Culturally Articulated Neoliberalization

8/13/2019 Culturally Articulated Neoliberalization

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Horowitz, Leah S. in press. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.

Culturally articulated neoliberalization: Corporate Social Responsibility and the capture ofindigenous legitimacy in New Caledonia

AbstractThis paper expands our understandings of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a form of roll-outneoliberalism, building upon analyses of CSR initiatives as elements of a capitalist system activelyworking to create its own social regularizationto secure a socio-politico-economic contextsupporting capitalist development. Using an ethnographic analysis of the rise and fall of an indigenousprotest group that targeted a multinational mining project in New Caledonia, this paper has twotheoretical aims. First, itbuilds upon literature that analyzes neoliberalism as articulating withparticular politico-economic conditions in order to argue that such articulation is also, necessarily,cultural. I describe how the mining company undercut and ultimately coopted local resistance, largelyby successfully capturing culturally-based ideologies of customary and indigenous legitimacy. Thus,neoliberalizations articulations may involve attempts to capture not only formal but also informal

regulation or regulators, through direct personal benefits and also indirectly through the capture ofculturally-valued ideologies. These ideologies, in turn, are caught up in culturally-groundedhegemonic processes. This leads to the papers second theoretical aim, which is to explore whathappens when different forms of hegemony, based in distinct cultural formations, encounter eachother as well as counter-hegemonic forces. In engaging directly with customary authorities rather thanexclusively with activists, the company relegitimized itself by delegitimizing its activist opponents,repositioning them as subordinates within their own culturally-informed social hierarchy, andreinstating customary authorities privilegedhegemonic status. Thus, multiple, culturally-distincthegemonic processes may co-exist and interact; here, they reinforced each other by suppressingcounter-hegemonic activities. However, some customary authorities still sympathized with theprotestors aims and perceived potential threats from the companys expanding economic power.Iend by suggesting that counter-hegemonic possibilities reside in the perpetual dynamism of cultures.

Keywords: cultural hegemony, environmental governance, neoliberalism, political ecology, regulationtheory, transnational corporations

Introduction: Corporate Social Responsibility as neoliberalizationOn a warm September afternoon, in the gymnasium of the Goro Nickel mine site in New Caledonia(Southwest Pacific), Kanak protestors who a few months previously had hurled violent threats atmining company employeesand two years earlier had burned millions of dollars of equipmentnow, smiling, embraced their erstwhile opponents. They, alongside local customary authorities, hadjust signed a pactpledging no more direct actions against the project. Welcome to the Valefamily, the companys president gushed. However, there were signsquickly brushed aside by the

company and right-wing mediathat all was not well in Paradise. The delegation had arrived nearlyfour hours late, mumbling excuses about customary ceremonies; all through the night, andup to thelast minute, village elders had engaged in heated debates over whether to sign the agreement. Somearrived still unconvinced but, faced with a crowd of cameras, put pen to paper. One, though, annotatedhis signature, noting his still-fervent hope that a solution be found to avoid the pillaging of the Kanakresource.

Despite its internal contradictions and tendency toward economic and environmental crisis(Altvater 1990; Benton 1996; O'Connor 1988), capitalism is expanding on the global scale. Since the1970s, the regulationist framework (better translated from the original French as regularizationthanregulationsee Jessop 1995) has sought to explain capitalisms paradoxes by analyzing the socio-political institutions and conditions that reproduce [...] the mode of production, making continualaccumulation possible (Aglietta 1979, 16). In other words, capitalism as an independent economicsystem would soon fail; its survival relies on a coupling between the accumulation system and themode of social regula[riza]tion (Bridge & McManus 2000, 13). The latter is a complex fabric of


