Critical Notes on Peasant Mobilization in Latin America

Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant Mobilization in Latin AmericaAuthor(s): Peter SingelmannSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 4, Peasants and PoliticalMobilization (Oct., 1975), pp. 389-409Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178298 .

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The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant Mobilization in Latin America PETER SINGELMANN

University of Missouri, Kansas City

Students of contemporary campesino movements in Latin America have their analyses generally focused on two problem-complexes. One of these entails the macro-structural changes of the larger society within which campesino movements develop. Such changes are represented by the gradual imposition of the nation-state over the more remote regions of the countries, the concomitant decline in the geographic, political, and economic isolation of these remote areas, the emergence of 'multiple-power domains' within which ascending groups challenge the political brokerage monopolies of the traditional large landholders over the campesinos within their domains, and the development of clientelistic political structures within which campesino followings become attractive power resources for politicians at the regional and national level.1 The second, and more controversial, problem-complex deals with the formation of class consciousness and solidarity among mobilized campesino groups. In this line of inquiry the most critical questions concern the degree to which campesino movements represent the struggles of a 'class for itself' and emancipate their members from the domination of the upper classes.2 While authors generally agree that campesino movements, as prima facie evidence of at least a minimal measure of class solidarity, have developed in the twentieth century largely as a consequence of the indicated macro- structural changes, a number of authors have suggested a very specific theoretical model for analyzing the interrelations between campesino solidarity and structural changes. This is the model of the 'closed triangle' which was first developed by Cotler (1969) and subsequently applied to the analysis of Peruvian and Bolivian campesino movements by other authors (cf. Whyte, 1970; Dandler, 1969, 1971; Bourque, 1971; Alberti, 1970).

I am indebted to Julio Cotler for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. For the remaining shortcomings I take the responsibility.

1 On the general development of multiple-power domains in Latin America, cf. Adams (1967b; 1964: 63-73). On the structure of clientelistic politics, cf. Powell (1970).

2 This concern is particularly articulated in the debates between Galjart (1964, 1965) and Huizer (1965), and in Petras and Zemelman (1972).

389



390 PETER SINGELMANN

According to this model, the development of class solidarity among the campesinos is a direct function of the encroachments on the part of 'new' political brokers upon the traditionally monopolistic power domains of the landed estates. In the following sections some pivotal assumptions of the 'closed triangle' model will be explicated and subjected to a critical analysis.

THE MODEL OF THE 'OPEN' AND 'CLOSED' TRIANGLE3

The model of the 'closed' triangle, representing relatively modernized socio-political structures (Tullis, 1970: 46-50), contrasts ideal-typically with that of the 'open' triangle for the traditional socio-political frame within which rural-class relations have existed in the past.

Traditional rural-class relations in Latin America have been characterized by patterns of extreme unilateral dependence.4 Founded on a mixture of coercion and legally sanctioned privileges with regard to political and property rights, the position of the large landholders has traditionally enabled them to control and restrict the subsistence means of most of the rural lower sectors. Given this scarcity, powerlessness and dependence, campesinos who interacted with larger landholders as renters, sharecroppers, serfs, or laborers had little choice but to subject themselves to the arbitrary and exploitative terms set by their patrones. Their only means of improving their life chances were deference, obedience, and loyalty to their landlords as incentives for good treatment and perhaps a few favors in time of need. The dependence of the campesinos on the patrones in the micro-social relations was reinforced by macro-structural patterns which granted the large landholders quasi-monopolies over the access to, and control over, armed forces and other institutional resources of the larger society such as political office or influence in the courts. Campesinos had access to these institutions only via the intermediary services of a patr6n who had the cultural capacities and political connections to mobilize institutional resources on behalf of his dependents. The power and brokerage monopoly which the traditional landed gentry wielded over the dependents in their domain precluded the interference of rival brokers and made the landlords virtually the sole source of subsistence, protection, and identification for their dependents. Under these conditions, campesinos had everything to gain from solidarity with the patron but little from horizontal solidarity with members of their own class. Relations between landlords and campesinos were particularized; i.e., each tenant or laborer had to place himself individually in a favorable

3 The following discussion follows the outlines of the model by Cotler (1969), Alberti (1970), Whyte (1970), Bourque (1971), Dandler (1969: 4-16; 1971: 64-75), and Tullis (1970: 43-5).

4 In unilateral dependence one party is relatively more dependent on another than the other party is dependent on the first; in contrast, bilateral dependence is a relatively mutual inter- dependence between two or more parties on one another (cf. Blau, 1964: 21-2, 118-25).



