Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works (Part IV), Immanuel Kant

7/29/2019 Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works (Part IV), Immanuel Kant

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FIRST PART

OF

THEPHILOSOPHICALHEORYFRELIGION

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c19- o)FTHEINDWELLINGOF THE

BADPRINCIPLELONGWITHTHEGOOD;

OR_

0N THE RADICALEVIL IN HUMANNATURE.

HAT the worldlieth in wickednesss a complaintas old ashistory, evenas what isstill older,poetry; indeed,as old

as the oldestof all poems,sacerdotalreligion. All alike,never-theless,make theworldbeginfromgood; withthe goldenage,with life in paradise,or one still more happy in communion

withheavenlybeings. But they representthis happystate assoonvanishinglike a dream,and then they fall into badness(moralbadness,which is alwaysaccompaniedby physical),ashastening to worseand worsewith acceleratedsteps;1so thatweare now living(this nowbeing howeveras old as history)in the last times,the last day and the destructionof the worldare at the door; andin someparts of Hindostan(20)thejudgeand destroyerof the world, Ru&'a (otherwisecalled 8i,,a),isalready worshippedas the God that is at present in power;

the preserverof the world, namely, F'ish._u,havingcenturiesagolaid downhis office,of which he wasweary,and whichhe had receivedfrom the creator of the world,Brahma.

1Aetas parentum,pejor avis, tulitNos nequiores,mox datarosProgeniemvitiosiorem.

HORATIUS.



_6 OFTHEBADPRINCIPLE E20]

Later, but much less general, is the oppositeheroic opinion,

which has perhaps obtained currency only amongst philoso-phers, and in our times chieflyamongst instructors of youth;

that the _'orld is constantly advancing in precisely the reversedirection, namely, from worse to better (though almost insen-

sibly) : at least, that the capacity for such advance exists inhuman nature. This opinion, however, is certainly not founded

on experience, if what is meant is _wral good or evll (not civi-

lization), for the history of all times speaks too powerfully

against it, but it is probably a good-natured hypothesis ofmoralists from Seneca to :Rousseau,so as to urge man to the

unwearied cultivation of the germ of good that perhaps lies in

us, if one can reckon on such a natural foundation in man._There is also the consideration that as we must assume that

J [OneofRousseau'searliestliteraryeffortswasonthis subject,whichhadbeenproposedor discussiony the AcademyfDijon. tiedefendedthe thesisthat the advancensciencendartswasnotfavourableomorals.Kant'sowuviewis statedthus in thetreatise: "Dosmagin derTheorie,u. s. w.," publ.in 1793. He is commentingn Mendelssohn,hohadtreatedLessing'shypothesisfa divineeducationofmankindasa delusion,sayivgthat the humanracenevermadea fewstepsforwardwithoutpre-

sentlyafterslippingbackwith redoubledvelocityntoits formerposition.This, saysKant,is like the stoneof Sisyphus,andthis viewmakestheeartha sortof purgatoryforoldand forgottensins. He proceedshus:"I shallventuretoassumehat, asthe humanraceisconstantlydvancinginrespectof culture,as it is designedo do,soalso,as regardshemoralendof its existence,t is constantlyprogressing,ndthis progresss neverbrokenoff,althought maybe sometimesnterrupted. It is notnecessaryfor meto provethis; it is for thosewhotakethe oppositeiewto provetheir case,"viz. becauset is mydutyto strivetopromotehis improve-ment(p.222). "Manyproofs,oo,maybe giventhatthehumanrace,onthe whole,especiallynourown,as comparedwithall precedingimes,has

madeconsiderabledvancesmorallyor the better(temporaryhecksdonotproveanythingagainstthis); andthat thecryofthecontinually-increasingdegradationf therace arisesjust fromthis,that whenonestandsonahigherstepof moralityhe seesfurtherbeforehim,and hisjudgmentonwhatmenare ascomparedwithwhattheyoughttobeismorestrict. Ourself-blames, consequently,oreseverethemorestepsofmoralitywehavealreadyascendedn thewholecourseoftheworld'shistoryasknowntous"(p.224).]



_-21] I_ I-IUMAXATVltE. 327

manis by nalure(thatis, as he isusuallyborn)soundin body,thereis thoughtto be noreasonwhyweshouldnot assumehat

: heis alsoby naturesoundin soul,sothat natureitselfhelpsus

: to developthismoralcapacityfor goodwithinus. "Sanabili-busmgrotamusmalis,nosqueb_rectumgemtosnatura,si sanarivelimus,adjuvat,"saysSeneca.

:Butsinceit maywellbe that there is errorin the supposedexperienceonbothsides,the questionis,whethera meanisnotat leastpossible,namely,that man as a speciesmaybe neithergoodnor bad,or at all eventsthat he is as muchoneas theother,partlygood,partlybad?(21)Wecalla manbad,however,notbecausehe performsactionsthat are bad (violatinglaw),

butbecausetheseare of sucha kind that we mayinferfromthembadmaximsin him. Nowalthoughwecaninexperienceobservethat actionsviolatelaws,and even (at least in our-selves)that lheydo so consciouslyyet we cannotobservehemaximshemselves,ot evenalwaysinourselves consequently,the judgmentthat thedoer of themis a badmancannotwithcertaintybe foundedon experience. In orderthen to callaman bad, it shouldbe possibleto argue # priori from someactions,or _roma single consciouslybad action, to a bad

maximas its foundation,and from this to a general sourceinthe actor of all rarticularmorallybadmaxims,this sourceagainbeingitselfamaxim.

Lest anydifficultyshouldbefoundin the expressionnature,which,ifit meant(asusual)theoppositeofthe sourceofactionsfromfi'eedom,wouldbe directlycontradictoryo thepredicatesmorall!/goodr evil,it is to be observed,hat by thenatureofman wemeanhereonly the subjectivegroundof theuseofhisfreedomn general(underobjectivemorallaws)whichprecedes

everyact that fallsunderthe senses,whereverhisgroundlies.Thissubjectiveground,however,must itself again be alwaysan act of freedom(elsethe use or abuseof man'selectivewillin respectof the moral law couldnot be imputedto himnorthegood or bad in him be calledmoral). Consequently,hesourceof the bad cannotlie in any objectthat deterndnesheelectivewill throughinclination,or in anynatural impulse,but



398 oF _ _A_r_i_ciP_ [2_]

onlyin arule that the eleofivewillmakesforitself/or the useofits freedom,hat is,in a maxim. Nowwe cannotgoontoaskconcerningthis,What is the subjectiveground why it isadopted,and notthe oppositemaxim? (22) For if thisgroundwereultimatelynot nowa maximbut a merenaturalimpulse,thentheuseoffreedomwouldbe l'edueedo determinationbynaturalcauses,whichis contradictoryo its conception. Whenwe saythen,man is by nature good,or,he is bynaturebad,thisonlymeansthat he containsa primary source(tousin-scrutable)of the adoptionof goodor of the adoptionof bad(lawviolating)maxims: and this generallyas man,and con-sequentlyso that by this he expressesthe characterof hisspecies.

We shall say then of one of thesecharacters(whichdis-tinguishesman fromother possiblerationalbeings)i_is innate,andyet wemust alwaysrememberthat Nature isnot to beartheblameof it (if it is bad),or the credit(if it isgood),butthat theman himself is the author of it. But sinesthe pri-marysourceof the adoptionof our maxims,whichitselfmustagainalwayslie in the freeelectivewill,cannotbe a factofexperience,encethe goodor bad in man (asthe subjectiveprimarysourceofthe adoptionof thisor that maximin respectof the moral law)'is innate merelyin thi_se_se,hat it isinforcebeforeanyuseof freedomis experienced(23)(inthe ear-liestchildhoodbackto birth) so that it is conceivedas beingpresentin manatbirth, not that birth isthe causeof it.

lThatheprimaryubjectiveourceftheadoptionfmoralmaximss

inscrutableaybeseenevenromthis,thatasthisadoptions free,tssourcethereasonhy,ez.gr, I h aveadoptedbadandnotrathergoodmaxim)mustnotbelookedorinanynaturalmpulse,utalwaysgainina maxim;andasthisalsomusthaveitsground,ndmaximsretheonlydeterminingrinciplesfthe'freeelectivewillthatcanor oughtobeadduced,earealwaysrivenurtherbackadinfinitumntheseriesfsubjectiveeterminingprinciples,ithoutbeingabletoreachheprimarysource.



[23-243 IN nU_L_N_Aa'UR_. 329

REMARK.

The conflict between the two above-mentioned hypotheses

rests on a disjunctive proposition; man is (by nature) either

_wrally good or morall!/ bad. :But it readilyoccurs to every

one to ask whether this disjunction is correct, and whether onemight not affirm that man is by nature neither, or another that

he is both at once, namely, in some parts good, in others bad.

Experience seems even to confirm this mean between the twoextremes.

It is in general, however, important for Ethics to admit, as

far as possible, no intermediates, either in actions (adiap]wra)or

in human characters; since with such ambiguity all maximswould run the risk of losing all definiteness and firmness.

Those who are attached to this strict view are commonly ca]ledrigo_lrists(a name that is meant as a reproach, but which is

really praise) : and their antipodes may be called latit_ldi_aria_s.The latter are either latitudinarians of neutrality, who may

be called i_d(fl'erentists,or of compromise, who may be calleds_ncretists._

xIf good= a,its eontradietoryishe not-good.Thisis the resulteitherof themereabsenceof a principleof good= 0, orofa positiveprincipleof the opposite= - a. In tim latter ease the not-goodmaybe calledthepositivelybad. (In respeetof pleasureandpain there is a meanof thiskind, sothat pleasure= a,pain = - a, and the state of absenceof bothis indifference,= 0.)(94) l_owif the morallawwerenot a springof theelectivewill in us, thenmoralgood(harmonyof the will with the law)would= a, not-good= 0,andthe latterwouldbe merelythe resultof theabsenceofa moralspring= a+ 0. But the lawisin usas a spring= a ;thereforethe want of harmonyof the electivewill with it (=0) is onlypossibles a resultof a reallyoppositedeterminationof elective_21,that

isa resistanceo it,=- a, that isto say, onlybya badeleetivewill; thereis,therefore,nomeanbetweena badanda gooddispositioninnerprincipleof maxims)bywhichthe moralityof the actionmustbe determined. Amorallyndifferentaction'_adiaphoronorale)wouldbe an actionresultingmerelyromnatural laws,and standinghereforen norelationtothe morallaw,whichis a lawof freedominasmuchasit isnota deed,andin respectof it neithercommandnor prohibition,nor evenlegalpermission,as anyplaceor isneeessary.



