THE BATTLE OF

RIDGEFIELD

P3 VS F8: THE REAL STORY

BATTLE

OF MANILA

BAY

and more....

Cry “Havoc!”International Newsletter of Reviews, Commentary, Insights & Information

August 1, 2001 No. 35

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CONTENTSLet Slip The Dogs of War David W. Tschanz 4

The Battle Of Ridgefield Steven Darley 5Benedict Arnold meets the British in Connecticut

The Pirates Of St. Tropez Robert W. Lebling 11Muslim seafaring brigands use France as headquarters.

Civil War Medicine Janet Phillips 17Review of Robert Denney's classic

U.S. P3 Orion Meets PRC F8 Fighter Robert A Miller 19The American pilot's account of what happened

Bits 'N Pieces Staff 22Member news from around the world

The Battle of Manila Bay George M. Dewey 23Dewey defeats the Spanish Fleet in 1898

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Former editorial assistantPV2 Karl M. Tschanz re-cently completed BasicTraining at Fort Sill wherehe learned how to use theM16A2. The picture ofKarl to the left was takenin January 1992 at KhobarTowers, under the watchfuleyes of the 1st Cavalrywhile on a Cub Scout out-ing to visit the militaryunits stationed there. Lit-tle did anyone know that itwas a harbinger of thingsto come....

LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR

CH35 has been completed just as our occa-sional editorial assistant (and my son) Karl M.Tschanz completes his Basic Training at FortSill. I will admit to editorial indiscretion in that Ideliberately delayed the issue until I could writethe above and enclose the picture on the previ-ous page. I'm proud of him!

Steve Darley makes his first appearance inour pages with an analysis of the Battle ofRidgefield and the role of Benedict Arnold in it.

Muslim pirates in France? That's what Iasked when I first received new member BobLebling's article. But as you will discover foryourself it is a fascinating topic!

Newly minted Contributing Editor JanetPhillips returns to our pages with a review of animportant book on Civil War medicine.

Bob Miller also returns with a review andexamination of the P3 Orion - Chinese F8 midaircollision this past spring.

A special reprint of Admiral George M.Dewey's account of the battle of Manila Bayrounds out the issue.

Now -- one more thing. I deliberately left outthe date of the battle of Manila Bay. There's aone subscription extension to the member whofirst e-mails in the date (print copy people have aseparate contest based on postmark).

Cry "Havoc!" No. 35

November 2000 p. 4

CRY “HAVOC!”

Editor & Publisher: David W. Tschanz

Senior Contributing Editor: James P.Werbaneth

Contributing Editors: J. Michael Flynn, TWGideon, Janet Phillips, Brian R. Train, Ken-neth W. West

Cry “Havoc!” is published four times a yearby TNT Enterprises. One year membershipsubscriptions are $25.00, payable in USfunds. Electronic subscriptions are $10.00.All checks should be made out to TNT En-terprises and should be sent to David W.Tschanz, 7862 W. Irlo Bronson Hwy. #188;Kissimmee, FL 34747. Outside the UnitedStates please address all correspondence toDavid W. Tschanz; Box 8050 Aramco; Dhah-ran 31311; Saudi Arabia.

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Introduction The Battle of Ridgefield, which occurred on April

27, 1777, is not considered to be a major battle of theRevolutionary War by normally accepted standards.There were relatively few casualties on either side. It in-volved neither large armies nor the two commanders-in-chief. It had no major strategic objective and did not re-sult in a decisive defeat for either side. At first glance itwould appear to be one of many little skirmishes in alarger war that would take six and a half years in whichto decide a winner.

Ridgefield, however, is a significant battle for threereasons. First, it revealed to Washington that isolatedand unsupported American supply depots, such asDanbury, were vulnerable to enemy attack. In fact, whensupplies were stored at Danbury after Tryon’s raid,Washington posted a sizable force nearby under GeneralIsrael Putnam. He did not fail to provide proper supportthe second time. Second, it made an important and last-ing impression on the British that even in an isolatedarea like Danbury, the Americans could, and often did,offer a military response to a British attack that was ef-fective and decisive. In other words, the Americans werenot afraid to fight British regulars in the backcountrywhere there were no British ships to afford protection.One commentator has concluded that “while the Britishraided the coast of Connecticut and other northern mari-time states throughout the war, they never attempted topenetrate inland again, but contented themselves withthe destruction of coastal facilities. ”Finally, and mostimportantly, the Battle of Ridgefield helped to reinforcethe up and down reputation and career of then BrigadierGeneral Benedict Arnold. By any reasonable measure,Arnold was the most effective fighting General on theAmerican side. A fact that was, at the time, recognizedmore clearly by the British than by many of Arnold’scontemporaries-both military and civilian. Because theContinental Congress in its promotions to Major Generalslighted him in February of 1777, he was contemplatingresigning from the army, and had so intimated to Wash-ington, prior to the Battle of Ridgefield. Arnold’s actions

at Ridgefield were so outstanding that the Congress waspressured to promote him to Major General, althoughthey did not give him back his seniority.

Ridgefield is significant because it delayed Ar-nold’s resignation until Burgoyne had begun his thrustfrom Canada. Arnold did submit his resignation to theContinental Congress on July 10. At Washington’s re-quest, Congress responded on July 12th by ordering Ar-nold to report to Washington to assist in the defense ofthe Burgoyne invasion. Arnold reluctantly agreed andoffered his services to Washington. It was largely due toArnold that the Burgoyne advance was stopped at theBattles of Saratoga. Without Ridgefield, it is doubtfulthat Arnold would have been available to participate inthat battle.

Situation in 1777The war for American independence was approxi-

mately twenty months old in early 1777. Since GeorgeWashington had taken command of the ContinentalArmy, he had forced the British Army to leave Bostonand then found himself pushed out of New York and fi-nally through New Jersey and across the Delaware Riverinto Pennsylvania. The American attempt to invade Can-ada had not worked as Washington planned, despite theheroic efforts of Benedict Arnold and Richard Montgom-ery. In October of 1776, Arnold had delayed the British

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Feature

THE BATTLE OF RIDGEFIELDStephen Darley

North Haven, Connecticut

counterattack from Canada asCommander on Lake Champlainand bought the ContinentalArmy another winter ofsurvival.

Washington had made adaring raid on the British en-campment at Trenton on Christ-mas morning of 1776 and hadcaptured and effectively de-stroyed the British Army unitsstationed there for the winter.

He followed that victory with another at Princeton andthen retired to his winter quarters in Morristown, NewJersey. Meanwhile, “Gentleman Johnny” Burgoyne, theflamboyant British Lieutenant General, was in Englandand had convinced the decision-makers there to givehim an army to try a second invasion south from Canadato cut the colonies in half. In late 1776, a British army un-der the command of Sir Henry Clinton captured Newport,Rhode Island and established a base of operations there.At the beginning of 1777, the British seemed to have theupper hand but victory was not certain for them andWashington was encouraged by his recent victories atTrenton and Princeton.

Major General Promotions By Continental CongressThe Continental Congress, acting at the behest of

Washington to improve the organizational capacity ofthe army, promoted five Brigadiers to Major General inFebruary of 1777. Benedict Arnold, who was a seniorBrigadier and had been involved in some significant mili-tary actions since 1775, was not one of the five. It turnedout that all of those promoted by the Congress were jun-ior to Arnold in terms of appointment to Brigadier. Thiswas a situation where political considerations com-pletely out-weighed seniority or ability in the promo-tions. Arnold, who was in Newport at the time theappointments were announced, had recently com-manded the American forces in the naval battle on LakeChamplain. Some naval historians regard this battle asone of the finest examples of tenacity and courage com-bined with superb naval skills in delaying a far superiorforce. By his daring exploits, Arnold had demonstratedto the British that Americans could fight when led by anable leader.

Washington had informed Arnold by a March 3rdletter of the promotions made by the Congress and ofhis failure to get one of those promotions. Arnold wasincensed over his slight by the Continental Congress,because he knew that he had proven himself time aftertime as a military commander. Not only that, but thesummer before he had been forced to face a court-martialinstigated by his enemies from Ticonderoga and Quebec

- Brown, Easton and Hazen. Arnold spent some time inNew Haven with his family after his success on LakeChamplain. He left New Haven in January of 1777 to as-sume second-in- command of the troops around New-port. After he received Washington’s letter, he alsospent some time trying to overturn the promotions or atleast to get himself promoted with his seniority restored.By mid April, Arnold realized there was nothing to beachieved in Newport because there was no immediateAmerican offensive planned but, more importantly, heneeded to spend some time in Philadelphia dealing withthe promotion issue. Arnold received permission to leaveNewport to return to his family in New Haven beforeheading to Philadelphia. It was fortunate both for himand the American cause that he made that decision.

Danbury RaidThe British Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Howe,

who was at winter quarters in New York City, sent a smallforce on a surprise raid on the American supply depot atPeekskill, N.Y. in February of 1777. The supplies storedthere were destroyed with minimal loss of British sol-diers. Howe liked that success and two months later heplanned another raid on an American military supply de-pot. This time it was to be Danbury, Connecticut. Howethought that the two raids would help deflect criticismthat he was too easy on the colonials. Howe’s spies hadcorrectly informed the British that the Americans had“considerable amounts of clothing, provisions, pork,flour, munitions, medicines, Army tents and other items”in depositories at Danbury and the surrounding area. Hewanted to follow up his recent raid on American supplieswith another that involved even bigger stakes. It was be-lieved by many on the British side that it would not takemuch to get the Americans to end the war and that de-stroying their supplies would completely demoralize thepoorly supplied American Army. Moreover, Howe washaving his own supply problems and could use the re-bels' supplies for his own men.

