Crim Pro Cases

People vs. Sandiganbayan, Sept. 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 489

Facts:

The accused, Rolando Plaza was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 or The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Allegedly, he failed to liquidate the cash advances he received by reason of his office on December 19, 1995 in the amount of P30,000. On April 7, 2005, Plaza filed a motion to dismiss with the Sandiganbayan which was found to be with merit.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case. So, the petitioner filed this case to the Supreme Court contending that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to their office.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads ( Sec. 4 (1) (a) of P.D. 1606); city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads (Sec. 4 (1) (b) of P.D. 1606); officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of P.D. 1606 provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

So, those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The Supreme Court ruled in earlier cases that: as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to his office. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office.

People vs. Sandiganbayan & Amante, Aug. 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 49

Serana vs. Sandiganbayan, Jan. 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 224

Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.

The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.

Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.

Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held: Yes.

First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.

Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Geduspan vs. People, Feb. 11, 2010

Facts:

On July 11, 2002, an information was filed against petitioner Geduspan and Dr. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively, for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

RULING:

Yes. The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A. It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.

People vs. Sandiganbayan and Plaza, Sept. 15, 2010 (same with 1)

Cases:

Valdespenas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871

NATURE

Appeal by Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the CA, affirming that of the CFI of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent.

FACTS

- Jan 25, 56 – Ester Ulsano filed with the justice of peace a criminal complaint charging Valdepenas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After the preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepenas, the justice of peace found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the CFI.

- CFI found him guilty as charged and sentenced him accordingly.

- On appeal, CA modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with consent.

- Valdepenas filed MFR and new trial contesting the findings of CA, to the effect that complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence. Motion was granted. The decision was set aside and the case was remanded to the CFI

- CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA. Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed the CFI decision.

- MFR was filed on the ground that lower court had no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action wrt the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied

Petitioner’s claims – there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent.

ISSUE

WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdiction over the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abduction with consent

HELD

NO.

- Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that he never questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions therein filed by him — implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.

- On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that:

". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case may be".

- Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the

culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial."

- The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.

- As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members."

- The complaint in the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by force and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity

Republic vs Sunga, 162 SCRA 191

Araula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 567

Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil 149

Fukuzume vs People, Nov. 11, 2005

Facts:

Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires, accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his undertaking to return Yu’s money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to file an estafa case.

Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial courts’ decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.

Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Foz, Jr. & Fajardo vs People, Oct 9, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty. Petitioners moved for recon but was denied. Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion for recon which CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged.

Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, Oct. 12, 2009

NATURE

Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution[1] dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment[2] dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

FACTS

-Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.

-On Sept27, 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT vs. Garcia for VIOLATION OF

1. SECTION 8 (IN RE Section 11) of RA 6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

2. Art 183, RPC

3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law

-based on this complaint, a case was filed vs. Petitioner

-Wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth

-Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife and 3 sons: Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry (similar to PI) has determined a prima facie case exists vs. Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income – SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

-Garcia filed MTD then this PETITION (same day):

a.LACK OF JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379 – should be w/ RTC as provided under SEC2(9) of the law

b. Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.

c. SB was intended principally as a criminal court

BASIS: Presidential issuances and laws

d. Granting that SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, SEC2:

i. inquiry similar to a PI

ii. Certification to SOLGEN of prima facie case – here: no certification

iii. action filed by SOLGEN - here: by Ombudsman

COMMENT by SB:

1.Republic vs. SB: “there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.”

2. Under Consti and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under RA 1379

3. Section4a(1), PD 1606, not Section 2(9), RA 1379 should be made the basis of SB’s jurisdiction:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

….

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;

….

4. SB’s jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019 IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE

COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:

1. Republic vs. SB

2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials

3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on COnsti and RA 6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be “illegal,

unjust, improper or inefficient” covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379

4. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.

5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGEN’s participation no longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute

6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB

REPLY by Garcia

1. SB’s criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SB’s jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction

2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

ISSUES

1. WON SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379

2. WON Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture

3. WON petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELD

Petition W/O MERIT, dismissed

1. SB HAS JURISDICTION

Reasoning:

*Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: Originally, SOLGEN was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before then CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]

…Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in SB.

…PD 1606: repealed 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection w/ crimes w/n exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:

> restitution or reparation for damages

>recovery of instruments and effects of the crime

>civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code

>and forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379

…BP 129: abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, expanded EOJ of SB over offenses enumerated in SEC4 of PD1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable penalty.

…PD1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher than PC or its equivalent and even such cases not serious in nature

jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w/ SB

…under RA 8249: SB vested w/ EOJ in all cases involving violations of :

>>RA 3019

>>RA 1379

>>ChapII, Sec2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC

Where 1 or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense (see above)

ON CIVIL NATUR OF FORFEITURE ACTIONS

-they are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [“An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.”]: the law provides a procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully acquired properties

2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)

RA 1379, Sec2: SOLGEN authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings

PD 1486: vested SB w/ jurisdiction over RA 1379 forfeiture proceedings

…Sec12: Chief Special Prosecutor has authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases, not SOLGEN, to SB, not CFI (BUT THIS IS JUST AN IMPLIED REPEAL as may be derived from the repealing clause of PD 1486)

PD 1487: created Ombudsman

PD 1606 repealed expressly PD 1486

PD 1607 provided that Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor has exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the SB, file info therefore, and direct and control prosecution of said cases

…also removed authority to file actions for forfeiture under RA 1379

the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.

PD 1630: expanded the Tanodbayan’s authority: given exclusive authority to conduct PI of all cases cognizable by SB, to file info therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases

**1987 CONSTI enacted

RA 6770 + ART XI, SEC 13 of 1987 CONSTI: POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:

1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

…

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379

BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB 1986

3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!

–Garcia failed to inform the court that he had filed a MTD in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the SB.

A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the

ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.

Macasaet vs. People, 452 SCRA 255

People vs. Sandiganbayan, 597 SCRA 49

People vs Rivera, 597 SCRA 49

Bonifacio et al vs RTC of Makati, et al, May 5, 2010

Facts:

Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complain for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.

That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.

Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.

Issue:

How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?

Ruling:

Art. 360 of the RPC provides:

“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

xxxx

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the oofense. xxxx”

That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to:

Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or

Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and first publication. TO give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.

The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

Magno vs People, April 6, 2011

Buaya vs Polo, 169 SCRA

Facts:

· Solemnidad M. Buaya was an insurance agent who was authorized to transact and collect the premiums for CBIC.

· Buaya is required to account and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila.

· An audit showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72.

· She was charged with estafa before the RTC-Manila.

· She filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by respondent Judge. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.

· Buaya:

o Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.

o Subject matter is purely civil in nature because the fact that CBIC separately filed a civil case involving the same alleged misappropriated amount.

· CBIC:

o Denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

o Procedure to be followed is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC)

Issue/Held:

1. WON denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered?

· As a general rule, YES, but there are exceptions because it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.

2. WON the Manila RTC has jurisdiction?

Allegations of complaint as basis

· YES. Jurisdiction of court is based on the COMPLAINT.

· Averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People).

· The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).

Essential Elements of a crime

· Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court:

o In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.

· Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The failure to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

Dispositive: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Remanded to RTC.

De Guzman vs Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171