.330 oF THE_ADPRI_ClrL_ [24-25]

(24)The answergiven to the abovequestionby the rigourists1

is founded on the important consideration : (25) That freedomof elective will has the peculiar characteristicthat it cannot be

determinedto action by any spring exceptonly sofar astl_ema_has ta],'c;2t u2)into Isismaxim (has made it the universal rule of

his conduct); only in this way can a spring, whatever it maybe, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of the elective will

(freedom). Only the moral law is of itseH _nthe judgment ofreason a spring, and whoever makes it his maxim is moraIl!/

good. Now if the law does not determine a man's elective

will in respect of an action which has reference to it, an oppo-site spring must have influence on his elective will; and sinceby hypothesis this can only occur by the man taking it (and

consequently deviation from the moral law) into his maxim(in which case he is a had man), it follows that his disposition

1ProfessorSchiller,n his masterlytreatise(Tlmlia,1793,pt. 3) onpleasant_essgraee_and d*:qnilyn morals,findsfault withthiswayofpresentingobligation,s if it implieda Carthusianspirit; but as weareagreedn themostimportantprinciples, cannotadmitthat thereis anydisagreementnthis,i/we couldonlycomeoa mutualunderstanding.Iadmitthat I cannotassociateany21easant_lessiththe eolwelJtioufduty,

just becauseofits dignity. Forit involvesunconditionalbligation,hichis directlycontraryo pleasantness.Themajestyof the law(likethat on

_inai)inspires(not dread,whichrepels,noryet a charmwhichinvitestofamiliarity,but)awe,whichawakesres2ectofthe subjectorhislawgiver,andin the presentcasethelatter beingwithinourselves,feelin!!of t]_esublimityof our owndestiny,whichattractsus morethan anybeauty.Butvirtue,i.e.thefirmly-rootedispositionofulfilourdutypunctually,is in its resultsbeneficentlso,morethananythingn theworldthatcanbedonebynatureor art; andthe noblepictureof humanityexhibitedinthis_ormadmitsverywellthe"accompanimentsfthe Graces,utas longas dutyaloneis in question,heykeepat a respectiuldistance.f, how-

ever,we regardthe pleasantresultswhichvirtue wouldspreadin theworldif it foundaccesseverywhere,hen morally-directedeasondrawsthe sensibilityntoplay(by meansof the imagination).25) It, is onlyaftervanquishingmonstershatHerculesbecomesl[usagetes,eforewhichlabourthosegoodsistersdrawback: ThesecompanionsfVenusUraniaarelewdfollowersf VenusDioneas soonastheyinterfereinthebusinessofthedeterminationf duty,andwanttosupplythespringshereof. Ifitisnowasked,Ofwhatsortisthe emotionalharacteristic,hetemperamen_



[26J IN rItr_1xN_ATV]_E. 331

in respect of the morallaw is never indifferent (is always one

of the two, good or bad).

(26) Nor can he be partly good and partly bad at the same

time. :For if he is in part good, he has taken the moral lawinto his maxim; if then he were at the same time in another

part bad, then, since the moral law of obedienceto duty is one

and universal, the maxim referring to it would be uuiversal,and at the same time only particular, which is a contradiction.'

When iris said that a manhas the one or the otherdisposition

as an innate natural quality, it is notmeant that it is not acquiredby him, that is, that he is not the author of it, but only that it

is not acquired in time (that)_'omyouth uT he has beenalwaysthe

oneorthe other). The disposition, that is, the primarysubjec-tive source of the adoption of maxims can be but one, and

applies generally to the whole use of freedom. But it must

asit wereofvh'tue: is it spiritedandcheerful,or an_ouslydepressednddejected? an answeris hardly necessary. Thelatter slavishspirit canneverexistwithouta secrethatredofthe law,andcheerfulnessf heartintheperfoTmaneef one'sduty(notcomplacencyn the reco.qnitwnf it) isa markof the genuinenessf thevirtuousdisposition,venin devoutness,whichdoesnotconsistn theself-tormentingf thepenitentsinner(which

is veryambiguous,and commonlys onlyan inwardreproachfor havingoffendedgainstthe rulesofprudence},utin the firmpurposeo dobetterin the future,which,animatedbygoodprogress,mustproducea cheerfulspirit,withoutwhichone is nevercertainthat he has takena likingtogood,hat is tosay,adoptedt intohismaxim.

The ancientmoralphilosophers,whonearlyexhaustedall that canbesaidaboutvirtue, havenot omittedto considerthe twoquestionsabovementioned.Thefirsttheyexpressedhus: Whethervirtuemustbelearned(sothat man is bynature indifferentto it and vice)? The secondwas:Whetherthere is morethan one virtue (in otherwords,whetherit ispossiblehat a manshouldbepartlyvirtuousandpartlyvicious)? Toboththeyrepliedwith rigorousdecisionin the negative,and justly; for theycontemplatedirtuein itselfas an ideaof the reason(asmanoughttobe).But if we are to forma moraljudg_aentof this moral being,man in_lppearanee,hat is, as welearnto knowhimby experience,henwe mayanswerbothquestionsm the affirmativetbrthenhe is estimatednotbythe balanceof purereason(beforea Divinetribunal),butbyan empiricalstandard(beforea humanjudge). We shalltreat further of this in thesequel.



332 oF _HEBADP,_I_CIPLE [27]

havebeentself adoptedby freeelectivewill, for otherwisetcouldnotbeimputed. Nowthe subjectivegroundorcauseofitsadoptioncannotbefurtherknown(althoughwecannothelp

askingfor it) ; sinceotherwisenothermaximwouldhaveobeadduced,into whichthisdispositionhasbeenadopted,and thisagainmust haveits reason. (27)Since,then, wecannotdeducethis disposition,or ratherits ultimatesource,from anyfirstactof the electivewill in time,we call it a characteristicof theelectivewill, attaching to it by nature(althoughin fact it isfoundedin freedom). Nowthat when we sayof a man thathe isby nature goodor bad, we are justifiedin applying thisnot to the individual(in whichcase onemight be assumedto

be by nature good, anotherbad), but to the wholerace,thiscan only be provedwhenit has beenshownin the anthropolo-gicalinquirythat the reasonswhichjustify us in ascribingoneof the twocharactersto a man as innate are such that thereis

noreasonto exceptanyman from them, and that thereforeitholdsof the race.

I.

')F THE OltlGINAL IR'CAPACITYORGOODIN HUMAN_NATURE.

We may convenientlyregardthis capacity[AnlageJunderthreeheadsdividedin referenceto their end,as elementsinthepurposefor whichman exists:--

1. Thecapacitiesbelongingto the animal_atureofmanasa livi_.qbeing.

2. Tohis humanityas a livingandat the sametimerationalbeing.

3. To his personalityas a rational and at the same timeresponsibleeing[capablef imputation]._

This must not be considered'as contained in the conception of thepreceding,but must necessarily be regarded as a speeial capacity. For it

does not followthat because a being has reason, this includes a faculty ofdetermining the elective will unconditionally by the mere conoeptionof the



[28--293 IN HU_,IAh'YATURE. 333

(2s)1. The capacitiesbelongingto the AnimalNature ofman may bebrought under the general title of physicalandmerely¢nechanicalelf-love,that is, such as does not requirereason. It isthreefold:--first,for themaintenanceof himself;

seeo,dly,or the propagationof his kind,andthe maintenanceof his offspring; "thirdly,or communionwith othermen,thatis,theimpulsetosociety. Allsortsofvicesmaybe graftedonit,butthey donotproceedfromthat capacityitselfas a root. Theymaybe calledvicesofcoarse_zessfnature, andin their extremedeviationfromthe endof nature becomebrutalvices: i_l_empe-ra_we,e_sualitg,ndwild lawless_lessin relationto othermen).2. ThecapacitiesbelongingtohisHumanitymaybebrought

underthe generaltitle of compa,'ative,houghphysical,self-love

(whichequiresreason),namely,estimatingone'sselfashappyorunhappyonly in comparisonwith others. Fromthis isderivedthe inclinationtoobtai_t wortl,in tileopb_io_fothers,and pri-marilyonly that of e_uality to allowno onea superiorityoverone's self,joinedwitha constantapprehension29)that othersmightstriveto attainit, and from this there ultimatelyarisesan unjust desireto gain superiorityfor ourselvesover others.Onthis, namely,jealot_syndri_'c_h'g,he greatestvicesmay begrafted,secretand open hostilitiesagainst all whom we look

uponas not belongingto us. These,however,donot properlyspringof themselvesrom natureas their root,but apprehend-ing that others endeavourto gaina hated superiorityoverus,

qualificationof its maxims to be universal law, so as to be of itself prac-tical: at least so far as we can see. (28) The mostrational being in theworld might still have needof certain springs comingto him fromobjectsofinclination, to determine his electivewill ; and might apply to these themost rational calculation,both as regards the greatest sum of the springsand alsoas to the means of attaining the object determinedthereby; with-

out eversuspecting the possibility,of anything like the moral law, issuingits commandsabsolutely, andwhich aauounees itself asa spring,and that

the highest. Were this law not given in us, we should not be able to findit out as such by reasonorto talk the elective will into it ; and yet this lawis the ouly one that makes us eonsciousof the independenceof our electivewillon determination by any other springs (our freedom),and at the sametime of the imputability of our actions.



