Sir Winston Churchill HSMUN Conference

SWCHSMUN 2014

SWCHSMUN 2014Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: JCC North Korea

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Table of Contents

Background History …………………………………………………………….Page 2-3

The Korean War ………………………………………………………….Page 4

End of the Korean War ………………………………………………..Pages 4-5

DPRK during the Cold War..………………………………………….Pages 5-6

ROC during the Cold War …………………………………………….Pages 6-7

End of the Cold War …………………………………………………….Page 7

Present Condition of the DPRK …………………………………………….Page 8

Cabinet of North Korea ……………………………………………………Pages 11-12

What Are Crisis Committees? ………………………………………….Page 13

Directives and Notes ……………………………………………………….Pages 14-16

Flow of Debate: Crisis Committees ………………………………….Page 17

Notes ……………………………………………………………………………….Pages 18-19

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Background HistoryNorth Korean history officially dates back only to 1948, with the creation of

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea1. Prior to its independence, North Korea existed as one half of Korea, which had been under Japanese control since the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1912. However, Japanese involvement in World War II pushed the Allied Powers (notably Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and the United States) to negotiate and discuss the fate of Japan's statehood. Consequently, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed to meet at the Cairo Conference in November 1943. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader at the time, refused to attend because he believed that Chinese attendance at the conference would raise tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union as the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact had been signed in 1941, and the Soviet Union had not been at war with Japan in 19432. Getting involved would have put their relations in jeopardy. With Stalin not in attendance, the three main leaders agreed to discuss Japan's territories and their combined stance toward to the nation. The three nations agreed to keep deploying forces until Japan surrendered unconditionally. Additionally, they agreed that all of the territories that had been taken by Japan from the Chinese would be returned, and that Korea “in due course...shall become free and independent.” The timetable for independence was decided to be four years, though both Korean nationalists and Soviet leaders were skeptical of the decision, both wishing for a shorter period of time.3

However, two years later, there had still been no decision made as to the fate of Korea. After the United States carried out its controversial decision to bomb Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945, Stalin made the decision to invade Manchuria – upholding the agreement he had made with Harry Truman at the Potsdam Conference.4 They invaded Korea as well, but stopped at the 38th parallel, which divides the country roughly in half, in agreement with the United States. This unfortunately incited fears among United States officials that the Soviet Union was gaining too much power in the peninsula, and that it could lead to a Soviet occupation of Japan. Therefore, two relatively young officers, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel were charged with the responsibility of determining an occupation zone for the United States. Despite demographic differences and politics in the region that should have factored into their decision, the two officers were fairly uninformed about the region, and used a geographic map to determine the zone.

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On complete coincidence, they chose the 38th parallel because it divided the country approximately in half while leaving Seoul, the capital, under American jurisdiction. However, they were completely unaware that Japan and Russia had previously discussed the same line as a potential division, and would likely have chosen a different place had they known5. Shortly after, Japan ceded power over Korea, and chose a left-wing moderate, Lyuh Woon-Hyung, to oversee the creation of a new Korean state. The new administration had left-leaning views and many had Communist ties, much to the dismay of the United States government.

In response to the new administration, Koreans began to organize and prepare for an independent Korea, creating “Committees for the Preparation of Korean Independence.” Keenly aware of the rising nationalist sentiment that was growing in the area, the Soviet Union adeptly monitored all of these committees, and set up the Soviet Civil Authority to do so. They managed to place Communist leaders in key positions throughout the government, while the Koreans founded the Interim People’s Committee in February 1946 with Kim Il-Sung as the leader of the new central government. Kim was able to initiate shockingly peaceful land reforms that redistributed the land of wealthy landowners to the poor, and was able to strategically centralize power among his group of allies6. Clearly leftist in policy, many wealthy landowners grew angry with reform and fled to South Korea, which was then controlled by the United States and decidedly less Communist-oriented, allowing the rich warlords to hold more authority over their land7. In 1946, Kim Il-sung was named as the head of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, but corruption and rivalries were starting to seriously infiltrate the government. By 1947, the Cold War was underway, and the Soviet Union and the United States were unable to agree on a way to achieve a unified Korea. The United States sought UN help to reach a solution, but the Soviet Union opposed any kind of UN involvement. Therefore, in November 1947, the UN decided that free elections were to be held, and all foreign troops ought to be withdrawn. Although the Soviet Union left North Korea in 1948, a pro-Soviet government had been set up in Pyonyang, North Korea, with the creation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with Kim Il-sung as prime minister.8

