Crisis of Democracy

7/29/2019 Crisis of Democracy

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Global Crisis of Democracy?

Eduard BATALOV

Modern democracy is in crisis, possibly global crisis. It is not as profound ordramatic as, say, the major crisis that marked the 1920s and the 1930s, when fas-cists came to power in Italy, Nazis in Germany, and Bolsheviks in Russia. Andyet crisis phenomena and processes are thick on the ground, with many regionsand countries sharing them.

This claim may seem odd, especially so against the background of allega-tions about the worldwide triumph of not only liberal but also democratic ideaand not just the ideawhich came into vogue in the late 1980s when the SovietUnion and the world socialist system collapsed, and even became accepted as

something that goes without saying.Politicians, propagandists, and political analysts, including quite serious

ones, all talked about the unquestioned victory for democracy. During the lasthalf of the twentieth century the world witnessed an extraordinary and unprece-dented political change. All of the main alternatives to democracy either disap-peared, turned into eccentric survivals, or retreated from their field to hunkerdown in their last strongholds,1 Robert Dahl, a prominent US social scientistand author of fundamental works on democracy, wrote in 1998. The same wasthe line of thought accepted by the majority of new political leaders in former

socialist countries, including Russia, which was virtually obsessed with democ-racy in the early 1990s.After several years, however, worry replaced euphoria; speakers and writers,

both in the West and in Russia, increasingly air the view that democracy is not asfine a proposition as it seemed ten or twelve years ago and possibly will groweven worse. Moreover, the signs of crisis are revealed not only in countries wheredemocracy has just made its first steps, but also where it has roots deep in theground. Selfsame Robert Dahl, incidentally, admitted as much: Even in countrieswhere democracy had long been established and seemed secure, some observersheld that democracy was in crisis, or at least severely strained by a decline...2

There were numerous crises in the history of democracy, the more so that itshistory was discrete in nature and lacking in onward thrust. After coming into

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medieval society and disappeared as a mass-scale phenomenon for more than

one thousand years. Its revival in Europe as such a phenomenon was linked tothe emergence of capitalism that in the course of its development experienced anincreasingly urgent need for democracy as a form and method with a capacity toorganize and maintain power relations corresponding to the spirit and principlesof the laissez faire liberalism.

This need persisted throughout capitalisms history, even though moderndemocracy, like capitalism itself, developed unevenly, with breaks and fallbacksoccurring in the process of its deployment in space and time. A latest fallback ofthis kind is before our eyes.

THE NEW CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY can be traced at the conceptuallevel. There grows steadily the number of publications, including scientific ones,devoted to the phenomenon of democracy. In the meantime, its content andmeanings are increasingly vague. Democracy is a concept that virtually defiesdefinition,3 says its prominent student Arend Lijphart. Echoes Mattei Dogan ofthe National Center for Scientific Research in France: Lacking a definition, theword democracy proves deceptive.4 Other political scientists speak in the samevein. There is no unanimity in the understanding of democracy at the mass con-sciousness level either, in Russia included. This dissonance is largely the conse-quence ofsemantic pollution distinguishing the term democracy. The political,social and economic successes of advanced democracies (accompanied byintense eulogies and self-praise) led to a situation where democracy becamewrongly identified with freedom, well-being, justice, good rule, etc., to wit,came to be seen as a synonym of good and a key to national prosperity. As aresult, the concept of democracy lost its true meaning, waxing, to quote US polit-ical scientist Fariid Zakaria, analytically useless.5

The notes that follow below consider democracy (as many of its students do)as aform and method of power (power relations) organization, based on popularself-government. More specifically, democracy is such a form of organization of

power relations as enables the citizenry to participate in power decision-makingeither directly (direct democracy) or through freely elected representatives (rep-resentative democracy), while being able to influence the latter effectively andcontrol their activities.

While not identical to freedom, equality and other values of the same kind,democracy proves effective only if there are definite conditions andprerequisites.These are equality ofcitizens (or subjects of democracy) before the law and theirrespect for the law, primarily the Constitution or its equivalent; freedom, andspecifically, the existence of civil rights and freedoms in society; respect for and

protection of minority rights; political, religious and cultural tolerance. It is alsoobvious that a full-blooded democracy is possible only after society attains a def-i it (it i d b t bl hi h i l ) l l f i d i l d l t

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1980s and the early 1990s implied that it included a number of successive stages.

