Veröffentlichung der Abteilung Institutionen und sozialer Wandel des Forschungsschwerpunkts Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse des

Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung

FS m 94-202

Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

Dieter Fuchs Edeltraud Roller

Berlin, November 1994

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50, D 10785 Berlin,

Telefon (030) 25 49 1-0

Abstract

Following the introduction of democratic institutions in the countries of central and eastern Europe, the question of the consolidation of these newly implemented democracies arises. One of the most important conditions for consolidation is support for democracy from the community of citizens in the respective countries. In the theoretical frame of reference of this analysis, it is postulated that, although high initial support is to be expected, only enduring positive experience with the reality of democracy makes this a stable attitude. Only where this is the case can one speak of a consolidated democracy. The empirical analysis on the basis of representative surveys in 11 central and eastern European countries (conducted between 1990 and 1991, in East Germany 1992) indicates that there is indeed initial approval of democracy as a specific form of political order. But it also shows that there was no positive feedback from experience with the reality of democracy to sustain this initial support. The reality of democracy was judged to be bad in all countries. A cau­sal analysis makes it clear that the respondents' negative assessment of the reality of de­mocracy in their own countries depends primarily on the perceived performance of the respective governments. In view of the problems all governments in central and eastern European countries were and are facing, the positive feedback necessary to consolidate democracy in these countries is unlikely to manifest itself. The question of the consolida­tion of democracy in central and eastern Europe is accordingly still an open one.

Zusammenfassung

Nach der Einführung demokratischer Institutionen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas stellt sich die Frage nach der Konsolidierung dieser neu-implementierten Demokratien. Eine der wichtigsten Bedingungen für diese Konsolidierung ist die Unterstützung der De­mokratie durch die Gemeinschaft der Bürger in den einzelnen Ländern. Im theoretischen Bezugsrahmen der Analyse wird postuliert, daß anfänglich zwar eine hohe Unterstützung erwartbar ist, daß diese sich aber erst durch andauernde positive Erfahrungen mit der Wirklichkeit der Demokratie zu einer stabilen Einstellung verfestigt. Nur wenn letzteres der Fall ist, kann von einer konsolidierten Demokratie gesprochen werden. Die empirische Analyse auf der Grundlage von repräsentativen Umfragen in 11 Ländern Mittel- und Ost­europas (Erhebungszeitpunkt: 1990-1991, in Ostdeutschland 1992) zeigt, daß die anfäng­liche Zustimmung zur Demokratie als einer spezifischen Form der politischen Ordnung tatsächlich existierte. Sie zeigt aber auch, daß ein positiver Feedback von den Erfahrungen mit der Wirklichkeit der Demokratie auf diese anfängliche Unterstützung nicht stattfinden

konnte. Die Wirklichkeit der Demokratie wurde in allen Ländern als schlecht eingestuft. Eine Kausalanalyse macht deutlich, daß die negative Einschätzung der Wirklichkeit der Demokratie im eigenen Land vor allem von der perzipierten Performanz der jeweiligen Regierungen abhängt. Angesichts des Problemdrucks, dem sich alle Regierungen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas gegenübersahen und noch gegenübersehen, ist der für die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in diesen Ländern notwendige positive Feedback wenig wahrscheinlich. Die Frage der Konsolidierung der Demokratie in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas ist demnach noch nicht entschieden.

Contents

1. Outline of the Problem, 1

2. Theoretical Framework 3

2.1 The Concept o f Political Culture i n the Present Discussion 3

2.2 A General Model of the Legitimation of Democracy and a Concept of Political Culture 5

2.3 Specifications of the General Model 11

3. Empirical Analysis 14

3.1 Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Indicators 14

3.2 Empirical Dimensions 19

3.3 Support for Democracy 22

3.3.1 Support for the Culture of Democracy 22 3.3.2 Support for the Structure of Democracy 26 3.3.3 Support for the Performance of Democracy 29

3.4 A Model of the Performance of Democracy 35

4. Summary and Conclusions 41

Cultural Conditions of the Transition to Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*

1. Outline of the Problem

The processes of social change in central and eastern European countries still present a challenge to social scientific analysis. They permit the application, testing, and modification of the most diverse theories and concepts. In other words, they offer an opportunity to further our knowledge. Of the issues inviting examination, Ekiert (1991, 285) believes the problem of the transition to liberal democracy to be the most interesting one from a theoretical point of view and the most relevant from a political perspective. This transition becomes a problem primarily when attainment of the final phase in the process, seen by Di Palma (1990) as the consolidation of the newly established institutional structure of liberal democracy, is subject to uncertainty. Such uncertainty is reduced i f a modernization theory frame of reference is applied. In so far as social change in central and eastern Europe is attributed to modernization processes, consolidation wi l l be a likely outcome. In a recent study, Inglehart (1992) for example postulates the gradual convergence of all developed industrial societies towards three central elements: democratic political institutions, a free market economy, and liberal religious, social, and sexual norms. Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) take a similar, though somewhat less affirmative view, basing their argument on, among others, Hauslohner (1989) and Lapidus (1989). They see modernization processes in industrial societies as contributing to the acceptance of democratic values and thus to the consolidation of the democratic order. They believe that the surprisingly strong support for democratic values they recorded in Moscow as early as 1990 can be explained in terms of such modernization processes.

Ekiert (1991) develops a far more sceptical perspective. He regards the functioning and consolidation of a democratic order as only one of several possible developments in the transition process, and not even as the most likely one. He sees two other variants as being at least as likely. The first is the "formation of new non-democratic political regimes" (Ekiert 1991, 288). He refers to them as new because he excludes a return to the recently abandoned state-socialist regimes. As far as non-democratic regimes are concerned, Ekiert

* This article stems from the project "Political Culture, Political and Economic Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe during Transition to Democracy 1990 -1992". It will be published in a volume edited by Samuel H. Barnes, Laszk) Bruzst and Janos Simon, the initiators and coordinators of the project.

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is thinking primarily of authoritarian types. The second variant is a sort of "anarchization" (Ekiert 1991, 287) of society, which can also come about within the framework of democratic and market economy institutions. These institutions would then have little binding effect on the actions of members of these societies. Ekiert (1991, 310f.) states the main reason for his scepticism to be the enormous pressure exerted by problems concomitant to the transition process in central and eastern European countries. This is due primarily to the need simultaneously to "democratize the polity" and "marketize the economy", and to both the economic and the social crises that have to be mastered at the same time.

We adopt Ekiert's view for three reasons. First, we consider that Ekiert has convincingly demonstrated the barriers to consolidation. Second, there are sufficient instances of a breakdown in democratic regimes under similar conditions, also in relatively highly developed societies. In Europe we need mention only Italy and Germany prior to the Second World War, and Greece in the post-war period. Third, modernization theory allows for the possibility of partial modernization. This can, for example, mean that the economic system modernizes to become a market economy, but that modernization towards liberal democracy and liberal values fails to occur. Such developments are indicated in a number of Asian countries. The Western model of complete modernization on all three dimensions mentioned by Inglehart (1992) is thus not the only one possible nor the only one existing. Differing views on liberal values and norms, in particular, constitute one of the sources of the "clash of civilizations", which Huntington (1993) regards as one of the most important cleavages world society wi l l be facing for the near future.

Especially i f the outcome of the transition processes in central and eastern European countries is considered to be open, social scientific analysis faces at least three issues: first, determining the factors that play a role in attaining the goal —• that is to say the consolidation of liberal democracy; second, understanding the mode of operation of these factors; and third, evaluating further developments on the basis of the empirical analysis of these factors. The following study wil l focus on analysing the salience of cultural factors in the process of transition. The subject of our investigation w i l l thus be the cultural conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe. By cultural conditions we mean not the entire cultural spectrum but only political culture.

With regard to political culture, however, two basic aspects are controversial. On the one hand the more general aspect of the analytical and explanatory usefulness of the concept, and on the other the more specific aspect of the salience of the concept for explanatory ventures within the framework of the transition process. Di Palma (1990) and Przeworski (1986) assess the importance of political culture for the transition process as rather low, whereas Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992), Kaase (1993) and Toka (1994) regard it as a

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relevant factor in the transition process. The most unequivocal evaluation is given by Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992,330): "This article is grounded in the basic assumption that processes of change are dependent on the political culture of the polity. (...) Though cultural theory does not provide a complete explanation of political change, culture un­doubtedly influences the process mightily." We assume that a possible reason for the controversial status of political culture as a factor in explaining the transition process is the more general aspect mentioned above, namely conceptual vagueness. In the following section we therefore intend to develop a number of theoretical ideas on the ways in which the concept of political culture can be made fruitful for analysing the transition process. A series of empirical studies based on case analyses and macro data have already shown that certain cultural factors play a role in the stabilization and persistence of democracies (see inter alios Grew 1978; Linz 1978; Lichbach 1981; Lipset 1981).

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Concept of Political Culture in the Present Discussion

Within the framework of empirical social research, the concept of political culture was introduced by Almond and Verba (1963). Despite numerous critical comments on their concept, their understanding of political culture still prevails in most studies undertaken within the empirical research paradigm. On the most general level, political culture is defined as "the subjective orientation to politics" (Verba 1965, 315) or as the "psychological or subjective dimension of politics" (Almond 1980, 26). A certain particularization of this subjective element of politics is provided by the following definition: "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time" (Almond and Powell 1978, 25).

It is especially this definition that makes Almond and Verba's concept of political culture so attractive for empirical analysis. Survey data can be used for analysis without further ado, and more or less every political attitude recorded can be subsumed under the concept of political culture, thus investing it with a certain theoretical sanctity. But it is also this definition that draws criticism. Dittmer (1977) refers to the concept of political culture as a "catch-all term" or a "blurred conception". In a critical review, Kaase (1983) used a graphic metaphor to characterize the situation, describing it as "trying to nail a pudding to the wall".

In investigating the transformation of central and eastern European countries, Gibson,

Duch and Tedin (1992) place themselves quite explicitly in the tradition of Almond and

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Verba's political culture concept. But as a consequence, we believe their otherwise very elaborated analysis has also inherited the problems posed by the extremely comprehensive and thus analytically vague meaning of the concept. The authors themselves recognize the difficulty when they state: "there is little agreement on a list of specific cultural attributes that is conducive to democratic development" (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992, 331f.). They attempt to solve the problem by referring back to Dahl. In the two works by Dahl that they cite (1971; 1989), the author does, indeed, offer a list of the various factors promoting the development of democracies, or polyarchies as Dahl terms them. However, we feel it is not a matter only of listing plausible factors, even though this ddes restrict the spectrum of possible variables. In order to make the concept of political culture analytically and explanatorily fruitful, the issue must be specified, the factors relevant to it must be selected, and an idea both about the relations between these factors and about their mode of operation must be developed. However, this was unnecessary for Dahl's analysis because his principal interest was not to explain the development of polyarchies. A well-founded list of factors was therefore sufficient for his purpose. But such a list is not yet a theory, but rather a preliminary stage in the formation of a theory. We thus feel that by taking recourse to Dahl's list, Gibson, Duch and Tedin do not offer an adequate solution to the problem. We wil l later be taking up certain of Dahl's theoretical considerations in another fashion.

Almond himself indicates a direction in which the general concept of political culture can be converted for concrete analytical purposes. To begin with he states: "Political culture is not a theory; it refers to a set of variables which may be used in the construction of theories" (Almond 1980, 26). Which theory is to be constructed depends on the issue in hand. Almond turns again to the central question of 'civic culture', that of the stability or persistence of democracies. In this regard, he and Powell differentiate political culture into system culture, process culture, and policy culture (Almond and Powell 1978). On the question of persistence, system culture is the especially relevant factor, and the most important category of system culture is the legitimacy of the system. Since the consolidation of democracies in central and eastern European countries is to a large extent identical with their persistence, we remain true to the direction indicated by Almond and Powell in proposing, in the next section, a model of the legitimation of democracy. It is in this context that we also advance the definition of political cultural underlying our empirical analysis.