834 OF THE BAD 1)RINCIPLE [30

theseare inclinationsto securethis superiorityfor ourselvesasa defensivemeasure,whereasNaturewouldusethe ideaof such

competition(whichin itselfdoesnot excludemutuallove)onlyas a motiveto culture. The vicestha_ are grafted on this

inclinationmaythereforebe calledvicesof culture,andin theirhighestdegreeof malignancy(inwhichthey are merelytheidea of a maximumof badnesssurpassinghumanity), ex.gr.in envy,in i_gratitude,malice,&c.,arecalleddevilid_ices.

3. The capacitybelongingto Personalityis the capabilityof respectfor the moral law as a sprhtgof the electivewalladeqttatc_ itself. Thecapabilityof mererespectfor the morallawin uswouldbe moral feeling,whichdoesnot of itselfcon-stitute an end of the naturalcapacity,but onlyso far as it is

a spring of the electivewill. Nowasthis isonlypossiblebyfreewilladoptingit into its maxim,hencethe characterofsuchan electivewill is thegoodcharacter,which,likeeverycharac-ter offreeelectivewill,is somethingthat canonlybe acquired,the possibilityof which,however,requires the presenceof acapacityin ournatureonwhichabsolutelynothing badcanbegrafted. The ideaof the morallawalone,withthe respectin-separablefromit, cannotproperlybe calleda capacityelongingtope;'so;zality(30)it ispersonalityitself (theideaofhumanity

consideredaltogetherintellectually). But that we adopt thisrespectinto our maximsas aspring, fhisseemsto havea sub-jectivo ground additionalto personality,and so this groundseemsthereforeto deservethe name of a capacitybelongingto personality.

If we considerhosethree capacitiesaccordingto the con-ditions of their possibility,we find that the first requiresnoreason; the seconds basedon reasonwhich,thoughpractical,is at the serviceof other motives; the third has as its root

reason,whichispracticalof itself,that is,unconditionallyegis-lative: all these capacitiesin man are not only (negatively)good(not resistingthe moral law),but are also capacitiesforgood(promotingobedienceo it). They are original,or theyappertain to the possibilityof human nature. Man can usethetwo formercontraryto their end,but cannotdestroythem.



[3]] IN HUMANNATURE. 335

By the capacitiesof a being,weunderstandbothitsconstituentelementsandalsothe forms of theircombinationwhichmake

it suchandsucha being. Theyareoriginalif they are essen-tiallynecessaryo the possibilityof sucha being ; contingentf

the beingwouldbe initselfpossiblewithoutthem. It isfurtherto be observedthat we are speakinghere onlyof thosecapaci-tieswhichhave immediatereferenceto the facultyofdesireandtotheuse ofthe electivewill.

II.

OF THE PROPENSITY"to EVIL IN HUMAN-NATURE.

:BypropeJ_sityprepe_sio) understandthe subjectivesourceofpossibilityofaninclination,(habitualdesire,conc_qJisce_t/a)ofar as this latter is, asregards man generally,contingent2(Sl)It isdistinguishedrom a capacitybythis,that althoughit maybe innate, it neednot be conceivedassuch,but mayberegardedas acquiredwhenit is good), or (whenit is bad)as drawnbythepersononhimself. ]:[ere,however,wearespeakingonlyofthe propensityto whatis properly,i. e.morallybad,which,asit

ispossibleonlyas a determinationof free electivewill,and thiscanbe adjudged to be good or badonly by its maxims,mustconsistin the subjectivegroundofthe possibilityof a deviation

]Prope_zsity" Hang")sproperlynlyhepredispositiono thedesiref_luenjoyment,hichwhenhesubjectashadexperiencefitproducesn_J_clinatio_zoit. Thusalluncivilizedenhaveapropensityointoxicatingthingsfor,althoughmanyofthemarenotacquaintedithintoxication,sothattheycannothaveanydesireorthingsthatproducet,oneneedonly

letthemoncerysuchthingstoproducenalmostnextinguishableesireforthem.Betweenropensityndinclination,hichpresupposescquaint-ancewiththeobject,s i_stS_ct,hichsa feltwantto doorenjoysome-thingofwhichonehasasyetnoconceptionsuchasthemechanicalnstinctinanimalsor the sexualimpulse).Thereis a stillfurtherstepin thefacultyof desirebeyondnclination,amely,assionsnotau_ections, forthesebelongothe feelingofpleasurenddispleasure),hichareinclina-tionshatexcludeelf-control.



336 OF_'HEADPm_CiP_ [32]

ofthe maximsfrom the moral law,andif thispropensitymaybe assumedas belongingto manuniversally(andthereforetothecharacteristicsf hisrace)willbe calleda nalura!propensityof man to evil. We may add further that the capabilityorincapabilityofthe electivewillto adoptthe moral lawinto itsmaximsor not, arisingfromnatm'alpropensity,s calleda goodor bad]_ea;'t.

Wemayconceivehreedistinctdegreesofthis:--first, i t i sthe weaknessofthe humanheart infollowingadoptedmaximsgenerally,(82)or the frailtgofhumannature; seco;;dlg,hepro-pensityto minglenon-moralmotiveswith the moral(evenwhenit is donewitha goodpurposeandundermaximsof good),thatis imlmrit!/;thirdly, the propensityto adoptbadmaxims,thatisthe delJravityf humannatureorofthe humanheart.

_17b.st,he frailty (fragilitas)of humannature is expressedevenin the complaintof an apostle: "To willis presentwithme, but how to performI find not"; that is, I adopt thegood(the law)into the maximof my electivewill; but this,whichobjectivelyin its ideal conceptionint/_esi)san irresis-tiblespring,is subjectively(in]_ypothesi),henthe maximistobe carriedout,weakerthan inclination.Secondltj,he impurilg(impurilas,mprobitas)f the human

hear_consistsin this,that althoughthe maximis goodin itsobject(theintendedobedienceo the law), and perhapsalsopowerfulenoughfor practice,yet it isnot purelymoral,that is,does not, as ought to be the case,involvethe lawaloneas itssuflkientspring,but frequently(perhapsalways)has needofotherspringsbesideit, to determinethe electivewillto whatdutydemands. In other words,that dutiful actions are notdonepurely fromduty.Thirdly,thedepravityvitiositas,;'avitas),rif it is preferred,

the corrui)tionco;'m_ptio),fthe human heart,is the propensityof the electivewill to maximswhichprefer other (notmoral)springsto that whicharisesfrom the moral law. It mayalsobe calledthe2_e;'versit(perv_.rsitas)f thehumanheart,becauseit reversesthe moralorder in respectof the springsof a freeelectivewill; andalthoughlegallygoodactionsmaybeconsistent



[33-84-] i_HUm_ _ATU_Z. 337

withthis, themoral dispositionstherebycorruptedin its root,and the manis thereforedesignatedbad.

(3_)It will be remarkedthat the propensityto evilin manishere ascribedevento the best (bestin action),whichmust bethe caseifit is to beprovedthat thepropensityto evilamongstmenis universal,or what heresignifiesthe samething, that itisinterwovenwithhumannature.

]=[owover,manof goodmorals(5e_emoratus)anda morallygoodman (_Jwrali[eroners)o not differ (orat leastought notto differ)as regardsthe agreementoftheiractionswiththelaw;onlythat in the onethese actionshavenot alwaysthe lawfortheir solo and supremespring; in the other it is invariablyo.We maysayof the formerthat he obeysthe lawin the letter(thatis, asfar as theact is concernedwhichthelawcommands),but of the latter, that he observesit in the s2irit (thespiritofthe morallaw consistsia this, that it is alone an adequatespring). Wl_cdevers _wtdonefi'om this,faitl_ssh_(inthe dis-positionof mind). For if other springsbesidethe lawitselfare necessaryto determinetheelectivewill to actionsco_formiJ_gto thelaw(ex.gr. desireof esteem,self-lovein general,or evengood-naturedinstinct,such as compassion),hen it is a mere

accidentthat they agreewith the law,for they might just aswellurgeto its transgression. The maxim,then, thegoodnessofwhichis themeasureof all moralworthin the person,is inthis caseopposedto the law,and whilethe man'sacts areallgood,he is neverthelessbad.

The followingexplanationis necessaryinorder todefinetheconceptionof this propensity. :Everypropensityis eitherphy-sical,that is, it appertainsto man'swill asa physicalbeing;or it is moral, that is, appertainingto his electivewill as a

moral being. In the first sense, there is no propensity tomoralevil,for this mustspring fromfreedom; (34)and a phy-sicalpropensity(foundedonsensibleimpulses)toanyparticularuseof freedom,whether forgoodor evil,is a contradiction. Apropensityto evil,then, can onlyattachto the electivewillas amoralfaculty. Now,nothingis morallybad (that is,capableo[beingimputed)but what is ourownact.Ontheother hand,by

Z



338 OF THE BAD PRINCIPLE [35]

the notionof a propensitywe understand subjectivegroundof determinationf the electivewill antecedentoanyact,andwhichis consequentlynotitselfanact. Hencetherewouldbea contradictionn thenotionofa merepropensitytoevil,unless

indeedthisword" act " couldbe taken in twodistinctsenses,both reconcilablewith the notionof freedom. Nowthe term" act" in generalappliesto that nseof freedomby whichthesuprememaximis adoptedinto one'selectivewill(conformablyorcontraryto the law), as well as to that in which actionsthemselvesastotheirmatter,that is, the objectsof theelectivewill)areperformedn accordanceith that maxim. The pro-pensity to evil is an act in the former sense(peccatumrigi-_arhtm),andis at thesametime the formalsourceof everyactin the secondsense,whichin its matterviolatesthe law andiscalledvice(peccatumdericativum);and the firstfault remains,oven though the secondmaybe often avoided(frommotivesother than the law itself). The formeris an intelligibleactonly cognizableby reason,apart from any conditionof time;the lattersensible,empirical,given in time(factumphcenome-non). The formeris especiallycalled, iu comparisonwiththesecond,a merepropensity;and innate, becauseit cannot beextia'pated(sincethis would require that the suprememaxim

shouldbegood,whereasby virtueof that propensityitselfit issupposedtobebad); (35)and especiallybecause,althoughthe cor-ruptionof oursuprememaximis ourownact,we cannotassignany further causefor it, any more than for any fundamentalattributeofournature. Whathasjust boonsaidwillshowthereasonwhywe have,at the beginningof thissection,soughtthethree sourcesof moral evil simplyin that which by laws offreedomaffectstheultimategroundof our adoptingorobeyingthis or tha_maxim,not in what affects the sensibility (asreceptivity).