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The Korean War Kim convinced the Soviets to prohibit the UN from crossing the 38th

parallel, effectively negating UN oversight of elections. By 1949, North Korea was effectively a Communist dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, a command economy was established, placing 90% of all industry in the country under state control9. Meanwhile, the United States was working closely with Syngman Rhee’s government in South Korea in order to combat the spread of communism in the South. Without aid from the US, Kim looked to Soviet and Chinese support in order to reunify the two Koreas by force. Initially, Stalin rejected Kim’s overtures but the 1949 Chinese communist revolution combined with the Soviet’s nuclearization caused him to reconsider offering Soviet support. In January of 1950, Stalin approved an invasion of South Korea—though Soviets initially only provided advisors for North Korean training. Although in hindsight the Korean War was seen largely as a proxy war between the Soviets and America, Stalin had made it clear to the North Koreans that he wished to avoid a direct conflict with the Americans and would commit no ground troops to the cause.10

In the early months of 1950, conflict was largely limited to clashes on the 38th parallel. However, on June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale offensive, crossing the 38th parallel by force. North Korea was able to overwhelm the South fairly quickly and took Seoul, causing Rhee and the government to flee. One of the largest issues the South dealt with was a torn populous—not everyone in South Korea supported their own government, which had been accused of corruption, and some still had family or friends in the North. By July, the North had pushed the South all the way to the Pusan Perimeter. Up until this point, Americans had acted primarily as military advisors, but soon they escalated their presence. In September of 1950, the United Nations forces entered the fray and retook Seoul, pushing all the way to Pyongyang, causing Kim to flee. In response, Chinese forces joined North Koreans and pushed the UN forces out of the North Korean capital. By March of 1951, Seoul had moved back from Chinese hands to UN hands and the war was effectively in a stalemate for the next two years.

End of the Korean War On July 27th, 1953, North and South Korea signed an armistice agreeing to

cease hostilities, effectively establishing two separate nations. However, this was not an official peace agreement, indicating that they are technically still in a state of war. To prevent further immediate hostilities, they created a 2.5 mile wide

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Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along their entire border.11 The international community sought to resolve the issue of the divided Koreas during the 1954 Geneva Conference. Although both the USSR and the USA supported a unified and independent Korean nation, the other delegations present at the conference refused to adopt the declarations from either side, citing parts of both their declarations to be unreasonable or unrealistic.12 Critics blame the failure to produce meaningful results on the United States’ unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations, some going as far as accusing the US of actively obstructing efforts towards creating a peace agreement. Reunification of the two Koreas remained as the stated goal for the international community for both the North and the South. However, efforts towards reunification gradually waned after the conference, eventually shifting resources towards maintaining the status quo. The two Koreas were left to develop themselves in whichever way each saw fit, though they inevitably played important roles during the Cold War as protégés of the two most powerful nations.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during the Cold War After the end of the Korean War, North Korea was able to rebuild from the

aftermath of the war largely thanks to the large amount of aid provided by the Soviet Union and communist China. For Kim’s North Korean regime, this effectively meant that he had total freedom to impose his will upon his half of the peninsula. Once reconstruction was mostly complete, North Korean leader Kim Il- Sung immediately began the process of solidifying his control over the North Korean government. Kim initiated a series of loyalty purges throughout the government and military of North Korea between 1956 and 1958. By 1961, Kim’s control over North Korea was complete and he had successfully created a cult of personality.13 Though firmly in the communist camp, North Korea came under some tough decisions when the two communist powers, Soviet Russia and China, began to drift apart from one another. During this period, Kim’s goal was to balance North Korea’s stance between the two, refusing to favor either side too much. After all, North Korea’s development heavily depended on aid from both its neighbors. Initially, Kim slightly favored the Chinese, largely due to historical and cultural ties. However, a rift occurred between North Korea and China when Kim refused to follow Mao Zedong in his Cultural Revolution. Kim stopped short of publicly criticizing the Cultural Revolution but, during a visit to Moscow in 1966, he did express his bafflement concerning Mao’s actions.14 As a result, sporadic border

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clashes occurred between the two supposed allies, China and North Korea. Both sides employed a propaganda campaign against the other. Hostilities lasted until late 1970s, when the Cultural Revolution began to wind down in China. Eventually, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai apologized for the smear campaign ran by the Chinese Red Guard against Kim during his visit to Pyongyang.15

The next major conflict in the Cold War was the Vietnam War between 1968 and 1975. When North Vietnam prevailed against the South in 1975 despite the massive American military support, Kim saw it as an opportunity to restart the Korean War and unify the peninsula under his rule. Knowing that the North Korean forces had very little chances to conquer the South on its own, Kim went to Beijing to ask Mao for aid. Mao Zedong refused to support Kim due to the ongoing efforts between China and the United States in normalizing their relations16. Kim would continue to attempt to balance North Korean relations with China and the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War.