THE CLOSING TRIANGLE 391

relationship with his patron in competition with his peers.5 Not only could he gain relatively little from the relations with his fellow-campesinos, but the very imperative to help himself by obeying, and acting in the interest of, his patr6n placed his immediate self-interest in contradiction with his objective class interest (cf. Singelmann, 1973). This ideal-typical model of traditional rural-class relationships is graphically represented by the 'open triangle' (Figures 1 and 2) in which P designates the patron, C the

p

c c

Fig. 1. The 'open' triangle (simplified).

individual campesinos, and R the institutional resources available in the larger society (government, courts, banks, markets, etc.); the connecting lines represent channels of communication, influence, exchange, and brokerage. In this model, links of exchange and communication between campesinos are minimal; the latter are related to one another indirectly by the patron who, in turn, controls the links of the campesinos to the institutions and resources of the larger society.

R R R

C C

Fig. 2. The 'open' triangle.

The twentieth century has witnessed significant changes in the macro- structural parameters of rural-class relations in Latin America. New 'power domains' have encroached upon the traditional domain of the large hacienda or fazenda, most notably the government (cf. Adams, 1967a: 226-31, 238-47; 1967b). As a result, Adams argues, the individual campesino has come to occupy a series of roles within a complex of

5 This incompatibility of horizontal and vertical solidarity has been suggested by a number of authors; e.g., Huizer (1972: 18-19), Hutchinson (1966: 14), Cotler (1970b: 416), and Singelmann (1973, 1974).




'multiple-power domains' and thereby 'has a number of alternative channels of access to power. By holding positions in a series of domains, he has access to derivative power that lets him play one organization against another, each of which in turn operates with access to the power of the government' (Adams, 1967a: 241). It is in this kind of situation that alternative, 'new brokers' (Wagley, 1964: 45-6) have emerged in the persons of teachers, lawyers, politicians, or union leaders whose interests may conflict with those of the traditional landholders. These 'new brokers'

B

C-1 - C-2

Fig. 3. The 'closed' triangle (simplified).

are capable of mobilizing political and economic resources on behalf of the campesinos in circumvention of the traditional patrdn. The establishment of vertical solidarity between campesinos and the 'new brokers' thus no longer entails an inherently necessary contradiction of self-interest and class-interest for the campesinos, and the development of class solidarity among the campesinos becomes possible. Graphically, this ideal- typical situation is represented by the 'closed' triangle in which the traditional patron is substituted by a 'new broker' (B), and lines of exchange and communication emerge between the campesinos (Figure 3). It should

R-1 R-2

8-1 P B-2

C-1 C-2

Fig. 4. Complex of 'closed' triangles.

be noted that in reality series of triangles are likely to develop with several new brokers offering access to different institutional resources (Figure 4).

The major implications of the closed triangle model for rural-class relations, at the vertical and horizontal levels, can be summarized as follows:




1. The break-up of the traditional brokerage monopolies held by the large landowners and the emergence of alternative brokers reduce the dependence of the campesinos, render their exchanges with patrons more bilateral, and allow them greater freedom for 'bargaining' with actual or potential patrons. 2. Alternative patrons or brokers share common economic and political interests with the campesinos. Governments whose political strength rests on direct or indirect coalitions with campesinos share common political interests with the campesinos. 3. The new patterns of system linkage, brokerage, and communication encourage class solidarity among the campesinos. 4. The new patterns of system linkage, brokerage, and communication encourage the successful articulation of campesino class interests and serve to emancipate the campesinos from domination.

The open and closed triangles have been conceived as polar ideal types which can be used as standards for comparing empirical cases. Accordingly, authors generally recognize that deviant cases and especially 'transitional' phases are empirically common (cf. Tullis, 1970:49). It should be recognized, however, that the model of the closed triangle constitutes neither the only logical nor the only empirical alternative development to the open triangle. Furthermore, while the two models may adequately summarize the salient parameters of macro-structural changes (such as the encroachments of multiple-power domains on the traditional single-power domain of the haciendas, the emergence of alternative brokers and their alliance with campesino movements), the issues of campesino class solidarity and emancipation as a consequence of these larger changes remain unresolved. Specifically, the four characteristics of the 'closed triangle' model outlined above are generally proposed to be historical trends in Latin America by authors using the triangle model. The model is thus transformed into a theoretical statement which requires empirical scrutiny. The following discussion will suggest some critical qualifications of the triangle model as a heuristic and descriptive tool of analysis.

CRITICAL ISSUES

1. Reduced dependence, bargaining, and bilateral exchanges. The emergence of alternative brokers or sympathetic governments per se does not ensure that the campesinos' dependence will be reduced, that they will be able to bargain more freely with their patrons, and that their exchanges with new brokers will be more bilateral than those with the old brokers. They may simply become dependent on their new brokers and substitute one patron for another (cf. Adams, 1967a: 186-7). This pattern is graphically represented by Figure 5, which differs from the open triangle only in that the brokerage monopoly of the traditional patron is substituted by that of a new broker (B). Such continued dependence on new brokers has indeed been common in Latin America, although there have been variations in the patterns and degrees of dependence. One of the most characteristic aspects




R R R

B

C C

Fig. 5. 'Open' triangle with new broker.