[36] IN HUMANNATURE, 339

III.

MAN IS BY NATUREBAD.

" Vitiis nemo _ine nasei_ur."--Ho_xT.

Accordingto what has been said above,the proposition:]_an is badcan onlymean: He isconseiousof themorallaw,and yethasadoptedintohis maxim(occasional)eviationthere-from. He isbynaturebadis equivalento saying: Thisholdsofhimconsideredas aspecies; not asif suchaqualitycouldbeinferredfrom the specificconceptionof man (thatof maningeneral)(forthenit wouldbe necessary) butbywhatisknown

of himthroughexperiencehe cannotbe otherwisejudged,oritmaybe presupposedas subjectivelynecessaryin everyman,even the best.

Now this propensityitselfmust be consideredas morallybad,and consequentlynot as a natural property,but as some-thingthat canbe imputedto the man,and consequentlymustconsistinmaximsof the electivewillwhichare opposedto thelaw; but on accountof freedomthesemust be lookeduponasin themselvescontingent,whichis inconsistentwiththe univer-salityof thisbadness,unlessthe ultimatesubjectivegroundofall maximsis, by whatevermeans,interwovenwith humanity,and,as it were, rootedin it ; hencewe callthis a naturalpro-pensityto evil; andas themanmust,nevertheless,alwaysineurthe blameof it, (3s)it may be calledeven a radicalbadnesshihumannature,innate (but not the less drawnupon us byourselves).

Nowthat theremust be sucha corrupt propensityrooted inman neednot be formallyprovedin the faceof the multitudeof crying exampleswhichexperiencesetsbeforeone'seyes intheacts of men. If examplesare desiredfrom that state inwhichmanyphilosophershopedto find pre-eminentlythe na-turalgoodnessof humannature, namely,the so-calledstateof_mture,weneedonly lookattheinstancesof unprovokedrueltyin the scenesof murderin Tofoa,New Zealand,the -Navigator

Z2



340 01_THEBADPRINCIPLE [_7]

IslmMs,andthe never-ceasingnstancesin the widewastesofNorth-WestAmericamentionedyCaptainHearne),'wherenoonehaseventhe leastadvantageromit ;_andcomparinghesewiththat hypothesis,we havevices of savagelife morethan

enoughto makeus abandonthat opinion. Onthe otherhand,if one is disposedto think that human nature can be betterknown in a civilizedcondition(inwhichits characteristicpro-pertiescanbemoreperfectlydeveloped),hen onemustlistentoalongmelancholyitanyofcomplaintsofhumanity; (27)ofsecretfalsehood,even in the most intimate friendship,so that i t i sreckoneda generalmaximof prudencethateventhebestfriendsshouldrestraintheir confidencen their mutualintercourse ofa propensityo hate the man to whomoneis underanobliga-

tion, for whicha benefactormust always be prepared; of ahearty good-will,whichneverthelessadmitsthe remark that" in the misfortunesofour bestfriendsthereissomethingwhichis notaltogetherdispleasingto us" ;_ andof manyothervicesconcealednder the appearanceof virtue, not to mentionthevicesofthosewhodo not concealthem, becauseweare satisfiedto callamangoodwhois a badman of theaveragelass. Thiswillgive oneenoughof the vicesof cult_treandcivilization(themostmortifyingof all)to makehimturn awayhis eyefromthe

l [Hearne'sourneyromPrinceofWalesFortinHudson'saytothel_orthernOceann 1769-72.London:795.]

2AstheperpetualarbetweenheAtbapescawndtheDogRibIndians,whichhasnootherobjecthanslaughter.Braverynwaris thehighestvirtueofsavages,ntheiropinion.Eveninastateofcivilization,tisanobjectfadmirationndagroundofthepeculiarespectemandedythatprofessionnwhichthisis theonlymerit,andthisnotaltogetherithoutgoodeason.Forthatamancanhavesomethinghathevaluesmorehan

life,andwhichhe canmakehisobject(namely,onour,enouncingllself-interest),rovesa certainsublimityn his nature.Butweseebythecomplacencyithwhichconquerorsxtoltheirachievementsmassacre,unsparingutchery,&c.),hat it is onlytheirownsuperiorityndthedestructionheycaneffectwithout.anytherobjectnwhichheyproperlytakesatisfaction.

3[Comparetewart,ActivendJ_YoralPowers,k.I. ch.iii,sec.3,whogivesanoptimistxplanationfthissaying.]



[38] IN HUMANuR_. 3_tl

conductfmen,lesthe shouldfall intoanothervice,namely,misanthropy. If he is not yet satisfied,however, he need only

take into consideration a condition strangely compounded ofboth, namely, the external condition of nations--for the rela-tion of civilized nations to one another is that of a rude state of

nature (a state of perpetual preparation forwar), and they arealsofirmly resolved never to abandon it--and he will become aware

ofprinciplesdoptedby the greatsocietiesalledStates/(as)which directly contradict the public profession,and yet arenever to be laid aside, p14ncipleswhich no philosopher has yet

been able to bring into agreement with morals, nor (sad to say)can they propose any better _,hieh would be reconcilablewith

human nature ; so that the philosol_hicalmille;_nium,which hopes

for a stateof perpetual peace founded on a union of nations asarepublic of the world,is generally ridiculed as visionary, just as

much as the t];eological,which looks for the complete moralimprovement of the whole human race.

Now the source of this badness (1) cannot, as is usuallydo,le, be placed in the ,_'emibililgof man and the natural incli-

i It welookat the historyof thesemerelyasa phenomenonftheinnernatureof man,whichis in great Fortconcealedromus,wemaybecomeawareof a certainmechanicalrocessfnaturedirectedtoends_'hicharenotthoseof thenationsbut of iN'aturc.AslongasanyStatehasanothernearit whichit canhopeto subdue,it endeavourso aggrandizetselfbytheconquest,trivinghus toattainuniversalmonarchy--aonstitutionnwhichall freedomwouldbe extinguished,nd withit virtue,taste, andscienceswhichareits consequences).39) But this monster(inwhichalllawsgraduallylosetheirforce),afterit has swallowedp its neighbours,finallydissolvesfitself,andbyrebellionnd discords dividedntoseveralsmallerStates,which,insteadof endeavouringo forma States-uniona

republicoffreeunitednations),beginthe samegameoveragain,eachforitself,sothat war(that scourgeof the humanrace)maynotbeallowedocease. War, indeed,s notsoincurablybadasthe deadnessofauniversalmonarchyorevena unionofnationso ensurethatdespotismhallnotbediscontinuedn anyState),yet, as anancientobserved,t makesmorebadmenthau it takesaway. [Compareon this subjectKant's Essay,Z_tmew_qenFrieden;l[rerke,vii.Thl.,1Abth.,p.229; alsoDostnagia derTheorie,&e.,_o. 3,ibid.p.220.]



342 oFThE_ADP_INe,PI._ [s0J

nationsspringingtherefrom. For not onlyhavethesenodirectreferencetobadness(on the contrary,they affordthe occasionfor the moralcharacterto showits power,occasionfor virtue),

but f_ther we arenot responsiblefor their existence(wecan-not be, for being implantedin us they havenot us for theirauthors),whereasweareaccountableor the propensityo evil;for asthis concernsthe moralityof the subject,and is conse-quentlyfoundin himas a freely actingbeing,it must beim-puted to him as his own fault, notwithstandingts being sodeeplyrooted in the electivewill that it must be saidto befoundin man bynature. The sourceofthis evil (2)eannotbeplacedin a corruptionofReasonwhichgivesthe morallaw(sg),

asifReasoncouldabolishthe authorityofthe lawin itselfanddisownits obligation; for this is absolutelyimpossible.Toconceiveone'sselfasa_reelyactingbeing,andyetreleasedfromthe lawwhichis appropriateto such a being(themorallaw),wouldhe the sameas to conceivea causeoperatingwithoutanylaw(fordeterminationby naturallawsisexcludedbyfreedom),and this wouldbe a contradiction. For the purposethen ofassigninga sourceof themoral evilin man,se_sibilitcontainstoo little, for in taking awaythe motiveswhich arise from

freedomit makeshimamere a_dmalbeing onthe otherhand,aReasonreleasingfromthe morallaw,a _taligJ_aJzteason,asitwerea simplybadRationalWill,[" Wille"] involvesoomueh,forbythisantagonismo the lawwoulditselfbemadeaspringof action(for the electivewill cannotbe determinedwithout

somespring),so that the subject would be madea devih's/_being. Neither of these views,however,is applicabletomall.

