Criminal Law 2 2nd Batch of Cases

8/10/2019 Criminal Law 2 2nd Batch of Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner

vs.JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATEPROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTORFERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITYPROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONALBUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM,BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of theNorthern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONSWHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON

OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO,petitioners,vs.PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C.TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in hiscapacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, QuezonCity, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminaljurisprudence,People vs. Hernandez1once more takes centerstage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of itsapplicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number ofsimilar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a markedlack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season andcircumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide

public attention and excite impassioned debate, even amonglaymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and

range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the samequestion.The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27,1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile wasarrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Limof the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of awarrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed andearlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed ofSenior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State ProsecutorFerdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor EulogioMananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebeccoand Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime ofrebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedlycommitted during the period of the failed coup attempt fromNovember 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken

to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in theinformation and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The followingmorning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp TomasKaringal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custodyof the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.Edgardo Dula Torres.3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, throughcounsel, filed the petition for habeas corpusherein (which was

followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being,or having been:(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist inthe statute books;(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for whichno complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation wasconducted, hence was denied due process;(c) denied his right to bail; and(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued

without the judge who issued it first having personallydetermined the existence of probable cause. 4


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The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5,1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for therespondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which hadbeen contemporaneously but separately filed by two of SenatorEnrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,

and raised similar questions. Said return urged that thepetitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez rulingbecause-and this is putting it very simply-the information inHernandez charged murders and other common crimescommitted as a necessary means for the commission ofrebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.charged murder and frustrated murder committed on theoccasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.Stated otherwise,the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complexcrime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a

necessary means for committing another, which is referred to inthe second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is thesubject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two ormore grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clauseof the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was notconcerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, onMarch 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of thesame date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses

provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hoursfrom notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for SenatorEnrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. TheResolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a moreextended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of thepetitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legalissues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9votedagainst granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 againstgranting bail to the Panlilios.The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are

raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with thefollowing options:(a) abandon Hernandezand adopt the minority view expressedin the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case thatrebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that underArticle 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly becomplexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was

suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although itis not offered in his written pleadings;(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed infurtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, ofrebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellionwhich also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less gravecharacter;(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb allother offenses committed in its course, whether or notnecessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court votedagainst abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that thedoctrine should be re-examined. 10-AIn the view of the majority,the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical baseshave withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones arepresented here persuasive enough to warrant a completereversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too longago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others,

Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime whichprecisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandezby enacting anew provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to theeffect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of thecrimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, whichincludes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon whichgraver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penaltyfor the most serious offense in its maximum period shall beimposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President ineffect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding

doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less thanaccord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful


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reason against so doing.On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject thetheory that Hernandezis, or should be, limited in its applicationto offenses committed as a necessary means for thecommission of rebellion and that the ruling should not beinterpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with othercommon crimes committed on the occasion, but not in

furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt thatthe proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, theconsensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome whatappears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out thecomplexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in itscourse under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as ismade clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion inthat case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why

Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case atbar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the twocrimes were punished separately (assuming that this could bedone), the following penalties would be imposable upon themovant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine notexceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the correspondingperiod, depending upon the modifying circumstances present,but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for thecrime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period todeath, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in

other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, theextreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,under Article 48 saidpenalty would have to be meted outto him,even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of theprosecution, would beunfavorableto the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for thepurpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to apenalty more severe than that which would be proper if the

several acts performed by him were punished separately. In thewords of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos aque hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), estabasado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penaldel Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our

Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en elcaso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, ocuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer elotro.En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente aldelito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite querepresents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penandoseparadamente los delitos.Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se

sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification insertedin said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty forthe graver offense in its maximum period to the case when itdoes not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if theacts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of saidlimitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affectsubstantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one actconstitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to

inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one ofsaid offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for thegraver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe apenalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for eachoffense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolentspirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or morecrimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed lessperverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate anddistinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime

independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum ofthe penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is


