CREW v. DOJ: Re: Valerie Plame: 7/1/09 - DOJ's Supplemental Memorandum (Lanny Breuer Declaration) (Document 17)

8/7/2019 CREW v. DOJ: Re: Valerie Plame: 7/1/09 - DOJ's Supplemental Memorandum (Lanny Breuer Declaration) (Document

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The Courts Order also directed DOJ to submit the three documents listed in its Vaughn1

index to the Court forin camera review, and to file appropriate declarations. DOJ is submitting

the three documents to the Court today. Material that is exempt pursuant to Exemptions 1, 2, 3,

5 (deliberative process), and/or 5 (Presidential communications privilege) is bracketed with the

appropriate exemption(s) annotated in the margin. Declarations setting forth the bases for each

of these exemptions as well as Exemption 7(A), Exemption 5 (law enforcement privilege), and

Exemption 5 (work product privilege) are attached. The law enforcement privilege and

Exemption 7(A) apply to the documents in their entirety. Work product privilege applies to the

typed written outline of questions (but not the handwritten notes of answers) on one of the sets of

notes.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND )

ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, )

)Plaintiff )

) No. 1:08-cv-01468 (EGS)

v. ) Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan

)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________ )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICES SUPPLEMENTAL

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the Courts direction at the June 18, 2009 hearing and the Courts Order of

June 20, 2009, the United States Department of Justice submits this Supplemental Memorandum

to address (1) two cases identified by the Court at the hearing and (2) known instances of senior

White House officials engaging in interviews with law enforcement investigators outside the

presence of the grand jury.1

Case 1:08-cv-01468-EGS Document 17 Filed 07/01/2009 Pag


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A reasonable probability is clearly sufficient to meet the reasonably anticipated2

standard for application of Exemption 7(A). Indeed, courts have indicated that Exemption 7(A)

is applicable even with a substantially lower showing. See, e.g., Bevis v. Dept of State, 801 F.2d

1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Exemption 7(A) appropriate where the court cannot discount the

2

I. Sussman v. United States Marshals Service and Antonelli v. Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives

A. Sussman and Specific Information About the Impact of the Disclosures

In Sussman v. United States Marshals Service, 494 F.3d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the D.C.

Circuit reiterated the basic principles of Exemption 7(A):

Exemption 7(A) covers materials compiled for law enforcement purposes whose

disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement

proceedings. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The enforcement proceedings need not

be currently ongoing; it suffices for them to be reasonably anticipated.

Mapother v. DOJ, 3 F.3d 1533, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted).

494 F.3d at 1113-14.

The court went on to note that to successfully assert Exemption 7(A), an agency

declaration must contain specific information about the impact of the disclosures on pending

or reasonably anticipated law enforcement proceedings. Id. at 1114. In this matter, both the

formal letter from Attorney General Mukasey and the Declaration of the Assistant Attorney

General currently in charge of DOJs Criminal Division, Lanny A. Breuer, set forth such specific

information about the impact of the disclosures sought by plaintiff.

As Mr. Breuer states, given the history of law enforcement investigations that have

involved obtaining information from senior White House officials, the Department of Justice

believes that there is a reasonable probability of future law enforcement investigations by the

Department of Justice that will require and benefit from obtaining information from White

House officials, possibly at the highest level of government. Breuer Decl. 2. Mr. Breuer2



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prospect of future law enforcement proceedings within the class of proceedings that would be

impacted by disclosure); Hildago v. FBI, 541 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (D.D.C. 2008) (An ongoing

search for and possible future trials of indicted and unindicted fugitives satisfies that

[concreteness] standard, even if the possibility of actual prosecution is ultimately remote.).

3

further explains that [a] non-public interview can be particularly important in gaining the

cooperation of senior-level White House officials given the public role of such witnesses, the

sensitive nature of the subject matters that may be discussed, the potential politicization of these

sensitive issues, and the possibility that whatever matter is being investigated ultimately may not

warrant any law enforcement action. Id. 4. [I]f law enforcement interviews of the President,

Vice President or other senior White House officials become subject to routine public disclosure,

even upon the conclusion of an investigation, there is an increased likelihood that such officials

could feel reluctant to participate in voluntary interviews or, if they agree to such voluntary

interviews, could decline to answer questions on certain topics. Id. 5; accordMukasey letter,

at 4 (attached as Bradbury Decl. Ex. B) (Were future Presidents, Vice Presidents or White

House staff to perceive that such voluntary cooperation would create records that would likely be

made available to Congress (and then possibly disclosed publicly outside of judicial proceedings

such as a trial), there would be an unacceptable risk that such knowledge could adversely impact

their willingness to cooperate fully and candidly in a voluntary interview.); see also United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (Human experience teaches that those who expect

public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for

appearances . . . .).

As Mr. Breuer further states, [a] White House officials reluctance to submit voluntarily

to an interview or share certain information in an interview could hamper an investigation in



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4

several important ways. Breuer Decl. 6;accordMukasey letter, at 4 (Such a result would

significantly impair the Departments ability to conduct future law enforcement investigations

that would benefit from full White House cooperation.). For example, obtaining information

through interviews early in an investigation often assists law enforcement agents in obtaining

important background information, help[s] law enforcement investigators determine where to

concentrate or focus the investigation, and may obviate the need to convene a grand jury at all

or circumscribe the focus of the grand jurys inquiry. Breuer Decl. 6. A law enforcement

investigation based upon interviews subject to an expectation of confidentiality also benefits

from senior officials more inclined to provide identifiable leads, name percipient witnesses, offer

credibility assessments of the accuser or other witnesses, and even articulate inferences, insight

or hunches that can be invaluable to a law enforcement investigator. Id. Additionally, if a

senior White House official were to require the investigators to go through the grand jury

process, [s]uch a decision could impose considerable practical difficulties and burdens upon

investigators and prosecutors that at best could prolong investigations and at worst thwart

investigations. Id. 7.

