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CPG
Exclusive property
G.R. No. L-23352 December 31, 1925
THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.,
INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN M. POIZAT, ET AL., defendants.GABRIELA ANDREA DE COSTER, appellant.
Antonio M. Opisso for appellant.
Eusebio Orense and Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for
appellee.
STATEMENT
August 25, 1905, the appellant, with his consent executed to
and in favor of her husband, Juan M. Poizat, a general power
of attorney, which among other things, authorized him to do
in her name, place and stead, and making use of her rights
and actions, the following things:
To loan or borrow any amount in cash or fungible
conditions he may deem convenient collecting or
paying the principal or interest, for the time, and
under the principal of the interest, when they
respectively should or private documents, and
making there transactions with or without
mortgage, pledge or personal securities.
November 2, 1912, Juan M. Poizat applied for and obtained
from the plaintiff a credit for the sum of 10,000 Pounds
Sterling to be drawn on the" Banco Espanol del Rio de la
Plata" in London not later than January, 1913. Later, to secure
the payment of the loan, he executed a mortgage upon the
real property of his wife, the material portions of which are as
follows:
This indenture entered into the City of Manila, P.I.,
by and between Juan M. Poizat, merchant, of legal
age, married and residing in the City of Manila, in
his own behalf and in his capacity also as attorney
in fact of his wife Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster
by virtue of the authority vested in him by the
power of attorney duly executed and acknowledge
in this City of Manila, etc.
First. That in the name of Dona Gabriela Andrea de
Coster, wife of Don Juan M. Poizat, there is
registered on page 89 (back) of Book 3, Urban
Property consisting of a house and six adjacentwarehouse, all of strong material and constructed
upon her own land, said property being Nos. 5, 3,
and 1 of Calle Urbiztondo, and No. 13 of Calle
Barraca in the District of Binondo in the City of
Manila, etc.
Second. That the marriage of Don Juan M. Poizat
and Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster being
subsisting and undissolved, and with the object of
constructing a new building over the land
hereinabove described, the aforesaid house with
the six warehouse thereon constructed were
demolished and in their stead a building was
erected, by permission of the Department ofEngineering and Public Works of this City issued
November 10, 1902, said building being of strong
material which, together with the land, now forms
only one piece of real estate, etc; which property
must be the subject of a new description in which it
must appear that the land belongs in fee simple and
in full ownership as paraphernal property to the
said Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster and the new
building thereon constructed to the conjugal
partnership of Don Juan M. Poizat and the said
Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster, etc.
Third. That the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., having granted to Don
Juan M. Poizat a credit of Ten Thousand Pounds
Sterling with a mortgage upon the real property
above described, etc.
(a) That the Philippine sugar Estated Development
Company, Ltd. hereby grants Don Juan M. Poizat a
credit in the amount of Ten Thousand Pounds
sterling which the said Mr. Poizat may use within
the entire month of January of the coming year,1913, upon the bank established in the City of
London, England, known as 'Banco Espanol del Rio
de la Plata, which shall be duly advised, so as to
place upon the credit of Mr. Poizat the said amount
of Ten Thousand Pounds Sterling, after executing
the necessary receipts therefore.
(c) That Don Juan M. Poizat personally binds himself
and also binds his principal Dona Gabriela Andrea
de Coster to pay the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., for the said amount of
Ten Thousand Pounds Sterling at the yearly interest
of 9 per cent which shall be paid at the end of each
quarter, etc.
(d) Don Juan M. Poizat also binds himself personally
and his principal Dona Gabriela Andrea de Coster to
return to the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., the amount of Ten Thousand
Pounds Sterling within four years from the date
that the said Mr. Poizat shall receive the aforesaid
sum as evidenced by the receipt that he shall issue
to the 'BAnco Espanol del Rio de la Plata.'
(e) As security for the payment of the said credit, in
the case Mr. Poizat should receive the money,
together with its interest hereby constitutes a
voluntary especial mortgage upon the PhilippineSugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., f the
urban property above described, etc.
(f) Don Juan M. Poizat in the capacity above
mentioned binds himself, should he receive the
amount of the credit, and while he may not return
the said amount of Ten thousand Pounds Sterling to
the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd., to insure against fire the mortgaged
property in an amount not less than One hundred
Thousand Pesos, etc.
Fourth. Don Buenaventura Campa in the capacity
that he holds hereby accepts this indenture in theform, manner, and condition executed by Don Juan
M. Poizat by himself personally and in
representation of his wife Dona Gabriela Andrea de
Coster, in favor of the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd.,
In witness whereof, we have signed these presents
in Manila, this November 2, 1912.
(Sgd.) JUAN M. POIZAT
THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD.
The President
BUENAVENTURA CAMPA
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) MANUEL SAPSANO
JOSE SANTOS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CITY OF MANILA
In the City of Manila P.I., this November 2, 1912,
before me Enrique Barrera y Caldes, a Notary Public
for said city, personally appeared before me Don
Juan M. Poizat and Don Buenaventura Campa,
whom i know to be the persons who executed the
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foregoing document and acknowledged same
before me as an act of their free will and deed; the
first exhibited to me his certificate of registry No.
14237, issued in Manila, February 6, 1912, the
second did not exhibit any cedula, being over sixty
years old; this document bears No. 495, entered on
page 80 of my Notarial registry.
Before me:
(Sgd.) Dr. ENRIQUE BARRERA Y
CALDES
[NOTARIAL SEAL]
Notary Public
Up to the 31st of December ,
1912
For failure to pay the loan, on November 12, 1923, the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendants to foreclose
the mortgage. In this action, the summons was served upon
the defendant Juan M. Poizat only, who employed the
services of Antonio A. Sanz to represent the defendants. Theattorneys filed a general appearance for all of them, and later
an answer in the nature of a general denial.
February 18, 1924, when the case was called for trial, Jose
Galan y Blanco in open court admitted all of the allegations
made in the compliant, and consented that judgment should
be rendered as prayed for . Later, Juan M. Poizat personally,
for himself and his codefendants, file an exception to the
judgment and moved for a new trial, which was denied March
31, 1924.