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2.2 A General Model of the Legitimation of Democracy and a Concept of Political Culture

In elaborating a model of the legitimation of a democracy and a concept of political culture, we have to a large extent relied on theory developed by Parsons (1969; 1971).1

Parsons postulates his categories within the context of a comprehensive theory of society. This has the advantage that they relate to one another systematically, thus mutually delimiting and specifying one another. Another advantage is the relative ease with which the approaches espoused by Almond, Verba, and Powell can be integrated. Despite the ab­stract nature of Parsons' theory, it is thus possible to establish a link to empirical research. Easton's (1965b; 1975) concept of political support, which provides the frame of reference for most empirical studies on political support also points to the potential for empirical application displayed by elements of Parsons' theory. Easton adopts fundamental theoretical elements from Parsons.

Parsons himself does not use the term political culture. But he analyses the relationship between structure and culture in social systems. And since the political system is a social system, or to be more exact, a primary subsystem of society, specification for the political system is a relatively 'easy matter. This is all the more true since Parsons himself formulated the key aspects in his legitimation concept.

The point of reference of our study is the consolidation of the democracies in central and eastern Europe. When a democracy is consolidated it is also stable or persistent. The concept of persistence was proposed by Easton (1965a, 84) in order to avoid the connotation of static continuance associated with the term stability. Persistence is perfectly compatible with change, i f the latter does not affect the constitutive elements in a social system. In many cases persistence is possible only through limited change, implying ad­justment to the changing environmental conditions of a system. Eckstein and Gurr (1975, 465) refer to the same state of affairs as durability. The function of political culture in the persistence of a political system is stated in general terms by Almond and Verba. A political system is persistent when the culture and the structure of the system are congruent (Almond and Verba 1963, 21, 36). With the aid of Parsons' theory we wil l explain more exactly what is meant by congruence in this context.

The structure of a democratic system consists of certain patterns of roles and rules (procedures) relating in differing ways to the production of collectively binding decisions. Executive, legislative, and judicial roles can be distinguished. Parsons (1969, 126) describes roles that are strategically important for a social system as institutions. He

1 In applying Parsons' theoretical considerations, we waive derivation from the A G I L schema, because in our opinion this would to some extent produce very artificial analytical constructs.

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regards institutional patterns as the 'backbones' of a social system. The institutional patterns defining liberal democracy are the institutions of representation and of party competition. We wil l be looking at this in greater detail at a later point. In modern democracies, the function of roles and the definition of rules are laid down in the constitution (Parsons 1969, 207; 1971, 18). Besides these legally formalized roles and rules, however, every democracy also operates in accordance with informal rules holding between actors (Easton 1990, 66f., 87; Fuchs 1993a, 87ff.). Among other things, these informal rules can effect a distinction between the constitutionally based claim of democracy and reality. We wi l l also be returning to this question.

' Easton has developed a comparable concept of political structure, which he refers to as regime. Easton's (1965b, 191ff.) regime is composed of role patterns, but, in contrast to Parsons' concept, of values as well. Parsons' approach is more appropriate for our analysis, since he distinguishes analytically between the structural level and the value level (cultural level). It is only on this basis that a meaningful account of congruence between structure and culture can be given. Moreover, this distinction permits a plausible legitimation concept to be derived.

Legitimation justifies a given structure. Such justification provides reasons for the rights and duties, as well as the obligations and prohibitions defined in the role norms (Parsons 1969,12). These reasons and thus the justification relate to the values of the social system. Values are the constitutive elements of culture, and to this extent legitimation has a cultural basis (Parsons 1969, 43). The values forming the basis for legitimizing the struc­ture of a social system are the conceptions of the desirable type of this social system (Parsons 1971, 9). In our case we are dealing with the political system in the shape of a liberal democracy. Legitimation is thus defined as the justification of the structure of (liberal) democracy by the values of (liberal) democracy. This is expressed in Figure 1 by the arrow linking values of democracy and structure of democracy.

But legitimation is not a state but a process, and one that is performed by actors. There have to be actors through whom legitimation occurs and for whom legitimation occurs. A more precise account of this requires introduction of the concept of institutionalization.

A social system is a system of action, deriving its reality in the final resort only from the actions of its members. The values (culture) and the roles (structure) of the social system should accordingly be binding on these actions. This being so, the structure and the values of a social system can also be described as its normative order. As with the legitimation process, the two dimensions are located on different levels, structure being relatively closer to behaviour than are values.

Structure and values are rendered binding by institutionalization, and it is only as institutionalized elements that they become constitutive to the social system (Parsons 1971,

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6). The first level in the institutionalization of a democracy in modern societies is its implementation by the constitution (Parsons 1971, 18). The values of a society are generally set forth in the form of basic rights, the structural elements being specified on this basis as legal rules governing action. The analytical difference between the structure and the values of a democracy are thus also expressed by the constitution. The values and structure implemented by the constitution and the performance pursuant to them constitute the polity (see Figure 1). We wi l l discuss the concept of performance later. Constitutionally regulating the actions of members of a democratic system entails sanctioning non-compliance. This means the enforcement of legal norms, without which no political system can be stabilized. This level of institutionalization is, however, insufficient for stability in either a democracy or any other form of political system, as the collapse of the socialist systems in central and eastern Europe have shown.

Figure 1: A general model of the legitimation of democracy

Community Polity

Hi

Political culture

Commitment to

L values j

Legitimacy of

democracy

Political structure

Values of

democracy

Structure of

democracy

Political performance

Evaluation of

performance

BO

J3

Performance of

democracy

Normative order

of democracy

The second level of institutionalization is the consensus of members of the social system on its structure and values (Parsons 1969, 126; 1971, 9f.). The set of members of a social

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system is referred to as a community,2 and the members of the community of a democracy as citizens. Relative to structure, the consensus of the citizens can be called legitimacy, and in relation to values commitment (see Figure 1). Both are variable factors, and a democracy is institutionalized in proportion to the depth of commitment to values and the degree of legitimacy of its structure. Strong commitment to values is a precondition for the legitimacy of the structure, because legitimation occurs in reference to values. On the individual level, legitimacy is a certain type of attitude (specifically political support), the source of which is a subjective conviction that the structure of democracy corresponds to the values one personally considers to be right (Fuchs 1989, 25f£; 1993b, 235ff.). It becomes characteristic of the community through distribution of the citizens' legitimacy convictions. Democracy enjoys a high degree of legitimacy where a clear majority of citizens have a positive conviction of legitimacy.

On the basis of the discussion so far, the political culture of a democracy can be determined on two levels. The first is that of structurally relevant values which are legally codified by the constitution. The second level is that of community commitment to the implemented values. Where there is a high degree of commitment, political culture is institutionalized. Common to both of these levels is a concern for values. And it is these values that are central to our conception of culture. The political culture of a democracy thus consists of implemented and institutionalized values. These values representing conceptions of the desirable type of democracy. However, the two dimensions of political culture are not located on the same level as Figure 1 might suggest. A relationship of precondition and stabilization exists between the two. The values of a democracy are first selected and implemented before the question of commitment arises.3 I f a value pattern as a conception of the desirable type of democracy is implemented, it is essential for the consolidation of democracy that the members of the community also feel bound by it. The more pronounced the bond, the stronger the institutionalization of values. The extent of such commitments can also be interpreted as congruence, to take up a concept introduced at a earlier stage. Only institutionalized political culture stabilizes implemented values and contributes as a whole to the consolidation of democracy.

What has been said about political culture also applies to political structure. The first level of political structure is roles as defined with binding effect by the constitution. This level represents implemented political structure. To the extent that this structure is

2 This simple definition of a community suffices for the purposes of our study. It requires only a definition of a membership rule stating who belongs and who does not.

3 With regard to selection and implementation, the interesting issue of the relationship with the general culture of a society can be addressed, referred to by Parsons (1971, 9f) as 'cultural system'. The embedding of a democracy's values in general culture is also important in stabilizing a democracy. However, this perspective would inflate our study to too great an extent; moreover, we do not dispose of data on the subject.

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legitimized by the community, political structure is institutionalized. The political structure of a democracy accordingly consists of implemented and institutionalized roles. These roles representing normative expectations concerning the action of political actors.

The culture and structure of a democracy together constitute its normative order. Within this normative order, two levels of institutionalization exist: the first level is that of implementation of both the values and the structure of democracy by the constitution.4

And the second level is the consensus of the community on values (commitment) and structure (legitimacy). Only when the central elements of the culture and structure of a democracy are implemented by law and have won consensus among the citizens can these central elements be regarded as the institutions of a democracy. And when such institutions exist in a country, we can speak of a stable democracy. We wi l l now shift our analytical perspective, directing our attention no longer towards the two institutionalization levels of the normative order of democracy but towards the relationship between this normative order and the actual actions performed by the actors within this context. This level wi l l be referred to as the performance of democracy. In our model, the performance concept relates not in a general or indifferent sense to the actions of polity actors, but contains a question.5 This question arises from the relationship of the normative order of democracy to real political action: to what extent do the actions of actors satisfy the normative expectations laid down in the constitution? To the extent that this is the case, the normative order transforms into actual action, and constitutional norms approach constitutional reality.

Since the holders of decision-making positions in a democracy are selected by legal procedures, this selection also effects the legalization of their decision making. The arrow in Figure 1 accordingly leads from the structure of democracy to the performance of democracy. Legalization also involves the demand that the members of the community accept the decisions actually made, even if they do not agree with their substance. This type of acceptance of binding decisions even where the substance is disapproved is the real proof of a functioning democracy. However, the citizens' willingness to accept decisions is determined not only by the legality of the decisions but also by the concrete way in which decision makers act. Conformity with the rules on the part of polity actors is not yet ensured by the constitutionally defined rules of the game and the sanctions relating to this definition in the event of the rules being violated. Numerous examples can be cited. A

4 Or by functional equivalents to the constitution, which does not exist in codified form in every modern democracy (e.g. the United Kingdom). A written constitution can find a functional equivalent in, for example, rules passed down through history that, as a consequence of this tradition, exert a binding influence of the political actors. Another functional equivalent can be written documents other that a constitution.

5 A comprehensive discussion of the concept of performance in the analysis of political systems is to be found in Almond and Powell (1978, Chapter 11).

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recent instance is that of Italy, where corruption had developed into informal rules governing interactions among the political elite, which is, of course, not constitutional.

The perceived difference between constitutional norms and constitutional reality forms one of the bases on which citizens evaluate the performance of democracy. This applies all the more where the normative order is regarded by citizens as legitimate. In the case of Italy, the permanent violations of the rules by the political elite, violations which have taken, on the character of established informal rules, did not remain hidden from the community. In comparison to other western European countries, this led in Italy to a con­siderably more negative evaluation by the citizens of the performance of democracy (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1994). This negative evaluation by citizens is likely to be one of the reasons for the recent structural reforms of the Italian political system. They affected not the fundamental institutions of democracy but were limited to structural arrangements relating essentially to the mode of selection of decision makers.

Let us summarize our discussion of political performance. The decisive criterion for the performance of democracy is, as the model in Figure 1 shows, the extent of agreement between constitutional norms and constitutional reality. This criterion becomes one of the standards by which the community assesses the performance of democracy. Depending on the outcome of the evaluation, there is either positive or negative feedback to the community's legitimacy convictions and value commitments. This feedback stabilizes or erodes the community consensus on its democracy, and for this reason has important consequences for the consolidation of a democracy. There is, however, a factor that complicates citizen evaluation of democratic performance. Rule conformity by polity actors is in fact only one of the relevant evaluation criteria. We wi l l be returning to this aspect in the course of the study.

We will conclude our theoretical analysis at this stage with reference to three implications for the current discussion on political culture. First, political culture can be localized not only on the level of citizens' attitudes towards values, but relates also to the values implemented in the constitution, which have nothing to do with attitudes. Second, the congruence relevant for the persistence of a system is less that between structure and culture than that between polity and community. The essential point in this regard is the extent to which the normative order of the polity implemented by the constitution generates consensus among citizens, this being the only way it can achieve stable institutionalization. Third, the legitimacy of the system is no longer attributed to political culture, and can thus not constitute the central category of political culture. It is rather a category of the political structure, and within this dimension relates to a certain type of support of the community for the structure of the political system.