Howe selected Major General William Tryon, theformer British Governor of North Carolina and New York,to head the Danbury raid. The size of the force is subjectto varying estimates but Howe himself stated that theforce consisted of “a detached Corps of troops consist-ing of 1800 Rank and File”. Other estimates place theforce at 2000 men. Howe tried to confuse the Americansby sending a diversionary force up the Hudson River to-ward the Peekskill area. The diversion worked to a largeextent by keeping the only sizable American force in thearea holding in their positions and unable to render anyreal assistance during the Danbury raid and the subse-quent battles. Brigadier General Alexander McDougald,who was in the Peekskill area, commanded this divisionof the Continental Army. Washington learned of the

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British troop movements up the Hudson River andalerted McDougald to watch for British activity in hisarea.

Connecticut seemed like a good choice for Howe.Not only was it relatively close to Howe’s base of opera-tions in New York, it also targeted a fairly isolated spotwhich was not heavily guarded and it could be reachedprimarily by sea. The Continental Army commandseemed to believe that if it avoided a troop concentra-tion in the Danbury area, the enemy would not realizethe substantial build up of supplies they had storedthere for future use. Howe felt he could destroy somevaluable supplies without serious risk to his own forcesand that at the same time he could help advance the Brit-ish war effort by capturing enemy supplies for use bythe British. Howe also had intelligence reports, whichturned out not to be accurate, that suggested he couldinfluence the choice of sides by a sizable number of peo-ple in the countryside of Connecticut.

General Tryon and his troops left New York byship on April 22nd and arrived at Compo Beach on theafternoon of April 25th. Compo Beach is at the mouth ofthe Saugatuck River in Norwalk, Connecticut. Thetroops were unloaded from the ships and on the morningof the 26th they began the march to Danbury, which was22 miles away. Connecticut, as with other coastal colo-nies, had men assigned to watch the shoreline for Britishactivity, so knowledge of the movement of Tryon’stroops was soon conveyed to various towns throughoutConnecticut. The British, however, made good time ontheir march and arrived at Danbury on the afternoon ofApril 26th. This was much too soon for any major oppo-sition to get organized and the British were able to marchto Danbury uncontested and without any problems. Thesmall American militia force guarding the supplies of-fered no resistance to Tryon’s army but did hide somesupplies before they left.

The British immediately began to gather up thesupplies that were stored in various locations aroundDanbury. As the supplies were located, they were takento a central location to be destroyed. Tryon had histroops continue to use this method until the morning ofthe 27th when he realized that it would take too long.The British then began to burn the individual buildingsthat housed the supplies in order to save time. Most ofthe supplies accumulated by the Americans were de-stroyed and the British burned a number of homes andpublic buildings. Each side promulgated different esti-mates of the amount of goods and supplies that were ul-timately destroyed.

Meanwhile, the local American forces in Connecti-cut were converging on Danbury, determined to try tostop the British and avenge the losses in Danbury. Oneof those people who answered the call to arms sent out

when the Brit-ish first landedwas the in-trepid BenedictArnold, whowas still withhis family inNew Haven.Even thoughhe was trou-bled by hisfailure to getpromoted toMajor Generaland wanted toget to Philadel-phia, he imme-diately answered the call to arms understanding betterthan most how valuable his services would be. Recruit-in g a few locals from New Haven, including some of hisold comrades from the Connecticut Footguards like Elea-zor Oswald and John Lamb, he rushed towards Danburyto help stop the British. Another local Connecticut militialeader who answered the call was Major General DavidWooster, who had served in the French and Indian Warand in the early months of the Revolution. The early arri-vals from around the area, including Brigadier GeneralGold Silliman, who was a local militia commander fromFairfield, ended up in Bethel, which was a neighboringtown, and others soon followed. The gathering of poten-tial adversaries in Bethel was conveyed to General Tryonat one o’clock on Sunday morning. “This news upset theplans previously made by him for a stay in Danbury overthe Sabbath.”

Tryon’s troops had found some liquor among thestores and had consumed a large amount of it makingmany of his men too drunk to perform their duties. Tryonwas aware that the arrival of American forces in a nearbytown left him exposed. Moreover, he was a long wayfrom the protection of his ships and he wanted, as hesubsequently stated, “to avoid Mr. Arnold”, whose im-minent arrival had also been reported to Tryon. The Gen-eral made the decision to conclude the destruction of theAmerican goods and form up his troops for the returnmarch. Tryon made another very important decision thaton the return march he would not return the same way hehad come but rather he would make a wide sweepthrough Ridgefield and Wilton to avoid contact with thegathering American forces at Bethel. The British begantheir return march early Sunday morning, April 27th , andthey left a burning town and, according to local Danburyaccounts, some local residents dead and wounded.Tryon had achieved his basic objective of destroying

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rebel supplies “at the cost of a few wounded” but thatwas about to change.

Battle Of RidgefieldArnold sent a letter to McDougald, who was still in

Peekskill, on the morning of April 27th, stating that “at 9this morning the Enemy set Fire to the Meeting Houseand most of the Buildings in Town”. He further reportedthat the British then left Danbury and seemed to bemarching toward Peekskill and Tarrytown, New York.Arnold assumed “they are destined for the latter”. Ar-nold informed McDougald that “we propose followingthem immediately in hopes of coming up with their rear”.He urged McDougald to “take them in front”. Arnoldconcluded by stating that “Our loss at Danbury is greatbut I hope not ‘irreparably”. Arnold, who was writingfrom “Wt. Red’ing”, was convinced that the British wereheaded to attack Peekskill again.

Arnold, Wooster and General were acting as an in-formal joint command of the American forces that wouldbe resisting Tryon. The three generals agreed thatWooster would take command of a smaller force of ap-proximately 200 men to attack the British rear, and thatArnold and Silliman would go to Ridgefield with approxi-mately 400 men to confront the British there.

The British were forced to travel along the existingroads because they had supplies in wagons and live-stock with them. The American force, on the other hand,could make much better time across the interior that waslargely wilderness at that time. Arnold pushed his menand they were able to arrive in Ridgefield before the Brit-ish. The British were not trying to hurry because theywere unaware of the numbers that the Americans had

gotten together to face their little army. Tryon believedhe had gotten away from Danbury soon enough and thatby taking the different route back, he had successfullyavoided the army of the other side.

Wooster initiated the first action in the Battle ofRidgefield, at about eight o’clock in the morning, whenhe overtook the British army and fell on their rear detach-ment while they were halted to rest and eat. This actionwas short lived and ended up with Wooster capturing anumber of British prisoners. Each side had different esti-mations of the number of prisoners. McDevitt estimatesthe number to be between 12 and 15 British soldierstaken prisoners. Some American reports stated that thenumber could be as high as 40.

Tryon realized that the Americans were closer thanhe thought and that he would not have an uncontestedroute back to his ships. The British army then proceededat a faster pace, but Wooster continued to harass hisrear units. At one point in those efforts, Woosterthought he could capture some British field pieces andmade a major thrust to do so. In that attack, Wooster firsthad his horse shot out from under him. When hemounted another horse to continue the attack, he re-ceived a shot in his groin, which threw him off his horse.The troops under Wooster were untested militia andwhen they saw that Wooster was wounded, they tookhim up and left the field of battle. Wooster had hiswound attended to by a local physician and was thentaken by carriage back to Danbury. His wound turnedout to be fatal and he died on May 2nd while recuperat-ing in Danbury. Some of the more adventurous ofWooster’s men circled around and joined with Arnoldand Silliman in their Ridgefield efforts.

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Local legend in Ridgefield has tried to makeWooster the hero of the battle because of Arnold’s sub-sequent treason. However, most historians recognizethat Wooster’s effort to harass the British rear units wasinconsequential to the progress of the British army to re-turn to their ships. Undoubtedly, Wooster could havebeen more effective if he had a larger force and if hisforce consisted of trained soldiers instead of untested“militia”. Wooster’s military career, while it included twowars, was not as successful as Arnold’s. In 1776,Wooster had been discharged from his command inCanada in disgrace. He certainly did not have a militaryreputation comparable with Arnold’s in the view of ei-ther the Americans or the British.

Arnold and Silliman arrived at Ridgefield at ap-proximately 11, their numbers constantly growing. “Gen-eral Arnold’s fame was widespread and all menconsidered it a unique privilege to serve under his com-mand”. Most authorities have estimated Arnold’s forceat 500 men. Arnold made his stand “at a naturally defen-sive position blocking the road leading to the village”.Arnold had his men set up a barricade across the roadconsisting of “logs, stones and carts”. The site was agood choice because on the right was a farmhouse andthen the land dropped of at a sharp angle and on the leftwas a “rocky ledge”. It would be difficult, therefore, forthe British to flank the barricade on either side but ratherwould be forced to meet it head on. Two hundred menwere posted at the barricades and the rest of the troopswere placed so that they “protected the flanks”.

Tryon’s army came upon the barricade that Ar-nold’s force had erected at the outskirts of the small vil-lage of Ridgefield about 3:00 in the afternoon. Tryon,who assumed that his army could overrun the barricadewith no problem, ordered a frontal attack. Much to hisamazement Arnold’s troops held steady under the Brit-ish fire. Arnold described this engagement as “a smartaction which lasted about one hour”. Finally, seeing thatthe frontal attack would not work, Tryon sent out

flanking maneuvers on each side of the barricade. Theflanking party on the left side was able to get to the topof the ledge from which they had a good view of the bar-ricade and the troops behind it. The British immediatelybegan firing at the troops behind the barricade and, moreparticularly, at Arnold who was conspicuously directinghis troops about thirty yards away.

