Creating More Space for Contestation: The Norm Contester South Africa and the Promotion of a Just World Order Paper prepared for the panel “Constructing Spaces for Triangular Governance: Opportunities and Challenges before Africa, Asia and Europe” at the 24th World Congress of Political Science (IPSA), Poznań, July 23-28, 2016 Timo Lowinger M.A. Faculty Member and Researcher Department for European Studies and International Relations Institute for Political Science and Sociology University of Würzburg Wittelsbacherplatz 1 97074 Würzburg Tel.: +49 (0)931 / 31 83616 E-mail: timo.lowinger@uni-wuerzburg.de

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Content

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 2 2. Theoretical model: Contestation via Norm Entrepreneurs ........................................................ 4

2.1 Norm Entrepreneurs in norm research ............................................................................................... 5

2.2 Norm Entrepreneurs in the Norm-Dynamics Approach ....................................................................... 6

2.3 Two kinds of contestation through Norm Entrepreneurs ..................................................................... 7

2.4 Emerging Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs .......................................................................................... 8

2.5 Metanorm of Justice as Driving Force of norm contestation ................................................................. 9

2.6 Overview of the theoretical model ................................................................................................... 10

3. South African foreign policy and the demands for a more inclusive world order ................... 11 3.1 Mandela’s universalistic foreign policy ..................................................................................................... 12

3.1.1 Formative influence of Apartheid and the struggle for freedom ........................................................ 12

3.1.2 Reorientation of the foreign policy under Mandela ........................................................................... 13

3.2 Change of the South African foreign policy ............................................................................................... 14

3.2.1 Reinterpretation of South African multilateralism ............................................................................ 14

3.2.2 African Renaissance ........................................................................................................................... 16

3.2.3 New international relevance of South Africa through Club Governance ............................................ 17

3.3 Interim conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 19

4. Case studies ............................................................................................................................. 19 4.1 South Africa and the norm of nuclear disarmament .................................................................................. 20

4.1.1 Genesis and substance of the norm of nuclear disarmament ............................................................. 20

4.1.2 South Africa’s argumentation and social practice .............................................................................. 23

4.1.3 Interim conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 26

4.2 South Africa and the right to veto of the UN-Security Council .................................................................. 27

4.2.1 Genesis and content of the right to veto ............................................................................................ 27

4.2.2 Potential for contestation .................................................................................................................. 29

4.2.3 South Africa’s argumentation and social practice .............................................................................. 30

4.2.4 Interim conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 33

5. Summary .................................................................................................................................. 33 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 34 Attachment 1: South African government statements about nuclear disarmament ................... 43 Attachment 2: South African government statements about the right to veto ........................... 45

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1. Introduction

In the wake of the Cold War, a process of rule-making and juridification in international relations began. Promoted by the phenomenon of globalisation and exempt from the restrictions of bipolarity, new forms of “governance beyond the nation state” (Zürn 1998) have been developing up to the present time. New organisations and institutions, emerging international norms, newly established decision-making sys-tems and an unprecedented power constellation in the international system led to a reformation of the global structure. Labelled Global Governance, this restructuring of the global setting has also found his way into the social science debate (cf. Dingwerth/Pattberg 2006; critically Terhalle 2015). The advent of these new powers, the so called Emerging Powers, has increasingly challenged the legitimacy both of the established and the new global structure in international relations. Are all actors involved in decisions taken in the structures of the international system? Is the world order of inclusive character or are certain states and actors excluded from relevant decision-making structures? Both the setting of the global struc-ture per se as well as the Global Governance research program must be confronted with these questions. Particularly the countries of the Global South are vehemently contesting the current constitution of the world order. Contrary to Ikenberry’s (2008: 23) forecast according to which the new powers would estab-lish themselves into the structure of western norms and institutions and would gain a leading position in the world system, the Emerging powers are currently being underrepresented in the international system as they are being excluded from the relevant multilateral forums and institutions. So far no African, Latin-American or Asian state – with the exception of the People’s Republic of China – has had a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, the most relevant and powerful body of the international system. Despite the ever growing population numbers, the countries of the Global South are not being adequately considered. The BRICS-states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) alone have a share of 42 per-cent of the world population and a worldwide share of 26 percent of the gross domestic product (Statista 2014). Against the background of these numbers Messner/Nuscheler (2003:44) state that the countries of the Global South are of very little academic importance in the Global Governance discussion. One country of the Global South which amongst others aims at reshaping the international structures in order to give them a more inclusive character is South Africa. The question of how the state deals with the current world order will be discussed in the present analysis. This emerging state started to articulate its demands for a fairer and thus more inclusive access to global participation mechanisms in the post-apartheid period. After the country had been freed from the oppression of the apartheid, the freedom fighter and later president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, also called for a more inclusive world when delivering his first speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations:

“The elaboration of a new world order must, of necessity, centre on this world body. In it we should find the appropriate forum in which we can all participate to help determine the shape of the new world.” (Mandela 1994)

These demands for a more inclusive international order are always linked with a change of the normative structure. International norms are pivotal structure elements of the international system, creating a dense web around the international actors and providing them with a framework for action (Rosert 2012: 599). Two established norms which, among others, have got a strong regulative function in this global web are the right to veto of the Security Council of the United Nations and the norm of nuclear disarmament. The right to veto is one of the most fundamental structure elements of the international system as it divides the community of states into veto-holding powers and states without a right to veto, thereby cementing the inequality of the actors in international decision-making structures. The norm of disarmament also functions as a structuring device as its application in form of the Non-Proliferation Treaty constitutes a nuclear order which differentiates between official nuclear powers and Non-nuclear power states. There-fore, the norm is […] usually seen as the most relevant normative order […] in international security.” (Müller 2013). Can South Africa change this established international structure which consists of norms? In which way does South Africa demonstrate commitment for such a change of the world order?

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Current state of research and focus of the paper These questions will be answered with the help of a theoretical model that is inspired by a reflexive-con-structivist approach. Constructivist norm research has so far primarily focused on the examination of the implementation (cf. Risse/Jetschke/Schmitz 2002; Risse/Ropp/Sikkink 1999), diffusion (cf. Jetschke/Lenz 2011) and general compliance of norms. However, these approaches have disregarded the fact that actors ascribe different meanings to norms and contest their validity again and again. This blind spot in political science has so far remained unconsidered. Wiener (2004), having recognized the problem, developed the contestation approach which aims at disclosing the double construction of norms. Based on these as-sumptions of critical norm research, South Africa will be conceptualized as a Norm Entrepreneur in order to reconstruct its effects on the change of norms. The predominant interest of research is rooted in this context: South Africa as an aspiring power will be examined with regard to its role in changing established international norms of the international system towards more inclusive structures. Therefore, a theoret-ical model will be developed which provides a distinction of two kinds of contestation. These types of contestation will be differentiated for the purpose of reconstructing the way how South Africa’s social practice affects norms on the one hand and analysing the effect these actions have on norms on the other hand. In this paper, the term contestation is understood as the discursive dispute and challenge of norms by actors. The main research questions are:

1. How can South Africa as a Norm Entrepreneur and its influence on the change of international norms be grasped theoretically?

2. How does South Africa try to promote a fairer and more inclusive world order in the Security Council reform and in the discussion about nuclear disarmament?

3. Can South Africa be seen as a relevant Norm Entrepreneur towards a (from its perception) more inclusive normative order in the international system?

The present study, which is led by these questions, can be located in two research gaps. As the current state of research on norms in general and on Norm Entrepreneurs in particular will give rise to further findings, it will be discussed in chapter 2, which focuses on theory. When it comes to constructivist norm research, it has to be stated that research has mainly concentrated on the conceptualization of Norm En-trepreneurs, but the focus has almost exclusively been put on civil society actors and international organ-izations in empirical studies (cf. for many: Keck/Sikking 1998; Finnemore 1993, Santa-Cruz 2005). How-ever, states as Norm Entrepreneurs have widely been disregarded. Therefore, Wunderlich (2013: 33) states “[…] a lack of detailed case studies“. At least there are some studies which explicitly refer to norm research and try to empirically grasp states as Norm Entrepreneurs: In this sense, states like Scandinavian coun-tries (cf. Ingebritsen 2002), Canada and Switzerland (cf. Rutherford/Brem/Matthew 2003) and great pow-ers like China and the USA (cf. De Nevers 2007; Job 2006) have been analyzed in case studies. All in all, the investigation of state entities in relation to the transformation and change of norms enjoys no more than a shadowy existence. Furthermore, this cursory overview lays bare how little attention norm research has paid to Emerging Powers, which are getting more and more important. The edited volume of Mül-ler/Wunderlich (2013) is an exception here as its analysis of multilateral weapon control also takes into consideration the new rising powers. Following up this research gap, South Africa, which is classified as an Emerging Power, will be analyzed with regard to two concrete norms in this study. Another research gap is plain to see when analyzing states of the Global South in general and of the Afri-can countries in particular. States of the Global South are gaining more and more importance as object of research in International Relations. The effects Emerging powers have on Global Governance structures are being increasingly investigated (cf. for many: Cooper/English/Thakur 2002; Cooper/Antikiewitz 2008, Wouters et al. 2012; Gray/Murphy 2014). Nonetheless, there a no theory-based studies which concentrate on norms and Norm-Entrepreneurial activities of states. Research on the African continent in IR however has focused so far on the important analysis of external actors in Africa (cf. Grimm 2003; Taylor/Williams

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2004; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2007; Shaw/Cooper/Chin 2009; Gieg 2010; Taylor 2010). The actor-ness of the African states however has widely been disregarded. Brown/Harman (2013: 1) criticize this maladjustment in the scientific examination of the African continent:

„The study of Africa's international relations has for a long time been dominated by a concern to explain how the continent has been governed, shaped and marginalised by external actors.“

They themselves claim a broader consideration of the African agency in the scientific debate (Brown/Har-man 2013: 2ff). By analysing South Africa’s foreign policy, the present study aims at contributing to a stronger focus on African actors and African actorness.

Outline of the paper In order to analyze South Africa as a Norm Entrepreneur in reference to the norm of nuclear disarmament and the right to veto of the Security Council properly, this study will build on a reconstructivist research logic1. The theoretical starting point of this paper is the contestation approach. On this basis a theoretical model for Norm Entrepreneurs will be developed and two modes of contestation (applicatory contestation and justificatory contestation) will be theoretically introduced to describe the behavior of such Norm En-trepreneurs. Particular importance will thereby be attached to the theoretical implementation of the metanorm of justice because this norm has a significant impact on the actors’ contestation (chapter 2). In a second step, the analysis will focus on the constitution of demands for a more inclusive world order: Which basis did the impetus for justice of the South African foreign policy arise from? In order to answer that question, material circumstances as well as normative factors of the South African foreign policy will be identified. Thereby, the aim is to find out which interests determine the foreign policy of the nation in its effort to engage in the change of norms in order to establish more inclusive structures in the interna-tional system (chapter 3).

2. Theoretical model: Contestation via Norm Entrepreneurs

In the current debates (for example: Ulbert 2012; Engelkamp/Glaab/Renner 2014; Deitelhoff/Zimmer-mann 2014), discussions are going on about the question whether classical norm research2 has disre-garded actors over a long period and has adopted a very dominant structural perspective. Questions of norm resonance, that is to say the meaning of norms and the possible potential for conflict in the inter-pretation by the actors, have been neglected. The same can be stated for the cases that are to be analyzed in this study: The norm of nuclear disarmament, for example, is ontologized as stable – its meaning and the effect actors have on it are not part of the analysis. Inspired by the work of Antje Wiener and others, a theoretical area of research has evolved in the domain of constructivist engagement with norms: the critical constructivist norm research (Wiener/Puetter 2009; Wiener 2014). This new area of research does no longer regard norms as stable, but they are reflected rather critically. Furthermore, the theory also takes into consideration the dynamic processes that play an important role in the emergence and change of norms. What is essential here is the contestation of norms, thus the discursive and argumentative dis-pute of the validity and legitimacy of norms (Wiener 2014: 7). However, not only negative effects are ascribed to norm contestation: Norms can be weakened through discrepancies and disputes among the

1 A reconstructive research logic is a post-positivist method, according to which actions are embedded in social and intersubjective contexts and are mediated through language. Because of this, actions can be reconstructed by means of analysing the knowledge bases of the social contexts, e.g. primary literature and secondary literature. Therefore, laws of causation and hypotheses are obsolete (cf. Franke/Roos 2013: 21; Herborth 2010: 280; also Björkdahl 2010: 10). 2 For example: Finnemore/Sikking (1998: 896); Jepperson/Wendt/Katzenstein (1996: 33ff.); March/Olsen (1998: 951); Risse (2003: 108).

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actors, but also a strengthening of norms through the argumentative discourse is possible. As a conse-quence, the legitimacy of norms is constantly questioned and has to be proved in the argumentative pro-cess. Therefore, the critical element of the theory, in which it differs from the established norm research, is the insight that norms cannot be implemented in a top-down process and are not valid globally without being questioned (Wiener/Vetterlein 2013: 79). Therefore, norms have a double quality, actions are guided by norms and also the norms are constituted through actions. The relevant literature often distinguishes between legal, cultural and social norms. Consequently, the right to veto of the UN Security Council, which is examined in this paper, is classified as legal norm, as it is laid down in the charter of the United Nations. The norm of nuclear disarmament on the other hand is a social norm, which is applied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the norm has to be sep-arated from its application because also states which have not joined the NPT as well as civil society actors engage in nuclear disarmament. For further examination, such a perspective is critical because many au-thors assign the ability to be interpreted and contested to social norms only. In contrast, Wiener (2008: 192) regards this division as obsolete because all norms emerge from a process of interaction and therefore all norms have to be seen as social:

“In any case, contestation is expected. This also holds true for legal norms which require social institutions to enhance under-standing and identify meaning that is normative practice.” (Wiener 2009: 179)

This point of view will also be followed in the present study. The agreement about how norms emerge and change is not related to the objective reality, that is to say to the question whether a norm is a legal or a social one, but rather to socially constructed, interactive processes (Wiener 2009: 179). On the basis of these insights, also the norm of the right to veto can be analyzed with the help of the theoretical model which will be developed in the following chapter.

