Cover: 1992 was labelled the "year of the woman," primarily because of thepolitical gains that women made in the 1992 elections. All of the papers includedin this edition of the Wittenberg History Journal are products of women on theWittenberg campus. It is only fitting that a monument dedicated to women wouldserve as a cover. The Madonna of the Trail can be found on U.S. Route 40 Westnear Snyder Park. It is a monument dedicated to the women who braved thefrontier west of the Appalachian Mountains in the early years of our country.

THE WITTENBERGHISTORY JOURNAL

Wittenberg University • Springfield, Ohio

Volume XXIISpring 1993

The 1993 Wittenberg History Journal is dedicatedto Dr. Cynthia Behnnan to commemorate her years

as a professor of history and inspirer of buddinghistorians. The staff and I would also like to thank herserving as the advisor of the History Journal. I wouldlike to thank the staff for all of their help; without theirhelp I could not have done this. I would also like tothank the individuals who submitted entries; the choicewas a tough one, but I am pleased with the result. Iwould also like to thank the History Department fortheir help. I would also like to thank Mrs. Kneisley in /the Publications Department. Finally, I would like tothank Erin Purdy, senior editor of the Journal, forthe advice and insights on all of the things that I wouldface.

Malykke Bacon

History Journal Staff

Editor ................................................................................... Malykke Bacon

Senior Editor ................................................................................ Erin Purdy

Faculty Advisor .......................................................... Dr. Cynthia Behrman

Table of Contents

An Expendable Woman: The Case Of Mary Surratt ......................................................................... 1

by Marg Sterling

To Cona'ol Athens: The Power Struggle over the Sicilian Expedition ............................................ 3

by Erin Pttrdy

Did Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Deserve To Die? ............................................................................ 7

by Molly Wilkinson

The Craft of History ........................................................................................................................ 13

A Deeper Cut: The Admission of the Two Separate German States into the UnitedNations in 1973 and Its Effects on the Hopes for German Reunification ............................... 15

by J. E. Clayton

William Lloyd Garrison and James Bimey:Two Opposing Views on the Abolition Movement ................................................................ 21

by Jennifer Garman

Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education;Immediate Reaction from May Through October, 1954 ........ : ................................................ 25

by Melissa Stull

The 1972 Prestdent al Campaign s Appeal to Women ................................................................... 3

by Pam Ehresman

Photographs courtesy of Alexis Edwards, Barry Jackish, and Jennifer Washburn.Illustrations courtesy of Michael Vermillion.

Address correspondence to:

EditorThe Wittenberg History JournalHistory DepartmentWittenberg UniversitySpringfield, Ohio 45501

An Expendable Woman: The Case of Mary Surrattby Marg Sterling

(This paper won the 1993 Hartje Award.)

It was a blistering July afternoon. The air was still-no breezeto afford even momentary relief. The crowds which hadbegun to assemble early that morning packed the courtyardand lined the brick wall overlooking iL Men unable toobtain passes climbed the masts of ships moored in a nearbyfiver in order to catch a glimpse of history. At 1:15 P.M.,the door to the Old Penitentiary opened. Mary Surratt,leaning heavily on a guard and a priest, was led in to thecourtyard. Clad in a plain black dress and bonnet, her facewas visible beneath the thin black veil. As she gazed up atthe wooden scaffolding, her lips began moving rapidly inprayer. Slowly she moved forward; past the sea of unknownfaces, past the four freshly dug graves flanked by fourhastily built pine coffins. Climbing the steps was difficult asMrs.Surratt was weak and her waist was girdled with irons.

Assisted to an armchair at the far end of the scaffold,Mrs. Surrat stared at the noose dangling before her. A wailescaped her lips, quieted only by a crucifix placed in herhands by her priesL While a guard shielded her from thescorching san with an umbrella, her arms and legs weretightly bound and a hood was drawn over her head. In afaint voice she cried, "Don't let me fall." 1 The order toproceed was issued by General Hancock, and at 1:25 onJuly 7, 1865, Mary E. Surratt became the ftrst womanexecuted by the United States government.

How did this respectable, middle aged mother of threecome to such an ignoble end? Was she really the "materfaro'tins of the criminals" or simply an expendable womansacrificed in the name of rellibotion? Mary EugeniaSurmtt was die widow of a drunken tavern owner. Unable tomaintain the farm and tavern left to her by her husband,Mrs. Surratt leased the property in Surmllsville to JohnLloyd and moved to Washington, D.C. There she opened aboarding house at 541 H Street. With the help of her son,John, and daughter, Anna, Mrs. Surratt maintained a"scrupulously neat and respectable establishment." 3 John, asouthern sympathizer, became enmeshed in the intrigue ofconveying information from Washington to theConfederacy. His friends and cohorts began frequenting theH Street house, whispering secretly in the small upstairsrooms. Among John's friends were John Wilkes Booth,Lewis Paine (who called kimself Wood and claimed to be a

Baptist preacher), David Herold, and George Alzearodt.When his mother became concerned about their secretivebehavior and frequent visits at odd hours, John Surrallassured her that they were all involved in an oil speculationdeal---nothing more.

In fact, these men were conspiring to abduct PresidentLincoln. When that plot failed in March, 1865, their planschanged to murder. There is tittle evidence to suggest thatMrs. Sun'ali knew the nature of these plans. Although shetreated John's friends with maternal affection, according toconspirator Lewis Paine, Mrs. Sarmll was never privy totheir plans or conversations.

In early April, John Surrallleft Washington forCanada. In his absence, Mrs. SurratL forced to handle herown business affairs, made several trips to Surmttsville tocollect money owed to her. It was on these business tripsthat Mrs. Surmll was reported to have passed incriminatinginformation and packages from Booth to John Lloyd.During her trial, Lloyd testified that Mrs. Surratt told himon April 14, 1865, to have the "shooting irons ready" forthat night. Mrs. Surmtt maintained that Booth's messagewas to have "things ready" for that night and that Lloydwould understand what "things" she meanL 4

Arrested for aiding, abetting, and harboring theconspirators (including her son, John, whose whereaboutswere unknown), Mrs. Surratt was tried in military court bynine hand-picked generals "organized to convict." 5 Herconviction was secured by the testimony of John Lloyd,whose complicity in the affair seems to have beenoverlooked. * Although her defense counsel presented thirtywitnesses who rebutted Lloyd's testimony and affrrmedMrs. Surratt's upstanding character, the star chamber ofjudges quickly reached a guilty verdict and sentenced Mrs.Surrall to hang.

It was strongly felt by many at that time that MarySurratt's conviction was merely a government ploy to flushout her son, John, whom they felt was the real conspirator.Few expected Mrs. Surratt to actually hang. In fact arecommendation for a stay of execution, signed by five ofthe convicting tribunal, was sent to President Johnson. Itremains unclear whether that request was purposelydiverted or whether it was intentionally ignored.

2 * The Wittenberg History Journal

So, on that oppressive July afternoon, with the pressand public clamoring for revenge in this "female fiendincarnate," Mary E. Surratt climbed the thirteen steps of her

destiny. 7 As the trap door beneath her feet was released,Mary Surmtt paid with her life for the sins of her son, hisfriends, and possibly for those of the entire Confederacy.

t "End Of The Assassins."New York Times, 18 July, 1865, 1.

2 "The Conspirators, Their Trial."New York Tirn s, 12 May,

1865, 1.

3 Champ Clark, ed. The Assassination (Alexandria: Time-Life

Books, 1987), 25.

4 Jim Bishop. The Day Lincoln Was Shot, (New York: Harper and

Bmther, 1955), 96.

NotesCla , 201.

6 In the 1867 trial of lohn Surratt, Lloyd claimed that he was

c rced into presenting false testimony against Mrs. Sarratt during her

trial. (Guy Moore, The Case Of Mrs. Surratt, 1954, [Norman: University

of Oklahoma Press, 1954], 79).

7 "The Conspirators-Findings Of The Court." New York Times,

12 May, 1865, 1.

Bibliography

Secondary Sources

Bishop, Jim. The Day Lincoln Was Shot. New York: Haqer &

Brothers, 1955.

Borreson, Ralph. When Lincoln Died. New York: Appleton-

Century, 1965.

Clark, Champ, ed. The Assassination. Alexandria, Vs.:

Time-Life Books, 1987.

Crotty, William, ed. Assassination And The Political Order.

New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative Vol. 3 Red River To

Appomattox. New York: Random House, 1974.

Fowler, Robert H. Album Of The Lincoln Murder.'Harrlsburg,

Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1954.

Moore, Guy. The Case Of Mrs. Surratt. Norman: University of

Primary Sources"The Assassins."New York Times. 14 May 1865, 1.

"The Conspirators- Findings Of The Court" New York Times.

12May, 1865, 1.

'qhe Covspirators, Their Trial," New York Times. 15 May, 1865, 1.

"End Of The Assassins." New York Times, 18 July, 1865, 1,

"T6.al Of The Assassins."New York Times 15 May, 1865, 1.

Pitman, Benn, compiler and court reporter. The Assassination Of

President Lincoln And The Trial Of the Conspirators. Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood Press, 1954.

Wniehman, Louis. A True H&tory of the Assassination of

Abraham Lincoln And The Conspiracy of 1865. New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1975.

Oldahoma Press, 1954.

Reck, W. Emerson. A. Lincoln: His Last 24 Hours. Jefferson,

N.C.: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1987.

)

To Control Athens: The Power Struggle over the SicilianExpedition

Erm P dy(This paper was the runner-up for the 1993 Hai'tje Award.)

In early April, 415 B.C., the Athenian Assembly met toreconsider its decision of four days earlier to launch anexpedition to Sicily on behalf of the city of Segesta. 1Athens was currently in an era of peace with Spartans, butthe Peace of Nicias (named after the general who hadarbitrated the treaty) was slowly breaking down due to thediplomatic intrigues of Athens, Sparta, and their respectiveallies. And, after six years of inactivity, younger Athenianswere craving adventure and military exploits to recoverAthens' glory (as well as their own). The Segestan requestfor military assistance in Sicily was a chance for such anadventure and perhaps, flail went well, an opportunity forAthenina expansion in the West. The Assembly had decidedto assist the Segestans with a sixty-ship squadron under thecommand of three generals: Nicins, Lamarchus, andMcibiades. 2

In the early months of 415, Nicias presided over thepolities of Athens as he had since 421, when the era ofpeace he had arbitrated had begun. Nicias was a moderateand conservative man, cautions to fault, and opposed fromthe beginning to any Sicilian expedition, s The secondmeeting of the Assembly was his opportunity to stop whathe thought was a disastrous decision.

Nicias had as his primary political opponent one of hisco-generals who had been the major proponent of theexpedition. Alcibiades was young (around 38) andstunningly handsome where Nicias was old (near 60) andstricken with a disease of the kidneys. Mcibiades was cleverand charismatic, with shrewd political and military abilityoften eclipsed by his outrageous and dramatic personalexploits. 4 Unlike Nicins, who could boast of no aristocraticblood, Alulbiades could claim prestigious bloodlines fromboth of his parents, and felt a position of power andprivilege in Athenian politics was his due. 5 The Sicilianexpedition was a golden opportunity for Mcibiades to riseto such a position, an opportunity Alcibiades had workedfor arduously. To prevail, he had to diffuse Nicias'influence in the Assembly.

Nicias spoke frankly of his disapproval towards theeffort to attack Sicily, declaring that Athens should fastattempt to sofidify their current holdings before attemptingany new conquests. He did not claim any moral grounds for

his disapproval but instead expressed that a policy ofcaution should be followed -- a typical speech from Nicias.But surprisingly, Nicias included in his speech a directattack on the character of Alciblades, questioning hismotives for supporting the expedition. Nicias warnedAthens not to be caught in a young man's search for powerand wealth. 6

Alcibiades rose to the occasion with the grace of anatural politician. He did not deny that he was young andextravagant, but argued that his extravagant displays ofwealth had only increased the reputation of Athens abroad. 7He did not attack Nicias in retaliation, although he askedAthens to make the most of his own youthful vigor andNicins' "luck" in the battle. Instead, Alcibiades argued thatAthens could easily surpass in military skill the unorganizedSicilian cities. By appealing to the patriotism and visionsof grandeur of those in the Assembly, Alcibiades triumphed.Nicias was left to give a description of he needed forces,which the excited Assembly pledged to raise and outfit overthe next few months.

But Alcibiades' charisma could not override theominous and disturbing events that occurred between theAssembly's decision to invade Sicily and the launch of theexpedition. The second meeting itself was held on the daythe women of the city held a funeral for Adonis, and thedecision to invade was accompanied by wails of monmlag.9 By far the most disturbing event was the deriding of Hermsonly a few days before the launch, which pushed the moodof foreboding to the point of hysteria. The statues stoodoutside homes and temples in Athens as a symbol of goodluck and faith. Late at night, the statues were systematicallydefaced, their phalli knocked off, and their faces hacked.The vandalism was clearly an omen, a warning to a cityabout to embark on an important expedition, as Hermes wasthe protector of travelers, lo Was it the act of drunkenpranksters, as it was widely rumored, or was such asystematic a deliberate event part of some political plan?