Arnold’s troops, primarily inexperienced militia,were not disciplined enough to stay in position and takeenemy fire. Some began to run from their positions. Ar-nold drew his sword and rode back and forth among theretreating men to try to form them into a more disciplinedrear guard. In the midst of his efforts to control his men,Arnold’s horse was shot out from under him. “Havingbeen hit by nine balls, the tortured animal, thrashing indeath throes, had his rider pinned to the ground. An en-emy soldier, climbing the ledge, rushed forward withbayoneted musket in hand. Supposedly he shouted,‘Surrender! You are my prisoner!’ ‘Not yet’, was Ar-nold’s alleged reply as he deftly retrieved a pistol fromhis saddle holster, took aim and leveled his adversarywith one shot. Freeing himself from the flailing horse, Ar-nold hobbled off toward a nearby swamp, with musketballs flying around him.” An English magazine describedArnold’s action as his “usual intrepidity”.

Arnold’s actions had the immediate impact of de-laying Tryon’s march back to his ships at Compo Beach.Since it was late in the day, the British moved to the edgeof town and rested for the night. Meanwhile, that nightArnold was riding through the countryside to try to puthis force back together and recruit some new men in or-der to attempt to stop Tryon again. “By early morning onMonday, April 28, he had raised the rebel standard twomiles north of Norwalk at a geographical point whereTryon would have to follow one of two roads to thecoast.”

Unfortunately for Arnold, Tryon learned where hewas making his stand and maneuvered around theAmerican position. “By the time Arnold learned aboutTryon’s maneuver, he could not redeploy his forcequickly enough to strike effectively at the enemy col-umn.” The action then became a continuous hit and runattack on the British columns by Arnold and his troops.Finally the British reached the hill overlooking CompoBeach and were reinforced by the troops from the ships.Because of the presence of Lamb’s artillery with theAmerican forces, Tryon sent a force of 400 troops,mostly from the ships, to run off the Americans for thelast time.

Arnold had been leading the harassing troop move-ments all day and according to one observer, “exhibitedthe greatest marks of bravery, coolness, and fortitude”during those efforts. As the 400 British troops came to-ward them, Arnold’s untrained militia again broke ranks

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and began to run away. As Arnold tried to form his men,he had another horse shot out from under him and amusket ball passed through his coat. Arnold himself es-caped once more and realized that there was nothingmore he could do.

ConclusionsThe Danbury raid and the Battle of Ridgefield were

concluded with the British army being loaded on theirships and heading back to New York. Arnold sent a let-ter to McDougald the evening of the 28th advising himthat Tryon and his army had left for New York on theBritish ships. He favorably commented on “many of theofficers and men” who he said had “behaved well”. Healso had harsh words for the militia, “I wish never to seeanother of them in action”.

The Continental Congress approved the belatedpromotion of Benedict Arnold to Major General on May2nd even before he could make it to Philadelphia to meetwith them. Given the proximity in time to the Battle ofRidgefield, it is obvious that the promotion was a rewardfor those services. The approval, unfortunately, did notinclude restoring his seniority. That promotion for Bene-dict Arnold was too little and too late as it turned out.

The Continental Congress, in a further effort to re-ward Arnold and to try to undo their initial slight,passed a formal Resolution on May 20th directing: “Thatthe Quartermaster-general be directed to procure a horseand present the same...to Major-general Arnold... as atoken of their approbation of his gallant conduct in the

action against the enemy in their late enterprise toDanbury...”

The approval of Arnold’s promotion by the Conti-nental Congress proved to be enough incentive to keepArnold in the army and engaged in the fight to restorehis seniority. If Arnold had resigned in early May, afterRidgefield, instead of July 10th, there would have beenno actual Burgoyne threat to cause Washington to haveimmediate need of his services and Congress to ignorehis resignation. During the first half of 1777, Congress

showed little concern for threats by officers to resign. Inall likelihood, Arnold’s resignation, if offered in May,would have been accepted

Both sides in the battle had some casualties but itwas certainly not a major battle. Howard Peckham, theacknowledged expert on battle casualties, concludes thatthe British had 25 killed in action, 117 wounded and 29missing in action. He states that the American losseswere 20 killed and 75 wounded. If Peckham is correct, theBritish got the worst of the encounter and the higherBritish casualties, without question, were an importantfactor in the British reticence in attacking American sup-ply depots that were not on the coast. No one can reallysay how that decision affected the course of the war.

The Danbury raid did not achieve the British objec-tive of limiting the Continental Army’s ability to wagewar by destroying their supplies. It is true that the Britishdestroyed a large storage of supplies at Danbury. How-ever, as McDevitt says, the loss of the Danbury suppliesdid not impact the American army’s campaign of 1777 atall. The fact of life in the American army was a severeshortage of supplies, and this was true in all zones ofcombat and at all times. “The loss of these stores (speak-ing of the Danbury supplies) appears to have been butone more headache for the overburdened procurementservice of the American Army.” The shortage of suppliesfor the Continental Army was so acute that the loss ofthe Danbury supplies barely rippled the water. It is a sadcommentary on the state of the Continental Army in 1777and the inability of the Continental Congress to supplyits fighting army in the field.

Finally, the real hero of the Battle of Ridgefield wasBenedict Arnold. His commanding presence in the heatof battle, in this as in other battles, did much to advancehis immediate military objective of stopping the British.Arnold, once again, proved himself to be fearless in bat-tle and willing to lead his men by example. He constantlyexposed himself to enemy fire and by the force of hispresence turned raw untested recruits into a minimalfighting force that could achieve unexpected results. Healso won an overdue promotion.

ReferencesRobert McDevitt, Connecticut Attacked: A British

Viewpoint, Tryon's Raid on Danbury (Chester, Con-necticut: Pequot Press, 1974).

Silvio Bedini, Ridgefield in Review ( Ridgefield:Ridgefield 250th Anniversary Committee, 1958)

James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold RevolutionaryHero, An American Warrior Revisited ( New York: NYUPress, 1997).

George L. Rockwell, The History of Ridgefield, Con-necticut (Ridgefield: George L. Rockwell, 1927).

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Keeler Tavern

Under cover of darkness, they beached their small,lateen-rigged sailing vessel on the rocky shore and be-gan the slow, silent climb to the manor house on the hill.Storm clouds shrouded the moon, darkening the coastalMediterranean landscape; sporadic rain and gustingwinds concealed the sailors' approach. They were 20men, armed with daggers and short swords, and clad inthe fighting tunics of al-Andalus -- Islamic Spain.

They climbed carefully, avoiding the brambles thatcovered the slopes to their left and right. A few lightsstill burned in the manor house. The Provençal noble-man and his family had finished their last meal of theday. After listening to the songs of a visiting trouba-dour, they were preparing to sleep. But it would not belong before the evening serenity of that coastal villawould be shattered by screams and chaos.

This was the opening act in an 85-year dramaplayed out along the southern coast of France in theninth and 10th centuries of our era. It has been called thesecond Arab invasion of France. The first invasion,launched almost two centuries before, is the one most ofus know about: Conducted from al-Andalus by an armyon horseback, it was thwarted by Eudes of Aquitaine atToulouse in 721 and by Charles Martel at Poitiers in 732.

The second invasion, much less well known, beganas a freebooters' adventure along the beautiful stretch ofcoastline now known as the French Riviera. A small-scale raid expanded into something much more ambi-tious, giving the Arabs of Spain, for a moment in history,effective control of the coastal plain linking France andItaly and of the mountain passes into Switzerland --some of Europe's most vital trade and communicationroutes.

An Islamic State?Arab chroniclers of the period -- that is, those

whose works have come down to us -- are generally si-lent about what one Western historian called this"strange Islamic State encapsulated within a wholly

Christian land." Perhaps they did not regard it as suffi-ciently important, compared with the momentous eventsthen taking place in the Iberian Peninsula.

At that time, the Umayyad dynasty of al-Andalus,which had ruled Spain for scarcely a century, was beingchallenged from all directions. Revolts were underway inscores of Spanish cities, some led by Arabs, some byNorth African Berbers, and others by muwalladun, orMuslims of Spanish stock. The Umayyad ruler Abdullah,an educated, pious man who lacked political skills, strug-gled desperately to maintain his realm, but by 912 theamirate had virtually disintegrated, and Abdullah con-trolled little beyond the walls of his capital, Cordoba.

In that year, he was succeeded by his talentedgrandson Abdul Rahman III, who was destined to be-come one of the greatest leaders in the history of IslamicSpain. Over the coming years Abdul Rahman would endthe rebellions, establish a caliphate in al-Andalus, andpreside over a "golden age" of prosperity that saw Cor-doba become the leading intellectual and political centerof Europe.

All this occurred while Andalusi Muslims, buildingon a minor raid in Provence were gradually extendingtheir control into neighboring areas of France, northernItaly and even Switzerland. But if Muslim historians aresilent, the Europeans whose lives were so disrupted bythese events left records of the original incursion and itsaftershocks, and from them we can reconstruct the story.

One of the most detailed accounts comes from Li-udprand of Cremona, a 10th century Italian bishop anddiplomat. He described the 20 men who launched thesecond Arab invasion of France as "Saracen pirates";they might have described themselves as adventurers.Their identities are lost to history. They may have be-longed to a Spanish Muslim faction that had lost an in-ternecine power struggle in al-Andalus, and were lookingfor unclaimed lands to conquer. Or they may have had aformal link with the Umayyad government at Cordoba,operating under the Muslim equivalent of a letter of

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Feature

THE PIRATES OF ST. TROPEZ

Robert W. Lebling, Jr.Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

marque, with official authority to raid Frankish lands. Li-udprand suggests the latter stating that the base theyeventually established in southern France operated un-der the protection of Abdul Rahman III and in fact paidtribute to him.

