theindigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenouspeoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration ofminerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be theirancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the development and utilization of naturalresources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for notmore than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility tomaintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains andportions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest coveror reforestation."

Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassingdefinition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might eveninclude private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)violate the rights of private landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining thepowers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary lawapplicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains andancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the dueprocess clause of the Constitution.

These provisions are:

"(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation andrecognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole

authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that aparticular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to thefollowing officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and NaturalResources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;


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"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practicesof indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to propertyrights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of landdisputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof

shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall beused to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claimsand disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of theNCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that"the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the Presidentis characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes ofpolicy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringesupon the President's power of control over executive departments underSection 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted asfollows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago

join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challengedprovisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III ofNCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules andRegulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which hecontends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scaleexploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction withSection 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, JusticeMendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it doesnot raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing toquestion the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. JusticePanganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 areunconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality ofSections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await thefiling of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated bythe IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view


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that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. JusticesMelo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., join in the separateopinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was

not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, afterredeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant toRule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition isDISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinionsof Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Yñares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

In upholding the Constitutionality of the statute, Justice Raynato Puno, calling the IPRA“a novel piece of legislation,” recognized the presumption that land (1) as far back astestimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership to “never havebeen public land.” Thus tracing the development of the State’s treatment of indigenouspeoples from the Spanish period to the present, Justice Puno recognized the concept ofnative title of indigenous peoples over lands held since time immemorial.

This was echoed by Justice Santiago Kapunan noted that title to land by indigenouspeoples in the Philippine has been recognized since colonial times. Justice Kapunan

said:

“Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdingsincluding native land occupancy. Thus, the Recopilacion de Leyes de lasIndias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the natives.The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to landin the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, providedthat all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize theirpossession by means of adjustment proceedings, and within the periodspecified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwiseknown as the Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of

adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment wasnot sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law,it was held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should notbe construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of theprivilege of registering such title.

Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of thePhilippines to the United States, contrary to petitioners' assertion that the


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US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latter's rightsover lands of the public domain. Under the Treaty of Paris of December10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right toproperty existing at the time. During the American colonial regime,native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of

1902 provided that property and rights acquired by the US throughcession from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of theFilipinos. In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley'sInstructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill ofrights embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of theserights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every division and branchof the American colonial government in the Philippines, was that "noperson shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due processof law." These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples overtheir ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly established inlaw.”

In undermining the strength of the doctrine laid down in Cariño, Justice Vitug arguedthat the judicial pronouncements in the case antedate the provisions of the 1935Constitution which first categorically declared the State’s ownership of all lands andnatural resources in the Philippines. In the mind of Justice Vitug, a judicial decision,such as the case of Cariño, “cannot override the collective will of the people expressed inthe Constitution.” This was also the view of Justice Artemio Panganiban whoconsidered the doctrine in Cariño modified or superseded by the 1935, 1973 and 1987Constitutions. “Its ratio,” according to Justice Panganiban, “should be understood asreferring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by

citizens.”

Pertinently, the IPRA defines ancestral lands as land occupied, possessed and utilized byindividuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous cultral communitiessince time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, underclaims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present,including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,swidden farms and tree lots.7

c. Ecclesiastical Property

In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands held bypersons through native title, properties of the Roman Catholic Church prior to theAmerican occupation are also not considered public land or land owned by the State.The reason is because it was the Church and not the King of Spain that was the owner ofsuch ecclesiastical property during the time of the Spanish occupation. Therefore

7 Republic Act No. 8371, Section 3(b).


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ecclesiastical property was never public land and could not have been transferred to theUnited States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

JORGE BARLIN v. VICENTE RAMIREZ AND THE MUNICIPALITY OFLAGONOY

G.R. No. L-2832, 24 November 1906

WILLARD, J p:

There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo ofLagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuiltbetween 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by theorder of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for thisreconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction ofthe cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in thepueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation,for forty days every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of thesebuildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material necessarywas brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds ofthe church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo.After the completion of the church it was always administered, untilNovember 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and allthe people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church.

The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parishpriest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. headministered it as such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th

day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, thelatter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of thechurch, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels,money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a writtendocument of that date, refused to make such delivery. xxx

In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant,Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman CatholicChurch was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, thebooks, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it berestored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an

account of the property which he had received and which was retainedby him, and for other relief.

The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial ofthe allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possessionand administration of the property described therein with the authorityof the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, whowere the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been


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presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality ofLagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the caseand join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. Thispetition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filedan answer in which it alleged that the defendant, Ramirez, was in

possession of the property described in the complaint under the authorityand with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that suchmunicipality was the owner thereof.

Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the casewas tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiffand against the defendants. The defendants then brought the case here bya bill of exceptions.