These were liberalization of a non-democratic regime, its subsequent democrati-zation, and finally a consolidation which filled the political, primarily institution-al, forms with democratic content. The implication was that any country thatbroke with its dictatorship was certainly on its way to democracy. A special focuswas on free competitive elections as a necessary prerequisite for and simultane-ously a basic element of democratization. As for a countrys economic develop-ment level, its historical past, sociocultural traditions, and ethnic make-up of itspopulation, these were regarded as transition factors of secondary importance thatcould be neutralized by the powerful inertia of movement towards democracy.

It is totally clear today that the transition paradigm has failed to stand thetest of time. As Thomas Carothers writes in his article The End of the Transi-tion Paradigm (which generalizes this conclusion), The transition problem hasbeen somewhat useful during a time of momentous and often surprising politicalupheaval in the world. But it is increasingly clear that reality is no longer con-forming to the model.6 The claim that former dictatorships were firmly steeringin the direction of democracy proved imprecise and disorienting: many nationswhich initially opted for democratic change later strayed off course. The assump-tion that in the process of transition countries successively passed through allstages of democratization proved wrong as well, as did the view on elections asthe determining factor in the transition to democracy. On the contrary, it tran-spired that such things as economic development level and former politicalrecord were highly important. Finally, it became clear, concludes Carothers, thatthe making of democratic statehood was a much more difficult problem than ithad seemed at the time of third-wave democratization.7

BUT THE CRISIS of the transition paradigm overshadows the crisis of thetransition process itself. Only about twenty countries out of approximately onehundred that were regarded as being in the state of transition can boast real suc-cess in democratic institution-building. The rest are in the political gray zone.

True enough, many of those countries have adopted constitutions, hold regularelections, and have opposition parties and other civil society institutions. Butthey weakly reflect the real interests of the citizens, while the level of politicalinvolvement of the latter outside of the electoral sphere is very low; governmentofficials are at odds with the law; legitimacy of elections is in doubt; the level ofpublic trust in state institutions is not high, and their functioning is inadequate.This is the end of the transition paradigm, says Carothers.

A latest and possibly most graphic confirmation that the strategy of speedyworld democratization is in crisis was the failure of the policy the United States and

its allies pursued in regard of Afghanistan and Iraq. Some outward signs of democ-racy can appear there, and something is already in place, albeit in a parodic form.B t th i thi i th f i i id th t th d ti l



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Former Central Asian republics slammed down authoritarian regimes, in some

cases even harsher ones than the late-epoch Soviet regime. Russia opted fordemocratic reforms, but they were so hasty, chaotic, inconsistent, and crime-rid-den that, on the one hand, discredited the very idea of democracy in the eyes ofmany Russians, and, on the other, generated negative political tendencies thatrequired serious adjustments. The adjustments, in turn, were and are accompa-nied by unjustified excesses, as it often happens in this country.

One way or the other, it is clear that democracy is in crisis in Russia. It is dis-played in the crisis of democratic consciousness, which means that the politicalleaders lack a clear, concrete and, what is of no less importance, realistic view on

which democratic reforms must be implemented and how it should be done,while the majority of citizens have not just vague but totally distorted ideas aboutdemocracy8 and willingly support authoritarian leaders and policies.

The crisis of democracy is in thefailure to secure equal rights and equalityof parties vying for power mandates. Using dirty electoral technologies haslong become the talk of the town. Electoral infighting, regional infighting in par-ticular, is often a battle between moneybags, occasionally those with criminalantecedents, not one between groups of citizens, parties (mostly unsettled andpuny), or even elites. Of course, reversing the procedure that entitled citizens inthe regions to choose their own governors is a step back from democracy. Butisnt it simultaneously renunciation of a mechanism that has long revealed itsinefficiency if not counterproductiveness?

The crisis of democracy is in sceptical attitudes to the institution of elections(absenteeism) and mass-scale distrust for candidates participating in powerstruggles, something confirmed, among other things, by the invariably high per-centage of the against everyone vote. Power mandate is often bestowed onpoliticians who enjoy support of slightly more than 10-15% of voters.

The crisis of democracy is in the low level of public trust in the elected author-ities (President is the only and therefore distressing exception). I say distressing

because concentration of trust in just one person, however good, is bad for democ-racy, which is based on pluralism and competition. The crisis of democracy is inthe absence of efficient leverage whereby citizens can control the activities of theauthorities they elect, local, regional, let alone federal. The attack on the press inRussia that marked several recent years was certainly not an attack on democracy.It was an attack on freedom. But freedom, let me repeat it, is the necessary condi-tion of democracy, and its restriction inevitably affects the state of the latter.