Now although the existenceof this propensityto evil in

human nature can be shownby experience,from the actualantagonismn timebetweenhuman will andthe law,yet thisproofdoesnot teachusitsproper natureandthe sourceof thisantagonism. This propensity.concernsa relationof the freeelectivewill(an electivewill,therefore,heconceptionof whichis not empirical)tothe morallawas a spring(theconceptionfwhichislikewisepurely intellectual) its nature then mustbe



[40] _ _u_ANNATURE. 843

cognizedd I_,'io,'iromthe conceptof the Bad,so far as thelawsof freedom(obligationand accountability)bearuponit.The followingis the developmentof the concept:-

Man (eventhe worst)doesnot inany maxim,asit were

,rebelliouslyabandonthemorallaw (andrenounceobedienceoit). (40) Onthe contrary,thisforcesitselfuponhimirresistiblybyvirtueof hismoralnature,andif nootherspringopposedthe wouldalsoadoptit intohisultimatemaximasthe adequatedeterminingprincipleof his electivewill,that is,he wouldbemorallygood. But byreasonof his physicalnature,whichislikewiseblameless,he alsodependsonsensiblespringsofaction,andadoptsthem also into his maxim(by the subjectiveprin-

cipleof self-love).I[, however,e adoptedthemintohis maximasadequatef themselvesloneto determinehis willwithoutre-gardingthemorallaw (whichhe has within),henhe wouldbomorallybad. Nowas he naturallyadoptsbothintohismaxim,andas he wouldfind each,if it werealone,sufficiento deter-minehis will,it followsthat if the distinctionof the maxims

dependedmerelyonthe distinctionof the springs(thematterofthe maxims),namely,accordingas theywere_urnishedbythelawor byan impulseof sense,he wouldbe morallygoodand

badat once,which(aswesawin the Introduction)isa contra-diction. Hencethedistinctionwhetherthe manis goodorbadmustlie,notin the distinctionof the springsthat heacceptsntohis maxim,butin thesubordh_atio_,. e.whichof thehoehemakestl_eco_zditio,f tl_eotl_erthatis,not in the matterof themaximbut in its form). Consequentlya man (eventhe best)isbadonlyby this, that he reverseshe moralorderof the springsinadoptingtheminto his maxims; he adopts,indeed,themorallawalongwiththat olself-love butperceivinghat theycannot

subsisttogetheron equal terms,but that onemustbe subordi-nateto the otherasits supremecondition,he makesthespringof self-loveand its inclinationsthe conditionof obedienceo

the morallaw; whereas,onthe contrary,thelatter oughttobeadoptedintothe generalmaximsof theelectivewillasthe solespring,beingthe su2re_neo_ditionof the satisfactionof thetormer.



$44 oFTREBADP_INCIPLE E41-4_]

(41)Thesprillgsbeingthus reversedbyhis maxim,contrarytothe moralorder,his actionsmay,nevertheless,onformo thelawjust asthoughthey had sprung fromgenuineprinciples:providedreasonemploysthe unity of maximsin general,which

is properto the moral law,merelyfor the purposeof intro-ducinginto the springsof inclinationa unity that doesnotbelongto them,under the name of happiness(ex.gr. thattruthfulness,f adoptedas a principle,relievesusof theanxietyto maintainconsistencyin our liesand to escapebeing en-tangled in their serpentcoils). In whichcasethe empiricalcharacters good,but the intelligiblecharacterbad.

Nowif thereis in humannaturea propensitytothis, thenthereisin mana naturalpropensitytoevil; andsincethispro-

pensityitselfmustultimatelybe soughtin a freeelectivewill,and thereforecan beimputed,it is morallybad. Thisbadnessisradical,becauset corruptsthe sourceofallmaxims; andatthesametimebeinga naturalpropensity,t cannotbedestro_jedby human powers,since this couldonly be done by goodmaxims andwhenbyhypothesisthe ultimatesubjectiveourceof all maximsis corrupt,thesecannotexist; nevertheless,tmust he possibleto overcomet, sinceit is found in man asa freely actingbeing.

The depravityof human nature,then,is not somuchto becalledba&2ess,f thiswordis taken in its strictsense,namely,as a dispositiou(subjectiveprincipleof maxims)to adoptthebad,asbad,intoone'smaximsasa st_ring(forthat is devilish)but ratherperversit_jof heart,which,on accountof the result,is alsocalleda badheart. (_2) This mayco-existwitha Will["_Ville"] goodin general,and arises fi'om the frailty ofhumannature,whichis notstrong enoughto followitsadople,]principles,combinedwithits impurityin not distinguishingile

springs(evenof well-intentionedctions)fromoneanotherbymoral rule. So that ultimately it looksat best only to theconformityof itsactions with the taw,not to their derivationfromit, that is, to the law itself as tile only spring. Nowalthoughthis doesnot alwaysgive rise_owrongactionsandapropensityhereto,that is, to vice,yet the ],abit of regarding



[43] I_ HUMANNATURE. 345

the absenceof viceas a conformityof themi_dto the lawofduty (as_irtue)mustitselfbedesignatedaradicalperversityofthe humanheart (sinceinthiseasethe springin themaximsisnotregardedatall, but onlytheobedienceto the letterofthe

law).This is calledimputeguilt (reatus),becauset can be per-

ceivedas soonas ever the use of freedommanifestsitself in

man,and neverthelessmust havearisen fromfreedom,andthereforemaybe imputed. It mayin its twofirstdegrees(offrailtyandimpurity)beviewedas unintentionalguilt (cuipa),but in the third as intentional(dol_es),nd it is characterizedby a certain maligna_cyof the human heart (dolusmalus),deceivingitself as to its own good or bad dispositions,andprovidedonly its actionshavenot the bad result whichbytheir maximsthey might well have, then not disquietit_gitself about its dispositions,but, on the contrary,holdingitself to be justifiedbeforethe law. Hence comesthe peaceof conscienceof so many (in their own opinion conscien-tious)men, when amidstactionsin which the law wasnottakenintocounsel,(da)or at leastwasnotthe mostimportantconsideration,heyhavemerelyhad thegoodfortuneto escap8bad consequences. :Perhapsthey eveu imagine they havemerit,not feelingthemselvesguiltyof any of the transgres-sionsin which they see othersinvolved; withoutinquiringwhetherfortuneisnot tobe thankedfor this, and whetherthe

dispositionwhich,if they would,they could discoverwithin,wouldnothaveled themto the practiceof thelike vices,hadthey not been kept awayfrom them by want of power,bytemperament,ducation,circumstancesf timeandplacewhichleadintotemptation(allthingsthat canuotbe imputedto us).

This dishonestyin imposingon ourselves,whichhinderstheestablishmentof genuinemoralprinciplein us, extendsitselfthenoutwardlyalsotofalsehoodanddeceptionof otherswhich,if it is notto be calledbadness,at leastdeservesto be calledworthlessness,ndhas itsrootin the radicalbldaessof haremnature, which (inasmuchas it pervertsthe moraljudgmentinrespectof the estimationto be formedof a man,and renders



346 OF THEBADPRINCIPLE [43]

imputationquiteunoertMnbothinternallyandexternally)con-stitutesthe corrupt spotin ournature, which,aslongas wedonot extirpateit, hinders the so.rco of goodfrom developingitself as it otherwisewould.

A memberofthe EnglishParliamentutteredin the heatofdebatethe declaration,"Every manhashis price.'_ If this istrue (whicheveryonemay decidefor himself)--if_herois novirtueforwhicha degreeof temptationcannotbe foundwhichis capableof overthrowi.git--if thequestionwhetherthe goodorthebad spiritshallgainus to its side onlydependsonwhichbids highest and offersmost prompt payment--then whatthe Apostle says might well be true of men universally:" There is no difference,they are altogethersinners; there

is nonethat doethgood (accordingto the spiritof the law),IIO not one._2

[The sayingwas Sir Robert Walpole's, but was not so general as inthe text. He said it (not in debate) of the members of the House of

Commons,addingthat he knewthe price of each.]2 The proper proof of this condemnationpronounced by the morally

judging reason is not containedin this section,but in the preceding; thiscontains only the confirmationof it byexperience,which, however, couldnever discoverthe rootof the evil, in the supreme maxim of free electivewill in relation to the law, this being an intelh:qiSleact,whichis antecedent

to all experience. From this, that is, from the unity of the suprememaxim, the lawto which it refers being one, it mayalso be seenwhy, informing a purely intellectual judgmen_of men, the principleof exclusionof

a mean between good and bad must be assumed; whereasin forming theempirical judgment from sensiSleacts (actual conduct),the principle maybe assumed that there is a mean between these extremes: on one side a

negativemean of indifferenceprevious to all cultivation, and o,_the other

side a positive mean of mixture, so as to be partly good and partly bad.But the latter is onlyan estimationof the morality of man in appearance,and is in the final judgment subject to the former.



[44-45] IN_MAN NATURX. 34T

(44)V.

ON THE ORIGII_F THE EVILIN HUMAN NATURE.

Originprimary)sthederivationfane_fectromits

primarycause,that is, onewhichis notin its tm-nan effectofanothercauseof thesamekind. It maybe considereditherasa rationalor a tem3_oralrigin• In theformersignification,t isonlythe existenceftheeffectthat is considered in the latter,its occurre_we,o that it is referred as an eventto its causein/5ne. Whenthe effectis referredto a causewhichisconnected

withit bylawsofIreedom,asis the casewithmoralevil,then

thedeterminationof theelectivewill to the productionof it isnot regarded as connectedwith its determiningprincipleintime,but merelyin the conceptionof thereason,(45)andcannotbe deducedasfromanyantecedenttate,whichonthe otherhandmustbe donewhenthehadaction,consideredas an eyeletn the

world,is referredto its physicalcause. It is a contradictionthen to seekfor the time-originof freeactionsas such(aswedowithphysicaleffects) or of themoralcharacterof man,sofar as it is regardedas contingent,becausehisis theprinciple

of the _seof freedom,and this (as well as the determiningprincipleof freewill generally)must be soughtforsimplyinconceptionsofreason.

But whatevermaybe the originof themoralevilin man,the mostunsuitableofall viewsthat can betakenof its spreadand continuancehroughallthe membersofourraceandin allgenerationsis, to representit as comingto us by iMm.ita_wefrom our first parents; for wecan sayof moralevilwhatthepoet says of good:

• . . Genustproavos,t_ueezo_feci,nus_si,¥ix eanostrouto...