That the person in the actual possession of the church and other propertydescribed in the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainlyestablished by the evidence. It does not appear that the municipality, as acorporate body, ever took any action in reference to this matter until theypresented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnessesfor the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, saythat they are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, thepresident, said that the municipality as a corporation had nothingwhatever to do with the matter. That the resolution adopted on the 14thof November, and which has been quoted above, was not the action of themunicipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection thereof.

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There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.

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(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership everadmitting that the Spanish Government was the owner of theproperty and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the AmericanGovernment. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law, theSpanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, wasnot the owner of this property, nor of any other property like it,situated in the Philippine Islands.

It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parishchurches in the Philippine Islands were built by the SpanishGovernment. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws ofthe Indies is, in part, as follows:

"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parishhouses of the Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions


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from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royaltreasury, and applied for their service and maintenance thepart of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic concessionaccording to the division we have made."

Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches suchas the one in question. That law is as follows:

"The parish churches which was erected in Spanish townsshall be of durable and decent construction. Their costs shallbe divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury,another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the placewhere such churches are constructed, and the other part by theIndians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city,village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated toour royal crown, we command that for our part there becontributed the same amount as the residents andencomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents whohave no Indians shall also contribute for this purpose inaccordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is sogiven shall be deducted from the share of the Indians shouldpay."

Law 11 of the same title is as follows:

"We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to thefund for the erection of churches shall be given to theirsuperintendents to be expended for those things necessary for

these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials,and by their warrants, and not otherwise. And we request andcharge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in thecollection and disbursement thereof, but to guard thesestructures."

Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:

"In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shallbe erected a church where mass can be decently held, and itshall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact that it

be the subject to or separate from a parish."

Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by theKing and under his direction, but it was made unlawful to erect achurch without the license of the King. This provision is contained inLaw 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:


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"Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, andmaintain all cathedrals, parish churches, monasteries, votivehospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishmentswhere they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, andpreaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith,

and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury wheneverpossible, and to receive information of such places where theyshould be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiasticalpatronage of all our Indies belonging to us:

"We command that there shall not be erected, instituted,founded, or maintained any cathedral, parish church,monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious orreligious establishment without our express permission as isprovided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book,notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by ourviceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke andmake null, void, and of no effect."

By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown ofSpain, all tithes in the Indies were given by the former to the latterand the disposition made the King of the fund thus created isindicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows:

"Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to usby the apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs, wecommand the officials of our royal treasury of those provincesto collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become

due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner inwhich it has been the custom to pay the same, and from thesetithes the churches shall be provided with competent personsof good character to serve them and with all ornaments andthings which may be necessary for divine worship, to the endthat these churches may be well served and equipped, and weshall be informed of God, our Lord; this order shall beobserved where the contrary has not already been directed byus in connection with the erection of churches."

That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the

Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by the royalorder of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal order of the 13th ofAugust, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair of churches,there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force inthe Philippines.

This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines,having been erected by the Spanish Government, and under its


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direction, the next question to be considered is, To whom did thesechurches belong?

Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and,after discussing what can be called public property and what can be

called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of those things which aresacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows:

Law XII. — HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CANNOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.

"No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service ofGod, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it beconsidered as included in his property holdings. Although thepriests may have such things in their possession, yet they arenot the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians orservants, or because they have the care of the same and serveGod in or without them. Hence they were allowed to takefrom the revenues of the church and lands what wasreasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belongingto God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as thefeeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, themarrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evilwomen because of their poverty, and for the redemption ofcaptives and the repairing of the churches, and the buying ofchalices, clothing, books, and others things which they mightbe in need of, and other similar charitable purposes."

And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in towhich this law has divided these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28,third partida, consecrated things. That law is as follows:

"Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by thebishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices,censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are intended for the service of the church, and the title to thesethings can not be alienated except in certain specific cases aswe have already shown in the first partida of this book by thelaws dealing with this subject. We say further that even where

a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon which itformerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if anyconsecrated church should fall into the hands of the enemiesof our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred as long asthe enemy has it under control, although once recovered bythe Christians, it will again become sacred, reverting to itscondition before the enemy seized it and shall have all theright and privileges formerly belonging to it."


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The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of thePhilippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated

objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. They werenot public property, nor could they be subjects of private property inthe sense that any private person could the owner thereof. Theyconstituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which wasthat it was devoted to the worship of God.

But, being material things was necessary that some one should havethe care and custody of them and the administration thereof, and thequestion occurs, To whom, under the Spanish law, was intrusted thatpossession and administration? For the purposes of the Spanish lawthere was only one religion. That was the religion professed by theRoman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion andfor the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches inthe Philippines were erected. The possession of the churches, theircare and custody, and the maintenance of religious worship thereinwere necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It was, by virtue ofthe laws of Spain, the only body which could under anycircumstances have possession of, or any control over, any churchdedicated to the worship

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