Republic of Korea during the Cold War Unlike North Korea, the South Korean government shifted between many

types of government between the end of the Korean War and the end of the Cold War. Syngman Rhee’s First Republic became decidedly autocratic after the end of the Korean War despite its democratic origin.17 Rhee was eventually forced to resign in the aftermath of the 1960 April Revolution when students across South Korea initiated a series of protests that soon escalated out of the government’s control.18

A Second Republic was established after a parliamentary election was held in July 1960 with the opposition party gaining power. The government was headed by Prime Minister Chang Myon, who carried out several leftist policies. In May 1961, Major General Park Chung-hee led a coup out of fear of South Korea becoming a communist country and established a military government in its place.19

Under Park’s leadership, the Third Republic and later Fourth Republic were formed with Park being elected as president. The Third and Fourth Republics were periods of rapid development and economic growth for South Korea. While democratic elections were conducted through the Third Republic, they were gradually limited and eventually outright suppressed or rigged.20 Democratic activists again rallied against Park in widespread demonstrations. In 1979, Park was assassinated by the director of South Korea’s intelligence agency.21

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South Korea began its transition into an actual democracy during the Fifth Republic and became a full democracy with direct election of officials in 1987 during the current Sixth Republic.22 In summation, South Korea’s official stance towards the Korean division throughout the Cold War can be summarized by the slogan “Development first, Unification later.”

End of the Cold War With the Cold War coming to an end and the Soviet Union on the verge of

collapse, North Korea was forced to deal with a loss of a key economic and political ally. The void left by the Soviet Union’s collapse contributed to the gradual economic devastation of North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea continued its isolationist policy, reducing the amount of potential economic partners while also limiting the amount of detailed information on the country’s economic and military status.

North Korea’s isolationist policy was a derivative of the ideologies of its leading party, the Korean Worker’s Party (WPK). This WPK stands for an ideology of Juche, which says that the Korean masses are the masters of the country’s development and the country can therefore be self-sufficient. Juche also justified all government actions that seek to maintain a closed off, protected nation, such as a strong military presence and a reliance on Korean natural resources23. When the collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by natural disasters, a national famine ensued, lasting from 1994 to 1998 and killing an estimated 800,000 to 3.5 million citizens. After Kim Il-Sung died in 1994, many observers predicted that the nation’s new leader, Kim Jong-il would not be able to sustain the regime during the famine; later, he proved them wrong. In order to combat the drastic effects of famine, Kim Jong-il looked to his party’s Juche ideology for answers and solutions. What outsiders called a totalitarian, Stalinist dictatorship, Kim called a “military first” policy24. Semantics aside, his attempts at alleviating the effects of the economic collapse involved the removal of citizens’ human rights and a very strong military presence. This tradition of maintaining tight government control and enforcing very few human rights has continued until today.

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Present Condition of the DPRK North Korea’s dictatorial leadership continues its unwillingness to open or

restructure its economy and maintains its commitment to a centrally planned economy with very limited market allocation of goods – effectively, Communism. Although information is so limited on its economy, most scholars still consider North Korea a nation with the least economic freedom of any in the world. The government controls every aspect of economic activity and owns all industry, leaving no room for any private ventures. Due to the governments’ shackles on the invisible hand and the inability for the markets to be efficient, there is widespread poverty in the nation.25 Deprivation is widespread with much of the population dependent upon food rations and government subsidies for their housing. The nation’s GDP per capita in 2011 was $1,800, which ranks 193rd out of the 226 world nations.26 The North Korean nuclear program has led to international sanctions and limits on humanitarian assistance, only escalating the hardship for citizens. The government’s structure makes any hope of an economic rebirth dim. Property rights are not guaranteed, and almost all property belongs to the government. There is no judicial system and corruption in the government is ubiquitous. There is no tax system in place, and due to the government’s control of production plans for products, there is no efficiency. Furthermore, entrepreneurial endeavors are very hard to pursue. In fact, in December of 2009, the North Korean government revalued all of the currency and limited the amount of old currency that could be exchanged. As a result, many citizens lost their life savings and, with it, any prospects of engaging in the frowned upon private ventures they had dreamed of.27 However, it is important to note that a black market does exist and some cell phones and other communication devices are being smuggled in from China, providing some connection to the outside world. Nonetheless, a collapse of the North Korean economy is inevitable, as the government remains tied to its totalitarian ways.