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economic and non-economic structures, practices, and norms, both formal and informal, thatregularize capitalist development as an overdetermined process(Althusser 2005 [1969]), shapedmore by social context than by inherent properties. This social context enables accumulationprocesses to function, at least temporarily, through a series of institutional fixes(Tickell & Peck1996, 360)a continual process of rescheduling the crisis (Harvey 1989, 196). However, it isimportant to note that social regularization processes are not fixed and pre-determined but emergeout of contingent processes of struggle (Himley 2013, 397). Contra the rigid, totalizing socialconceptions of early social regulationists, each social context must be understood as an articulatedstructure that is only partially closed and always under construction (Gibson-Graham 2006 [1996],154). Thus, capitalism cannot simply rely on already-existing structures and procedures but mustactively work with and within flexible, dynamic local systems to create the conditions it needs,resulting in a multiplicity of capitalisms (Gibson-Graham 2006 [1996], 30).

Since the 1970s, capitalisms work to create such conditions has been facilitated andsupported by neoliberalism. This term is promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined,empirically imprecise and frequently contested (Brenner et al. 2010, 184); however, differentconceptualizations of neoliberalism are arguably reconcilable (Springer 2012,139), at least in termsof baselinedefinitions (Ward & England 2007, 6). Whether focused on its active manifestations as

policy and program,or, more abstractly, as state form or governmentality,or its ideologicalunderpinnings as a hegemonicproject (Springer 2012, 136-137), interpretations share anunderstanding of neoliberalism as an increasingly common institutional framework heavilyprivileging individual entrepreneurial freedoms (Harvey 2005, 2). Although discursively glorifyingmarket-based mechanisms rather than state intervention as the way to solve political and socialproblems(Soederberg 2004, 165), neoliberalism actually entails not only minimizing regulations butnurturing firms through, e.g., privatizing industries, creating markets, ensuring property rights, andprotecting these through both legal mechanisms and police powers. Protection may includesuppressing challenges to economic elites power or privilege (Rodan & Hewison 2006). This reducesthe state, as Marx observed, to a committee for managing the common affairs of the wholebourgeoisie (2008 [1848], 82).

Nonetheless, like capitalism, neoliberalism, far from being a static, homogeneous ideology

with a uniform outcome, results from complex and dynamic processes of neoliberalization(Peck &Tickell 2002). First, neoliberal ideologies have evolved over time. The 1980s saw the emergence ofthe Washington Consensus, a transnational policy paradigmthat promoted free markets by makinginternational financial institutions(IFI) loans conditional upon painful structural adjustmentreforms (Babb 2013), cutting social welfare initiatives and weakening labor unions (Rodan &Hewison 2006). Criticized by economists, rejected by governments, the Consensus faced a crisis ofhegemony in the Gramscian sense (Soederberg2004, 10): Elites maintained politico-economicpower but lost popular support for their ideologies as free markets deepened economic inequalities.As opposition spread, governments distanced themselves from the Consensus as harming theirpopularity and legitimacy (Soederberg 2004, 171).A post-Washington Consensusevolved: akinder, gentler neoliberalism(Plehwe & Walpen 2006, 45), with IFIs pronouncing a new-foundcommitment to good governance, participation, and Community-Driven Development (World

Bank 1996, 2006). Roll-backneoliberalism, focused solely on freeing markets, had putatively beenreplaced with a roll-outneoliberalism designed to address its predecessors social failings (Peck &Tickell 2002), although critics see these reforms as merely an attempt to relegitimise market-leddevelopment (Carroll 2010, 3), which inevitably exacerbates power asymmetries and associatedsocial problems (Nair 2013).

Meanwhile, neoliberalization is contextual and contingent (England & Ward 2007, 250),exhibiting variations in its on-the-ground realizations. This variegation results from articulation(e.g.Castree 2006, Smith 2007), which Hall defines as a protean linkage betweenan ideology andcontextual social forces such as politics and economic conditions(1996, 141). While alwayspositioned within a social context that gives it meaning, an ideology has no necessary connection toany particular context; it can be articulated in more than one way(1996, 142), in both a discursiveand a material sense. Thus, neoliberalization, as a global process,is forced in each manifestation toarticulateto engage in mutual shapingwith local circumstances:geographically-specificpolitical and economic conditions and institutional structures (Springer 2011, 2555), and with the


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individual characteristics of the particular stakeholders involved (Springer 2010b). Engagement withthese multiple influences helps fashion unique forms of neoliberalization, which in turn leads tovarying degrees of physical and structural violence (Springer 2011).