The crisis of Russian democracy is displayed in how powers are dividedbetween lawmaking, executive and judicial agencies, and in public attitudes

thereto. The real capacity to accept fundamental power decisions is concentrat-ed in the hands of the executive agencies, with power functions frequently arro-

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mer attempt was a success. The Ukrainian outcome, whatever it is, will become

known soon. But it is clear already now that the legislatively provided democra-tic (constitutional) mechanisms and methods of power succession have failed inboth countries.

Another thing is obvious too. As confirmed by one-year-long truck record ofthe new Georgian authorities, coups detat, even anti-authoritarian, cannotimpose a democratic regime. The method whereby a product is made would takecare of its quality characteristics not only in economics but also in politics. Thus,all apologetic explanations to the effect that violence was perpetrated againstthe antidemocratic order for the sake of establishing a truly democratic

regime cannot be accepted in earnest.The events in Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated that a considerable por-tion of their populations is ready to support violent, anticonstitutional actions of theopposition, and this is convincing evidence of a wide diffusion of revolutionaryand mutinous moods, which by their very nature are profoundly antidemocratic.

One more point. Political observers cite facts of direct Western involvementin the activities of Georgian and Ukrainian putsch-makers. Earlier there wasinterferencearmed interferenceby the United States and its allies in theaffairs of Yugoslavia. There was an armed invasion in Iraq. There were numer-ous actions bearing witness to a steady orientation in a portion of Western elitesto nondemocratic foreign policy methods and protection of the Wests interestsby any (!) methods.

Old democracies, too, evince substantial and stable malfunctioning ofdemocratic mechanisms and changes in the state of democratic consciousness.This is something admitted even by Western analysts, who note a low level ofpublic political involvement, government-corporate collusion, worsening real(and occasionally formal) inequality among citizens, encroachments on theirrights, low quality of political decision-making, imperfection of societal gover-nance mechanisms, a decline in the level of legitimacy of power, etc.

Increasingly mentioned latelyin particular, as applied to the UnitedStatesis the archaic nature of certain democratic institutions that took shapeback in the last century or earlier. According to John J. Stuhr of Vanderbilt Uni-versity, once efficient historical expedients are dogmatically presented as eternalvalues, values that are above the requirements of onward societal change.9 Theworld witnessed what that meant in practice in 2000, when the electoral collegevoted in a politician who, as experts claim, actually won fewer votes than his rival.

But what is perhaps the main (and generalizing) sign of the Western democ-racys crisis is the alienation of power from the people and the people from

power. Says Stuhr: We came to the exclusion of people from effective decision-making related to their own life on political, educational, aesthetic and religious

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well-organized groups of interests, regardless of how small the respective groups

of voters may be, are able to make the government obey their wishes. Designedto bring to power the majority, reforms brought into being the power of a minor-ity.11 A similar picture is observed in Europe, the only difference being that theclash of interests is more clearly partisan there.

But the moneybag impact on decision-making is excessive in both Americaand Europe, which shows even at the level of direct democracy. Originally con-ceived to rescue state policies from excessive Big Business influences, directdemocracy became an arena where only the wealthiest citizens and influencegroups could be the players.12

It might be objected that elections in old democracies normally involveless rigging than is the case in new democracies, that their power mechanismsallow fewer failures, that their election campaigns are less corrupt, etc. The gen-eral implication is that the crisis of Western democracy cannot be compared toits manifestations outside of North America and Europe. But can Americans andEuropeans feel better where others are even worse-off than they are?

Hence the position of voters, who have progressively less confidence thattheir elected leaders, the political parties, and government officials could orwould cope fairly or successfully with issues like persistent unemployment,poverty, crime, welfare programs, immigration, taxation, and corruption.13

In recent years, alarming things bearing witness to the crisis of democracyare observed in the electoral behavior of citizens of several European countriesFrance, Germany, Austria, and some others. The displeasure that certain sectorsof their populations feel with the emerging state of affairs (an influx of guest-workers, growing numbers of Third World immigrants, gradually changing cul-tural aspect of white democracies; material problems linked to the crisis of thesocial state, etc.) encouragesprotest voting in favor of extreme right, openly anti-democratic forces.

One cannot but mention yet another sign of the crisis of democracy, namely,

its inability to efficiently stand up to new threats, primarily the so-called inter-national terrorism. Strengthening national security is a natural governmentalreaction to its manifestations. But it transpires that not a single democratic stateand not a single democratic government in the world know how to provide secu-rity other than by actual restriction of rights and freedoms of its citizens. (TheUnited States took this path after September 11, as did Russia and other coun-tries.) A sharp rise in the level of secrecy and closeness of governmental agen-cies, and a surge in the number of clandestine political operations at home andabroad, which are not controlled from below (and occasionally from above),

actually block or restrict chances for constant and efficient civic control overmany bodies of power.

THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY lti

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One of such causes is an inadequate interpretation of the phenomenon of

democracy, which shows, as mentioned above, in the semantic pollution of thisterm and an unjustified identification of democracy with the general good. Inter-pretations of this kind tend to generate exaggerated expectations: hopes arepinned on democracy, which it is simply unable to make come true, and thatleads to an inevitable disillusionment with democracy and often to steps break-ing with democratic institutions and principles, which is particularly characteris-tic of states in transit.

Like any other system of power relations, democracy has limited politicalcapabilities and proves efficient in far from all situations and under far from all

circumstances. For example, researchers came to the conclusion, as early as the1970s, about inefficiency of democratic elections in split societies with stablereligious and ethnic dividing lines. Democratic mechanisms show poor perfor-mance in emergencies (wars, social explosions, disasters, etc.). It is not acciden-tal that democratic constitutions enable imposition of the state of emergency,which essentially is designed to limit democracy. Meanwhile, the late 1990s andthe early 2000s are marked by a steady rise, on the global scale, in the numberof emergencies and crises, which become something habitual and matter-of-fact.A particularly alarming development in this connection is the coming of interna-tional terrorism as a permanent threat to all democratic countries and democracyas such. If the latter fails to find some methods of enhancing its capability forself-reproduction against the background of constant external (and in some casesinternal) threat, it is in for difficult times.

There is yet another cause of the current crisis of democracyattempts at itsspeedy globalization and imposition where there are no necessary prerequisitesfor it. Of course, the starting minimum of conditions for democratization wasalways a very difficult matter, but often it was not even assigned (let us recall thetransition paradigm) in the naive hope that the main thing was to start the ballrolling, to get into a fight, and then the power and the inertia of the process of

democratization will supposedly sweep away all obstacles in its path.The lack of experience and skills in democratic institution-building and every-

day management of democratic mechanisms was also among the things that causedthe crisis. Leaders of the former Soviet republics, who, as a rule, had a vague ideaabout democracy but viewed it as a key to all problems, had to engage in politicalextemporation, which occasionally led them far away from the goal they had setthemselves. Many other transit nations, however, were in the same situation.

Mention should be made in this connection of such a powerful drag ondemocratization and functional democracy as the absence of democratic politi-

cal culture. Many years ago Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba warned aboutthis: But the development of a stable and effective democratic governmentd d th th t t f t d liti it d d



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majority of gray zone countries. Neither is there any today, which is not sur-

prising, for it takes years and years of purposeful efforts to shape it. Besides, itis not enough just to create this culture: its reproduction, like reproduction of thedemocratic system as a whole and its adaptation to new conditions should be thematter of constant concern. Nothing of the kind was practiced in Russia, orEurope, or America...

THE CURRENT CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY is not a crash or a demise, itis precisely a crisis, a morbid state accompanied by a partial dysfunction andconsequential upon a historic transition from one epoch to another. Though thenext few decades promise to be harsh and filled with hard struggles for power

inside separate countries and for resources and geopolitical footholds in the inter-national arena, democracy has chances to cope with its present predicament, themore so that it is much younger than ancient democracy and its potential is farfrom exhausted. At any rate, as long as capitalism exists, so will democracy, forthese two, to quote the poet (Vladimir Mayakovsky.Tr.), are twin brothers.

Modern competitive democracy which implies rivalry where election of offi-cials and the filling of leading posts are concerned fits in well with capitalism asa competitive market system. Moreover, the necessary condition of the normalfunctioning of an advanced market of economic commodities, capitals and ser-vices is the parallel functioning of a market of political commodities, capitals andservices in the shape of competitive democracy.

20th-century societal development was accompanied by a buildup in thesocial and political role of the masses as transgroup entities.15 An effective con-trol of these is possible either via governmental suppression and manipulationfrom above, or via their involvement in the political-market process (or ratherprovision of chances for that involvement) and the opening of an access topower, including its top echelons, for their individual representatives. Represen-tatives of the masses are given an opportunity to try and purchase a powermandate, doing this in a totally legitimate way in electoral competition with each

other. This cannot but win over to democracy members of most different socio-professional groups, who hope to get personal access to power or to secure grouprepresentation.

The bureaucratization and scientization of modern capitalist society are pro-ducing the same effect. The huge growth of bureaucratic apparatus is creating hun-dreds of thousands of cushy jobs which can be obtained by politicians and spe-cialists who serve them via a predominantly democratic (competitive) procedure.