Despite the fact that North Korea’s government has failed to serve its people, its repression on numerous civil rights has enabled the government to minimize dissent. Freedom of speech is absolutely outlawed in the country, and the majority of the news that citizens receive is through state-run television and radio; however, more people are obtaining access to South Korean media in the past few years.28 Moreover, North Korea’s citizens are limited in their capacity to move within or out of the country, as anyone that leaves is considered a defector by the government. Simply put, North Korea’s citizens are extremely limited in

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their ability to do anything that could potentially undermine the government, from openly discussing politics to even using cell phones openly. North Korea also operates extensive prison camps throughout the country to detain any dissidents; the prison system is so extensive that even the relatives of dissidents are imprisoned as well. An estimated 200,000 people are detained in these prison camps, forced to participate in essentially slave labor while on the verge of starvation. Furthermore, public executions are frequent in the prison camps to go along with deaths due to overwork and starvation. An estimated 10,000 prisoners die each year in the camps.29

The government is maintaining internal control by repressing dissent and emphasizing its leader’s cult of character while spending almost no money on its people. However, the country is able to ward off external influences because of its large expenditures in its military. Although the full details on its military are unknown due to North Korea’s isolationism, experts estimate that North Korea uses 25 percent of its GDP on the military, making it one of the most militarized countries in the world. There are currently 1 million people active in the military with 7 million in reserve.30 By numbers alone, North Korea theoretically poses a major threat, especially towards the neighboring South Korea.

Even with these numbers, the North Korean military is poorly trained and fed and much of their current technology is aging, limiting the potential capability of this conventional force. Instead, North Korea had invested more of their budget in ballistics and nuclear weaponry. North Korea first withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 to begin development of their nuclear arsenal. They suspended development in 1994 due to international pressure, especially from the United States and the UN Security Council; they resumed their program in 2002 after claiming that the United States failed to provide accessible energy, a concession in exchange for the suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program. After nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, analysts believe that North Korea now has possession of nuclear weapons along with technology to carry the weapons across far distances. Up to this point, tests of these delivery systems have led to mixed results.31

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Thus, even if a substantial portion of North Korea’s military technology is aging due to its political isolation and economic struggles, they have enough military might in both numbers and long-range weaponry to respond to any military provocation. In the end, North Korea’s military ambition acts as one of its greatest threats. They have already attempted multiple times to go underneath the DMZ through tunnels to create a route into South Korea. On top of that, North Korea has demonstrated an immense dedication to their military, essentially ignoring domestic issues just to continue their military spending.

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Cabinet of North KoreaThe cabinet is appointed and accountable to the Supreme People's

Assembly, the North Korean unicameral parliament. The SPA chooses the Premier of North Korea who appoints three vice premiers and the cabinet's ministers. All members of the cabinet are members of the Workers' Party of Korea which has ruled the country since its establishment in 1948. While the SPA is not in session, the cabinet is accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. The Cabinet, as the executive branch of the North Korean state, is responsible for implementing the state's economic policies, as guided by the Workers' Party. The cabinet is not responsible for defense and security issues, as those are handled by the National Defense Commission. Thus, the security organizations such as the Korean People's Army, Ministry of People's Security and State Security Department report and subordinated directly to the National Defense Commission. The Cabinet convenes a plenary meeting and an executive meeting.

The plenary meeting consists of all the Cabinet members; on the other hand, the executive meeting is kind of a presidium and comprises of fewer people, including the Premier, vice premier and other Cabinet members whom the Premier nominates. The cabinet forms acts in the form of decisions and directives. The National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (NDC) is defined by the 1998 constitution as “the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military matters.” The Chairman of the National Defence Commission controls the armed forces and, in this state where the military pre-dominates, is the most powerful position in the country. Currently Kim Jong-un is the First Chairman of the NDC.

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At SWCHSMUN 2014, the DPRK will be simulated by using a combination of the cabinet and the National Defense Commission.