Tempting Riches of ProvenceThe raiders were attracted to a region with great

natural appeal. The French coast from Marseilles to It-aly, with its rocky headlands and lush, wooded coves,studded with palm trees and brilliantly colored flowers,must have been as alluring to Muslim adventurers of theninth century as it is to travelers today. Indeed, accord-ing to the 17th century Arab historian al-Maqqari, someMuslim authors of earlier times believed that the Frenchwould be barred from Paradise, because they had al-ready been blessed by their Creator with a paradise onearth: fertile lands abounding in fig, chestnut and pista-chio trees, amid other natural bounties.

The raiders arrived in Provence in about 889, at atime of great confusion and misery. Just 30 years earlier,France's southern coast had been plundered and pil-laged by Norse pirates. Entire towns were leveled, andmany local inhabitants were put to the sword. DukeBoso of Lyons, a usurper related by marriage to France'sruling Carolingian dynasty, took advantage of the chaosand, with the support of local counts and bishops, setup his own breakaway kingdom in Provence in 879. TheCarolingian kings could not evict him. When Boso diedin 887, his son and heir, Louis, was too young to rule ef-fectively; local lords and princes began asserting theirindependence and challenging one another. The Carol-ingian empire was splitting into western and easternFrankish kingdoms. There was no central authorityalong the southern French coast, and Provence was ripefor the plucking.

Arab freebooters struck often along these shores.Just as in later centuries British privateers -- pirates -- of-ten worked hand-in-glove with the Royal Navy, so An-dalusi corsairs plied the western Mediterranean in thesympathetic shadow of a large Muslim naval fleet, builtup by the Umayyad government only a few decades be-fore in response to the Norse raids that also struck thecoasts of al-Andalus.

The 20 Muslim corsairs set sail from a Spanishport, intent on raiding an unknown target to the east.Stormy weather forced them to retreat --"unwillingly,"Liudprand says -- into the Gulf of St. Tropez, where theybeached the craft without being spotted. The gulf openstoward the east; the present-day fishing port of St.Tropez, fashionable vacation spot of artists, film starsand the well-to-do, is situated on the southern shore.The pirates landed northwest of there, and, drawn by thetorch lights of the manor house, headed up the mountain

ridge known as theMassif desMaures. Some saythe ridge takes itsname from the in-vading Arabs, whowere also known asMoors; othersclaim it derivesfrom a Provençalcorruption of theGreek wordamauros, meaningdark or gloomy --an apt descriptionof the mountain's thick forests of cork oak and chestnut.

Before sunrise, the pirates attacked and capturedthe manor house and secured the surrounding area.When dawn finally broke they could see, from theheights of the massif, towering Alpine peaks to thenorth, thickly forested slopes below, and the broad blueexpanse of the Mediterranean to the south.

OccupiersThe raiders decided to stay. They began building

stone fortifications on the surrounding heights. As fur-ther defense against Frankish attack, Liudprand says, theArabs encouraged the growth of particularly fierce bram-ble bushes that proliferated in the area, "even taller andthicker than before, so that now if anyone stumbledagainst a branch it ran him through like a sharp sword."Only "one very narrow path" offered access to the cor-sairs' fortifications. "If anyone gets into this entangle-ment, he is so impeded by the winding brambles, and sostabbed by the sharp points of the thorns, that he findsit a task of the greatest difficulty either to advance or toretreat," the cleric wrote in his history, titled Antapodo-sis, or Tit for Tat.

Their defenses secured, the adventurers beganlaunching raids into the countryside. They sent messen-gers back to al-Andalus with word of their conquests,praising the lands of Provence and making light of themilitary ability of the local inhabitants. As a result, a newband of about 100 Andalusi fighters, certainly includingcavalrymen and their mounts, soon arrived to bolster theoriginal 20.

Many more followed as the Muslims' military victo-ries mounted. Administrators and supplies arrived fromCordoba. In time, the Muslim presence along the Rivieragrew to such an extent that military expeditions some-times involved thousands of troops. The Gulf of St.Tropez became a regular port of call for Muslim navaland cargo ships in the western Mediterranean.

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The Muslims called their base Fraxinet (in Arabic,Farakhshanit), after the local village of Fraxinetum,named in Roman times for the ash trees (fraxini) thencommon in surrounding forests. Today, this village sur-vives as La-Garde-Freinet, a picturesque, unspoiled set-tlement tucked amid forests of cork oak and chestnutsome 1300 feet (400 meters) up in the Massif desMaures, between the Argens Plain and the Gulf of St.Tropez. About a half-hour's hike up from the village arethe ruins of a stone fortress said to be the one built bythe Arab pirates. Other high points in the area were alsofortified by the Muslims, but local authorities state thatnothing remains of those structures.

New Allies or Not?Gradually local Frankish lords, seeking to take ad-

vantage of the new political and military realities, soughtthe aid of the Andalusis in settling their private quarrels.The strategy backfired, according to Liudprand: "Thepeople of Provence close by, swayed by envy and mu-tual jealousy, began to cut one another's throats, plun-der each other's substance, and do every sort ofconceivable mischief.... They called in the help of theaforesaid Saracens ... and in company with them pro-ceeded to crush their neighbors.... The Saracens, who in

themselves were of insignificant strength, after crushingone faction with the help of the other, increased theirown numbers by continual reinforcements from Spain,and soon were attacking everywhere those whom at firstthey seemed to defend. In the fury of their onslaughts ...all the neighborhood began to tremble."

European chroniclers claim that the Arabs laidwaste the coastal territory around Fraxinet, today calledthe Côte des Maures, and then moved into neighboringareas in search of plunder. First, pressing eastward, they"visited the county of Fréjus with fire and sword, andsacked the chief town," according to historian E. Levi-Provençal, a 19th century expert on al-Andalus. Thetown of Fréjus, a major seaport founded by Julius Caesarin 49 BC and given the name Forum Julii, was reportedlyrazed and its entire population driven off.

The raiders drove on, hitting one town after an-other along the Côte d'Azur. Eventually the Muslimforces looped back to the west, raided Marseilles andAix-en-Provence, then headed up the Rhône Valley andinto the Alps and Piedmont. North African Berber sol-diers experienced in mountain warfare were probablyused extensively in the Alpine operations, historians be-lieve. By 906, Andalusi forces had seized the mountainpasses of the Dauphiné, crossed Mont Cénis and

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occupied the valley of the Suse on the Piedmontesefrontier. The Arabs erected stone fortresses in areasthey conquered -- in the Dauphiné, Savoy and Piedmont-- often naming them Fraxinet, after their base. The namesurvives to this day in these areas, in various forms likeFraissinet or Frainet.

It did not take much longer before direct communi-cations between France and Italy were virtually severedby the Arab expansion. Pilgrims bound for Romethrough such Alpine valleys as the Doire, Stura andChisone were forced to turn back or risk falling victim toArab raiding parties. In 911, the bishop of Narbonne,who had been in Rome on urgent church business, wasunable to return to France because the Muslims con-trolled all the passes in the Alps. By about 933, saysLevi-Provençal, "light columns, very mobile, held -- atleast during the summer -- all the country under a reignof terror, while the bulk of the Muslim forces was en-trenched in the mountainous canton of Fraxinetum, inthe immediate vicinity of the sea."

As for the "reign of terror," another 19th centuryhistorian, J. T. Reinaud, observes: "One saw ample evi-dence forthcoming for the oft-repeated saying that oneMuslim was enough to put a thousand [Franks] toflight." But an element of cultural bias colors the existingchronicles: Not all Provençals feared the Andalusis ofFraxinet. Some formed alliances with them. "There are ...reasons to believe that a number of Christians madecommon cause with the Muslims and took part in theirattacks," Reinaud notes in his Invasions des Sarrazinsen France, et de France en Savoie, en Piémont et enSuisse. If the villagers and townsfolk of Provence andneighboring regions feared the Muslims as much ascontemporary chroniclers claim, they somehow managednonetheless to cooperate with them in a wide range ofsocial, economic and artistic fields.

The Arabs of Fraxinet were not simply warriors;careful reading of the chronicles reveals that many Mus-lim colonists settled peacefully in the villages ofProvence. They taught the Franks how to make corks forbottles by stripping the bark every seven years from thecork oaks that proliferate in the forests of the Massif desMaures. Today, the cork industry is the area's chief localenterprise. The Muslims also showed the Provençalshow to produce pine tar from the resin of the maritimepine, and to use the product for caulking boats. Reinaudbelieves the Muslims kept a naval fleet permanentlybased in the Gulf of St. Tropez, in part to facilitate com-munications throughout the western Mediterranean. Thetar of Fraxinet would have been used by those sailors.Today in France, pine tar is called goudron, from theArabic qitran, with the same meaning.

The Muslims also taught the villagers medicalskills and introduced both ceramic tiles and the

tambourine to the area, and Reinaud believes the secondArab invasion of France had a "considerable influence"on the development of local agriculture. Some Frenchscholars believe the Muslims of Fraxinet introduced thecultivation of buckwheat, a grain that has two names inmodern French, blé noir (black wheat) and blé sarrasin(Saracen wheat). Furthermore, strong similarities havebeen noted between the poetry of the Provençal trouba-dours and that of Andalusi poets, but this particular caseof cross-fertilization may have occurred even earlier thanthe Arab capture of Fraxinet.