The Assembly was in permanent session for the tendays before the fleet's departure. It was during one of thesemeetings that a man named Pythoniens stood and addressedthe Assembly, reporting that Alcibiades, one of the verygenerals of the expedition, had participated in a parody of

4 • The Wittenberg History Journal

the Elensiman mysteries. To accuse anyone of suchreligions im opriety was serious charge. Immediatelyfollowing the sacrilegious defilement of the Herms, theaccusation was damning and intlammatory."

Alcibiades was a shrewd politician. The longer suchcharges stood, the more they would be believed. Theextravagance, wit, and irreverence that brought Alc'thiadespublic attention and even acclaim were the samecharacteristics that could make the charges believable. Hewas also aware of the inference that many would make: if aman is engaged in one type of religious impropriety, wouldhe not likely be candidate for another?. Alcibindesimmediately denied the charges and called for a trial to.prove his innocence. He was one step behind his enemles,however. Whoever had arranged the timing of theacensalions and had most likely arranged the attack on theHerms, made it impossible that a trial could be held beforethe expedition's departure. The launch was to go on as

planned 12.

Thus, the great expedition to Sicily left Athens amidststrange omens and public unease. One of the three leadershad spoken frankly about his disapproval of the endeavor,another was accused of a serious crime and was suspectedof another. The two were also intense political rivals. Theexpedition would end three years later for Nicius withhideous massacre of Athenian forces and his own executionin Sicily. 13 But for Alciblades, the expedition would be overin a few short months. In his absence form Athens, hisenemies would stir public hysteria into hatred for tbe veryman they had proclaimed general. More wimesses, most.slaves, would accuse Alcibiades of profaning the mysteries.Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to stand trial for hiscrimes, but he escaped and defected to Sparta with hisknowledge of the Athenian militm'y's srategies. In Athens,he was condemned to death, his property confiscated, andhis name was to be publicly cursed. 14 Neither he nor Niciaswould ever again stand with the power and acclaim asleaders of Athens as they had in April of 415.

SYRACUSE

To Control Athens: The Power Struggle over the Sicilian Expedition ° 5

Notes

L peter Green, Armada From Athens (New York: Doubleday and

Co., Inc, 1970), 3.

z Donald Kagen, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian

Expedition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1981), 172-173;

Victor

Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates (London: Methuen and Co., 1968),

298.

3. Kagen, 176-177.

4 Walter Ellis makes a strong case for the militarJ ability of

Aleibiad es in his biography. Walter Ellis, AIcibiades (London:

'. "lhucydides, Book Six: 17.

- Gree , 111-112.

' Ellis, 58450.

,L Green, 116-117. Themyst ries were very sacred rituals, but

the stylish or decadent circles in Athens would parody them as

enterlainment. Alcibiades was most likely guilty of parodies, but not the

defacement of the Herms.

,z Ibid.

ts. Ibid., 335-338, 345.

' Ellis, 65

Rouflodge, 1989).

. The most illustrious of Alcibiades' ancestors was the famous

leader pericles, who acted as a foster parent for Alcibiades mad his

brother. Ellis, 9.

Green, 102, 107; Thucydides, A History of the Peloponnesian

War, Book Six: 12-13.

. Thucydides, Book Six: 16. When AIcibiades speaks of his

extravagance improving Athens" image abroad, he is referring directly to

the Olympic games of 416. He entered seven teams into the chariot races,

capturing first, second, and fourth places for Athens. Ellis suggests that

such extravagance was part of Aleibiades' power struggle with Nieias

(who was also known to spend large amounts on public displays, usually

of a religious natttre). Ellis, 50.

Works Consulted

Ehreaberg, Victor. From Solon To Socrates. London: Metheun

and Co., 1968.

Walter Ellis. Alcibiades. London: Roufledge, 1989.

Green, peter. Armada From Athens. New York: Doubleday and

Co,, Inc , 1970.

Hooper, Finey. Greek Realities. New York: Charles Scribaer's

Kagen, Donald. The Peace of Niaias and the Sicilian Expedition.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Corner University Press, 1981.

Thucydides. A History of the Peloponnesian War.

Sons, 1967.

6 • The Wittenberg History Journal

J

Did Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Deserve To Die?by Molly Wilkinson

(This paper was prepared for Hisotry 328: The United States Since 1945.)

On July 17, 1950, Julius Rosenberg was arrested on thecharge of directing the spy ring tbat had recruited hisbrother-in-law David Greenglass into espionage incooperation with the Soviet Union. On August 11, EthelRosenberg, Julius' wife and Grcenglass' sister, was arrestedas Julius' accomplice. After a near eight monthimprisonment, the Rosenbergs were finally brought to trial,and after three weeks of testimony primarily by Greenglassand ins wife Ruth, they were found guilty of atomicconspiracy. Refusing to hear the recommendation of thejury, Judge Kaufinan sentenced them to death, saying:

[Your] pnV.ing into the hands of the Russians theA-bomb years before our best scientists predictedRussia would perfect the bomb has alreadycaused.., the Communist aggression in Korea, withthe resulting casualties exceeding 50,000 and...millions more innocent people may pay the priceof your treason, indeed, by your betrayal, youundoubtedly have altered the course of history tothe disadvantage of our country. 1

A majority of Americans supported the death penalty.According to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: "The deathsentences seem completely justified... [the electric chair]could well stand as a warning to any others who are notrepelled by treason from love of country but who must berestrained by fear." 2 However, some people protested thedeath penalty, both those who questioned the guilty verdictand also those who acknowledged guilt but believed that theRosenbergs did not deserve execution for their crime.

Protest came chiefly from the National Committee toSecure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, from the citizens ofother couna-ies, and from communist propaganda. Althoughsolid evidence indicated tlmt the Rosenbergs were guilty ofatomic espionage, the death penalty as punishment for thiscrime was an injustice. The government followed throughwith the execution primarily to avoid appearing to succumbto communist propaganda while America was in the midstof the Cold War.

After a series of articles appeared in the liberalNational Guardian insinuating that the Rosenbergs wereinnocent victims of a set-up, the National Committee to

Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case was formed. 3 Manypeople, such as Rabbi S. Andhill Fineberg of the AmericanJewish Committee who wrote a book both endorsing theguilty verdict and the death sentences, dismissed theCommittee as nothing more than a communist front 4However, this was not the case. The Committee struggleddesperately to auract national attention for almost a year;,were the Committee communist, it would probably haveenjoyed immediate support from the communists. Also,David Alman, one of the founders of the Committee, visitedcommunist headquarters seeking support and was rudelydenied support with the statement, ' hey'ru [the Rosenbergs]expendable." s Therefore, for almost the first year after thdtrsentencing, the Rosenbergs endured life on death row,knowing that the one group advoeating clemency receivedlittle public attention.

However, in November of 1952, the Rosenbergs' hopeswere renewed. Almost overnight people throughout theworld representing the entire political specmam begunenthusiastically campaigning for clemency. Although somequestioned guilt, the main goal of the protests was the repealof the death penalty. Although some of this protest wasfrom communists, a great deal of it was not. For example,according to the more conservative London NewsChronicle: "President Eisenhower was saying how theCoronation had thrown a vivid light on the glorious heritageof law that was common to the United States and to Britain.It is a pity that a heritage of clemency is not apparentlycommon to them. 7 Also, an article in Commonweal by aFrench citizen pointed out that people form all walks of lifeand all political leanings hi France were opposed to thedeath penalty and asserted that it would be a "grave error injudgment" to attribute all protest to communist propaganda s

Why exactly did so many people oppose the deathsentences? One objection centered around the light sentencegiven to Klaus Fuchs, the scientist who actually providedthe spy ring with the atomic secrets. The Rosenbergs werefound guilty of operating the spy ring that put into the handsof the Russians the information provided by Fuchs, not foractually divulging classified information themselves.Christian Century opposed the death sentences because ofthis light sentence of fourteen years given to Fuchs. The

/"

8. The Wittenberg History Journal

magazine stated that Fuehs actually gave away the valuableinformation whereas the Rosenbergs were only messengerspassing on information and said, "The thing we fear will beremembered is the unnecessary severity of American justiceand its readiness to wreak its anger on the relatively minorfigme when the major is beyond reach. 9 Even those whobelieve that a death sentence fitted the crime changed theirminds in light of the disparity in sentences. For example,according to Louis Nizer in his book The ImplosionConspiracy: '°the crime was serious enough to warrant it,but the disparity of punishment given to others who wereequally guilty resulted in uneven justice, which is equivalentto injustice." lo

People also opposed the death penalty on the groundsthat the information the Rosenbergs transmitted wasbasically useless. For example, Noble Prize winningphysicist Harold C. Urey opposed execution, saying: "Aman of Greenglass' capacity is wholly incapable oftransmitting the physics, chemistry, and mathematics of thebomb to anyone." Therefore, the Rosenbergs did notdeserve to die for recrailing Greenglass. Urey was alsodissatisfied with the disparity in sentences, u Agreeing withUrey, renowned physicist Albert Einstein wrote a letter toPresident Truman requesting clemency, citing the reasonsposed "by my distinguished colleague, Harold C. Urey." 12The argument that the information transmitted was ofminimal significance was reinforced by the excerpt thatdefense attorney Bloch read from the Yale Law Journal atthe sentencing hearing. The article argued that even withoutspies the Russians would have developed the atomic bomb.To us today, this is evident, but in 1953 most Americansbelieved the Russians far too "primitive" to develop thebomb on their own. 3

Other opposition to the death sentence centered aroundtechnicalities in the case. For example, the Rosenbergs weretried under the Espionage Act of 1917 that only warrantedexecution in the case of wartime espionage that gaveAmerican enemies advantage over us. 14 Although theRosenbergs were convicted for espionage that occurredduring WWI!, Russia was our ally during this war. JudgeKaufman conceded this point but added that the Roscnbergscontinued espionage after the war when Russia became ourpeacetime "enemy." In other words, he acknowledges thatfiae espionage occurred during peacetime; this openlycontradicted the Espionage Act that only allowed executionfor wartime espionage. 15 To prevent any further conflictsbased on this discrepancy, the Rosenberg Law was passedin 1954, allowing execution for peacethne espionage. 1

Another technicality surrounded that use of the 1917Espionage Act in the fast place. Because the trial was heldin 1951, the Espionage Act should have been superseded bythe 1946 Atomic Energy Act which only warranted thedeath sentence under the recommendation of the jury. 17

However, Judge Kunfuran refused to hear therecommendation of the jury as he prepared to sentence theRosenbergs, saying: "The responsibility is so great that I

believe the Court alone should assunae the responsibility." 18In other words, had the Rosenbergs been tried under

the most recent law applying to their case, then they couldnot by law receive the death penalty. Although hiscolleagues on the Supreme Court eventually overturned hisdecision, this discrepancy was enough to persuade SupremeCourt Justice Douglas to stay the execution in June of 1953to allow further investigation into this matter. 19

People not only sought clemency on grounds of parityand technicality but also, completely conceding the guilt ofthe Roscnbergs, sought clemency on humani ian grounds. One prominent htunanitarian consideration was the fate ofthe Rosenberg children, Michael and Robert, aged six andten. As Louis Nizer sa d in The Implosion Conspiracy:"Even a thirty year sentence would have deprived theRosenberg children of a father's and mother's care, but itwas worse to orphan them. It increased the horror ofexecution." 21

Others encouraging clemency on humanitarian groundsincluded the Pope and various religious groups such as the.French Catholics. Although Pope Pins XII himself did notsupport clemency, he did send a letter to Eisenhowerrecounting the many letters he had received requestingclemency. He made his request not on civil groundsdebating guilt but rather on humanitarian grounds because"when the State is moved by justice, it is the mission of theChurch to remind men of mercy." z In addition to claimsfrom the Pope, a letter written by a French citizen inCommonweal cited the various groups in France whoopposed the execution on humanitarian grounds, rangingfrom religious groups to labor unions to veterans tointellectuals. The article said, "Many refused to expressopinions on the legal points in the case, but all foundmonstrous the possibility that a mother of two childrenwould be sent to the chair."

There were even more who attacked the Americansystem of justice as inhumane. Renowned philosopher Jean-Paul Sarlre called the death penalty a"legal lynching whichsmears with blood a whole nation." A writer recountingthe case in Nation also attacked American justice onhumanitarian grounds: "I cannot help feeling that the Britishtreatment of Fuchs shows a higher degree of civilizationthan the sentence in this case." 25 Individuals such as RabbiFineberg of the AJC defended America's system of justice,citing as evidence examples of the Soviet Union'scomparatively low standard of justice. An editorial inChristian Century best refuted such reasoning: "If the bestwe can say for what we do is that it is not as bad assomething we have long claimed outrageous, there is littlereassurance in thaL"

Another objection to the death penalty was that theRosenbergs were victims of anti-Semitism. This argumentwas really only popular abroad and lacked significantvalidity. For example, both the judge and prosecutor wereJewish. Nonetheless, writer Howard Fast in an article inL'Humanite countered lids fact by insinuating that the

Did Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Deserve To Die? • 9

Jewish judge and prosecutor were part of a conspiracy; theRosenbergs "have been tried by Jews and sent to death byother Jews. Exactly the old technique of the Jewish Tribunalemployed by Hitler." However, despite attacks such asfltis, even the most fiberal groups in America did notembrace the theory of anti-Semitism. For example, neitherthe American Civil Liberties Union nor the AmericanJewish Committee believed that the case raised any civilfiber'des issues. If sufficient evidence indicated anti-Semitism, these organizations would have probably becomeconcerned. 9 However, a recent analysis of the case, TheRosenberg File by Ralph Radosh and Joyce Milton,suggests that the ACLU/AJC hesitancy to side with theRosenbergs could possibly be attributed to the generaltendency of leftist groups during the McCarthy era to takeadvantage of the chance to "prove that he or she was notsoft on communism when it really counted and nationalsecurity interests were at stake."