This paper builds upon understandings of roll-out neoliberalization as articulating withparticular politico-economic conditions as it aims to relegitimize market-led development and thuscounter resistance. However, analyses to date have underestimated the role of culture in theseprocesses, instead tending toward an overly economistic derivation of political economy or anoverly statist rendition of governmentality (Barnett 2005, 10).I thus respond to the call to examinethe translation of global capital across various spaces and cultural contexts (Springer 2012, 134).Through a study of Corporate Social Responsibility practices in New Caledonia that captured theculturally-valued ideologies upon which protestors relied, and thus undermined this resistance, Iconceptualize the cultural articulation of neoliberalization. The next sectionbuilds a theoreticalframe for this work by discussing ways corporations capture both formal and informal regulators, andparticularly exploring the role of ideological capture in encounters of multiple hegemonic andcounter-hegemonic processes.

Articulating CSR: Culture, capture, cooptationCorporate Social Responsibility (CSR) exemplifies neoliberalizations temporal dynamism andcontextual articulation. A type of roll-out neoliberalism, grounded in the notion that businesses havemoral duties, CSRsroots lie in 19thcentury debates about industrys social role (Sadler 2004). By the1990s, pressures on corporations had intensified, largely through the informal regulation of activism(Pargal & Wheeler 1996, 1315), enforced through direct action such as destruction of equipment orindirect action including attacks on companies global reputations (Garsten & Hernes 2009). [S]ocialmovement spaces (Nicholls 2009) such as transnational activist networks (Keck & Sikkink 1998),facilitated by the information age (Castells 1996), had vastly increased activists influence.Meanwhile, enabler states encouraged informal regulation of economic activities(Ayres &Braithwaite 1992), devolving to civil society duties that they were reluctant to embrace themselvesand acting only as regulator of last resort when absolutely necessary (Gouldson & Bebbington

2007, 7). Simultaneously, socially responsibleinvestors began to screen, and pressure, potentialfunding recipients. For instance, in 1998 the International Finance Corporation adoptedEnvironmental and Social Safeguard Policiesdirected at clients. Meanwhile, in response tocriticism from the nongovernmental community, the World Bank Group commissioned a review ofits involvement in the extractive industries, which recommended funding only projects with adequategovernance, [...] much more effective social and environmental policies; and respect for humanrights (World Bank Group 2003, vii). The hidden agenda, of course, was to mitigate risk and ensureproject profitability through political technologies of participation ultimately aimed atrelegitimizing neoliberal hegemony (Carroll 2009, 138).

Consequently, corporations needed to (re)legitimize themselves, too, in the eyes of bothactivists and investors. As financial and reputational costs of ignoring opponents began to outweighcosts of addressing them (see Humphreys 2000), corporations saw a business case for good

corporate citizenship (Zadek 2001). Strategies switched from dodging socio-environmental concernsto putatively embracing them, in the aim of creating a social context favorable to long-termprofitability (Bridge 1998, 227) i.e. achieving social regularization. Corporations thus viewed CSRas an opportunity to seize control of the movement before it seized control over them(Welker 2009,145), while achieving a second aim of displacing regulatory responsibilities from governments tocorporations (Sadler & Lloyd 2009). CSR could demonstrate, to all observers, that the operation hadobtained a social license, a critical mass of public consent(Owen & Kemp 2013, 31). One meansof demonstrating this is the Impact and Benefit Agreement (IBA), a company-community contractthat documents community acceptance of a project in exchange for benefits, e.g.,financialpayments, employment quotas, environmental management, and/or cultural heritage preservation(O'Faircheallaigh 2012).