August 22, 1924, execution was issued directing the sale of
the mortgaged property to satisfy the judgment. itc@alf
September 18, 1924, the property, which had an assessed
value of P342,685, was sold to the plaintiff for the sum of
P100,000.
September 23, 1924, and for the first time, the appellant
personally appeared by her present attorney, and objected to
the confirmation of the sale, among other things, upon
illegally executed, and is null and void, because the agent of
this defendant was not authorized to execute it. That there
was no consideration. That the plaintiff, with full knowledge
that J. M. Poizat was acting beyond the scope of his authority,
filed this action to subject the property of this defendant to
the payment of the debt which, as to appellant, was not a
valid contract. That the judgment was rendered by confessionwhen the plaintiff and J. M. Poizat knew that Poizat was not
authorized to confess judgment, and that the proceeding was
a constructive fraud. That at the time the action was filed and
the judgment rendered, this defendant was absent from the
Philippine Islands, and had no knowledge of the execution of
the mortgage. That after the judgment of foreclosure became
final and order of the sale of the property was made, that this
defendant for the first time learned that he mortgage contract
was tainted with fraud, and that she first knew and learned of
such things on the 11th of September, 1924. That J. M. Poizat
was not authorized to bind her property to secure the
payment of his personal debts. That the plaintiff knew that
the agent of the defendant was not authorized to bind her or
her property. That the mortgage was executed to secure a
loan of 10,000 Pounds which was not made to this defendantor for her benefit, but was made to him personally and for the
personal use and benefit of J. M. Poizat.
Among other things, the mortgage in question, marked Exhibit
B, was introduced in evidence, and made a part of the record.
All of such objections to the confirmation of the sale were
overruled, from which Gabriela Andrea de Coster appealed
and assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in finding that Juan M.
Poizat was, under the power of attorney which he
had from Gabriela Andrea de Coster, authorized to
mortgage her paraphernal property as security for a
loan made to him personally by the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., to him;
II. The lower court erred in not f inding that under
the power of attorney, Juan M. Poizat had no
authority to make Gabriela Andrea de Coster jointly
liable with him for a loan of 10,000 pound made by
the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co., Ltd.,to him;
III. The lower court erred in not f inding that the
Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company,
Ltd., had knowledge and notice of the lack of
authority of Don Juan M. Poizat to execute the
mortgage deed Exhibit A of the plaintiff;
IV. The lower court erred in holding that Gabriela
Andrea de Coster was duly summoned in this case;
and in holding that Attorney Jose Galan y Blanco
could lawfully represent her or could, without proof
of express authority, confess judgment against
Gabriela Andrea de Coster;
V. The court erred in holding that the judgment in
this case has become final and res judicata;
VI. The court erred in approving the judicial sale
made by the sheriff at an inadequate price;
VII. The lower court erred in not declaring these
proceedings, the judgment and the sale null and
void.
JOHNS,J.:
For the reasons stated in the decision of this court in the Bank
of the Philippine Islands vs. De Coster, the alleged service of
the summons in the foreclosure suit upon the appellant was
null and void. In fact, it was made on J. M. Poizat only, and
there is no claim or pretense that any service of summons was
ever made upon her. After service was made upon him, the
attorneys in question entered their appearance for all of the
defendants in the action, including the appellant upon whom
no service was ever made, and file an answer for them. Later,
in open court, it was agreed that judgment should be entered
for the plaintiff as prayed for in its complaint.
The appellant contends that the appearance made by the
attorneys for her was collusive and fraudulent, and that it was
made without her authority, and there maybe some truth in
that contention. It is very apparent that t the attorneys made
no effort to protect or defend her legal rights, but under our
view of the case, that question is not material to this decision.
The storm center of this case is the legal force and effect of
the real mortgage in question , by whom and for whom it was
executed, and upon whom is it binding, and whether or not it
is null and void as to the appellant.
It is admitted that the appellant gave her husband, J. M.
Poizat, the power of attorney in question, and that it is inwriting and speaks for itself. If the mortgage was legally
executed by her attorney in fact for her and in her name as
her act and deed, it would be legal and binding upon her and
her property. If not so executed, it is null and void.
It appears upon the face of the instrument that J. M. Poizat as
the husband of the wife, was personally a party to the
mortgage, and that he was the only persona who signed the
mortgage. and the he was the only person who signed the
mortgage. It does not appear from his signature that he
signed it for his wife or as her agent or attorney in fact, and
there is nothing in his signature that would indicate that in the
signing of it by him, he intended that his signature should bind
his wife. It also appears from the acknowledgment of theinstrument that he executed it as his personal act and deed
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only, and there is nothing to show that he acknowledge it as
the agent or attorney in fact of his wife, or as her act and
deed.
The mortgage recites that it was entered into by and between
Juan M. Poizat in his own behalf and as attorney in fact of his
wife. That the record title of the mortgaged property is
registered in the name of his wife, Dona Gabriela Andrea deCoster. That they were legally married, and that the marriage
between them has never been dissolved. That with the object
of constructing a new building on the land. the six warehouses
thereon were demolished, and that a new building was
erected. That the property is the subject of a new registration
in which it must be made to appear that the land belongs in
fee simple and in full ownership as the paraphernal property
of the wife, and that the new building thereon is the property
of the conjugal partnership. "That the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., having granted to Don Juan M.
Poizat a credit of 10,000 Pounds Sterling with the mortgage
upon the real property above described," that the
Development Company "hereby grants Don Juan M. Poizat a
credit in the amount of 10,000 Pounds Sterling which the said
Mr. Poizat may use, etc." That should he personally or on
behalf of his wife use the credit he acknowledges, that he and
his principal are indebted to the Development Company in the
sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling which "they deem to have
received as a loan from the said commercial entity." That he
binds himself and his wife to pay that amount with a yearly
interest of 9 per cent, payable quarterly. That as security for
the payment of said credit in the case Mr. Poizat should
receive the money at any time, with its interest, "the said Mr.
Poizat in the dual capacity that above mentioned binds
himself, should he receive the amount of the credit."