Many people who opposed the death penalty feltespecially that it was unjustified for Ethel Ruseaberg. Someof this objection centered around her gender and her twoyoung children. For example, FBI dkector J. Edgar Hooverhesitated to condone Ethel's execution because "A deathsentence for Ethel might be in tune with public opinion ofthe moment, but once passions had cooled the execution ofa wife and mother.., might well come to be perceived ascruel and vindictive." 31 Other objections to the execution ofEthel concemed whether or not she was an equal participantin the crime. For example, a list of questions prepared forJulius at the execution in case he decided to confess madeonly one reference to Ethel's participation: "Was your wifecognizant of your activities?" In other words, thegovemment was willing to execute Ethe! as a "full-fledgedpartner" without certainty that she was even aware of theactivities. 2 In an article in New Republic, Ralph Radoshand Sol Stern suggest that Ethel was not an equal partnerand therefore did not deserve to die. They believed that"Ethel would not have died had Julius been willing toconfess. The U.S. actually had little or no valid evidenceimplicating Ethel but charged her anyway as a way ofinducing Julius to talk." 33

Despite all of these objections to the death penalty, theRosenbergs were executed on Jane 19, 1953. Why was this?One answer lies in communist exploitation of the casedaring an era in America of heightened antagonism towardsthe Russians. As stated before, the Rosenbergs were giventhe death sentence in April of 1951, and the NationalCommittee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case wasfounded later that same year. However, the communistsshunned this Committee, and public fury over the deathpenalty remained fairly low until, in November of 1952,demands for clemency intensified all over the world.Radosh and Milton attribute this upsurge in a large part todie communist propaganda machine: "There could be noqnestion that the rise in pro-Roseaberg sentiment, both inthe United States and overseas, was die result of a

tremendous outpouring of support from Communistintellectuals, publications, and trained organizers." 4

But why, when the communists had known about theexecution for over a year, did they wait until the end of1952 to jump to the support of the Rosenbergs? Oneexplanation is that the communists were finally assured thatthe Rosenbergs would not confess and incriminate theRussians in any way; thus, the communists could safelysupport them. 3 Another reason fur the communists' changeof sentiment could have been the need for them to detractfrom some of their own inhumane actions. For example, inPrague, Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Slansky and ten otherformer leaders of the Czechoslovakian communist partywere executed. Their ldals showed not a trace of justice,and their convictions indicated anti-Semitism because oneof their crimes was Zionism. These trials were the source ofmuch negative publicity and caused many divisions withinthe Communist Party. Thus, "What the Western EuropeanParty leaders desperately needed at the moment was anissue that could deflect attention from the Slansky purgetrial, and the Rosenberg case fit the bill perfectly." 36

Regardless of why the communists developed suchfervor for clemency at so late a time, their exploitation ofdie case contributed significantly to the fact that, despitevery valid objections, the government followed throughwith the executions. The opinion that communistpropaganda may have been the reason the Rusenbergs wereexecuted was articulated as early as 1953 in Commonweal:"Perhaps if they [the communists] had not exploited it soshamelessly there would be a greater sentiment towardcommuting the Rosenberg sentence to life imprisonment." 37

That the communists waited until convinced theRosenbergs would not admit any guilt lends support to thebelief of many that the communists wanted the Rusenbergsto die. They were merely exploiting the case for propagandapurposes to gain martyrs for the communist cause° Forexample, much of the American public believed that thecommunist' "purpose was not to save the Rusenbergs but toantagonize the UoS. government into executing them. Thiswould give the communist cause everywhere a powerfulexample of martyrdom and brand the U.S. a ruthlessnation." In order to deny the communists their martyrs,some people decided to support clemency for theRosenbergs. 9 In this way, communist propaganda helpedthe clemency effort. Unfortunately, for most peoplecommunist propaganda in the midst of the McCarthy erasWeagthened the resolve to see the execution; no onewanted the U.S. to appear to succumb to communistpressures. For example, Commonweal stated, "They [thecommunists] have maneuvered the President into theposition where if he did grant a stay it would be widelyinterpreted as succumbing to communist pressure in thiscountry and the pressure of Soviet propaganda abroad--which is precisely what the United States cannot afford atthis time." 4o The fact that so much "politics" entered into adecision concerning the lives of two individuals is best

10 o The Wittenberg History Jomala!

summed up by Radosh and Milton: "While the Rosenbergswere not the victims of a frame-up, they were indeedhelpless scapegoats of a propaganda war--a war in whichtheir deaths would be counted as victory for both sides." 41

The specific effect McCalthyism and the Cold War hadon the execution of the Rosenbergs is difficult to measure.However, it is fair to say that McCarthyism did effect theexecution because the government was determined not togive into the communists by sparing the lives of theRosenbergs. The Rosenbergs may well have receivedclemency had they been convicted during a different timeperiod. The January 1953 issue of Commonweal agrees:"Whether they would have received as drastic a sentencehad they been tried, say, in 1946 rather than during the coldwar, is doubtful." 42 People from other countries seemedespecially able to note the effect of McCarthyism of theexecution. For example, Commonweal points anincriminating finger at the Cold War era and McCartyism:"We French Catholics note with a growing apprehensionthat sort of iconoclastic rage, that frenzy for purging and

'book-burning' and 'witch-hunts'--and all else that is

signified over here by the name of MeCarthyism." 43 Infact, the influence of McCarthyism has been cited as apossible reason why more American people and especiallyliberal groups such as the ACLU did not speak out in theRosenbergs behalf. The silence of these people can beattributed to their fear of being labelled pro-Communist, afear "stronger than the fear of communism itself." 4Despite so many valid objections from people fullyacknowledging the Rosenbergs' guilt, the Rosenbergs wereexecuted in the electric chair on June 19, 1953. Thisunnecessary tragedy can best be explained in that Cold Waranti-communist sentiments had such a grasp on Americathat they influenced the government to kill two peoplerather than to swallow its pride, even if doing so meantappearing to succumb to communist propaganda. The fullextent of the tragic Rosenberg executions can best bedescribed as "a sickening and disheartening faihire---of theAmerican conscience, of the American sense of fair play, ofAmerican moral leadership, of American justice." 45

Endnotes

i RonaldRadoshandJoyceMilton, TheRosenbergFile(New

York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), 284.

2 JonathanRoot, TheBetrayers(NewYork:Coward-MeCann,

1963), 223.

J Radosh and Milton, 3.7.3.

4 S, AndhiUFineberg, TheRosenbergCase:FactandFiction

(New york: Ocean,a, 1953), 35.

5 Radosh and Milton, 327.

Ibid., 347.

"An American Failure," Nation, 27 lune 1953, 534.

B Robert Barrat, "From France: The Rosenberg Case,"

Com2nonweal, 14 August 1953, 465.

- • " " " 149 Reflecttons on the Rosenberg Case, Christian Century,

January !953, 36.

10 Louis Nizer, The Implosion Cor plracy (New York: Doubleday

and Company, 1973), 487.

u Radosh and Milton, 433.

12 Root, 260451.

13 Radosh and Milton, 282-83.

t4 Ibid., 452.

t Freda, IGrchwey, "Mercy for the Rosenbergs," Nation, 10

January 1953, 24.

Radosh and Milton, 452.

t Root, 18,

1 Radosh and Milton, 276.

9 Root, 18.

"Payment Deferred," Newsweek, 26 January 1953, 42.

2 Nizer, 487.

"The Pope and the Rosenbergs," 27 February 1953, 513.

Barmt, 466.

z Raflosh and Milton, 351.

=s Arthur Garfield Hayes,"The Rosenberg Case,"Nation, 8

November 1952, 423.

Fineberg, vii.

2* "The Rosenbergs Are Executed," Christian Century, 1 "Suly

1953,763.

Radosh mad Mihola, 351.

• 9 Ibid., 352.

ibid., 448.

3t ibi&, 280.

32 Ibid., 417,

3 Arlie Schardt and Ibnily F. Newhall, =Julius Guilty, Ethel

Framed?" Newsweek, 2 July 1979, 64.

Radosh and Miltxm, 348.

Did Julius and Ethel Rosenberg Deserve To Die? • 11

n "Payment Deferred," 42.

76 Radosh and Milt a, 348-49.

rr,,Regarding the Rosenbergs," Commonweal, 9 January 1953, 344.

"Root, 21.

9,,Payment Deferred," 4Z

4o "Regarding the Rosenbergs," 344.

4] Radoth and Milton, 452.

42 "Regarding the Roseaabergs," 344.

4 Barrat, 466.

"Who Sentenced the Ros abergsT'Nation, 20 June 1953, 514.

4s "American Failure," 533.

Bibliography

"After Seventeen years."Natinn, 12 September 1966, 203-04.

"An American Failure." Nation, 27 Jane 1953, 533-34.

Barrat, Robert. "From France: The Rosenberg Case." Commonweal, 14

August 1953, 464-466.

Fineberg, S. Andh]n. The Rosenberg Case: Fact and Fiction. New York:

Oceana, 1953.

Foodick, Ierrold K., Lucy Howard, and Tony Fuller. "The Rosenbergs

• Retried."Newsweek, 19May1975,54-55.

Guldstein, Alvin H. The Unquiet Death of Julius and Ethel Rosenherg.

New York: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1975.

Hays, Arthur Garfield. "The Rogenberg Case." Nation, 8 November

1952, 422-23.

Kirchwey, Fred "Mercy for the Ro enbergs."Nation, 10 January 1953, 24.

"Last Mile." Nation, 28 February 1953, 30.

Nizer, Lorfis. The Implosion Conspiracy. New York: Doubleday mad

Company, 1973.

"No Clemency."Newsweek, 23 February 1953, 30.

"No Executive Cinmeney for the Rosenbergs." Christian Century, 25

"Payment Deferred." Newsweek, 26 January 1953, 42.

"The Pope and the Rosenbergs." Commonweal, 27 February 1953, 513.

Radoth, Ronald and Joyce Milton. The Rosenberg File. New York: Holt,

Rinehart, and Winston, 1983.

"Reflections on the Rosenberg Case." Christian Century 14 January

1953, 36.

"Regarding the Rosenbergs." Commonweal, 9 January 1953, 344.

Root, Jonathan+ Th Betrayers. New York; CowardoMcCann, 1963.

"The Rosenberg Case." New Reptdalic, 30 June 1953, 7.

"The Rosenbergs Are Executed." Christian Century, 1 July 1953, 763.

Schardt, Arlie and Emily F. Newhall. "Julius Guilty, Ethel Framed?"

Newsweek, 2 July 1979, 64.

"Spies! Last Rosenberg Mile."Newsweek, 29 June 1953, 26-28.

Theoharis, Athma. "A Break in the Rosenberg Case." Nation, 1 July

1978,5-6.

"Who Sentenced the Rosenbergs?" Nation, 20 Rme 1953, 513-14.

February 1953, 213.

o

291. The Craft of History. 4 credits.A course required of all majors anddesig ned to acqu ai nt them with the basicskills of historianship: reading, writing,research, and analysis in light of thenature and users of history.

This is how History 291, the course which Dr. Behrman primarily taught,is described in the Wittenberg Registrar's Catalog (1992-1995). This sectioncontains some of the papers produced by students in the class.

14. The Wittenberg History Journal

The Berlin Wall

Reichstag in Berlin

A Deeper Cut: The Admission of the Two Separate GermanStates into the United Nations in 1973 and Its Effects on the

Hopes for German Reunificationby J. E. Clayton

Until the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, most of the Germanpopulation thought reunification was tittle more than anunattainable, token goal of the democratic Federal Republicof Germany [FRG], actively fought against by her sisterstate, the communist German Democratic Republic [GDR].Even before the official separation of the two states in Janeof 1973 with the signing of the Basic Treaty, very fewGermans themselves believed reunification to be apossibility. 1 Many factors led up to the assumptions held in1973 that the two Germnnys would remain permanentlyseparated. One of these factors and the strongest deterrent toreunification was the admittance of the states as separatesovereign nations into the United nations. Theirmembership hi the UN, approved by the Security Councilon 22 June 1973 2, and the main reason behind the signingof the Basic Treaty hi 1973 , led most of the world tobeIieve that reunification had been dealt a fatal blow.