National Defense Commission

Eternal Chairman: Kim Jong-il First Chairman: Kim Jong-un Vice Chairmen: Vice Marshal of the KPA Kim Yong-Chun Vice Marshal of the KPA Ri Yong-mu General of the Army O Kuk-ryol

Members of the Commission: General of the Army Ri Myong-su, Minister of State Security General of the Army Choe Pu-il General of the Army Kim Kyok-sik, Minister of the People's Armed Forces Pak To-chun Paek Se-bong Kim Won-hong Ju Kyu-chang, 1st Deputy Secretary, WPK Department of Military

Industries

Cabinet of North Korea‡:

Premier Pak Pong-ju Minister of Foreign Affairs: Pak Ui-chan Minister of Finance: Choe Kwang-jin Minister of Public Health: Choe Chang-sik Minister of Land and Marine Transportation: Kang Jong-gwan Minister of Agriculture: Hwang Min

‡ Note: Not all members of the North Korea cabinet will be present for the simulation.

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What are Crisis Committees?

Crisis Committees are specialized groups at SWCHSMUN that spend most of their time dealing with real-time events that require immediate attention and action. These crises range from terrorist attacks to natural disasters to corruption within a certain organization. Common considerations of crisis committees include: understanding the crisis and its implications, informing (or not informing) the press and public, undertaking immediate damage control, reacting to the actions of other groups, and preventing future crises.

Simulation OverviewParliamentary Procedure Specific to Crisis CommitteesThe same parliamentary procedures used for General Assemblies and Special Committees apply to Crisis Committees as well. However, Crisis Committees (such as the US National Security Council) tend to be more informal than other committees, that is, they require a limited use of parliamentary procedure. They are often times more unstructured, and the flow of the committee is heavily dependent on the discretion of the chair. The chair will make his/her procedural preferences clear at the start of the first committee session. There may be a speaker’s list, yet most committees do without one. There is often no official setting of the agenda, as debate tends to flow between topics and is determined by the pertinent crisis at hand. In general, discussion occurs through moderated caucuses in which the chair calls upon delegates to speak. Delegates motion for moderated caucuses of a specified length and speaking time and on a specified topic. Many issues may be discussed concurrently and crises introduced by the crisis staff may interrupt discussion. Occasionally, unmoderated caucuses (motioned for by a delegate) are held in which formal debate is suspended and delegates speak at will in groups of their choosing. In voting, a motion for an unmoderated caucus takes precedence over a motion for a moderated caucus. Often, motions are simply passed without voting if there are no competing motions. Action is taken through directives, and there are generally no working papers or resolutions, unless the chair so desires. Notes are used to communicate between delegates while the committee proceeds. They are often used to work with delegates of similar viewpoints to coordinate actions. Questions can also be sent to the chair (or crisis staff) in a note.

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Directives and NotesDirectivesIn order to carry out any action during committee, a directive must be sent by an individual, a group of individuals, or the committee as a whole. If it is not on behalf of the entire committee, then the delegate(s) can choose to make the directive private and it will not be revealed to the whole committee. If the chair deems necessary, the directive may need to be introduced by a requisite number of writers. To pass a directive on behalf of the whole committee, a simple majority vote is required. The chair will hold a vote as each directive is introduced. There are three types of directives – Action Orders, Communiqués, and Press Releases. Action orders are used to direct troops, agencies, individuals, etc. to take an action that is within the authority of the committee. An individual may only send an action order if it is within his powers. A communiqué is used to communicate with foreign governments, or individuals outside the committee. A press release is used to reveal information to the public.

Examples of Directives

Action Order

Direct Allied forces to invade Normandy, France on June 6th. Paratroopers shall bedropped behind enemy lines on June 4th. Landings shall take place at Utah, Omaha,Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.