2.1 Norm Entrepreneurs in norm research

Norm contestation is not a mechanical process, but an interplay of structure and actor. As elements of the international structure, norms constrain and enable the behaviour of the actors who seek for a change of norms either by questioning the existing norm partially or fully or by supporting it (Wunderlich 2013: 31). First attempts to conceptualise the actors in relation to norms were undertaken by Florini (1996: 375) and very prominently by Finnemore/Sikking (1998: 895) who revitalised the term Norm Entrepreneur as a cen-tral mechanism in the first phase of their Life-Cycle-model, the so called norm emergence. In this model, the French translation of the term “Entrepreneur” is emblematic; Actors were seen as entrepreneurs which try to boost a project. Transferred to norm research in the field of political science, norm entrepre-neurs are ascribed the ability to modify the normative system by identifying problems and deficiencies. Norm entrepreneurs draw the attention of the international community to certain topics and try to con-vince other actors of certain norms of the discourse:

“Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using lan-guage that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.“ (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 895)

In doing so, they are put in relation to ideas in the international system. According to Björkdahl (2002: 45), such actors are capable of promoting social change by influencing the collective behaviour of others or by acting as agenda-setters who introduce new ideas to the international debate. These actors, who are often called “norm advocates” (Deitelhoff 2006), can be individuals, representatives of an organisation or collective actors like states, NGOs or regional organisations (Schapper 2013:15). Especially non-governmental organisations and actors of the civil society and their prominent role in the emergence of international norms have consistently been researched on in an empirical way in the con-text of constructivist norm research (cf. Risse/Jetschke/Schmitz 2002). States however, as stated in the introduction, have not aroused much interest as field of research and have only been regarded as so called norm receivers (Müller 2013: 33). A first step towards filling the research gap on the theoretical level was

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done by Björkdahl (2002: 46), who combines Norm Entrepreneurs with constructivist insights. According to her fundamental premise, identities are no longer exogenously given but they rather constructed through the interaction with other actors and the normative structure in the international system. How-ever, Björkdahl (2002: 47) refers to Wendt in her theoretical elaboration and conceptualizes the state as a unitary actor without deconstructing it. With a view to the upcoming empirical study of that paper, this cannot be agreed upon. When taking action in the international system, South Africa relies again and again on its normative principles. In order to investigate the motivation of a Norm Entrepreneur’s action, it is indispensable to open the “black box” of the state: Identities in IR are defined as ideas about oneself in differentiation to other actors. They are based on norms, values and principles (Harnish 2003: 331). A collective identity which is constructed in such a way, accepted and underpinned normatively is one pre-condition for actorness. This is also true for Norm Entrepreneurs: “The identity of the norm entrepreneur is crucial to the selection of ideas, the choice of diffusion strategies and the arenas of actors favoured for the norm entrepreneurial activities“ (Björkdahl 2002: 46). Identity is not only the source of empathic and altruistic motivation to support international norms, as described by Finnemore/Sikkink (1998: 898), but it also constitutes the interests of the actors who want to benefit from supporting a norm. To sum up, Björkdahl (2002: 46) suggests the following definition of Norm Entrepreneurs in International Relations, which is generally accepted:

“By identifying or creating opportunities, actors committed to a particular idea set out to change the existing normative context and alter the behaviour of others in the direction of the new norm.” (Björkdahl 2002: 46)

However, according to this definition, Norm Entrepreneurs have a limited focus on the process of emer-gence of norms. Actors provide the international system with new ideas, which are then pushed forward by the effects and actions of the Norm Entrepreneurs until they form new and stable norms. Thereby, it is problematic that Norm Entrepreneurs have been conceptualised through an understanding of stably on-tologised norms, which has been criticized in point 2.1. As soon as norms are internalised in international relations, the actors no longer have any impact on them and fundamental questions remain open: How can the change of existing and established norms be grasped? Which impact do Norm Entrepreneurs have? Answers to these questions are given by the Norm-Dynamics Approach which enhances the concept of Norm Entrepreneurs in terms of the double quality of norms.

2.2 Norm Entrepreneurs in the Norm-Dynamics Approach

The Norm-Dynamics Approach, developed by Müller/Wunderlich (2013), tries to put the transformation of norms and therefore also the Norm Entrepreneurs in the focus of norm research. As the denomination of the approach already tells, it emphasises the dynamic that is inherent to norms by falling back on the definition of norms and the logic of action presented by Wiener: The general contestation of norms by the actors is linked with the concrete conceptualization of Norm Entrepreneurs in order to explain norm change (cf. Wunderlich 2013: 31ff.). Because of their contestation and vagueness, norms are subjects of negotiation processes and thereby subjected to change by actors (Müller 2013: 11). In this sense they have to be interpreted by actors in order to turn them into concrete action and behaviour. In doing so, this approach contradicts teleological or circular models, like the Life-Cycle model of Finnemore/Sikkink (1998) or the Cycles of Change model of Sandholtz/Stiles (2009), in which Norm Entrepreneurs are im-bedded in specific phases of norm emergence. According to Wunderlich (2013: 28f) norms can be influ-enced in every phase of a norm career: Norms can be weakened, strengthened or they might even disap-pear. Contrary to the approaches criticized in the beginning of chapter 2, Norm Entrepreneurs are here not only relevant with regard to the emergence of norms. Norm Dynamics distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic factors which determine norm change. Ac-tor-centred and structural powers constitute opportunities in which Norm Entrepreneurs can develop their effects on norms (Wunderlich 2013: 29). Intrinsic factors focus on norms as such, more precisely on

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the ontologisation of norms as contested as described above. Due to the social contingency of norms, norms are interpreted differently by the actors. Norm conflicts and contestations which arise from this can result in a change of norms (Wunderlich 2013: 30). What is meant by extrinsic factors, on the other hand, is the structure which surrounds norms: “Extrinsic factors concern changes in the sociopolitical environment in which the norms are embedded.“ (Müller 2013: 11). In this way, the effects the interna-tional structure has on the norm are to be theoretically grasped. Power shifts in the international system, technological progresses within the thematic domain of the norm or crises situations can challenge the normative order, which might lead to the development of new norms or the reformulation of existing norms. The focus is not only put on the international structure, but also on domestic circumstances: Changes of democratic power structures, revolutionary overthrows and revolts can also affect norms (Müller 2013: 12). All in all, norm change is the result of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. However, Wunderlich (2013: 30) states unmistakably: “[A]gency is needed for norm change to take place“. The actors’ behavior is pivotal; thus, Norm Entrepreneurs are now in the center of norm change. On the basis of a definition suggested by Björkdahl’s (2002), the Norm-Dynamic approach regards Norm Entrepreneurs as follows:

“Norm entrepreneurs are characterized as actors who set out to alter the prevalent normative order according to certain ideas or norms that they deem more suitable as compared to the existing ones. In order to persuade the audience of the appropriate-ness and necessity of the propagated norm(s) and to recruit norm followers, they engage in processes of strategic social con-struction using identional as well as material resources.” (Wunderlich 2013: 37)

Thus, Norm Entrepreneurs try to change emerging as well as existing norms according to their views by reverting on strategic behavior. As a result, actors’ actions can lead to a strengthening but also to the decay of a norm. This definition will serve as a basis in this study because, in contrast to Björkdahl’s def-inition cited above, it goes beyond the pure emergence process. Moreover, even though it focuses strongly on the actors, it does not neglect the structural level as extrinsic factors are implemented explicitly. The following empirical investigation of South Africa will focus especially on the level of the actors for re-search pragmatic reasons, but structural circumstances will be included in the analysis over and over again. However, it is necessary to further differentiate this approach in order to make it fertile for further empirical research because it remains unclear which action of the Norm Entrepreneurs strengthen a norm and which weaken it. Indeed, Wunderlich (2013: 34) and Müller (2013: 12) differentiate between proto-typical Norm Entrepreneurs, which support the existing normative system, and revolutionary Norm En-trepreneurs, which aim at changing existing norms of the international system radically. This dualistic typology can only comprise the actors’ objectives, the explanation of the way how actions of Norm Entre-preneurs impact the validity and the legitimacy of norms however is missing.

2.3 Two kinds of contestation through Norm Entrepreneurs

Deitelhoff/Zimmermann (2013) consider this level of validity of norms in their theory: Which kind of dis-courses lead to norm stability and which weaken a norm? Deitelhoff/Zimmermann (2013: 5) try to answer this question by classifying contestation discourses into two types: The justificatory and the applicatory contestation. This general differentiation of discourses will be applied in the theoretical model of the present paper in order to refer to the different ways how Norm Entrepreneurs can influence norms. Both kinds of contestation target the level of norm validity. Collectively accepted normative expectations con-stitute the validity of a norm, which is constantly negotiated anew. As norms are generally contested, they are interpreted differently by the actors and they are part of an argumentative process: Actors can ques-tion the norm fully, claim for further modification with stricter rules or challenge only the application of the norm. Norms become valid through intersubjectively shared acceptance of the involved actors (De-itelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 4). If this acceptance is touched by discourses, it can have negative or positive effects on norms. Which effects occur and when depends on the type of contestation.

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Applicatory Contestation Application contestation comprises discourses about the correct application of the rules and obligations embodied in the norm. It is about the proper interpretation of the norm from the perspective of the re-spective actors:

“Norm applicatory discourses have to clarify whether (1) a norm is appropriate for a given situation and (2) which actions it requires in the specific situation.” (Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 5)

Thus, the applicatory contestation of the actors refers to the appropriateness of a certain situation. In the case of the right to veto, one specific situation is meant by this: A situation in which one of the permanent Security Council members made use of its veto, which is seen critically by other actors. In this case, the actors do not question the validity of the norm itself, but just the concrete application of the norm. A change of the norm can go along with the modification of its interpretation and therefore also of the expectations which exist towards the norm. The more precise the norm is, the less application contesta-tions will be pronounced (Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 5). Therefore, discourses about the application result in general in a strengthening of the validity of a norm because the contestation triggers learning processes in the actors which make them adjust their interpretations or develop the norm according to their interests (Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 14). The norm is further specified in order to adapt itself to the given situation. With regard to the Norm Entrepreneur, who plays a central role in this theoretical model, the application contestation is seen as one of his possible discursive option for action. The actor, in this study South Africa, questions the application of a norm through his linguistic expressions and his social practices, which can initiate learning processes in himself or other actors and can successively lead to a modification of the norm.

Justificatory contestation In contrast to the application contestation, the norm of validity contestation refers directly to the validity of a norm. Not only is the concrete application of a norm questioned, but the norm itself is challenged. Groups of actors ask themselves discursively if a norm can be valid to them at all and what they can expect from each other regardless of a concrete situation (Deitelhoff/Zimmermann 2013: 5). In Conjunction with the Norm Entrepreneur, the justification contestation is a behavior which articulates the actor’s interpretation of a norm itself and its validity and which challenges a norm on the part of actors. The interaction with other actors might thereby cause a long-term weakening of the norm because it is contested in its core. In summary, Norm Entrepreneurs’ actions can be divided into two types of contestation, which makes an analytically reasonable differentiation of the impacts of the actors’ behavior on the norm possible.

2.4 Emerging Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs

At first glance, Norm Entrepreneurs, which act in these two ways, are actors who try to compensate their deficit of traditional power resources through discursive and argumentative behaviour by relying on their credibility and expertise (Rosert 2012: 603). This explains why especially NGOs and civil society actors as Norm Entrepreneurs have been in the centre of interest in norm research for a long time (cf. Finne-more/Sikkink 1998, Risse/Jetschke/Schmitz 2002). However, states can also act as Norm Entrepreneurs in the international system. Which contestations and discursive contributions respectively are influential and which are not? Who is perceived as an influential Norm Entrepreneur? The definition of Norm Entre-preneurs, as laid down in Point 2.2, definitely implies strategic action undertaken by state entities. This potential of actions has to be fed back theoretically to the power of a state because Krook/True (2010: 109) see in power an integral part of strategic constructions. Therefore, especially with a view to South Africa

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as Emerging Power, power has to be considered as a main element of the theoretical model. Emerging Powers are generally defined as follows:

“The reasons for the assignment of a new role to these states are their demographic and geographic size, their growing economic and military capacities, and their political aspirations. The countries defined here under the rubric of emerging powers dominate their neighbors in terms of power over resources, that is, population, territory, military capacity, and gross domestic product. In addition, they articulate a wish to change the distribution of power in the international system and assume leadership roles in global governance.” (Schirm 2006: 2)

This definition highlights the classic power resources of a state, which in case of an Emerging Power are brought about by rising economic and population quotas. However, with regard to norms, an Emerging Power as Norm Entrepreneur possess “[…] Gramscian, not Walzian power.“ (Sandholtz/Stiles 2009: 16).3 This is already implied in definition above: Rising states articulate their desire to change the power struc-tures and thereby also the normative structure of the international system. The traditional power concept cannot grasp such a transformation analytically as it focuses on the material power only. In contrast, Gramscian’s concept of power incorporates the influence of actors on the generation and diffusion of ideas and information, which is particularly dependent on the communication resources of a state (Sand-holtz/Stiles 2009: 16). Baring these thoughts in mind, a constructivist power concept, which considers both material and ideal resources of a state, is suggested as a basis in the theoretical model. Power and the handling with the material resources constitute themselves through ideas and the cultural context of a state; thus, through the identity of the Norm Entrepreneur (Baldwin 2013: 287). In that way, it is possible for actors to present their actions as normal and appropriate in the international system. They have the ability ”[…] to shape conceptions of normal“ (Manners 2002: 239). With regard to the different types of contestation, which were described in Point 2.3, this means that the influence of arguments and contri-butions in a norm discourse is dependent on the particular material and ideal resources of a state. Due to the circumstances Emerging Powers find themselves in – that is to say due to its high number of popula-tion and its generally accepted normative strength in the case of South Africa, they have the power to justify and legitimize their contestations of existing norms. The normative foundations of the Emerging Power will be in focus in the empirical part of this study.

2.5 Metanorm of Justice as Driving Force of norm contestation

Besides power, reference to the metanorm of justice in discourses is another important element of the theoretical model. Schirm’s (2006: 2) definition of Emerging Powers, which has been mentioned before, implies the desire of these states for a change of the structure towards a more inclusive and more partic-ipative world order. Norm Entrepreneurs try to bring about this change of structure by supporting the contestation of the norms that are to be changed with moral and ethical arguments. By referring to metanorms, they seek to give more weight to their demands and want to convince other actors of the necessity for change. Metanorms are evaluative norms, they provide evaluation standards and inform about the appropriateness of the behavior and actions of actors. Thus, metanorms perfectly suitable for strategic construction because they depict norms which are strongly generalized and are consequently recognizable by everybody in their own way (Wiener 2007: 8). Linking their argumentation for a change or a modification of an existing norm with one or multiple metanorms is reasonable from the point of view of the actor because metanorms bear in them a very strong persuasiveness which makes it very dif-ficult to oppose to them (Sandholtz/Stiles 2009: 17). Therefore, metanorms are part of actors’ strategic action, however they can also affect actions as a norm as such by giving impetus for contestation. Based on the respective constitution of the actors, the metanorm shapes the awareness and thus also the actions which result from it.