An understanding of the political and economicrelationship of the two German states after World War 1Ihelps to clarify the situation hi 1972 and 1973 which led upto the UN admission of two separate German states. Thedivision of Nazi Germany at the Elbe River and through theHarz mountains left the Soviet-cccupied eastern sectorweaker than its brother, which was cnntroUed by theremaining Allied forces of the United States, Great Britain,and France. * East Germany was approximately one-thirdthe size of the Nazi empire and had less than one-third thepopulation of the FRG. Politically as well as economically,the growing FRG remained bound to its Eastern half inmany ways. West Germany Basic Law stated that the Bonngovernment was only temporary, contingent on thereunification of Germany, and "The entire German people[were] called upon to achieve in free self-determination theunity and fieedom of Germany." 6 This commitment on the,part of the Bonn govemment was supported by $248million of interest-free credit offered to the GDR 7, and aministry in Bonn, worth $160 million annually, with solepurpose of researching and promoting reunification." Bonnalso pursued these connection with the East for the sake of

West Berlin, which lay in the center of communist EastGermany. West Berlin's security and political status was amajor point of contention at this lime. 9

The standing trade situation between the tWo statesmade the GDR the only Eastern Bloc nation with access toCommon Market goods. Bonn refused to recognizepolitically the border between the states, and therefore theGDR was able to make about $140 million annually bytrading goods with FRG without duty or late deliverypenalties, lo East Germany's access to Western productscreated a clash of interests between the communist rulingparty of the GDR and communist leader Leould Brezhnevof the USSR. He had begun to put significant politicalpressure on the East German government to continue thedetente [easing] of the borders between the states andmaintain trade situation ", especially after his visit to theFederal Republic early in 1973. n One of the reasonsBrezhnev did this was to secure the trade agreements hisgovernment had made with the FRG during this visit.

Despite the advantageous economic situation that Bonnhad extended to the GDR, the communist government hadbeen very hesitant to accept this tie to the West. Politically,any connection, much less alliance, to the FRG wasdisadvantageous to the country's separatist policies andpropaganda, which cast the West and especially the FRG inthe role of 'class enemy.' 13 The GDR had been pursuingsovereign nation status through recognition by othersovereign nations and was, in essence, fighting for itsexistence as a communist nation. This policy prevented thegovernment from endorsing any connection to die FRG. 1,

In this context it becomes apparent why both Germanyswere affected by the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 andwhy they agreed to the Basic Treaty of 1973, despitehesitations on part of both states. In the QuadripartiteAgreement of 1971, a meeting of the heads of state from theUnited States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union1, the security and status of the western sectors of Berlinwas the focus. The main goal of the negotiations was toclarify West Berlin's status in light of imminent UN

16. The Wittenberg History Journal

membership for the two Germanys. 16 West German BasicLaw and the Constitution of West Berlin defined thewestern half of the city as a part of the FRG. 17 The GDRand the USSR, however, saw West Berlin as a separate statea, for many of the same reasons that the GDR wasemphasizing her own sovereignty. The East's refusal torecognize this connection resulted in violations of many ofthe basic Human Rights outlined in the UN, such asarbitrary detention of the citizens of West Berlin within EastGermany. 19 The Quadripartite Agreement did not changethe status of West Berlin, but served to clarify what thatposition was: a separate state with some connections to theFRG, which itself had, however, no political power over thewestem sectors Berlin.

In late may of 1973, only five months before the twoGermanys were to gain admittance to the UN, Brezhnevvisited Bonna°, but left Bonn and Chancellor Willy Brandtwithout a solid answer on the USSR's position on the statusof Berlin, and even failed to give him "acquiescence inBonn's right to represent West Berlin at the UN when bothEast and West Germany [were] admitted." 2 This issue wasa major stumbling block to UN admittance. The Alliedpowers of the West--4he US, Great Britain, and France---

maintained the position which they had clarified at theQuadrparitite Agreement of 1971: the FRG had theirpermission to represent the interest of the western sector ofBerlin at the UN as well as at other internationalorganizations. 2=

The Berlin Question, among other issues, became oneof the greatest points of contention between the FRG andthe GDR, and it led to the creation of the Basic Treaty in1972. z This document was the Fast official treaty betweenthe two states and a compromise on the part of both; theFRG would yield recognition of the GDR as a sovereignnation and admittance into the UN as such, and in return theGDR would agree to a gradual easing of borders [andhostilities at the borders], and the freedom of West Berlinersto unrestricted travel between the Berlin and FRG. 24 Thislreaty, and UN admission was made possible in mayrespects because of Bumdt's Ostpolitik, a program ofpolities and policy focusing on the Eastern Bloc. The goalof Ostpolitik was to secure relations with the FederalRepublic's communist neighbors. It was successful enoughto open up a working relationship between the USSR andthe FRG , as well as allow the Federal Republic torecognize and exchange ambassadors with Czechoslovakia,Hungary, and Bulgaria, Eastern Bloc nations that had notformally recognized, or been recognized by, the FRG.

The reaction in both German states to the treaty wasoverwhelming. It caused public outcry in the FRG sointense, that it led Bavaria to seek enforcement of WestGermany's Basic Law. This would have made the signingof this treaty, which was contradictory to the goal ofreunification, illegal. The GDR reaction to the treaty led to"Many more East Germans... [being] classified as holdersof official secret and thus... [being] made to feel nervous

of contacts with Westerners." 29 as well as stricter, moretedious searches at the border. Peter Bender, a specialist onEast Germany and Eastern Europe at that time, explainedwhy the Basic Treaty proved particularly unsatisfying to theGDR: %..in the Basic Treaty the GDR had to pay forforeign policy gains with domestic policy losses." 3o Thedetente at the borders makes East Germans "[vulnerable] tothe seductions of the West...'! 31; the communist rulingparty of the GDR had also been pushed into the Treaty bythe influence of 'Soviet Westpolitik' 32, the Sovietequivalent to Ostopolitik, which was trying to expand andformalize lies with western nations.

The border itself, described by on journalist as %..the100 yard wide strip...[stretching] up hill and down dale for836 miles[;] the broken back of Germany" 33 was perhapsthe biggest wound preventing the German hope ofretmification. Strewn with watchtowers, guard dogs, landmines, and SM-70 auto-firing devices , the border hadtaken many victims. Between 1961 and 1973, it wasestimated that over 149,000 East Germans had escaped tothe West, 90-160 people had been shot and killed by bordergnards, over 69 on the Berlin Wall alone. Even after theBasic Treaty was signed, East German border guardsremained under orders to shoot to kill any escaping fellowcitizen. 37

Hours before Willy Brandt gave his speech to the LrNin honor of German membership on September 18, 1973,four East Germans had been shot as they attempted toescape over the Berlin Wall. Even in lids tension-filledsituation both German states "renounced the use of force"and "acknowledged Germany's role as instigator of pastwars," 39 while each still maintained its stance on thereunification issue. Scheel, UN representative for the FRG,stated: "Our aim remains dear: The Federal Republic ofGermany will continue to work for a state of peace inEurope in which the German nation will recover its unity infree self-determinalion." Winzer UN representative forthe GDR, in his statement to the General Assembly,"emphasized that the Germanys were indisputably separatenations." 4 The UN's recognition of the GDR's sovereigntywas a tremendous success for the communist ruling party ofthe GDR; membership in the UN increased the number ofgovernments that acknowledge the independent state from30 in 1969 to over 100 in 1973.42

Despite the Security Council's unanimous approval ofGerman membership in the UN, which required years ofnegotiations, not all counUies approved of the admission.The strongest voice against membership came from Israeland Guinea. Yosef Tekoaf, Israel's representative at theUN, objected to East Germany's admittance on the basisthat the GDR had not recognized its responsibility for Naziatrocities, by paying reparations to Israel as West Germanyhad. 43 Guinea objected to the FRG with allegations that ithad supported the white minority government in SouthAfrica and participated in sabotaging the government ofGuinea. ' Even in the US, people expressed strong opinions

A Deeper Cut • 17

about the decision; articles both for and against EastGerman admittance into the UN appeared in editorials in theNew York Times in July of 1973.45 Despite theseobjections, the General Assembly approved the admissionof the two separate states without a vote on September 18,

1973.The UN gained a great deal through the inclusion of the

two Germanys. Their admission as the 133rd and 134thmembers brought the UN closer to its goal of universalmembership and encouraged the membership andencouraged the membership of other divided nations andEastern Bloc countries. 4s It also signified a markedimprovement and detente in East-West relations, whichmany hoped would later encoarage armament talks and aneasing of borders in the Eastern Bloc. 7 The UN received asubstantial subsidy ham the two Germanys, second only tothe contributions of the US and the USSR. 48

Many actions of the two German states dtlring this timeperiod seemed to reflect an attempt by those states to atonefor their atrocities in World War II. This attempt wasapparent in the FRG's generous contributions to specialcommittees in the UN even before its membership 49 and itsefforts through Ostopolifik to atone for Nazi sins inCzechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. o East Germanypaid reparations to many Eastern Bloc nations that weredevastated by Nazi aggression in World War II and the EastGerman government had shown considerable financialsupport for Jewish and non-Jewish victims on Nazism in theGDR. 5 These attempts at atonement on the part of theGerman states were consistent with the attitude of the SuperPowers at the lime. In both the US Department of Suttes

Bulletins and the televised speech given by Brezhnev to theGerman people in May of 1973, the German people werereminded of their Nazi heritage and the world-widesuffering they had caused. 2

In this environment, the hope of reunification lookedfutile at best. Although the Allied forces of the US, GreatBritain, and France had given the FRG full reign in regardto self-government, they still withheld from the FRG thefreedom to pursue self-determination in the East and Berlin.The USSR and East Germany were both strongly opposedto any talk of reuulficafion and working intemationaUy toprevent it ham ever being a possibility. Both theQuadripartite Agreement of 1971 and the Basic Treatyworked against reunification by formalizing the separationof the two states. East German actions on the border onlyserved to reinforce the division of the Germanys. Even inthe FRG, where reunification was officially supported,Willy Brandt's Ostopolitik was formalizing the sovereigntyof the GDR and other Eastern Bloc nations, not beforebeing recognized by the West. Above all was themembership as two nations in the UN, which made itpossible for over a hundred nations to officially recognizeEast Germany; the admission in itself presupposed that thestatus of the two states would not change in the near future.In addition to these deterrents, there was also the generalbelief held by most other nations, and the Allies especially,that a reunified Germany would be too strong as a unifiednation, and with its new industrial power would turn onceagain to nationalism and Nazism. In this light it is easier tounderstand the prevalent mood in regards to reunification at

this time.

End Notes

"MJ. Kubin. "Two Germanys: end of the Myth." (ft.)Newsweek.

82 (1 October 1973): 46.

R. Alden. "UN Admission of two Germanys Approved by

Security Cotmcil."New York Times. (23 June 1973): 1+11. Admission of

the two Germanys was approved by the Security Council on 22 June

1973.

3. 1.-"Now we are two." Economist. 247(23 June 1973): 36. and 2.-

"With the two Gennanys closer together." US. News and World Report.

73(20 November 1972): 84. The Basic Treaty was finalized on 8

November 1972, but was signed on the 20Jtme 1973.

4. Pad Bender. "Special relailonship of the two German states?'

Worm Today. 29(September 1973): 389.

. "East Germany." Collier's Encyclopedia. vol. 11. p.37

6. "Now we are two." p.36

7. The interest-free credit extended by the FRG was justified by

Bonn as domestic trade.

• Two Germanys: end of Myth. p. 36

9. G. Doeker and others. "Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement of

1971." American Journal oflnternational Law. 67 (January 1973): 44.

'a "With two Germanys closer together." p. 84

it "Special Relationship of the Two German States." p.391

n_ Leoald Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in May of 1973 was the first

,Ash to the FRG ever made by a high-ranking Soviet official; the visit

was one of the results of Willy Bran&Is O stopolitlk.

1 SpeclalRelaktonshipofthetwoGennanSlates. p.389-9

1 "Two Germanys: end of the myth." p.36

15. "Berlin zald the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971." p.44.

I Ibid, p.61-2

18 • The Wittenberg History Journal

17. Ibid, p.48

IL ]bid, p. 50

9. 1.-!bld, p. 50-1 and 2.-J. Salwyn Schapiro. "Reading No, 23-

Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Liberalism: Its Meaning and

History. (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nost rand Co., Inc. 1958) 139 12. and 3.-

D I, Sobieski, "Why East Germany Does Not Belong In 'Ihe

UN?' New

York Times. (6 July 1973): 22.

See footnote #12

2;. "HaLf a Loaf on Berlin." New York Times. (24 May 1973): 44.

z "Chapter XIV: Admission of new Members." Yearbook of the

United Nations 1973. (New York: Office of Public Information, United

Nations. vol. 27) 261.

. See footnote #3

" 1.-"UN Admission of two Germanys Approved By Security

Council." p.l+ll 2.-"Special Relationship of the two German gates."

p. 393

. "Germans at Turtle Bay."New York Times. 4 July 1973): 14.

Craig Whitney. "Brezhnev urges peace and Trust as Bonn Trip

Ends."New YorkTirnes. 22 May 1973): I.

zl. "He meant what he said." Economist. 249 (6 October 1973): 39.

t "No quiet on the Eastern Front" Economist. 247 (9 June 1973):

38.

- "No, it hasn't gotten may better." Economist. 248 (18 August

1973):32.

3a "Special Relationship of the two German states." p.393

Jl. ]bid, p.389

z ]bid, p.393

3. "The Craellest Frontier." Economist. 249 (24 November 1973):

37.

]bid, p. 36-7

3. 1961 was the year in which the Berlin wall was built.

3 l.-"No, it hasn't gotten may betler." p. 32 mad 2.-"Talk now,

shoot later."Economist. 248 (14 July 1973): 42. Please note: articles

contain conflicting information regarding the number of East Germans

ldllad while trying to escape to the West.

- "No, it hasn't gotten any better." p. 32.

u , iiL Germans m the UN - at last Willy Brandt s Call to the World.