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2.3 Specifications of the General Model

Before we come to the empirical analysis, the general model shown in Figure 1 must be specified in two respects. This specification wil l then be transformed into two hypotheses providing the background for the empirical analysis.

The first specification concerns the constitution of community consensus with .the values and structure of democracy. Parsons (1969, 15, 36; 1971, 6) believes that commitment to values occurs through internalization of values by individuals. Internalization takes place through socialization in the context of family and school. This is also the case for the internalization of legitimacy convictions (Easton and Dennis 1969). The addressees of socialization are future citizens, and the agents performing socialization are parents and teachers. The socialization process is based not only on affective mechanisms but also on reasons given for why the values and structure of democracy are the right choice. The socialization agents derive this justification from memories of their own socialization and from their current intake of information. One of the most important sources of this information intake is the constant legitimation effort undertaken by the political elite vis-a­vis the community. The legitimation of the political elite vis-a-vis the citizens as members of the community is thus assumed by the socialization agents in the course of their socialization activities. It constitutes something in the way of second-order legitimation.

This brief sketch of the internalization of values commitment and legitimation convictions naturally applies only under the conditions of an already consolidated democracy. It is based on Parsons and Easton, who in this regard both think very much in psychoanalytical categories. However, from a learning theory point of view, internalization occurring through socialization processes is to be regarded rather as a predisposition for individual experience in adulthood. Even where socialization takes place under the favourable conditions of an established democracy, a positive assessment of the values and structure of democracy is not secured for all time but is either weakened or strengthened by feedback from experience with the reality of democracy. We wil l assume this to be the case, thus inferring that citizen commitment to the values and legitimacy of structure is constituted and sustained by both socialization and experience.

Socialization can be more or less successful, and experience can be positive or negative. For this reason, consensus among citizens must also be regarded as a variable factor. The criterion of variability is determined by the extent to which consensus on the values and structure of democracy has become anchored in the belief system of the individual. Newcomb, Turner and Converse (1965) term this centrality. In order conceptually to identify and also to simplify the different degrees of anchoring, we wi l l resort to the differentiation proposed by Wright (1976, 268f.), who distinguishes between consent,

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assent, and dissent. We take political support as the superordinate. Easton (1975, 436) un­derstands political support to mean an evaluating attitude of an individual towards a political object. Consent is a type of positive support, which in the sense of Newcomb, Turner and Converse is anchored in the individual belief system and is highly central to it. Dissent means the same, except that it is a matter of negative support. The type that we are interested in within our context is assent, which, although expressing a positive assessment, is indicative of a low degree of anchoring or centrality for the individual.

Figure 2 shows the two objects of the normative order of democracy, which constitute the objects of citizen support. Citizen consent to values is, in accordance with the general model (see Figure 1), described as commitment and citizen consent to structure as legitimacy. As explained above, commitment to values and legitimacy of structure are attitudes that are also anchored in citizens' belief systems. As attitudes, both types of political support relate primarily to the individual level. However, the decisive factor for the consolidation of democracy is how these attitudes are distributed within the community. The crucial question for the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe is thus whether a majority of the community in each country develops a commitment to the values of democracy and whether the structure of democracy gains legitimacy.

Figure 2: Types of support for democracy

Support

Objects

Consent Assent Dissent

Democratic values Commitment

Democatic structure

Legitimacy

The formulation of this question shows that we assume this had not yet occurred at the point in time when the data we are analysing were recorded. The surveys took place in all 11 countries covered by the comparative study between 1990 and 1991 (1992 in East Germany), thus relatively soon after the implementation of at least some fundamental structural elements of (liberal) democracy. In all eleven countries, at least one competitive

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election had taken place by the survey date. A t this time, both preconditions for the anchoring of the values and structure of democracy among the members of the community could not have been fulfilled. In the first place, their socialization had taken place under the conditions of a socialist regime. In the second place, the experience citizens had had with the reality of democracy had not been so extensive that the anchoring of democratic values and structure can plausibly be assumed. The necessity of positive experience with the performance of democracy for its stabilization is also stressed by Weil (1993, 197f.), who accordingly argues that "democratic values should not be strong at the point of transition because they have not yet had time to grow". He introduces an additional aspect, namely comparison by the citizens with their former situation and with the situation in other countries. This seems to us to be a crucial point of view, which we wi l l be taking up and somewhat modifying in specifying our general model for analysing the processes of transition in central and eastern Europe.

The introduction of new democratic institutions in the countries of central and eastern Europe occurred on the one hand as a result of the breakdown of the old system, which at the same time was an expression of failure. But on the other hand, the breakdown also happened with reference to the more successful alternative system represented by Western countries. Consequently, the form of the two important subsystems of Western societies, liberal democracy and market economy, were and are the points of reference for the transition processes. Applying this to the citizens of central and eastern European countries, we can thus assume initial support for liberal democracy and market economy. This initial support can be assumed on the basis of citizens drawing comparison between the former socialist societies and current Western societies. Weil (1993, 198) has labeled this process of comparison which is clearly favourable to the latter "demonstration effect". This effect is based rather on information about the new type of society than on experience, let alone socialization. Although positive attitudes exist, it therefore cannot be assumed that democracy has been institutionalized through citizen commitment to democratic values and the legitimacy of structure. We can make this apparently contradictory state of affairs clearer with the help of the types of support distinguished in Figure 2, formulating a first hypothesis for this purpose: Shortly after implementation of democratic institutions, there is a high degree of assent to democratic values and the democratic structure in central and eastern European countries. Although this type of support is expressive of a positive assessment, it is nonetheless superficial, thus being relatively volatile in the face of concrete experience. This leads us directly to a second hypothesis: The assent of citizens in central and eastern European countries to the values and structure of democracy transforms into consent to the extent that positive experience with the performance of democracy is obtained. I f this is the case, then, in the conceptual

14

terminology we have chosen, the normative order of democracy would be institutionalized and democracy consolidated. The second hypothesis and corresponding model are shown in Figure 3. The second hypothesis also represents the second specification of the general model.

Figure 3: A model of the consolidation of democracy in central and eastern Europe

Assent Consent

Democratic values

Democratic structure

High

High

Strong

Strong

Institutionalized normative order

Time t l t l + n

i Democratic performance

a Immediately after the implementation of basic democratic institutions.

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Indicators

In the outline of the problem given in the first section, the cultural conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe were stated to be the subject of our study. We have used the term political culture in the usual survey-research sense. However, our theoretical analysis provides greater precision. We analyse support for liberal democracy by the communities of these countries on all three theoretically defined levels: the culture, structure, and performance of liberal democracy. The subject of the study is thus the attitudinal conditions of the transition process. The cultural conditions are only one dimension of attitudinal conditions.

We will attempt empirically to clarify the two hypotheses formulated in the previous section as far as is possible on the basis of the data available. Because of the data situation, this is possible only to a limited extent. This qualification applies more particularly with regard to the second hypothesis than to the first. We will be dealing with these qualifications in greater detail in the course of our analysis. In this section the available

15

indicators wi l l be introduced and assigned to the theoretical constructs. This presupposes that we have a more precise definition of what is to be understood by democracy. It is no longer enough to speak in general terms of culture, structure, and performance, and then simply to refer to Western democracies. What are in fact the constitutive elements of Western democracies that are also the points of reference for the processes of transition in countries of the East?

Western democracies are often referred to as liberal democracies, and we adopt this term in our study as well. An alternative designation is representative democracy. But the two terms merely stress different aspects of the same thing. Bollen (1993,1208) provides a brief but precise definition covering both aspects: " I define liberal democracy as the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule". Powell (1992) sees liberal democracy in a very similar light. In our theoretical frame of reference, political liberties are to be assigned to the cultural level and democratic rule to the structural level. To understand what is meant by these terms, we turn to Dahl. On the basis of an historical and systematic analysis, Dahl (1971, 3; 1989, 233) develops seven requirements for a democracy among a large number of people. These relate on the one hand to political liberties (freedom of expression, associational autonomy, and alternative information), and on the other to party competition and the principle of representation (inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, elected officials, and the right to run for office). Dahl describes these as institutions; where they are implemented in a country with binding effect, he speaks of a polyarchy. According to Dahl, all Western democracies are polyarchies, or liberal democracies as we prefer to call them.

When introducing the institutions of polyarchy, Dahl does not explicitly distinguish between the levels of culture and structure. We have, however, explained in our theoretical frame of reference that this distinction is a useful one for our analysis. Even i f political liberties are implemented with binding effect by a constitution, they are still in the nature of general principles or values, and thus belong to political culture. But a democracy is realized in the final resort in the collectively binding decision-making processes, and for this reason institutions are necessary that relate to the procedural level. These are what Dahl calls the institutions of party competition and representation, and in our definition they are the structural components of a democracy. Dahl's polyarchical institutions, partly on the cultural level and partly on the structural level, together constitute the normative order of liberal democracy.

This normative order of liberal democracy must be distinguished from the reality existing in a given country. We call this level the performance of democracy (see Figure 1). The distinction is necessary for a number of reasons. First, there is room for interpretation in judging the extent to which the activities of political actors meet

16

normative expectations. It is only in borderline cases of obvious rule violation that this is negligible. Second, such violation cannot be ruled out despite the threat of legal penalties. And third, normative expectations do not fully define the activities of political actors for every situation. There are very often degrees of leeway. I f the attitudinal conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe are to be analysed, the attitudes of citizens to the central objects of liberal democracy must be determined on all three theoretical dimensions, namely the culture, structure, and performance of liberal democracy.

Table 1 brings together the indicators contained in the survey we have analysed that can be assumed to measure, at least approximately, the attitudinal constructs we are interested in. The attitude objects addressed in the questions provide the basis for this assumption. They permit most indicators to be assigned relatively clearly to the attitudinal constructs and theoretical dimensions. This face validity of the indicators is complemented by a dimensional analysis in the following section.

The two indicators of the cultural level relate to political liberties in Dahl's sense of the term. For all indicators, the response categories are given in brackets following the question. As is clear from the two cultural level indicators, respondents had to decide how strongly they associate the basic rights mentioned with democracy. Of central interest here is the cognitive understanding of democracy or the cognitive association of values with de­mocracy (CI). It is not so much a matter of support for these values on the part of respondents, and not at all a matter of recording commitment to these values (C2). The survey contains no indicators for the latter. Nevertheless the question of adequate cognition of democracy is not a trivial one, since it is a precondition for commitment to the pertinent values. I f citizens were not to regard political liberties as essential elements of democracy, the question of commitment to such rights would not arise, and the ground would more or less cut from under the feet of democratic structural legitimacy, and thus indirectly of performance.

At the structural level we follow Dahl in distinguishing two constructs relating firstly to the institutions of representation and secondly to the institution of party competition. The central institutions of representation (SI) are elections and parliament. Elections select representatives who make collectively binding decisions on behalf of the citizens in parliament. In Table 1 an additional indicator is assigned to this attitudinal construct, referring in general terms to the type of democracy in Western countries (Q49a). Re­spondents may well relate this to the institutions of representation, but also to political liberties, to the institution of party competition, or to something quite different. The indicator in question has been assigned to this construct on the basis of the dimensional analysis yet to be discussed, and is thus ex post facto and not a priori.