Mr. Breuer also expresses a concern about politicization of law enforcement

investigations: In addition, forcing White House officials to be brought before grand juries

could have the effect of injecting the law enforcement investigation itself into the political

process, which could intrude upon government operations at the highest level of government,

and which could risk the perception that the investigation itself was political, thus undermining

public faith in the impartiality of the judicial system. Baseless, partisan allegations that easily

could be investigated and dismissed through voluntary interviews now may have to be



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Pursuant to the Courts Order, DOJ is also submitting two additional declarations3

providing support for the invocation of the other applicable exemptions (i.e., other than

Exemption 7(A) and the law enforcement privilege that is incorporated into FOIA via Exemption

5). See Declaration of David J. Barron; Declaration of Ralph S. DiMaio. Because the Courts

directives regarding supplemental briefing were limited to certain discrete topics, DOJ does not

discuss these declarations here, except to note that the Barron Declaration explains the

applicability of two exemptions that were not discussed in the Bradbury Declaration

Exemption 2 which protects purely administrative information and the work product privilege

(through Exemption 5) which protects the question outline prepared by the Special Counsel.

While these exemptions should have been asserted in Mr. Bradburys declaration, seeMaydak v.

United States Dept of Justice, 218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000), this inadvertent error does not

prevent the Court from considering them now, seeSenate of Puerto Rico v. United StatesDept

of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, J.) (affirming District

Courts consideration of exemption that, while not raised in initial filing, was raised prior to the

District Courts entry of judgment).

5

investigated through the specter of the grand jury process. In addition, if law enforcement

interviews are routinely subject to public disclosure, there could be a significant risk of

politicization of law enforcement files and investigation, which could undermine the integrity

and effectiveness of, and public confidence in, those investigations. Id. 8.3

B.Antonelli and Concrete Prospective Law Enforcement Investigations

In Antonelli v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. Civ. A. 04-1180,

2005 WL 3276222 (Aug. 16, 2005), the court addressed the meaning of reasonably anticipated

in the Mapother7(A) analysis, stating that [r]easonably anticipated means a concrete

prospective law enforcement proceeding. 2005 WL 326222, at *4 (quotingBevis v. Dept of

State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). TheAntonelli court did not specify the meaning of

concrete in this analysis. It did, however, find that the anticipated proceedings in the case

before it were sufficiently concrete for Exemption 7(A) to apply. The court further found that

the agencys declaration stating, inter alia, that release could . . . discourage future witnesses

from cooperating with ATF presented a proper justification for invoking Exemption 7(A).



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While DOJ has endeavored to find as many law enforcement interviews of senior White4

House officials as possible, we cannot assure the Court that this is a comprehensive list.

Additionally, DOJ has only identified in this public filing those interviewees that the Department

6

Id. at *4 (quoting agency declaration).

While Antonelli does not discuss the meaning of the term concrete, the recent D.C.

Circuit case ofBoyd v. Criminal Division, 475 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2007), makes it clear that

establishing concreteness does not require identification of a particular statute that has been

violated or a particular crime that has been committed. See id. at 386. Rather, there the court

found sufficient specificity in the agencys generalized identification of the targets of the

investigation: individuals . . . to some degree, related [to], controlled [by], or influenced by

the plaintiff. Id. (quoting agency declaration) (alterations in original). This suggests that

sufficient concreteness is present where a class of potential investigations is described with

sufficient specificity. Here, while there is no identification of the targets, there is an

identification of a narrow, specified class of criminal investigations those that require

assistance from senior White House officials, including possibly the President and the Vice

President that could reasonably be expected to be impeded by release of the documents at issue

here. And, as DOJs earlier discussion ofMapother v. Department of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), demonstrates, identification of a class of prospective proceedings, even in the

absence of an identification of specific targets, is sufficient to meet the reasonably anticipated

standard, under Exemption 7(A). See Docket No. 11, at 5-6.

II. Prior Interviews of Senior White House Officials

DOJ is aware of the following interviews of senior White House officials conducted by

law enforcement investigators outside the grand jury:4



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has confirmed have previously been publicly disclosed. If the court requires DOJ to submit a

filing discussing interviews that the Department has not previously made public, the Department

requests the opportunity to do so in camera.

7

As part of the Iran-Contra investigation, then-Vice President Bush was interviewed by

the FBI. See I Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Ch. 28.

National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane was interviewed by the Independent Counsel. See

id. Ch. 1. Former White House Chief of Staff (and then-Attorney General) Edwin Meese III was

interviewed by the Independent Counsel. See id. Ch. 31. White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray

was interviewed by the Independent Counsel. See Walter Pincus, Past Attorney-Client Issue

Resonates, Wash. Post, A3 (June 7, 1997). Former President Reagan was interviewed by the

Independent Counsel in 1992. See I Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra

Matters, Part II:9.

Former President George H. W. Bush and former Vice President Quayle were

interviewed as part of the investigation into possible access to the passport file of then-Governor

Bill Clinton while he was running for President. See I Final Report of the Independent Counsel

In Re: Janet G. Mullins, 378.

As part of the investigation into the death of Vincent Foster, numerous White House

officials were interviewed, including President Clinton, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton,

White House Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty, Assistants to the President Bruce Lindsey, John

Podesta, Ricki Seidman, and George Stephanopoulos, and former White House Counsel Bernard

Nussbaum. See Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: Vincent W. Foster, Jr., at 3.

Nussbaum was also interviewed as part of the investigation related to the White House Travel

Office. See Report of the Independent Counsel In Re: David Watkins, at 194.



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For the vast majority of these interviews, no transcript, FBI 302 report, or similar5

summary has been released to the public. The transcript of President Reagans 1992 interview is

available to the public at the National Archives and Records Administration. This interview,

which occurred approximately four years after President Reagan left office contains little

information about White House or other governmental activity. FBI 302 reports of the

interviews of President Clinton and Vice President Gore by the Campaign Finance Task Force

were provided to a Congressional committee by the Department of Justice. DOJ does not know

whether these reports were released to the public by Congress. DOJ is not aware of any other

interview transcript or report listed above having been released to the public.

8

Associate Counsel to the President William Kennedy III was interviewed as part of the

investigation into the Whitewater land deal. See III Final Report of the Independent Counsel In

Re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Assn, Part E.