Meanwhile, CSR initiatives articulate with local politico-economic contexts. For instance,corporations tailor their responses to concerns according to the communitys economic and politicalpower (Pellow & Brulle 2005); research shows poorer corporate environmental performance in


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economically-depressed areas (Gouldson 2006). Where communities and/or governments are strongenough to set the agenda, companies may resist the negotiation of an IBA, embracing this processonly when they are in a dominant position.1Meanwhile, actual community approval is often lessimportant to firms than the appearance of having achieved it, in the eyes of governments, investors,and activists (Owen & Kemp 2013). Related to both these points, the more economically andpolitically vulnerable a population is, the more easily a company is able to manipulate or intimidate itinto accepting environmental and social harms in return for the promise of benefits (e.g. Auyero &Swistun 2009); particularly in the developing world, industrial actors may use a trinkets and beadsapproach to buy-off or silence desperately poor communities (Calvano 2008). This begs thequestion of how, in each context, corporations achieve the appearance of community consent.Before discussing cultures role in these processes, I willbriefly outline two corporate strategies forundercutting both formal and informal regulation: capture and cooptation.

Corporations may escape or preclude constraints through regulatory capture, the hijackingof the regulatory process, so that what regulators decide and/or perform is what industry prefers(Mitnick 2011, 35). Regulators sympathies may be won through benefits such as votes or campaigncontributions. Capture then takes a variety of forms; industries, businesses, or other special interestsmay shape or draft new regulations, lobby legislators to weaken or repeal existing ones, or redefine

themselves so as to be governed by more lenient regulatory bodies (Etizioni 2009). The termregulatory capture has until now been definitionally applied to a relationship with the publicsector due to the governments monopoly of force(Mitnick 2011, 35-36). However, as this studyshows, communities growing influence encourages firms to attempt to capture informal regulatorstooprotestors, local publics, and/or the international community. One means of capturing informalregulators is cooptation, a defensive mechanism whereby governments or corporations neutralizeopposition by assimilating challengers into their own leadership structures (Selznick 1948, 34).Communities may be especially vulnerable to cooptation, as corporations possess far greaterexperience, technical knowledge, and financial resources(Murphree et al. 1996, 448).

Special interests may capture regulators (formal or informal) directly, such as through bribesor privileges. Alternatively, they may use indirect tactics, such as ideological capture: the symbolicand rhetorical alignment of corporate activities with broader social discourses, framing business

activities so as to make them acceptable to regulators and civil society and thus paving the way forfull-fledged regulatory capture (Lippmann 2005, 119). For instance, discussing U.S. capitalist classinterests in the 1980s, Harvey (2005, 42) explains that these labored against government regulationnot only by capturing political parties through donations but also by capturing ideals, winningsupport from the American populace by conjuring up its obsession with individual freedom andappealing to this ideal in rejecting constraints on corporations behavior. Similarly, in recent decadesindustry has captured the ideology of sustainability, thwarting environmental opposition byappropriating, redefining and deploying once oppositional concepts and thereby relegitimizingindustrial activities (Bridge & McManus 2000, 36-37). Ideological capture not only enables informalregulatory capture and cooptation; it is also further expanded by these processes. To externalobservers, it appears that the corporation or government body has included the community indecision-making; the organization has thus captured the valued ideals of democratic participationand community representation (Murphree et al. 1996, 455). Meanwhile, the organization not onlyquiets protestors but may adopt, through association, the respectability or legitimacy that theyrepresent in the public eye (Selznick 1948, 34).