17

Table 1: Support for liberal democracy - theoretical dimensions, attitudinal constructs, and empirical indicators

Theoretical

dimensions Attitudinal constructs

Culture C I : Association of values

C2: Commitment to values

Structure S I : Institutions of representation

S2: Institution of party competition

[S3: Implementation of institutions]

Performance P1: Functioning of democracy

P2: Effectiveness of democracy

P3: Performance of government

P4: Economic performance

Empirical indicators

Q l l a Political liberties e.g. freedom of speach, freedom of association (have a lot/ something/not much/nothing to do with democracy)

Q l l f The judges provide equal justice before the law (have a to/something/not much/nothing to do with democracy)

Q39 Elections are the best way to choose a govern­ment and the authorities of the country (yes/no)

Q40 Necessity of a parliament (yes/no) Q49a Our country needs a kind of development

typical of the Western countries (agree/ disagree)

Q66 One-party vs multi-party system Q54a We need political parties if we want democratic

development (agree/disagree) Q54c Parties provide opportunity to participate in

political activities (agree/disagree)

Q49c We have got the same kind of democracy here as in Western European countries (agree/ disagree)

Q49e You can't say that democracy has already been accomplished in (country) (agree/disagree)

Q12 Satisfaction with the way democracy is working in our country today (1-4 = dissatisfied, 5-6 = neutral, 7-10 = satisfied)

Q53 Contented with the present state of democracy in our country (totally/certain/lMe/not at all)

Q50 Problems of our country in democracy (will be solved/will remain the same/will be getting more and more serious)

Q23 Satisfaction with the present government (1-4 = dissatisfied, 5-6 = neutral, 7-10 = satisfied)

Q38 Trust in the government in our country (just about always/most of the time/only some of the time/almost never)

Q13 The economic situation of the country during the period that the present government has been in power (improved'/get worse/the same)

Q14 The economic situation of the country in the next year (will improve/get worse/the same)

18

In a liberal democracy, selection of the citizens' representatives takes place within the context of competition between parties (S2). This implies two things. First, the political parties have to be understood as actors carrying and shaping political processes, and second, there has to be a two or multi-party system i f there is to be such a thing as party competition in the first place. The assigned indicators concern these two implications.

A t the structural level, a further attitudinal construct is specified, relating not to a central structural component of liberal democracy but to the extent of implementation of the institutions of liberal democracy in the country concerned (S3). Complete implementation of the institutions of liberal democracy is itself a component of the transition process. They are not introduced in one fell swoop. Citizens' evaluation of the reality of democracy in their country at any given time can therefore depend on perception of the degree to which democratic institutions have been implemented at the given point in time. The construct 'implementation of institutions' has been included to take this possibility into account.

The performance of democracy is covered by two constructs. The first of these represents a generalized evaluation of the functioning of democracy in the respondent's own country (PI). Since this is a generalized evaluation, the underlying reasons and sources are left open. For the consolidation and maintenance of a democracy, it would be best i f citizens were to make use of the normative expectations embodied in the values and structure of democracy as standards for assessing performance. Real democracy would then be measured against criteria by means of which it can legitimate itself. But as empirical democracy research has shown, this is not always the case, and the degree of evaluation of an existing democracy on the basis of the values and norms of democracy as such is in its turn a contributing factor to the persistence of an existing democracy. Increased demands are made on democracy in proportion to the saliency of other evaluation standards, rendering a positive evaluation of performance more difficult. Lipset has diagnosed the 'effectiveness of democracy' as one of the most important of these other factors, and the second construct on the performance dimension in Table 1 is named ac­cordingly (P2). Although Lipset (1981, 64) relates effectiveness to the outcomes of democratic processes, he refers not to the day-by-day actions of the governments concerned but to "the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government". Linz (1978,20) develops a similar conception when he defines effectiveness as "the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system". Dahl (1971, 144), too, stresses the importance of the "effectiveness of different regimes in dealing with the critical problems". Since basic problems have to be resolved in almost all central and eastern European countries, ranging from the integration of ethnic minorities to providing internal order and meeting basic economic needs, this factor is likely to play an important role in the evaluation of the performance of democracy by the

19

citizens. In a later analytical step, we wil l attempt to investigate this empirically with the aid of the indicator that appears to record this construct appropriately.

Within the framework of the performance dimension, a further two constructs are given, which do not relate to democracy but to the current government (P3) and economic situation in the respondent's country (P4). Both are constructs recording what Easton refers to as 'specific support'. One of the characteristics of a consolidated democracy, according to Easton, is the large independence of generalized support for this democracy from the diverse variants of specific support. Replacing the government through elections is the way in which dissatisfaction with the results imputable to politicians is worked off in conformity with the system. This mechanism is above all to prevent such dissatisfaction from shifting to the system level. But this characterization of a consolidated democracy does not permit the conclusion that what exists is what should exist. The effect of specific support on generalized support for democracy must therefore be regarded as an empirical question, to which we wil l be returning at a later stage.

In the following section, a dimensional analysis will examine the indicators to test the empirical tenability of the theoretically postulated attitudinal constructs. This wi l l then provide the basis on which the extent of support for liberal democracy can be empirically analysed.

3.2 Empirical Dimensions

The empirical dimensions are determined by exploratory factor analysis. This analysis aims to provide information on the extent to which the differentiation postulated by the attitudinal constructs is indeed made in the communities of central and eastern European countries. The data for all eleven countries is pooled in the factor analysis. The reason for doing so is that we are interested primarily in general propositions on all countries rather than on the peculiarities of individual countries. The two hypotheses formulated in the previous section are accordingly general in nature, applying to the countries at issue in the aggregate. In the sections to come, we will be dealing repeatedly with differences between countries, but on the descriptive level only. Such description shows the extent to which the general hypotheses are tenable. The difference in size between national samples poses a problem for the pooled factor analysis. However, it is our assumption that the results are not distorted to a significant extent since the average sample size is about 1,000 respondents per country, some samples being a little below this figure and others a little above it. Deviations are unlikely to give rise to any systematic effects.

20

Table 2 shows the results of the exploratory factor analysis on the basis of these pooled data. Only the factor loadings of .25 or more are recorded. Nine attitudinal constructs were differentiated theoretically (see Table 1), and we have data on eight of these. Factor analysis extracted six factors correlating to a large extent with the postulated attitudinal constructs. Unexpectedly, "functioning of democracy1 (PI) and "performance of government" (P3) form a common factor. In principle, this can mean two things: either the citizens actually do not distinguish between these two objects or, i f they do draw a distinction, their evaluation of the one object has a considerable influence on their evaluation of the other. Since the stimuli for the two attitudinal constructs — democracy

Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis (pooled analysis)3

F l F2 F3 F4 F5 F6

Culture

CI Association of values Political liberties .77 Equality before the law .81

Structure

51 Institutions of representation Elections .71 Parliament .54 Western model .34 .63

52 Institution of party competition Multi-party system -.66 Political parties .79 Participation by parties .69

53 Implementation of institutions Western European democracy already implemented .33 -.66 Accomplishment of democracy .76

Performance

PI Functioning of democracy Working of democracy -.68 Present state of democracy .71

P2 Effectiveness of democracy Problem-solving capacity of democracy .25 .31 .27

P3 Performance of government Satisfaction with present government -.77 Trust in present government .74

P4 Economic performance Economic situation (present) .77 Economic situation (future) .36 .68

Explained variance (in %) 18.1 12.4 7.1 6.2 6.0 6.0 Explained variance: Total 55.8

a Principal component analysis, orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion. Only factor loadings & .25 shown.

21

and present government — are quite distinct, the second possibility seems to us to be the more plausible one. Also contrary to theoretical expectations, 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2) does not form a factor by itself, the corresponding indicator having loadings on several factors. This result presumably has to do with method, since, unlike the others, this attitudinal construct has only one indicator available, making it relatively unlikely that an independent factor would be extracted.

Table 3: Exploratory factor analysis with three pre-defined factors (pooled analysis)3

F l F2 F3

Culture

CI Association of values Political liberties Equality before the law

Structure

SI Institutions of representation Elections Parliament Western model

S 2 Institution of party com petition Multi-party system Political parties Participation by parties

S3 Implementation of institutions Western European democracy already implemented Accomplishment of democracy

Performance

PI Functioning of democracy Working of democracy -.68 Present state of democracy .67

P2 Effectiveness of democracy Problem-solving capacity of democracy .33 .29 .31

P3 Performance of government Satisfaction with present government -.76 Trust in present government .69

P4 Economic performance Economic situation (present) .52 Economic situation (future) .61

Explained variance (in %) 18.3 12.4 7.1 Explained variance: Total 37.8

a Principal component analysis, orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion. Only factor loadings & .25 shown.

Within our theoretical frame of reference, the various attitudinal constructs are subsumed under the dimensions of the culture, structure^ and performance of democracy. A further

.75

.81

.36

.41

.51

.31

-.60 .74 .58

22

factor analysis determines whether these more general theoretical dimensions are also reflected on the citizen attitudinal level. The empirical test assume that the culture, structure, and performance of democracy are second-order factors, hierarchically superior to the attitudinal constructs (first-order factors). Adequate testing of such a model would require confirmatory factor analysis, explicitly specifying the two hierarchical levels. By introducing a restriction in the exploratory factor analysis, namely a three factor requirement, our procedure is quasi-confirmatory, achieving at least an approximation to adequate testing. The outcome expected of this factor analysis is that the three factors wi l l correspond to the theoretical dimensions (culture, structure, performance). As can be seen from the result of Table 3, this is indeed the case. Apparently, respondents distinguish in terms of the culture, structure, and performance of democracy. Once again, this solution offers no clear localization of the indicator for 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2).

Overall, the results of the two factor analyses invite the conclusion that the theoretically identified objects of the democratic system are also citizens' attitude objects in central and eastern European communities. There is noteworthy deviation from theoretical expectations in only one aspect: the two attitudinal constructs 'functioning of democracy' (PI) and 'performance of government' (P2) form one factor. We interpret this empirical result not to mean the existence of only one attitude but as the consequence of a strong causal effect of the evaluation of 'performance of government' on the evaluation of 'functioning of democracy'. The corresponding specification is undertaken in the model tested in section 3.4.

3.3 Support for Democracy

3.3.1 Support for the Culture of Democracy

In the following three sections, the extent of support for democracy is analysed. The corresponding distributions are shown both for the aggregate of central and eastern European countries and separately for each individual countries. The analysis begins with the cultural level, which forms the topmost level of the democratic system in the control and legitimation hierarchy. As we have already noted, there are no indicators available for directly determining support for the central values of the culture of democracy. However, the survey does contain an indicator permitting the degree of correct cognitive association of values with democracy to be assessed. On the basis of this indicator, it is possible first to analyse a crucial precondition for support for democratic values, and second to construct something in the way of a substitute for support for the culture of democracy.

23

The survey presented respondents with a list of eleven quite different characteristics. For each of these characteristics, respondents were requested to state i f and how strongly they feel that they are features of a democracy. At least two of these characteristics relate unequivocally to elements of polyarchy as defined by Dahl: political liberties (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of association) and equality before the law. These two elements are described as democratic values. The association of these values, which essen­tially define the culture of democracy, is a necessary condition for support for the culture of democracy. As the distributions in Table 4 indicate, such association is made by somewhat more than two thirds of citizens in central and eastern European countries. The necessary condition is thus to a large extent met, even i f some thirty per cent of citizens do not associate the two democratic values with democracy or do so to only a limited extent.

There are considerable differences among the countries concerned in the extent to which the two values are associated with democracy. In Romania and Slovenia, an average of only about fifty per cent of citizens make this attribution, whereas in the majority of countries the average is over seventy per cent. Romania and Slovenia can thus be regarded as deviant cases.

One of the marks of a liberal democracy in modern societies is the distinction drawn between the political and economic systems. In order for the boundary between these two systems to be actually drawn, it is necessary to define it by legal rules as well as in the perception of the citizens. The fundamental values that are associated with the two systems and which have a formative influence on expectancies regarding the reality of the two systems, ought to be confused as little as possible. Among other things, this means that values and performances proper to the economic system ought not to be considered essential elements of democracy. In the list of eleven characteristics submitted to respondents, there are two relating precisely to such economic performance: improvement of economic conditions, and: more jobs, less unemployment. As Table 4 shows, some fifty per cent of all respondents associate these two economic values with democracy. In order to evaluate this result adequately, a comparison with western European countries would be useful, but the data situation precludes this. However, the differences among central and eastern European countries also show that such an understanding of democracy need not necessarily prevail. In Czechoslovakia, only about thirty per cent of citizens associate the two economic values with democracy. A contrast is presented by Bulgaria and Romania, where a average of seventy per cent of respondents make such an association. These figures indicate that legitimation conditions for liberal democracy differ widely from country to country. Where the citizens of a country associate democracy also, or even primarily, with economic effectiveness, legitimation of the structure and performance of democracy on the basis of originally democratic values is likely to have an only limited chance of success. It is dependent on the performance of a quite different system.