It thus appears that at the time the power of attorney and the
mortgage were executed, Don Juan M. Poizat and Gabriela
Andrea de Coster were husband and wife, and that the realproperty upon which the mortgage was her sole property
before her marriage, and that it was her paraphernal property
at the time the mortgage was executed, and that the new
building constructed on the land was the property of the
conjugal partnership.
The instrument further recites that the Development
Company "hereby grants Don Juan M. Poizat a credit in the
amount of 10,000 Pounds Sterling which the said Mr. Poizat
may use within the entire month of January of the coming
year, 1913." In other words, it appears upon the face of the
mortgage that the loan was made to the husband with
authority to use the money for his sole use and benefit. With
or without a power of attorney, the signature of the husbandwould be necessary to make the instrument a valid mortgage
upon the property of the wife, even though she personally
signed the mortgage.
It is contended that the instrument upon its face shows that
its purpose and intent was to bind the wife. But it also shows
upon its face that the credit was granted to Don Juan M.
Poizat which he might use within the "entire month of
January."
Any authority which he had to bind his wife should be
confined and limited to his power of attorney.
Giving to it the very broadest construction, he would not haveany authority to mortgage her property, unless the mortgage
was executed for her "and in her name, place or stead," and
as her act and deed. The mortgage in question was not so
executed. it was signed by Don Juan M. Poizat in his own
name, his own proper person, and by him only, and it was
acknowledge by him in his personal capacity, and there is
nothing in either the signature or acknowledgment which
shows or tends to show that it was executed for or on behalf
of his wife or "in her name, place or stead."
It is contended that the instrument shows upon its face that it
was intended to make the wife liable for his debt, and to
mortgage her property to secure its payment, and that his
personal signature should legally be construed as the joined
or dual signature of both the husband and that of the wife as
her agent. That is to say, construing the recitals in the
mortgage and the instrument as a whole, his lone personal
signature should be construed in a double capacity and
binding equally and alike both upon the husband and the wife.
No authority has been cited, and none will ever be found to
sustain such a construction.
As the husband of the wife, his signature was necessary tomake the mortgage valid. In other words, to make it valid, it
should have been signed by the husband in his own proper
person and by him as attorney in fact for his wife, and it
should have been executed by both husband and wife, and
should have been so acknowledged.
There is no principle of law by which a person can become
liable on a real mortgage which she never executed either in
person or by attorney in fact. It should be noted that this is a
mortgage upon real property, the title to which cannot be
divested except by sale on execution or the formalities of a
will or deed. For such reasons, the law requires that a power
of attorney to mortgage or sell real property should be
executed with all of the formalities required in a deed. For thesame reason that the personal signature of Poizat, standing
alone, would not convey the title of his wife in her own real
property, such a signature would not bind her as a mortgagor
in real property, the title to which was in her name.
We make this broad assertion that upon the facts shown in
the record, no authority will ever be found to hold the wife
liable on a mortgage of her real property which was executed
in the form and manner in which the mortgage in question
was executed. The real question involved is fully discussed in
Mechem on Agency, volume 1, page 784, in which the author
says:
It is to be observed that the question here is nothow but how such an authority is to be executed. it
is assumed that the agent was authorized to bind
his principal, but the question is, has he done so.
That is the question here.
Upon that point, there is a full discussion in the following
sections, and numerous authorities are cited:
SEC. 1093. Deed by agent must purport to be made
and sealed in the name of the principal. It is a
general rule in the law of agency that in order to
bind the principal by a deed executed by an agent,
the deed must upon its grace purport to be made,signed and sealed in the name of the principal. If,
on the contrary, though the agent describes name,
the words of grant, covenant and the like, purport
upon the face of the instrument to be his, and the
seal purports to be his seal, the deed will bind the
agent if any one and not the principal.
SEC. 1101. Whose deed is a given deed. How
question determined. In determining whether a
given deed is the deed of the principal, regard may
be had First, to the party named as grantor. Is the
deed stated to be made by the principal or by some
other person? Secondly, to the granting clause. Is
the principal or the agent the person who purportsto make the grant? Thirdly, to the covenants, if any.
Are these the covenants of the principal? Fourthly,
to the testimonium clause. Who is it who is to set
his name and seal in testimony of the grant? Is it
the principal or the agent? And Fifthly, to the
signature and seal. Whose signature and seal are
these? Are they those of the principal or of the
agent?
If upon such an analysis the deed does not upon its
face purport to be the deed of the principal, made,
signed, sealed and delivered in his name and his
deed, it cannot take effect as such.
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SEC. 1102. Not enough to make deed the principal's
that the agent is described as such. It is not
enough merely that not acted in the name of the
principal. Nor is it ordinarily sufficient that he
describes himself in the deed as acting by virtue of
a power of attorney or otherwise, or for or in
behalf, or as attorney, of the principal, or as a
committee, or as trustee of a corporation, etc.; forthese expressions are usually but descriptio
personae, and if, in fact, he has acted of action
thereon accrue to and against him personally and
not to or against the principal, despite these recital.
SEC. 1103. Not principal's deed where agent
appears as grantor and signer. Neither can the
deed ordinarily be deemed to be the deed of the
principal where the agent is the one who is named
as the grantor or maker, and he is also the one who
signs and seals it. . . .
SEC. 1108. . . . But however clearly the body of the
deed may show an intent that it shall be the act ofhe principal, yet unless its executed by his attorney
for him, it is not his deed, but the deed of the
attorney or of no one. The most usual and
approved form of executing a deed by attorney is
by his writing the name of the principal and adding
by A B his attorney or by his attorney A B.'
That is good law. Applying it to the facts, under his power of
attorney, Juan M. Poizat may have had authority to borrow
money and mortgage the real property of his wife, but the law
specifies how and in what manner it must be done, and the
stubborn fact remains that, as to the transaction in question,
that power was never exercised. The mortgage in question
was executed by him and him only, and for such reason, it is
not binding upon the wife, and as to her, it is null and void.
It follows that the whole decree against her and her
paraphernal property and the sale of that property to satisfy
the mortgage are null and void, and that any title she may
have had in or to her paraphernal property remains and is
now vested in the wife as fully and as absolutely as if the
mortgage had never been executed, the decree rendered or
the property sold. As to Don Juan M. Poizat, the decree is
valid and binding, and remains in full force and effect.