German International. 17 (October 2973): 10.

" R. Alden. "The two Germanys tell UrN they renounce Use of

Force." New York Times. (20 September 1973): 2.

+a ]bid, p.2

4L ]bid, p.2

4z D. Binder. "East German's 'Great Moment' at UN." New York

Times. (21 September 1973):1.

+ R. Alden. "Two Gerrnanys join UN as Assembly opens 28th

Year." New York Times. (19 September 1973):1

+4. "UN Admission of two Germanys Approved by Security

Council." p+l +11

+x 1.-"Why East Germany Does Not Belong in the UN." p. 22 and

2.-W.C. Sehmauch and P. Oke. "The Debt for Nazi Crimes: East

Germany pays its Share." New York Tims. (26 July 1973):36.

+ 1.-W.E. Sehaufele. "UN Membership for FRG and GDR

supported by US." Dept. State Bull. 69 (16 July 1973): 110-11 and 2.-

"US welcomes admission of three new members to UN, SepL 18, 1973."

Dept. State Bull. 69 (22 October 1973): 519-19.

47. "UN Admission of Two Germanys Approved by Security

CounciL" p. 1+11

*t 1.-"On best behavior." Economist. 248 (22 September 1973):65,

and I.-"UN Admission of Two Germanys Approved By Security

Council." p.11. Please note: percentages cited vary according to source;

Economist soaree cited 7%, whileNew York Thrms artinle cited 6% for

FRG and 2% for GDR.

+9. "On best behavior." p. 64-5

"The Loose Ends." Economist. 247 (9 June 1973): 39.

,L "The Debt for Nazi Crimes." p. 36

z 1.- "US welcomes admission of three new members to the UN,

Sept. 18, 1973." p. 518-19 1.-"UN Membership for FRG and GDR

supported by US." p.110-111 and 3.-"Text of the Soviet Party Leader's :

.... ' 22Tele,nslon Speech to the West German People. New York Tunes. (

May 1973): 8.

A Deeper Cut • 19

BibliographyAlde L P "Two Germ ays join UN as Assembly opens 28th year."

New York Times (19 September 1973): 1+5.

Alden, R. "The Two Germanys tell UN they renounce Use of Force."

New York Times. (20 September 1973): 2.

Alden, R. =UN Admission of two Germanys approved by Security

Cotmdl." New York Times. (23 lone 1973): 1+ 11.

Bender, P. "Special Relationship of the two German States." World

Today. 29 (September 1973): 389-97.

Binder, D. "East German's 'Great Moment' at the UN." New York

Times. (21 September 1973): 5.

"Chapter XIV: Admission of the new Members." Yearbook of the

United Nation 1973. New York: Office of PubEc Information,

United Nations. v. 27. 260-62.

"The Cmellest Frontier." Economist. 249 (24 November 1973): 36-7.

Docker, G. and c hers. "Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement of

1971." American Journal of lnternationaI Law. 67 (lanuary

1973): 4445Z

"East Germany." Colller's Encyclopedia. v. 11. p.37.

"Eater the Germanys." Newsweek. 82 (i October 1973): 46+.

"Germans at Turtle Bay."New York Times. (4 July 1973): 14.

"Germans in the UN- at last: Willy Brandt's Call to the World."

German lnterPutional. 17 (October 1973): 9-10+.

"Half a Loaf on Berlin." New York Tbnes. (24 May 1973):44.

"He meant what he said."Economist. 249 (6 October 1973): 3940.

- " 82Kuble, MJ. TwoGermanys end of the Myth. Newsweek.

(1 October 1973): 46.

"The Loose Ends."Economist. 247 (9 Jtme 1973): 39.

"No, it hasn't gotten any better." Economist. 248 (18 August 1973):

"No Qttie on the Eastern Front." Economist. 247 (9 June 1973): 38-9.

"Now we are two." Economist. 247 (23 June 1973):34+.

"On best behavior."Economist. 248 (22 September 1973): 64-5.

Sehapiro, Selwyn J. "Reading No. 23-Urtiversai Declaration of

tttmaan Rights." Liberalism: Its Meaning and History. Princeton,

NJ: D. VmaNostrand Co.,Inc. 1958. 13942.

Schatffele, W.E. "UN Membership for FRG and GDR supported by

US." Dept. State Bull. 69 (16 July 1973):110-11.

Sehmauch, W.C. and P. Oke. "The Debt for Nazi Crimes: East

Germany pays its share." New York Times. (26 July 1973): 36.

Sobieski, DJ. "Why East Gemaany Does Not Belong in the UN." New

York Tims. (6 July 1973): 22.

"Talk now, shoot later." Economist. 248 (14 July 1973): 42.

"Text of the Soviet party Leaders's Television Speech to the West

German People." New York Times. (22 May 1973): 8.

-UN_Wbere Eastmects West" Serdor Scol. lOJ (5 October1973): 518-19.

"US Welcomes admlssion of the three new members to the UN,

18.September 1973." Dept. State Bull. 69 (22 October 1973)

518-19.

"With Two Germanys closer together, a single nation is stiff far away."

USNews and WorldReport. 73 (20 November 1973): 84.

Whitney, Craig. "Breztmev Affirms His Washington Date." New York

Times. (21 May 1973): 3.

Whitney, Craig. "Brezhnev urges Peace and Trust as Bonn Trip Ends."

New York Tin s. (22 May 1973): 1+8.

31-32.

L

r

William Lloyd Garrison and James Birney:Two Opposing Views on the Abolition Movement

by Jennifer Garman

Almost as "peculiar" as the institution of silvery itself, theabolition movement in the history of the United Statesbecame a melting pot of ideas on how to rid the country ofthe evils of silvery. As William Lloyd Garrison noted, itwas a reaction against the institution which had madeAmerica lose all self-respect and ideas of justice. 1 Themove served to aggregate the ideas of abolitionist as well aspresent these views to the public. However, as themovement expanded, it became apparent that the ideas ofthe abolitionists were not readily blending together in acommon opposition, nor was the public accepting it withopen arms. Representative of this were William LloydGarrison and James Birney, two individuals who emergedas leaders in the abolition movement.

Garrison, an abolitionist from Massachusetts, was theeditor of the well-known anti-slavery newspaper theLiberator. Although considered by some as having donemore for the emancipation of slaves titan anyone else, hemet with great opposition from both inside and outside themovement. 2 The Bennington Gazette nicknamed him"Lloyd Garrulous" and claimed that "he is withal a greategotist, and when talking of himself displays the pertloquacity of a blue jay." 3 In addition, he was mobbed by thepublic in Boston where, "they coiled a rope around hisbody, nearly stripped him of his clothing, then dragged himthrough the streets fill he was finally rescued." Althoughnot as controversial as Garrison, Bimey suffered some ofthe same attacks. A slaveholder from the south, he took abold stand by freeing his slaves and declaring himself anabolitionist. Criticized by his neighbors in the south, hemoved North only to meet opposition. 6 On the night ofSeptember 5, 1841, his printing press for the newspaper thePhilamhropist was destroyed for the third time. 7 For theabolitionist, criticism was widespread and unavoidable.

Birney and Garrison both embraced the concept ofimmediate abolition, however, they came to support itthrough to opposite views. Garrison is credited with beingthe first to criticize gradualism and form a movementcentered upon immediate emancipation, s He beganworking for The Genius of Universal Emancipation in 1829with Benjamin Lundy, another leading abolitionist, and itwas during this time that he saw f' 't-hand accounts of the

true evils of slavery. 9 Garrison supported immediateabolition because he believed in its fundamentalcorrectness. He felt timt it was not merely the best solution,but rather the only solution and explained that "his feet wereon the sand, and not on the solid rock, so long as he grantedslavery the right to exist for a single moment." 10 Garrisonbecame so devoted to the concept that he separated from hisco-editor who remained loyal to the idea of gradualism, uFrom then on, Garrison refused to compromise his idea thatthe only way to end slavery was to "lay the axe at the rootof the tree." 12

Bimey did not have the emotional fervor of Garrison inhis acceptance of the idea of immediate abolition, butinstead took a logical appmach in reaching this conclusion.He realized that it was perhaps the best available solutionfor dealing with the question of slavery. Bimey was first asupporter of the attempt to transport ex-slaves back toAfrica. As an agent of American Colonization Society, hetoured the South attempting to promote its beliefs. 13However, Birney came to realize the following:

It is to be feared that we, who have beensupporters of colonization, have, throughignorance, been inslxumental in prolonging, atleast through one lifetime, the dark reign of slaveryon the earth, and in sending on generation of ourfellow men, weeping witnesses of its bitterness, toa comfortless grave! 14

in addition, Bimey was also a critic of gradual emancipationand argued that it created no guilt for the slaveholder as wellas angered the slaves who felt that nothing was being donefor their rights, but rather for the benefit of their masters, aThis finally led Birney to support immediate abolition as themethod that most fully realized the principles of Christi-anity. He recognized timt the slaves have a fight to freedomand it was his Christian duty to secure it for both of them. 16Since Garrison and Bimey were both supporters ofimmediate emancipation, it seems ironic that each could beconsidered the others greatest critic. Their disagieement isfound in their views of approach that the abolitionist shouldtake in achieving immediate and unconditional emanci-pation. Bimay was a great supporter of political action

22 • The Wittenberg History Journal

while Garrison stood firm on the idea of moral influenceand the reformation of values through methods other than

pofitical.On the subject of political action, Bimey stated that,

"one good Congressman can do more for our cause than ahundred lecturers... The slaveholders gain their advantagesin national politics and legislation, and should be met inevery move they make." 17 These two ideas are thefoundation of Bimey's view of the role of abolitionists. Firstof all, Birney was disturbed by the growing import,ance ofslave power. He felt that it already possessed control overthe national government through President Jackson, whoheld office 1829-37, and was accused of removing anyofficial with anti-slavery views. Bimey also claimed thatbeth of the major political parties were bound by slavepower. Not only did the Democrats draw a large percentageof support from the South, but the Whigs were alsosensitive to slaveholder's demands because of Whig supportfor protective tariffs. 1 The other half of Bimey's belief wasthat political action should be a top priority in the cause foremancipation. He was among the last to see its power--andthe first to use iL 19 Bimey stated that the functions of avoluntary anti-slavery society should be the diffusion ofinformation, the promotion of discussion, and the formationof public opinion against slavery. His goal was, thus, toadapt the societies into organized political movementsbased on the belief of"legislation being the only methodknown in this republic of bringing moral power into action." 2

Garrison's foundation as an abolitionist was a strongbelief and dedication to the part of the Declaration ofIndependence staling, ' all men are created equal. Hestated that in America, liberty was the right of every manand along with this came the right to protest ff it was notgranted, z Garrison had amore idealistic view ofabolitionism than Birney, believing that there wasabsolutely no reason why humanity could not live inpoverty. 2*In addition, he felt that it was the abolitionist'srole to promote this harmony. Garrison insisted that,

"moral

influence, when in vigorous exercise, is irresistible. It has animmoral essence." 2 He believed that slavery was evil, butalso believed that abolishment of it by the "strong ann ofthe civil government" was evil as well. Being a devotedpacifist, he felt that the appeal should be to the slaveholders,not the forcible suppression of slaveholding that may resultfrom an anti-slavery law. " Where Birney advocated usingthe American Anti-Slavery Society as a source forlaunching political action, Garrison made an effort toremove it from everything that had to do with the power ofCongress and government. 27 He stated that the Societyshould be solely for the abolition of slavery. It should notattempt to reform other areas and should be open toeveryone (of different religion and political beliefs) on thesingle basis that they give no support to slavery. 2sGarrison's underlying belief was that the goals ofabolitionists were not to be achieved through political"machinery," but through the hearts of men. His argument

against Birney was that by first appealing to the morals ofthe public about the wrongs of slavery, political actionwould be the consequence.

What can be concluded from these two views is thatboth Bimey and Garrison believed that their idea should bethe dliving force in the abolition movemenL It is a questionof which comes fast as Bimey believed political actionwould bring moral power into play and Garrison believedthe opposite. The division between the two abolitionist grewwider as they became outwardly vocal against the ideas ofeach other. In Bimey's A Letter on the Political Obligationsof Abolitionists, he directly criticized Garrison and hisfollowers for attempting to use the Anti-Slavery Society as ameans for promoting "un-govemmcat" principles. 31 He feltthat these principles were not upheld in the society'sconstitution and that although the society had no measuresfor expelling its members, it should be the duty of themembers to resign when their opinions are not in line withthose of the other members. 32 Bimey's rejection of moralpersuasion goes back to his early days as an abolitionist.Through his involvement in the American ColonizationSociety, he became disillusioned by his attempts to gainsupport in the south. 33 He later became convinced that itwas impossible to appeal to the slaveholders through the"selfish principle."

In response to Birney's Letter on the PoliticalObligations of Abolitionists, which was clearly intended forGan'ison and his friends, Gaiiison showed his dislike for theterm "no-government" by saying that he was a Stlongsupporter of the government, but oilly a "perfectgovernment." He insisted that it should be a governmentof heaven and summarizing his views as the following:

We cannot acknowledge allegiance to anygovernment by a resort to physical force.... Wetherefore voluntarily exclude ourselves from everylegislative and judicial body and repudiate allhuman politics, worldly honors, and stations of

authority.