The Campaign Finance Task Force interviewed President Clinton, Vice President Gore,

and Senior Presidential Advisor Harold Ickes. See Tenth Report by the Committee on

Government Reform, H.R. Rep. 106-1027, at 149 (December 13, 2000).

As part of the investigation that led to the creation of the documents at issue here, Special

Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald interviewed White House officials, including President George W.

Bush, Vice President Cheney, White House of Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security

Advisor Condaleeza Rice, Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Senior Advisor to

the President Karl Rove, Counselor to the President Dan Bartlett, White House Press Secretary

Scott McClellan, and Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis Libby. See Draft Report of

the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, at 4 (attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs

Opposition Mem.).5

The above interviews of senior White House officials in various administrations

demonstrate that there is a reasonably probability of future instances in which investigators will

want or need to interview such officials. Regarding these interviews, the Department of Justice



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At the June 18 hearing, plaintiffs counsel indicated that White House Counsel C.6

Boyden Gray may have negotiated an agreement with the Independent Counsel. DOJ has no

knowledge of this other than what is contained in the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Report,

which suggests that Gray attempted to negotiate over privilege rather than confidentiality with

regard to a second interview sought by the Independent Counsel.

According to the Report, Gray and his deputy produced certain documents to the

Independent Counsel subject to an agreement that the act of production did not waive any pre-

existing privileges over the documents. See I Final Report of the Independent Counsel for

Iran/Contra Matters, Ch. 28. This non-waiver agreement provided: This review will not waive

and will be without prejudice to any privilege against disclosure that may exist with respect to

any of the documents, including the attorney-client privilege. Id., Ch. 28 n.52. The

Independent Counsel sought to interview Gray, but Gray sought a non-waiver provision

protecting his own as well as President Bushs privileges. Id., Ch. 28. When the Independent

Counsel refused to agree to these terms, Gray declined to be interviewed. Id.

9

is unaware of any formal confidentiality agreements between interviewees and prosecutors. In

any event, a prosecutor or other law enforcement investigator has no power to override statutes

such as the Freedom of Information Act and a promise of confidentiality has no bearing on the

applicability of Exemption 7(A).6



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10

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in DOJs prior memoranda, DOJs Motion for Summary

Judgment should be granted.

July 1, 2009 Respectfully submitted,

TONY WEST

Assistant Attorney General

IAN GERSHENGORN

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

CHANNING D. PHILLIPS

Acting United States Attorney

JOHN TYLER

Assistant Branch Director

/s/ Jeffrey M. Smith

JEFFREY M. SMITH (D.C. Bar # 467936)

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

20 Massachusetts Ave., NW,

Washington, D.C. 20001

Room 7144

Tel: (202) 514-5751Fax: (202) 616-8202

Counsel for the United States Department of Justice

Case 1:08-cv-01468-EGS Document 17 Filed 07/01/2009 Page


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY ANDETHIC S IN WASH INGTON,Plaintiff

V.No. 1:08-cv-01468 (EGS)Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JuSTICE,Defendant.

DECLARATION OF LANNY A. BREUER,ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION

I, Lanny A. Breuer, declare as follows:1. I am the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division at the United States

Department of Justice. In this position, I oversee the operations of the Criminal Division, whichdevelops, enforces, and supe rvises the application of all federal criminal laws, excep t thosespecifically assigned to othe r divisions.

2. There have been law enforcement investigations by Independent Counsel and theDepartment of Justice that have involved obtaining information from high-level White Houseofficials in nearly every administration since the Johnson Administration. Given this history, theDep artment of Justice believes that there is a reasonable proba bility of future law enforcem entinvestigations by the Depa rtment of Justice that will require and benefit from obtaininginformation from W hite House officials, possibly at the highest level of government.

3. In any such investigation, it will be important that White House officials be ableto provide law enforcement officials with a full account of relevant events. Any suchinvestigation may delve into or require a full accounting of internal White House deliberations or

Case 1:08-cv-01468-EGS Document 17-2 Filed 07/01/2009 Pa


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other government operations. Questions may cover, for example, conversations between thePresident or Vice President and se nior advisors, the decision-making proce ss on specific policymatters, advice given to the P resident or direction provided by the President, and internaldiscussions relating to White H ouse interactions with other Executive Branch entities and withCongress. Particularly during the early stages of an investigation, questioning can range over awide variety of subjects, many of which ma y ultimately prove to be unrelated to or without valueto the investigation.

4. In any law enforcement investigation, interviews are a powerful investigatory

tool, in large part because such interviews allow law enforce ment to efficiently gatherinformation in a no n-public setting, very early in an investigation, without the form alities of thegrand jury process. As a general matter, the non-public nature of law enforcement interviewscan be a significant factor in securing the voluntary cooperation of witnesses. Indeed, it is notuncomm on for prosecutors and law enforcem ent investigators to inform witnesses that, subject toapplicable statutes, regulations and rules, they will attempt to maintain the confidentiality ofinformation provided. A non-public interview can be particularly important in gaining thecooperation of senior-level W hite House o fficials given the public role of such witnesses, thesensitive nature of the subject matters that ma y be discussed, the potential politicization of thesesensitive issues, and the possibility that whatever matter is being investigated ultimately may notwarrant any law enforcement action.

In addition, as a general rule, a prosecutor cannot tell a W hite House o fficial howlong he or she believes an investigation may last, and the official may thus believe thatinformation provided could become public while the official is still in office. Therefore, if law

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enforcem ent interviews of the President, Vice President or other senior Wh ite House officialsbecom e subject to routine public disclosure, even upo n the conclusion of an investigation, thereis an increased likelihood that such officials could feel reluctant to participate in voluntaryinterviews or, if they agree to such voluntary interviews, could decline to answ er questions oncertain topics.