Of course, ideologies are profoundly unconscious[...] cultural objects (Althusser2005[1969], 233), contextualized byand, in turn, shapingnorms, traditions, and discourses that outlinewhat is acceptable, even possible, to do, say, and think. Different cultures, clearly, are infused withdifferent ideologies. Awareness of cultural specificities, then, must inform any attempt to capturerelevant ideals; neoliberalization must be, to coin a term, culturally articulated. Meanwhile, inprescribing and constraining patterns of thought and behavior, culture is deeply intertwined withhegemony, in Gramscis sense of a ruling ideology that deeply permeates subconscious life, arisingfrom long-standing practices of cultural socialization (Harvey 2005, 39). This ideologicalframework stabilizes, by legitimizing, social relationships of domination and subordination.Inequitable power relations then appear as a fundamental component of the habitus, indeed ascommonsense, a reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move


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(Williams 1977, 110). Here, I argue that the scholarly literature would benefit from a greaterrecognition of the multiplehegemonies, with different cultural groundings, that are increasinglycoming into contact. Meanwhile, scholars have recognized that it is better to speak of dynamichegemonic processes, which must be continually restabilized, at least partially through the discursiveworkof subjectivation: the internalization of hegemonic ideologies(Springer 2010a), in the face ofchallenges from counter-hegemonic forces. Thus, hegemonyor, as I argue, hegemoniesare notfixed but must constantly struggle with those who would modify or overturn their relations ofdomination/subordination, or the politico-socio-economic context that enables these.

This study explores ways that hegemonic processes attempt to maintain themselves in the faceof challenges, examining the crucial, yet heretofore underexamined, role of culturally-informedideologies in these struggles. It also analyzes what happens when differing forms of hegemonyencounter each other. The next sections take the reader on an empirical exploration of the culturalarticulation of neoliberalization (in the form of CSR), as a hegemonic process, based in its owncultural ideologies, encountering both resistance (a protest group) and an alternative hegemonicsystem grounded in the local culture (customary authority). I examine how a multinational miningcompany undercut and ultimately coopted informal regulation in the form of local protest in NewCaledonia by appropriating culturally-valued ideologies of customary legitimacy, repositioning their

opponents within localized hegemonic relationships, and simultaneously capturing indigenouslegitimacy in the international arena.

New CaledoniaNew Caledonia is a particularly appropriate site for exploring corporate strategies for capturinginformal regulation. This Pacific island nation, the size of New Jersey, is a biodiversity hotspot withexceptionally high numbers of endemic species that are severely threatened, especially by miningactivity (Kier et al. 2009; Richer de Forges & Pascal 2008). Mined since 1874, New Caledoniacurrently hosts over 30 active mine sites (DIMENC 2012), some locally-based and others run bymultinational corporations (MNCs). This mining prompts concern from a multitude of stakeholders,rural and urban, indigenous and non-indigenous (Horowitz 2008a). Meanwhile, formal and customary

authorities compete for the right to regulate this activity, or at least to claim a privileged role inengaging with it.New Caledonia, administered by France since 1853, is a Melanesian archipelago with a

population of approximately 231,000 (ISEE 2008). The population is comprised of several ethnicgroups, primarily Melanesians, known as Kanak (45%), and people of European ancestry (34%)(ITSEE 2001). In Kanak societies, the first clans to occupy an area have customary (although notlegal) rights to determine land use at that site, and occupy the highest social position, with other clanshierarchically ranked in order of arrival (Bensa & Rivierre 1982). In the pre-colonial era, the chief,appointed by first-occupant clans, had no substantive authority but enjoyed respectful brotherlyaffection (Leenhardt 1937, 149). However, this position acquired greater significance after 1898,when colonial administrators created lesser chiefs, responsible for a village, and high chiefs, withauthority over several villages, often distributing these titles themselves (Naepels 1998). These chiefs

received new powers over land along with the ability, at least theoretically, to punish their subjects(Merle 1996). In 1947, administrators created village-level Councils of Elders. Later, the 1998Nouma Accords institutionalized eight Customary Regions, each with its own Customary Council.Each region selects two members of the Customary Senate, with an advisory role on mattersconcerning Kanak identity. Clearly colonial and post-colonial governance systems radically alteredcustomary authority structures. Even in their mutated and convoluted contemporary forms, however,positions of customary authority command a high degree of respect from every corner of Kanaksociety.