This led Bimey to realize that No-govemment and Pro-government abolitionists could never get along and perhapsmarked the final, irreversible division between the two men.

However, the consequences of this disagreement werenot fatal. Each had individual successes as devotedabolitionists. James Russell Lowell's "Tribute to Garrison"

begins by saying:

In a small chamber, friendless and unseen, Tolledo'er his types one poor, unlearned young man; Theplace was dark, unfumitured and mean, Yet thefreedom of a race began, zs

Of Bimey it was said," obeying a high sense of duty, hesacrificed the comforts of wealth, home, and position to thecause of universal freedom" Abolitionism spent theirentire lives being criticized for attempting to establishjustice, yet refused to back down on their beliefs. As

William Lloyd Garrison and James Birney: Two Opposing rgiews on the Abolition Movement • 23

Garrison stated, "In sho I did what I could for theredemption of the human race." 4o In conclusion, thequestion they were facing was how one small group can

save a whole society. With the delicate subject of humanity,can just one solution prevail?

Endnotes

] William Lloyd Garrison." Northem Responsibility for Slavery."

New York Times, 15 Feb 1854, 8.

z Samuel Joseph May. Sorae Reconciliation of Our Goad Anti-

Silvery Conflict. (Boston: Fields, Osgood, and Co., 1869), 5.

3. William Bimey. James G. Birney and His Times. (New York: D.

Appletoa and Company, 18901, 316.

. parker Pillsbury. Acts of the Anti-Silvery Apostles. (1883; reprint,

FreepoU: Books for Libraries press, 1970), 42.

Hanfiet Martineau. The Martyr Age of the United States. (Boston:

Weeks, Jordan, and Co., 1839), 19.

*. Beriah Green. Sketches of the Life and Writings of James

Gillespie Birney. (Utica: Jackson and Chaplin, 1844), 36-37.

7. William Goodell. Silvery and Anti-Silvery; a History of the

Great Struggle in Both Hemispheres; With a View of the Silvery

Question in the United States. (New york), 406.

s Oliver Iohnson. The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review of Eli

Theyers's Paper on the New England Emigrant Aid Company.

(Worchester: The Worchester Society of Andqulty, 1887), 22;

9. Samuel Joseph May. Some Recollections of Our Anti-Siavery

Conflict. 15.

10. Wendell Phillips and Frmacis Jackson Garrison. Witliam Lloyd

Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story of His Life Told by His Children. (New

York: The Century CO., 1885), 140.

it parker Pillsbtuy. Acts of the Anti-Silvery Apostles. 12.

lz Wendell phillips and Francis Jackson Garrison. William Lloyd

Garrison, 1805-1879. 140.

1 Beriah Green. Sketches of the Life and Writings of James

Gillespie B irney. 11-12.

4 Ibid., 13.

as. Ibid., 23.

]bid., 24.

iz William Bimey. James G. B irney arm His Times. 340,

tL Ibid., 222-227.

,9. Ibid., ix.

Ibid.; 266.

1. Ibid., 175.

2z William Lloyd Ganison. "Noalaem Rcspoaslq lity For Slavery." 8.

. WilEam Lloyd Garrison. Selections From the Writings and

Speeches of William Lloyd Garrison. (Boston: R.F. Wallcut, 1852),

54-56.

24. Ibid., 30,

z . Wendell Phillips and Francis Jackson Ganison. William Lloyd

Garrison, 1805-79. 135.

v William Gooden. Silvery and Anti-Silvery; a History of the

Great Struggle in Both Hemispheres. 538-539.

. William Bimey. James G. B irney and His Times. 302.

William Lloyd Garrison. Selections From the Writings and

Speeeheof William Lloyd Garrison. 237.

zg. James G. Bimey. A Letter on the Political Obligations of

Abolitionists, By James Birney: With a Reply by William Lloyd Garrison.

(Boston: Dow md Jackson, Printers, 18391, 23.

Ibi&,32`

at Ibid., 12.

r Ibid., 8.

3 William Bimey. James G. Birney and His Times. 128-129.

u-Ibid., 137.

ai James G. Bimey. A Letter on the Political Obligations of

Abolitionists. 16.

3 James G. Bimey. A Letter on the Political Obligations of

Abolitionists. 16. William Bimey. James G. Birney and His Times. 292-

293.

- Ibid., 10.

t Oliver Johnson. The Abolitionists Vindicated. 2.

William Bimey. James G. Birney and HIS Times. vii.

Wendell phillips and Francis Jackson GardsorL William Lloyd

Garrison, 1805-1879. viL

24 • The Wittenberg History Journa!

BibliographyBimey, James G. Exami tion of the Decision of the Supreme Courl of

the United States, in the Case of Strader, Gorman, and

Armstrong vs. Christopher Graham, Delivered at its December

Term, 1850: Concludb g with an Address to tim Free Colored

People, Advising Them to Remove to Liberia. Cincinnati:

Traman and Spofford Publishers, 1852.

Bimey, James G. A Letter on the Political Obligations of Abolilionists,

By James Birney : With A Reply By William Lloyd Garrison.

Boston: Dow and Jackson, Printers, 1839.

Bimey, WiilJam. Jam s Birney and His Times. New York: D. Alrpleton

and Company, 1890.

Garrison, Wendell Philhps and Francis Jackson Garrison. William Lloyd

Garrison, 1805-18791 The Story of HIS Life Told by HIS

Children. New York: The Century Co., 1885.

Garrison, William Lloyd. "Northern Responsibility For Slavery."New

YorkTimes, 15Feb 1854, 8.

Garrison, Willimn Lloyd, Selectlans from the Writings of Speeches of

William Lloyd Garrison. Boston: R.F. WaUcut, 1852.

Green, BeriahSketches of the Life and Writings of James Gillesp&

Birney. Utica: Jackson and Chaplin, 1844.

Goodell, William. Slavery and Anti-Slavery; A History of the Great

Struggle in Both Hemispheres, with a View of the Slavery

Question in the United States. New York.

Johnson, Oliver. The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review of Eli Thayer's

Paper on the New England Emigrant Aid Company. Worchester:

The Worchester Society of Antiquity, 1887.

Martineau, Harriet. The Martyr Age of the United States. Boston: Weeks,

Jordan, and Co., 1839.

May, Samuel Joseph. Some Recollections of Our Anti-Slavery Conflict.

Boston: Fields, Osgood, and Co., 1869.

Pillsbury, Parker. Acts of the Anti-Slavery Apostles. 1883; Reprint,

Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.

"Review of Pamphlets on Slave ad Colonization." Quarterly Christian

Spectator. 1833, 23.

Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education:Immediate Reaction from May Through October, 1954

by Melissa Stull

'To separate [Negro children] from others ofsimilar age and qualifications solely because oftheir race generates a feeling of inferiority as totheir status in community that may affect theirhearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever beundone .... We conclude that in the field of pubficeducation the doctrine of' separate but equal' hasno place. Separate educational facilities areinherently unequal.' i

Chief Justice Earl Warren read this decision in the Brown v.Topeka Board of Education ruling on May 17, 1954 whichdeclared school segregation unconstitutional. Thisunanimous decision nullified Plessy v. Ferguson of 1896which legalized separate facilities for whites and blacks onthe condition that they must be equal. In the fifty-eight yearsseparating the two decisions, the equality clause hadbecome increasingly disregarded; separate and unequalfacilities thrived, especially in the South. The Brown v.Board decision sparked debate among group leaders,ministers, Northerners, Southerners, whites, and blacks.Although the constituencies held conflicting opinions, arecurring attitude permeated all of them. The immediatereactions of the N.A.A.C.P., the North, the Southern churchcommunity, and the South to the Brown v. Board rulingfrom May through October, 1954 reveal the diversity of thegroups; yet, an underlying cautiousness pervades all of theirresponses.

Walter White, executive secretary of the N.A.A.C.P.,correctly foreshadowed the mmificatious of the Brown v.Board of Education ruling by predicting that it would be farreaching. Plessy v. Ferguson had dealt specifically interstaterailroad travel but had affected all aspects of life, and Whitebelieved that Brown v. Board would do the same. Thisruling would help eliminate some of the social barriersbetween the races. However, White was not so naive as toexpect the South to comply whole-heartedly with thedecision; Southern shaW.s, he thought, would continue toresist. Furthermore, from his experiences in the North, herealized that segregation would remain as long as rigidhousing patterns existed. Primary schools would stin besegregated, whereas high schools would become moreintegrated. 2

Overall, White clearly supported the ruling which heconsidered to be a major victory for equality. He assuredBlack educators that the N.A.A.C.P. would get involved iftheir jobs became jeopardized due to discrimination. Whiteacknowledged the hypo sy in the North in terms ofsegregation; therefore, he was hesitant to criticize the deepSouth for resisting the desegregation decision. Although heacknowledged the segregation occurring in portions of theNorth, he did not condemn it. Why did White, as the leaderof the foremost civil rights organization at the time, notcondemn the segregation in both the South and the North?

The North's respense to Brown v. Board reflects acautiousness similar to Walter White's and theN.A.A.C.P.'s. They hailed the decision as the beginning ofthe end of racial discrimination; however, the North, for themost part, was unwilling to criticize the South. This isevident in the editorials appearing in Northern newspapersin the days following the decision. The Cleveland PlainDealer expressed the sentiment that no other decision couldhave been possible. Moreover, the selection of words in the

• . * . . n.

tfollowing passage depicts a serious contradictto ....[blacks had] earned the right to be treated as fwst-mtecitizens and earned it the hard way." 3 The fact thatcitizenship had to be 'earned' shows that Blacks were notconsidered to be equal. Was the writer expressing his ownbias or was his view a reflection of the Northern majority?

Other contradictions surfaced in an editorial in theChicago Tribune. The article reads," The principleestablished by this decision is not that anybody has to giveup any of his prejudices...The principle is the muchsimpler one that the state government, North and South,must regard all men as created equal so far, as opportunitiesat the disposal of the state are concerned." 4 Once again,irony surfaces - the government must treat men legally asequal, but individuals do not have to do so. This statementseems to be another appeasement - an attempt to reassurethe South that no one "has to give up any of his prejudices."From these articles, it appears that most of the North istaking the middle position as did the N.A.A.C.P.

However, this does not mean that no nan criticized theSupreme Court's decision. Fred Rodell, a Northeroer,responded to Southern claims that desegregating schools

26 • The Wittenberg History Journal

would only lead to chaos. Rodell explained that thisstatement was a scapegoat white Southemers used for notsegregating. White adults feared an end to segregation dueto their own self-doubts. Therefore, it was not only theeducation of children through desegregation means that wasnecessary, but the education of white adults. This, Rodellexplains, was the ".. !rind of education most sorely neededin the South." It was "...not the education of the coloredchildren in a civilized fashion, but the education of thewhite adults in the brand of inner strength that breedshumility and true humanity - unsegregated." 5 Rodell'scritique of the South put him in a minority, for the North, asa whole, was slow to judge the South.

Despite all of the praises the North bestowed upon theSupreme Court decision and the rhetoric that surfaced fromNorthern commentary, the North still retained segregation.Clifford Dowday, a joumaliat bern and raised in the Southbut employed in the North, commented on this:

"In living

terms, the low percentage of Negro population in themajority of the Northern communities has made it possiblefor the white to preen himself on his abstxact humanity andlack of discrimination laws, while practicing de factosegregation." 6 De facto segregation did continue in theNorth; this is a reason why the North hesitated to condemnthe Southern actions and instead focused on the positivevirtues of the Brown v. Board decision.

The churches of the South followed the same reasoningby de-emphasizing the practices of the South and thedissenting voices of some political leaders andconcentrating on the morality of the Court's ruling. TheCatholic Committee of the South, the Ninety-FourthGeneral Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in NorthCarolina, the Southwest Texas Methodist Conference, theSouthern Baptist Convention, the Episcopal Diocese ofNorth Carolina, along with numerous other churchesendorsed the court's desegregation decision. 7 All of themdeclared that they would begin making the ruling a reality mtheir schools and churches. The Ninety-Fourth GeneralAssembly of the Presbyterian Church "...affirmed, by avote of 236 to 169, that 'enforced segregation of the races isdiscrimination which is out of hurmony with Christiantheology and ethics.'" 8 The fact that 42% of these at theconference did not support this statement, reveals the hiddenuncertainty with which many in the church viewed theBrown v. Board decision. This brings forth a question - didthe churches vocally condemn segregation practices prior to

the ruling?The example the National Council of Churches further

explains this dilemma. They supported the Supreme Court'sdecision, as most Southern churches did, and they called fora Christian example of brotherhood, Yet, churches weremore segregated than schools! The council explained that asa non-segregated church must come. 9 What about theleadership of the Church2 It seems that the churches did notwant to be the leaders in disrupting the status qan. Hence,although the Southern churches praised the Brown v. Board

of Education nding, their actions indicated their relunctancyto adhere to the ruling.

The N.A.A.C P., the North, the Southern churchesstood together in their support of the Brown v. Board ruling.On the other hand, a broad spectrum of responses emanatedfrom the South ranging from immediate desegregation ofthe schools in Washington, D.C. to the condemning actionsand words of Georgia's Govemor, Herman Talmadge. Theactions of Washington, D.C. and Georgia were theextremes; the general consensus of the South revealed asurprising calmness. One reason may have been that manySoutherners believed the ruling did not and would not affectthem. They did not anticipate much change becausegeography would aid in separating the races. The Court hadalso postponed the specifications of implementing thedecision until October.