6. A White House official's reluctance to submit voluntarily to an interview or sharecertain information in an interview could hamper an investigation in several important ways. Alaw enforcem ent investigation often benefits from conducting interviews early in an

investigation, well before a grand jury has been convened. Indeed, obtaining such evidenceearly in an investigation often assists law enfo rcement age nts in obtaining important backgroun dinformation relevant to understanding the allegations being investigated. Voluntary interviewsalso help law enforcem ent investigators determine where to conce ntrate or focus theinvestigation, not only for the collection of evidence, such as documents, but also the most likelycandidates for interview. Indeed, voluntary interviews might obviate the need to convene agrand jury at all or circumscribe the focus of the grand jury's inquiry. A law enforcementinvestigation based upon interviews subject to an e xpectation of confidentiality also benefitsfrom senior officials more inclined to provide identifiable leads, name percipient witnesses, offercredibility assessments of the ac cuser or other witnesses, and even articulate inferences, insightor hunches that can be invaluable to a law enforcement investigator. A law enforcementinvestigation could lose these poten tial benefits if the senior official believes his or her statementwill be subject to public disclosure.

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7. Moreover, if interviews of senior-level White House officials become subject toroutine public disclosure, the W hite House o fficial may agree to talk only in response to a gran djury subpoena in order to obtain the co nfidentiality protection of Rule 6(e) of the Fe deral Rulesof Criminal Procedure. Such a decision could impose considerable practical difficulties andburdens upon inve stigators and prosecutors that at best could prolong investigations and at worstthwart investigations. As described above, as a general rule, law enforcement investigatorsinterview witnesses in the early stages of an inve stigation to help focus the investigation and as ameans of predicating document requests. Absent such interviews, prosecutors could have toconfront and choose from several undesirable choices, including: (a) grand jury appearances forwitnesses too early in an investigation, including at a stage when prosecutors are still developinga factual record to unde rstand the backgrou nd and ba sis for the potential criminal allegations,identifying leads and potential witnesses, predicating docume nts requests, and conducting otherpreliminary, investigative steps normally best left for voluntary interviews; (b) relayinginformation develope d in the grand jury to law enfo rcement investigators to pursue identifiableleads or predicate docume nt requests without the benefit of the investigators having obtained thatinformation first-hand; (c) multiple grand jury appea rances for some w itnesses as theinvestigation uncovers relevant docum ents and condu cts other grand jury sessions in order tocorrect or refine previously sworn testimony; and (d) grand jury app earance s for other witnesseswho simply ha ve no informa tion relevant to the allegations being investigated; or, alternatively,

(e) delaying the grand jury appearance s of all witnesses to some later, undefined phase of theinvestigation in order to prevent the creation of unproductive, potentially inaccurate grand jurytestimony. All of these choices are unproductive and inefficient, and impose burdens,

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inconvenience s and stretches of unavailability on senior officials who ma y have pressingnational security and other issues to address on a daily basis.

In addition, forcing W hite House o fficials to be brought be fore grand juries couldhave the effect of injecting the law enforcem ent investigation itself into the political process,which could intrude upon gove rnment opera tions at the highest level of governme nt, and whichcould risk the perception that the investigation itself was political, thus undermining public faithin the impartiality of the judicial system. Baseless, partisan allegations that, easily could beinvestigated and dismissed through voluntary interviews now m ay have to be investigated

through the specter of the grand jury process. In addition, if law enforcement interviews areroutinely subject to public disclosure, there could be a significant risk of politicization of lawenforcem ent files and investigations, which could undermine the integrity and effectiveness of,and public confidence in, those investigations;

I declare under pena lty of perjury that the foregoing is true and c orrect.Executed ( 2009.

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NO . 3~ )Z l P . 2

IN THE ~,TITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIACITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITYAND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,Defendant.

)))

Civil Action No. 08-1468 (EGS)

DECLARATION OF RALPH S, DIMAIO,INFORMATION REVIEW OFFICER, NATIONAL

CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTRODUCTION

I, PJ~LPH S. DIMAIO, hereby declare:i. I am the Information Review Officer ("IRO") for the

National Clande stine Service ("NCS")~ of the Central IntelligenceAgency ("CIA") . I was appointed to this position on Ii June2007. I have held several senior operational and administrativepositions in the CIA since 1983.

2. The NCS is the organization within the CI A responsiblefor conducting the CIAs foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence activities; coordinating liaison withforeign intel ligence and security services; serving as therepository for foreign counterintelligence informationsupporting clandestine techni cal collection; and coordinatingCIA support to the Department of Defense and other U.S.

The NCS was formerly known as the Directorate of Opeiations or "DO.

Case 1:08-cv-01468-EGS Document 17-4 Filed 07/01/2009 Pag


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Government agencies. Specifically, the N CS is responsible forthe conduct of foreign intelligence collection activitiesthrough the clandestine use of human sources. The NCS maintainsofficial records of all clandestine foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence activities an d operations conducted by theCIA with respect to human sources. These records are maintainedby the CiA in the regular course of business and it is t he CIAsregular practice to maintain such records.

3. As the NCS/IRO, I am responsible for bot h theprotection and review of documents originated by t he NCS, orotherwise implicating NCS in terests, which may be the subject ofcourt proceedings. As part of my official duties, I ensure thatany determinations a s to the release or withholding of such

information are proper and do not jeopardize NCS interests orondanger NCS personnel or facilities. As the NCS/IRO, I haveaccess to all official NCS records. My officialresponsibilities include the search for, and retri eva! of, NCSrecords pursuant to requests for i nformation concerningoperational and intelligence activities.

4. For the purposes of this litigation, I have beendesignated CIA Records Validation Officer ("RVO"). As RV0, I amauthorized to access all CIA records relevant to thislitigation. I also am authorized to task appropriate personnelto conduct record searches within any offi ce or component of t he



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3~!_. 1. 2009 6,27~k~ .... l , lO, 39z+1 P , 4

C!A, including, but not limited to, the NCS. Similarly, I amauthorized to sign declarations on behalf of the CIA re~ardingsearches of CIA record systems and the contents of recordslocated during these searches.

5. As a senior CIA official under a written delegation ofauthority pursuant to section 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12958,as amended, I hold original classification authority at the TOPSECRET level.~ Therefore , I am authorized to make original

classification and declassification decisions, As the RVO inthis case, my original classification and declassificationauthority extends to all CIA information.