Table 4: Support for culture of democracy3

Central Czecho- East Krasno and eastei

Bulgaria Slovakia Germany Estonia Hungary yarsk Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Ukraine Europe'3

CI Association of democratic values Political liberties 75.8 79.6 83.2 76.5 75.3 73.5 63.6 70.3 55.6 51.7 73.7 70.8 Equality before the law 89.0 63.0 72.2 82.8 77.6 78.0 775 62.4 48.9 44.6 85.1 71.0

Association of economic values Improvement of economic conditions 81.6 37.0 59.7 65.9 56.2 59.2 59.1 46.8 79.0 42.7 64.7 59.3 " More jobs, less unemployment 65.4 20.4 67.7 37.2 47.6 465 47.8 37.7 66.9 41.3 573 48.7

Type of association Exclusively democratic 7.8 29.1 Dominantly democratic 17.3 13.8 Democratic and economic 473 12.7 Dominantly economic 12.6 4.1 Exclusively economic 1.8 1.5 Ambiguous 13.2 38.7

13.8 18.1 18.7 15.2 14.8 95 26.7 15.4 163 18.7

40.8 23.5 33.5 30.3 24.1 12.8 8.1 5.8 9.6 11.1 2.3 1.5 1.4 0.7 3.9

20.9 22.0 25.2 27.9 27.4

193 2.9 10.3 14.2 14.9 10.0 7.6 3.6 16.6 14.1 24.6 25.4 21.7 38.7 293 7.4 20.6 11.8 9.8 103 2.8 15.5 3.8 1.2 3.3

36.0 28.0 48.9 19.6 28.0

a Cell-entries are percentages of respondents who support the various elements of democracy (positive support characteristics are the italicized terms in the third column of Table 1).

b Average of country percentages, c Combination of association of values.

25

This variation in the understanding of democracy and the related legitimation conditions is demonstrated even more clearly by systematically combining 'democratic values' and 'economic values'. In constructing the corresponding variable, the scores for all four indicators were first of all dichotomized. A l l respondents strongly Ca lot') associating the respective characteristic with democracy were given a score of 1. We assume that a stable association exists only in this case. Respondents associating the characteristic only weakly or not at all with democracy were given a score of 0. On this basis a variable with six different types of association was then constructed. The two extreme categories are 'exclusively democratic' and 'exclusively economic'. In the first case, respondents explicitly associate the democratic values with democracy, but not the two economic values. In the second case the reverse is true. The association is 'dominantly democratic' where the two democratic values and only one of the economic values are associated with democracy. The category 'dominantly economic' is the mirror image of this. Where the type of association is described as 'democratic and economic', all four, characteristics are strongly associated with democracy. The combinations not covered by the five categories mentioned above are classified as 'ambiguous'.

We wi l l first take a look at the two extreme categories and the relations between them at the level of the individual countries. As indicated by the distribution of the individual characteristics, Czechoslovakia is the relatively most positive case and Romania the relatively most negative one, i f one considers positive and negative from the perspective of the consolidation of liberal democracy. In Romania only 2.9 per cent of respondents come in the category 'exclusively democratic' as opposed to 15.5 per cent in the category 'exclusively economic'. In Czechoslovakia, by contrast, 29.1 per cent of respondents associate exclusively democratic values with democracy, and only 1.5 per cent exclusively economic values. Closest to the Czechoslovak position in this respect are Estonia, Hungary and Poland.

However, these two extreme categories fail to cover an important possibility. It is perfectly possible to assign the two democratic values correctly to democracy while in addition assigning the two economic values to democracy as well. Indeed, this type of association is the most frequent one in the aggregate of the countries in question (29.3 per cent). This is a not unproblematic result for the issue of the consolidation of liberal democracy, because it raises citizens' expectations with regard to democracy to so high a level that disappointment becomes almost inevitable. There are also considerable differences between countries respecting this type of association. By far the lowest proportion is to be found in Czechoslovakia (12.7 per cent). By contrast, over forty per cent of respondents in East Germany and Bulgaria come in this category, while in Ukraine the figure is almost forty per cent.

26

In order to obtain a simple and comprehensive measure for all countries providing evidence on how favourably conditions for the legitimation of the structure and performance of democracy are to be assessed, the two categories 'exclusively democratic' and 'dominantly democratic' are combined (not shown separately in the tables). The countries then ranking highest are Estonia and Czechoslovakia, followed by Hungary and Lithuania. With a clear gap, Slovenia and Romania rank lowest, and Bulgaria and East Germany are also located at the bottom end of the scale.

The differences discovered between countries show that, as far as support for the culture of democracy is concerned, no uniform situation nor homogeneous conditions can be assumed for all central and eastern European countries. In the following section, in which support for the structure of democracy is to be analysed, the situation looks quite different.

3.3.2 Support for the Structure of Democracy

The term structure of democracy applies to the form that controls political decision-making processes and within which the political actors act. As a rule this form is laid down in the constitution and thus legally codified. It can be understood as a specification of the values constituting the culture of democracy, and which find their expression in the basic rights catalogue of the constitution. Reference to these values legitimates the structure of democracy, and the success of such legitimation is primarily to be measured in terms of the extent to which the community of citizens believes that the structure relates to the values. In so far as the legitimacy of a democracy is, when it comes to the point, a matter of legitimacy beliefs, it is in principle measurable. Table 5 shows the support for the structure of democracy in central and eastern European countries. We will be dealing with the difference between legitimacy and support at a later stage.

The structure of democracy is covered by the institutions of representation (SI) and the institution of party competition (S2). The most important institutions of representation are elections and parliament. Elections select politicians for parliament, where they then act on behalf of the citizens. The institution of party competition is based on political parties and on political participation by parties. In their plurality, the parties constitute a multi-party system, the borderline case being a two-party system. In the survey these five structural elements constitute respondent attitude-objects. On the basis of the factor analysis, the so-called Western model has been additionally assigned to the institutions of representation (SI). The six objects of democracy are evaluated by consenting or dissenting response (see Table 1 for the response categories). Since the sources of evaluation are unclear, the latter

Table 5: Support for structure of democracy3

Central

Bulgaria Czecho­slovakia

East Germany Estonia Hungary

Krasno­yarsk Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Ukraine

and eastern Europe^

SI Institutions of representation Elections Parliament Western model

973 96.0 812

79.5 863 74.1

84.1 89.9 80.2

96.0 94.0 73.5

93.9 93.5 94.8

82.2 69.7 693

88.4 90.2 86.2

83.2 97.1

94.4 93.8 93.9

89.1 903 96.9

78.4 85.6 74.1

883 88.4 83.8

S2 Institution of party competition Multi-party system Political parties Participation by parties

92.9 94.8 91.8

913 85.6 84.0

95.4 92.2 84.9

88.6 87.1 84.4

87.4 90.2 873

79.0 75.4 68.5

84.0 83.2 78.4

77.8 82.9 89.2

86.0 87.6 84.4

81.7 913 83.7

76.1 82.0 81.9

85.5 86.6 83.5

S3 Implementation of institutions Western European democracy already implemented Accomplishment of democracy

62

14.1

13.0

19.7

30.2

17.5

6.4

13.0

7.6

9.2

8.7

19.9

10.7

34.9

16.5

27.0

18.1

31.7

41.1

19.9

7.4

14.7

15.1

20.1

a Cell-entries are percentages of respondents who support the various elements of democracy (positive support characteristics are the italicized terms in the second column of Table 1).

b Average of country percentages.

28

is referred to as support, for in our definition support expresses merely a positive or negative view of a political object. Only where such support is based on a perception by citizens of congruence between structure and values does it take on the form of legitimacy. We have already noted that legitimacy is only one of the possible sources of support. Support for democracy in a country can, for example, be grounded in instrumental considerations of reward. The question of the sources of support must be left open in our analysis. Only the extent of support can be established.

With regard to all six elements of the institutions of representation and the institution of party competition, there is on average a high degree of support in the countries surveyed. The figure is over 80 per cent throughout, and for four of the structural elements it is even in excess of 85 per cent. This result permits a relatively unequivocal answer to the first hypothesis formulated in section 2.3. Shortly after the implementation of democratic institutions, there is a high degree of assent to democratic values and democratic structure in the communities of central and eastern European countries. On the basis of the data presented in Table 5, the hypothesis can be regarded as largely confirmed for the structure of democracy. However, these data do not offer an answer to the question whether this support is superficial assent or already well-anchored consent.

In contrast to the culture of democracy, there are not such marked differences between countries regarding structure. The two countries with relatively least support are Krasnoyarsk and Ukraine. But even here the average for all six structural indicators lies above 70 per cent. Interestingly enough, Romania and Slovenia evidence a very high degree of support for the structure of democracy. These are the two countries where the citizens' association of democratic values with democracy is markedly weaker than in other countries. The high level of support for the structure of democracy in these two countries is therefore likely only to a very limited extent to be based on the conviction that the structure of democracy in the respective country is congruent with democratic values. As far as the other countries are concerned, the source of support can be legitimacy beliefs. Given the high degree of support for the structure of democracy and the strong association of democratic values with democracy, this can at least not be excluded; but nor can it be positively maintained. This important question for the consolidation of democracy can thus not be definitively resolved.

Strong support for the structure of democracy indicates in the first place that the citizens of central and eastern European countries give a positive evaluation to the institutions that define liberal democracy as such. However, this support cannot be directly transferred to the democracies existing in the individual countries. Liberal democracy as a new form of political order has not been implemented in these countries all at once but in the course of a more or less protracted process. Table 5 also shows how the degree of implementation is

29

seen by the citizens themselves (S3). On average for all countries, only 20 per cent of citizens believe that democracy has already been accomplished in their country, and only 15 per cent that democracy in their country corresponds to that in Western countries. This assessment that democracy has not yet been fully implemented in their own countries is likely to affect evaluation of the functioning of democracy there. I f this is the case, it could also provide something in the way of a buffer in the event of deficiencies occurring in democratic performance, since such deficiencies could then be attributed to the incomplete implementation of democracy. The specification of the model tested in section 3.4 takes into account the effect of the implementation of democracy on the functioning of democracy. In the following section, however, we wil l first examine how the performance of democracy appears in the eyes of citizens of central and eastern European countries.

3.3.3 Support for the Performance of Democracy

Positive experience with the performance of democracies in central and eastern European countries is vital for the consolidation of these democracies. As positive experience is made, the initially superficial assent to the values and structure of democracy transmutes into consent anchored in the citizens' belief system. This was formulated in section 2.3 as the second guiding hypothesis. With the aid of our data, we can discover how it was with this experience at the survey period. How do the citizens assess the performance of democracy, what is actually happening within the context of the newly introduced institutions in central and eastern European countries? The data given in Table 6 provide a clear answer.

Table 6 lists various attitudinal constructs. The construct that relates, at least theoretically, most directly to the performance of democracy is labelled 'functioning of democracy' (PI). As is apparent from the formulation of the questions for the two indicators assigned to this construct, the attitude object is democracy in both cases (see Table 1). The first indicator enquires after the 'working of democracy' in the respondent's own country, and the second after the 'present state of democracy' there. Thus both relate unequivocally to the reality of democracy in the respondent's country, and, as the factor analysis has shown, both measure the same theoretical construct. In our context, the reality of democracy is to be understood as synonymous with the performance of democracy, and evaluation of this performance is referred to as support.