Thethreeso-calledigherFacultieswouldexplainhisinheritanceeachnitsownway,namely,sa hereditaryalady,rhereditaryuilt,orl_ered_taryb_. 1. Themedicalacultywouldegardhereditaryvilassomethingikethetapeworm,espectinghichomeaturalistsreactually



_$48 OFT_ BADPRINCIPLE [4S--_7]

(_61tiStobeobserved,urther,hathenweinquirentoheoriginfevil,edonotat_rstal_entoccountheropensity

±oit (aspeeccltumn1Jotensia),ut onlyconsiderhe actualevilof givenactions,in its inner possibility,and in what must

concur to determinethe will to the doing of them.Everybadaction,whenweinquireinto its rationalorigin,

mustbe viewedas if themanhad falleninto it directlyfromthe state of innocence. For whatevermay have been hispreviousconduct,and of whateverkindthenatm'alcausesn-iluenclnghimmt_ybe,whethermoreoverhey aa'einternalorexternal,his actionis still free,and not determinedby anycauses,andthereforeit bothcan andmustbe alwaysjudgedasan originalexerciseof hiselectivewill. He oughtto haveleft

it undone,n whatevercircumstancesiemay havebeen; forbynocausein theworldcanhe ceaseto bea freelyactingbeing.It is saidindeed,andjustly,that themanisaccountableortheconseque;_ces,f hispreviousreebutwrongactions but by thisis onlymeant that oneneednot haverecoursetothe subter-fuge of decidingwhetherthe later actions are free or not,.becausehere is su_ieientgroundfor theaccountabilityn theadmittedlyfreeactionwhichwas their cause. But if a manhadbeenneversobaduloto the verymomentof an impend-

ing freeaction(evenso that customhadbecomesecondnature),yet not onlyhas it beenhis dutyto be better,but it is nowstillhis dutytoimprovehimself; (47)hemustthenbealsoabletodoso,andif he doesnot,he is just asaccountableatthemomentof acting asif,ndowedwiththe natural capacityfor good(whichis inseparablefromfreedom),he had steppedintoevil

ofopinionhat,asit is notfoundn anyelementutsidesnor(ofthesame-kind)nanyotheranimal,t musthavebeenpresentn ourfirst

parents.2. Thelegalacultywouldegardtasthelegitimateonsequenceofenteringnaninheritanceeftto usbytllem,utburdenedithaheaD"crimefortobebornis nothinglsebuttoobtainheuseofthegoodsfearth,ofarastheyareindispensableooursubsistence).emusthere-forepaythedebt(expiate),ndshallintheendbedispossessedbydeath)._ight,egally 3.Thetheologicalacultywouldiewhisevilasapersonal3)artieipationfourfirstpaxent_ntherevoltofa reprobateebel,either



[48] m _U_ANNATUre. 3_9

fromthestateofinnocence.We mustnotinquirethen whatistheorigin in time of this act,but whatis its originin reason,in order to definetherebythe propensity,that is to say,thegeneralsubjectiveprincipleby whicha transgressions adopted

intoour maxim,if there is sucha propensity,and if possibleoexplainit.

With this agrees very well the modeof representationwhichthe Scripturesemployin depictingthe originof evilasabegin_zi_gf it in thehumanrace,inasmuchas they exhibit itin a historyin whichthat whichmustbe conceivedas first inthe nature of the thing (withoutregardto the conditionoftime)appearsas first in time. Accordingto the Scriptures,evil does not begin from a fundamental propensityto it--

otherwiseits beginningwould not springfromfreedom--butfromsin (bywhichis understoodhe transgressionofthe morallawas a eg_ineco_nmand)while the state of manbeforeallpropensityo evil is calledthe stateof i_t_wcence.hemorallawprecededas a pro]_ibition,smustbe the casewithmanasabeingnot pure,but temptedby inclination(Geu.ii. 16, 17).Insteadnow of followingthis law directly as an adequatespring(onewhich aloneis conditionallygood,and in respectof whichno scruplecan occur),heman lockedaboutfor other

springs(iii.6)whichcouldonlybe conditionallyood(namely,sofar as the law is not prejudicedthereby),andmadeit hismaxim--ifwe conceivehe actionasconsciouslyarising fromireedom--toobeythelawofdutynotfromduty, butfromrega_'dtoother considerations.4s) Hencehe beganwithquestioningthestrictnessof the law,whichexcludeshe influenceof everyotherspring; then he reasoneddown'obedienceto it to the

thatwe(thoughowunconsciousfit),didthenco-operatenit ourselves,

(_6)orthatnowbeingbornunderhisdominionasprinceofthisworld_,wepreferitsgoodsothecommandftheheavenlyRltler,andhavenotloyaltynougho tearourselvesromhem,forwhichwemusthereaftersharehislotwithhim.

1Aslongasthemorallawis notallowedhepredominancen one'_maxim'sboveallotherdeterminingrinciplesfthe electivewill,asthespringufficientfitself,allprofessionfrespectorit isfeigned,ndthepropensityothisisinwardalsehood,hatis,apropensityodeceivene's



_50 OF THE BAD PRINCIPLE [49]

mereeonclitionalonformityomeans(subjectotheprincipleof self-love),hence,inally,hepredom;n_ncofsensible

motivesabove the spring of the law was adopted into themaximof action,and so sin wascommitted (iil. 6). _utato

_wmine,e te [abula_arratur. That we all do just the same,consequently"have all sinned in Adam,'_ and still sin, isclear fromwhat has preceded; only that in usan innatepro.pensityto sin is presupposedin time,but in the firstman,on

the contrary, innocence,so that in him the transgressioniscalleda fall; whereas,in us it is conceivedas followingfromthe innatedepravityof our nature. What is meant,however,by this propensity is no more than this,that if we wish toapply ourselvesto the explanationof evil as toits begi_i_gin

ti_;2e,we must in the case of every intentionaltransgressionpursueits causesin a previousperiodof our life, goingback-wardstill we reacha time whenthe use of reasonwasnot yetdeveloped:in other words,we must trace the sourceof evil

to a propensitytowardsit (as a foundationin nature)which,on this account, is called innate. In the case of the first

man, whois representedas alreadypossessinghe full powerof using his reason, this is not necessary, nor indeed pos-sible; (49)sinceotherwisethat natural foundation(theevilpro-

pensity)must have been createdin h_rn; thereforehis sin isrepresentedas produced directly from a state of innocence.But wemustnot seekforan originin timeofa moralcharacterfor whichwe are to be accountable,howeverinevitablethis is

whenwe try to exlJlainits contingentexistence(henceScrip-ture may haveso representedit tous in accommodationo thisourweakness).

selftotheprejudicefthemoralawin interpretingt (iii.5); onwhich

accountheBible(Christianart)callstheauthorofevil(residingnourselves)heliarfromhebeginning,ndhuscharacterizesaninrespectofwhatappearsobethemainprinciplefevilinhim.

[Rom.v.12;Vulgate.Luther'sversionscorrect.Jeromelsogivesthecorrectnterpretation,lthoughe retainshe "in quo"oftheoldversion.Probablyhiswasmeantbytheoriginalranslators aliteralrenderingftheGreek$9'_ "in that."]



[50] IN HUMANI_ATURE. _51

The rationalorigin,however,of this perversionof our_lsetivewill in respectof the wayin whichit adoptssubordi-natespringsinto its maximsas supreme,.e. the originof thispropensityto evil,remainsinscrutableous ; forit mustitself

beimputedto us,andconsequentlyhatultimategroundofallmaximswouldagainrequirethe assumptionof a had maxim?Whatis badcouldonlyhavesprungfromwhatismorallybad(notthe merelimits of ournature); andyet theoriginalcon-stitutionis adaptedto good (norcouldit be corruptedbyanyother thanman himself,if he is to be accountableor thiscorruption);there is not then any sourceconceivableo usfromwhichmoralevilcouldhavefirst comeinto us. Scrlp-tare,2in its lfistoricalnarrative,expresseshisinconceivability,

at the sametimethat it definesthe depravityof ourracemoreprecisely(6o)by representingevllas pre-existingat thebegin-ningof theworld,not howevern man,but ina82Jiritriginallydestinedfor a loftycondition. Thefirst beginningof all evilia generalisthusrepresentedasinconceivableo us(forwhencecamethe evilin thatspirit?),andmanashavingfallenintoevllonlyby ,eduction,and thereforeas notfundamentallycorrupt(i.e.eveninhis primaryeapadtyfor good),butasstill capableof animprovementin contrastto a seducingspirit,that is, a

t_elnginwhomhe temptationof thefleshcannotbe reckone,

E"It is averycommonuppositionfmoralphilosophyhatitisveryeasyoexplainheexistencef moralevilinman,namely,hatit arisesfromhestrengthfthesensiblepringsfactionntheonehand,andthefeeblenessftherationalpring(respectorthelaw)ontheother,hatis,fromweak,,ess.Butinthateaseit shouldbestilleasieroexplainhemoraloodnm,m(inhismoralapacity)foronecannotbeconceivedobecomprehensibleithoutheother.Batthefacultyofreasonobecomemasterverallopposingpringsofactionbythemeredeaofthelawis

absolutelynexplicableit is thenequallyncomprehensibleewthesen-siblespringscanbecomemastersf a reasonwhichommandsithsuchauthority.Forif alltheworldactedaccordingothepreceptfthelaw,itwouldesaidthateverythingasgoingoninthenaturalorder,nditwoal_notoccuroanyoneo inquirehecause.'--t_eligion,c.,pp.67,68, _mte.]2Theseremarksmustnot be regarded[as intemledtobe an interpretation



352 (,FTm__A1)PI_NCIPLE [51]

as alleviating his guilt; so that the former, who, notWith-

standing his C01Tuptheart, continues to have a good RationalWill [-"Wille "] has still left the hope of a return to the good

from whichhe has gone astray.

_EN EltAI, I_EMARK. 1

ON THE RESTORATIONOF THE ORIGINAL CAPACITY FOR GOOD

TO ITS FULL POWER.