3 Only the Gramscian concept of power will be adopted, the other theory elements of Sandholtz/Stiles (2009), which are connected to a research program inspired by a poststructuralist perspective, will not be considered.

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In the context of the present research project, it becomes obvious that Norm Entrepreneurs fall back on the metanorm of justice in their argumentation for a change of the normative structure. Especially states which have been marginalized in the past and are rising to power now, like South Africa, are trying to achieve their goals by applying the strategy mentioned above. Their actions are coined by the metanorm. As the title of this paper already tells, they aim at achieving a more inclusive world order, this means at developing an international system that also includes their issues and keep at hand suitable options to participate for all states. On a more abstract level, that means that actors articulate demands, which they perceive to be their right. Accordingly, a denial of these expectations constitutes a situation of injustice (Müller 2013: 6). What is meant by justice, however, is not only distributive justice: “Justice is in the eye of the beholder.“ (Welch 1993). Buchanan/Keohane (2006: 406) also confirm this perspective by examin-ing standards of justice with regard to the legitimacy of governance structures. According to Müller (2013: 6), it can be about the distribution of material and immaterial goods, which has been mentioned above, about the possibilities of participation in the international system or about the perception of actors in certain situations and functions: “Likewise, it has been stated that justice is a central element in […] de-cisionmaking“ (Müller 2011: 1). The present study will refer exclusively to the justice of participation, thus to the question of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of international relations. The unequal global dis-tribution of material goods and discourses about justice which result from it, will not be investigated for research pragmatic reasons. Instead, the focus of the present paper will be placed on the inclusiveness of international structures and on the claims for justice that go along with it: The core of justice refers to the equal and free participation of all actors in the international system, therefore to the inclusiveness of global governance structures. In the domain of norm contestation, especially with regard to justificatory contestation, justice is of par-ticular significance. Contestations which are based on claims for justice can on the one hand lead to the emergence of conflicts about the question whether a norm satisfies these claims for just. On the other hand, the question might be raised which standards of justice at all can or should be valid for the norm (Müller 2013: 7). This occasionally results in violent disputes because also the norm of justice is subject to the principle of contestness and therefore also to the interpretation of individual actors. To sum up, justice in general and in the specific case of Emerging-Norm Entrepreneurs is to be seen as the Driving Force of norm contestation. The metanorm stimulates and strengthens norm contestation towards an active change of norms. With a view to the following empirical work, this means that the impetus for justice of South Africa’s foreign policy has to be reconstructed in order to be able to analyze the contes-tation adequately.

2.6 Overview of the theoretical model

On the basis of the contestation approach of Wiener and the dictum of contested norms which is related to it, a model could be developed for the following empirical investigation, whose aim is to grasp two points in particular: 1. The model seeks to focus on the rising material and ideational potentials of actors and to put them in relation to a change of norms caused by actors. Thus, the theoretical framework is oriented decidedly toward the analysis of Emerging Powers: The constitution of behavior of Norm Entrepreneurs through the foreign policy identity as well as through the material situation and the power potentials which result from it, is considered and can be reconstructed empirically with regard to the claims for a more inclusive world order and in matters of the metanorm of justice. 2. Moreover, the change of norms is being looked at from another perspective because the different types of contestation, which a Norm Entrepreneur can make use of, are also taken into consideration. For this reason, the validity of norms is in the center of the research interest. This theoretical construction makes

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it possible to examine also norms that are perceived as very stable, like the right to veto of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the contested nature of norms can be analyzed. These two core elements constitute the theoretical fundament of the model. The following implications, which are essential for the further empirical investigation, result from this theoretical construction: Firstly, research has to be done on the social context of South Africa. In order to adequately analyze the type of contestation of the concrete norms of the right to veto and nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to reconstruct the constitution of the claims for justice. Which norms and values of the foreign policy identity and which material circumstances have been and still are relevant with regard to the claims for a more inclusive world order? This procedure considers the central role that identity and power play in the theoretical model of the present paper. On this basis, the particular behavior of the Norm Entrepreneur South Africa will be examined with the help of the cases in which the two types of contestation are applied.

3. South African foreign policy and the demands for a more inclusive world order

The theoretical model, which is discussed in chapter 2, forms the framework for the following empirical investigation of South Africa as Norm Entrepreneur. As was found out in the theoretical elaboration, it is essential for the analysis of norm entrepreneurs to reconstruct their social context and thus to grasp the basis of the South African foreign policy with regard to its impetus for justice. The focus will thereby be put on factors which constitute the actions and motivations South Africa undertakes to promote a more inclusive world. Therefore, the material circumstances as well as the normative factors will be analysed with recourse to the theoretical framework in order to draw an accurate picture of the impetus for justice of the South African foreign policy. Thereby, the following question is decisive: Which material and ide-alist conditions determine the foreign policy interests of South Africa in order to achieve more inclusive structures and a change of norms? When the Apartheid regime was abolished in 1992 and freedom fighter Nelson Mandela won the elections in 1994, there was a break in South African politics in general and in the nation’s foreign policy in partic-ular. The same is true for the emergence of an impetus for justice of the South African foreign policy: Only after this turning point did demands for a more inclusive world order constitute themselves. During the Apartheid era, South Africa had been internationally isolated and had put its focus in foreign policy on the attempt to achieve a hegemony in the region; a stronger and especially internationally accepted role of South Africa had been out of question (cf. Geldenhuys 1984; Barber/Barrat 1990). Only due to the pres-idency of Mandela and the ever-increasing political dominance of the Anti-Apartheid movement and the African National Congress (ANC), the current political party, a specific view on the inequalities of the world order was created. This view rooted in the experience of the long struggle for freedom, which had lasted for decades. Therefore, primarily the foreign policy in the Post-Apartheid era and its constitution are of interest in the present analysis of the South African impetus for justice. Thus, two phases of South African foreign policy can be identified in which the demands for a more inclusive international structure have constituted themselves: The first phase constitutes the normative fundament of the demands and encompasses the ideas shaped by the struggle for liberation as well as their first implementation by Pres-ident Mandela. While demands had been articulated carefully under his presidency, the importance of South Africa increased in the second phase, which triggered an intensification of the rhetoric of the new President Thabo Mbeki. The basic features of these politics were continued by Jakob Zuma, the current office holder.

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3.1 Mandela’s universalistic foreign policy

The foreign policy of Nelson Mandela, the first President of the Post-Apartheid era, is called universalistic politics by Olivier (2012: 174). During that period, South Africa’s acting in the international system was determined by several factors: The struggle for freedom of the ANC and ideas that emerged at that time had a great influence on the domestic and foreign policy of South Africa. Furthermore, the end of Apart-heid and the fresh start in South African foreign policy coincided with the end of the Cold War period so that South Africa had to find its position in the transforming world order.

3.1.1 Formative influence of Apartheid and the struggle for freedom

The struggle for equality and participation of the black South African populations, which was initiated by the African National Congress (ANC) founded in 1912 and other important protest movements, like the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), as well as the increasing radicalization because of the racist and authori-tarian Apartheid politics, which was anchored in law in 1948, have left deep marks on the foreign policy identity of South Africa. With regard to the constitution of the demands for a more inclusive world order, multiple aspects are interesting. The suppression of the colored population majorities by the South African Apartheid regime, which had lasted for decades, anchored a strong awareness of injustice into the national identity of the new Post-Apartheid republic. This understanding also generated a new South African awareness of the necessity of articulating social, economic and participative injustice and of accelerating the demands to change these conditions with regard to foreign affairs (DFA 2003: 7). The political system of South Africa was stigma-tized by the ANC as a “colonialism of a special type“ (Evans 1996: 252). In that way, the struggle for free-dom was placed on the same level as the freedom movements of the colonialized states, which is why the course of action undertaken against colonial and imperialistic structures plays a central role also in the foreign affairs due to the collective experience gathered during the foreign rule in South Africa. The awareness of injustice, which was evoked as a result of suppression, was increased by the initially peaceful and later armed struggle led by the ANC and other liberation movements. After the ANC had been declared illegal in 1963, attempts have been made to internationalize the fight against apartheid. Under the leadership of Oliver Tambo, the first ANC missions were established abroad, the recognition of the United Nations was achieved in 1974 and attempts were made to forge alliances for the liberation struggle especially in countries of the Global South (Ellis 1991: 442; Evans 1996: 250). Thereby, it seems particularly interesting that the geographical priorities of the former ANC missions influence the focus of the current foreign policy even today (Pfister 200: 4). This is mainly due to the very minimalist role of the European states in the fight against Apartheid and the increasing isolation of the South African regime. As the Global South, most notably India, supported the claims of the ANC, a deeply rooted solidarity with the southern states was constituted. In contrast, skepticism against the European states and an anti-west-ern perception were further results, which significantly determined South Africa’s foreign policy, espe-cially under Mbeki and Zuma (Olivier 2012: 178; Serrão/Bischoff 2009: 364). This fight of the black population which was also led internationally, was a fight against government-mandated racism and therefore was at its core a fight for democracy in South Africa: The liberal idea of equality of all humans – manifested in Anti-Apartheid slogan “One Person, one vote“ – should also be implemented in South Africa (Jordaan 2012: 288). When the first free elections were held in 1994, this goal was reached and the democracy as desirable norm as such was included in the foreign policy. It has been shaping the external actions of South Africa since that time (Johnston 2001: 14f.). This does not only entail a strong commitment to the promotion of democracy especially on the African continent, but the democratic views were also transferred to international institutions and therefore, they constitute the demands for a reform of the established organizations (Serrão/Bischoff 2009: 365).

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Accordingly, the struggle for freedom has significant influence on the foreign policy of the current Rain-bow Nation: On the basis of collective experience, a strong sensation of injustice, a deeply rooted feeling of solidarity with the states of the Global South and a democratic agenda constituted themselves, all of which coined the South African demands for a more inclusive world order.

3.1.2 Reorientation of the foreign policy under Mandela

Experience and ideas gathered during Apartheid were implemented by Nelson Mandela, the first demo-cratically elected president of South Africa in the Post-Apartheid era. Nevertheless, the preconditions of this implementation were extremely bad: Until then, South Africa had been internationally outlawed and had been bilaterally sanctioned by the Security Council of the United States as well as many other states since 1963 (Klotz 1994: 4; Meese 1990: 300). Mandela’s prior and urgent concern therefore was to renew the cooperation with all states and international institutions in order to provide South Africa with a new place on the international stage (Olivier 2012: 174): By means of a foreign policy based on multilateral commitment, Mandela and the new South African elite tried to shake off the nation’s former Pariah status and to transform the country into a “[…] responsible global citizen“ (Mandela 1993: 87). The following numbers illustrate this policy: In 1990, South Africa only had 30 diplomatic embassies, in 1996, however, the number had increased to 124 embassies worldwide. Moreover, the government led by Mandela man-aged to make South Africa member in 45 international institutions, whereas South Africa had been ex-cluded from most organizations because of the Apartheid policy until 1994 (Barber 2005: 1082). Through his reorientation of the South African foreign policy, Mandela laid the basis for the emergence of the demands for a more inclusive world order for the first time. The placing of the topics and contents of the foreign affairs had only been possible through the new recognition of South Africa in the international system, which enabled South Africa to obtain a hearing. In his article Foreign Affairs, Mandela defined the aims of his foreign policy, which comprise: Respect and promotion of human rights in the international system, promotion of peace through armed regimes and unarmed conflict-solving mechanisms, safe-guarding of interests of the African continent and economic development. With regard to the present paper’s focus, one of his aims is very interesting:

“[…] - that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;” (Mandela 1993: 87)

According to the quotation above, justice and international law should represent the leading ideas for relations between nations. In the further course of his article, Mandela formulates his argumentation more precisely: With regard to South Africa, the United Nations have a leading role to preserve global security and order. In that way, the structures of the United Nations have to be reorganised and the dom-inance of one or more powers has to be prevented, though, in order to keep South Africa’s recognition as a legitimate organisation in the international system in the long term (Mandela 1993: 89). According to this, the South African President explicitly links the multilateral commitment in the United Nations with the demands for a readjustment of this organisation and for a change of structures of dominance. In the strategy document of the ANC of the year 1996, this is transferred to the world order as a whole: By means of the new bilateral relations and multilateral ties, South Africa is expected to speak up for a more just world order: “Such links and alliances should be driven by a vision and agenda aimed at creating a just and equitable world order.“ (ANC 1997). This policy is linked with the solidarity with the Global South, which was developed during the freedom struggle (cf. ANC 1997). These rhetoric declarations are opposed to an ambivalent balance in the political practice. Mandela tried to implement his ideas of foreign policy and got involved mostly successfully with the resolution of the conflicts in Mozambique (1994), Lesotho (1994), Nigeria (1995), Zambia (1996) and Swaziland (1996). Even though these diplomatic interventions have not been successful at all times, like in the DR Congo, or have not always been executed in a goal-oriented way, as it turned out to be the case in the benevolent politics toward Zimbabwe’s dictator Mugabe, a decisiveness to act still became obvious. Steps which had

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signaling effect were the disclosure of the secret nuclear program of the Apartheid times and the joining of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) under de Klerk as well as the continuation of this policy under Man-dela (Schultze 2007: 400f.). However, Mandela’s efforts to push forward the reformation of the interna-tional structures, were not consistently implemented. Reasons for that inconsistent implementation can mainly be found in the pragmatic and neutral foreign policy, as it is called by Olivier (2012: 174). The South African elites around foreign minister Alfred Nzo aimed for a smooth transformation of the foreign policy in order not to destroy the benevolent perception of the young South Africa in the world public. A radical ideologically colored policy would have scared away possible and new foreign investors and might have afflicted the economy which was sanction-free at last, which would have had consequences on the fragile internal politics (Olivier 2012: 174). Demands for a more inclusive world order which would have been spoken out loudly would not have been an appropriate signal, the more so as Mandela had to con-centrate on the normalization of the relations to the relevant actors first, as described above. The foreign policy under the presidency of Nelson Mandela plays a central role with regard to the consti-tution of the demands for a more inclusive world order – inasmuch as his universalistic policy of recogni-tion laid the basis for an impetus of justice in the international system. However, an active and rhetorically consistent commitment did not result from it.