It is an undisputed fact, which appears in the mortgage itself,
that the land in question was the paraphernal property of the
wife, but after the marriage the old buildings on the property
were torn down and a new bui lding constructed and, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that
the new building is conjugal property of the husband and
wife. As such, it is subject of the debts of the conjugal
partnership for the payment or security of which the husband
has the power to mortgage or otherwise encumber the
property .
It is very probable that his particular question was not fully
presented to or considered by the lower court.
The mortgage as to the paraphernal property of the wife is
declared null and void ab initio, and as to her personally, the
decree is declared null and void, and as to her paraphernal
property, the sale is set aside and vacated, and held fornaught, leaving it free and clear from the mortgage, decree
and sale, and in the same condition as if the mortgage had
never been executed, with costs in favor of the appellant. So
ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003]
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT
and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053,
entitled Romeo V. Miat vs. Spouses Virgilio and Michelle
Castro, Moises B. Miat and Alexander V. Miat, dated
November 29, 1999.[1]
The evidence shows that the spouses Moises and Concordia
Miat bought two (2) parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located at Wawa La Huerta, Airport Village,
Paraaque, Metro Manila[2] and covered by TCT No. S-
33535.[3] The second is located at Paco, Manila,[4] and
covered by TCT No. 163863.[5] Concordia died on April 30,
1978. They had two (2) children: Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the
Paraaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and
Alexander.[6] However, when Moises returned in 1984, he
renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He
wanted the Paraaque property for himself but would leave
the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They agreed.[7]
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco
property on installment basis on May 17, 1977.[8] However,
it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay
its balance.[9] He secured the title over the property in his
name as a widower.[10] According to Romeo, Moises violated
the agreement that their (Romeos and Alexanders) names
would be registered in the title once the balance was paid.[11]
Upon demand, Moises gave the owners duplicate of the Paco
property title to Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid
its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums.[12] In early
August 1985, Alexander and his first wife left the house for
personal reasons. In April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to
Romeo his share in the Paco property for P42,750.00.[13] He
received a partial payment of P6,000.00 from Romeo.[14]
Nonetheless, he never executed a deed of assignment in favor
of Romeo, as he had lots of work to do and had no time and
x x x there [wa]s nothing to worry [as] the title [wa]s in
*Romeos+ possession.*15+
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his
wedding, Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio
Castro, that she had given Moises P30,000.00 as
downpayment for the sale by Moises of the Paco property to
her son Virgilio.[16]
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner
Virgilio Castro to the chambers of Judge Anunciacion of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where the status of the
Paco property was discussed.[17] On December 16, 1988, he
received a letter from petitioner Castros lawyer asking for a
conference. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had
been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale
dated December 5, 1988[18] for ninety-five thousand
(P95,000.00) pesos.[19]
Ceferino Miat, brother of petitioner Moises,[20] testified that
even before the death of Concordia[21] there was already an
agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and
Alexander.[22] This was reiterated at the deathbed of
Concordia.[23] When Moises returned to Manila for good,
the agreement was reiterated[24] in front of the extended
Miat family members.[25] Initially, Romeo and Alexander
orally[26] divided the Paco property between themselves.[27]
Later, however, Alexander sold his share to Romeo.[28]
Alexander was given P6,000.00 as downpayment. This was
corroborated by Pedro Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Miranda
worked with Moises at the Bayview Hotel and the Hotel
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Filipinas.[29] His wife is the cousin of Romeo and
Alexander.[30] Virgilio is the brother of Moises.
Moises confirmed that he and his wife Concordia bought the
Paco property on installment from the Fraval Realty, Inc.
There was still a balance of P12,000.00 on the lot at the time
of his wifes death.*31+ He paid P3,500.00 in 1981[32] and
P8,500.00 in 1984.[33] He registered the title in his name.
Romeo then borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it
to his friend Lorenzo.[34]
Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged
for P30,000.00 the Paco property to the parents of petitioner
Virgilio Castro.[35] He informed Romeo and Alexander that
he would be forced to sell the Paco property if they would not
redeem the mortgage. He accompanied his children to the
Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a judge and a lawyer.
Also present in the meeting were petitioner Virgilio Castro
and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell
the property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.[36]
Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third
(1/3) of the proceeds while he received two-thirds (2/3).
Romeo did not get a single centavo but was given the right to
till their Nueva Ecija property.[37] From his share of the
proceeds, Alexander intended to return to Romeo the
P6,000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He considered the
money to be a personal debt due Romeo, not Romeos
downpayment of his share in the Paco property.[38]
The buyer of the property, petitioner Virgilio P. Castro,
testified that he informed Romeo that his father Moises was
selling the Paco property. Romeo replied: Bahala siya.*39+
The second time he informed Romeo about the pending sale
was when he brought Romeo, Alexander and Moises to Judge
Anunciacion to consult him *as to+ who has *the+ right over
the *Paco+ property.*40+ He further declared that he went
to the Metropolitan Trial Court because [he] wanted to be
sure whether *he+ could buy the property.*41+ During the
meeting, he was told by Romeo that the Paco property was
already given to him (Romeo) by Moises. He admitted
knowing that the title to the Paco property was in the
possession of Romeo.[42] However, he proceeded with the
sale. Moises assured him that he would be able to get the
title from Romeo.[43]
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an
action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro
spouses; to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed
of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him
upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to make
them pay damages.[44]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,[45]
which in its dispositive portion states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view ofthe foregoing, the Court hereby
orders the following: 1) Defendant Alexander V. Miat to
execute a deed of sale of his share in the property upon
payment by plaintiff Romeo of the balance of the purchase
price in the sum of P36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V. Miat to
recognize as valid the sale of defendant Moises share in the
house and lot located at No. 1495-C Fabie Estate, Paco,
Manila; 3) the dismissal of defendants counter-claim; and 4)
defendants to pay the costs of suit.
Both parties appealed to Court of Appeals. On November 29,
1999, the appellate Court modified the Decision as
follows:[46]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) The deed of sale entered into between defendants-
appellants Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio and Michelle
Castro is hereby NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises Miat and Alexander Miat are
ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the Paco
property with TCT No. 16383 (sic) in favor of plaintiff-
appellant Romeo Miat, upon payment by Romeo Miat of the
balance of the purchase price in the sum of P36,750.00.