6. Through the exercise of my official duties, I amfamiliar with this civil action. I make the followingstatements based upon my personal knowledge and information madeavailable to me in my official capacity.

7. Pursuant to t he Courts 20 June 2009 Order in thiscase, this declaration: (I) describes the CIA i nformation thatthe Freedom of Information Act (~FOIA") exempts from disclosurein this case; (2) identifies the FOIA exemptions applicable tothe CIA in formation that is exempt from disclosure in this case;and (3) explains why the cited FOIA exemptions apply.

~ Executive Order $2958 was amended by Executive Ord er 13292. See Exec. OrderNo. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg, 1~,315 (Mar. 28, 2003). All citations to ExecutiveOrder 12958 are to the Order as amended by Executive Order 13292. SeeExec, Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,025 (Apr~ 20, 1995), reprinted asamendd in Z0 U.g.C.A. ~ 435 note at 193 (W est Supp. 2008).



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! I .IL . 1 .2( ;


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Reform to Attorney G eneral Michael B, Mukasey on June 16, 2008,for the same records concerning Vice President Cheney."

10. After an initi al search, OIP determined DOJs Officeof Lega! Counsel ("OLC") had th e documents responsive toPlaintiffs FOIA request. Accordingly, OIP referred CREWs FOIArequest to OLC on 4 September 2008.

ii. In the course of processing CREWs FOIA request, OLClocated three documents responsive to Plaintlffs request

(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the documents"), Thedocuments totaled 67 pages.

12. The first document is a FBI document summarizing aninterview of Vice President Cheney lhereinafter referred to as"the FBI Interview Report"). The FBI In terview Report is 28pages and is dated 8 May 2004,

13. The second document (Document Number IA-242) is a copyof FBI handwritten notes summarizing an inter view of VicePresident Cheney (hereinafter referred to as "the HandwrittenFBI Notes"). The Handwritten FBI N otes is 22 pages (includingthe FD-340 cover sheet) and is dat ed 8 May 2004.

14. The third document (Document Number IA-178) is anoutline of q~/estions with handwritten a nnotations summarizing aninterview of Vice President Cheney (hereinafter re ferred to as"the Annotated Outline"). The Annotated Outline is 17 pages(including the FD-340 cover sheet) and is dated 8 May 2004.



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15. in an effort to protect CIA equities and information,DOJ sent the documents to the CIA fbr coordination.

16, OLC responded to CREWs FOIA request on 18 September2008. OLC asserted the documents were exempt from disclosurepursuant to FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(A). OLC also stated it waswithholding portions of the documents pursuant to POIAExemptions 1 and 3.

17. CREW filed its Complaint for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief in this case on 25 August 2008.i8. DOJ moved for summary judgment on l0 October 2008.

its Motion for Summary Judgment, DOJ stated "a number ofparagraphs [in the documents] are protected under FOIAExemptions One and Three because they contain informationcurrently classified at the SECRET level by the CentralIntel ligence Agency." See Defos Mot. Summ. J. 18-19; see alsoBradbury Decl. ~ 16, DOJ further stated "I t]he CIA hasdezermined that the documents contain information concerningintelligence sources and methods." See Def. s Mot. SUmmo J. 18-19; see also Bradbury Decl. ~ 16.III, EXEMPT CIA INFORMATION AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE

19. During its coordination of the documents, the CIAdetermined that a number of the paragraphs in the FBI InterviewReport and portions of the Handwritten FBI Report and 7knnotatedOmtline contain exe~t information regarding the CiAs



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~!t. 1.20~ti B.27PM

intelligence sources and methods. Regarding intelli gencesources, the CIA withheld exempt information related to fore igngovernment information and liaison relationships. Regardingintelligence methods, the CIA withheld exempt informationrelated to practi ces and procedures that the CIA uses to assessand evaluate int elligence and to inform policy makers.

A . ~ence Sources20. The CIAs primary mission is to gather intelligen ce

from around the world that the President an d other governmentofficials can use in making important nationa l security andpolicy decisions. TO do this, the CIA often must rely on:information that it only can obtain from knowledgeableclandestine human intelligence sources under an agreement of

~secrecy. Intelligence sources rarely will furnish informationunless they are confident that they are protected fromretribution or embarr assment by the secrecy surrounding thesource-CIA relationship. In other words, intelligence sourcesmust be certain the CIA can and will do everythi ng in its powerto prevent the public disclosure of their association with theCIA.

21. Intelligence sources .include clandestine humanintelligence sources, foreign intelligence and securityservices, foreign governments generally, and liaison services.In this case, the exempt CIA source-related information relates

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to foreign liaison information, foreign government information,and liaison relationships.

22. Foreign liaison information is information that theCIA obtains clandestinely from foreign intelligence and securityservices. In this way, the foreign service itself functions asan intelligence source.

23. Similarly, foreign government information isinformation that the CIA obtains clandestinely from officials offoreign governments with whom the CIA maintains an officialliaison relationship. In this way, the official of the foreign

government functions as the intelligence source.24. Liaison relationships with foreign intelligence

services and other liaison services offer the United States aforce-multiplier for its intelligence collection activities,especially in the present conflict against global terrorism.Intelligence services with which the CIA has a close or robustliaison relationship will provide the CIA with the intelligencereported by many of its own intelligence sources. Such servicesmay even task their own sources to gather information at therequest of the CIA. Therefore, through liaison relationships,

the CIA can gather and provide intelligence information toUnited States national security and foreign policy decision-makers that is critical to informed decision making. Harm to



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these relationships can be particularly damagin~ to the fightagainst terrorism.

25. Both foreign liaison services and individual foreign~overnment officials provide sensitive information in strictconfidence to the CIA on issues of importance to United Statesforeign relations and nati onal security. These services andofficials of such services convey information to the CIA withthe CIAs express agreement that the content of the information,

as well as the mere fact of the rel ationship through which theyprovided the information, will remain secret.