of this new dependence has been the general link between the fortunes of campesino organizations and the policies or fates of their political sponsors inside and outside the government. First of all, there is often a rather close correlation between the increases or decreases in the number of campesino movements or leagues on the one hand, and the ascendence or deposition of 'sympathetic' governments on the other. In Brazil this has been the case especially during the rise and fall of the Goulart regime (cf. Price, 1964; Hewitt, 1969), and detailed documentations indicate the same patterns in Guatemala under the Ar6valo and Arbenz regimes (Murphy, 1970; Pearson, 1969), in Venezuela between 1945 and 1968 (Powell, 1971) and in Peru (cf. Matos Mar, 1967). In Chile, a gradual liberalization of the agrarian laws before and during the Frei government allowed peasant organizations to gain an increasing momentum (cf. Menges, 1968) which culminated in the radical movements under the tenure of President Allende (Petras and Zemelman, 1972: xii; New Chile, 1973: 66-79) and then was set back by the coup of September 1973. In these and other cases the development of campesino movements was directly associated with the ending of repressive regimes and the emergence of regimes relatively more favorable to the campesinos. Conversely, the fall of 'sympathetic' regimes has generally struck a severe and often fatal blow to the peasant organizations.

Second, the dependence of campesino movements on allied governments is indicated by their subjection to changing policies. In Mexico, for example, the revolutionary governments have fluctuated in their support for the agrarianists, often persecuted them, and since the end of the Cardenas presidency (1934-40) steadily shifted away from the radical stance of the agrarianists (Huizer, 1970b). Similar trends have been observed in Venez- uela by Powell (1971:105), where the increasingly moderate policies of the Accion Democrdtica resulted in a de-radicalization and splits in the peasant movement.

Third, the dependence of campesino movements on friendly governments and politicians is manifested in the paternalism which often charac- terizes their relationship with one another. In Guatemala, peasant syndicates and federations were virtually imposed on the rural lower classes by




the revolutionary Ar6valo and Arbenz governments (cf. Adams, 1960; Murphy, 1970; Pearson, 1969). In Goulart's Brazil, Galjart (1964, 1965) has argued, the peasant leagues and syndicates constituted the 'followings' of political leaders with access to government favors; many peasant strikes were selectively approved by the government when they were directed at its political opponents, and spoils were handed down to those organizations which proved themselves loyal followers or allies of politicians in the government (cf. also Leeds, 1964; Hewitt, 1969: 395; for a different view, cf. Huizer, 1965). In Mexico, the provisions of the agrarian reform laws also have tended to be selectively enforced in a manner which rewarded political acquiescence to the PRI leadership (Huizer, 1970b). These structural aspects of paternalism are generally matched by the correspond- ing attitudes on the part of politicians and their followings. Petras and Zemelman, for example, found that leaders of the successful peasant organizations on the fundo Culipran recognized that without the support of politicians they would not have had the courage to occupy the estate: 'They were the ones who came to give us encouragement and make all the plans' (1972:118); help from Congress had always to be asked for, 'because if the congressmen aren't on your side, you're lost. We, for example, obeyed Senator Altamirano' (1972:136). Similar examples from other countries are numerous. Francisco Juliao in Brazil, for instance, was not only respected by his followers as the 'chief' and 'doctor' (Moraes, 1970: 470-1), but also revered as 'the Prince of Life, who is going to give us the resources to live' (Forman, 1971:13). In Bolivia campesinos considered President Villaroel as the 'father and protector' (Dandler, 1971 :113), just as they expressed their personal devotion and gratitude to Victor Paz Estenssoro for 'giving' them the land after the revolution of 1952 (Heath, 1969:189).

Besides government officials and politicians, other brokers have assumed the roles of the traditional patrones, with the paternalism and dependence of the traditional landlord-peasant relations persisting. In Bolivia after 1952, campesinos continued to be dependent on town-dwelling mestizo middlemen (comerciantes, rescatistas, who were often former landlords) for marketing their products, becoming godparents to their children, and for general favors (Heath, 1969:205); in other cases, the secretary-general of the local campesino syndicate assumed the 'dominant paternalistic status formerly held by the landlord' (Heath, 1969:207) so that 'aspects of the patron-peon relationship persist virtually unchanged' (1969:206). In other cases peasants have been dependent on the services of teachers such as Juan Guerra in Ucurenia, Bolivia (cf. Dandler, 1971) and others in the Mantaro Valley of Peru (cf. Tullis, 1970:Ch. 6). Clergymen have often assumed dominant positions in peasant movements; the occasional com- plete dependence of the peasants on the political connections of these




clergymen has been illustrated in case studies from Brazil (Foland, 1967) and Chile (Landsberger, 1969).

It may be suggested, then, that campesino movements in Latin America have not only required coalitions with other political forces in order to obtain a measure of success, but that these alliances were often highly lop- sided and institutionalized new patterns of dependence for the campesinos.