(3) Defendants-appellants are ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff-appellant attorneys fees in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit.
Reconsideration was denied on May 17, 2000.
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following
errors:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
DID PETITIONERS AN INJUSTICE IN MODIFYING OR REVERSINGTHE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED MARCH 17, 1993
WHICH ORDERED RESPONDENT ROMEO MIAT TO RECOGNIZE
AS VALID THE DEED OF SALE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
PETITIONERS MOISES MIAT AND SPS. VIRGILIO AND MICHELLE
CASTRO PERTAINING TO PETITIONER MOISES MIATS SHARE
IN THE HOUSE AND LOT LOCATED IN PACO, MANILA, WHEN IT
DECLARED SAID DEED OF SALE NULLIFIED.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING OR UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
ORDERING ALEXANDER MIAT AND INCLUDING MOISES MIAT
TO EXECUTE A DEED OF CONVEYANCE OVER THE PACO
PROPERTY WITH TCT NO. 16383 IN FAVOR OF ROMEO MIATUPON PAYMENT BY THE LATTER OF THE BALANCE OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE IN THE SUM OF P36,750.00.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FURTHER ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENT,
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P30,000.00 AND AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUOS ORDER
FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PAY THE COST OF SUIT.*47+
The issues can be simplified thus:
1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital;
2. Whether there was a valid oral partition covering the said
property; and
3. Whether the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith.
I
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital
property of Moises. They allege that the spouses Moises and
Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance oftwelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos in 1984. At that time,
Concordia had long been dead. She died in 1978.
We disagree.
Since Moises and Concordia were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil
Code apply.
Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code[48] provides as follows:
The following are conjugal partnership property:
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(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by
onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It
is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear.[49]
Petitioners reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas*50+ is misplaced.
That case involved two (2) parcels of land that Magdalena
Clemente purchased on installment and started paying for
when she was not yet married to Manuel Lorenzo. When she
married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay the
installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment,
the deed of final conveyance was executed in her sole favor
and the land was registered in the exclusive name of
Magdalena Clemente. The Court ruled that the two (2)
parcels of land were the paraphernal properties of Magdalena
Clemente, thus:
x x x the fact that all receipts for installments paid even
during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were
issued in the name of Magdalena Clemente and that the deed
of sale or conveyance of parcel no. 6 was made in her name in
spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still alive shows that
the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena
Clemente.*51+ (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the Paco
property during their marriage Moises did not bring it into
their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Likewise, Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals[52] cited by the
petitioners is inapropos. In said case, Daniel Jovellanos, while
he was still married to his first wife, Leonor Dizon, entered
into a contract of leaseand conditional sale with Philamlife.
He continued paying the rental after the death of his first wife
and during the subsistence of his marriage with his second
wife, Anette Jovellanos. He completed the payment during
the existence of his second marriage. The Court ruled that the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership with the
second wife as Daniel Jovellanos acquired ownership thereof
only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he
had been in possession of the premises since September 2,
1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that the Philamlife
executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. x x x
Since as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H.
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal
partnership with his second wife.*53+ In the case at bar,
Moises and Concordia executed a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage. The contract is one of sale the title passed to
them upon delivery of the Paco property.[54] In fine, title was
gained during the conjugal partnership.
II
The next issue is whether the oral partition between Moises
and his sons, Romeo and Alexander, involving the said
property is valid. In ruling in favor of its validity which we
affirm, the appellate court relied on a portion of Moises letter
to Romeo, which reads as follows:[55]
KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG MABUTI ANG ANONG
BALAK AT GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI SA BAHAY, AT YAN AY
PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO KONG (sic) MAKAKABUTI SA INYONG
DALAWA. AT WALA AKONG HIGIT NA PAPABURAN SA
INYONG DALAWA PAREHO KAYONG MAHAL SA AKIN, HINDI
AKO TULAD SA IBANG MAGULANG NA HINDI PAREHO ANG
PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG BAHAY[56] AY PARA SA
INYONG DALAWA, LALO NA NGAYONG MAY ASAWA NA
KAYONG PAREHO. x x x *All caps in the original+
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that before
Concordia died, there was an agreement that the Paraaque
property would go to Moises while the Paco property would
go to Romeo and Alexander. This was reiterated at the
deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila for
good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended
Miat family members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally
divided the Paco property between them. Later, Alexander
sold his share to Romeo.
This agreement was attested to by the extended Miat Family
members in a document marked as Exhibit D, which reads
as follows:[57]
Pebrero 18, 1989
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,
Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay nanunumpa sa harapan ng
Punong Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:
Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina G. MOISES B. MIAT,
asawa ng yumao na, na si Gng. CONCORDIA VALENZUELA
MIAT, at mga anak nitong sina G. ROMEO V. MIAT at G.
ALEXANDER V. MIAT:
Na ang kasunduan ay ang mga sumusunod:
1. Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa (MOISES
at CONCORDIA) sa Airport Village sa Paraaque, Metro Manila
ay mapupunta kay G. MOISES B. MIAT;
2. Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa
ring nabanggit ay sa magkapatid na ROMEO at ALEXANDER
mapupunta at ito ay nasa address na 1495-C FABIE, PACO,
MANILA.
MGA SUMUMPA:[58]
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
1) Ceferino B. Miat 6) Lorenzo C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Moises) (kapatid ni Concordia)
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
2) Avelina J. Miat 7) Patricio C. Valenzuela
(asawa ni Ceferino) (kapatid ni Concordia)
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
3) Virgilio Miat 8) Victor C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Moises) (kapatid ni Concordia)
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
4) Aurea Miat-Joson 9) Elsa P. Miranda
(kapatid ni Moises)
(Sgd.)
5) Jose A. Joson
(asawa ni Aurea)
(Sgd.)