Table 6: Support for performance of democracy3

Central

Bulgaria Czecho­slovakia

East Germany Estonia Hungary

Krasno­yarsk Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Ukraine

and eastern Europeb

PI Functioning of democracy Working of democracy Present state of democracy

7.1 36.6

192 33.0

155 425

11.9 20.8

12.0 15.0

105 182

245 44.1

172 34.9 34.6

20.7 302

4.9 18.4

16.2 293

P2 Effectiveness of democracy Problem-solving capacity of democracy 73.6 48.7 64.0 57.0 37.3 46.2 59.4 53.2 63.0 465 46.6 475

P3 Performance of government Satisfaction with present government Trust in present government

11.3 '

31.8

31.9

56.3

12.9

28.4

24.3

32.6

13.9

26.7

11.4

46.9

31.9

48.4

25.3 47.0

59.8

30.8

40.3

7.6

48.5

22.6

42.0

P4 Economic performance Economic situation (present) Economic situation (future)

2.7 23.0

5.7 18.7

19.8 38.9

7.7 18.8

6.4 23.9

6.3 33.9

13.9 522

38.3 42.1

35.1 63.9

3.9 29.0

4.0 33.6

13.1 34.4

a Cell-entries are percentages of respondents who support the various elements of democracy (positive support characteristics are the italicized terms in the second column of Table 1).

b Average of country percentages.

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As the figures for central and eastern Europe as a whole make immediately clear, this support is considerably weaker than that for the structure of democracy. An average of 29 per cent of citizens in all countries are satisfied with the 'present state of democracy', and only 16 per cent with the 'functioning of democracy'. Comparing these two indicators directly with those for the structure of democracy is not really permissible due to differences in measurement, but the difference between support for the structure of democracy and the performance of democracy is so strong that this aspect can be disre­garded.

Of the two indicators for the 'functioning of democracy', 'working of democracy' is the stricter measure. The related attitude is measured on response scale ranging from 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied). For the support shown in Table 6, only the scores from 7 to 10 were combined, the category 6 being omitted. I f this category is included, dichotomizing the response scale, 26 per cent support is obtained, a figure approaching the 29 per cent for 'present state of democracy'. However, we abstained from dichotomizing the scale in order to record only the proportion of respondents giving an unambiguously positive answer.

Disregarding differences between the two indicators, the results allow us to state that fewer than a third of citizens in central and eastern Europe evaluate the performance of democracy in their respective countries positively. Where only the stricter measure is applied Cworking of democracy'), the figure is less than 20 per cent. Thus, at least at the time in question, the citizens' experience with the operation of democracy in their particular country cannot be said to have produced positive feedback. This finding holds true in principle for all eleven countries, but to varying degrees.

In order to obtain a simple measure for the performance of democracy and also to provide some correction for measurement errors, we calculated the average of the two percentages. The results of the calculation are shown in Table 7. For Poland there is no measurement for 'present state of democracy', so that only the score for 'working of democracy' can be taken into account. Countries are ranked in order of support levels. According to this combined measure, Romania and Lithuania top the list. In both countries the percentage of citizens expressing positive support for the performance of democracy is close to 35 per cent. Below 20 per cent, and thus at the bottom of the scale are Estonia, Krasnoyarsk, Hungary, and Ukraine. Poland has a similarly low score, but this is probably underestimated due to the missing indicator, which at the same time represents the more liberal measure. This distribution once again indicate that only a minority of citizens in the eleven countries are satisfied with the performance of their respective democracies, even i f there are notable variations between countries.

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Table 7: Support for performance and structure of democracy (summary table)3

Performance Structure of democracy1* of democracy0

Romania 34.8 (1) 96.0 (1) Lithuania 34.3 (2) 85.1 (8) East Germany 29.0 (3) 87.8 (5) Czechoslovakia 26.1 (4) 83.5 (9) Slovenia 25.5 (5) 88.8 (4) Bulgaria 21.9 (6) 92.3 (2) Poland 17.2 (7) 86.0 (7) Estonia 16.4 (8) 87.3 Krasnoyarsk 14.4 (9) 74.6 (11) Hungary 13.5 91.2 Ukraine 11.7 (11) 79.7 (10)

Central and eastern Europe 22.8 86.0

a Cell-entries are percentages of respondents who support performance of democracy and structure of democracy, b Average of the two indicators measuring support for 'functioning of democracy' (see Table 6). c Average of the six indicators measuring support for 'institutions of representation' and 'institution of party com­

petition' (see Table 5).

To underline the difference between these results for the performance of democracy and those for the structure of democracy, the average was also calculated for the 'institutions of representation' (SI) and the "institution of party competition' (S2) on the basis of the six indicators, expressing the degree of support for the structure of democracy (Table 7). A comparison between the two values reveals the striking difference existing within each country. It is relatively strongest in Estonia and especially Hungary. In Hungary, support for the structure of democracy is higher than average, and support for the performance of democracy is lower than average. Further developments in Hungary are thus likely to be the best demonstration of what happens i f this gap is not closed.

I f the perspective is shifted to consider the values for the structure and performance of democracy shown in Table 7 together, then three countries attract particular attention. Krasnoyarsk and Ukraine rank lowest among the countries on both dimensions of support for democracy. The scenario for the consolidation of democracy is accordingly likely to be worst in these two countries. Surprisingly, Romania scores best here, topping the list for both dimensions. Among the eleven countries, Romania should therefore clearly have the best prospects for consolidating democracy. For anyone who has followed political developments in Romania over the past few years, obtaining information primarily from the mass media, this result certainly gives the lie to intuition. In social scientific research, however, the constant occurrence of results contrary to intuition requires such prior intuition to be corrected. In this particular case, we nevertheless hesitate to accept the truism and allow the evidence of the data to convince us. One of the reasons for our hesitation is the result obtained for Romania in the analysis of the culture of democracy. In comparison to other countries, the understanding of democracy in Romania is least

33

consistent with the normative model. Only a small minority of Romanian citizens associate exclusively or dominantly democratic values with democracy (see Table 4). We must therefore at least raise the question whether the empirically determined support really relates to democracy in the sense of the normative model. It could also relate to the po­litical elite acting within the context of the democratic structure. I f this is be the case, the democratic structure would be a merely contingent form in which the political elite attempts to resolve current political problems. That this possibility cannot be rejected out of hand is indicated by the satisfaction expressed by Romanians with the 'performance of government' (P3). Romania has the highest score of all countries for both indicators (see Table 6). In the causal model analysed in the following section, a strong influence by the 'performance of government' on the 'functioning of government' in all central and eastern European countries is ascertained. The relatively high degree of satisfaction shown by Romanians with governmental performance is therefore likely to be one of the reasons for the higher than average positive evaluation of the functioning of democracy in their own country. In Romania, it cannot be excluded that the actions and decisions of the political elite provide positive feedback to support for the structure of democracy, even though this support relates less to democracy in the sense of the normative model than democracy as the currently implemented form of a political order.

The attitudinal construct 'functioning of democracy' (PI) relates to a generalized evaluation of the reality of democracy in the respondents' own country at a particular point in time. The second attitudinal construct contained in Table 6, and which also relates to democracy, is 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2). From one point of view it is more specific and from another more general than 'functioning of democracy'. It is more specific in so far as it deals with the problem-solving capacity of democracy, that is to say with a certain aspect of functioning. It is more general in so far as it has to do with fundamental problem-solving capacity and not just with solving immediate problems as they arise. In discussing the various theoretical constructs of our analysis in section 3.1, we have already pointed out that, according to the results of empirical democracy research, the effectiveness of democracy in addition to its legitimacy exercises a vital influence on the maintenance and consolidation of democracy. From this perspective it is worth noting that in all eleven countries the fundamental problem-solving capacity of democracy gains a markedly better score than that for the general functioning of democracy in the respondents' own country at the survey period. On average for all countries, almost 50 per cent of citizens are of the opinion that the problems facing their countries will be solved by or within democracy. Since respondents could opt not only for the negative alternative (will be getting more serious) but also for the indifferent and thus 'easier' response 'will remain the same', this can definitely be regarded as a positive result. The country whose citizens give democracy

34

by far the worst score on problem-solving capacity is Hungary (37 per cent). In most countries the figure is around the 50 per cent mark. Distinctly above this figure are Romania (63 per cent), East Germany (64 per cent), and Bulgaria (74 per cent). Thus at the time of survey, the problem-solving capacity of democracy had gained something in the way of credit in most of the eleven central and eastern European countries. It is an open question how long this state of affairs will continue i f the current assessment of performance remains as unfavourable as at the survey period.

The two constructs 'performance of government' (P3) and 'economic performance' (P4) also contained in Table 6, do not relate to an attitude towards democracy. However, in the following section they will be used as predictors of such attitudes. The distribution of responses to the questions are therefore presented as background information. 'Performance of government' (P3) is measured by two indicators, one asking for satisfaction with the present government and the other asking for trust in the government. Depending on the specific indicator, 'performance of government' is evaluated very differently by the respondents. In all eleven countries 'trust in government' is higher than 'satisfaction with democracy'. Trust is relatively low in Hungary und East Germany with scores below 30 per cent. Trust is highest in Romania and Czechoslovakia with trust over 50 per cent. With respect to 'satisfaction with government', the lowest level of satisfaction exists in Ukraine (7.6 per cent) and it lies barely above 10 per cent in Krasnoyarsk, Bulgaria and East Germany. The highest level of satisfaction with the present government exists in Romania (47 per cent). On average, the difference between the proportion of respondents showing trust in government (42 per cent) and the proportion of respondents satisfied with the present government (22.6 per cent) is about 19 per cent. The fact that this difference is apparent in all countries may indicate the existence of common factors. We suggest two possible methodological factors which may be at work here. First, it is likely that the trust in government question, which broadly asks the respondents to consider "the government in our country", is prompting more an evaluation of the government as an institution and less an evaluation of the present office holders. Normally the institution of government is evaluated higher by citizens than the present government. Second, it is likely that the satisfaction with government question is prompting an evaluation of the governments success at meeting citizen demands, an evaluation that is often negative. The trust in government question may not be prompting such an evaluation.

'Economic performance' (P4) is measured by two indicators; one referring to the present economic situation of the country, and the other to the future economic situation. In almost all countries the present economic situation is evaluated extremely negatively. Somewhat higher evaluations are shown by Poland and Romania. In all countries the future economic situation is evaluated in a more positive light than the present situation. Nevertheless, only

35

a minority of citizens hold positive expectations toward the future economic situation. Here only Lithuania and Romania are exceptions to the general pattern.

3.4 A Model of the Performance of Democracy

In this section, a number of strands of the argument developed in our analysis so far are to be meshed in a causal model to be empirically tested with the aid of a multiple regression analysis. The central dependent variable of the model is 'performance of democracy' (highlighted in Figure 4). It should be noted that the construct 'performance of democracy' in this model is identical with the attitudinal construct 'functioning of democracy' (PI).

Figure 4: A model of the performance of democracy

Implementation of

democratic institutions

v Institutional performance

of democracy

1

Performance of

democracy

Performance of

democracy

Performance of

government

Effectiveness of

democracy

Economic performance

A newly introduced democracy can consolidate only i f there is positive feedback from the experience of citizens with the performance of democracy to the structure and values of democracy. This has been stated as one of the basic theoretical assumptions of our analysis. What is decisive for this feedback, which is presumed to lead to the institutionalization of already implemented values and structure, is not any objectively ascertainable performance but the performance perceived by citizens. A l l variables in the following model of the performance of democracy therefore relate to the attitudes of citizens towards the objects in question.

36

I f the performance of democracy does indeed play a strategic role in the consolidation of democracy, the question arises as to what this consolidation depends on and what influences it. A number of statements have already been made on this subject in the course of the analysis. In discussing the general model of the legitimation of democracy (2.2), we described how it should be from a democracy theory perspective. I f we take it as given that the normative order of democracy, the values and structure implemented in the constitution, is accepted, the essential question is the extent to which the reality or performance of the democracy is congruent with this order. At this point we shall disregard the problem of whether acceptance is to be regarded as assent or consent. What is important is only that the values and norms contained in the democratic order also constitute the basis for evaluating reality. The sense of such a legitimation model is clear: the evaluation of the reality of a democracy by its citizens is presumed to obey criteria by which democracy legitimates itself. These are primarily certain democratic values and the related behavioural norms contained in the implemented structure.