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less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for eachoffense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines theprimary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remainsbinding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellionwith any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either

as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintendedeffect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finisto the case. Petitioner's guiltor innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. Thatis for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's rulingmerely provides a take-off point for the disposition of otherquestions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denialof his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the informationfiled against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complexrebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, thatindictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, inHernandez, the Court said:In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of theamended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies describedtherein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly

committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for theperpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime chargedin the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simplerebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiplemurder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penaltyimposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) yearsofprision mayorand a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformitywith the policy of this court in dealing with accused personsamenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may beallowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime

that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correctso far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not becomplexed with other offenses committed on the occasionthereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeedcharge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by theRevised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having beeninitially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? Therecord shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner forsimple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureauof Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint apreliminary investigation was conducted by the respondentprosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questionedinformation. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary tolaw in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense

different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, ifwarranted by the evidence developed during the preliminaryinvestigation.It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued thewarrant for petitioner's arrest without firstpersonallydeterminingthe existence of probable cause by examining under oath oraffirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art.III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15This Court has already ruled,however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to makesuch a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows

established procedure by personally evaluating the report andthe supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely onehour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to therespondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time topersonally go over the voluminous records of the preliminaryinvestigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had whatsome might consider only a relatively brief period within which tocomply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he hadnot, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single

circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption thatofficial duty has been regularly performed.


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Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. Inthe light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandezas applicableto petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollarythat the information against him should be considered ascharging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailablebefore conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct

proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts fromwhich this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in thisCourt the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail orvindicating its denial?The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normalvenue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisionalliberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction togrant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correctcourse was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing apetition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by

reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only afterthat remedy was denied by the trial court should the reviewjurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, notwithout first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate reliefwas also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by theHernandezruling, the information charges a non-existent crimeor, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges morethan one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper

choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obviousrecourse would have been a motion to quash brought in thecriminal action before the respondent Judge. 18There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds uponwhich petitioner has founded the present petition, whether thesewent into the substance of what is charged in the information orimputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel orof the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges againsthim, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before saidJudge and should have been brought up there instead of directly

to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of anyof these questions was beyond the ability or competence of therespondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would bedemeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whateverto hold them to be of such complexity or transcendentalimportance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, fromdeciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing

established judicial processes designed to orderly movelitigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically,this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Courtagainst the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial courtshould not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdictionto grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied anopportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that therespondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor'srecommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as

the better course for the judge motu proprioto set a bail hearingwhere a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has beenrecommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing andthereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidenceagainst him.It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered arush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, allapparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous ofthe efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just

outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed tothe delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by comingdirectly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on theoutcome of the present petition, but also because to wash theCourt's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would onlycompound the delay that it has already gone through, the Courtnow decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Courtcannot express too strongly the view that said petition

interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedingsthat should have started with the trial court and reached this


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Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the formerand, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longercountenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it withthe resolution of issues properly within the original competence

of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equallyapplicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses(G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitionerEnrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on thesame principles already set forth. Said spouses haveuncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued againstthem as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Limin the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custodyand detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in

violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act ofrebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifiesthe relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished bylaw, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of countrythan by lust for power and have become no better than mereterrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, isallowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing sounderscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senselesskillings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much

in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocentcivilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoingrebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is noexception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital Cityseem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of thepublic peace and stymies every effort at national economicrecovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on

rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly defineand delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed

thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as theumbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can onlyinterpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what isneeded lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress willperceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in thismatter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrineenunciated in People vs. Hernandez,the questioned informationfiled against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spousesRebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simplerebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, beforefinal conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant ofbail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, theproceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to therespondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the

petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of thepetitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Courtshall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part inG.R. No. 92163.Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,vs.

HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional TrialCourt of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: SeniorState Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State ProsecutorFERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City ProsecutorEULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices forpetitioner.

GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:Together with the filing of an information charging Senator JuanPonce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed withmurder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,government prosecutors filed another information charging himfor violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the RegionalTrial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias

Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonableground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate ordelay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) tohold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pendingpersonal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b)

to dismiss the case and expunge the information from therecord.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, aspairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied SenatorEnrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there(was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrileliable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on thegrounds that:(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoidof factual and legal basis; and(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder andfrustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their allegedmeeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of theSenator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same

occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denyingthe motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit andsetting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictioncommitted by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismissthe information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 isabsorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed"rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meetingon 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be

only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;


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IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial foralleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for allegedviolation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminaryinvestigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patentirregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedingsin Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by thisCourt.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitionercould be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PDNo. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the

petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special lawwhile the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a generallaw.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case ofPeople v. Hernandez(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of whichwere recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of JuanPonce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164,June 5, 1990). The Enrilecase gave this Court the occasion toreiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the

component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them toseparate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in theHernandezcase. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines theprimary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remainsbinding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellionwith any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, eitheras a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of anactivity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can notbe charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater

penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately fortwo (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive orcomponent element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No.1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum

period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shallbe imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfullyobstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension ofsuspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal casesby committing any of the following acts:xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, anyperson he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe orsuspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in

order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitionerentertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving himfood and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowingthat Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrileallegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested orapprehended. And because of such failure the petitionerprevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of

Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon Citywere based on the aff idavits executed by three (3) employees ofthe Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col.Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiersattended the mass and birthday party held at the residence ofthe petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. Theinformation (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan

conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrileaccompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing


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white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col.Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence ofabout 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can beinferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed Decembercoup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting therebellion charge constitute or include the very incident whichgave rise to the charge of the violation under PresidentialDecree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution(Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellioncomplexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but therecould be 101 separate and independent prosecutions forharboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebelsunder PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements isreadily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracywith the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being inconspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring orconcealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of thecrime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it wasmotivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crimeof rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against thepolitical order, as well as such common crimes as may be

committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor isthe intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as avast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.(People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us thatacts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes inthemselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime ofrebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659

[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, theact of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere

component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done infurtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made thebasis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto2(80Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only beaccomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of

a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.(Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be,and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penalstatute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as anelement of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crimeand can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used incombination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 ofthe Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not bepunished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking theIdentical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or

trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, becausepossession of opium and force and trespass are inherent insmoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant bemade liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunctionwith another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as aconstitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboringor concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law whilethe rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,

prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under theother. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.In the light of the Hernandezdoctrine the prosecution's theorymust fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whetherpunishable under a special law or general law, which are merecomponents or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not beisolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:This does not detract, however, from the rule that theingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence,

are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished eitherseparately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the


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Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)The Hernandez and other related cases mention commoncrimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These commoncrimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson,robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code.The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however,constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion

cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also tooffenses under special laws which are perpetrated infurtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of SenatorPonce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up withhis allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practicallythe same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion andviolation of PD No. 1829.Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing

which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan wascommitted in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion andmust now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identifiedwith the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 ofthe RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudenceoverwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested oftheir character as "common" offenses, and assume the political

complexion of the main crime of which they are mereingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separatelyfrom the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justifythe imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra,p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused,after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime ofrebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegalpossession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime

with which the accused is charged in the present case which isthat of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is alreadyabsorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime ofrebellion with which the same accused is charged with otherpersons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty andwas convicted. (at page 662)xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which theaccused is charged in the present case is already absorbed inthe rebellion case and so to press it further now would be toplace him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No.83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion topass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitionerMisolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA),was charged with illegal possession of firearms and

ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitionerbased his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulingson the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court,however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically forthe qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms andammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGEDWITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HEBEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION ANDFOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulingsof the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find noapplication in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegalpossession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separateprosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 Theprosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator

Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion caseand charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and


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also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion withmurder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecutehim for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 inMakati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separateprosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City. In such a case, the independentprosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisivefactor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion andhe harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because thelatter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act iscompletely different. But if the act is committed with political orsocial motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it shouldbe deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of beingpunished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be triedseparately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted inthe rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Courtto pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information inCriminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminaryinjunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors inCriminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, fromholding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and fromconducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,concur.Medialdea, J., took no part.Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWINNUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN;ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO@ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE;RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITOMAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE ATBAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that aconfession is admissible until the accused successfully provesthat it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat orpromise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the muchabused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally

defective and hence, should not have been admitted andconsidered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical andobviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attemptto avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of thepolice authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood byhim during the investigation. Indubitably established and now amatter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It islikewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the

services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answeredaffirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation

has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation isanother naive effort of appellant to back track from his priorvoluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OFDIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE

THEREOF.The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is avast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes inthemselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime ofrebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well thatthe victim is a person in authority is a mere component oringredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of therebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCELAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not

applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 ofthe Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayorand a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person whopromotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversalof his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others whoare still at large, in an information which reads:"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city ofMandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse ofsuperior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed withunlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, apolice officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his

death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was apoliceman who was then in the performance of his official


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duties."Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented itsfirst witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance thepromulgation of a judgment against said accused until theprosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was

still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, therebyextinguishing his criminal liability.The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon ofAugust 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon andPfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer toassist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and BonifacioStreets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lightingfacility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamoraacted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed

eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez,acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructionsto two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed thetwo, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediatelyproceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard aseries of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and tosave his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearbyBIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.

Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he isdead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as backup. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle andfled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamoratestified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues becauseof a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which henoticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of himtogether with his companions.On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked toconduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of

the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Uponreaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin

Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorrecaptured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. RonaldArnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, butwas shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended.A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscatedfrom him.

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment,while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom forinvestigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt.Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital inCebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty.Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requestedby the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer.Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan askedappellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to

which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of hisconstitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted inCebuano upon appellant's request.Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killedPfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues weremembers of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confessionof appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on everypage thereof with the first page containing a certification likewisesigned by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein

statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by mycounsel in the course of this investigation" followed by thesigned conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicialconfession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.Fiscal Salvador Solima.In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure bywhich his extra-judicial confession was taken was legallydefective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He furthercontends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and

not murder with direct assault.Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done


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while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not havefully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a seriousoffense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counseldid not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to theproceedings and not to protect appellant against possible

abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions thesincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights consideringthat the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that thelaw firm to which he belongs has represented high rankingofficers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in hiscertification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personallyexamined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter'sstatement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed thesame in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of

everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified thathe assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to itstermination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout ofRodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So theyinformed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time Iintroduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person ofRodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with RodrigoDasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his

lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?A No.xxx xxx xxxQ In other words he accepted your services as counsel inconnection with that investigation which was about to be made?A Yes.Q Who are the persons present at that time?A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man fromthe CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.

Q What happened after that?A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?A Yes.Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasiginformed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counseland if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement ofhis will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights whattranspired next?A The investigation started.Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.Q Was that reduced to writing?A Yes.xxx xxx xxxQ You said you were present during the entire investigation.Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the

questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?A Yes, they voluntary.Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. RamosSt., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of FiscalSolema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before FiscalSolema (sic).Q Were you present during the proceeding?A I was also present."

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings andconclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession ofthe appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accusedduring his investigation was properly informed and appraised ofhis constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competentand independent counsel preferably of his own choice but sinceat that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer ofhis own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the personof Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was

available at that time, to assist him during the custodialinvestigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital


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bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City wherehe was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after thelatter has answered in the affirmative to his question as towhether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as hiscounsel of his own choice."The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato

Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him whenhis extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribedand sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused hasactually affixed his signature on each and every pages of hisextra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of hisconstitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession."Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City FiscalSalvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly

shows that accused in executing the same has done sovoluntarily and after having understood the contents thereofwhich is in the visayan language, a language known to him,found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B.""Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig iscollaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused EdwinNues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed tobefore City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office ofCebu City."The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is

admissible until the accused successfully proves that it wasgiven as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise ofreward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v.Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog thiscourt had this to say:"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for thecommission of an offense shall have the right to be informed ofhis right to remain silent and to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the personcannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one.

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in thepresence of counsel.'"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a personunder investigation for the commission of an offense maychoose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services ofcounsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choiceof the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police

investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he mayreject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. Inthe instant case, the records show that no objection was voicedby the accused throughout the entire proceedings of theinvestigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracitybefore City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparentlyacquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained forthe first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only duringtrial. Thus it was too late."Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial

confession was legally defective and hence, should not havebeen admitted and considered by the trial judge. Thisaccusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge forappellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, henow questions the integrity of the police authorities and thereputation of the lawyer who stood by him during theinvestigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of recordis the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan whoeven signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise amatter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial

confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to theservices of Atty. Parawan to which query he answeredaffirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation hasnot been substantiated by evidence other than his self-servingtestimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is anothernaive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntaryadmission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicialconfession was done with regularity and legality.Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument thatgranting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of

simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted ofmurder with direct assault.