2. Common interests of campesinos, new brokers, and governments. According to the model of the closed triangle, alliances between campesinos and new political patrons are founded on their common interest in containing the economic and political powers of the traditional landlords. While this proposition has indeed some merit (cf. Singelmann, 1973), it needs to be examined in the context of the clientelistic political structures within which campesino organizations operate. Such clientelistic political frameworks are characterized by intermediate exchanges between high- level politicians and their campesino followings. In these exchanges, the campesinos typically exert pressures, provide votes or arms, or supply organizational support for governments and other politicians who, in turn, use the campesino support as a political resource in the competition for patronage and spoils.6 In return for their support, campesinos typically receive political protection, governmental tolerance of pressure tactics, such as land invasions or strikes, and favorable legislation and policies. Characteristically, campesino clienteles are linked to their political sponsors through intermediaries (political brokers) who occupy a dual role as patrons to the campesinos and clients to higher-level politicians. Their success hinges on their ability to deliver governmental benefits to the campesinos and, in turn, to muster the collective support from their clientele on behalf of the political sponsors. In such political structures the balance of power varies; all parties are interdependent on one another, but in some instances the campesinos exert strong independent pressure on their patrons, while on other occasions they are primarily manipulated. Thus, clientelistic politics may have the potential for a revolutionary alliance between peasants and other political groups, but the emergence of such an alliance cannot be postulated a priori from a heuristic model; rather it depends on the particular historical contingencies at hand. Many of these contingencies have typically encouraged moderate improvements in the status of many campesinos without, however, basically altering structures of dependence and without rendering the class interests of the campesinos equal to those of their new patrons.

First, the primary goal of governments and other politicians, in Latin America, in spite of ideological pronouncements, has typically been pragmatic: to obtain and maintain political offices and the concomitant

6 On the general nature of clientelistic peasant politics, cf. Powell (1970); on the general background of patron-client relationships, cf. Foster (1963) and Wolf (1966).




controls over spoils and patronage on behalf of their supporters (cf. Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970: 562-3). For these ends the support of campesino clienteles in the form of demonstrations, votes, or arms is convenient for many politicians, but not necessarily intrinsically desirable. In Peru, the APRA party for a long time refrained from organizing peasants because they could not vote, while the Accion Popular was worried about army intervention (Cotler, 1970b: 430-1). Prior to the Frei administration in Chile, radical parties had often mobilized and de- mobilized the peasantry according to criteria of political expediency (Petras and Zemelman, 1972: 14-22). In Bolivia the Paz Estenssoro government of 1952 spearheaded the agrarian revolution only after strong pressures and a futile attempt to impose its own leadership on the peasant movement (Dandler, 1971: 215-22). Where a pragmatic concern for con- quering political offices is the primary foundation of alliances between campesino movements and political parties, the parties tend to compete with one another and with other political brokers for control of the campesino clientele (cf. Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970:561-4). While such competition may enable the campesino to play some brokers against others and thus bargain for maximal benefits, it usually plays into the hands of the common class enemy (cf. Huizer, 1970b:449). Especially the participation of governments in this competition tends to result in the favorable treatment of those campesino organizations whose political patrons control political offices, while rival organizations are neglected, harassed, and repressed. These conditions prevailed in Venezuela between 1945 and 1948 (Powell, 1971 :73-86), in Mexico after the Cardenas regime (Huizer, 1970b), and to an extent in Brazil under Goulart (Hewitt, 1969). In these cases the interests of the governments thus were at best in congruence with the interests of some campesinos-namely their particular followings-but not with the interests of the campesinato as a whole.

Second, governments which represent the interests of campesino clienteles in Latin America have always also needed political support from other sectors such as urban labor unions, intellectuals and other segments of the urban middle classes, or the armed forces. This diversified basis of support required the establishment of some balance between the interests of groups who shared some common concerns but were divided on other issues. One of the most common coalitions involved campesinos, industrial and mining workers, and members of the 'progressive' bourgeoisie. This was the case in countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela.7 But Latin American countries, in contrast to West European countries during their industrial revolution, generally do not have a 'pro-

7 These peasant coalitions are discussed in most of the literature. E.g., Huizer (1970a, 1970b), Pearson (1969), Menges (1968), Cotler and Portocarrero (1969), Dandler (1971), Powell (1971), and Bourque (1971).




gressive' bourgeoisie whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of the traditional landholders (Stavenhagen, 1969: 110-11; also Baran, 1970). Furthermore, the interests of urban workers are in some respects incompatible with those of the peasants. For example, the relative improvements in their levels of living are generally obtained at the expense of the rural population, and the initial decrease in food production resulting from agrarian reform (the interest of the peasants) is generally to their detriment (cf. Stavenhagen, 1969:116-7). Occasionally governments have been able to play the interests of urban workers against those of the peasants. Mexican labor unions organized 'red battallions' in 1915 to combat the peasant armies of Pancho Villa; in return, the Carranza government permitted them to organize workers in areas reclaimed from the peasants (Huizer, 1970a: 386). The evolution of the PRI in Mexico is another classic example of a movement with a diversified basis of support in which the voice of the peasant sector gradually diminished in favor of middle-class interests (Huizer, 1970b).