26. If the CIA were to violate this express agreement,internal or external political pressure on the f oreigngovernment could cause the f oreign liaison service or foreigngovernment official to limit or even end the CI A relationship,causing the United States Government to lose valuable foreignintelligence. In fact, this political pressure could compel theforeign government to take defensive actions against the CIA,such as reducing the approved CIA presence in th at country.Such an action would further damage the CIAs ability to collectintelligence about other countries or persons operating in thatcountry.

27. In many cases, the very nature of the i nformation thatthe foreign liaison service or foreign government official



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provides necessarily tends to reveal the identity of the sourceof the information and, therefore, the relationship itself.

28. In this way, disclosing the fact of the re lationshipor the i nformation itself would suggest to other foreign l iaisonservices and foreign government officials that the CIA is unableor unwilling to observe an express agreement of secrecy . Thisperception could cause the li aison services and governmentofficials to limit their provision of information to the CIA oreven to end the relationship altogether, thus causing the UnitedStates Government to lose valuable foreign intelligence.

29. Moreover, this perception could discourage foreignliaison services and governments from entering into any kind ofrelationship with the CIA, thus preventing altogether thecollection of i nformation from these sources.

30. As such, any official acknowledgment by the CIA of apast or current liaison relationship, or any revelation ofinformation by the CIA that implicates a past or currentrelationship, with a foreign intelligence gervice or a foreigngovernment official could cause serious damage to relati ons withthat foreign government and possibly other relationships withother governments as well. This could result in a significantloss of intelligence information for the United StatesGovernment and thereb y cause serious damage to nationalsecurity.



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Bo Intelli~ence Methods31. Intelligence methods are the means by which the ClA

accomplishes its objectives. Intelligence methods include thebasic business practices and methodological "tools" that the CIAuses to accomplish its mission.

32. The CIA must protect its intelligence methods fromdisclosure in every situation where a certain intelligenceinterest, capabi lity, or techn ique is unknown to those groups

that could take countermeasures to nullify its effectiveness.To adequately safeguard its intelli gence methods, the CIA mustprotect the methods it uses to obtain intelligence as well asthe information produced by those in telligence methods,

33. One of the primary missions of foreign inte lligenceservices is to discover the particular methods that the CIAuses. To this end, foreign intelligence services scour opensources for officially released intelligence information. Theseforeign intelligence services are capable of gatheringinformation from myriad sources, analyzing this information, anddeducing means to defeat CIA collection ef forts from disparateand seemingly unimportant details. W hat may seem trivial to theuninformed may, in fact, be of great significance, and may put aquestioned item of information in its proper context. The CiAmust protect the fact th at it uses a particular intelligence

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method in & particul&r situation in addition to the methoditself.

34. A particular intelligence method is effective only solong as it remains unknown and unsuspected to its target. W henan intell igence method is revealed, this causes the target ofthe method to t ake countermeasures. Once the target discoversthe n&t~]re of an intelli gence method or the fact of its use in acertain situation, the method usually ceases to be effective.

Moreover, once an intelligence method or its use is discovered,the method may be used against the CIA.

35. Disclosing CIA intel ligence methods and practicesmaterially assists those who would seek to detect, penetrate,prevent, evaluate, and/or damage the intelligence operations ofthe United States generally and the CIA specifically. In fact,without legal protection against the public relea se ofintelligence methods, the CIA likely would become impotent.

36. When a particular inte!ligence method ceases to beeffective, the United States endures a significant loss. Thisis because the cost of developing and validating an intelligencemethod is hugely disproportionate to the cost of destroying thatmethod via public disclosure. A single intelligence method cancost many millions of dollars, but a single newspaper storygenerated by a single disclosure can often end the utility ofthe method. Moreover, the actual damage and loss to the Unite d

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States from the loss of the intelligence method is not only thecost of the method itself but also the !oss of intelligenceduring the time it takes to fund and field a replacement method.

37. In short, the disclosure of a CIA intelli gence methodinevitably leads to the neutralization of that method, whetherthe method is used for the collection of intell igenceinformation, the conduct of clandestine activities, or theanalysis, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligenceinformation.I V , FOIA EXEMPTIONS

A . FOIA Exem_m_m_m_m_m_m_m_m_m~ion 13 8 . FOIA Exemption i provides that FOIA does not require

disclosure of information that is: "(A) specifically authorizedunder criteria established by a n Executive Order to be keptsecret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive

O r d e r . , , ~

39~ The authority to classify information is derived froma succession of Executive Orders, the most recent of which isExecutive Order 12958, as amended. Personne! from the CIAs IROOffices reviewed the documents in this case under the criteri aestablished by Executive Order 12958, as amended, and havedescribed the information contained therein. I have determined

~ 5 U.S.C. ~ 552(b)(!) (2000).

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the information withhe ld from the documents pursuant to FOIAExemption 1 is in fact properly classified.

40. Section 6.1(h) of Executive Order 12958, as amended,defines "classified national security information" or"classified informatlon a s "information that has beendetermined pursuant to this order or any red,~ce s~or order torequire protection a~ainst unauthori zed disclosure and is markedto indicate it s classified status when in documentary form.~Section 6.1(y) of Executive Orde r 12958, as amended, defin es"national security" as the "national defense or foreignrelations of the United States.s Section i 2(a) of ExecutiveOrder 129~8, as amended, establ ishes three levels ofclassification for national security information. Informationshall be classifie d TOP SECRET if its unauthorized disclosurereasonably could be expected to result in exSremely ~rave damageto the national securit y; SECRET if its unauthorized disclosurereasonably could be expected to. result in serious damage to thenational security ; and CONF!DENTIAZ if its unauthorizeddisclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage tothe national security.

41. Section l.l(a) of Executive Order ~2958, as amended,provides information may be originally classified under the

~ E x e c . O r d e r N o . 12,958, 6 0 F e d . R e g . 19,825 { A p r . 2 0 , 199~), r e ~ r i n t e d a samended i n 5 0 U . S . C . A , ~ 4 3 5 n o t e a t ~ 9 3 (West Supp. 2008) .~ Id.