REYNALDO P. WONG
Kapitan ng Barangay
Sta. Maria, Licab, N.E.(emphasis supplied)
The consideration for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of
the Paco property was best expressed by Moises himself in hisletter to Romeo, which reads as follows:
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Labis akong nagpapasalamat at nauunawaan ninyo ang mga
pagkakamali ko at mga kasalanan kong nagawa sa inyong
mag-iina, huwag kayong mag-alala at lahat nang naipundar
namin nang (sic) inyong nanay ay sa inyong dalawang
magkapatid mapupunta.*59+
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and
Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is
enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the
six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco
property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat
and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of
Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by
petitioners counsel.*60+
In the recent case of Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals, we
held:[61]
*N+o law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and
be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1,
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in
a public document and registered, has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without
creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution
thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential
for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document so as to
be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.
The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts
which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the
validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property, considering that it involves not a transfer ofproperty from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives
the inheritance. x x x.
III
The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-
spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in
good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair
price for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of
some other persons claim on or interest in it. The rule is
settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the
possession of persons other than the seller, must be wary and
should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as buyer in good faith.[62]
This finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses
were not buyers in good faith is supported by evidence.
Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted in his testimony that
Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco property to
them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who had
the right to the property Moises or Romeo. As well pointed
out by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge
of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most
protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is
that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat
on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with
Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge
Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a rightover the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that
Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral
partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he
knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then
insisted that he is the owner of the property.
Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession
of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was
fully aware of another persons possession of the lot he
purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent
purchaser for value.*63+
It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-spouses Castro did
not buy the Paco property in good faith. They have no right to
the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43053 is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989
MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.
Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled
"MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA
JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-
appellants," upholding the validity of three (3) documentsquestioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which
declared them as null and void; and of its resolution, dated
September 30, 1980, denying therein appellee's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent
Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra
Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate
estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died
intestate on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the
validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed,
by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers
almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null and void and
the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between
him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by
Moises Jocson, as the party assailing its validity, but rather by
herein respondents, are the following:
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1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa,"
marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13, Records)
for the defendant in the court a quo,
dated July 27, 1968. By this document
Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all located
at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten
thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On the samedocument Emilio Jocson acknowledged
receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang
SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000)
salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng
buong kasiyahan loob at ang
pagkakatanggap ay aking hayagang
inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang
ito, sa aking anak na si Agustina Jocson,
na may sapat na gulang, mamamayang
Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at
naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay
aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at kagyat at
walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit
na anim na pirasong lupa na nasa unang
dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit
na Agustina Jocson, at sa kaniyang
tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din
nais kong banggitin na kahit na may
kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile
ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking anak
na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin
at ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa ko
pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang
tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin
ko sa aking katandaan at mga huling
araw at sa aking mga ibang
mahahalagang pangangailangan.[Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa
kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano mang batas
o kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile
ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga
lupang nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang
asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni
pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin
ng dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral
na batas (p. 13, Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated
July 27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14,Records). On the face of this document,
Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, two
rice mills and a camarin (camalig) located
at Naic, Cavite. As in the first document,
Moises Jocson acknowledged receipt of
the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG
LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping
Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong
kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina
Jocson .... Na ang halagang ibinayad sa
akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunitdahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya
... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga
nabanggit na pagaari kahit na hindi
malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Adjudication with Sale,
"dated March 9, 1969, marked as Exhibit
2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby Emilio
Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
without the participation and
intervention of Moises Jocson,
extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled
estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing thesame into three parts, one-third (1/3)
each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete,
namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same
instrument, Emilio sold his one- third
(1/3) share to Agustin for the sum of
EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As
in the preceding documents, Emilio
Jocson acknowledged receipt of thepurchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum
of only eight thousand (P8,000.00) pesos,
which I, the herein Emilio Jocson had
received from my daughter Agustina
Jocson, do hereby sell, cede, convey and
transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson,
her heirs and assigns, administrators and
successors in interests, in the nature of
absolute and irrevocable sale, all my
rights, interest, shares and participation,
which is equivalent to one third (1/3)
share in the properties herein mentioned
and described the one third being
adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and
the other third (1/3) portion being the
share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public.
Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and the transfer
certificates of title covering the properties therein in the
name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were
cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on
Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of
First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil Case No. TM-
531), and which was twice amended. In his Second Amended
Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner
assailed the above documents, as aforementioned, for being
null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in
his complaint for the reason that the nature of his causes of
action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that]
the defendants, through fraud, deceit,
undue pressure and influence and other
illegal machinations, were able to induce,
led, and procured their father ... to sign
[the] contract of sale ..., for the simulated
price of P10,000.00, which is a
consideration that is shocking to the
conscience of ordinary man and despite
the fact that said defendants have no
work or livelihood of their own ...; that
the sale is null and void, also, because it
is fictitious, simulated and fabricated
contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on
Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third
document, that they] are null and void
because the consent of the father, Emilio
Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit,
undue pressure, misrepresentation and
unlawful machinations and trickeries
committed by the defendant on him; and
that the said contracts are simulated,
fabricated and fictitious, having been
made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff
from participating and with the dishonest
and selfish motive on the part of the
defendants to defraud him of his
legitimate share on said properties
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[subject matter thereof]; and that
without any other business or
employment or any other source of
income, defendants who were just
employed in the management and
administration of the business of their
parents, would not have the sufficient
and ample means to purchase the saidproperties except by getting the earnings
of the business or by simulated
consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on
Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between
a father and daughter who are living under the same roof,
especially so when the father has no need of money as the
properties supposedly sold were all income-producing.
Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in
Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former,
therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal).