We know little of the individuals who directed ortook part in this Muslim enterprise in France. Rarely areMuslims of Fraxinet mentioned by name in the Europeanchronicles of this period. Liudprand tells of one Arabmilitary commander with the Latinized name Sagittus(perhaps Sa'id) who led an Andalusi fighting force fromFraxinet to Acqui, some 50 kilometers (30 miles) north-west of Genoa. But about all we learn of Sagittus is thathe died in battle at Acqui in about 935.

A leader of Fraxinet itself, Nasr ibn Ahmad, is men-tioned in the Muqtabis of Ibn Hayyan of Cordoba, thegreatest historian of medieval Spain. According to that11th-century chronicle, Abdul Rahman III made peace in939-40 with a number of Frankish rulers and sent copiesof the peace treaty to Nasr ibn Ahmad, described as"commander" of Farakhshanit, as well as to the Arabgovernors of the Balearic Islands and the seaports of al-Andalus -- all of them subject to the Umayyad caliphate.Nothing else is known about the Fraxinet commander.

The first serious effort to expel the Muslims fromFraxinet was made by Hugh of Arles, king of Italy, inabout 931. Hugh enlisted the aid of Byzantine warshipson loan from his brother-in-law Leo Porphyrogenitus,emperor of Constantinople. The warships, hurling "Greekfire," attacked and destroyed a Muslim fleet in the Gulf ofSt. Tropez. Meanwhile, in a coordinated land assault,Hugh's army besieged the fortress at Fraxinet and suc-ceeded in breaching its defenses. The Muslim defenderswere forced to withdraw to neighboring heights. But justwhen the end of Muslim power in France seemed inevita-ble, local politics intervened.

Hugh received word that his rival Béranger, then inGermany, was planning a return to France in a bid to cap-ture the throne. The king, desperate for allies, sent theGreek fleet back to Constantinople and formed a hastyalliance with the Muslims he had just sought to expel. Hesigned a treaty conceding control of Fraxinet and otherareas to the Muslims and stipulating that Arab forcesshould occupy the Alpine heights -- from Mont GenèvrePass in the west to the Septimer Pass in the east -- andblock any attempt by Béranger to cross into France. Li-udprand was outraged by Hugh's actions; in the midst ofhis chronicles, the historian chides the king: "How

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strange, indeed, is the manner in which thou defendestthy dominions!... Thou allowest them to escape who arewithout doubt criminals, and fit to be put to death."

After seizing the Great St. Bernard and other keyAlpine passes, the Andalusi forces spread out into thesurrounding valleys. Grenoble and the lush valley of theGraisivaudun were captured in about 945.

About 10 years later, Otto I, king of Germany andlater Holy Roman Emperor, perhaps fearing the Muslimswould invade his realm, sent an envoy to the caliph atCordoba, Abdul Rahman III, urging an end to raids bythe Arabs of Fraxinet. The caliph's response to the ap-peal is not known.

In the early to mid-960's, the Muslims began a slowbut steady withdrawal from the Alpine regions. To someextent this was due to growing Frankish military pres-sure, and perhaps to the diplomatic initiatives of Otto I.But one modern scholar, Middle East specialist ManfredW. Wenner, suggests the withdrawal may have beenprompted by a foreign-policy change in Cordoba. AbdulRahman III died in 961 and was succeeded by his sonHakam II, a peaceful man who did not share his father'senthusiasm for military operations in southern Franceand the Alpine regions. Wenner believes Hakam mayhave "withheld permission for reinforcements to leavefor Fraxinetum from Spanish ports," making it increas-ingly difficult for the colony to maintain a military pres-ence in the Alps, particularly in the face of ongoing localresistance.

By 965, the Andalusis had evacuated Grenoble andthe valley of the Graisivaudun under continuing Frank-ish pressure. The fertile farmlands and prosperous vil-lages they relinquished were divided up among theFrankish troops who replaced them, in proportion toeach soldier's valor and service. According to Reinaud,writing in about 1836, "even today such families of Dau-phiné as the Aynards and Montaynards trace the turn oftheir fortune to this struggle with the Muslims."

As late as 972, the Muslims still controlled theGreat St. Bernard Pass. In that year, they captured andheld for ransom the famed French cleric St. Maiolus, ab-bot of Cluny, who was traveling through the pass on hisreturn from Rome. The ransom for Maiolus and his largeentourage was set at 1000 pounds of silver -- one poundfor each Andalusi soldier involved in the operation. Theransom was eventually paid through the sale of abbeyholdings, and Maiolus and his party were released. Theincident provoked outrage throughout Christian Europeand sparked further efforts to dislodge the Fraxinet col-ony and its satellites.

Shortly after 972, the Muslims were driven from theheights around the Great St. Bernard. One of the leadersof the opposing forces in this hard-fought battle wasBernard of Menthone, for whom the mountain pass was

later named. (Its name at the time was Mons Jovis, Latinfor "Mount Jupiter" -- a term the Arabs of that era incor-porated into their name for the entire Alpine region, JabalMunjaws.)

St. Bernard, of course, later founded the well-known hospice for travelers in the heights of the GreatSt. Bernard that exists to this day. Some scholars believethe St. Maiolus incident furnished the impetus for build-ing that refuge. Bernard's name, incidentally, was alsogiven to the celebrated dogs trained there to rescue trav-elers trapped in the winter snows.

William of ArlesAlong the Riviera itself, local lords gradually over-

came their differences and, in about 975, they united un-der Count William of Arles, later marquis of Provence, ina bid to drive the Muslims out of France for good. Wil-liam was a popular leader, and managed to persuade war-riors from Provence, the lower Dauphiné and the countyof Nice to join his cause against the Muslims.

The Andalusis consolidated their forces at Fraxinetand "came down from their mountainous resort in serriedranks," as Reinaud says, to encounter the Christianforces at Tourtour, near Draguignan, about 33 kilometers(20 miles) northwest of Fraxinet. The Muslims weredriven back to their mountain stronghold, and the Frankslaid siege to the fortress. The Andalusis, realizing theirfate was sealed, abandoned the castle in the dark ofnight and fled into the surrounding woods. Most wereeither killed or captured by Count William's forces, ac-cording to contemporary accounts, and those who laiddown their arms were spared. It is said that the Frankisharmy also spared the lives of those Muslim colonists liv-ing peacefully in neighboring villages; most of thesewere made serfs, subject to local landlords.

Fraxinet had served as the administrative capital ofall Muslim colonies in France, northern Italy and Switzer-land, and its castle is believed to have held vast quanti-ties of treasure. All the booty from Count William'sconquest was said to have been distributed among hisofficers and men. His second-in-command, Gibelin deGrimaldi of Genoa -- an ancestor of Prince Ranier III, whorules present-day Monaco -- received the area where thehillside village of Grimaud stands today, overlooking theport of St. Tropez. Ruins of Grimaldi's feudal castle, builtin the Saracen style, still crown the village.

Thus ended the Muslim colonization of southernFrance. Andalusis made later attempts to establish foot-holds along that coast: They raided Antibes in 1003,Narbonne and Maguelone in 1019, and the Lérins Islandsoff Cannes in 1047. But never again were the Muslimsable to repeat the stunning success of Fraxinet.

The mountainous regions of inland Provence aredotted with hundreds of old fortified hill villages, like

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Grimaud, whose very existence is a reminder of the"Saracen period." These villages were first built for pro-tection against Muslim raids, and later served to protectthe villagers from marauders of their own faith. Thepeasants lived within their walls, venturing out to worktheir fields by day. By the 19th century, however, withthe establishment of durable peace and order, peasantsbegan leaving the hill villages and moving down into thevalleys. Today, some of these villages lie wholly or par-tially abandoned, but many are being restored, their oldstone structures converted into weekend or summerhomes for the affluent, or housing small colonies of art-ists and craftsmen.

Old mines and remnants of forges at Tende in theMaritime Alps northeast of Monaco and at La Ferrière,near Barcelonnette, have been identified as sites whereMuslims extracted iron ore and manufactured weapons.

Another surviving echo of the Fraxinet period arethe old round towers erected for defense and as watch-posts not only by the Muslims but also by local Chris-tians. The Frankish towers mimic the style of Arab ones.Ruins of what are called "Saracen towers" are found allalong the coast, as well as in nearby Alpine valleys.

These are the remaining physical traces of the Ar-abs of Fraxinet: courses of cut stone, jutting from the

underbrush, as fragmentary and mysterious as the talethat underlies them. Beyond this, the pirates of St.Tropez and their cohorts live on as part of the folk mem-ory of Provence, remembered as conquerors, teachersand agents of change in a dark and troubled era.

Quotations from Reinaud are taken from the English translationof his work, Muslim Colonies in France, Northern Italy & Swit-zerland, translated by Haroon Khan Sherwani and published inLahore in 1955 by Sh. Muhammad Ashraf. Excerpts from theAntapodosis are from The Works of Liudprand of Cremona,translated by F. A. Wright and published in London in 1930 byGeorge Routledge & Sons, Ltd.  

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Some Ways For Old Salts to Simulate Being in the Navy1.  Lock all friends and family outside.  Your only means of communication should be with let-ters that your neighbors have held for at least three weeks, discarding two of five.  2.  Surround yourself with 200 people that you don't really know or like: people who smoke,snore like Mack trucks going uphill, and use foul  language like a child uses sugar on cereal.  3.  Unplug all radios and TVs to completely cut yourself off from the outside world.  Have aneighbor bring you a Time, Newsweek, or  Proceedings from five years ago to keep you abreastof current events.  4.  Monitor all home appliances hourly, recording all vital information  (i.e.: plugged in, lightscome on when doors open, etc.)  5.  Do not flush the toilet for five days to simulate the smell of 40  people using the samecommode.  6.  Lock the bathroom twice a day for a four hour period.  7.  Wear only military uniforms.  Even though nobody cares, clean and  press one dress uniformand wear it for 20 minutes.  8.  Cut your hair weekly, making it shorter each time, until you look  bald or look like you lost afight with a demented sheep.  9.  Work in 19-hour cycles, sleeping only four hours at a time, to ensure that your body doesnot know or even care if it is day or night.  10.  Cut a twin mattress in half and enclose three sides of your bed.   Add a roof that preventsyou from sitting up (about 10 inches is a good  distance) then place it on a platform that is fourfeet off the floor.   Place a small dead animal under the bed to simulate the smell of your

Robert E. Denney, Civil War Medicine Care & Comfortof the Wounded. New York: Sterling Publishing Com-pany, Inc., 1995. 383 pages.