3.2 Change of the South African foreign policy

At the end of Mandela’s term, Thabo Mbeki took over the official duties in South Africa in 1999. After the constitutive phase under Mandela, the foreign policy has gradually changed under Thabo Mbeki. While Bischoff (2003: 183ff.) and Williams (2000: 73) reduce Mbeki’s term only to the economic, neoliberal com-ponent and depict the external actions of South Africa at that time as non-transparent and incoherent, Nathan (2005: 362) claims that such a realistic research focus which exclusively concentrates on economic factors does not grasp adequately enough the internationalist and emancipated agenda of Mbeki. Moreo-ver, according to Nathan, the Mbeki era comprises indeed a coherent foreign policy – this perspective will also be followed in this study. The external identity of South Africa, which was shaped in the early Post-Apartheid years, continued to exist in its basic ideas; however, it was rhetorically strengthened by Thabo Mbeki and his foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This change can be grasped in three ways: Firstly, a redefinition of multilateral commitment was formulated under the presidency of Mbeki, which included central demands for a more inclusive world order. Secondly, South Africa’s commitment to the African continent and the interrelated concept of African Renaissance were further elements of change and at the same time relevant for the development of an impetus for justice. Furthermore, the current economic rise and the commitment in the Club Governance, which goes along with it, are foreign policy elements which differ from Mandela’s policy and constitutively affect the demands for a more inclusive world order.

3.2.1 Reinterpretation of South African multilateralism

The change of the South African foreign policy under President Thabo Mbeki becomes obvious in his in-terpretation of multilateralism. As mentioned in Point 3.1.2, Mandela’s universalistic policy turned the multilateral acting and behavior into a central and fixed part of the external identity of South Africa. The acting in multilateral forums also played a central role in Mbeki’s eyes, as his Director General of Foreign Affairs states in a speech: “Indeed, multilateralism is the cornerstone of the country's foreign policy” (Selebi qtd. in Nel/Taylor/Westhuizen 2001a: 1). Thus, Mbeki continues Mandela’s foreign policy. How-ever, what distinguishes him from Mandela is the connection of multilateral commitment with emanci-pated ideas that are expressed in a rhetorically powerful way. Multilateral institutions were perceived as forums in which the hegemonic order can be opposed to and structures linked with it can be changed (Jordaan 2012: 290; cf. Nathan 2005: 365). Accordingly, Mbeki tried to continue the emancipated policy

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that Mandela had already intended but not implemented consistently. In political practice, this mani-fested itself in an anti-western and anti-imperialistic rhetoric: “Mbeki refused to accept western political and cultural hegemony […]“ (Olivier 2012: 176). His speech as chairperson of the G77 (plus China) at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2006 illustrates this exemplarily:

“Poverty and underdevelopment remain the biggest threats to progress that has been achieved, and the equality among the nations, big and small, is central to the survival, relevance and credibility of this global organization […] Madam President, when you correctly urge us to implement a global partnership for development, we the members of the G77 and China, who represent the poor people of the world, understand […] this common commitment for a global partnership for development cannot be transformed into a reality when the rich and powerful insist on an unequal relationship with the poor. A global partnership for development is impossible in the absence of a pact of mutual responsibility between the giver and the recipient. It is impossible when the rich demand the right, unilaterally, to set the agenda and conditions for the implementation of commonly agreed programmes.” (Mbeki 2006)

In this quotation, the anti-western argumentation becomes visible. South Africa connects a rhetoric which is directed against the west with solidarity with developing countries and tries to become a voice of the Global South. Due to the collective experience during Apartheid, South Africa shows an intrinsic understanding for the needs of the developing countries and a continuing interest in questioning the marginalization of the South, as it is laid down in the Strategic Plan of the South African Foreign ministry of the years 2003 to 2005 (DFA 2003: 7). In this context, the “Fancourt Commonwealth Declaration on Globalisation and People-Centred Development“ of the year 1999, the “Berlin Declaration of the Summit on Progressive Govemance“ of the year 2000 and the “Skagen Declaration” of the Nordic prime ministers also of the year 2000 have to be mentioned, all of which were significantly initiated by the South African President and criticize the desperate situation developing countries find themselves in (Nel/Tay-lor/Westhuizen 2001a: 4). Even though they appeal for a global distributive justice, the demands for a more inclusive world order constitute themselves on that basis: According to Mbeki, claims for a fairer world economy are strongly connected with access to the participation on eyelevel in the relevant struc-tures of the international system. Accordingly, already one year after his inauguration, he said in the General Assembly of the United Nations:

“If we are indeed seriously committed to these critical objectives of peace and democracy in the world, then we have no excuse to permit the further postponement of the meaningful restructuring of the United Nations. If we were honest with ourselves, we would admit that what is blocking progress is the desire to accommodate what are perceived as new power relations, to re-institutionalise relations of inequality within the UN in an amended form.” (Mbeki 1999)4

Besides the intentions to transform the world economy in a way that allows southern developing countries to benefit from it, South African foreign Policy also aims at reforming international structures, especially of the United Nations. South Africa does not intend to realize these aims in a radical way, the nation is rather expected to become an “agent of progressive change“ (DFA 2003: 7), as described in the Strategic Plan 2003-2005. In political practice, this foreign policy dictum found expression in a stronger multilat-eral commitment. From that time on, South Africa committed itself even more strongly in the United Nations, the UNCTAD, the G77, The NAM and in World Trade Organisation (WTO) (cf. Nel/Tay-lor/Westhuizen 2001b: 120f.). The Rainbow Nation took over the presidency of the ninth UNCTAD, the Non-Alinement Movement, the Commonwealth and the conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Con-vention in 2000. Furthermore, South Africa tried again and again to achieve debt reliefs or programmes in order to reduce poverty, like for example at the G8 Summit in Okinawa 2000 (Schultze 2007: 401f.; cf. Geldenhuys 2006: 93). At the G8 Summits, South Africa generally tried to represent the interest of the developing countries and to articulate the demands of the South (Vickers 2008: 171). Thus, the Rainbow Nation has continued its multilateral commitment and sought to insist on the above mentioned demands within the established forums and institutions. That is why Nel/Taylor/Westhuizen (2001b: 118) refer to

4 More examples of the critique articulated by president Mbeki can be found in his speeches in front of the General Assembly in 2003 and 2004 (cf. Mbeki 2003; Mbeki 2004b) or also at the minister meeting of the NAM (Mbeki 2004a).

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South Africa under Mbeki as “reformist”. South Africa’s demands do not radically challenge the hege-monic order, especially because South Africa avows itself to a strong neoliberal economic orientation which it also promotes in its foreign policy (see 3.2.3). For this reason, South Africa’s activism for the Global South is accepted by the western states (Nel/Taylor/Westhuizen 2001a: 6; cf. also Vickers 2008: 172). In summary, the reconstruction of the interpretation of multilateral action shows that South Africa’s ac-tivism is connected with the commitment for the Global South, which includes demands for an economic as well as participatory justice and constitutes itself on the basis of an anti-western attitude of the presi-dent and the elites. In line with the definition presented in the theoretical elaboration (see chapter 2), the demands for a more just and inclusive world emerge from clearly articulated criticism of the economic marginalisation of the South.

3.2.2 African Renaissance

Besides the new interpretation of multilateral action, another key element in the development of the de-mands for more inclusive structures in the international community is the concept of African Renais-sance, which was supported by Mbeki. Even as vice president of the first government in the post-Apartheid era, Mbeki gave the go-ahead for the revitalization of the concept of African Renaissance when delivering his speech “I am an African”, which was very well received internationally (Vale/Maseko 1998: 271): The development of regional and continental institutions, the resolution of the serious safety problems and economic empowerment are meant to help Africa to achieve a “renaissance” and an adequate position in the international system (Rennkamp 2013: 42; Landsberg 2008: 258). With the help of this vision, which was characterized by the guiding principle of African Renaissance, the South African president triggered an active development of regional associations in the mid-1990s. One important institutional step in this direction was the foundation of the New Partnership of Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in the year 2001, in which South Africa was significantly involved (Jacobeit 2006: 21). The conceptual orientation of the first African economic strategy is based on the dictum “African solutions to African problems“ (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2010: 47) and already reflects the new direction of impact of the initiative: The domi-nance of the western actors on Africa should be broken up and the continent should be enabled to solve its problems on its own. The foundation of the African Union in 2002 was another step in which South Africa played an important role, particularly in the development of the African Security and Peace Archi-tecture (Engel/Porto 2010: 3; Kuwali 2014: 33), as well as in the reactivation of the Southern African De-velopment Community (SADC) by Mbeki. By the establishment of the African Union and other regional instruments, the aim should be achieved “[…] to put the continent on the road of recovery“ (Landsberg 2008: 258). Besides these African domestic developments, the concept of African Renaissance also had a global component: With the help of the so called “Mbeki's Global Initiative for Africa“, the president sought to call for a global responsibility of Africa by means of shuttle diplomacy and a multitude of initi-atives (Nel/Taylor/Westhuizen 2001a: 4). In accordance with the slogan “Better Africa in a Better World“, the African continent was expected to achieve a more relevant position in a more inclusive world order under the leadership of South Africa (Vickers 2008: 164). A speech given in front of the South African Parliament lays bare the argumentative connection of Africa’s marginalisation with the demands directed to the international community to reform relevant organisations:

“We must and will continue actively to engage the rest of the world to make whatever contribution we can to ensure that the process of globalisation impacts positively on those, like the millions of our people, who are poor and in dire need of a better life. This engagement must necessarily address among things the restructuring of the UN, including the Security Council, a review of the functioning of such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank, the determination of agenda and the manner of oper-ation of the WTO and an assessment of the role of the G7.Central to these processes must be the objective of reversing the marginalisation of Africa and the rest of the South, and therefore compensation for the reduction of national sovereignty by increasing the capacity of the South to impact on the system of global governance.” (Mbeki 2000)

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The concept of African Renaissance put the focus of the South African foreign policy under Mbeki decid-edly on the African continent. In this context, Nathan (2005: 363) identifies anti-imperialism, Africanism and Democracy as guiding principles of his foreign policy. In comparison to Mandela’s foreign policy, the African continent attracted greater attention under Mbeki, as was shown above. Which impacts does this Africa related focus have on the constitution of the demands for a more inclusive world order? On the one hand, the development of the impetus for justice is reinforced through the concentration on Africa and Africa’s economic and participative marginalisation in the international system. On the other hand, the African Renaissance gives the constitution of the demands for more inclusive world order a special touch. South Africa perceives itself as the leader of the African states in the international system (Alden/le Pere 2009: 158): Accordingly, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the South African minister for International Rela-tions and Development Cooperation remarks: “In practice, we have assumed the role of peacemaker and negotiater in Africa, and a champion of Africa’s interests abroad“ (Nkoana-Mashabane qtd. in Alden/Schoeman 2013: 116). Because of the numerous South African initiatives in the course of the African Renaissance, as described above, South Africa was perceived as representative of the entire African continent, personified by presi-dent Mbeki, especially form western states.5 That was for example the case at the G8(+5) Summit in Gleneagles 2005, at the economic summit in Davos or at the G20 Summit, which has taken place since 1999, at which South Africa acts as the only African member (Barber 2005: 1089). South Africa also cam-paigned for a prioritisation of the African interests at a time when it was non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Habib 2009: 149). A new dimension of the constitution of the demands arises from this perception: South Africa’s global commitment for more inclusive structures is not only based on the representation of the interests of the Global South, as shown in Point 2.2.1, but it is also rooted in South Africa’s perception of itself as a representative of African interests on the global level. Therefore, the Rainbow Nation connects its own interests with those of the entire continent.

3.2.3 New international relevance of South Africa through Club Governance

This two-sided perception is further enhanced by the increasing relevance of South Africa. At the latest when South Africa became member of the BRICS in 2010 and when it started to commit itself in various club formats like IBSA and G20, South Africa could strengthen its role, was perceived as a relevant actor in the international system and could establish itself among the so-called Emerging Powers. Under the leadership of the ANC after the end of Apartheid, South Africa undertook far-reaching economic reforms. Even before the 1994 elections, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was launched, which paved the way for the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR) – a large-scale and neoliberally inspired programme which was introduced in 1996. This economic programme, which was very controversially debated even in the left orientated ANC, orients the South African economy towards export, includes fiscal discipline and opens the markets in a neoliberal sense. The current ASGISA pro-gram (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa) also goes in this direction (Vickers 2008: 167; Barber 2005: 1081) and shows ambivalent success: Although South Africa shows huge economic in-equalities (Schoeman 2008: 242), it was able to advance to being the strongest African economic power – 40 percent of the GDP of Subsahara-Africa are generated by the Rainbow Nation and South Africa man-aged to increase its trade with Africa by 300 percent by means of its export orientation (Alden/Le Pere 2009: 157). The biggest potential of the South African economy lies in the resources: South Africa pos-sesses the biggest gold, manganese and platinum sources. Here the key question arises to which extent South Africa can be seen as Emerging Power because its material capacities are significantly lower than

5 Nevertheless, one has to critically state that this perception of the western states is not shared by most of the African states (cf. Alden/Schoeman 2013: 123).

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those of the other uprising states. Table 1 clearly shows striking differences with regard to demographic and economic indicators:

Tab.1: Economic and demographic figures of the BRICS

Population

(in million) Size of economy

(in billion US Dollar)

Growth rate (in percent)

GDP per capita (US Dollar)

Brasil 204 2170 7,5 10800 China 1300 10090 10,3 7600 India 1200 4600 10,4 3500 Russia 139 1477 3,8 15900 South Africa 51 524 2,8 10700

Source: own illustration based on Alden/Schoeman (2013: 115)

Viewed economically, South Africa is regarded as gate to African markets indeed (Draper/Scholvin 2012), however it cannot keep up with the economic and military potential of China, India and Brazil at all. The theoretical discussion picked up on that point and a vital debate developed out of it about whether South Africa should be considered an Emerging Middle Power (cf. Schoeman 2004; Flemes 2009; Stephen 2012; Grimm/Van der Westhuizen 2014). The status of an emerging middle power is based on South Africa’s claim for a leading role on the African continent (cf. Krämer/Melber 2013). The following statements can be seen as consensus of this discussion about South Africa’s position: South Africa is considered to be an Emerging Power not due to its material capacities, it rather is the self-perception of South Africa and its perception by other actors that is significant (cf. Alden/Schoeman 2013: 113). And this perception is a result of South Africa’s commitment in the G20, the BRICS and the IBSA dialogue forum. Furthermore, South Africa tries to represent the interests of Africa and of the Global South in the NAM, in the BASIC climate change coalition and in the WTO (Kornegay 2012: 201). A new international relevance of South Africa results from this, which contributes to the constitution of the demands for a more inclusive world order. Through its commitment in these clubs, South Africa shows its aim to reform the unjust and exclu-sive dominance structures of the international system (Alden/Vieira 2011: 513). Of course, the member-ship especially in the BRICS and the IBSA, as pointed out in Chapter 2.2.1, is an opportunity for South Africa to work towards an economically fairer world, like for example by means of the BRICS development bank. Nevertheless, and this is of major importance within the framework of the present study, it also always implies the demands for more inclusive structures and a reform of the established institutions. Jacob Zuma, successor of President Thabo Mbeki after the caretaker president Motlanthe, affirmed this at the BRICS Summit 2012 in New Delhi:

“We share with our BRICS partners the imperative need for the reform of global decision-making structures, in order to improve global governance. We single out, in particular, the comprehensive reform of the United Nations and international financial institutions. The purpose is to make these structures more effective, efficient and representative.” (Zuma 2012)

Thereby, especially the United Nations are considered to need reforms. In a speech at the IBSA-Summit in Brasilia, Zuma concretized these demands for an urgent reform of the UN-Security Council:

”It is thus imperative that IBSA, alongside like-minded political and economic formations, seize the moment for the reform and restructuring of global governance. This includes the United Nations Security Council, the international financial institutions, and the G20.” (Zuma 2010)

The two exemplarily chosen quotes impressively show that South Africa acts in the Club Governance not only for economic reasons, but it also aims at achieving inclusive participation forms in the international system by doing so. In sum, it can be stated that South Africa could strengthen its position thanks to its economy that is very strong in comparison to other African nations as well as by means of active participation in the newly emerged clubs. This contributes to the constitution of demands for a more inclusive world order because

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it offers an opportunity to articulate them powerfully and as a state which gained international reputa-tion.