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terms of this Executive Order only if all of the followingconditions are met;

(I) an original classificationauthority is classifying the information;

(2) the information is owned by,produced by or for, or is under the controlof the United States Government;

(3) the information falls within oneor more of the categories of informationlisted in Section i.4 of th is order; and

(4) thl original classificationauthority determines that the unauthorizeddisclosure of the information reasonablycould be expected to result in damage to thenational security, which includes defenseagainst transnational terrorism, and theoriginal classification authority is able toidentify or describe the damage.6I. Original Classfication Authority

42. Section 1.3(a) of Executive Order 12958, as amended,provides the authority to classify information originally may beexercised only by the President and, in the performance ofexecutive duties, the Vice President; agency heads and offici alsdesignated by the President in the Federal Reqister; and U.S.Government officials delegated this authority pursuant tosection 1.3(c) of Executive Order 12958, as amended. ~ Sectioni.3(c) (2) provides TOP SECRET original classification authoritymay be delegated only by the President; in the performance ofexecutive duties, the Vice President; or an agency head or~ I d .~ S e e id

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officia! designated pursuant to section 1.3(a)Order 12958, as amended,e

43. In accordance with section !.3(a) (2)

2) of Executive

the Presidentdesignated the Dir ector of the CIA as an official who mayclassify information originally as TOP SECRET.~ Under theauthority of section 1.3(c) (2), the Director of t he CIAdelegated original TOP SECRET classification authority to me.Section 1.3(b) of the Executive Order provides that origina l TOPSECRET classification authority includes the authority toclassify information originally as SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.idetermined the classified CIA information redacted from thedocuments in this case is currently an d properly classifiedSECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.

2. U.S. G overnment Information44. Information may be originally classified only if the

information is owned by, produced by or for, or. is under thecontrol of the U.S. Government. ! determined the CIAinformation reda cted from the documents in this case is owned by

~ See id~~ Se__~e Presidential Order of April 21, 2005, Designation under Executive Order1295~, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,609 (Apr. 26, 2005), reprinted in 50 U.S. C. ~ 435 note(S~lpp. v 200S) . Similarly, the Presidential Order of 13 October 1995designates the Director of the C~A a~ an officia l authorized to claesifyinformation originally as TOP SECRET. See Presidential Order o Oct. 13,1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,8~15 (Oct. 17, 1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. ~ .125 note(2000).~0 Exec. order N o. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995), reprinted a~aniended ~n 50 U.S.C.A. S 435 note at 193 (west Supp. 2009).

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the U.S, Government, produced by zhe U,S. Government, and underthe control of the U.S. Government.

3 o Categories of Information Listed in Section 1.4 ofExecutive Order 12958

45. Executive Oxder 12958, as amended, addressesclassification of information relating to intelligence andnational security. Section 1.4 provides information shall beclassified only when it i ncludes, among other things,information concerning "intelligence activities (includingspecial activities), intelligence sources or methods, orcryptology." i determined the CIA information redacted from thedocuments in this case contain information concerning the CIAsintelligence sources and/or methods.

4. Damage to the N ational Security46. Disclosure of the SECRET information redacted from the

documents in this case reasonably could be e xpected to causeserious damage to the national security. Disclosure of t heCONFIDENTIAL information redacted from the documents in thiscase reasonably could be e xpected to cause damage to thenational security. I further describe this classified

information and its relation to CiA i ntelligence sources andmethods in Paragraphs 50 through 55 below.

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5. Proper Purpose47. I determined there is no reason to believe that any of

the CIA inform&tion contain ed in the documents at issue in thiscase has been classified in order to conceal violations of law,inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent embarrassment toa person, organization or agency; restrain competition; oyprevent or delay the release of information that does notrequire protection in the interests of national security.

6. Marking48. I determined that each of the documents at issue in

this case bear one of the three classification levels defined insection 1.2 of Executive Order 12958, as amended.

7. Proper Classific~tion49, I determined the CIA information redacsed fxom the

documents in this case is currently a nd properly classified inaccordance with the substantive an d procedural requirements ofExecutive Order 12958, as amended.

8, Classified CIA Information at Issue in this Case50. Pursuant to FOIA Exemption I, the CIA redacted t he

following exempt, classified information fr om the documents inthis case:

information that would identify foreigngovernment information;

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information that would identify a foreigngovernment and liaison services with whomthe CiA had/has a relationship;the true na me of & covert CIA employee;

information the would reveal intelligencemethods the CIA uses to assess andevaluate intelligence~ and

information that would reveal intelligencemethods the CIA usesto inform policymakers.

51. Disclosure of the classified ClA information redactedfrom the documents in this case would reveal classifiedinformation regarding the CIAs intelligence sources andmethods. Such disclosures would provide the United Stat esadversaries with keen insights into the CI As intelligenceactivities, sources, and methods and reasonably could beexpected to cause serious damage to the national security.

(a) The CIA Redacted the Names of CIA Sources52, Specifically, the CIA red acted the names of a forei gn

government and liaison services from pages 2, 7, and 9 of theFBI Interview Report and pages 5 and 7 of the HandwrittenNotes. The di sclosure of th is SECRET information would damagethe national security by damaging the CIAs liaisonrelationships. As an initial matter, the disclosure of this.information would suggest to other foreign governments andliaison services that the CIA is unable or unwilling to observean express agreement of secrecy. This perception could

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discourage foreign governments from entering into any kind ofrelationship with the CIA, thus preventing altogether thecollection of information f rom these sources. Similarly,disclosing the CIAs affiliation with the foreign government andliaison services identified in the documents at issue in thiscase also could cause these liaison services to limit or e venend the CIA relationship. Disclosure also could compel foreigngovernments to take defensive actions against the CIA, such

reducing the approved CIA presence in thau country. Al! ofthese actions would severely limit the CIAs ability to collectcritical foreign intelligence.

( b ) The CIA Redacted the Name of a CovertEmployee

53. The CIA also redacted the na me of a covert employeefrom page 3 of the PBI I nterview Report, page 3 of theHandwritten FBI Notes, and page 3 of the Annotated Outline. Thedisclosure of this SECRET information would provide hostileintelligence services with valuable information that they coulduse to uncover CIA activities, sources, methods. If hostileintelligence services knew the identity of the CIAs covertofficers, these intelligence services reasonably could identifythe officers activities, sources, and methods.