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The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on thispoint as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower courterroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon aPerson in Authority, instead of Rebellion."Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against thegovernment, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal

Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily hismembership with the sparrow unit but also his participation andthat of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning thetraffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is ofjudicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad ofthe New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing theduly constituted government. It is therefore not hard tocomprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as ameans to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not

murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vastmovement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Actscommitted in furtherance of rebellion though crimes inthemselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime ofrebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too wellthat the victim is a person in authority is a mere component oringredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of therebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that

where the accused who was charged with murder admitted hismembership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PCinformer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellionpunishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised PenalCode.As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate SentenceLaw is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2,R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any

person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that

appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of facthe was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as theperson giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc.Manatad.Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or justexecuted the command of an unknown leader. Hence, heshould be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight

(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant islikewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTYTHOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial courtthat the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, theliquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective isto overthrow the duly constituted government, the crimecommitted is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of

participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt andis hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ofeight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.SO ORDERED. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWINNUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN;ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO@ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE;RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITOMAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-

appellant.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.


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Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE ATBAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that aconfession is admissible until the accused successfully provesthat it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or

promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the muchabused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legallydefective and hence, should not have been admitted andconsidered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical andobviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attemptto avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of thepolice authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood byhim during the investigation. Indubitably established and now amatter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is

likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to theservices of Atty. Parawan to which query he answeredaffirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidationhas not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation isanother naive effort of appellant to back track from his priorvoluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF

DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCETHEREOF.The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is avast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes inthemselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime ofrebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well thatthe victim is a person in authority is a mere component oringredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of therebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE

LAW (R.A. 4203).

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is notapplicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),

contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 ofthe Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayorand a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person whopromotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal

of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others whoare still at large, in an information which reads:"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city ofMandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse ofsuperior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed withunlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, apolice officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused hisdeath soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was apoliceman who was then in the performance of his officialduties."Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented itsfirst witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance thepromulgation of a judgment against said accused until the

prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial wasstill ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, therebyextinguishing his criminal liability.The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon ofAugust 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon andPfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer toassist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and BonifacioStreets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lightingfacility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamoraacted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticedeight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez,


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acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructionsto two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed thetwo, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediatelyproceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard aseries of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to

save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearbyBIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he isdead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as backup. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle andfled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamoratestified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues becauseof a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which henoticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of himtogether with his companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked toconduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members ofthe sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Uponreaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and EdwinNues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorrecaptured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. RonaldArnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, butwas shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended.A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated

from him.Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment,while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom forinvestigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt.Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital inCebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty.Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requestedby the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer.Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked

appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, towhich appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his

constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted inCebuano upon appellant's request.Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killedPfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues weremembers of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confessionof appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every

page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewisesigned by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the hereinstatement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by mycounsel in the course of this investigation" followed by thesigned conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicialconfession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.Fiscal Salvador Solima.In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure bywhich his extra-judicial confession was taken was legallydefective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further

contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion andnot murder with direct assault.Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was donewhile he was still very sick and consequently, he could not havefully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a seriousoffense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counseldid not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect,his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the

proceedings and not to protect appellant against possibleabuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions thesincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights consideringthat the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that thelaw firm to which he belongs has represented high rankingofficers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in hiscertification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personallyexamined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter'sstatement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the

same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity ofeverything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that


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he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to itstermination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout ofRodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So theyinformed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time Iintroduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of

Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with RodrigoDasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as hislawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?A No.xxx xxx xxxQ In other words he accepted your services as counsel inconnection with that investigation which was about to be made?A Yes.Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man fromthe CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.Q What happened after that?A The CIS started the investigation.Q You mean this Ariston Ira?A Yes.Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasiginformed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counseland if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement ofhis will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights whattranspired next?A The investigation started.Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.Q Was that reduced to writing?A Yes.xxx xxx xxxQ You said you were present during the entire investigation.

Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to thequestions propounded by the investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. RamosSt., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of FiscalSolema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before FiscalSolema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?A I was also present."We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings andconclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession ofthe appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accusedduring his investigation was properly informed and appraised ofhis constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competentand independent counsel preferably of his own choice but sinceat that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of

his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the personof Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who wasavailable at that time, to assist him during the custodialinvestigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospitalbed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City wherehe was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after thelatter has answered in the affirmative to his question as towhether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as hiscounsel of his own choice.

"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. FortunatoParawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him whenhis extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribedand sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused hasactually affixed his signature on each and every pages of hisextra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of hisconstitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession."Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal

Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearlyshows that accused in executing the same has done so


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voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereofwhich is in the visayan language, a language known to him,found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B.""Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig iscollaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused EdwinNues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed tobefore City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of

Cebu City."The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession isadmissible until the accused successfully proves that it wasgiven as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise ofreward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v.Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog thiscourt had this to say:"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed ofhis right to remain silent and to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the personcannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in thepresence of counsel.'"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a personunder investigation for the commission of an offense maychoose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services ofcounsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice

of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the policeinvestigators, the accused really has the final choice as he mayreject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. Inthe instant case, the records show that no objection was voicedby the accused throughout the entire proceedings of theinvestigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracitybefore City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparentlyacquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained forthe first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only duringtrial. Thus it was too late."

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicialconfession was legally defective and hence, should not have

been admitted and considered by the trial judge. Thisaccusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge forappellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, henow questions the integrity of the police authorities and thereputation of the lawyer who stood by him during theinvestigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of recordis the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who

even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise amatter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicialconfession, he was first asked if he was amenable to theservices of Atty. Parawan to which query he answeredaffirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation hasnot been substantiated by evidence other than his self-servingtestimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is anothernaive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntaryadmission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicialconfession was done with regularity and legality.

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument thatgranting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime ofsimple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted ofmurder with direct assault.The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on thispoint as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower courterroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon aPerson in Authority, instead of Rebellion."Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the

government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised PenalCode). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily hismembership with the sparrow unit but also his participation andthat of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning thetraffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is ofjudicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad ofthe New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing theduly constituted government. It is therefore not hard tocomprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as ameans to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.

Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, notmurder with direct assault upon a person in authority."


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The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vastmovement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Actscommitted in furtherance of rebellion though crimes inthemselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime ofrebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too wellthat the victim is a person in authority is a mere component oringredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the

rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held thatwhere the accused who was charged with murder admitted hismembership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PCinformer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellionpunishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised PenalCode.As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate SentenceLaw is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2,R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.

Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to anyperson who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove thatappellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of facthe was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as theperson giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc.Manatad.Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or justexecuted the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he

should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant islikewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTYTHOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial courtthat the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, theliquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective isto overthrow the duly constituted government, the crimecommitted is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty ofparticipating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and

is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ofeight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.SO ORDERED.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking alongBurgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when aman suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun fromhis waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired.The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on

the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and hiscompanions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1The incident was witnessed from a distance of about ninemeters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar,Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and theman who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man whofired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew(appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knewthe victim from the fact that the latter was a resident ofBagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiplegunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of thebody.2On autopsy, the municipal health officer established thecause of death as hypovolemic shock.3As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor ofAlbay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information chargingaccused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime ofMurder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. TheInformation reads:That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30

o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality ofDaraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim.Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) otherswhose true identities are at present unknown and remain atlarge, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping oneanother for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intentto kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then

and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot oneSPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station,inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing hisdeath, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Thedispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993states:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, thisCourt finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, definedand penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, andhereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of ReclusionPerpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay theheirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow,Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand(P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; topay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the

said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages,without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvencyon the part of the said accused.With costs against the accused.SO ORDERED.Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed isthat portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crimeof murder and not rebellion.Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal

witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he shouldhave been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his


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committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion,if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for privatepurposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has beenheld that the crime would be separately punishable as acommon crime and would not be absorbed by the crimerebellion.11Clearly, political motive should be established before a person

charged with a common crime alleging rebellion in order tolessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from thelaw's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.Amin,12where the prosecution sought to charge Senator JuanPonce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for allegedlyharboring or

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