Transferred to the level of citizen attitudes, this produces in particular two standards by which to evaluate the performance of democracy. First, the extent to which the professional actors of the polity occupying the decision-making positions actually act as they should. We can refer to this criterion as rule conformity. Second, the extent to which the institutional mechanisms of democracy actually function. The institution of party competition can illustrate what is meant. From the point of view of the citizens, this institution functions when the party system confronts the voters with recognizable alternative solutions to relevant political problems, when the citizens can see a connection between their electoral choice and the formation of government coalitions. And above all when the exchange of governing and opposition parties consequent on wide-spread dissatisfaction with the current government operates smoothly. A further positive effect of this exchange of government and opposition is produced when hitherto neglected sections of the population gain representation in government. This list could be extended still further, but is sufficient to illustrate our point. An empirical study by Weil (1989) has demonstrated for Western democracies the relevance of such institutional mechanisms for political support by citizens.

There are two reasons why only the 'institutional performance of democracy' construct has been included in the model presented in Figure 4. The first is that this construct is presumably relatively more important than rule conformity. The second reason is that it is not possible to determine the two effects empirically because the study contains no corresponding indicators. For the sake of clarity, we have therefore taken only the relatively more important construct into account. I f the lack of indicators has not led us entirely to omit the evaluation standards compatible with the normative model of

37

legitimation, this is due to the theoretical importance of the constructs and to the necessity of taking their potential effects into account in interpreting the empirically determined effects of the other independent variables.

I f we disregard the question of the degree of implementation of the democratic institutions in individual countries, all other explanatory variables in the model — effectiveness of democracy, performance of government, economic performance — are more or less output-related variables. We are thus dealing with effects accorded no role by the normative model. But is not very realistic to assume that they do not play a role. This is made particularly clear by the importance of the 'effectiveness of democracy' construct. With reference to Dahl, Linz and Lipset we have explained that this construct relates to the ability of a political system to deal with the fundamental problems confronting a society (3.1). Since shortly after the collapse of an entire societal system in central and eastern European countries, there is a whole series of such fundamental problems, it is highly unlikely that the manner and extent of their resolution will fail to affect the evaluation of democracy. Disregarding citizens' subjective perception, this can also be explained in theoretical terms. The societal function of a democratic system goes beyond organizing decision-making processes as democratically as possible. It consists also in solving societal problems by generating collectively binding decisions.

The 'performance of government' is not a matter of the generalized problem-solving capacity of democracy as a form of political order, but a question of the competence of the current government in solving concrete problems as they present themselves. Under a democratic constitution, too, the government of a country is the decisive executive actor, and is likely to be perceived as such by the citizens. The government can therefore be identified as the authority citizens expect to satisfy their demands. At this point we wil l turn once more to the normative model of the legitimation of a democracy. According to this model, dissatisfaction with the current government does not affect support for democracy, .but is absorbed by the change in party preference and the voting out of the government. This is not only a normative postulate but also relates systematically to the persistence of a democracy. To the extent that citizen dissatisfaction directly affects support for the system, the persistence of the system is at risk (Easton 1965b, 1975).

The explanatory variable in the model not yet been dealt with is 'economic performance'. In including this variable in the model, we assume that the basic problems facing societies in central and eastern Europe are either partially or primarily economic ones. Perception of the economic situation in the citizens' own country is therefore likely to exercise a systematic influence on the 'effectiveness of democracy' and on the 'performance of democracy'. One of the two indicators presents a problem in measuring this construct, since evaluation of the economic situation in the respondents' country relates to the period

38

in which the present government has been in power (see Q13 in Table 1). This indicator, at least, is thus not quite independent of 'performance of government' as a dependent variable.

Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the causal effects specified in the model. The instruments used to measure the individual constructs are mean indices of indicators belonging to or defining each construct. Table 1 shows which indicators are involved. 'Effectiveness of democracy' alone is measured by only one indicator. Table 8 shows the results of the model estimate for central and eastern European countries as a whole, i.e. for the pooled data.

Table 8: Regression analysis (pooled analysis)3

Performance of democracy (PI)

Effectiveness of democracy (P2)

Performance of government (P3)

Implementation of institutions (S3) Effectiveness of democracy (P2) Performance of government (P3) Economic Performance (P4)

.11**

.12**

.46**

.13** .18** .38**

Adjusted R 2

N .35 6736

.03 .14

** p s .01 * ps.05 a Listwise deletion, cell-entries are standardized regression coefficients.

According to this estimate, all the effects postulated in the theoretical model are highly significant. Given the size of the sample (N=6736), this is hardly surprising. The value of the individual regression coefficients is therefore more instructive. In relation to the central dependent variable of the model, 'performance of democracy' (identical with 'functioning of democracy' PI), the effects recorded tend to be weak, that is to say that the standardized regression coefficients (beta) are situated between .10 and .15. 'Performance of government' (P3) is the exception. At .46, the estimated effect is considerable, thus contributing most strongly to the 35 per cent explained variance (see adjusted R 2 in Table 8). Thus according to the model estimate, the degree of implementation of democracy in the respondents' own country hardly plays a role in evaluating the reality of this democracy. The same is surprisingly true for 'effectiveness of democracy' (P2). The analysis apparently indicates that the citizens relate what is theoretically meant by 'effectiveness of democracy', namely the evaluation of the basic problem-solving competence of democracy, to the government as the actor that has actually to solve such problems in the course of daily political action.

Contrary to theoretical expectations, 'economic performance' (P4) also directly affects 'performance of democracy', although not so markedly (beta=.13). By contrast, the effect

39

on 'performance of government' is strong, with a beta value of .38. In our opinion, this result cannot be attributed to the one indicator referring to government in the formulation of the question, thus risking tautology. I f a regression analysis is carried out separately for the two indicators of 'economic performance', the markedly stronger effect of 'performance of government' derives from the other indicator, which concerns the estimate of the economic situation of the country in the next year (see Q14 in Table 1). 'Economic performance' thus has a weak overall effect on 'effectiveness of democracy' and on 'performance of democracy', and a strong direct effect on 'performance of democracy'. Via the latter, 'economic performance' also has an appreciable indirect effect on 'performance of democracy'. This saliency of the variable in the model estimate make it clear that economic development plays an important role in evaluation by the citizens of central and eastern Europe of the reality of democracy.

In Table 9 the results of the estimation of the model depicted in Figure 4 are shown separately for each country. We cannot go into detail on the profusion of these results, but will merely underline some of the more significant deviations from the general pattern. In all countries, the best predictor for 'performance of democracy' is 'performance of government', with the one exception of Poland. There 'economic performance' plays the relatively most important role. Poland is also the only country in which the 'implementation of democratic institutions' has at least a medium-strong effect on 'performance of democracy'.

The independent variables specified in the model explain more than 40 per cent of variance in four countries in 'performance of democracy'; a considerable figure. In three countries, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, this very high variance reduction is primarily attributable to the extremely strong influence of 'performance of government', and in one country, Romania, also to 'economic performance'. Romania is also the country evidencing the strongest effect of 'economic performance' on 'performance of government'. According to this model estimate, at least for the survey period, the economic situation played a considerable role in the evaluation of both government and democracy.

As a whole, the model estimates have shown a strong dependence of 'performance of democracy' on 'performance of government' and 'economic performance'. This outcome makes the sceptical assessment of the reality of democracies in central and eastern Europe understandable. But it also means that for the foreseeable future positive feedback to the support for the structure and values of democracy is hardly to be expected. This wi l l continue to be the case at least as long as massive problems subject central and eastern European countries to pressure hardly amenable to satisfactory abatement by the respective political decision-makers.

40

Table 9: Regression analysis (country-specific analysis)3

J. Dependent variable: Performance of democracy (PI)

Independent variables: Implementation of institutions (S3)

Effectiveness of democracy (P2)

Performance of government (P3)

Economic per­formance (P4)

Adjusted N

Bulgaria -.01 .08* .29** .18** .14 656 Bulgaria (-.02) (.07) (-25)

594 Czechoslovakia .13** .12** .54** .06 .44 594 (.28) (.08) (.50) (•07)

.36 East Germany 08** .13** .46** 14** .36 730 East Germany (.15) (.11) (.41)

518 Estonia .06 .07 .44** .14** .28 518 (•17) . (.05) (.32) (-13)

Hungary .12** .19** .46** .09** .37 934 Hungary (.32) (.14) (.38) (-08)

.21 561 Krasnoyarsk .07 .01 .35** .19** .21 561 Krasnoyarsk (.16) (.00) (.31) (.19)

Lithuania -.04 .08* .65** .09** .50 533 (-.10) (.06) (•59) (.12)

Poland .21** .10* .21** .24** .24 440 (.42) (.09) (.20) (.26)

Romania .11** .08** .43** .27** .44 761 (.26) (.07) (.37) (.27)

Slovenia .13** 14** .57** .07 .52 374 ¿10) (.52) (.09)

Ukraine .11** .04 .47** -.02 .24 635 (.27) (.03) (.39) (-.03)

Centraland eastern .11** .12** .46** .13** .35 6736 Europe" (.26) (•09) (.40) (-13)

//. Dependent variables: Effectiveness of democracy (P2) Performance of government (P3)

Independent variables: Economic per­ Adjusted Economic per­ Adjusted formance (P4) R 2 formance (P4) R 2 N

Bulgaria .04 .00 .31** .09 656 Bulgaria (.06) (.42)

Czechoslovakia .27** .07 .41** .16 594 (•44) (.46)

East Germany .30** .09 42** .18 730 East Germany (.31) (.42)

Estonia .13** .02 .39** ,15 518 (.20) (-51)

Hungary 19** .04 .45** .20 934

Krasnoyarsk (•24) (.52)

Krasnoyarsk .22** .05 .35** .12 561 (.31) (.39)

Lithuania .21** .04 .32** .10 533 (.34) (.47)

Poland .35** .12 .29** .09 440 (.43) (.34)

Romania .11** .01 .51** .26 761

Slovenia (.13) (.60)

Slovenia .25** .06 .33** .10 . 374 (.46) (.48)

Ukraine .06* .00 .19** .03 635 (43) (.29)

Central and eastern .18** .03 .38** .14 6736 Europe" (.24) (.44)

** ps.01 * P. s-°? a List wise deletion; cell-entries are standardized regression coefficients, unstandardized coefficients appear in parentheses, b Including all respondents, unweighted.

41

In conclusion we wil l return once again to the influence of institutional performance on the performance of democracy which, although specified in the model, cannot by tested by the data. Since this variable is a factor of a quite different sort than the other independent variables in the model, we do not believe that the effects on'performance of democracy' empirically demonstrated by the model estimate would significantly change were this factor to have been included empirically. However, the vital question for the consolidation of democracies is whether this factor has a supplementary influence, and how strong this influence is. The independent variables taken into account were able to explain 35 per cent of the variance of 'performance of democracy1, which is certainly an extraordinarily high figure. But at the same time this implies that 65 per cent of the variance is not explained. This leaves enough room for influence by the 'institutional performance of democracy'. I f such influence were to prove ascertainable, the criteria by which democracy legitimates itself and can legitimate would also play a role in evaluating the reality of democracy. To this extent the not very rosy picture our analysis provides of the consolidation of democracies in central and eastern Europe would then look somewhat brighter. Given the restricted date, however, this must remain a hypothetical consideration.

4. Summary and Conclusions

In outlining the problem, we defined the subject of our analysis as the cultural conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe. The initial concept of political culture seemed to us not to be instructive enough to guide the further course of the analysis. For Almond, one of the fathers of this notion in empirical social research, it is more a general taxonomy for specifying a multiplicity of variables for widely different analytical purposes than a theory. For this reason, we first attempted to elaborate a theoretical base for the issue. This led to the issue itself having to be reformulated. The subject was now no longer cultural conditions but the attitudinal conditions of the transition to liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe. Attitudes to the values of democracy as the constitutive elements of the culture of democracy are thus a partial aspect of a now more comprehensive perspective. The original title has nevertheless been retained because the present discussion of important attitudinal aspects of the transition process is conducted under this heading.

One of the key tasks for a meaningful analysis of attitudinal conditions for the transition to liberal democracy is to define a limited number of variables that are clearly material to the transition process. This is necessary i f only because there are innumerable potential

42

attitudes that can be related in one way or another to the object of liberal democracy. We have limited this potential by specifying two models.