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( e ) The CIA Redacted Inoz~nation that WouldReveal CIA Intelligence Met hods54. Similarly, the CIA redacted i nformation on pages 6,

16, and 17 of the FBI Interview Report and pages 5, 12, and 13of the Handwritten FBI Notes that would reveal intell igencemethods the CiA uses to assess and evaluate intelligen ce andinform policy makers. When viewed together, this information isclassified CONFIDENTIAL. The disclosure of this i nformation, intotality, would provide %he United S~ates adversaries withinsight into how the CI A analyzes, evaluates, compiles, anddisseminates intelligence. Such a disclosure could allowhostile governments and intelligence agencies to influence andpotentially manipulate the CIAs intelligence a nalysis.Similarly, the disclosure of this CIA me~hod could furtherhostile government services attempts to disrupt the CIAsdissemination of key intel ligence to policy makers. Simply put,the disclosure of this redacted information likely weuld lead toneutralization of this intelligence method.

55. Significantly, the CIA information that is exempt fromdisclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption I is also protected fromdisclosure under FOIA Exemption 3.

B . FOIA Exem~5 6 . The FBI Interview Report, the Handwritten FBI Notes,

and the Annotated Outline contain information disclosing CIA

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intelligence sources, intelligence methods, organization,functions, employee names, official titles, and personnelstrength. This information is exempt from disclosure under FOIAExemption 3. FOIA Exemption 3 provides FOIA does not apply tomatters that are:

specifically exempted from disclosure bystatute (other than section 552b of thistitle) provided that such statute (A)requires that the matters be withheld fromthe public in such a manner as to leave nodiscretion on the issue, or (B) establishesparticular criteria for withholding orrefers to particular types of matters to bewithheld.~

! was advised that the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 403-1,as amended and the Central Inte lligence Agency Act of 1949(~CIA Act" , 50 U.S.C. 403g, as amended, are the withholdingstatutes applicable to this case.

i. National Security Act of 194757. Section 102A(i) (i) of the National Security Act, as

amended, requires the protection of intelligence sources andmethods. Disclosure of exempt information withheld from th edocuments in this case would reveal intel ligence sources andmethods. Accordingly, the CIA relies on the N ational SecurityAct to withhold any information that would reveal intelligencesources and methods

~"~ S U.$.C. ~ $52(b] (3] 2000) ,

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3 9 4 1 - - P . 2 4

58. In contrast to Executive Order 12958, as amended, theNational Security Acts statutory requirement to protectintelligencemethods does not require the CIA t o identify ordescribe the damage to national security that reasonably couldbe expected to result from their unauthorized disclosure.

2o Central Intelligence Agency Act of 19495 9 . Section 6 of the CIA Act, as amended, provides:

In the interests of the security of theforeign intelligence activities of theUnited States and in order to furzherimplement section 403-i(i) of this titl ethat the Director of National Intelligenceshall be responsible for protectingintelligence sources and methods fromunauthorized disclosure, the [ C I A ]shall be exempted from the provisionsof any other law which require thepublication or disclosure of theorganization, functions, names, officialtitles, salaries, or numbers of personnelemployed by the Agency.

As the CIAs primary function is to collect intelligence throughhuman sources and by other appropriate methods, section 6 of theCIA Act authorizes the C~A to withhold intelligence sources andmethods that are related to the CiAs core function. Moreover,CIA employees names and personal identif iers (for example,employee.signatures, emp!oyee identificati on numbers, orinitials), titles, file numbers, and internal organizationalinformation are specifically protected from disclosure by theCIA Act.

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P , 2 r ~

60. In contrast to Executive Order 12958, as amended theCIA Acts statutory requiremen< to further protect intelligen cesources and methods by protecting CIA org&nization and functionsdoes not require the CIA to identi fy or describe the damage tonational security that reasonably could be expected to resultfrom their unauthorized disclosure. Stated simply, section 6requires no showing of harm.

61. The CIA properly withheld exempt information and

documents from release under FOIA Exemption 3 where disclosurewould re~eal CIA sources, methods, organization, functions,employee names, and the number of personnel employed by th e CIA.

(a) The CIA Redacted the Names of CIA Sources62. Specifically, the CIA redacted i nformation that would

identify clandestine intelligence sources, that is, the names ofa foreign government and f oreign liaison services from pages 2,7, and 9 of the FBI Inter view Report and pages 5 and 7 of theHandwritten FBI Notes.

(b) The CIA Redacte d the Na mes o CIA Employees63. The CIA redacted t he name of CIA employees from pages

3 and 6 of the FBI Int erview Report, pages 3 and 5 of theHandwritten FBI Notes, and page 3 of the Annotated Outline.

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( c ) The ClA Redacted Informmtion that WouldReveal CIA Intelligence Me thods64. The CIA also redacted exempt information on pages 6,

16, and 17 of the FBI Inter view Report and pages 5, 12, and 13of the Handwritten FB! Notes. The disclosure of thisinformation would provide insight into CIA organization,functions, staffing, activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities,intelligence sources, and intelligence methods. As noted above,the disclosure of this information would reveal intelligencemethods the CIA uses to assess and evaluate intell igence andinform policy makers.

65. Section 6 of th e CIA Act and, thus, FOIA Exemption 3,unambiguously protect this information from disclosure.

SEGREGABILITY66. The CIA conducted a line-by-line review of the

documents at issue in this case, individuall y and as a whole, todetermine whether meaningful, reasonably segregable, non-exempt

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portzons of documents could be rele ased. The CIA released anyinfor~,ation that was segregable and not otherwise exempt,

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury ~hat theforegoin@ is true and correct,

Executed th~s ~ day of July, 2009.

Ralph DiMaioInformation Review OfficerNation~l Cl~n~estine set zceCentral Intelligence Agency


Documents

CREW v. DOJ: Re: Valerie Plame: 7/1/09 - DOJ's Supplemental Memorandum (Lanny Breuer Declaration) (Document 17)