CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST_SEARCH AND SEIZURE.docx

CRIMINAL PROCEDUREPROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

PROVISIONS & LAWS● Constitution, Article III Sec. 2CONSTITUTION Art III Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

● Rule 126Search and Seizure

Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)

Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)


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Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)

Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)

Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which

may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)

CASES● Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)Facts:

Stonehill – Businessman – alleged gansterDiokno – Justice Secretary

Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

As "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."


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Issue: WON the search warrants are valid.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized

however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides;

(1) That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

(2) That the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.

The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

● Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823DOCTRINE: The Judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Also the search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized and shall not be issued for more than one specific offense.

FACTS: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote

a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain


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case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.

After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition.

The search was subsequently conducted at the offices of Bache in Ayala Ave, Makati, Rizal. So the company lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. But the agents still proceeded the search which yielded 6 boxes of docs. .

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.HELD:

No. Thus the evidence obtained were inadmissible in any proceeding.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. He merely listened to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words warning against the commission of perjury and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness and signed the warrant.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill“Such is the

seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant “Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocksand securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

● People vs. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)Doctrines:1) Existence of Probable Cause: The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void


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2) Specificity of the offense charged: The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. One (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 3) Particularity of the Place: The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. 4) Plain View: Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.Facts:Version of the Prosecution Version of the Defense

On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-

On the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof. When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. That he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a

appellant to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. The police operatives took accused-appellant with them along with the items they had seized to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City. The white crystalline substance and those contained in a small were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves were found to be marijuana.

search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned goods. The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.


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Trial Court rendered its decision: 1. Finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; 2. Finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

Issues:1) Whether or not there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia2) Whether or not the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense3) Whether or not the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity4) Whether or not the seizure of Marijuana was seized under the plain view

Ruling: 1) No. The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. None was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In Aday v. Superior Court, the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the

defects concerning other articles that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. That the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

2) No. In Olaes v. People, "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." In People v. Dichoso, the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias." However, it upheld the validity of the warrant: The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In Prudente v. Dayrit, the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under section 1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under section 3 thereof, the


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decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.

3) No. As the Solicitor General states: The fact that the records of Search Warrant contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. The location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

4) No. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. To apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.

(a) Prior justification; (b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidenceOnce the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. That the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.

(c) Immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Similar to People v. Musa, in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. They had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Even assuming that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. For failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine,"


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the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.WHEREFORE, 1) the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under Section 16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended is AFFIRMED; 2) the decision finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of marijuana, as well as the methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

● AlGhoul vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126859, Sept. 4, 2001FACTS:

On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay of RTC Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95 and 55-95 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.

On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were:

2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions1 Bar of demolition charge1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions2 pieces of fragmentation grenade1 roll of detonating cord color yellow2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance22 detonating cords with blasting caps

½ and ¼ pound of high explosives TNT1 timer alarm clock2 bags of suspected gun powder2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamitesOne weighing scaleTwo (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord.

Petitioners were charged with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to PD No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.

Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995 which was denied on February 19, 1996, the accused were charged of two criminal offenses both under PD 1866, Sec. 1 and 3, penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.…

CA ruled: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty under which petitioners were charged has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail. TRO is partially lifted.

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure orders are valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence.

HELD:The search warrant 54-95 and search warrant 55-95, specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There was no mention of


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Apartment No. 8. Thus, the search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, “While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.” We could not logically conclude that where the description of those goods to be seized has been expressed technically, all others of a similar nature but not bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere technicalities.

The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of Search Warrant Nos. 54-95[25] and 55-95[26] shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1[27] and 3[28] of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

Further, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2. Hence, we find here no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol) seized therein inadmissible in evidence. However, the search at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid and legal, and the articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in evidence.

● Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, 3 November 2008

DOCTRINE:The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the court upheld its constitutionality of it because, first as to the students, right to enroll is not absolute, the school has its prerogative to add additional reasonal, fair and equitable requirement for the betterment of the the school and their students. And as to the employees, the court said that the medium is reasonable because the Ople case laid down the confidentiality protection as to the result of the drug test. Thus, if the result is in the affirmative, they will not be


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criminally prosecuted; they will rather be offered to undergo rehabilitation. As to Pimentel case, the court said that additional requirement by the Comelec shall be in accordance to the requirement embodied in the 1987 Constitution.As to Laserna case, The court said that it is unconstitutional because the randomness and suspicionless of drug testing will never be met because the accused is specifically picked-up, therefore, they will be forcibly incriminating himself if the result would not be in his favor.