The 1980s witnessed anti-colonialist uprisings, which ended with the 1988 Matignon Accord(Henningham 1992). A decade later, the Nouma Accords promised a gradual devolution ofadministrative authority to the territory, recategorized as a sui generis collectivity in 1999, althoughstill a French possession. Meanwhile, New Caledonia was divided into Northern, Southern, andIslands Provinces. Many regulatory responsibilities were decentralized; for instance, the power to


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draft mining regulations was transferred to New Caledonia, with the provinces responsible forenforcing them (paragraph 3.2.5 of the Nouma Accords).

Grande Terre, the main island, is estimated to possess nearly 25% of the worlds nickelreserves (Mining Journal1999) and is the second largest producer of ferronickel and fifth greatestsource of nickel ore (Lyday 2006). Beside the current pyrometallurgical refinery, two refineries are inprogress, colloquially called the Northern and Southern Refineries (see Horowitz 2004). TheSouthern Refinery project, officially Vale Nouvelle-Caldonie (known until 2008 as Goro Nickel),is located at the southern tip of Grande Terre (Figure 1). Inco, an MNC, purchased mining rights tothe Goro site in 1992, and in 1999 completed a pilot refinery which, due to the oreslow mineralcontent, uses hydrometallurgical technology. This procedure, never before implemented in NewCaledonia, uses acid under pressure to leach nickel and cobalt from the ore, with effluent dischargedinto the sea. In 2006 Inco was purchased by CVRD, a Brazilian MNC, world leader in iron oreproduction and the second largest producer of nickel, operating in 37 countries. In 2007, CVRDchanged its name to Vale. Operations are projected to reach full capacity by 2015, despite delayscaused by acid leaks in 2009, 2010, and 2012 (Frdire 2012) and the effluent diffusersrupture in2013 (Mainguet 2013).

Insert Figure 1 here.

Having conducted fieldwork in New Caledonia since 1998, I began studying the SouthernRefinery project in 2006. Between 2006 and 2012 I conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviewswith over 120 stakeholders, including residents of villages near the mine site, leaders and members ofgrassroots organizations, representatives of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),government officials, and mining company representatives. Additionally, I conducted telephoneinterviews with NGO and grassroots leaders, lawyers, researchers, and mining company officials,based in Australia, Canada, France and New Caledonia. All translations from French are mine. I usepseudonyms for all interviewees.

Formal and informal regulation of the Southern RefineryThe parent MNC, first Inco then Vale, benefitted from a favorable regulatory and fiscal policyenvironment. The French state convinced Inco to invest in New Caledonia by offering a taxexemption package involving savings of US$100 million. Meanwhile, although the Nouma Accordsspecified that New Caledonias mining legislation, dating largely from the 1950s, should be revisedand updated, a new mining code was not implemented until 2010. Moreover, governing bodies andpoliticians themselves had financial interests in the project. The Southern Province, responsible forproviding permits and enforcing mining regulations, remains a shareholder in the project.Additionally, the President of the Southern Province from 2004-2009, Philippe Goms, was indictedin 2012 for illegal conflict of interest after Goro Nickel granted his air conditioner company a million-euro contract in 2005-2006, although he successfully appealed this decision a few months later(Matthieu 2012).

That these financial interests might reduce regulators willingness to risk harming profits soonbecame clear. In April 2009, the refinery leaked 42,000 liters of 98% sulfuric acid, much of whichflowed into a nearby creek; the incident was not reported to the government until the following day.An investigation revealed design flaws in the refinery, insufficient risk management, and aninadequate response from Vale (Lloyd's Register 2009). Local environmentalists took the company tocourt. However, the case was dismissed in 2010 as too much time had elapsed: The public prosecutorhad requested information from the regulatory body, the Southern Province, which had neverresponded. Two years later, through environmentalists persistence, the case was reopened, Valefound guilty, and the maximum penalty under the Southern Provinces environmental code wasimposed: a paltry sum of 3,750 (Chatel 2012).