As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the
extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his father to
Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of
petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the
considerations mentioned in the documents were merely
simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing
that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the
prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of
consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale
between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking
into consideration the circumstances obtaining between the
parties; and that the real intention of the parties were
donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from
participating in the estate of his parents. It further declaredthe properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because
they were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married
to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties subject
matter of all the documents be registered in the name of
herein petitioners and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R
rendered a decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the
trial court's and ruled that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are
concerned the appellee's complaint for
annulment, which is indisputably basedon fraud, and undue influence, is now
barred by prescription, pursuant to the
settled rule that an action for annulment
of a contract based on fraud must be
filed within four (4) years, from the
discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal
contemplation is deemed to be the date
of the registration of said document with
the Register of Deeds ... and the records
admittedly show that both Exhibits 3 and
4, were all registered on July 29, 1968,
while on the other hand, the appellee's
complaint was filed on June 20, 1973,
clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year
prescriptive period provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits
2, 3, and 4, are decisively not simulated
or fictitious contracts, since Emilio Jocson
actually and really intended them to be
effective and binding against him, as to
divest him of the full dominion and
ownership over the properties subject of
said assailed contracts, as in fact all his
titles over the same were all cancelled
and new ones issued to appellant
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same isvalid and subsisting, and the partition
with sale therein made by and between
Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the
subject properties described therein
have all been made in accordance with
Article 996 of the New Civil Code on
intestate succession, and the appellee's
(herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has notbeen prejudiced (pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following
assignments of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH
THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD"
AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE AND
NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING
SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE
CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALSAND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN
THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS
INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE
CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN
REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and
shall be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes
of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil
Code, a contract tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent
was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action for
annulment must be brought within four years from the time
of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code),
otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under
present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to havetaken place at the time the convenant was registered with the
Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May
29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3 and 4 were registered
on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint only on
June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these
documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit"
had prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in
assailing the questioned documents, We would have
sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As
pointed out by petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of
conveyance on the ground that they were without
consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paidwere in fact merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without
cause produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a
simulated price is void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]),
and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not
prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castil lo v. Galvan,
No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons
saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of nullity
of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is
imprescriptible.
II.
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For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely
academic. The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack
consideration rests on he who alleged it. The degree of proof
becomes more stringent where the documents themselves
show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and
more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case
at bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are
of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven thatthe questioned documents are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
had no other source of income other than what she derives
from helping in the management of the family business
(ricefields and ricemills), and which was insufficient to pay for
the purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac
Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were
engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n.,
January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife
testified that they did not know whether or not Agustina was
involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p.
36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in
the business of buying and selling palay and rice even before
her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948 and
continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976).
Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a
contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is
clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because
of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no
showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In fact, the
total purchase price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is above
the total assessed value of the properties alleged by
petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petit ioner
alleged that the total assessed value of the properties
mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and
Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price paid was
P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the
1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of
his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the
market value and the purchase price, which as admitted by
Emilio Jocson was only slight, may not be so shocking
considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-
31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in theconsent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civi l Code) and there
is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio
Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale
between a father and his daughter is purely speculative which
has no relevance to a contract where all the essential
requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing
Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein
are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since theproperties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3
were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as
evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough
proof to show that the properties covered therein were
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore,
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal
properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertainsexclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22,
1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are
conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a
modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked
article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that ... .
As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes thispresumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in
Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it
was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is
sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property." In the recent case ofMaramba vs.
Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474],
this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that
"the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
refers to property acquired during the marriage," and
then concluded that since "there is no showing as to
when the property in question was acquired...the fact
that the title is in the wife's name alone is
determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there
is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of
the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong
exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de
Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571,
December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs.
Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke
the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof
that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his
claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during
the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that
the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson
when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he wasdescribed in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show,
on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio
Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words
"married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera,
100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4
SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December
16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
properties, the same having been registered in his name
alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently
held that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal
(See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA
248). But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above
pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse,
were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been
acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore,
presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having
presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs-
Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented
sufficient proof to show that the disputed properties wereacquired during his parents' coverture. We would have ruled
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that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio
Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the
presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof,
the condition sine qua non for the application of the
presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the
properties under Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of
Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two
ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal
properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive
properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on
petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28589 January 8, 1973
RAFAEL ZULUETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., defendant-
appellant.
Alfredo L. Benipayo for plaintiffs-appellee Rafael Zulueta and
Carolina Zulueta.
Justo L. Albert for plaintiff-appellee Telly Albert Zulueta.
V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito,
Misa and Lozada for defendant-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration
of the decision of this Court promulgated on February 29,
1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision appealed from
should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that
the decision of this Court be "set aside ... with or without a
new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs;
or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award embodiedtherein be considerably reduced." .
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration,
the defendant filed a "petition to annul proceedings and/or to
order the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellees' complaint" upon
the ground that "appellees' complaint actually seeks the
recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages, because, for
the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the lower court,
the unspecified sums representing items of alleged damages,
may not be considered, under the settled doctrines of this
Honorable Court," and "the jurisdiction of courts of first
instance when the complaint in the present case was filed on
Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos" and
"the mere fact that the complaint also prays for unspecified
moral damages and attorney's fees, does not bring the action
within the jurisdiction of the lower court."
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not
true that "the unspecified sums representing items or other
alleged damages, may not be considered" for the purpose
of determining the jurisdiction of the court "under the
settled doctrines of this Honorable Court." In fact, not a single
case has been cited in support of this allegation.
Secondly, it has been held that a clam for moral damages is
one not susceptible of pecuniary estimation.1
In fact, Article
2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides
that "(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence, "(n)o proof
pecuniary loss necessary" pursuant to Article 2216 of the
same Code "in order that moral ... damages may be
adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of such damages ... is left
to the discretion of the court" - said article adds - "according
to the circumstances of each case." Appellees' complaint is,
therefore, within the original jurisdiction of courts of firstinstance, which includes "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation."2
Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended
complainants, defendant had set up a counterclaim in the
aggregate sum of P12,000, which is, also, within the original
jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing the alleged defect if
any, in plaintiffs' complaint. 3
We need not consider the jurisdictional
controversy as to the amount the
appellant sues to recover because the
counterclaim interposed establishes the
jurisdiction of the District Court.Merchants' Heat & Light Co. v. James B.
Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285,
51 L. Ed. 488; O. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v.
Klepner, 176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari
denied 216 U.S. 620, 30 S Ct. 575, 54 L.
Ed. 641. ... .4
... courts have said that "when the
jurisdictional amount is in question, the
tendering of a counterclaim in an amount
which in itself, or added to the amount
claimed in the petition, makes up a sum
equal to the amount necessary to the
jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is
established, whatever may be the state
of the plaintiff's complaint." American
Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler (D.C.)