3.3 Interim conclusion

The reconstruction has shown that, despite the very short phase of constitution since 1994, South Africa is characterized by a very distinct impetus for justice in its foreign policy. The demands for a more inclu-sive world order are strongly connected with the appeals for distributive justice for the Global South and the advocacy of South Africa against the marginalization of the African continent. The following factors shape the South African demands for a more inclusive world order:

(1) Collective awareness of injustice (2) Solidarity with the Global South (3) African Renaissance (4) Perception as leader of the African states (5) Perception as leader of the Global South (6) Perception as Emerging Power and status enhancement through Club Governance

If these six factors are brought together and are taken into consideration in the reconstruction outlined above, the following South African perception of inclusive structures can be stated: What South Africa primarily associates with inclusive structures is open access to the United Nations and above all partici-pation of southern, especially African, states in the Security Council. However, the demands are not lim-ited to the UN-system, but they also comprise finance institutions and institutes for the world economy. As indicated in Point 3.2.3, the demands for a more inclusive international system are always connected with demands for distributive and social justice. Reference back to the theoretical model shows that by means of reconstruction of the South African demands the potential and motivations of the norm entre-preneur South Africa could be illustrated (cf. 2.3).

4. Case studies

The reconstruction of South African demands for a more inclusive world order in chapter 3 serves as basis for the empirical examination of the discursive course of action of the state as norm entrepreneur. In order to analyze South Africa’s way of proceeding with regard to norms and in order to answer the central question of this study, the argumentative and discursive effect of the state on two norms will be recon-structed with recourse on the theoretical model elaborated in chapter 2: The two norms are the right to veto of the UN-Security Council and the norm of nuclear disarmament. The two cases differ with regard to the type of norm that is involved: The right to veto is a legal norm of the International Organization, whereas nuclear disarmament represents a social norm, which manifests itself especially in the interna-tional regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (cf. 2). South Africa exhibits a special interest in changing these norms because of the specific constitution of the demands for a more inclusive world order (see chapter 3). Therefore, the third question is of central importance for the following reconstruction: Is South Africa a relevant norm entrepreneur (from its perspective) towards a more just normative order in the international system? By taking part in discourses, norm entrepreneurs can influence an existing norm in two ways, as shown in point 2.3. The aim of the following examination is to analyze which kind of action South Africa chooses to change norms. This goal shall be achieved in three steps: First of all, the respective norm will be reconstructed and its normative core will be exposed in order to examine the contestation potential of the norm in the second step. Finally, the South African argumentation and social practice in relation to the norm will be analyzed and the specific type of contestation will be identified.

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4.1 South Africa and the norm of nuclear disarmament

The international norm of nuclear disarmament was brought into the focus of public attention when US president Barack Obama delivered a speech in Prague in April 2009 in which he expressed his wish to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons in the long run. However, the aim to dispose of nuclear weapons is not a new one: Already after the firing of the first nuclear bomb against Japan in Hiroshima in 1945, the idea of nuclear disarmament was articulated and an international norm emerged from this quite quickly. Today, nuclear disarmament, besides other norms of disarmament, is even seen as one of the most rele-vant structure elements of international security (Müller 2013: 14). Due to this prominent position within the web of international structures, this norm is permanently exposed to discussions and contestations because this norm is also subordinated to the principle of contestedness (see chapter 2). For this reason, the norm of nuclear disarmament serves as a case example. It has to be analytically distinguished from the term weapon of mass destruction. This case study exclusively refers to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. The term “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)” includes nuclear as well as biological and chemical weapons and thus constitutes a catch-all category without analytical potential (Singh Sidhu 2013: 411). The same is true for the norm of non-proliferation, which refers to the horizontal non-prolif-eration of nuclear weapons to other states or actors and has to be distinguished from the norm of nuclear disarmament.

4.1.1 Genesis and substance of the norm of nuclear disarmament

Nuclear disarmament dates back to the idea and norm of general military disarmament. It aims at reducing the number of weapons in national armies, partially the complete withdrawal of these weapons is implied (Haywood 2013: 273). The moral core of this idea is the reduction of weapons and means of war as a measure to prevent casualties in militant conflicts and to destroy the basis for war (Weiss/Thakur 2010: 91). Ever since there has been armed disputes, the idea behind military disarmament has existed and it dates back to antiquity (Haywood 2013: 273). The norm of nuclear disarmament has gradually developed from this basis after 1945. On July 16, the United States fired the world's first nuclear test in New Mexico. Only a few weeks later, the extreme de-structiveness revealed itself when the USA made use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the first and only time. Both events put political decision makers and the international civil society under pressure to act. They were expected to tackle the possible problem of nuclear destruction and to extend possibilities of civil use of atomic energy at the same time (Greitens 2014: 380). In the light of these events, the newly established United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was instructed by the first resolution of the General Assembly in January 1946 to propose plans how to ban nuclear weapons in the international system (Weiss/Thakur 2010: 94). Even though this first resolution only had symbolic power and did not have any effect with regard to actual disarmament, the United Nations have gradually become a multilateral platform since the adoption of the resolution. On this platform, the norm has fur-ther constituted itself and has changed from an emerging to an established norm in the international system. The foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 was a first normative milestone on the way to nuclear disarmament. Further steps followed: The Cuba Crisis in 1962 showed quite plainly the threat of a nuclear war between the two power blocs to the world public. After the crisis, the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which allows only these three states to perform underground tests and bans nuclear test in the atmosphere and underwater. In 1967, a second nuclear-free zone, besides the zone in the Antarctica, was created by means of the Tlatelolco treaty in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lodgaard 2011: 46). All these stages illustrate the relevance of the norm of nuclear disarmament at that time. The norm of nuclear disarmament arose from pure disarmament – through demands for disarmament of nuclear war-

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heads and because of the goal of complete global disarmament. However, the norm still has to be consid-ered as emerging in this phase because, according to Finnemore/Sikking (1998: 901), a norm only is es-tablished in the international system if a critical number of relevant states accept the norm. This ac-ceptance was not yet given at that stage: Not only were efforts for disarmament promoted, but also effects in the opposite direction emerged. Incited by these events and the Cold War, which got more and more intense, the Soviet Union also launched its own nuclear program, which resulted in a massive armament of both power blocs in the 50s and 60s (Haywood 2013: 266). Performing nuclear test, Great Britain (1952), France (1960) and the People’s Republic of China (1964) joined the club of nuclear powers and took part in the arms race in the East-West Conflict.

4.1.1.1 Norm implementation through the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Despite the intensifying arms race between the power blocs, the norm of nuclear disarmament could es-tablish itself in the international system. Because of the application of the norm, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was agreed on in 1968, could be institutionalized and reached the “tipping point” (Finne-more/Sikking 1998: 901) towards an established norm. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was initiated by means of the resolution 2373 of the General Assembly after long negotiations in the UN-Disarmament committee. The agreement was accompanied by three objec-tives: The promotion of a peaceful use of atomic energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarma-ment (Brühl/Rosert 2014: 180). Thereby, the norm of nuclear disarmament was decidedly incorporated into the targets of the regime. However, there is a qualitative difference between the two objectives: “The NPT […] established a robust norm of non-proliferation and a weaker norm against nuclear weapons“ (Weiss/Thakur 2010: 96). Rühle (2007: 514) argues in a similar way by classifying the NPT as a treaty which is almost exclusively about non-proliferation and focuses the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to Rühle, the disarmament of this type of weapons is disqualified as “dis-armament myth“ (Rühle 2007: 514) and is not given sufficient importance. This argumentation can only be partly agreed with: As a matter of fact the non-proliferation is deeply rooted in the treaty, but the central objective of the NPT is to achieve a world which is free of nuclear weapons by means of disarma-ment (Guiles 2013: 8). From this perspective, the fulfilment of the norm of non-proliferation is only one step towards global disarmament: “Nuclear disarmament remained the eternal norm, which would even-tually displace the provisional norm of non-proliferation.“ (Walker 2007: 436). The norm of disarmament is laid down in Article VI of the treaty:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.“ (UNODA 2014b)

In that way, the article formalises the norm of nuclear disarmament but reduces the request for complete disarmament, which is inherent to the norm, to the demand for negotiations on measures for disarma-ment. As a result, the core element of the norm to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons is washed out. However, the particularity of the institutionalisation of the NPT is the transformation with regard to the application of the norm, which is related to it, as was already described above. This correlates directly with the discriminative dualistic character of the treaty (Hassner 2007: 460). Article XI says that all states which had fired an atomic bomb before 1967 are regarded as nuclear powers. Thereby, they are able to preserve their status quo and keep on benefitting from the privilege of possessing nuclear weapons. The USA, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union (respectively now Russia)6 belong to these states. In re-turn, these states commit themselves to nuclear disarmament according to article VI, which was men-tioned above. In contrast to that, the other Non-Nuclear-Weapon States waive the right to hold nuclear weapons and consent to the verification measurements on their territory (Müller 2009: 1; Thakur 2006: 2f.). The application and implementation of the norm into the NPT-Regime takes place only in connection 6 As well as the People’s Republic of China since 1992.

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with an explicit distinction between nuclear powers and non-nuclear weapon states. This differentiation lead to the constitution of a nuclear order in the international system on the basis of two classes. This distinction guaranteed the approval of the treaty by the super powers. The treaty should be evaluated every five years at Review Conferences and can be renewed every five years. The treaty came into force in the 1970 and further signatory states could be gained fast. Therefore, the tipping point was reached very quickly. Already at the first Review Conference, 91 states had signed the treaty, 131 states agreed on the contract in 1985 and today, the treaty has almost achieved universal character with 189 member parties. In summary, the norm of nuclear disarmament could be formalised and transferred into a treaty in the time of the Cold War. Despite the institutionalisation of the norm of nuclear disarmament, the assessment of that period must be somewhat sober. In 1974, India carried out its so-called “peaceful nuclear explo-sion”, Israel and South Africa realised potential tests in 1979 and the arms run among the super powers reached its climax (Haywood 2013: 267; Greitens 2014: 380). Moreover, the relevant threshold countries, like the People’s Republic of China, Brazil, South Africa and Pakistan, did not join the treaty (cf. UNODA 2014a). Other disarmament efforts like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SALT I and SALT II only limited the maximum number of long-range missiles and middle-range missiles as well, and did not constitute concrete request for disarmament.

4.1.1.2 Nuclear disarmament after the East-West conflict

The caesura in world politics, the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union, had immense impacts on the norm. This phase, which has lasted until the present time, is like a continuum between disarmament efforts of different actors on the one side and the marginalisation of the NPT-re-gime through the official and unofficial nuclear powers on the other side. (Johnson 2006: 61f. cf. Mül-ler/Fischer/Kötter 1994). Despite this ambivalent development, several striking milestones, which have a constitutive effect can be identified.

The removal of the time limit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a milestone The Review Conference in 1995 constituted an important milestone in the development of the norm of nuclear disarmament. At the conference, an extension for an unlimited period of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was agreed upon. The removal of the time limit was directly linked to the demand for nuclear dis-armament after negotiations which had lased very long because of the opposition of the nuclear powers. Accordingly, the declaration of the conference says:

“In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotia-tions on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” (UN 1995: 2)

Besides putting emphasis on the request to the nuclear powers to promote nuclear disarmament, this declaration also demands the signing of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) (cf. UN 1995: 2). In addition to these measures, the unlimited extension was also linked to the reinforcement of the status quo of the nuclear order. As described by Daase (2003: 27), this undermines the core of the regime: The non-nuclear weapon states waive nuclear weapons as long as the nuclear powers commit themselves to nuclear disarmament. However, the removal of the time limit lead to the decoupling of the commitments for disarmament of the nuclear powers from the renunciation of nuclear weapons of the other states both on a temporal and objective level (Daase 2003: 28). This might cause a perception according to which this might mean that the nuclear powers are absolved from their duty of disarmament (Walker 2007: 438). However, claims for their commitment to disarmament nuclear weapons came up very quickly. The de-mands of disarmament to the nuclear powers is explicitly highlighted in the ground-breaking judgement of the International Court in 1996 about the usage of nuclear weapons:

‘‘There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’’ (UN 1996a)

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What is special about this judgement is the judicial declaration that the aim of disarmament has to be pursued (Johnson 2006: 62). However, these Advisory Opinion of the International Court are not binding in accordance with international law, as Ford (2007: 402) critically remarks.

The Review Conference 2000 and the step backwards in 2005 The Review Conference in 2000 was characterized by the request for far-reaching commitments to dis-armament of the New Agenda Coalition, which was founded by Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zea-land, Sweden and South Africa in 1998 (Müller/Becker/Seidler-Diekmann 2008: 8). It was successful: The so-called “13 steps” on the way to global disarmament were included into the final declaration of the conference. Steps 5 and 6, which fixed the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and the commitment to compliance with article VI by all contracting parties until the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, con-stituted the core of this agreement (cf. UN 2000: 1). According to Jayantha Dhanapala (2010: 10), the former UN Under-Secretary-General, this ambitious commitment symbolizes the will on the part of the nuclear powers to comply with article VI and to consistently continue their disarmament efforts. That is why Müller (2009: 3; Translation: TL) refers to the Review Conference as “a perfect model of successful summits”. Accordingly, the commitment to stick to the norm of disarmament, also on the part of the nuclear powers, was confirmed. Furthermore, the idea of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, which had been expressed for a long time by the civil society, was included for the first time into an official document and negotiations to transfer this idea into action were contemplated as a third step of the point plan (cf. UN 2000: 1). The Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000 in general can be assessed positively with regard to the norm of nuclear disarmament. A slow but continuous turning away from the previous application of the norm in the sense of article VI of the NPT regime became visible and attempts were made to apply the norm of nuclear disarmament in a stricter and more binding way. However, this progress was completely under-mined by the following Review Conference in 2005. Due to the USA and France, which ignored the results of the Review Conference of 1995 and 2000 partic-ularly also the 13-steps plan, the conference had already turned into an “unprecedented disaster” (Müller 2005: 3; Translation: TL) in the run-up to the conference. The central controversial issue was the imple-mentation of binding commitments to disarmaments for the nuclear powers. As a result, the commitment to disarmament in article VI was devaluated and the asymmetry which is inherent to the NPT was laid bare (Baumann 2011: 9). The disappointment about the behaviour of the nuclear powers on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states was expressed in their counterproductive behaviour at the conference. The non-aligned states refused a strengthening of the regime, for example by means of the introduction of stricter export controls and broader-based verification rights, in order to set a sign against the nuclear powers and their denial to fulfil their commitments to disarmament (Brühl/Rosert 2014: 182).