Robert E. Denney chronicles the history of medicaltreatment during the Civil War in day-by-day accountsfrom 1861 to 1865 drawn from letters, reports, journals,and diaries from both sides of the conflict. Denney, aveteran of both the United States’ Marines and Armyand the past president of the Civil War Round Table ofWashington, D.C., writes brief explanations of the day’shistorical significance before posting the first hand ac-counts of that day. Most of the book are the reflectionsof the people involved in the war such as surgeons,soldiers, nurses, or members of the Sanitary Commis-sion. In Civil War Medicine Care & Comfort of theWounded, Denney allows the first hand reports to be-speak the valiant struggles of those trying to save livesamidst the horrors of diseases, unsanitary conditions,lack of supplies, and inadequate transportation systemsfor the wounded.

The armies that fought in the Civil War lost moremen to disease than to combat. Not much was knownabout bacteria in the 1860’s. Doctors did know of the“malarial miasmas” of swamps and the “mephitic efflu-via” believed to be around privies and unburied gar-bage. These were the most popular beliefs for theorigins of disease. Civil War Medicine is a testimonialof the constant catastrophic consequences of measles,dysentery, scurvy, malaria, typhoid, typhus, and small-pox. Two out of three fatalities died from disease. As-sistant Surgeon United States Army writes on June 29,1862:

Many of the wounds began to look badly; typhussymptoms rapidly developed; operative cases showedlittle or no disposition to heal; three or four cases ofpure typhus occurred, and one half of the whole num-ber of these men died during the month......, p.125)

The creation of the United States Sanitary Commis-sion alleviated some of the unprepared state for war bythe Army Medical Department. Frederick Law Olmsted

was appointed to the office of executive secretary. Olm-sted was the architect and superintendent of New York’sCentral Park. The United States Sanitary Commission didheed the lessons learned by the British Sanitary Commis-sion after the fiasco of the Crimean War. The SanitaryCommission took on the responsibility to spread infor-mation about sanitation and hygiene to Armies. It wasnoted the Regular Army did not suffer as much diseaseas the volunteers and their camps were much cleaner.The Sanitary Commission published reports on theproper location and the disposal of wastes in a militarycamp.

The book gives accounts of moving the woundedto hospitals. In the early years of the war, the woundedsoldier would often have the experience of lying in afield, without water or food for hours or days. In theevent the soldier was lucky enough to be discovered, hethen had the pleasure of being transported over miles ofrough road in an impractical cacolet or litter. Thewounded were also transported by boats and on trainswhich was not a pleasant experience. The patients wereoften exposed to the elements and cramped condition.

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Review

CIVIL WAR MEDICINE

Janet PhillipsAshdown, Arkansas

A major cause of illness in the war was the clothingand food issued to the troops. Some of the troops wereoutfitted with shoddy uniforms, blankets and linens.Food was a major problem. The troops were issued ra-tions but were required to prepare their own meals. Thesoldier was issued beef , flour, hard bread, beans, rice,coffee, sugar, candles, and vinegar. One seasoned gen-eral even remarked, “beans kill more than bullets.” TheSanitary Commission issued pamphlets on the properpreparation of food in the field to avoid a common mal-ady known as “death by frying pan.”

Denney’s documentation of Civil War Medicine isextensive. Each day of the book has at least two entriesof letters, journals, or diaries. Denney does provide abrief narrative of the day before posting the entries. Thevoices of the people give the book an authentic voice.The book encompasses each day of the war. This is am-ple reading for those interested in a daily account of theaftermath of the battles. The descriptions of the disease,filth, and loss of life depicted in gruesome detail of the war are not for the weak of heart or stomach. One flawof the book is the confusion from so many personal ac-counts. Another flaw of the book is an actual lack ofhistory despite all the first hand documentation. To un-derstand the significance of many events, looking at an-other reference is often necessary.

. Often the impression of Civil War medicine is of crudeamputations and mass death. This book shows the peo-ple involved were trying to do their best to save lives.The success of the Sanitary Commission and the UnitedStates Army Medical Department can be documented inthe lessening of fatalities as compared to the MexicanWar. The Mexican War death count had been seven dis-ease deaths to every battle death.

Civil War Medicine is a finely documented book. Itis a must to accompany other Civil War books such asDoctors In Blue The Medical History of the Union Armyin the Civil War by George Worthington Adams.

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The story behind this article is a bit complex. I re-ceived the original text (in a sidebar on the followingpage) from Geoff Riddell. It was far too technical forme, so I turned it over to Bob Miller for a "translation"which is what appears directly below. Bob also wroteup a glossary to accompany the article. So thanks toGeoff, Bob and the unknown "Denny the Rod", here is apretty accurate account of the entire incident from theUS P3 pilot.

From a telephone conversation with US Navy Lt.Shane Osborne (Aircraft Commander of the P-3 Orion),the following account was given of the mid-air collisionwith a Chinese F-8 fighter.

The F-8 pilot attempted to fly very close to theP-3’s left wing in what was an obvious harassment exer-cise. At the time, the US Navy P-3 was cruising at 180knots in level flight at 22,000 feet.

This was a foolish and dangerous maneuver on thepart of the Chinese pilot because (a) jet fighters do nothandle well at such low speeds and (b) large, heavy air-craft (such as the Orion) create quite a bit of rolling airturbulence in their flight path — not unlike the wakewhich trails behind a boat. Of course, air turbulence isinvisible.

Upon closing with the P-3’s left wing, the ChineseF-8 became unstable and impacted the Orion’s numberone engine and propeller. At the same time, the F-8’s tail(vertical fin) impacted the Orion’s left aileron and droveit to the full up position. The evidence of this impact is alarge hole punched in the left aileron.

As a consequence of the immediate application offull up left aileron (which, of course, caused the right ai-leron to go full down), the P-3 “snap rolled” to the left.The stricken Chinese F-8 then crashed into the nose ofthe Orion, smashing the radome and breaking off the twosets of pitot tubes.

At this point, the F-8 reportedly broke in two. Orioncrew members reported seeing a parachute, so it can beassumed that the Chinese pilot ejected. He did notsurvive.

The P-3 continued its left roll to a near inverted po-sition. Number one engine had ingested debris from thefighter and flamed out. The number one propeller wasalso badly damaged.

Upside down, with a smashed radome, a punctured(depressurized) fuselage, one dead engine and damagedprop and complete loss of airspeed and altitude instru-ments (not to mention damaged flight controls), Lt. Os-borne struggled to regain control of his aircraft.

It was later discovered that the Orion’s damage waseven worse than first feared. Number three propeller wasdamaged as well as parts of the tail surfaces of theaircraft.

As if they needed anything else to go wrong, theHF radio antenna wire separated and wrapped aroundthe trim tab of the elevator.

Although a sturdy aircraft, the P-3 Orion was neverdesigned for such“aerobatic” flying. Lt.Osborne and his co-pilot together had to ap-ply all their strength toregain level flight. TheOrion had dropped to(estimated) 15,000 feetand was still descend-ing at about 3,000 feetper minute.

Full power was ob-tained from the remain-ing engines (numbers 2and 4) and full right ai-leron was required tohold the aircraft level.

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Feature

US P3 ORION MEETS PRC F-8:AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

Robert A. MillerAl Khobar, Saudi Arabia

Descent was finally arrested at (estimated) 8,000 feetabove the sea.

Numbers one and three propellers were damaged tosuch an extent that they could not be feathered. Numberone prop was missing an entire blade and was, therefore,causing serious vibration. A danger existed that theprop or indeed the entire engine could be ripped fromthe wing.

Lt. Osborne ordered the crew (24 total) to “Preparefor bailout.” This is probably a “first” in the long historyof the Orion. Once he determined that the aircraft wasactually “flyable,” the order was amended to “Preparefor ditching.”

The odds of successfully ditching a large, heavyaircraft in the ocean are, under the best of circum-stances, not good. In this case, Lt. Osborne had a se-verely damaged, barely flyable Orion that, most likely,could not have survived a water ditching.

The closest “friendly” airfield was more than 600miles away, so the only available option was the Chineseairbase on Hainan Island. Ironically, this was the homebase for the Chinese fighter that originally caused theproblem.

With two engines out, damaged flight controls, noflaps, vibrating propeller, a high gross weight (108,000pounds), Lt. Osborne managed to plant the Orion on theHainan runway at 170 knots (very high landing speed).A heroic bit of flying that, clearly, saved twenty-fourlives.

EpilogueThe Chinese Air Force officials had the affront to

complain that he landed “Without permission.” Can youthink of a good two-word reply to that?

Cry "Havoc!" No. 35

Augusr 2001 p. 20

The Original Text

I had the opportunity to talk w. Lt. Shane Osborne viaphoncon (he was in Disney World!) this past Mon-day.  The whole story is more incredulous than theprint version.  The F-8 attempted to join their leftwing..the P-3 was doing 180 KIAS at 22K...for a 3rdpass. This A/S is a bad combination clearly for theF-8.  His wing came  up, either trying to stop closureor as a result of being too slow, and he impacted the#1 prop.  The vert fin of the F-8 prob drove the P-3port aileron full up,..there's a big hole in the port ai-leron.  The P-3 snap rolled near inverted in 2 secondsper Shane..that's 3-4x the max roll rate of the P-3 w/max aileron only.