The first model of the legitimation of democracy relates to the specific phase in the transition process experienced by the countries of central and eastern Europe in 1990 and 1991 (1992 for East Germany), the period in which the individual surveys were carried out. A t this period, basic institutions of liberal democracy had been introduced in all eleven countries represented in the study. With reference to the usual subdivision of the transition process into liberalization, democratization and consolidation, these countries were thus in the consolidation phase. The crucial problem in this consolidation phase was first the routinization of the newly implemented institutional structure in everyday political processes, and second the institutionalization of this newly introduced democracy. Institutionalization occurs to the extent that the values and structure of this democracy as implemented by the constitution attract the support of the citizens. Because of the collapse for intrinsic reasons of the former regime in central and eastern European countries, it can be assumed that the new regime finds support at least initially. But so soon after the introduction of the new democratic regime, support cannot yet be anchored in citizens' beliefs, being rather in the nature of superficial, 'wait-and-see' acquiescence. This type of support was labelled 'assent', and is to be distinguished from 'consent' in the sense of anchored and thus stable support. Only when consent to the values and structure of democracy has been obtained can one speak of a consolidated democracy. The condition for the formation of such consent is positive experience with the reality of democracy, democracy in operation, over a longer period of time. In the second model of the performance of democracy, a number of factors were identified that can be assumed to influence evaluation of the performance of democracy or the reality of democracy by the community of citizens. This model was to a large extent empirically tested, and provided evidence on the prospects of the ongoing consolidation process.

Two results of the analysis are particularly important for the question of the consolidation of liberal democracy in the countries of central and eastern Europe. First, a high degree of support was ascertained for the institutions essentially constituting the structure of liberal democracy. This finding is in keeping with the theoretical expectation that such support is likely to exist shortly after implementation of democratic institutions. I f the average of all analysed structural indicators is calculated, it is found that over 85 per cent of citizens in almost all countries support these institutions. The only exceptions are Ukraine and Krasnoyarsk, where the level of support is between 70 and 80 per cent. On this basis, the scenario for the consolidation of democracy can for the moment be regarded as favourable.

43

However, this assessment has to be modified when taking account of the second important finding of the analysis. Whereas the structure of democracy is supported by a clear majority of citizens in all countries, performance finds on average only 23 per cent support. There is considerable deviation from this average, but it does not affect the fundamental state of affairs: in Romania and Lithuania support for the performance of democracy is around 35 per cent, and in Hungary, Krasnoyarsk, and Ukraine, it is below 15 per cent. At the time of the survey, there was thus a strong discrepancy between support for the structure of democracy and support for performance. Positive feedback for the citizens from performance to the structure and values of democracy can therefore not be assumed, at least for the survey period.

It is doubtful whether such positive feedback wi l l develop in the coming years. It is clear that the pressure that existing problems exert on actors in positions of responsibility has not decisively diminished. At the same time, this implies considerable restrictions on successful government activity in the perception of the citizens. I f one takes into account that support for the performance of democracy depends essentially on support for the performance of government, as the empirical test of the relevant model has shown, increased support for the performance of democracy is unlikely. The data presented in Table 10 give some sustenance to these speculative postulates.

Table 10: Support for democracy 1990-19933

Czecho-Bulgaria Slovakia Estonia Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania

1990 35 62 - 21 - 50 1991 46 29 36 34 62 35 43 1992 40 40° /24 c 30 24 52 36 29 1993 20 48 b/19 c 36 20 36 35 30

a Cell-entries are percentages of respondents who are very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the way democracy is developing in (the own country). Other response categories: not very satisfied, not at all satisfied,

b Czech Republic, c Slovakia. Sources: Eurobarometer East 1990,1991,1992, and 1993.

Table 10 evaluates the development of democracy in the respondents' own country for the period 1990 to 1993 by citizens from five countries in central and eastern Europe also represented in the study analysed by us. The indicator underlying Table 10 is not absolutely identical with the one we analysed for the performance of democracy, but the two are comparable. The main difference is that this indicator relates less unequivocally to performance. The support it determines is therefore likely to be somewhat higher than that ascertained by our analysis. As the distributions in Table 10 show, with two exceptions, only a minority of citizens in all five countries at all five points in time assess the

44

development of democracy in their respective countries positively. The two countries out of line are Poland and Czechoslovakia, but only for the first survey period, 1990. There was considerable fluctuation in the values from period to period in all countries. However, i f one wishes to draw conclusions on the basis of these values regarding developments over time, the prospect is negative rather than positive. In our theoretical frame of reference and on the basis of the results obtained, it must be concluded that the consolidation of liberal democracy in central and eastern European countries is still far from complete, and that the outcome of the process is still open.

There exists an important aspect which could alter this rather sceptical diagnosis. It concerns citizens' experience with the functioning of the institutional mechanisms of the newly introduced democracy. Unfortunately, data does not currently exist to measure this concept. As research findings on Western democracies have shown, this factor is important for the support of democracy independently of concrete outputs. But such experience needs time, probably beyond the period covered by the data analysed. For example, the mode of operation of the government/opposition mechanism can only became evident to citizens when it has functioned over several elections. Moreover, one of the preconditions for the functioning of this mechanism is the development of a stable party system offering a variety of clear and distinct party programmes for the voters to choose among. This, too, takes time. The question is whether the citizens of countries in central and eastern Europe wil l give their democratic system the time it needs.

45

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WZB Forschungsschwerpunkt III Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse

Verzeichnis der Arbeitspapiere aus dem Forschungsschwerpunkt I I I (Stand: November 1994)

FS HI 93-301 Wir und die Anderen. "Imagined Communities" im westeuropäischen Vergleich. Dieter Fuchs, Jürgen Gerhards und Edeltraud Roller

Abteilung 1 "Öffentlichkeit und soziale Bewegungen"

FS in 90-101 Strukturen und Funktionen moderner Öffentlichkeit. Fragestellungen und Ansätze. Jürgen Gerhards, Friedhelm Neidhardt

FS in 91-101 Mesomobilization Contexts: Organizing and Framing in two Protest Campaigns in West ermany. Jürgen Gerhards, Dieter Rucht

FSIII91-102 Left-libertarian Movements in Context: A Comparison of Italy and West Germany, 1965-1990. Donatella delta Porta, Dieter Rucht

F S m 91-106

FS in 91-103 The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on their Mobilization. Hanspeter Kriesi

FS HI 91-104 Persönliche Netzwerke und die Mobilisierung politischen Protests: Stand der Forschung und strukturanalytische Perspektiven. Thomas Ohlemacher

FS I I I 91-105 Öffentliche Kommunikationsbereitschaft. Test eines zentralen Bestandteils der Theorie der Schweigespirale. Dieter Fuchs, Jürgen Gerhards, Friedhelm Neidhardt

Eine Untersuchung des Beitrags politischer Klubs zur Entwicklung einer demokratischen Infrastruktur in Polen - am Beispiel von 'Dziekania'. (Forschungsbericht) Helmut F ehr

FS HI 91-107 Parteien, Verbände und Bewegungen als Systeme politischer Interessenvermittlung. Dieter Rucht

FS in 91-108 Die Macht der Massenmedien und. die Demokratie: Empirische Befunde. Jürgen Gerhards

Anbieter von öffentlichen politischen Veranstaltungen in West-Berlin. Barbara Blättert Nachfrager und wahrgenommenes Angebot von öffentlichen politischen Veranstaltungen in der Bundesrepublik. Jürgen Gerhards

Support for New Social Movements in Five Western European Countries. Dieter Fuchs and Dieter Rucht

Dokumentation und Analyse von Protestereignisssen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Prodat), Codebuch. Dieter Rucht, Peter Hocke, Thomas Ohlemacher

Social Relays: Micro Mobilization via the Meso-Level. Thomas Ohlemacher

Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Jürgen Gerhards

Selbstkontrolle in den Medien: Der Deutsche Presserat und seine Möglichkeiten. Jessica Eisermann

Prominenz in der Bundesrepublik Birgit Peters

Bevölkerungsmeinung und Gewalt gegen Ausländer im wiedervereinigten Deutschland. Empirische Anmerkungen zu einem unklaren Verhältnis. Thomas Ohlemacher

Von den Oppositionsgruppen der DDR zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen in Ostdeutschland? Barbara Blättert, Dieter Rink und Dieter Rucht

Abteilung 2 "Institutionen und sozialer Wandel"

Politisches Denken in der Informationsgesellschaft. Zum Zusam­menhang zwischen Fernsehnutzung und Einstellungskonsistenz. Katrin Vollmer

The Normalization of the Unconventional - Forms of Political Action and New Social Movements. Dieter Fuchs

Vielfalt oder strukturierte Komplexität? Zur Institutionalisierung politi­scher Spannungslinien im Verbände- und Parteiensystem in der Bun­desrepublik. Bernhard Weßels

Zum Wandel politischer Konfliktlinien. Ideologische Gruppierungen und Wahlverhalten. Dieter Fuchs

Ein analytisches Schema zur Klassifikation von Politikinhalten. Edeltraud Roller

Coalition Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Does Policy Matter? Hans-Dieter Klingemann und Andrea Volkens

Trends of Political Support in the Federal Republic of Germany. Dieter Fuchs

"Bubble-Up"-Theory or Cascade Model? The Formation of Public Opinion Towards the EC: Shaky Evidence from Different Empirical Sources. Bernhard Weßels

Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-1991. Ar end Lijphart

Bürger und Organisationen - Ost- und Westdeutschland: vereint und doch verschieden? Bernhard Weßels

Hermeneutisch-klassifikatorische Inhaltsanalyse - Analysemöglichkei­ten am Beispiel von Leitfadengesprächen zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Edeltraud Roller und Rainer Mathes

Ideological Basis of the Market Economy: Attitudes Toward Distribution Principles and the Role of Government in Western and Eastern Germany. Edeltraud Roller

The Cumbersome Way to Partisan Orientation in a 'New' Democracy: The Case of the Former GDR. Max Kaase und Hans-Dieter Klingemann

Eine Metatheorie des demokratischen Prozesses. Dieter Fuchs

A Metatheory of the Democratic Process. Dieter Fuchs

Sozialisation in unterschiedlichen Systemen. Zum Profil der Persön­lichkeitstypen in West- und Ost-Berlin. Carolin Schöbet

Mass Media: Political Independence of Press and Broadcasting Systems. Katrin Voltmer

FS m 93-206 Mobilisieren Interessengegnerschaften? Die "Hostility"-Hypothese, Wahlbeteiligung und Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl 1990. Bernhard Weßels

FS HI 93-207 Wählen als rationales Handeln: Anmerkungen zum Nutzen des Rational-Choice Ansatzes in der empirischen Wahlforschung. Dieter Fuchs und Steffen Kühnel

FS HI 93-208 Gruppenbindungen und rationales Handeln als Determinanten der Wahlentscheidung in Ost- und Westdeutschland.

Bernhard Weßels

FS in 93-209 Geteilte Medienrealität? Zur Thematisierungsleistung der Massen­medien im Prozeß der deutschen Vereinigung. Babara Pfetsch und Katrin Voltmer

FS I I I 94-201 Democratic Transformation and the Prerequisites of Democratic Opposition in East and Central Europe. Bernhard Wessels und Hans-Dieter Klingemann

FS HI 94-202 Cultural Conditions of the Transformation to Liberal Democracies in central and eastern Europe Dieter Fuchs und Edeltraud Roller

FS in 94-204 Individuelle Teilnahme an.politischer Kommunikation im Prozeß der deutschen Vereinigung. Zur Struktur von interpersonaler und massenmedialer Kommunikation. Katrin Vollmer, Eva Schabedoth und Peter R. Schrott

FS IE 94-205 Nationalitätenkonflikt und Mechanismen politischer Integration im Baltikum Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Jürgen Lass und Katrin Mattusch

Die Arbeitspapiere können kostenlos bestellt werden: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Reichpietschufer 50 D-10785 Berlin

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