4.1.2 South Africa’s argumentation and social practice

The Emerging Power South Africa is one actor whose behaviour is related to the potential of contestation of the norm of nuclear disarmament. South Africa has a special initial position to act on the norm of nuclear disarmament as a norm entrepreneur: The rainbow nation is the first state worldwide which was in possession of nuclear weapons and which abandoned its nuclear program and completely disarmed its arsenals. This nuclear „Roll Back“, which is unique in history, (Long/Grillot 2000: 24) made South Africa a proactive supporter of nuclear disarmament and of the NPT regime. Especially the commitment for the promotion of the NPT treaty has constituted a social practice which bridged the gap between the official nuclear powers and the Non-Nuclear weapon states. This social practice affects the South African contes-tation of the norm of nuclear disarmament in a special way.

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4.1.2.1 South Africa as an active promoter of nuclear disarmament

In the 1970s, South Africa developed a secret nuclear weapon program with six operational nuclear war-heads in the 1970s under president Voster and Botha and probably with support of Israel (cf. Liberman 2001: 45). This nuclear policy was more and more contested among the decision-making elites of the National Party after the international isolation of South Africa had increased due to apartheid policy and because the sanctions had had negative effects on the economy of the country. Giving up the nuclear program was seen as a practicable way “[…] to reenter the international community in compliance with international norms“ (Long/Grillot 2000: 32), although the exclusion from the international community was not due to the nuclear program but rather due to the inhuman and racist Apartheid policy. After F.W. de Klerk had become president of South Africa in the year 1989 and already and shortly before the end of Apartheid, South Africa revealed its previously secret nuclear weapon program. F.W. de Klerk mandated the disarmament with the support of the NATO in 1996. Consequently, the six South African warheads were completely dismantled (Onderco 2012: 301). Besides the international recognition, the reasons for giving up the nuclear program were manifold. The discontinuation of the threat through the allegedly communist or Soviet-instructed aggression by the neighbouring countries of Angola and Mozambique at the end of the East-West conflict has mainly contributed to that event (Liberman 2001: 74). Furthermore, the National Party had a very strong (racist) fear that an unpredictable former resistance group, formed by people with a politically left orientation and led by black people, might hold nuclear weapons because of the looming take-over of the government by the ANC (Pretorius 2011: 330). The complete disarmament of nuclear weapons coincided with the end of apartheid and with the period of upheaval of the society and represents a caesura in foreign policy. From that date, South Africa com-mitted itself proactively for the promotion and compliance of the norm of nuclear disarmament. In the course of disarmament, the South African state subordinated itself under the supervision of the Compre-hensive Safeguards Agreement of the IAEA (van Wyk 2012: 183). After the newly elected and ANC-led Post-Apartheid government had also committed to the chosen way and had declared nuclear disarmament one of the central objectives of their foreign policy (Onderco 2012: 301), South Africa turned into a “champion of disarmament” (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 256). Therefore, the fear of the National Party that the ANC might get in possession of a nuclear bomb was unfounded because the ANC had spoken out against nu-clear weapons already at a very early stage. Abdul Minty, who was responsible for nuclear questions within the ANC in exile, had spoken out against armament efforts even month before the election of the year 1994:

“South Africa that will not only clean itself, but also play an international role, both to fight racism abroad, and to stop prolif-eration and help to produce peace.” (Minty 1994)

South Africa actively participated in the multilateral debate about nuclear disarmament within the NPT regime very early. It played a key role in the conclusion of the treaty extension in the negotiations about the unlimited extension of the NPT treaty (Pretorius 2011: 330). This commitment is all the more remark-able given the fact that the conference took place only one year after the assumption of office of the ANC government and that the newly elected government therefore hardly had any international diplomatic experience. South Africa also tried to advocate the treaty at other Review Conferences of the NPT (see more precise 4.1.2.2). It also committed itself for the norm of nuclear disarmament outside the NPT re-gime. In 1998, South Africa ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, under the lead-ership of South Africa, the negotiations about the Pelindaba-Treaty, which had been contemplated in 1960, were promoted so that the treaty came into force in 2009. With the help of this treaty, a zone which was free of nuclear weapons was formalized on the African continent (Pretorius 2011: 325ff.). South Africa has been campaigning for the norm of nuclear disarmament since the complete disarmament of its own nuclear capacities. This aim is laid down officially in the Strategic Plan 2005-2008 of the foreign ministry: “South Africa will continue to play an active role in all aspects of disarmament“ (DFA 2005: 58). This goal was also affirmed in the last strategy document of the years 2011-2014 (DFA 2011: 20).

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4.1.2.2 Applicatory contestation

As the reconstruction in Point 4.1.2.1 showed, South Africa has been a promoter of the norm of nuclear disarmament since it has joined the NPT-regime. The norm was fulfilled through the complete disarma-ment in 1991 and has been complied with to this day. Since that time, the validity of the norm has not been questioned anymore by South Africa – the social practice to promote the norm proactively even emerged in the South African foreign policy. In this external practice, an applicatory contestation can be identified, by means of which South Africa tries to change the norm in its application. This contestation practice is based on the demands for a more inclusive world order, which were reconstructed in chapter 3. As a norm entrepreneur, South Africa wants to change the norm of nuclear disarmament in its applica-tion within the Non-proliferation regime. This can be seen in the balance-argument, which is the attempt to create a balance between the commitments of the treaty parties.

Balance-Argument In order to reach the goal of complete disarmament of all nuclear weapons, it is necessary, from an South African perspective, to act within the NPT-regime and to strengthen the treaty. Therefore, Nzo, the for-mer foreign minister, stated: “NPT remains the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear-weapon states are bound“ (Nzo qtd. in Shelton 2003: 1). In its role as a bridge builder, South Africa tries to create a balance between the commitments of the NPT-treaty of the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear weapon states. Thereby, the central objective of South Africa is to claim dis-armament commitments that are politically binding for the official nuclear powers in order to change the application of the norm in the long run. Furthermore, South Africa wants to eliminate the inequality of the NPT-regime in favour of an upgrading of the non-nuclear weapon states in the nuclear order (Wunder-lich et al. 2013: 257). Only if the five nuclear powers comply with their disarmament commitments, the norm can be consequently implemented. These argumentation patterns could be identified and recon-structed in official statements of the South African government referring to nuclear disarmament (see attachment 1). This argumentation was translated into concrete actions in the negotiations about the removal of the limitation of NPT-treaty at the Review Conference in the year 1995. South Africa supported very strongly the idea of the unlimited extension of the NPT and contributed significantly to the overcoming of the entrenched divisions between nuclear powers and non-nuclear weapon states through its conference pro-posal (Landsberg/Monyae 2006: 140). The South African proposal, which was described as “brilliant pack-age“ by conference chairman Dhanapala, includes the unlimited extension of the NPT, if the nuclear pow-ers implement an overarching stop of weapon tests and if they affirm their commitments with regard to the long-term elimination of all nuclear weapons in return (Shelton 2003: 2). On the basis of this proposal, the Principles and Objectives-conference document could be passed, in which the commitment of the nu-clear powers to nuclear disarmament was laid down (cf. UN 1995: 2). At the next Review Conference in 2000, South Africa also campaigned very strongly for the adoption of the 13 steps and the binding com-pliance of nuclear disarmament in the New Agenda Coalition (see 4.1.1.2.2). This shows that South Africa sought to tackle the problem of asymmetry in an institutional way in the NPT and tried to create a balance between the two groups at both conferences. But the applicatory contestation was formulated even more vehemently and was underpinned with argu-ments of justice, when France and the USA, as described above, ignored the progress and the results of the conference in 1995 and 2000 in the run-up of the Review Conference 2005 while attempting to enforce further restrictions against the non-nuclear weapon states. As a result, the balance between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear weapon states was changed diametrically: Again, the commitments of the NPT affected only the non-nuclear weapon states in opposition to the established nuclear powers which did not bindingly accept nuclear disarmament. Such a behaviour was not acceptable for South Africa which was highly aware of injustice in the foreign policy (cf. 3.3). Therefore, this procedure of the established

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nuclear powers was criticized by Abdul Minty, the South African representative at the Review Conference in New York:

“The imposition of additional restrictive measures on some NPT States Parties while allowing others to have access to these capabilities, only serves to exacerbate existing inequalities that are already inherent in the NPT and undermines one of the central bargains that are contained in the Treaty.” (Minty 2005: 4)

Even though Abdul Minty strongly criticized the inequality of the treaty, he affirmed South Africa’s com-mitment to the NPT at the end of this speech and described the treaty as a “[…] cornerstone of nuclear disarmament“ (Minty 2005: 7), in which South Africa would continue to play an active role. South Africa was increasingly frustrated because of the injustice of the treaty (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 260) and re-quested to keep developing the treaty in “[…] a balanced way“ (Goosen qtd. in Wunderlich et al. 2013: 260). Such balance aspects have subsequently been articulated by South African representatives (see at-tachment 1). This applicatory contestation became particularly evident in the negotiations in the UN-Security Council during the crises caused by the nuclear program of Iran. After the IAEA had ascertained the non-compli-ance of the NPT-rules by the Iran, South Africa tried to prevent the handover of the case to the UN-Secu-rity Council. After South Africa had been overruled in the IAEA, the state, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, strove for the prevention of sanctions against the Islamic Republic (Onderco 2012: 303f.). Also in this case, South Africa aimed at preserving the balance between the rights and obligations within the NPT (Landsberg/Monyae 2006: 140). Thabo Mbeki, then president, clarified in an interview that Iran could not be prohibited from the enrichment of uranium for peaceful use as a member of the NPT as long as proof was not provided that it was used for military purposes (cf. Mbeki 2007). South Africa urged the Islamic Republic again and again to comply with the NPT-regulations, but campaigned simul-taneously for the rights of the non-nuclear weapon stats, in this case for Iran:

“[…] we don’t wish to see a nuclear-weaponized Iran, neither did we want to deny the rights of any NPT signatory to exploit the peaceful applications of nuclear technology." (Kumalo 2007)

According to Onderco (2012: 307), the motivation for this behaviour can be found in the rejection of the western dominance within the NPT-regime:

“[…] the most important constitutive element of South African policy towards Iran is the countering of the North, and specifi-cally the US and its dominance in the interpretation of non-proliferation norms.”

The one-sided interpretation of the application of the norm of nuclear disarmament by western states, with the nuclear powers leading the way, cannot be accepted without any opposition because of the dis-tinct solidarity with the Global South and the impetus for justice of the South African foreign policy. Moreover, the South African behaviour shows the anti-western perspective and scepticism (cf. 3.2.1). But the applicatory contestation does not question the complete application of the norm as such. After South Africa had not seen a chance anymore to act as a bridge builder between Iran and the USA and Iran had not fulfilled the South African demands for transparency, South Africa, as a non-permanent member, voted in favour of the resolution 1747, in which the Iranian course of action was criticized and Iran was imposed with sanctions (Nieuwkerk 2007: 68f.).

4.1.3 Interim conclusion

The reconstruction of the contestation concerning the norm of nuclear disarmament shows that South Africa does not contradict the norm in its validity. On the contrary, the application of the norm within the NPT is the projection screen of South Africa’s contestation practice. South Africa wants to change the norm within the institutional framework of the NPT-regime. The contestation is only connected in an indirect way with a change of the structural status quo. Nevertheless, one has to object the research find-ings of Nel/Taylor/Westhuizen (2000: 49ff.), in which South Africa is blamed for its alleged advocacy of the current world order in a profitable way for the western states. They even go so far as to assume that

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South Africa’s policy is oriented towards the interests of the established powers: “Pretoria was in a morally strong position that enabled it […] defending the hegemonic order's interests“ (Nel/TaylorWesthuizen 2000: 49). In the light of the results of the reconstruction in chapter 3, this view can no longer be seen as true. South Africa aims for a balance between the different groups by means of the social practice as bridge builder indeed, but it connects this behaviour with a gradual and long-term change of the norm and the structure. What effect does this contestation have on the power of the norm? With recourse to the theoretical model, it can be stated that South Africa initiates learning processes in other actors and can trigger long-term modifications in norm application through its social practice. Even though radical changes in the appli-cation within the NPT are not likely, the validity of the norm of nuclear disarmament is strengthened by South Africa’s contestation. By contesting the norm application and questioning the nuclear structure, South Africa paves the long way towards more inclusive global structures.

4.2 South Africa and the right to veto of the UN-Security Council

After the investigation of the norm of disarmament, the case study of the right to veto of the Security Council of the United Nations will be in the focus of the analysis now. The foundation of the United Na-tions and the coming into force of the charter in October 1945 led to the implementation of the right to veto. The Security Council as an organ of the United Nations is not only a relevant decision-making body within the planetary system of the United Nations (Göthel 2000: 5), but it also is “[…] on the way to be-coming a world legislator“ (Scheuermann 2014: 64; Translation: TL) because of its extraordinary power in the international system. The charter of the United Nations mainly puts the responsibility for world peace and international security on the Security Council (Article 24). As a result, the UNSC achieves an unexampled character within the world community as it constitutes the only legitimate organ according to international law, which can take binding decisions, due to the universality of the United Nations (Ga-reis/Varwick 2014: 48). For these reasons, the Security Council, according to Bosco (2009: 1), is “[…] the world’s most elite and powerful diplomatic body“. Within the Security Council, the decision-making pro-cedures are mainly determined by the right to veto of the permanent members. Due to the described high relevance of the organ in the arrangement of the worldwide community of states, the legal norm is strongly contested by many actors. South Africa is not a permanent member of the Security Council and therefore, it does not dispose of the right to veto, but tries to modify and change the norm as a norm entrepreneur. In this case, too, the contestation of South Africa will be reconstructed in three empirical steps.