The F-8 impacted the radome & broke in two.  Chutewas sighted by P-3 crew. The P-3 #1 engine flamed outdue FOD, the radome exploded due F-8 impact, the P-3depressurized, lost all airspeed & altimeter info duelost probes & vibrated violently due damage to #1 and#3 prop and tail damage.  The HF wire separated andwrapped around the elev trim.  Shane said it took bothpilots max pull to right the A/C to wings level and stilltook cherry lights (max power x 3 ) and full right ai-leron to hold wings level initially.  The P-3 had rolledto 130 degrees w/ 30 degrees nose down. They made arecovery at estimated 15 K altitude but still had a 3kROD despite max power.   Maxpowr was required toarrest descent thru 8 K.  They most feared #1 propseparting due high vibes, despite attempted Fx.  Thecockpit ordered bailout (prob a P-3 first) until they re-covered control and then commanded a PreparetoDitch....before assessing the extent of damage andquestion of control. They finally selected an emer-gency landing at the nearest field..Hainan. Other AI-lied fileds were 600 + miles away.   They made a 170 KtGS (they had INS info in the cockpit), no flap, highGW (108K), no trim, no KIAS, damaged aileron, highdrag due #1 windmill, damaged elevator, near full R ai-leron landing at Hainan. Heroic flying that clearlysaved 24 lives.  Tell the rest of the story if you hear anopinion that starts w. "they should have ditched."  A170 Kt, no radome, no flap, #1 windmill, no trim, dam-aged aileron ditch would have lost 24 lives.  I vote forthe flight crew and great flying.  

R / Denny the Rod

(Thanks to Bob Miller for the translation!)

GLOSSARY OF AVIATION TERMS ANDEXPRESSIONS.

There are three different ways of expressing theSPEED of an aircraft such as the P-3 Orion:

Indicated Airspeed (IAS or KIAS). This is the indi-cation given on the aircraft “Airspeed Indicator.” It be-comes less accurate the higher you go and the warmerthe air temperature. Speed is usually expressed in knots(K).

True Airspeed (TAS). This is the indicated airspeedcorrected for altitude, barometric pressure and tempera-ture. TAS is usually higher than IAS.

Ground Speed (GS). The speed the aircraft is mak-ing over the ground. If, for example, an airplane is flyingat 200 knots TAS into a 50 knot headwind, the GS wouldbe150 knots.

Yes, for the technical nitpickers, there is a fourthway of expressing speed: Mach Number. A typicalcruise speed for a Boeing 747 would be Mach 0.84 — or84% the speed of sound.

There are several ways of expressing ALTITUDE:MSL (Mean Sea Level) As the name implies, this is

altitude above sea level and is adjusted for local baro-metric pressure by a little knob on the Altimeter.

AGL (Above Ground Level) How high the airplaneis actually above the ground below. This can be meas-ured only by a radar altimeter.

FL (Flight Level) This is just a handy way to knockoff the last two zeros. FL220 would mean 22,000 feetMSL. When FL is used, the altimeter is set to a standardbarometric pressure of 29.92” or 1013 Millibars(Hectopascals).

There is one more instrument associated with theabove group: VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator). This tellsthe pilot how fast he is going up or down in thousands-of-feet per minute.

FLIGHT CONTROLSAirplanes have three active flight control systems:

AILERONS (roll), ELEVATORS (pitch) and RUDDER(yaw).

Turning is accomplished (mostly) by the ailerons“rolling” the aircraft left (port) or right (starboard). Therudder is just for “coordinating” (cleaning up) the turn.Note: Left and Right in an aircraft is ALWAYS the pi-lot’s left and right.

The elevators raise or lower the attitude of the air-craft nose up or nose down. This affects bothclimb/descent and speed.

The controls of an airplane are completely and ut-terly UNLIKE a car. The three flight controls and thethrottles (engine power) work together (hopefully in

concert) to control the aircraft attitude and “flightenvelope.”

TRIM (or Trim Tabs) are small devices found on theflight control surfaces used to set a “bias.” Up or down,left or right, whatever is needed to zero the pilot’s pres-sure on the controls. They just make flying physicallyeasier.

***Most large aircraft have RADAR. It is mostly used

for weather mapping, although military aircraft may use itin “search” mode. The radar antenna is usually located inthe aircraft nose and must be protected (and streamlined)by a cover called a “Radome.” The radome is made of fi-berglass and must be protected by a coat of radar trans-parent paint. This paint used to always be black(neoprene), but now you can get it an any color.

RADIOS: There are basically three types of aircraftradios: HF (High Frequency), VHF (Very High Fre-quency) and UHF (Ultra High Frequency). HF is neededfor very long range communications.

ENGINES: On multi-engine aircraft, engines arenumbered from left to right. Number One Engine wouldbe the leftmost.

FOD (Foreign Object Damage) Jet engines do notlike to ingest nuts, bolts and birds. Turboprops are jetengines connected through a gearbox to a propeller.

PITOT/STATIC System: The Airspeed, Altitudeand VSI indicators need a sample of the dynamic andstatic wind pressures on the aircraft in order to provideproper readings. This is accomplished by a “Pitot Tube”and “Static Port” mounted on the outside of the aircraft.

The pilot’s and co-pilots instruments are independ-ently given these air pressure samples by separate sys-tems. Unfortunately, on the P-3, the pitot tubes aremounted fairly close together — therefore were subjectto simultaneous damage by the Chinese fighter.

SNAP ROLL: the immediate application of FULL ai-leron (either left or right) that results in a very rapid roll.

WINDMILLING: If an engine must be shut down(on a multi-engine prop aircraft), the propeller blades areturned into the wind (feathered) so the prop will not ro-tate and cause drag. If the engine is shut down and theprop can not be feathered, the prop will spin and act likea dragging brake.

If a propeller is badly damaged (as was the casewith the P-3), not only does the offending prop causedrag, but serious vibration as well.

Cry "Havoc!" No. 35

Augusr 2001 p. 21

Cry "Havoc!" was saddened to learn recently ofthe passing of Dale Tomlinson. Tomlinson had authored"Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign" that appeared inCH 28 (August 1999). A veteran of the Korean War,Tomlinson had been a member of the original MilitaryHistory SIG back in the 1970's and rejoined the presentone in 1998. Dale will be missed by all of us.

Sometime Editorial Assistant Karl Tschanz com-pleted BasicTraining at Fort Sill, OK on August 23rd(and is the reason we delayed this issue, see pictures onpage 3 of the youthful warrior). PV2 Tschanz is slated tobegin training as a fire direction specialist on a MLRSalso at Fort Sill with post AIT assignment still open.

Welcome to new members Clay West (Connecti-cut), Martina Deichman (Weisbaden), Steve Darley(Connecticut), Simon Small (Goteburg, Sweden), MajorLuis Gonzalo Paz Asensio (Buenos Aires, Argentina),David Saks (Johannesburg, South Africa), Robert Le-bling (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia), Judy Vasiliauskas (Ne-vada), Jerry Maltz (Arizona), Edward Haidinyak(Illinois), Robert Naborney (New York) and Robert Nock(Maryland).

SIG member Judy Vasiliauskas was elected Na-tional Secretary of American Mensa at the Annual Gen-eral Meeting. Congrats to Judy! (See what contributingto Cry "Havoc!" can do for you!).

David Tschanz recently earned Certified InternetWebmaster status (okay, you ask, then where is theSIG's website? -- to which I reply, "I'm working on it").And someone mumbles that the shoemaker's children gobarefoot...

Cry "Havoc!" No. 35

Augusr 2001 p. 22

Feature

BITS N' PIECES Member News from Around the World

News items can be sent to Cry"Havoc!" by e-mailing

dtschanz@sahara.com.sa

I am currently in the midst of research on certainaspects of the Spanish-American War. I came acrossthis account, written by Admiral Dewey of what is stillone of the most one-sided naval victories in history.Since the SPAW is one of the least known and leats un-derstood wars in US history, I thought this accountwould be enlightening to the readership -- DWT

Preparation for BattleOnce through the entrance, as I deemed it wise to

keep moving in order not to be taken by surprise whenthe ships had no headway, and as, at the same time, I didnot wish to reach our destination before we had suffi-cient daylight to show us the position of the Spanishships, the speed of the squadron was reduced to fourknots, while we headed toward the city of Manila. In themeantime the men were allowed to snatch a little sleep attheir guns; but at four o'clock coffee was served to them,and so eager were they that there was no need of anyorders to insure readiness for the work to come.

Signal lights, rockets, and beacon lights along theshore, now that we were sure of grappling with the en-emy, no longer concerned us. We waited for dawn andthe first sight of the Spanish squadron, which I hadrather expected would be at the anchorage off the city ofManila. This seemed naturally the strong position forAdmiral Montojo to take up, as he would then have thepowerful Manila battery, mounting the guns which havealready been enumerated, to support him. But the admi-ral stated in his report that he had avoided this positionon account of the resultant injury which the city mighthave received if the battle had been fought in closeproximity to it.

The Nanshan and Zafiro, as there was no reserveammunition for either to carry, had been sent, with theMcCulloch, into an unfrequented part of the bay in or-der that they should sustain no injury and that theymight not hamper the movements of the fighting-ships.When we saw that there were only merchantmen at theManila anchorage, the squadron, led by the flag-ship,gradually changed its course, swinging around on thearc of a large circle leading toward the city and making a

kind of countermarch, as it were, until headed in the di-rection of Cavite. This brought the ships within two orthree miles of shore, with a distance of four hundredyards between ships, in the following order: Olympia(flag), Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston.