Many Southerners viewed this action of the Court ascritical in avoiding violence. Harold Fleming, a staffmember of the Southern Regional Council of Atlanta,believed the Com't was wise to lake two years to make adecision in the Brown v. Board case, for this allowed peopletime to accept the idea of desegregation. 10 Hodding Carter,editor and publisher of the Delta Democrat-Times, inGreenville, Mississippi, argued that rushing things wouldonly heighten white fears and anxieties. A legal rulingwould not change attitudes; time was necessary. 1 Thepresident of Morehouse College, Benjamin L. Mays,realTtrmed this: "The complete integration of the schools'will become slower than you think.'"

Others in the South believed that desegregation hadbeen occurring for several years. The Louisville Courier*Journal expressed the inevitability of the ruling: '"TheSupreme Court's rule is not itself a revolution. It is ratheracceptance of a process that has been going on a long timeand that is like an ocean's steady pressures - not easy to seeas they move in, bat finally impossible to restrain by anyman-made devices.'"l Harry S. Asmore, editor of LittleRock's Arkansas Gazette, thought that desegregation hadbeen occurring for sixty years. 14

Other improvements were taking place, as well. Carterstated that changes had been happening without legislation.He cited that there had been no lynchings in three years. 1Arthur Sutherland, a professor of law at Harvard University,expounded on this positive note. He stated that:

No state in the Union is populated by a separatespecies of cruel and brutal white men, seeking bycynical devices or by sheer defamce to escape theperformance of constitutional duties. One has totravel in the present South to realize the contrary oto be convinced of the rapid increase ofhumanitarianism, of cultivation, of kindness, ofcomfort, of all the good things that go to make upa great civilization, a6

Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education: Immediate Reaction from May Through October, 1954 • 27

Southemers obviously believed that they had been initiatingmorality on their own; the records show differently,however.

Several Southerners thought the ruling would enhanceAmerica's position as a world-wide leader. An article inLife magazine entitled, "A Historic Decision for Equality,"stated that "... the Supreme Court not only kept pace witheducational and social progress but at one strokeimmeasurably raised the respect of other nations for theU.S." a7 Time and time again when support fordesegregation on the grounds that racial segregation wasimmoral could not be found, support could be fostered fordesegregation on the grounds that it heightened the UnitedStates' position in the world.

Southern reporters and politicians immediatelyidentified obstacles to desegregation which they used asreasons for continuing segregation. For instance, an obviousdifficulty in desegregating would happen in communitieswith a large number of black people. Whites here would bemuch less accepting of opening up the schools. Moreover,Carter, the editor of a Mississippi newspaper, explained thatthe black man was "...still easygoing in his morals..."which made it difficult for whites to accept him. ,8 Carter'sattitude reveals how deeply embedded racism was in theSouth - a solid blockade to desegregation efforts. Cartercontinued by saying that desegregation may jeopardizeeducational standards because black educators have notbeen trained as well as whites. ,9 The largest and mosthindering barrier to desegregation was the deep-rootedracism of many Southerners.

Dowdey, born in the South but employed in the Northas a joumnlist, claimed that the hypocrisy of the Northimpeded the desegregation ruling. He explained that it wasthe North who had begun the South's segregated schoolsystem after the Civil War. Furthermore, the North claimedthat its schools were desegregated, however, black belts andwhite suburbs flourished. Dowdey would prefer not todesegregate but he agreed that the South would do so oncethe North had. 2o His convictions echoed those of othersthroughout the South.

In the Brown v. Board rtding twenty-one states wereaffected, the overwhelming majority of which were in theSouth. Each section of the South reacted differently. Theborder states responded calurly to the decision and proceedto develop proposals for implementing the Court's ruling.Washington, D.C., led by President Eisenhower, begandesegregation plans immediately following the decision inhopes of leading the country peacefully through the processof desegregation. Kansas, Oklahoma, Arizona, and NewMexico expected no problems in the ruling mainly due tothe small number of blacks in these states. 21

The other states did not react with such dignifiedcomposure. Texas Governor Allan Shivers commented thatit might take years to implement the decision. TheCommissioner of Education in Texas, J.W. Edgar,reaffirmed the Governor's position. North Carolina's State

Democratic Convention declared that obedience to the lawswas the only option. The Louisiana House ofRepresentatives, with only three dissenting votes, urged thecontinuation of separate but equal facilities. Floridahesitated to make any strong statements of support ordefiance.

Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Georgia -the deep South - did not exhibit any such reservations aboutdenouncing the ruling. The Birmingham News in aneditorial stated its regrets over the Supreme Court decision:"The News believes that the considerations of publicinterest and state's rights which underlie the supersededdecision of 1896 still apply and would better serve theprogress in race relations and education." zs South Carolinaalso denounced the ruling and refused to comply. Likewise,a Mississippi superintendent of education stated that '"thedecision to comply would not affect us at aft. That's becausewe are not going to observe it in our country. It will be 'tohell with the Supreme Court' down here. Of course, we mayall hang for it. But we won't hang separately. We'll all hangtogether.'"

These exclamations of Alabama, South Carolina, andMississippi pale in comparison to the fiery assertions ofGeorgia's Governor Herman Talmage. The Supreme Court,Talmage claimed, has

'... reduced our constitutions to a mere scrap ofpaper...Georgians.., will not tolerate the mixingof the races in public schools... I think about98% of the white and colored people of the stateprefer segregation... We're not going to secedefrom the Union, but the people of Georgia will notcomply with the decision.'

He went on to claim that he was not" ... anti-Negro ordiscriminatory." 2s Despite his claims of not beingdiscriminatory, Talmage led his state in resistance todesegregation.

These states, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Georgia,sought specific methods to circumvent the Court's decision.South Carolina focused on 'voluntary' segregation as asolution. School officials believed that most blacks wouldnot be willing to be the first to alter the status qun. Thoseblacks who attempted to do so would be discouragedthrough the usage of social and economic pressures; mostblacks were employed by whites. Accompanying thisprogram of 'voluntary' desegregation was an attempt togain the approval of black educators, who knew that it wesunlikely that white schools would hire them. Another optionSouth Carolina favored was gerrymandering of schooldistricts; however, this would not affect rural communitieswhere blacks and whites lived in the same neighborhoods.The idea of abolishing public schools was explored duringthe first two months following the Court's decision, but itwas found to be impractical.

Mississippi hoped to perpetuate the current system ofsegregation by using a law already enacted in the state

28 o The Wittenberg History Journal

legislature. The law basically dictated that pupilassignments could be influenced by the emotional needs ofthe student and the best welfare of those students alreadyattending the school. Although the law did not mentionsegregation, the vague wording allowed for interpretation. 27Similarly, Georgia explored many of the options SouthCarolina and Mississippi had. Another idea Talmagepursued involved creating separate sexed schools at thesecondary level to discourage interracial relationships.Georgia and Mississippi continued their acts of deflanco byrefusing to participate in the October Court discussion onhow to implement desegregation measures.

Although segregation remained a part of everyday lifein the years following the Brown v. Board of Educationdecision, this ruling was the ftrst step towards ending

inequities in race relations. Although the N.A.A.C.P., theNorth, and the Southern church community praised thedecision us "... a milestone in the achievement of civilfights," they realized that desegregation would be difficultto implement. They supported the Court but hesitated tocriticize or force the South into action. The divided Southpursued separate plans of action with the deep Southblatantly and vigorously resisting desegregation. Those whosupported the decision soon realized that a legal mandatemay bring down the visible barriers separating the races, butit was incapable of changing people's racist convictions andactions. Black children still possessed feelings of inferioritydespite the hopeful implications apparent in Chief JusticeWarren's decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education

in May, 1954.

Endnotes

i "To All On Equal Terms," Time, 24 May 1954, 22.

"What Negroes Want Now" An Interview with Walter White,

Executive Secretary of the N.A.A.C.P.," U3 News and Worm Report, 28

May 1954, 54-59.

3 "Editorial Exeerpu from the Nation's press on Segregation

Ruling," New York Times, 18 May 1954, 19.

* Ibid.

Fred Rodall, "School Kids Are Color Blind: A Northerner Looks

at the Supreme Court's Decision," The Saturday Review, 16 October

1954, 48.

6 Clifford Dowday,"A Southerner Looks at the Supreme Court,"

The Saturday Review, 9 October 1954, 10.

Charles Keenan, "Church Leaders on School Segregation,"

America, 10 July 1954, 378.

I Ibid., 379.

"What Will The Churches Do?" National Council Outlook, June

1954, 17.

m Harold C. Fleming, "The South Wfl[ Go Along: Segregation: A

Report from Atlanta,"New Republic, 31 May 1954, 7.

tl Hodding Carter," The Court's Decision and the South," Reader's

Digest, September 1954, 51-5l

ix 3ohn LaFarge, "Scuthem Catholics," 372.

3 Quoted in "A Historic De n' a for Equality;' fife, 31 May 1954,14.

,4 "The Last 'Fuming?" Time, 24 May 1954, 98.

t Hodding Carter, The Court's Decision," 54.

t6 Arthur E. Suthedand, "Segregation and the Supreme Court," The

AilanticMouthly, July 1954, 36.

7 "A Historic Decision," 1 I.

l, Hodding Carter, "The Court's Decision." 54.

19 Ibid.

o Clifford Dowday, "A Southerner Looks," 38.

21 "To All On Equal Terms" 22.

m,,Talmag and Segregation: He Makes his Last Stand,"

Newsweek, 31 May 1954, 31.

"Editorial Exeeq ," 19.

"Will South End Negro Schools? Here's the Story of What States

Plan To Do Next," U.S. News and Worm Report, 28 May 1954, 24.

z, "Talmage and Segregation," 31.

"Will South End Negro Schools?" 22-23.

Zqbid., 2Z

"What Will the Churches Do?" 17.

Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education: Immediate Reaction from May Through October, 1954 • 29

Bibliography

Carter, Hodding. "The Court's Decision and the South." Reader's Digest,

September 1954, 51-56.

Dowdey, Clifford. "A Southerner Looks at the Supreme Court." The

Saturday Review, 9 October 1954, 9-10, 35-38.

"Editorial Excewts from the Nation's press on Segregation Ruling." New

YorkTimes, 18 May 1954, 19.2

Fleming, Harold C. "The South Will Go Along: Segregation: A Report

from Atlama."NewRepublie, 31 May 1954, 6-7.

"A Historic Decision for Equality:' Life, 31 May 1954, 11-14.

Hollis, Ernest V. "The Supreme Court Deelsion on Segregation:

Problea'ns We Face In Implementing the Decision." Vital

Speeches, 1 November 1954, 823-826.

Keenan, Charles. "Church Leaders on School Segmgariou." America, 10

July 1954, 378-379.

LaFarge, John. "Report on Desegregation."America, 16 October 1954, 70.

LaFarge, Iohn. "Southern Catholics Chart a Course." America, 10 July

1954, 372.

"The Last Turning?" Time, 24 May 1954, 98-99.

Rodell, Fred. "School Kids Are Color Blind: A Northerner Looks m the

Supreme Court's Decision." The Saturday Review, 16 October

1954, 9-10, 47-48.

"South is Cautious on H gh Court Bid." New York Times, 19 May 1954,

1,18.

Sutherland, Arthur E. "Segregation and the Supreme Court." The Atlantic

Monthly, July 1954, 33-36.

"Talmage Recalls Militia Use."New York Times, 19 May 1954, 18.

"Tulmage and Segregation: He Makes His Stand." Newsweek, 31 May

1954,31-32•

"To All on Equal Terms." Time, 24 May 1954, 21-22.

Wertham, Frederic. "N'me Men Speak To you. Iim Crow m the No a '

TheNatlan, 12 June 1954,497-499.

"What Negroes Want Now: An Interview with Walter White, Executive

Secretary of the N.A.A.C.P." US. News and World Report, 28

May 1954, 54-59.

"What Will The Churches Do?" National Council Outtook, Imae 1954, 17.

"Will South End Negro Schools? Here's the Story of What States Plan to

Do Next." US.News and World Report, 28 May 1954, 21-24.

30 • The Wittenberg History Journal

The 1972 Presidential Campaign's Appeal to Womenby Pare Ehr esman

(Parn Ehresman was the winner of the 1993 ATO - Paul F. Bloomhardt Award for outstanding junior history majors.)

1972 was a busy political year, full of pressing issues suchas the Vietnam War, inflation, and busing. Neither of thecandidates nor the electorate had enough energy to devoteto other concerns, let alone women's concerns - yet theydid, President Nixon and Senator George MeGovern paidenough attention to women's issues to engage in a battleover them. As insignificant as the battle may seemcompared to the Vietnam War, the candidates" struggle towin women's support resulted in women substantiallystrengthening their political influence.