4.2.1 Genesis and content of the right to veto

The evolution of the right to veto is directly connected to the formation process of the United Nation during the Second World War. The Atlantic-Charter, which was presented in 1941, the formation of the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the “Declaration of the United Nations”, which was presented on 1 January 1 1942, were signs that the institutionalisation of the new world organisation was on its way. The founda-tion phase of the new organisation began when the UdSSR and China could also join the war alliance in the following years (Scheuermann 2014: 21f.). During that period, the conference of experts in Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 was of particular relevance. As discussing the fundamental structure and the principles of the new organisation was reserved for the Big Three (USA, Great Britain, Soviet Union) and China at first, the expert representatives of the four governments met in order to work on a joint proposal for a charter of the United Nations (Unser 2003: 23).On the basis of a proposal of the USA and after many informal consultations, the fundamental structure of the United Nations was agreed upon: A more dominant role of the great powers within the organisation should be established – with an “Executive Council”, in which the permanent members would get the right to veto. In addition, there was the consensus to also include

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France and China as permanent members besides the Big Three (Vogler 2008: 13). The involvement of the great powers by giving them a permanent seat should serve as a means to tackle problems of the interna-tional security, which had been ineffectively and insufficiently protected until that time (Andreae 2002: 9). Baring this in mind, the delegations agreed on the fact that the great powers “[…] were entitled to special positions on the Council by virtue of their exceptional responsibility for world security“ (Bosco 2009: 21) in Dumbarton Oaks. Furthermore, the veto was seen as a “safety valve” (Knight 2002: 28) to protect the United Nations from a political, military and economic over-commitment. Despite the progress in Dumbartion Oaks, many questions remained open. Especially the right to veto was one of the most controversially discussed points, which is why the final proposals of Dumbarton Oaks have not addressed that issue at any time (Scheuermann 2014: 25). Nevertheless, Luard (1982: 29) states with regard to this conference: “There was never at any stage any dissension about the general principle of the veto” (Luard 1982: 29). The core elements of the debates about the drafting of the right to veto were the demands of the UdSSR for a universal veto in all issues, which affect themselves, and the claim for inclusion of all Soviet republics as full members of the UN (Scheuermann 2014: 25). Only the meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in Jalta in February 1945 could solve the conflict about the drafting of the legal norm. The so-called Jalta-Formula came into existence as a compromise between the great powers: Roosevelt and Churchill allowed Stalin the full membership of the Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine, in return, Stalin voted in favour of the modified voting formula within the Security Council (Vogler 2008: 16). In this decision-making mechanism, a distinction has been made between procedural issues and non-procedural issues. In the case of non-procedural issues, which dealt with dispute resolution and securing of peace, seven out of eleven Security Council members, including all of the five veto powers, have to agree. However, in the case of procedural issues, decisions can be made through the approval of seven members. Here, the right to veto does not exist (Scheuermann 2014: 27; Andreae 2002: 11).

4.2.1.1 Implementation of the norm through the charter of the United Nations

The implementation and formalisation of the legal norm in the charter was put into effect at the founding conference in April 1945. In San Francisco, the structure of the Security Council and especially the right to veto for the permanent member was heavily criticized. However, the permanent members clarified their position very fast: “Without a veto, there would be no United Nations“ (Bosco 2009: 36). The Big Five made concessions to the other states with regard to the changes of the charter and the right of veto: A conference to revise the charter can called by means of a two-thirds majority and the veto of the five permanent members does not apply, contrary to the initial conception. However, the right to veto remains sacrosanct by way of the back door: The results of the review conferences have to be approved unani-mously by the permanent members to be legally binding (Vogler 2008: 23).7 On 25 June 1945, after having settled all discussion points, the charter was unanimously accepted. Through coming into effect of the charter on 24 October 1945, the United Nations were officially founded and the right to veto was embedded legally in the Security Council. The following facts are laid down in article 27 of the charter:

“1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. “ (UN 1945: 9)

Every permanent member of the Security Council has the right and the option to make decisions within this body if they do not affect procedural questions. Furthermore, the so-called P5 de-facto have a double

7 However, the right to veto also was contested in the group of the permanent members, see Luard (1982: 45ff) and Vogler (2008: 21)

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right to veto because they can also decide on the classification of procedural or technical questions by means of their veto (Löwe 2000: 607). Therefore, article 27 of the UN charter, in which the decision-making procedures of the Security Council are defined, constitutes the core element of the legal norm. As it was stated in chapter 3 of this article, its central point is also related to article 23. In this article, the permanent members are defined by name and the right to veto is assigned to them:

“1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council […]“ (UN 1945: 8)

Through the nomination of the so-called Permanent Five in this article, a wide range of power is ascribed to the states because only the Security Council can make legally binding decisions under international law. In addition, a far-reaching regulatory function is inherent in this article. The clear distinction be-tween permanent and non-permanent members determines the decision-making structure of the world organization (Knight 2002: 28). Thus, the right to veto is not only a legal norm, which includes the deci-sion-making rules with regard to resolutions taken in the Security Council, but it also implies a two-part structure within the organization. This has significant effects on the contestation potential of the norm (see 4.2.2). This finding is central for the analysis of the norm entrepreneurial activity. The norm itself also includes the explicit nomination of the five permanent members – the validity of the norm is there-fore also linked to the P-5 and it is contested if an actor wants to change this composition.

4.2.1.2 Application of the right to veto

The enhancement of the potential for contestation also originates from the application of the legal norm. Especially in the time of the East-West conflict, the right to veto was used again and again to prevent disagreeable decisions in the Security Council (cf. Malone 2007: 120ff.). Because of this excessive appli-cation of the veto, the Security Council increasingly lost its political legitimation. Through the continuous prevention of decisions, the perception of the other member states arose that the right to veto only serves the interests of the P-5: “[I]t perceives that the Council has acted in ways that are unjust, unfair, improper, or not in keeping with the promise an spirit of the UN Charter“ (Knight 2002: 24). This perception takes place on two levels. On the one hand, the concrete application of the right to veto is questioned in every single case. On the other hand, this contestation leads to a general questioning of the validity of the norm itself.

4.2.2 Potential for contestation

As it was shown in the reconstruction, the potential for contestation of the right to veto becomes evident above all in the regulatory function of the legal norm. Reform efforts have concentrated on the classifica-tion into permanent and non-permanent members for decades. Due to the falling legitimization during the Cold War caused by the blockade of UNSC through the veto usage by the USA and the Soviet Union, the member states of the United Nations aimed again and again for a reform of the Security Council and of the right to veto. Until now only one reform has been successful: In 1963, the number of non-permanent members increased from six to ten. In the 90s, the reform debate was intensified and by means of the Razali-Plan the first step towards restructuring was made in 1997 (Wunderlich 2009: 8). After the initial impulse, the different models were elaborated and many groups of states were formed to shape the reform according to their needs (Rittberger/Baumgärtner 2006: 49; cf. Blum 2005). In this debate, Scheuermann (2014: 78f.) differentiates two kinds of reform attempts with respect to the Security Council. They are either related to the working methods of the Council or to the categories of membership. As shown above, the potential for contestation of the legal norm mainly concentrates on the question of veto (Binder/Heupel 2014: 2). The classification into permanent and non-permanent

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members is in conflict with the norm of sovereignty and equality between the members, as it is laid down in the charter of the United Nations (cf. UN 1945: Art. 2). A specific potential for contestation arises from this norm conflict. Because of the implementation of the right to veto, dominance structures emerged within which the five veto powers enjoy a much higher position than the other members of the world order.

4.2.3 South Africa’s argumentation and social practice

After having analysed the potential for contestation of the right to veto, the focus will now be put on the South African handling with the legal norm. South Africa could develop aspiration for a seat in the Secu-rity Council only after the end of Apartheid because it had been excluded to a large extent form the inter-national community until 1994, as described above. The Rainbow Nation managed to become a non-per-manent member of the Security Council for the first time under Thabo Mbeki in the year 2007. On 12 October 2010, South Africa was elected into the powerful body for a second period for the years 2011-2012 with an overwhelming majority of 182 to 190 votes (Serrão 2011: 2). The opinions about this very fast re-election, which was supported by the majority, differ: On the one hand, it is seen as a recommendation for a permanent seat in the Security Council and on the other hand, the behaviour of South Africa in these two terms is seen as counterproductive for the achievement of the status as a veto power (Naidu/Connolly 2013: 19). Nevertheless, South Africa’s behaviour clearly goes beyond an applicatory contestation. South Africa had tried to achieve a reform of the Security Council in an institutional way since 2005. Thereby, the aim is to claim for a permanent seat. This behaviour and the argumentation connected with it will be reconstructed in the following.

4.2.3.1 South Africa’s efforts for a reform of the Security Council

South Africa’s multilateral efforts for a permanent seat began relatively late. Only when the African rival Nigeria made an unexpected claim for a permanent seat in the debate in the General Assembly 2004 did South Africa respond fast: After having returned from New York, Mbeki announced South Africa’s ambi-tion for a permanent seat: “South Africa is ready to serve the people in Africa and the people of the world in the Security Council” (Mbeki qtd. in FAZ 2004; Translation: TL). With these announcements both states, Nigeria and South Africa, disengaged themselves from the previous consensus of the African Un-ion. In September 1994 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the AU, had agreed on a proposal, which provided two seats for Africa. These seats should be rotated among the African states (Fröhlich/Hüfner/Märker 2005: 28). By doing so, the right the veto was questioned by the Africans for the first time:

“Ultimately, with the progress in the democratization of the international system, permanent membership and the right of veto would be reviewed […]” (UN 1996b: 14)

Therefore, the OAU strove for the abolishment of the veto. All members of the Security Council should be approved through regular elections. Permanent members would be obsolete in such a system. This draft directly challenged the validity of the legal norm. True, South Africa adopted this view until the above described announcement in the year 2004, but the South African government was only marginally in-volved in inner-African discussions in September 1994. South Africa got multilaterally active again when democratic elections took place in 1994 and it joined the OAU only in June 1994. This break with the continental position is symptomatic for the South African efforts for a place in the UNSC as the foreign policy dilemma began when the objectives to achieve a seat with veto were articulated in 2004. On the one hand, there was the expressed intention to receive a seat with right to veto. On the other hand South, Africa was subject to the decisions of the OAU and AU respectively.

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As a reaction to the proposal of the G-4 group8, the African countries agreed on a proposal in Ezulwini, Swaziland in March 2005, which comprised plans for two permanent and five non-permanent seats for Africa (Blum 2005: 648). This agreement, which is labelled Ezulwini-Consensus, was affirmed once again in the Sirte Declaration of the Reform of the United Nation only four month later (cf. AU 2005: 1). The special feature of the African proposal is the allocation of the seats with a right of veto. From the African point of view, the right to veto should be abolished in general, but until that would happen it should also be transferred to the new permanent members (Freiesleben 2013: 7). According to Pietz, (2007: 36) this pro-posal lacks political appropriateness. At that time, the plight of the South African foreign policy reached its peak because the Ezulwini-Consensus records that the African Union should be responsible for the allocation of the permanent seats. South Africa is seen as a “hot” candidate for one of the African seats indeed, nevertheless, Pretoria could not be sure as the decision on permanent seats would be made in Addis Ababa (Naidu/Connolly 2013: 23). Moreover, the allocation of the permanent seats by the African Union was not further specified, in the current debate on the African continent, the majority is for a ro-tation (Naidu 2012: 34). As more and more demands were articulated by other African states like Nigeria, Egypt or Kenia, South Africa’s uneasiness with the African proposal was increased. South Africa aimed at pushing the negotiations forward to find a pragmatic and realizable solution after especially India had pressed for negotiation of the G-4 with the African Union. Together with Nigeria South, Africa tried with-out success to convince the African states to give up their rigours claims for the right to veto (Freiesleben 2013: 8). After the failed attempt to unify the African position with the G-4, South Africa began to promote the reform of the legal norm within the framework of IBSA. India, Brazil and South Africa put forward the L69-proposal in the General Assembly in order to revitalise the reform of the Security Council, which was stagnant. In recent years, it can be observed that South Africa is turning more and more towards the G-4-group to achieve the aim of a permanent seat. Together with the G-4, South Africa drafted for example an open letter to the chairman of the Reform Working Group, which was signed by 138 states. In this letter, South Africa urged him to push the reform process (Swart 2013: 34). The insistence on reviewing the Ezulwini Consensus by Jacob Zuma at the AU summit in January 2014 also has to be viewed in this light (Gowan/Gorden 2014: 18). Accordingly, South Africa tries to achieve the political aim in a pragmatic way. In this regard, Swart (2013: 34) states:

“[…] South Africa restated their more flexible stances initially made in 2005 about the right of veto, clearly breaking with the Ezulwini Consensus.”

4.2.3.2 Justificatory contestation

Albeit the foreign policy dilemma described above, South Africa seeks to receive a permanent seat in the Security Council. It is irrelevant whether the aim will be achieved by means of a reform and the realisation of the unlikely African model or whether South Africa alone will get a seat: In both cases, the legal norm is questioned in its validity. The following reconstruction of the discursive argumentation attempts to uncover the basis in which the norm entrepreneurship of South Africa is rooted. The dilemma, which was identified above, can be explained if the justificatory contestation is related to the reconstructed demands (see chapter 3) for a more inclusive world order.

African Leadership As it was shown in the analysis in chapter 3.2.2, an increasing normative claim for a South African lead-ership on the African continent developed because of Mbeki’s African Renaissance agenda. This is also reflected in the qualitative analysis of the South African government statements (see attachment 2). South 8 In 2005, Japan, India, Brazil and Germany as the G-4 group presented a joint reform proposal (cf. Choeden 2007; Greubel 2015). The four states and two more African states should get a permanent seat each. Asia, Latin America and East Europe should also get one additional non-permanent seat each (cf. UN 2005: 3f.).