Third, parties which control the national governments of societies must gain a minimum of legitimacy among those sectors who do not constitute their clienteles, and they must also commit themselves to what is generally perceived to be a national, in contrast to a particular clientelistic, interest. The armed forces must at least tolerate a regime and always have the opportunity to withdraw their neutrality or active support. In the absence of a violent take-over by their own forces, peasant-oriented governments cannot be totally oblivious to the interests of other sectors. When the AD government of 1945 in Venezuela too narrowly pursued the interests of its peasant and labor clientele, it met the resistance of the manufacturing and petroleum industries, the landed elite, and members of the military who eventually overthrew the regime in 1948 (Powell, 1971:83-4). Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular in Chile was in a similar bind where it was not legitimized by the middle classes and unable or unwilling to assert itself by forceful means.

Claims on the part of a government to larger legitimacy require com- mitments to 'national' (as opposed to partisan) goals. One of the most salient goals proclaimed by Latin American governments has been that of economic development. Economic development, however, is generally predicated on rapid industrialization, limitations on consumption, re- stricted investments in welfare and other non-productive services, and in- creased agricultural production. All of these have historically favored the establishment of large commercial agricultural enterprises in Latin America and the attraction of foreign capital. In order to increase production and attract foreign capital, governments have generally considered it necessary to suppress disruptive labor agitation and strikes. Mexico's PRI under the presidency of Miguel Aleman (1946-52) is a classic instance of a revolu-




tionary party which turned away from the interests of its peasant clientele in favor of what it defined as the requirements for national development (Huizer, 1970b: 486-9; also Gonzalez-Casanova, 1969; Chevalier, 1967).

The result of the pragmatic concern with spoils and patronage, the diversified power bases of peasant-oriented parties, and the overriding preoccupation with national concerns by these parties have militated against the representation of campesino interests by their own political patrons. These patrons have often de-radicalized their followings so that they could not disturb tenuous political balances between various political forces at the national level. Leaders of campesino movements have frequently been coopted to represent the interests not of their clientele but of those upper-echelon politicians whose patronage they needed (e.g., Lands- berger and Hewitt, 1970: 571-3; Adie, 1970; Anderson and Cockroft, 1966). Clientelistic politics has encouraged politicians to compete with one another for the privilege of manipulating campesinos on behalf of their own political ambitions or ideological convictions. Campesino organizations have been sponsored by governments to compete with the campesino organizations of their opponents in Chile (Menges, 1968), Brazil (Hewitt, 1969; Moraes, 1970; Galjart, 1964), Peru (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969; Dew, 1969) and Mexico (Huizer, 1970b). Churches have mobilized campesinos so that they would not follow communist organizers in Chile (Menges, 1968), Peru (Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969), and Brazil (Hewitt, 1969; Moraes, 1970). Finally, many times politicians have used campesino organizations solely as a vehicle to obtain political power (e.g., the Ciceres brothers in Juliaca, Peru; cf. Dew, 1969; Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970: 569-70), or to enrich themselves through graft and corruption (cf. Huizer, 1970b). The interests of the campesinos (land redistribution, freedom from dependence and domination) are thus not necessarily those of their individual new patrons or sponsoring political groups.

The latter have their own ambitions and generally must balance the interests of the campesino clientele with those of other clienteles or of allies with other concerns. The interests of campesinos and their political sponsors are therefore not identical but at best complementary for given purposes (cf. Singelmann, 1973). Situational expediency thus sets the parameters of campesino coalitions with other groups, but the coalitions always remain tenuous. That they may contain a revolutionary potential need not be denied. But in the long historical view it appears that clientelistic politics, even in its most radical manifestations (e.g., Bolivia after 1952, Venezuela after 1958, Mexico under Cardenas) has always contained built-in limitations for the development of interest identity on the part of peasant movements and their political leadership.

3. Class solidarity among campesinos. According to the model of the closed triangle, the formation of class solidarity among campesinos is




predicated upon the emergence of alternative patrons with common political interests who are freely accessible for relatively bilateral exchanges with the campesinos. To the extent that, as has been suggested in the previous sections, campesinos have often remained dependent on new patrons who shared their political and economic interests only to a limited extent, the terms of the model themselves would suggest that campesino solidarity should be at best limited. Indeed, it can be argued that the clientelistic political systems of Latin America have had an inherently divisive potential not only in terms of rival political brokers but also with regard to different segments of the peasantry competing with one another in the following of their patrons (cf. Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970: 562-4). As a result, there have been splits in many countries between

G

B B

c c c C C C

Fig. 6. Competing brokers and competing campesinos (G = Government).

peasants following different leaders, a condition which constitutes yet another alternative to the one modeled by the closed triangle (Figure 6). Such intra-class competition among campesinos has been common in Mexico (Huizer, 1970b), Brazil (Hewitt, 1969; Moraes, 1970), Venezuela (Powell, 1971), Bolivia (Malloy, 1970: 211-3), Peru (Cotler and Porto- carrero, 1969; Dew, 1969), and Chile (Menges, 1968).