-The Allies

Communiqué

To the Emperor of Japan:We demand an immediate, unconditional surrender by all Japanese forces within 48hours, or we shall be forced to unleash heretofore unimaginable devastation upon yourcities. - The Allies

Press Release

Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. - Franklin D. Roosevelt

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Examples of NotesTo a member of the same committee

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Franklin D. RooseveltFrom: Winston Churchill[Message on inside of Note]We ask that you work with us to increase intelligence efforts directed against our so-calledallies, the Soviets, so that we will not be surprised by any actions they take after the war.- Winston Churchill

To a member of another committee

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Leaders of Romania, AxisFrom: Josef Stalin, Allies[Message on inside of Note]Seeing as the defeat of Nazi Germany is near, we would advise you to make a deal with theSoviet Union now or we will show no mercy when the time for your defeat arrives.- Josef Stalin

To chair or crisis staff

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Chair/CrisisFrom: Winston Churchill[Message on inside of Note]What is the current disposition of British forces in the Middle East?- Winston Churchill

An Outline of Typical Crisis Committee Flow A moderated caucus takes place with delegates outlining their position. A delegate motions for a moderated caucus on a specified topic of a specified

length with a specified speaking time. Delegates discuss actions to take regarding that topic through the moderated

caucus and through notes. Delegates submit directives to the chair to take an action and motion to

introduce the directive. Discussion on the directives will proceed through the current moderated

caucus and amendments may be proposed and voted on.

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A delegate will motion to vote on a directive and the directive is either passed or rejected.

A crisis will occur, oftentimes in the middle of debate. The crisis staff will introduce new information or developments through news articles, videos, intelligence reports, etc.

Discussion will shift informally or through a new moderated caucus to discuss this development.

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FLOW OF DEBATE: CRISIS COMMITTEES

Moderated caucus takes place where

delegates outline their positions

A delegate motions for a moderated caucus with a

specified length on a specified topic with a

speaking length

Delegates discuss actions to take

regarding that topic through speeches and

notes

Delegates submit directives to the chair to take an action and motion to introduce

their directive

Discussion on directives will proceed

through the current moderated caucus

Amendments may be proposed and voted

on

A delegate will motion to vote on a directive,

which will either be passed or rejected

A crisis will occur. The crisis staff will introduce

new information or developments through news articles, videos,

intelligence reports, etc.

Discussion will shift informally or through

a new moderated caucus to discuss this

development

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Notes1 “Background Note: North Korea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm 2 Text in Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence Regarding Negotiations... (1903–1904) pp. 7–9. 3 Savada, Andrea Matles; Shaw, William, eds. (1990), "World War II and Korea", South Korea: A Country Study, GPO, Washington, DC: Library of Congress. 4 Walker, J Samuel, Prompt and Utter Destruction, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 5 Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas. Basic Books, p. 6. 6 “Country Profile: North Korea.” Library of Congress-Federal Research Division. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf 7 Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas. Basic Books, p. 6. 8 “Background Note: North Korea.” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm 9 Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas. Basic Books, p. 6. 10 Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1, 1945-1949. Princeton University Press. 11 Background note: North Korea. U.S. Dept. of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm 12 Bailey, Sydney D. (1992). The Korean Armistice. St. Martin's Press. pp. 167–168. 13 Marshall Cavendish Corporation (2007). World and Its Peoples: Eastern and Southern Asia. Marshall Cavendish. p. 929. ISBN 978-0-7614-7631-3. 14 Cold War International History Project http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=home.document&identifier=76955249- 5056-9700-03A9A99D8C2DC264&sort=collection&item=North%20Korea%20in%20the%20Cold%20War 15 Kim il sung weeps after death of Chinese Primer Zhou http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/05/18/5005s2854835.htm 16 East German Documents on Kim Il Sung’s April 1975 Trip to Beijing. Wilson Center. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/east-german-documents-kim-il-sung%E2%80%99s-april-1975-trip-to- beijing 17 Rhee syngman; causes of the 4.19 revolution. In Doosan Encyclopedia. Korea: Doosan Donga. 18 Rhee syngman; causes of the 4.19 revolution. In Doosan Encyclopedia. Korea: Doosan Donga

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19 The 3rd Republic. In Doosan Encyclopedia. Korea: Doosan Donga. 20 The Academy of Korean Studies (2005). Korea through the Ages Vol. 2. Seoul: The Editor Publishing Co.. 21 Major Polices of the 3rd Republic. In Doosan Encyclopedia. Korea: Doosan Donga. 22 Library of Congress. (n.d.). Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987 http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/66.htm 23 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/07/AR2009060700717.html24 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/322457/Korean-Workers-Party-KWP 25 http://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea 26 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html 27 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125963843649570793.html 28 http://en.rsf.org/internet-enemie-north-korea,39755.html 29 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA24/001/2011/en/2671e54f-1cd1-46c1-96f1- 6a463efa6f65/asa240012011en.pdf 30 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm 31 Jonathan D. Pollack, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Development: Implications for Future Policy" Proliferation Papers, Paris, Ifri, Spring 2010