The women's movement was the main cause of women

increasing their activity in the 1972 campaign. The notionof women's rights did not spontaneously occur toMcGovern and Nixon as a worthwhile issue to emphasize.On the contrary, wrote Life magazine, "From a runningsometimes strident start in the 1960s, the idea of women'sequality has caught in the national mind." ' Moreover, thefocus of the women's movement changed from social actionto political action as it began to organize itself, influencecandidates, and run candidates of its own. 2 Perhaps as aresult of the recent move toward organization, Timemagazine felt that in 1972 politicians were genuinelyresponding to women's demands such as equal pay forequal work, day-eare, and abortion rights. 3 Congress hadreflected women's increased political power when it passeddie Equal Rights Amendment earlier that year. 4 It would befoolish, however, to conclude that all Americans were inagreement about women's political activism; theconservative view that a woman's domain should remainprivate prevailed in the minds of many. For instance, twotelevision newsmen reporting on the National Women'sPolitical Caucus remarked that next will be a convention for"left-handed Lithuanians." 5

Until 1972, women had not made a great impact onpolitics, comprising 53% of the voting population, but only3% of elected officials. The Democratic Commission onParty Stmctore and Delegate Selection, intent on improvingthose statistics, devised a new rule for selecting delegates tothe national convention. The reform rule declared that thecomposition of the state delegations must represent thepopulations from which they were drawn. It aimed toinvolve more women, minorities, and young people in the

political process. 7 The Republicans, not wishing to appearopposed to the democratic ideal, and at the same lime notwanting to alienate GOP conservatives, simply called formore open representation at their convention. 8 To preparefor greater female participation at the conventions, bethparties formed the National Women's Political Caucus(NWPC). NWPC Executive Director Doris Meissnerexplained its puq se: "We want the women at theconvention to be aware of their common political interest.And we hope that as a result they will push for fairrepresentation in credential fights, in platform decisions,and in floor debate."

Women's groups and leaders endorsed candidates in1972 just as any other organization did, using their owncriteria. A feminist newsletter, The Woman Activist, ratedsenators' votes on four women's issues and scored SenatorGeorge McGoveru at 100 percent. The issues included anamendment to the ERA barring women from the draft, anamendment to a higher education bill which would cancel aprovision prohibiting discrimination based on gender, and amove to strike a day-care proposal from anti-povertylegislation. The newsletter also found that more democratsthan Republicans had pro-feminist voting records. 0 Themore liberal Democratic party, guided by McGoveru, wonthe approval of most feminists, including Betty Friedan andGloria Steinem. u The approval, however, was not whole-hearted. Steinem endorsed McGoveru only as the best"white, male candidate," 2 clearly implying timt she wouldsupport a woman flit were possible. She and other feminist,though, credited him with the success of the new delegationrule and the NWPC. 13 In contrast to McGoveru, Nixon hada mixed record on women's issues. He endorsed the EqualRights Amendment, yet later vetoed a popu r day-care bilL 14

McGovern found fault with Nixun's record onwomen's issues. On August 25, he publicly accused Nixonof mocking women's rights:

Out of 12,000 top policy positions in thisAdministration, 105 appointments have gone towomen - that's eight-tenths of 1 per cent; hardlyimpressive to an electorate that may be up [sic] by51 per cent women. It's not only unjust, but it'sstupid politics. ,2

32 o The Wittenberg History Jomxml

McOovern went on to demonstrate ins commitment towomen's rights by introducing five women, including BellaAbzug, appointed to high campaign posts, with ShirleyMacLaine as his chief advisor on women's issues. 6 Nixonimmediately responded to McGovem's accusations byproclaiming August 26 "Women's Rights Day."Defensively, Nixon corrected McGovem's figure of 105appointments to 118 then noticed that 118 was triple thenumber of women that had worked in top positions when hetook office. In addition, he pointed out that for the first timein American history, two women chaired regulatoryagencies simultaneously, and that he had nominated sixwomen to the rank of general in the armed forces. 17 Nixonconcluded his response by promising to "insure womenevery opportunity to the make the fullest contribution to ourprogress as a nation." 18 TheNew York Times interpretedMcGovern's and Nixon's confrontation as "a sharpreminder that women constitute half of the votingpopulation." 19 The candidates battled over winningwomen's favor because the women's movement had begunto organize women in both parties into a powerful politicalvoice that the campaign could not ignore. The candidateswere preparing themselves for women to vote as a blockand not paired off with their husbands - a modem way toview women's influence.

To understand how women influenced each party andits presidential candidates, the national conventions andplatforms must be examined. The exchange betweenMcGovern and Nixon on August 25th and 26th was, in part,an attempt to make amends for disappointing some keywomen at the conventions.

Women composed nearly 40% of the delegates at theDemocratic National Convention, including manyprominent feminists.at The party appointed a woman, JeanWestwood, as the Democratic National Committee chair - afirst for either party, z Women felt excited about theiradvanced level of involvement until McGovem's "tacticalmaneuvers" 2a began to curtail their ambitions. First, at thelast minute McGovem pulled back his support for the SouthCarolina challenge in which the NWPC proposed to addseven more women to the South Carolina delegation• *Second, McGovem did not support an abortion plankbecause he feared it would cost him votes - a stand thatfeminists were aware of before the convention. The surprisehit when a right-to-life speaker stepped up to themicrophone, a political move that McGovem promised thathe would not make. z In addition to other broken promises,although McGovem pledged to support a woman as a co-chairperson, he demoted her to a vice-chairwoman under amale chairman, infuriating many women at the convention.

Reacting McGovem's decisions, Steinem explode,"You promised that you would you would not to take thelow roads, you bastards!" Smarting from the governor'sbetrayal, she now attacked him when she when she hadonce faithfully campaigned for him. McGovem, shecomplained, only cared about how many McGovem

delegates the women would deriver;, she felt used anddegraded. " What Gloria Steinem and other miffedfeminists did not understand was that ff McGovemconceded too much to women's demands, he would lose apopular electoral base; he would lose the election to a moreconservative Richard Nixon - an even greater loss tofeminists. Steinem and others, caught up in their feministidealism, had lost sight of practicai politics. Or perhaps,since this was their first try at the political game, they neverfully understood the rules. A top McGovern aidesummarized the conflict in interests: the feminists expectedthat "the McGovem campaign should have collapsed itsidentity into the women's rights movement. That wasabsurd." 29

Women at the Republican National Convention chose adifferent approach to influence Nixon and the Republicanplatform. Republican women championed many of thesame causes as the Democratic women, yet they presentedthemselves as determined ladies rather than angry feminists.Because the Republican convention took place over amonth after the Democratic, GOP women had theoppormulty to draw lessons from the Democrats'experiences. The convention began with a keynote fromAnne Armstrong, co-chair of the Republican NationalConvention and the f t woman to ever give the keynote ata national convention. Jill Ruckelshaus, a woman Timedubbed "the Republicans' answer to Gloria Steinem,"pressured the party to adopt an abortion plank and did notget any further than the Democrats had. 30 More successfulwas Congresswoman Peggy Heckler, who fought for aplank supporting federally-funded day-care, even thoughNixon had recently vetoed a similar bill. Althoughdisappointed, she compromised and gained a sttongendorsement of childcare in the platform. t The Democraticplatform did not even mention day-care. Because theRepublican women did not attend the convention with loftyexpectations, they left much less braised than had theDemocratic women.

Analyzing the women's rights planks in the twoplatforms demonstrates the one-up contest that the

• • , ts'Republicans were determined to win. The Democraplank, entitled "Rights of Women," succinctly stated fifteenobjectives including "a priority effort to ratify the EqualRights Amendment," bringing sexual discrimination underCivil Rights laws, and full enforcement of the EqualEmployment Opportunity Act. 32 In contrast, the Republicanplank, more emphatically titled "Equal Rights for Women,"was longer and made broad statements about the party'scommitment to women, such as, 'q'his administration hasdone more than any before it to help women of Americaachieve equality of opportunity." 33 Hidden in theseeffusions were the most conservative stands of theRepublican party. For example, the Democrats wantedequal pay for comparable work, while the Republicansasked for equal pay for equal work. The Democrats listedspecific amendments they wanted to add to acts or eodes;

The 1972 Presidential Campaign's Appeal to Women • 33

the Republicans simply stated that they wanted to enddiscrimination against women and did not list how theyproposed to do so. The Republican plank acted more as asweeping gesture, attempting to appease women yet notalienate party standards. The Democratic plank did notinclude broad, supportive statements and thus did notappear as enthusiastic about women's rights. However, theDemocrats, less concerned with winning women's approvalbecause most women already supported them, could notafford to be more specific and critical in their plank.

In the 1972 campaign, significant change took place forwomen at the basic level of American politics when theyincreased their participation as party delegates. This countryhas since built on that initial change to run a woman forvice-president and elect an African-American woman to theSenate. The recent rise of women in elected positions mightnot have occurred ff the 1972 campaign had not aff'trmedwomen's importance in the political process. If only for abrief time, women and their rights became a main issue inthe 1972 presidential campaign, forcing the candidates tofocus on women and their growing influence in politics.

Notes

L "Now Women Talk Back," Life, 9 June 1972, 46.

z Ibid. and "New Face of politics," McCalls, October 1972, 101.

3. "Toward Female Power at the Polls," Time, 20 March 1972, 34.

" Susan Tuldlin, Clout: Womanpower and Polities (New York:

Coward, McCamt, and Geoghegan, 1974), 16.

s. Quoted in Nora Ephron, "Women," Esquire, November 1972,

18,28.

. Tolchin, 17.

" Ponclfitta Pierce, "What Do Women Want at the Conventions?"

McCalla, July 1972, 42.

B. My interpretation added to Tolehin, 32.

s. Quoted in Pierce, 42.

0. "Feminist Rates Senators' Votes," New York Times, 23 April

1972, 45.

:L Inference based ulxm the number of sources connecting feminist

leaders and organizations with G orge McGovera.

tz Quoted in "Gloria Stdmem Aids McGovem's Cause," New york

Times, 12 February t972, 15.

:x Ephron, 14.

1,. "Senators Bar Weakening of Equal Rights Proposal," New York

Times, 21 March 1972, 1, and Tolchin, 230.

u" Quctod in "MeGovern Asseas Nixon Policy Cost Milfions of

Jobs," New York Times, 26 August 1972, 10.

is Ibid., I, and Ephron, 14.

lz Robert S. Semple, Jr.,"Nixon Proclaims 'Women's Day' After

Accusation by McGovem,"New York Times, 27 August 1972, 33 (N).

August 26 was the 52nd anniversary of the ratification of the 19th

amendment.

Quoted in Ibid.

1 Ibid.

t Ibid.

L Epliron, 10.

= "Outsiders on the Inside." Newsweek, 24 July 1972, 36.

Senaple, 33 (N),

Ephron, 12.

2s Ibid., 14.

Tolchin, 33.

" Quoted in Ephron, 18.

2t Tulchin, 34.

' Ibid., 33.

"How to De-Radieulize: Republican National ConvenlicsL"

Times, 4 Septeznber 1972, 18.

31Ibid.

3z The Democratic and the Republican platforms of 1972 were

printed in Facts on File, 1972. The Democrats' Womtm's Rights plank is

on page 539.

The Republicans' Equal Rights for Women plank is on page 670

of Facts on File, 1972.

34. The Wittenberg History Journal

Sources Consulted

Diamonstein, B., ed. "Wc aen Need Politics: Interview With P M.

Eldridge?' Vogue, 15 February I972.

"Eve's Operatives: Women Delegates of the Democratic Convenrima."

Time, 24 July 1972.

H , , 7Epinon, Nora. Women. Esqmre, Novemberl9 2.

"An Examination of the Written Message." New York Times, 21 January

1972, 19.

Facts on F e, 1972.

"Feminist Rates Senatos" Votes." New York Times, 23 April 1972, 45.

"Gloria SteLuem Aids McGovem's Cause." New York Times, 12

February 1972, 15.

Hardwick, Elizabeth. "Election Countdown '72." 15 August, 1

September, 15 September, 1 October, 15 October, 1 November

1972,

"How to De-Radicalize: Republican National Convention." Time, 4

SepUnnber I972.

Johnston, Laurie. "Anti-Nixon Rally Ends in Arrest." New York Times,

24 October 1972, 31.

"McGovem Asserts Nixon Policy Cost Millions of Jobs." New York

Times, 26 August 1972, 1 and I0.

"New Face of Politics ?' McCalIs, October 1972.

"New Woman, 1972: Where She Is and Where She's Going." Time, 20

March 1972.

"Nixon on Abortion." National Review, 26 May 1972.

"Now Women Talk Back." Life, 9 June 1972.

"Outsider on the Inside." Newsweek, 24 duly 1972.

Pierce, PonchJtta. "What Do Women Want at the Conventions?"

McCaBs, July I972.

"The presidential Family: In Campaign Spotlight." U.S. News, 4

September 1972.

"Promises Republinans Make." U.S. News, 4 September 1972.

"Running for First Lady." MeCalls, October 1972.

Scruple, Robert S., Jr. "Nixon Proclaims 'Woman's Day' After

Accusation By MeGovem." New York Times, 27 August 1972,

33 0"0.

"Senators Bar Weakening of Equal Rights Proposal." New York Times,

21 March 1972, 1.

Sindlingur, A.E. "Big Campaign Issues, As Voters Rank Them." U.S.

News, 4 September 1972.

Those Other Campmgners, Pat and Eleanor. Time, 9 October 1972.

Tolchin, Susan and Martin Tulchin. Clout: Wc anpower and politics.

New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghogan, 1974.

"Toward Female Power at the Polls." Time, 20 March 1972.

"The Week." National Review, 26 May 1972.

"Women's Caucus Scores Musldes for Abs teeism." New York Times,

19 March 1972, 40.