One source of conflict among mobilized peasants is their continued competition for scarce goods even when old patterns of subjugation have broken down. Many Peruvian rural communities, manipulated by cynical lawyers, have been engaged in endless litigations against one another over land claims (Tullis, 1970: Ch. 6; Whyte and Williams, 1968: 8-12). Many such litigations involved violence. Characteristic lines of cleavage have developed between different types of peasants. In Peru indigenous communities have frequently fought with the former peones over the legal rights to the lands of an expropriated hacienda (Tullis, 1970: Ch. 6). In the valley of La Convenci6n (Peru), the initial success of the peasant movement opened the way for rivalries between the older tenant-laborers (arrendires) and the more newly arrived sub-tenants (allegados) (Craig, 1969: 290-1). On a Chilean fundo, the peasantry was divided between the regular inquilinos and the empleados who had received preferential treat-




ment by the patron (Petras and Zemelman, 1972). In post-revolutionary Mexico certain peasant groups were systematically excluded from membership in the official organization. Many of them (such as the resident hacienda workers) followed their priests and landlords in the armed Cristero bands against the government and the agrarian forces (Huizer, 1970b: 462), while others (such as sharecroppers and renters working small properties) followed the fascist sinarquistas and other reactionary movements (Huizer, 1970b:479). In Bolivia, the peasants of Cliza and Ucureiia have been engaged in notorious battles over the domination of the region (Antezana, 1960).8 It appears, thus, that peasant solidarity in Latin America has developed primarily at the subgroup level but not in a manner that united the peasants as a class. One reason for this 'limited concern' (Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970:574) of peasant movements is doubtlessly the diversity of the peasantry as a whole whose different subtypes9 have different class interests. But the evidence suggests that even within the same subtype of peasantry solidarity has seldom transcended a narrow concern with personal and local improvements.10 To the extent that such improvements had to be obtained in competition with other members of the same class, class solidarity among mobilized campesinos has contained the same inherent contradictions as under the traditional patron.

4. Articulation of class interests and emancipation. The analysis of campesino class interest and emancipation requires a critical examination of the underlying concepts, as both the terms 'interest' and 'emancipation' contain a variety of descriptive and normative connotations. One difficulty in defining group interests in general is the discrepancy between interests which are subjectively perceived at a given time by the members and which motivate their conduct on the one hand, and the normative implications of a relatively more objective structural analysis on the other.ll A dilemma which particularly applies to many peasants is that by virtue of their desire for landed property they identify themselves with the very values against which they rebel; once peasants have obtained the land they fight for, class differentiation is likely to emerge among them. Another problem in conceptualizing peasant interests rests in the differential significance of status improvements within the existing economic and political structure on the one hand, and the radical transformation of this same order on the other. Clearly, a point of view can be developed which can legitimately claim that Latin America campesino movements have been engaged in

8 Cf. the general discussion of the causes of weakness and cleavage in Latin American peasant organizations by Landsberger and Hewitt (1970).

9 On the diversity of peasant types in Latin America, cf. Adams (1967a: 91-3), Wolf (1955), and Wagley (1964).

10 For examples of peasant concerns, cf. Tullis (1970: Ch. 6), Petras and Zemelman (1972), and Powell (1971: 137, 138).

11 Cf. Lukdcs' (1970) thesis that 'class consciousness' is not identical with immediate sub- jective perceptions of one's position.

B




'class struggles,' furthered the 'interests' of their members, and contributed to their 'emancipation'. Some authors have even gone as far as to suggest that peasants have become a 'class for itself', as Marx conceived the term, in countries such as Brazil (Huizer, 1965) and Venezuela (Powell, 1971: 58-9). In the following, a few general characteristics of an emancipated peasant 'class for itself' will be sketched.12 The progress of campesino movements will then be assessed in terms of these criteria: they are:

1. Campesinos are autonomous political actors determining and negotiating their own destinies. 2. The concern of campesino movements is for the class as a whole, not for individual members or subgroups. 3. 'Class consciousness' entails a broad vision of macro-societal structures of domination and alienation, rather than a limited perception of absolute or relative deprivation within the peasantry or some of its subgroups. 4. The goals of campesino movements are directed at a radical transformation of the macro-societal structures within which campesinos are subjugated, rather than at the mere redress of group-specific grievances within the existing structures. 5. Landlords are collectively perceived as members of an opposing class, rather than being individually defined as particular 'good' or 'bad' patrones.