FACTS:NOTE: These are three consolidated cases with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)

In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

Thereafter, these three petitions were consolidated for it has the same vain as to questioning the constitutionality of RA 9165, specifically Section 36 of sad act. In the petition filed by Pimentel, the petitioner alleged that it is unconstitutional for the COMELEC to issue a resolution that will add another requirement of a Mandatory drug testing of all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in national and local government before they can be a qualified candidate for the 2010 election wherein according to them are not embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. The next petition is the Social Justice Society, the case where brought by petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the

Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.

For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. Lastly, the Laserna’s petition wherein Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not Mandatory drug testing of all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government is constitutional2. Whether or not Mandatory drug testing of all persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day is constitutional 3. Whether or not Random drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students as well as for officials and employees of public and private offices is constitutional. Thus, valid and reasonable wherein it didn’t infringe the constitutional right of being secured to unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD:1.) NO. In declaring sec. 36(g) unconstitutional, the Court said

that the same “unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition


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to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed senator-elect,” adding that the assailed provision of the law and the COMELEC Resolution “add another layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.”

2.) NO. The Court also found no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes, as required by sec. 36(f) of the law, as a mandatory drug testing in the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office “can never be random or suspicionless.” “When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will,” said the Court. “To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves .”

3.) YES. On the other hand, the High Court held that sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of students and officials and employees of public and private offices are constitutional. The Court, taking note of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country which threaten “the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims,” stated that until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools “is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.” The Court, taking into account the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,

and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of random drug testing, held that the challenged drug test requirement for those employed in public and private offices is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and constitutional.

● Nala vs. Barroso, GR No. 153087, Aug. 7, 2003Doctrine

In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses. Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by law.

Facts: On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the

issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as “Rumolo[8] Nala alias Long”[9] of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.”[10] The application was filed in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Republic Act No. 8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the law on Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, issued Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01, against “Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.”


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On July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched petitioner’s house and allegedly seized the following articles, to wit –

-1- one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609-1- one pc. fragmentation grenade (cacao type)-1- one pc. .22 long barrel-5- pcs live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver-4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu[

On July 5, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. 10943-2001-P and 10944-2001-P for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives were filed against the petitioner before the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kitaotao, Bukidnon

On August 8, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[13] seeking to – (1) quash Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01; (2) declare inadmissible for any purpose the items allegedly seized under the said warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle seized by the police officers.

Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash but ordered the return of the air rifle to petitioner. As to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”,

considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other.

Issues: 1. Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and

seizure warrant? 2. Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search

and seizure warrant against petitioner? 3. Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly

found in petitioner’s residence are admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure warrant.

Held:1. Yes2. No3. No

Ratio:1. On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in the search

and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a description personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.

2. The “probable cause” for a valid search warrant has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in


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connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.[21] In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses.[22] Probable cause must be shown by the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. On the part of the applicant and witnesses, the introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by law.[23] On the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of such license, as well as on whether the applicant and the witnesses have personal knowledge thereof.

In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the elements of which are – (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same.[26] Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that the

firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as “personal knowledge” but only “personal belief” because neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. This could have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to possess firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to present the same.

Witnesses only stated seeing the accused with a .22 magnum and a 9mm pistol in the market/firing etc.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.”[32]

Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the house of petitioner cannot be used as evidence against him because access therein was gained by the police officer using a void search and seizure warrant. It is as if they entered petitioner’s house without a warrant, making their entry therein illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible.

Moreover, it does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary,[33] because possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the required permit or license therefor is not first obtained.[34]


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So also, admissibility of the items seized cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine. It is true that, as an exception, the police officer may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm, or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, said officer must have a prior right to be in the position to have that view of the objects to be seized. The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.[35]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked in aid of the process when the officer undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the firearms and explosive were found at the rear portion of petitioner’s house[36] but the records do not show how exactly were these items discovered. Clearly, therefore, the plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no justification to search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of probable cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that subject articles were inadvertently found in petitioner’s house.

The issue of the reasonableness of the implementation of the search and seizure warrant, i.e., whether the search was conducted in the presence of witnesses and whether the air rifle which the trial court ordered to be returned to petitioner was indeed among the items seized during the search, are matters that would be best determined in the pending administrative case for grave misconduct and irregularity in the performance of duty against the police officers who conducted the search.

3. Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioner’s house, being “fruits of the poisonous tree”, are “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized by the officers were “four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu.” These items are not contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms for which the warrant was issued. Moreover, it is highly preposterous to assume that these items were used in connection with offenses involving illegal drugs. Even granting that they were, they would still be inadmissible against the petitioner for being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject articles should be returned to petitioner.[40]

● People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)DOCTRINE:

The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.


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FACTS: In the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga,

leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.

The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 by Belarga. The buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt. The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards

his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife who had slipped away. Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa.

In the NARCOM office, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana.

The trial court found accused Mari Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen was valid?

HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his


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immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. The NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.

Under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

● People vs. Ruben Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)DOCTRINE:

If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.


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THE FRUIT OF POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE: is an offspring of the Exclusionary Rule. The exclusionary rule mandates that evidence obtained from an illegal arrest, unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation mush be excluded from trial. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence is also excluded from trial if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest, unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation. Like the exclusionary rule, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was established primarily to deter law enforcement from violating rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

FACTS:Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information from one

Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntarily surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to join the NPA with the use of a firearm against his life, a team was dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos. Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was able to locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing his field at the time.

When asked about the firearm, the accused denied possession of it, but after questioning the accused’s wife, the police were able to locate and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the ground below their house. The police, after accused pointed them to the location, were also able to retrieve alleged subversive documents (a notebook and a pamphlet) hidden underground a few meters away from the house.

To prove accused’s subversive activities, Masamlok testified that accused came to his house and told him to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat to his life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ

in Davao testified that accused was not among the list of firearm holders.

On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Ruben’s wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the accused’s denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimed that it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.

The RTC after considering the evidences presented by both prosecution and defense convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion. The RTC justified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the circumstances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that “the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter.” If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. “A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.”

ISSUE:1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manner. 2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD/RATIO:


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1. NO. Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. In this case, the arrest was made without warrant and since it does not fall within the exceptions of arrests that can be made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies.

Reasoning Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time.

The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.

The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that

the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.

If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More important, the Court find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. The Court fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even clearer. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object.

To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.


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2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt.

Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court found Masamlok’s testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case, Masamlok’s testimony was totally uncorroborated.

Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness.

Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

● Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)Doctrine: An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Facts:An officer observed two men, the petitioner Terry, and Chilton,

standing on a street corner. One would walk up to a store window, look inside, and return to confer with his companion. This process was repeated about a dozen times. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. Given the nature of their behavior, and thinking that the men were “casing” the store for potential robbery, the officer confronted them and asked for their names. The men mumbled a response, at which time the officer spun the petitioner around and patted his breast. During this process of quick frisking, he found a concealed pistol, and removed the same. Thus, the petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, the petitioner moved to suppress this weapon from evidence. However, the TC, as affirmed by the CA, denied his motion.

Issue: WON the search for weapon was unreasonable?

Held & Rationale:No. An officer is justified in conducting a carefully limited search

of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous in order to discover any weapons, which might be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the absence of probable cause for arrest. The government’s interest in preventing harm must be balanced against the invasion into a person’s privacy. But the policeman should use an objective test, and be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which reasonably justify the intrusion. Effective crime prevention and detection is a governmental interest in appropriate circumstances for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It would be unreasonable to require that the policeman take unnecessary risks. He has a need to protect himself and others in situations where he lacks probable cause for arrest. In this case, nothing in the conduct of petitioner and his


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friends dispelled the officer’s reasonable fear that they were armed.

Critical summary: This case represents a delineation between a reasonable belief and a reasonable suspicion. Probable cause= reasonable belief. Stop and Frisk = reasonable suspicion backed by articulable facts.

● Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)Facts:

Umbra and Umbra members of Integrated National Police of Davao were conducting surveillance in Davao. They spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.Upon checking they found weapons and from then they arrested the petitioner and brought him to the nearest station to show the necessary license or authority to possess the same but petitioner failed to do so.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt, weapons forfeited in favour of Government.CA: affirmed in toto RTC’s decision

Petitioner alleges that since there is no valid warrant of arrest and search and seizure the evidence is inadmissible in court. The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest is valid?

Ruling:YES. PETITION DENIED. Between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search threat in the case at bar, the search conducted to the petitioner is more reasonable

considering that unlike in the former, it (the search of the petitioner) was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.Stop and search - Valmonte vs. de Villa, as follows:

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable


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cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information

● People vs. Jose Ancheta, GR 197371, June 13, 2012Doctrine:

Noncompliance with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.

Despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.

Facts:1. PO1 Honorio Marmonejo received confidential information regarding the drug pushing activities of “Joker” at Llorando Compound Makati City. This alias “Joker” was also listed in the said office’s watchlist of suspected drug pushers.

2. A buy-bust team of four policemen and eight Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council operatives was formed. PO1 Marmonejo was to act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team served as his back-up. Thereafter, five pieces of 100-bills were provided and marked for use in the operation.₱

3. In the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at the compound. PO1 Marmonejo accompanied by PO1 Mendoza and the informant, entered a slightly opened gate through an alleyway where they met a man who asked them where they were going. The informant replied that they were looking for Joker as they were going to purchase shabu from the latter. The man asked how much they were going to buy, to which the informant answered him that he was to purchase 500.00-worth of₱ shabu. The man told them to wait for a while and then called for Joker.

4. Joker came out from inside the house, and it was at this instance that PO1 Marmonejo took out the marked money. Joker, in turn, gave him one plastic sachet of shabu. The man they met at the alley took the marked money from him and handed it over to Joker. After having received the buy bust money, Joker faced the man washing clothes who is 3 to 4 meters away from them and gave the latter one plastic sachet of shabu as payment for his laundry service.

5.After the transaction, the team immediately went inside the house where the entrapment took place and assisted in effecting the arrest of the accused. Joker was later on identified as Joel Ancheta, the man at the alley was identified as John Llorando, and the one doing the laundry was Juan Carlos Gernada. After informing all of the accused-appellants of their violations and nature of their arrest as well as their constitutional rights, they were subsequently brought to the office of the Makati City Police.

6.Llorando denied the charge against him and claimed that he was cooking inside his house when 3 men suddenly entered his house and poked a gun at him and frisked him. His brother, who was inside the house, tried to intervene, but was not able to do anything. Meanwhile, a


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few meters away from his house lived his brother-in-law, Ancheta and the latter’s adopted son, Gernada.

7. Ancheta and Gernada testified while Gernada was at the kitchen doing the dishes and Ancheta was sleeping in his room with his wife, 5 men barged into their house without warning and arrested them. They were brought to a white vehicle, where they saw the Llorando, who was likewise apparently taken by the same group.

RTC: It gave credence to the arresting officers’ narration of the incident, as they were presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. It then rejected accused-appellants’ claims of frame-up. Ancheta and Llorando were found guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals)Ancheta and Gernada were found guilty of violating Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs)Llorando was found guilty of violating Section 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs)

CA: Affirmed RTC, It also explained that the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the proper procedure for the confiscation and seizure of dangerous drugs embodied in R.A. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. The CA then ruled that noncompliance with the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would not absolve accused-appellants of the crimes of which they were found guilty and would not render their arrest illegal or the seizure of the items inadmissible.

Accused-appellants- question the CA affirmation of their conviction by arguing that the arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. They claim that the officers failed to conduct the following: (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items; and (3) establish that a representative each from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any

elected public official had been contacted and was present during the marking of the items.

Accused-appellants then contend that the prosecution did not prove that noncompliance with procedure was on justifiable grounds. They also aver that the prosecution was unable to establish that the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

Issue: Whether or not noncompliance of the arresting officers with the procedure drawn in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would discharge accused-appellants from the crimes of which they were convicted.

Held:Yes. Though we have recognized that “minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused we have also declared that “when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.” We then ruled that such doubt “cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.” Accordingly, “the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.”

Here, the records are bereft of any indication that would show that the prosecution was able to establish the arresting officers’ compliance with the procedural safeguards under R.A. 9165. Neither do the records contain any physical inventory report or photograph of the confiscated items. None of the arresting officers testified that they had conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the items. Nor did they state that there was even any attempt to contact a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elected public official. Nowhere can it be found that the marking of the items was done in the presence of any of the said


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third-party representatives. In all these major lapses, no one gave so much as an explanation of why the procedure was not followed, or whether there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. The arresting officers and the prosecution simply did not bother discussing these matters.

Indeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items that is of utmost importance in determining the admissibility of the evidence presented in court, especially in cases of buy-bust operations. That is why Congress saw fit to fashion a detailed procedure in order to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items would not be compromised. The marking of the seized items was only a piece in a detailed set of procedural safeguards embodied in R.A. 9165. If the arresting officers were unable to comply with the other requirements, they were under obligation to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience.

Documents

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST_SEARCH AND SEIZURE.docx