What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must malceor must have made Mmse(f. Bothmust be the effectofhis free

elective will, otherwise i_ could not be imputed to him, and.

consequently, he would be mo_'al_Vneither good nor bad.When it is said he is created good, that can only mean that he

is created for good,and the original co_stih_tionn man is good;(51)but this does not yet'make the man himself good,but ac-

cording as he does or doesDOtadopt into his maxim the springs

which this constitution contains (whichmust be left altogether

to his own free choice),he makes himself become good or bad,

Supposing that a supernatural co-operation is also necessaryI()make a man good or better, whether this consists only in the

diminution of the obstaclesor in a positive assistance, the man

of Seript_re--athing that liesoutsidetheprovinceof merereason. Weexplainthe mannern whicha moraluse may be madeof a historicalstatementwithoutdecidingwhetherthis wasthe meaningof thewriter,orwhetherweonlyintroducet: providedonlythatit is truein itself,with-outneedinganyhistoricall)roof,andthat it is at the sametimethe onlywayin whichwe canderivesomethingor our ownimprovementroma passageof Scripturewhichwouldotherwisebe only an unprofitableadditiontoourhistoricalknowledge.Wemustnotwithoutnecessityon-tendaboutthe historicalauthorityof a matterwhich,whetherit beunder-stoodin thiswayor in that, doesnothelpusto becomeettermen(50),whenwhatdoeshelpcan andmustbe knownwithouthistoricalt)roof.Historicalknowledge,whichhas fie suchinnerreference,hat canholdgoodfor everyman,belongsotheadiaphora,withrespectto whichevel_--onemayjudgeashe findsmostedifyingorhimself.

fin thefirsteditionhis appearssimplyasNo.V.]



[52-53] INHUMANATURE. 353

mustpreviouslymakehimselfworthyto receiveit andto acceptthis aid (whichis no smallthing), that is, to adopt into hism_x_rnhe positiveincreaseof power,in whichwayaloneit ispossiblethat the good shouldbe imputed tohim, and that heshouldberecognisedasa goodman.Now how it is possiblethat a man naturally badshould

makehimselfa goodmantranscendsall our conceptions;forhow can a bad tree bring forth good fruit? But sinceit is

alreadyadmittedthat a tree originallygood (as to its capa-cities)hasbroughtforthbadfruit,1and the fall from good tobad(whenit is consideredthat it arisesfrom freedom)is notmore conceivablehan a rising again from bad to good,the

possibilityof the latter cannotbe disputed. For notwith-standingthat fall,the command"we oughtto becomebettermen," resoundswith undiminishedforce in our soul; conse-

quently,we mustbe ableto do so,even though what we our-selvescan do shouldbe insufficientof itself,and though weshouldthereby only makeourselvessusceptibleof aninsoru-tablehigherassistance. It must, however,be presupposedhata germ of goodhas remainedin its completepurity, whichcouldnot be destroyedor corrupted--(52)a germthat certainlycannotbe self-love,"which,whentaken as the principleof allour maxims,is in fact the sourceof all evil.

(53)The restorationofthe originalcapaoityor goodin usisthen not the accluisitionof a lostspringtowardsgood; for this,

The tree that is good as to its capacities is notyet soin fact ; for ifit were so it certainly could not bring forth bad fruit; it is only when

the man has adopted into his maxim the spring which is placed in himfor the moral law that he is calleda goodman (the tree is then absolutely

a goodtree).2Words that'admit of two totally different senses often retard con-

viction for a long time when the principles are perfectly clear. _5ovein

general, and self-love in partieular, maybe divided into that of goodwilland that of complacency (benevotentireet complaeentire),and both (as isevident) must be rational. It is natural to adopt the former into one's

maxim (for who wouldnot wish that it should always fare well with him-self ?). It is rational,inasmuchas in the first place, in respect of the endonlythat is chosenwhich is consistentwith the greatest and most lasting

2A



_54 OF TH_ BkD PRINCIPLE E_4]

which consists in respect for the moral law,we could never lose,

aud, were it possible to do so, we could never recover it. It is

then only the restoration of its purity, as the supreme principle

of all our maxims, by which it is adopted into these not merely

in combination with other springs or as subordinate to these(the inclinations) as conditions, but in its entire purity as aspring s_cient of itself to determine the elective will. The

original good is lwlb_essof _;2aximsn following one's duty, by

which the man who adopts this purity into his maxims, althoughhe is not himself as yet on that account holy (for there is stilla long interval between maxim and act), nevertheless is on the

way to approximate to holiness by an endless progress. Firm-

ness of purpose in following duty, when i_ has become a habit,

is called also virt_e, as far as legahty is concerned, which is itsempiricalcharacter(virt_lsphenomeno_). It has then the steady

maxim of co_iformi_gof actions to the law,whatever may be thesource of the spring required for this. (sa)Hence virtue in this

senseis graduallyaequh'ed, and is described by some as a long

practice (in observing the law) by which a man has passed fromthe propensity to vice, by gradual reform of his conduct and

welfare,andinthe next as the mostfittingmeansare chosenfor eachof

theseelementsof happiness. Reasonhereoccupieshe placeof aministerto naturalinclination,and the maximwhichis assumedonthat accounthasnoreferencewhatevertomorality. If, however,t is madethe uncon-ditionalprincipleof choice,hen it is the sourceofan immeasurablyreatconflictwithmorality. Nowa rationalloveof co,nplace_cyno,_e'se/fmayeitherbeunderstoodhus,that wehavecomplacencyn theabove-mentionedmaximsdirectedto the satisfactionof naturalinclinations(sofar asthatendis attainedbyfollowinghem); andthenitis the samehingaseompla-eeneytowardsne'sself; oneis pleasedwithone'sself,asamerchantwhosetradingspeculationsucceed,andwhocougratulateshimselfonhis insightin respectof the maximshehas adopted. But the maximof self-love,ofunconditionalornplace_cyn one'sself(notdependingongainor lossastheresultsof the action)wouldbethe inwardprincipleof asatisfactionwhichis onlypossibleo us on conditionof the subordinationf our maximsothe morallaw. Nomantowhommeralityisnotindifferentcanhavecom-placencyn himself,or indeedcanbefreefromabitterdissatisfactionwithhimself,whois consciousof maximsthat donot agreewiththe morallaw within. We might call this rationalself-love,whichpreventshim



[54] IN HUMANNATURE. 855

strengthening of his maxims, into an oppositepropensity.This doesnot requireany changeof heart,but onlya changeofmorals. A manregardshimselfasvirtuouswhenhe feelshim-self confirmedin the maximsof observanceof duty, althoughthis be notfrom the supremeprincipleof all maxims;but theintemperateman, for instance,returns to temperancefor thesakeof health; the liarto truthfor the sakeof reputation; theunjustmanto commonfairnessforthe sakeof peaceor ofgain,&c.,all onthe much-laudedprincipleofhappiness. But that amanshouldbecomenotmerelya legallybut amorallygood(God-pleasing)man, that is, virtuousin his intelligiblecharacter(virtus_zoume_w_2),man who,when he recognisesa thing ashis duty, needsno other spring than this conceptionof dutyitself; this isnot to beeffectedby gradual refor,_, as long asthe principleof his maximsremains impure, but requires arerolutio_tn themind (atransitionto the maximof holinessofmind), and he canonlybecomea newmanby a kind of newbirth, as it were by a new creation(Gospelof John, iii. 5,comparedwith @en. i. 2) and a changeof heart.But if a man is corrupt in the very foundationof his

from mixing with the springs of his will any other causes of satisfactiondrawn from the consequencesof his actions (under the name of happinessto be procuredthereby). Now as the latter indicates unconditional respectfor the law, why should a difficultybe put in the way of the clear under-

standing of the principle,byusing the expressiona ratiol_alself-love,whichis moral only onthe conditionjust mentioned, whereby we are involved ina circle (53) (for a man can love himself in a moralway only sofar as be isconsciousthat his maxim is to make respect for the law the supremespring

ofhis will)? For us, as beings dependent on objects of the sensibility,happinessis by our [physical] _zaturethe first and unconditional objectofour desire. But (if we give the name of nature in general to all that

is innate in us, then) as beings endowedwith reason and freedom,happi-ness is by our nature far from being the first or unconditional object ofour maxims; this character belongsto wortM_essof]_ap2iness,that is, thecoincidenceof all our maxims with the moral law. Herein consists the

whole precept of morality, that this is the objective conditionunder whichalone the wish for the former can coincidewith the legislation of reasou,and the moral character consistsin the state of mind which admits only

such a conditionalwish.2A2



3_6 OF THE BAD PRINCIPLE [55]

maxims,owisitpossiblehateshouldffecthisevolutionbyhisownpowerandbecomeagoodman ofhimselfAnd

yetdutycommandst,nddutycommandsothinghatsnotpracticableorus.Theonlywaythisifficultyanbegotover

is,hatrevolutionsnecessaryorthementalisposition,utagradualeformorthesensibleemperament,hichopposesobstaclesotheformerandbeingecessary,ustthereforee

possible; that is, whenaman reversesthe ultimateprincipleofhis maximsby whichhe is a bad man by a single immutableresolution(55)(andin sodoingputsona newman); then sofarhe is in principleand dispositiona subjectsusceptibleof good;but it is onlyin continuedeffortand growththat he isa goodman, that is, he mayhope with such purity of the principle

that he has taken as the suprememaximof his electivewill,and by its stability, that he is on the good (thoughnarrow)road ofa constantprogressfrom badto better. In the eyesofonewhopenetratesthe intelligibleprincipleof theheart (ofallmaximsof electivewill), and to whom thereforethis endlessprogressis aunity, that is,in the eyesof @od,thiscomesto thesameas beingactuallya goodman (pleasingto -Him),andinso far this change maybe consideredas a revolution;but inthe judgment of men, who can estimate themselvesand the

strength of their maximsonly by the superioritywhichtheygain oversensibilityin time, it is only to be viewedas an evercontinuing struggle for improvement; in other words,as agradual reform of the perverse disposition,the propensitytoevil.