While these idealized conditions are approached at varying degrees by historical realities, they are useful standards for comparison. In view of the previous analysis we must conclude that Latin American campesino movements, by and large, have not come very close to the ideal of an emancipated 'class for itself'. Far from being autonomous political actors, most campesinos still depend on one kind of patron or another who often manipulates and paternalistically co-opts them and who deflects campesino organizations from their original goals. The movements themselves are usually directed toward rather limited objectives such as getting rid of a particular landlord or implementing agrarian reforms; they benefit limited clienteles competing with one another in particular communities, regions, or socio-economic categories. Finally, landlords are often not opposed as members of a dominant class but as 'bad' particular patrones, while 'good' patrones are still preferred. Indeed, campesino movements have generally been triggered when landlords encroached upon their subordinates to such a degree that they were defined as 'bad', while the overall legitimacy of class domination remained unchallenged. It should be noted that sustained participation in campesino movements has often contributed to a politiciz- ation and radicalization of the members, especially in the wake of successful land invasions or strikes. But even the relatively more politicized participants of successful campesino movements may admit that at the bottom they would have preferred to stay with a patron provided he had been 'good' and taken care of his laborers (cf. Petras and Zemelman,

12 This outline will follow the general conceptualization of Lukcs (1970) and the criteria of'political consciousness' suggested by Petras and Zemelman (1972: 64-5).




1972: 129, 135); or they may refuse to expand their activities to a neighbor- ing estate which has a 'good patron' (Petras and Zemelman, 1972: 116, 129). As has been shown above, such paternalistic attitudes have often been transferred to the 'new patrones' who lead or protect the campesino organizations. In both traditional and 'modern' forms of paternalism, campesinos are subjected to the arbitrary whims of their protectors who have the dis- cretion to turn 'good' or 'bad' as they deem feasible (cf. Feder, 1969: 401); in both cases campesinos receive certain benefits not as enforceable rights but as unenforceable privileges and favors (Adams, 1964; 69-71). Militant demands and violent activities on the part of campesinos may thus be imbedded in traditional forms of power relations; by themselves, therefore, they do not mark the emergence of an emancipated peasantry.

A major difficulty in uniting campesinos under one movement rests in the fact that their class interests are diversified and often contradictory within subtypes. As was pointed out above, some categories of campesinos are often excluded from membership in unions or leagues which makes them vulnerable to recruitment into conservative movements. Also, different subtypes such as comuneros, peones, sharecroppers, and wage laborers tend to have different goals which may be mutually incompatible (cf. Landsberger and Hewitt, 1970: 574-5). But even within the same cate- gory there may be inherently contradictory goals. This is the case when rival patrons mobilize their clientele in rivaling organizations, so that for the individual campesino followers it is most rational to ally themselves with their upper-class patrons, rather than with their peers from a rival organization. A related problem is the petty-bourgeois striving for a private piece of landed property by many sharecroppers, renters, and colonos. Where lands have been parceled out to individual campesinos, however, class solidarity has been undermined by internal differentiation between those peasants with more land and those with little or no lands. These problems were observed on a Chilean expropriated fundo by Petras and Zemelman (1972: xii, 95-7) and in the valley of La Convenci6n (Peru) where the former tenant laborers became landlords and employers themselves (Craig, 1969: 290-1); similar developments occurred even in the Mexican ejidos (cf. Chevalier, 1967: 178, 180-4). Trends toward an embourgeoisement of campesinos after they have acquired their own land, by virtue of their effect on renewed class differentiation, plant the seeds of conflict into the very structure of campesino solidarity.

Finally, it should be noted that the structural transformations Latin American societies have undergone in the twentieth century have weakened but by no means always destroyed the powers of the traditional landholders. In most countries they still mount formidable pressure groups which compete with campesino organizations for the formulation of favorable government policies and legislation (Figure 7); or the traditional




G G

P 8B

P C C C

Fig. 7. Landowners (P) and campesinos Fig. 8. Single-power domain of land- (C) competing for governmental policies owners (P) competing with multiple-

and legislation (G). power domains of new brokers (B).

single-power domains of many landholders remain intact and confront the multiple-power domains within which campesino organizations operate (Figure 8). Particularly violent conflicts of this sort have taken place in post-revolutionary Mexico (Huizer, 1970b), but the influence of the landed elite in most other Latin American countries has remained strong enough that they could turn agrarian reforms into 'counter-reforms' which actually strengthened the status quo in the rural sectors (cf. Feder, 1969, 1970).