In a nutshell, under capitalism, which turns political relations into a variety(albeit specific) of market relations, democracy is a mechanism for their regulation;

this mechanism may suffer crises but on the whole it retains its importance as longas there is a demand for political and administrative power as a commodity.

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sistsprimarily in the form of economic liberalismin many countries and

regions of the modern world and naturally clears the way for democracy.Much will certainly depend on how its supporters use chances they are given

by history. Currently there are many references to Winston Churchills comment(not always quoted correctly16) to the effect that democracy, though not withoutfaults, is the best thing mankind has invented so far. But who said that the insti-tution of democracy could not be open to improvement or that no attemptsshould be made to minimize those faults (it will never be possible, thank God, toremove them completely) and make the democratic institutions more consistentwith the imperatives of the epoch?

Many years ago, John Dewey made this splendid observation: We muststudy the idea, the meaning of democracy again and again. It has to be constant-ly discovered and rediscovered. If democracy is failing to advance, it takes thepath of regress that leads to its extinction.17 This advice alone can help deal withthe current crisis of democracy and later make democracy more efficient as aform and method of popular self-government.

The above holds true for Russia as well. Fair enough, many view the crisisof democracy it is facing as evidence of democracys incompatibility with Russ-ian historical traditions and Russian mentality. To quote St. Petersburg GovernorValentina Matviyenko, Where mentality is concerned, the Russians need a lord,a tsar, a president... In a word, one-man rule.18 Matviyenko voiced what, in fact,is felt by many Russians, who, however, fear to say it in so many words. Andthey feel this way because they constantly have to run into sluggish thinking,civic passivity, sloth, lack of initiative, and paternalist or downright servile psy-chology.

This cannot be easily changed. There are other obstacles impeding democ-ratization, including the Wests policies in respect of Russia and the constantthreat coming from international terrorism. And yet, this country will have todevelop liberal democracy institutions if it wants to solve problems facing it and

find itself among the leading world powers. It is only in this way that the dor-mant creative energy of the people, one so much needed for a national revival,can be released. It is only the democratic mechanisms that can provide for adynamic and regular replacement of leaders and regeneration of political elites,something that protects society against stagnation and bogging (one of thethings that caused the collapse of Soviet socialism).

The problem is how democracy should be built in Russia and how it shouldlook concretely. The sad experience of the 1990s demonstrated that the mechan-ic borrowing of Western political experience only discredited democracy and

made it even more remote. The same applies to the hasty and across-the-boarddemocratization, which went practically in parallel with the blanket privatiza-ti Thi th t id ti h ld b i t h t dj t th it



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NOTES

1 Robert Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven & London, 1998, p. 1.

2 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

3 Arend Lijphart,Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, New Haven

& London, 1980, p. 4.

4 A New Handbook of Political Science, Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter

Klingemann, Oxford, 1996.

5 Fariid Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, New

York, 2003.

6 Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm,Journal of Democracy, 2002,

vol. 13, No. 1, p. 7.

7 Ibid., pp. 14-17. (For waves of democratization, See: Samuel Huntington, Third Wave.

Democratization in the Late 20th Century, London, 1991).

8 According to a February 2004 poll conducted by Yury Levada Center, Russian citizens

asked What does democracy mean?, replied freedom of speech, of the press, and of

religion (44%); nationwide economic prosperity (31%); strict compliance with laws

(24%); order and stability (29%); a chance to do anything you want (6%), and so on.

Only 18% (!) replied that democracy was election of state leaders, and only 6% linked

democracy with the defense of minority rights (See: Yu. Levada, What the Polls TellUs,Journal of Democracy, 2004, July, vol. 15, No. 3).

9 John J. Stuhr, Revealing Democracy Anew, Polis, 2003, No. 5, pp. 14-15.

10 Ibidem.

11 Fariid Zakaria, Op. cit., p. 183.

12 Ibid., p. 213.

13 Robert Dahl, Op. cit., p. 2. According to numerous Gallup polls, the number of citizens

accepting that Washington Administration can be trusted because it always or mostly

does the right thing declined from more than 70% in the early 1960s to approximately30% in the late 20thearly 21st centuries.

14 Gabriel Almond, Sidbey Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in

Five Nations, Princeton, 1963, p. 498.

15 For more detail, see: E. Batalov, Political Culture of Modern American Society, Moscow,

1990 (Ch. 3, 1) (in Russian).

16 For more detail on this incorrectness, See E. Batalov, Democracy and War, Svobodnaya

myslXXI, No.7, 2004.

17 John Dewey, The Later Works: 1925-1953, vol. 11, Carbondale, 1981/1990, p. 182.

18 Itoghi, October 26, 2004, p. 16.

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Crisis of Democracy