-Henceit followsthat the moralcultureofman must begin,not with improvementn morals,but witha transformationofthe mind and the foundation of a character,although menusually proceed otherwise,and contend against vicessingly,leavingthe generalroot of themuntouched. Now evenamanof the mostlimitedintellect is capableof the impressionofanincreasedrespectfor an action conformableo duty, inpropor-tionas he withdrawsfrom it in thought all otherspringswhichcouldhave influencedthe maxim of the actionby meansofself-love and evenchildrenare capableof findingout eventhe



[56] i_nU_A__ATURS. 357

leasttrace ofamixtureofspuriousspringsof action,n whichcasethe actioninstantlylosesall moralworth in their eyes.Thiscapacityorgoodis admirablycultivatedby adducingtheeza_2l_of evengoodmen (goodasregardstheir conformityolaw),andallowingone'smoralpupilstoestimatethe impurityofmanymaximsfromtheactual springsof theiractions; (56)and it graduallypassesoverinto the character,so that dutysimplyof itselfcommenceso aecluireconsiderableweight intheir hearts. But to teachthem to a&_2ireirtuousactions,howevergreatthe sacrificeheymaycost,is not therightwaytomaintainthefeelingof the pupilfor moralgood. For how-evervirtuousanyonemaybe, all the goodhe can ever do isonlyduty; andto dohis dutyisno morethan todowhatisinthe commonmoralorder,and thereforedoesnot deserveobeadmired. On the contrary,this admirationis a loweringofcur feelingfor duty, as if obedienceto it were somethingextraordinaryand meritorious.

There is, however,onething in our soulwhich,whenwetake a right viewof it, we cannotceaseto regardwith thehighestastonishment,and in regardto whichadmirationisrightor evenelevating,andthat is the originalmoralcapacityinus generally. What is thatin us (wemayaskourselves)bywhichwe,whoareconstantlydependentonnatureby somanywants,are yet raisedso far aboveit in the ideaof an originalcapacity(inus)hat we regardthemall as nothing,and our-selvesas unworthyof existence,f weweretoindulge in theirsatisfactionin oppositionto alaw whichourreasonauthorita-tivelyprescribes;althoughit is this enjoymentalonethat canmakelifedesirable,whilereasonneitherpromisesanythingnorthreatens. Theimportanceofthis questionmustbe deeplyfeltby everyman of the most ordinaryabil/ty,whohasbeenpre-viouslynstructedas tothe holinesshathasinthe ideaofduty,but whohasnot yet ascendedo theinvestigationof thenotionef freedom,whichfirst arisesfromthis law;1(57)andeventheincomprehensibilityfthiscapacity,acapacitywhichproclaims

*Thattheconceptionffreedomftheelectivewilldoesnotprecedeheconsciousnessfthemoralawin us,butisonlynferredromthedeter-



_58 oFThEBA_PRINC,PLE [_7-_s]

Divinerigin,ustouseispiritoenthusiasm,ndstrengthen

i_Sotnysacrificeshichespectorthisutyayimposenhim. Thefrequentexcitementfthis feelingOfthe sublimityof a man'smoralconstitutionsespeciallyoberecommendeds

a meansof awakingmoralsentiments,inceit operatesndirectoppositionotheinnatepropensityopervertthespringsinthem_._msofourelectivewill,(ss)andtendstomakeunconditionalrespectforthe lawtheultimateconditionoftheadmissionfallmaxims,and sorestorestheoriginalmoralsubordinationfthespringsofaction,andthecapacityor goodin thehumanheartin its primitivepurity.

But is netthis restorationbyone's ownstrengthdirectlyopposedothethesisoftheinnatecorruptionofmanforevery-

thing good? Undoubtedly,sfarasconceivabilitysconcerned,that is to say,our discerltmentf its possibility,just as witheverythingwhichhasto beregardedasaneventin gme(change),andas suchnecessarilyeterminedby lawsofnature,whilstitsoppositemustyet beregardedaspossiblebyfreedomn accord-ancewithmorallaws;but it is notopposedothepossibilityfthis restorationtself. For if themorallawcommandshat we

shallnowbe bettermen,it followsnevitablythat wealsoca_tbebetter. The thesisofinnateevilhasnoapplicationn dogmatic

morality;forits preceptsontainhe verysameduties,andcon-tinue in thesameforce,whetherthereis in usaninnatepro-

minabilityfourwillbythislaw,asanunconditionalommand,nyonemayreadilyeconvinced57)byaskingimselfwhethereisimmediatelycertainfafacultynablingimbyfirmnessfpurposeoovercomeverymotiveo transgressionoweverowerfulPhalarisicetimTerettsis.Falsus,tadmotoicteterduriaauro).Everyoneustconfesshathedoesnotknowwhethernsucha casehewouldotbeshakennhispurpose.Nevertheless,utycommandsimuneonditioaal.lythoushaltemainrue

toit ; andhencehe_us_lyoncludeshathemustalsobeable,ndthatac-cordinglyiswillsfree. Thosewho£_llaciouslyepresenthisinscrutablepropertysquitecomprehensiblereatenillusionytheworddeterminism(thethesishattheelectiveillis determinedyinternalufficienteasons),asif thedifficultyonsistednreconcilinghiswithfreedom,hichoonesupposesthedifficultys,howpredetermluism,ywhicholuntaryctionsaseventsaveheirdeterminingausesnprecedbzgtimewhichwithwhat



[59] 1_ HU_AN_ATU_E. 359

pensityto transgressionor not. In the c_dt_tref moralitythisthesishasmoresignificance,but still it meansnomorethan this,that in the moral cultivation of the moralcapacityfor goodcreatedin us, we cannotbegin from a natural state of inno-cence,but must start fromthe suppositionofa depravityoftheeleetivewillin assumingmaximsthat are contraryto the origi-nal moralcapacity,and,sincethe propensitytheretois ineradi-cable,with an unceasingeffort against it. Now, as this onlyleadsto a progressin i_fi_itumfrom bad to better, it followsthat the transformationof the dispositionof a badinto that ofa goodmanisto beplaced in the changeof the supremeinnerprincipleof allhis maxims,in accordancewith the morallaw,providedthat this newprinciple(thenewheart)beitselfimmu-table. A man cannot,however,naturallyattain theconviction

[that it is immutable],either by immediateconsciousness,59)or by the proofderivedfrom the courseof lifehe hashithertopursued,for the bottomofhis heart (the subjectivefirst princi-pleof his maxims)isinscrutableto himself;but untothepaththat leads to it, and whichis pointedout to himby a funda-

mentallyimproveddisposition,hemustbe able to ho2etoarriveby his ownefforts,sincehe ought to becomea good manand

can onlybe esteemedmorallygoodby virtueof that whichcanbe imputedtohimas doneby himself.Now reason, whichis naturallydisinclinedto moraleffort,

it containss nolongernourpower),anbe consistentithfreedom,ywhichboththe actiontselfandits oppositemustbeinthepowerofthesubjectt themomentfitstakingplacethisiswhatmenwanttodiscernandneverwillbeabletodiscern.Theresnodifficultynreconcilingheconceptionffi'eedomiththe

ideaof Godasa necessaryeing forfreedomoesnotconsistnthecon-

tingeneyftheaction(thatit isnotdeterminedyreasonstall),thatis,notin determinismthat it mustbe equallyossibleorGododogoodorevil,if his actionstobecalledfree),but inabsolutepontaneity,hichalonesendangeredypredeterminism,hichplaceshedeterminingrin-cipleof the actionnpreceding time,sothattheactionsnownolongernmypower,butin thehandsof nature,andI amirresistiblyeterminedandsincesuccessionntimeisnottobe conceivednGod,hisd.iflicultydisappears.



360 OF THE BAD PRINCIPLE IN PIUMAN NATURE. [605

opposesothis expectationf self-improvementll sortsof cor-rup_ideasof religion,underthe pretextofnaturalimpotence(amongwhichis tobe reckoned,attributingo GodHimselfheadoptionofthe principleofhappinessasthesupremecondition

ofHiscommands).Iqowwemaydivideall religionsntotwoclasses--favour.seeklngeligion(mereworship),andmoralreli-gion,that is,the religioneta goodlife. By the formeramaneitherflattershimselfthat God canmakehimeternallyhappy(byremissionof his demerits),withouthishavingany needtobecomebetterman,or if this doesnot seempossibletohim,that Godcanmakehim a betterman,withouthis havingto doanythinginthe matter himselfexcepttoaskfor it; which,asbeforean all-seeingbeingaskingisnomorethanwishing,would

in factbe doingnothing; for if the merewishweresufficient,everyman wouldbe good. But in the moral religion(andamongstall the public religions that have everexistedtheChristianaloneis moral)it is a fundamentalprinciplethateveryonemust do as muchas lies in his powerto becomeabetterman, and that it is only whenhe has not buriedhisinnatetalent (Lukexlx. 12-16),whenhehasusedtheoriginalcapacityforgoodso as to becomea better man,that he can

hopethat whatisnot in his powerwillbe suppliedby a higher

co-operation.Butitisnotabsolutelynecessaryhatmanshouldknowinwhatthisco-operationonsists;(s0)perhapsit is eveninevitablehatif theway in whichit happenshadbeenrevealedata certaintime,differentmen at another timeshouldform

differentconceptionsfit, andthat withallhonesty. Butthentheprincipleholdsgood: "it is notessential,andthereforenotnecessaryor everyoneto knowwhatGoddoesor hasdoneforhissalvation,"but it is essentialto knoww/_athehimself/_asodoin ordertobe worthyof thisassistance.

1[-Theres appendedn theoriginal longnote(firstaddedn theseconddition)ntherelationetweenhe precedingeneralemarkndthecorrespondingemarksppendedothe otherthreesectionsf thePhiloso2McalT]_eoryof.Religion.stheseectionsrenothereranslated,thenotehasbeenomitted.]

Documents

Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works (Part IV), Immanuel Kant