In summary, campesino movements have without doubt engaged in class conflicts with the landed elite; they have 'articulated' some campesino 'interests', they have entailed a measure of campesino 'solidarity', and they have improved the status of many of their members. But if we critically examine the kinds of interests served by the movements and the nature as well as limitations of their group solidarity, it becomes apparent that campesinos have not yet become a 'class for itself'. They are divided along several lines; many engage in temporary joint actions for limited purposes at a given time, but few have persisted in a sustained effort to renew the larger social order; and they are often manipulated to serve the ambitions of cynical politicians. They have not overcome traditional forms of domination by changing the personnel of their patrons. Their 'interest articulation' thus does not necessarily emancipate them as a class.

IMPLICATIONS

The preceding analysis was not intended as a rejection of the closed triangle model for the analysis of campesino movements. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere (Singelmann, 1973, 1974) that the model is a useful heuristic device which comprehends the basic structure of campesino mobilization in Latin America. In this paper an attempt was made to spell out the model's implication with regard to campesino solidarity and campesino emancipation. It was suggested that there are logical as well as empirical alternatives to the 'closed triangle' and that the empirically observed alternatives cannot be dismissed as 'deviant cases' or 'transitional phases'. It may well be that they manifest a continuity of domination and repression built into the very structure of seemingly revolutionary changes. In com-




paring the experiences of various Latin American countries, it becomes apparent that general shifts in the larger power and brokerage patterns have entailed an emancipatory potential, but the triangle does by no means close automatically. In some countries the revolutionary potential of campesino movements has become apparent at various times, e.g. in Mexico between 1910 and 1915 and from 1934 to 1940, in Bolivia after 1952, in the Cuban revolution, in Chile under the presidency of Salvador Allende, and in Venezuela during the earlier years of the AD rule. What distinguishes these cases from the remaining ones is that in all of them the campesinos have had political resources which strengthened their bargaining power with their political sponsors. In some cases the survival of the ruling political groups depended heavily on armed support from the campesinos (Cuba, Mexico, Bolivia), while in others the campesino vote was a major pillar of the regime (Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile). Furthermore, in Bolivia and Mexico the armed peasantry forced agrarian reforms upon resilient governments. Conversely, when and where the repressive powers of governments or landholders were relatively larger (as in Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico before and after Cdrdenas or Zapata, Chile before Allende, contemporary and pre-1952 Bolivia), campesino movements have been more patronized, manipulated, and co-opted. Furthermore, even the Mexican, Venezuelan, and Bolivian cases show that trends toward campesino emancipation can be stopped or reversed.

Latin American campesino movements have, thus, vacillated in their relative political strength, but they all had their limits set by the nature of the larger political structures in their respective societies. The historical development of Latin American nations has thus far been toward the establishment of regimes hostile to the traditional landed oligarchies. But such a development has not entailed a radical commitment to campesino emancipation. Latin American societies have, instead, mostly adopted political models the characteristic dimensions of which included, in various degrees, populism, corporativism and cautious measures of nationalism. The premise of these models has been that social and economic development can take a 'third route' between capitalist class domination and socialist revolution via a vertical alliance between the upper and lower classes under the banner of nationalism and with a semi-corporate state operating as the integrating and controlling institution.13 Within this political structure, mass mobilizations of the lower classes constituted the political balance to the middle and upper classes; but on the other hand, these mobilizations, coupled with substantial material improvements for

13 This paper cannot discuss in detail the complexities and varieties of populism, the 'third' way and its Latin American variants. For a discussion of populism, cf. di Tella (1965); a general discussion of the 'third way' is found in Mansilla (1974). For pertinent studies on Peru, Mexico, Bolivia and Argentinia, cf. Cotler (1974), Tripp (1974), Mayorga (1974) and Skupch (1974) respectively.




at least some sectors of the lower classes, have also legitimated the regimes and made the persistence of certain traditional socio-political structures more acceptable to the lower classes. Furthermore, the corporatist- populist regimes have been beset by inherent contradictions and weak- nesses.14 Nationalistic economic policies were limited by dependence on foreign investments; policies directed toward the emancipation of workers and campesinos conflicted with the dependence on both domestic and foreign private investment; and within the national alliance the political balance always remained tenuous, as each sector retained its fundamentally self-centered interests. The regimes thus always needed strong controls to keep the parties within the boundaries of the political model. They thus fluctuated between states of more or less friction and states in which different sectors were relatively more or less influential in determining policies. It is against the background of these contradictions inherent in the modem political regimes of Latin America that the contemporary campesino mobilizations as well as their ultimate limitations can be understood. The generic mechanisms of domination prevailing in the past could thus reappear in a new form, integrating the campesinado into a society that was no longer oligarchical but so far has retained its inherently bourgeois character.

The purpose of the paper, then, was to point out some pitfalls in the generalizations derived from the closed triangle model and to suggest some guideposts for assessing the authenticity of the progress campesinos have made toward emancipation. Above all, observers are invited to take a critical stance toward that which is billed as 'modernization' or 'progress' and to look for possibly alienating structures under the guise of 'liberation' so that more truly emancipatory actions can be implemented.

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Documents

Critical Notes on Peasant Mobilization in Latin America