227 F. 321, 324. 5
Thus, inAgo v. Buslon,6
We held:
... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00
was, also, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the latter courts, and there are ample precedents to the
effect that "although the original claim involves less
than the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be
sustained if the counterclaim (of the compulsory type)"
such as the one set up by petitioner herein, based
upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in
consequence of the filing of said complaint "exceeds
the jurisdictional amount." (Moore Federal Practice,
2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41; Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97; Home Life Ins.
Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed. [2d]474; American Sheet & Tin
Plate Co. vs. Winzeler [D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix vs.
People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d. 537, 2 Cal. 2d.
446; Emery vs. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d.
1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663).
Needless to say, having not only failed to question the
jurisdiction of the trial court either in that court or in this
Court, before the rendition of the latter's decision, and even
subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion forreconsideration and seeking the reliefs therein prayed for
but, also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
merits of the case, defendant is now estopped from
impugning said jurisdiction. 7
Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant's
motion for reconsideration, it should be noted that the same
is mainly predicated upon the premise that plaintiffs' version
is inherently incredible, and that this Court should accept the
theory of the defense to the effect that petitioner was off-
loaded because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising from his
delay in boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open
his bags for inspection. We need not repeat here the reasons
given in Our decision for rejecting defendant's contention and
not disturbing the findings of fact of His Honor, the Trial
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Judge, who had the decided advantage denied to Us of
observing the behaviour of the witnesses in the course of the
trial and found those of the plaintiffs worthy of credence, not
the evidence for the defense.
It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his
written report, made in transit from Wake to Manila or
immediatelyafter the occurrence and before the legalimplications or consequences thereof could have been the
object of mature deliberation, so that it could, in a way, be
considered as part of the res gestae Capt. Zentner stated
that Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and
"belligerent attitude," thereby belying the story of the defense
about said alleged bomb-scare, and confirming the view that
said agent of the defendant had acted out of resentment
because his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zulueta's adamant
refusal to be bullied by him. Indeed, had there been an iota of
truth in said story of the defense, Capt. Zentner would have
caused every one of the passengers to be frisked or searched
and the luggage of all of them examined as it is done now
before resuming the flight from Wake Island. His failure to
do so merely makes the artificious nature of defendant's
version more manifest. Indeed, the fact that Mrs. Zulueta and
Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows beyond doubt
that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it
up.
The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any
evidence to contradict the testimony of Mr. Zulueta as to why
he had gone to the beach and what he did there, alleging that,
in the very nature of things, nobody else could have witnessed
it. Moreover, the defense insists, inter alia, that the testimony
of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because he had no idea
as to how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken
him an hour to relieve himself in the beach; there were eight
(8) commodes at the terminal toilet for men ; if he felt the
need of relieving himself, he would have seen to it that thesoldiers did not beat him to the terminal toilets; he did not tell
anybody about the reason for going to the beach, until after
the plane had taken off from Wake.
We find this pretense devoid of merit. Although Mr. Zulueta
had to look for a secluded place in the beach to relieve
himself, beyond the view of others, defendant's airport
manager, whom Mr. Zulueta informed about it, soon afterthe
departure of the plane, could have forthwith checkedthe
veracity of Mr. Zulueta's statement by asking him to indicate
the specific place where he had been in the beach and then
proceeding thereto for purposes of verification.
Then, again, the passenger of a plane seldom knows howmany toilets it has. As a general rule, his knowledge is limited
to the toiletsfor the class first class or tourist class in
which he is. Then, too, it takes several minutes for the
passengers of big aircrafts, like those flying from the U.S. to
the Philippines, to deplane. Besides, the speed with which a
given passenger may do so depends, largely, upon the
location of his seat in relation to the exit door. He cannot go
over the heads of those nearer than he thereto. Again, Mr.
Zulueta may have stayed in the toilet terminal for some time,
expecting one of the commodes therein to be vacated soon
enough, before deciding to go elsewhere to look for a place
suitable to his purpose. But he had to walk, first, from the
plane to the terminal building and, then, after vainly waiting
therein for a while, cover a distance of about 400 yards
therefrom to the beach, and seek there a place not visible bythe people in the plane and in the terminal, inasmuch as the
terrain at Wake Island is flat. What is more, he must have had
to takeoff part, at least, of his clothing, because, without the
facilities of a toilet, he had to wash himself and, then, dry
himself up before he could be properly attired and walk back
the 400 yards that separated him from the terminal building
and/or the plane. Considering, in addition to the foregoing,
the fact that he was not feeling well, at that time, We are not
prepared to hold that it could not have taken him around an
hour to perform the acts narrated by him.
But, why asks the defendant did he not reveal the same
before the plane took off? The record shows that, even before
Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt.Zentner was already demonstrating at him in an intemperate
and arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think you are?),
thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same
vein. As a consequence, there immediately ensued an
altercation in the course of which each apparently tried to
show that he could not be cowed by the other. Then came the
order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including
Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as their
luggage, their overcoats and other effects handcarried bythem; but, Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed
to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it had taken time to locate
his four (4) pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three
(3) of them were found, and the fourth eventually remained
in the plane. In short, the issue between Capt. Zentner and
Mr. Zulueta had been limited to determining whether the
latter would allow himself to be browbeaten by the former. In
the heat of the altercation, nobody had inquired about the
cause of Mr. Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart
from the fact that it was rather embarrassing for him to
explain, in the presence and within the hearing of the
passengers and the crew, then assembled around them, why
he had gone to the beach and why it had taken him some
time to answer there a call of nature, instead of doing so in
the terminal building.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the
amount of damages awarded as excessive; (2) the propriety of
accepting as credible plaintiffs' theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to
recover either moral or exemplary damages; (4) plaintiffs'
right to recover attorney's fees; and (5) the non-enforcement
of the compromise agreement between the defendant and
plaintiff's wife, Mrs. Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration contests the decision of this Court
reducing the amount of damages awarded by the trial court to
approximately one-half thereof, upon the ground, not only
that, contrary to the findings of this Court, in said decision,
plaintiff had not contributed to the aggravation of his
altercation or incident with Capt. Zentner by reacting to