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Africa combines with the contestation of the right to veto a claim to leadership in order to resolve the injustices in the Security Council to the African continent. This objective is explained by Ebrahim I, the Deputy Minister of International Relations. Ebrahim I said with regard to the reform of the Security Council: “[…] to advance and strengthen the African Agenda, our flagship foreign policy, in this world body“ (Ebrahim 2012). Thereby, the African claim to leadership is substantiated by arguments of justice in the reform (Melber 2014: 136). According to this, the impetus for justice of the South African foreign policy, which was laid down in point 3.3, has a strong effect. The central aims of South Africa are to achieve an equal treatment of all nations of the world in the Security Council and to establish more inclusive structures in the inter-national system in order to secure Africa’s place in the Global Governance (Bischoff 2009: 98). President Zuma combines this situation, which is perceived by South Africa as unjust, with the underrepresentation of Africa in the Security Council in a speech at the General Assembly in the year 2013:

“Its current composition has a propensity for deadlock and paralysis even in the face of crisis. It remains un-representative and undemocratic in both its composition and decision making. We would like to see a more meaningful representation of Africa in the UN Security Council. About 70 percent of the agenda of the UN Security Council is taken up by issues from the African continent.” (Zuma 2013)

This argumentation had already been presented in a similar way by the permanent representative of South Africa in the General Assembly in 2000: “African decision-makers have not been afforded equal represen-tation on the highest decision-making Organ on conflict prevention“ (Kumalo 2001: 136). South Africa denies the validity of the legal norm by emphasizing the unequal treatment of the African continent in the Security Council. South Africa manoeuvres itself into a tricky situation because of this argumentation. The Rainbow Nation has to support the decisions of the African Union, which were agreed upon in a consensual manner in order to remain credible as self-proclaimed representative of Africa in global forums. In this respect South Africa was part of the Ezulwini-Consenus decision as a member of the AU and has committed itself to it in its official Strategic Plan 2005-2008:

“South Africa is committed to the equitable representation of Africa in the UNSC and is bound by the African Common Position (the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’) that was adopted by the AU Executive Council in March 2005.” (DFA 2005: 57)

However, if South Africa broke up with the proposal of the AU, the justification of a permanent seat would lose its base (cf. Serrao 2011: 3). The South African leadership qualities can only be demonstrated in a convincing manner if they are coordinated with the African majority. The African leadership argumentation explains the influence of the Rainbow Nation on the change. The behaviour of South Africa with regard to the intended change and the “African” position in the dilemma can be understood if one takes into consideration South Africa’s perception as an African leading state in connection to its intrinsic awareness of injustice.

South Africa as legitimate veto power Besides the argumentation that South Africa should be included in the Security Council as representative of Africa, the permanent seat is justified more frequently by the new international weight of the country. The demands for a more inclusive world order, as reconstructed in point 3.2.3, are characterized by the perception as emerging power. Through the commitment within the Club Governance in conjunction with the economic rise, South Africa could achieve a higher international status. The impetus for justice, which is characterized by that, has effects on the justificatory contestation of right to veto. After the South Af-rican president had expressed his demands for a permanent seat in the 2004, as described above, the own claims and interests were articulated. The reference to Africa was completed through the emphasis of the own legitimation for a seat. Nevertheless, the African argumentation still is very dominant and therefore is not displaced (Cornelissen 2009: 21). Nkoana-Mashabane, the current foreign minister, justifies the candidature for a permanent seat by high-lighting the international weight of South Africa: According to him, South Africa has always promoted

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peace and security nationally as well as internationally – Nkoana-Mashabane thereby refers to South Af-rica’s participation at peace operations of the UN and the AU. He added that the Rainbow Nation was a forerunner with regard to the economic and social development (Nkoana-Mashabane 2010). Baso Sangqu, the African UN ambassador, also highlighted the achievements in the international system:

“South Africa’s leadership role and significant contribution to the work of the Council on African issues particularly on Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Mali and Libya and its principled position on the Middle East and Western Sahara is well recog-nised.” (Sangqu 2013)

The discursive underpinning of the argumentation, which is constructed in this or a similar way, can also be found in further statements and announcements of the South African government (see attachment 2). An argumentation put forward in this way has to be viewed in the light of the practices mentioned above and constitutes a justificatory contestation. Therefore, South Africa increasingly tries to break away from the Ezulwini-Consensus and to work together with the G-4. The fact that South Africa is subordinated to the Ezulwini-Consensus, which is laid down above in the citation of the Strategic Plan of 2005, was not repeated in the following Strategic Plan for the years 2011-2014 and in the Strategic Plan 2015-2020 as well (cf. DFA 2011; DFA 2015).

4.2.4 Interim conclusion

The norm validity of the right to veto is questioned by the norm entrepreneur South Africa. South Africa strives for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations and therefore contests the core of the right to veto. The Rainbow Nation opposes the regulatory function of the legal norm and questions the division into permanent and non-permanent members. As already indicated in the theory, usually stable norms can also be examined with the help of the theoretical model and the possible types of con-testation. A Security Council reform including a revision of the right to veto will not be realised in the near future – the norm is embedded stably in the structure of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the jus-tificatory contestation, which was identified above, could lay bare the activities of the norm entrepreneur undertaken in order to promote a change of the right to veto. This justificatory contestation weakens the norm. As shown in the theoretical elaboration, this type of contestation is connected with a long-term weakening. South Africa questions the norm in its core – and therefore its legitimacy decreases in the long run. Although the international norm is stable, the multi-lateral efforts to reform the Security Council and the constant articulation of the injustices in the right to veto trigger learning processes in the international community and generate more and more pressure to finally realise the transformation of the Security Council.

5. Summary

Just structures, inclusive character of the international system, equal participation, sovereign equality between the actors: these are the features which should characterize an inclusive world order in the eyes of South Africa. South Africa pursues these aims in order to change the established structures of the in-ternational system and to free them from the dominance structures. In this respect, the country can be seen as a promoter of a more inclusive world order. The following findings result from this study. The two empirical case studies show that the Emerging Powers try to implement their demands for a more inclu-sive world order. They promote the change of the established norms in a proactive way by questioning discursively either the application of a norm, as in the case of nuclear disarmament, or even the validity of the right to veto itself. With the help of the theoretical model, which was elaborated specially for the present research question, the influence of the actor on the two norms could be empirically grasped (see chapter 2). On the basis of the contestation approach, it was possible to define Norm entrepreneurs and to implement them in the

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theoretical model. By incorporating the general approach of Deitelhoff/Zimmermann (2013) into the model, the discursive influence of the norm entrepreneurs could be grasped theoretically and empirically (see chapter 2). In this way, first research question of how the change generated by the norm entrepreneur South Africa can be theoretically grasped can be answered. Against this theoretical background, the constitution of the demands for a more inclusive world order can be presented in detail. Over the years, South Africa has developed a very strong and normatively charged impetus for justice, which constituted itself on the basis of normative and material factors. The factors reconstructed in in chapter 3 set the basis for the empirical analysis of the cases. In both cases, the norms have a global regulatory function, which is contested by South Africa. In the case of nuclear disarmament an applicatory contestation could be reconstructed and in the case of the right to veto a justificatory one. These two case examples help to answer the second research question. The reconstruc-tion of the argumentation and social practices showed how South Africa campaigns for a more inclusive world order with regard to the Security Council reform and a reform of the condition of the NPT-regime. Can South Africa be seen as a relevant Norm Entrepreneur towards a (from its perception) more inclusive normative order in the international system? This third research question requires a differentiated an-swer. Despite the influence of the norm entrepreneur (and others), the norms are still firmly embedded in the international system. The contested application of nuclear disarmament in the NPT-regime was ex-tended for an unlimited period. Also in the future a radical change towards a more inclusive contract design seems unlikely. The same is applicable to the right to veto. Not for nothing is the Security Council reform called a never-ending story (Scheuermann 2014: 78). Can one speak of a relevant norm entrepre-neurship due to this resistance to change? On the basis of this study, this question can be affirmed. The answer of the research question is in direct correlation to the innovation of the theoretical approach: Norms are not ontologized as stable anymore and the reconstruction of the contestation via norm entre-preneurs does not only take aim at the facticity of a norm, but also at its validity and legitimation. There-fore, the analysis is located on a different level. Because of this, South Africa is a relevant norm entrepre-neur. It contests the validity or the application through its social practice in the major multilateral forums of the international system. The articulation of their demands for a more inclusive world order do not blow out in the forums of the world community, but they can decrease the validity of the norm and its application in the long run. South Africa can also trigger learning processes in the other actors through its discursive contestation, which can also cause long-term changes. To sum up, South Africa can therefore be seen as a promoter of a more inclusive world order. The impres-sion that southern states and especially African states are not relevant actors in the international system, which originates from the lack of research about the actor quality of countries of the Global South, can be objected as a result of this study. Nevertheless, this perspective must be widened by means of further research: More southern actors have to be included into the analysis and more international norms have to serve as case examples. Future research has to focus primarily on structure elements other than inter-national norms in order to draw a more precise picture of the dominance structures of the international system.

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Attachment 1: South African government statements about nuclear disarmament

In all below-mentioned South African statements the argumentation, which is explained in point 4.1.2, is visible and could be reconstructed. The demands for a balance between the obligations of nuclear powers and the non-nuclear weapon states. Legend: Distinctive features of the argumentation: A = Recourse on the normative foundation of the foreign policy by Nelson Mandela B = Bridge Builder-function: Attempt to mediate between the groups C = Commitment to the NPT-treaty

Grey = High-Level Statements of the South Afican president or the foreign minister

Statement on Cluster 3 (Peaceful uses of nuclear energy) 3rd Prepcom for the 2015 Revcon 05.05.2014 C

Statement by H.E: Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko at the Third Preparatory Committe Session for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.1

28.04.2014 A; C

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Statement by South Africa Cluster II Safeguards, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones

29.04.2013 B;C

Joint Statement delivered by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations in Geneva on: “The humanitarian impact of nuclear weap-ons”, at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 24 April 20132

24.04.2013

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Statement by South Africa, General Debate.3

22.04.2013 B;C

Draft South African Statement at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Confer-ence of the NPT, Cluster I Specific Issue – Negative Security Assurances4 04.05.2012 C

44

Statement by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, Resident Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the IAEA, First Preparators Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, Cluster I Nu-clear Disarmament, Vienna5

03.05.2012 C

Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samd Minty, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the UN in Geneva and to other International Organisations in Switzerland on Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, First Preparators Committee for the 2015 Review Confer-ence6

30.04.2012 C

Statement by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo Resident Representative of the Government of the Republic of South Africa to the IAEA First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Confer-ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons7

30.04.2012

Opening remarks by His Excellency President Zuma during courtesy call by President Hu Jintao of The People's Republic of China on the Sidelines of The Nuclear Summit Seoul, South Korea8 26.03.2012

Statement by H. E. Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the Conference on Disarmament 01.09.2011 B

Statement by Ambassador Jerry Matjila South African Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva on Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and secu-rity in Main Committee 1 of the 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons9

07.05.2010

Statement by Ambassador Abdul S. Minty, Special Representative for Disarmament and NEPAD at the South African Department for International Relations and Cooperation during the General Debate of the 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 5 May 201010

05.05.2010 B

Statement by Ambassador Leslie Gumbi during the General Debate, Third Session of the Pre-paratory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York.11

04.05.2009 C

Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty special Representative for Disarmament of For-eign Affairs Republic of South Africa ar the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons Agenda Item 4: General Debate on Issues Related to all Aspects of the Work of the Preparatory Committee12

28.04.2008 B;C

NPT Prepatory Committee Cluster 1 Specific Issue13 2008

Statement by the Republic of South Africa on Nuclear Disarmament (Main Committee I), New York, 2-27 May 200514

02-27.05.2005

Statement by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty Special Represenative of Disarmamemenr at the Dapartment of Foreign Affairs Republic of South Africa at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna15

08.05.2007 B

Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, at the Opening of the Plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Cape Town, 19 April 200716

19.04.2007

Draft Statement on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons17 2007

Statement by the Republic of South Africa an Nuclear Disarmement (Main Committee I)18 19.05.2005

Speech of President Tbabo Mbeki at the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York, September 20, 1999. 20.09.1999

45

Attachment 2: South African government statements about the right to veto

In all below-mentioned South African statements the argumentation, which is explained in point 4.2.3, is visible and could be reconstructed. Legend: Distinctive features of the argumentation: A = Claim to leadership in Africa B = International influence/relevance of South Africa C = Reference on justice

Grey = High-Level Statements of the South Afican president or the foreign minister

Statement by President Jacob Zuma at the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly Hall, United Nations, New York19 28.09.2015 A;C

Statement by Ambassador JM Matjila Director-General, DIRCO and BRICS Sherpa BRICS For-eign / International Relations Ministers’ Meeting on the margins of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA70), New York20

29.09.2015 C

Remarks by Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Chair of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G77+China at the 39th Annual Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77+China, United Nations Headquarters, New York21

24.09.2015 C

Speech by South African Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr Luwellyn Landers, at the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid, Spain on 09 April 2015 entitled: “South Africa’s foreign policy priorities for the 21st century”.22

09.04.2015 B;C

Statement delivered on the occasion of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly General Debate by President Jacob Zuma, New York, USA, 24 September 201423 24.09.2014 C

Statement of the President of the Republic of South Africa, His Excellency Mr Jacob Zuma, to the General Debate of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, UN Headquarters, New York, USA24

24.09.2013 C

South Africa successfully concludes its second term on the United Nations Security Council25 02.01.2013 A;B

Statement by Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Af-rica at the Joint Debate of the UN General Assembly on the “Report of the Security Council” and “Reform of the Security Council”26

15.11.2012 C

Statement by President Jacob Zuma of the Republic of South Africa to the General Debate of the 67th Session of the General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2012 25.09.2012 C

Statement by President Jacob Zuma to the General Debate of the 66th United Nations General Assembly, UN Headquarters, New York, 21 September 2011.27 21.09.2011 A;C

Address by Mr Marius Fransman, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation during a Panel discussion on South Africa’s Second Term on the UN Security Council - expecta-tions, objectives and challenges, Centre of Mediation and the Centre for Human Rights Univer-sity of Pretoria, Wednesday, 30 March 201128

30.03.2011 A;B;C

46

South Africa takes up its Seat on the United Nations Security Council, media briefing: Minister Nnkoana-Mashabane, 5 January 201129 05.01.2011 A

Speech by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane at the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) and the Department of Political Sciences (University of Pretoria) Seminar on "South Af-rica's Second Term as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council".30

15.10.2010 B;C

Statement by H .E. Ms M. Nkoana-Mashabane Minister of International Relations and Coopera-tion of the Republic of South Africa at the General Debate of the 65th Session of the United Na-tions General Assembly, New York.31

25.09.2010 A;B;C

South Africa’s lobbying for the non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2011 to 2012 gains momentum32 23.09.2010 B

The African Union Summit endorses South Africa’s candidature for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the period 2011 to 201233 02.02.2010 B

Address by the President of the Republic of South Africa His Excellency Mr Jacob Zuma to the 64th United Nations General Assembly Debate, New York, USA, 23 September 200934 23.09.2009 A;C

Speech by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Aziz Pahad at the South African Institute of International Affairs - Western Cape Branch 20 February 2007, South Africa in the UN Security Council35

20.02.2007 C

Address of the President of South Africa and the current Chairperson of the G77 and China, Thabo Mbeki at the 61st Session of United Nations General Assembly 19 September 2006, New York

19.09.2006 C

Address at the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly 23 September 200336 23.09.2003 C

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