Opening RoundsAbout 5:05 the Luneta and two other Manila batter-

ies opened fire. Their shots passed well over the vessels.It was estimated that some had a range of seven miles.Only the Boston and Concord replied. Each sent twoshells at the Luneta battery. The other vessels reservedtheir fire, having in mind my caution that, in the absenceof a full supply of ammunition, the amount we had wastoo precious to be wasted when we were seven thou-sand miles from our base. My captains understood thatthe Spanish ships were our objective and not the shorefortifications of a city that would be virtually ours assoon as our squadron had control of Manila Bay.

With the coming of broad daylight we finallysighted the Spanish vessels formed in an irregular cres-cent in front of Cavite. The Olympia headed towardthem, and in answer to her signal to close up, the dis-tance between our ships was reduced to two hundredyards. The western flank of the Spanish squadron wasprotected by Cavite Peninsula and the Sangley Pointbattery, while its eastern flank rested in the shoal wateroff Las Pinas.

The Spanish line of battle was formed by the ReinaCristina (flag), Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don An-tonio de Ulloa, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, andMarques del Duero.

The Velasco and Lezo were on the other (southern)side of Cavite Point, and it is claimed by the Spaniardsthat they took no part in the action. Some of the vesselsin the Spanish battle-line were under way, and otherswere moored so as to bring their broadside batteries tobear to the best advantage. The Castilla was protectedby heavy iron lighters filled with stone.

Before me now was the object for which we hadmade our arduous preparations, and which, indeed, mustever be the supreme test of a naval officer's career. I felt

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Augusr 2001 p. 23

Feature

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAYGeorge M. DeweyAdmiral, United States Navy

confident of the outcome, though I had no thought thatvictory would be won at so slight a cost to our own side.Confidence was expressed in the very precision withwhich the dun, war-colored hulls of the squadron fol-lowed in column behind the flag-ship, keeping their dis-tance excellently. All the guns were pointed constantlyat the enemy, while the men were at their stations wait-ing the word. There was no break in the monotone of theengines save the mechanical voice of the leadsman or an

occasional low-toned command by the quartermaster atthe conn , or the roar of a Spanish shell. The Manila bat-teries continued their inaccurate fire, to which we paid noattention.

The misty haze of the tropical dawn had hardlyrisen when at 5.15, at long range, the Cavite forts andSpanish squadron opened fire. Our course was not oneleading directly toward the enemy, but a converging one,keeping him on our starboard bow. Our speed was eight

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Augusr 2001 p. 24

knots and ourconvergingcourse and ever-varying positionmust have con-fused the Span-ish gunners. Myassumption thatthe Spanish firewould be hastyand inaccurateproved correct.

So far as Icould see,, noneof our ships wassuffering anydamage, while, inview of my lim-

ited ammunition supply, it was my plan not to open fireuntil we were within effective range, and then to fire asrapidly as possible with all of our guns.

"You may fire when ready"At 5.40 when we were within a distance of 5,000

yards (two and one-half miles) , I turned to Captain Gri-dley and said: "You may fire when you are ready,Gridley."

While I remained on the bridge with Lamberton,Brumby, and Stickney, Gridley took his station in theconning-tower and gave the order to the battery. Thevery first gun to speak was an 8-inch from the forwardturret of the Olympia, and this was the signal for all theother ships to join the action.

At about the time that the Spanish ships were firstsighted, 5.06, two submarine mines were exploded be-tween our squadron and Cavite, some two miles aheadof our column. On account of the distance, I remarked toLamberton: "Evidently the Spaniards are alreadyrattled."

However, they explained afterward that the prema-ture explosions were due to a desire to clear a space inwhich their ships might manoeuvre.

At one time a torpedo-launch made an attempt toreach the Olympia, but she was sunk by the guns of thesecondary battery and went down bow first, and anotheryellow-colored launch flying the Spanish colors ran out,heading for the Olympia, but after being disabled shewas beached to prevent her sinking.

When the flag-ship neared the five-fathom curveoff Cavite she turned to the westward, bringing her portbatteries to bear on the enemy, and, followed by thesquadron, passed along the Spanish line until north ofand only some fifteen hundred yards distant from theSangley Point battery, when she again turned and

headed back to the eastward, thus giving the squadronan opportunity to use their port and starboard batteriesalternately and to cover with their fire all the Spanishships, as well as the Cavite and Sangley Point batteries.While I was regulating the course of the squadron. Lieu-tenant Calkins was verifying our position by crossbear-ings and by the lead.

Three runs were thus made from the eastward andtwo from the westward, the length of each run averagingtwo miles and the ships being turned each time with porthelm. Calkins found that there was in reality deeper waterthan shown on the chart, and when he reported the factto me, inasmuch as my object was to get as near as pos-sible to the enemy without grounding our own vessels,the fifth run past the Spaniards was farther inshore thanany preceding run. At the nearest point to the enemy ourrange was only two thousand yards.

Spanish Fleet DestroyedThere had been no cessation in the rapidity of fire

maintained by our whole squadron, and the effect of itsconcentration, owing to the fact that our ships were keptso close together, was smothering, particularly upon thetwo largest ships, the Reina Cristina and Castilla. TheDon Juan de Austria first and then the Reina Cristinamade brave and desperate attempts to charge the Olym-pia, but becoming the target for all our batteries theyturned and ran back. In this sortie the Reina Cristinawas raked by an 8-inch shell, which is said to have putout of action some twenty men and to have completelydestroyed her steering-gear. Another shell in her fore-castle killed or wounded all the members of the crews offour rapid-fire guns; another set fire to her after orlop;another killed or disabled nine men on her poop; anothercarried away her mizzen-mast, bringing down the ensignand the admiral's flag, both of which were replaced; an-other exploded in the after ammunition-room; and stillanother exploded in the sick-bay, which was alreadyfilled with wounded.

When she was raised from her muddy bed, fiveyears later, eighty skeletons were found in the sickbayand fifteen shot holes in the hull; while the many hitsmentioned in Admiral Montojo's report, and his harrow-ing description of the shambles that his flag-ship had be-come when he was finally obliged to leave her, showswhat execution was done to her upper works. Her losswas one hundred and fifty killed and ninety wounded,seven of these being officers. Among the killed was her

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Augusr 2001 p. 25

"To my gratification not a single[American} life had been lost..."

Adm. Montojo

valiant captain, Don Luis Cadarso, who, alreadywounded, finally met his death while bravely directingthe rescue of his men from the burning and sinkingvessel.

Though in the early part of the action our firingwas not what I should have liked it to be, it soon stead-ied down, and by the time the Reina Cristina steamedtoward us it was satisfactorily accurate. The Castillafared little better than the Reina Cristina. All except oneof her guns was disabled, she was set on fire by ourshells, and finally abandoned by her crew after they hadsustained a loss of twenty- three killed and eightywounded. The Don Juan de Austria was badly damagedand on fire, the Isla de Luzon had three guns dis-mounted, and the Marques del Duero was also in a badway. Admiral Montojo, finding his flag-ship no longermanageable, half her people dead or wounded, her gunsuseless and the ship on fire, gave the order to abandonand sink her, and transferred his flag to the Isla de Cubashortly after seven o'clock.

Victory was already ours, though we did notknow it. Owing to the smoke over the Spanish squad-ron there were no visible signs of the executionwrought by our guns when we started upon our fifthrun past the enemy. We were keeping up our rapid fire,and the flag-ship was opposite the centre of the Span-ish line, when, at 7.35 , the captain of the Olympia madea report to me which was as startling as it was unex-pected. This was to the effect that on board the Olym-pia there remained only fifteen rounds per gun for the5-inch battery.

It was a most anxious moment for me. So far as Icould see, the Spanish squadron was as intact as ours.I had reason to believe that their supply of ammunitionwas as ample as ours was limited.

Therefore, I decided to withdraw temporarily fromaction for a redistribution of ammunition if necessary.For I knew that fifteen rounds of 5-inch ammunitioncould be shot away in five minutes. But even as wewere steaming out of range the distress of the Spanishships became evident. Some of them were perceived tobe on fire and others were seeking protection behindCavite Point. The Don Antonio de Ulloa, however, stillretained her position at Sangley Point, where she hadbeen moored. Moreover, the Spanish fire, with the ex-ception of the Manila batteries, to which we had paidlittle attention, had ceased entirely. It was clear that wedid not need a very large supply of ammunition to fin-ish our morning's task; and happily it was found thatthe report about the Olympia's 5-inch ammunition hadbeen incorrectly transmitted. It was that fifteen roundshad been fired per gun, not that only fifteen roundsremained.

Victory and Breakfast Feeling confident of the outcome, I now signalled

that the crews, who had had only a cup of coffee at 4AM, should have their breakfast. The public at home, onaccount of this signal, to which was attributed a noncha-lance that had never occurred to me, reasoned thatbreakfast was the real reason for our withdrawing fromaction. Meanwhile, I improved the opportunity to havethe commanding officers report on board the flag-ship.

There had been such a heavy flight of shells overus that each captain, when he arrived, was convincedthat no other ship had had such good luck as his own inbeing missed by the enemy's fire, and expected the oth-ers to have both casualties and damages to their ships toreport. But fortune was as pronouncedly in our favor atManila as it was later at Santiago. To my gratification nota single life had been lost, and considering that wewould rather measure the importance of an action by thescale of its conduct than by the number of casualties wewere immensely happy.

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