Informal regulation, then, attempted to counter the hegemonic neoliberal socialregularization that the company enjoyed, but faced a weak legal framework and politicians withquestionable motives. Resistance from indigenous protestors, however, proved more challenging forthe MNC, despite the fact that under French law the leased lands were in the public domain and


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therefore, notwithstanding customary ties to these places, local residents had no legal rights overthem. In 2002, local Kanak residents organized themselves to respond to Goro Nickels present andfuture activities. The group was strongly influenced in its early years (and by some accounts initiated)by chiefs of two villages: Goro, closest to the mine site, and Unia, the most populated local village.Like most customary authorities, they supported the mining project for the employment it wouldcreate, but were concerned that Kanak would not benefit adequately from this employment, asevidenced by the companys bringing construction workers from the Philippines. Meanwhile, theyhad serious concerns about potential environmental impacts, particularly on the marine resourcesupon which the local population depends for subsistence and livelihood. Therefore, they believed thatlocal residents needed to keep an eye on the project; hence the groups name, Rhb N, meanseye of the country in the indigenous language Num. When both chiefs passed away in 2004, thegroup took on a more militant and increasingly violent character, including multiple blockades of theconstruction site. In April 2006, a blockade turned violent with the destruction of approximately $13million of equipment and encounters with armed police in which four gendarmes were injured.Ultimately, 36 protestors were arrested and work was partially suspended at the site for over twoweeks.

However, on 27 September 2008, four Rhb N leaders, 25 customary authorities and two

Goro Nickel representativesfrom all sides, only senior mensigned a Pact for SustainableDevelopment of the Far South [of New Caledonia] (hereafter the Pact). Through this IBA, themining company committed to creating a Corporate Foundation to fund local development initiativesand a Consultative Customary Environmental Committee (CCCE), to recruiting and training localenvironmental technicians, and to an extensive reforestation program. In exchange, Rhb Nmembers committed to assert their point of view not through violent or illegal actions, but bydialogue (Vale Inco et al. 2008). How had this occurred?

Round one: Rhb N wins customary/indigenous legitimacyRecognition of a unique Kanak identity has always formed an important part of pro-independenceleaders demands (Henningham 1992; Tjibaou 1996), and respect for customary authority, even in its

vastly altered form, constitutes a crucial component of contemporary Kanak cultural-political identity.Throughout New Caledonia, Kanak tend to judge the legitimacy of any endeavor by whether it hasbeen initiated, and/or is supported, by customary authorities (Horowitz 2008b). Meanwhile,indigenous identity is an important source of political and moral legitimacy on an international scale,eliciting concern from the United Nations, NGOs, and the global public. Thus, both customarylegitimacy (Kanak peoples sense that a project has support from customary authorities) andindigenous legitimacy (the international communitys acceptance of a project or group asrepresentative of Kanak interests) are important stakes to capture before initiating a project of anyscope in New Caledonia. Both may be achieved through demonstrations of customary authoritiesapproval.

Not surprisingly, then, from their inception both mining company and protest group attemptedto garner the support of customary authorities. Although forms of customary authority have changed

and expanded radically in the colonial and postcolonial eras, the highest authority, that over land, stillstems from an ability to claim membership of a first-occupant clan. However, as is commonly thecase in New Caledonia (cf. Horowitz 2002), the identity and membership of first-occupant clans in theproject area was highly controversial, and the company and protest group approached this thornyquestion in different ways. In the 1990s, before beginning work on the pilot refinery, Incorepresentatives performed a customary ceremony with local chiefs and customary land owners in anofficial show of respect. However, they relied heavily on a few individual ties. Over the years, theybuilt a close relationship with the chief of Goro, spurring resentment from others who contested hisclans claims to authority over local lands. When the chiefs of Goro and Unia both died in 2004, themining company was left without a close ally among local residents. In the midst of intra-villagetensions between supporters and opponents of the mining project, no new chiefs were appointed forseveral years.

At first, Rhb N was more successful in publicly winning customary authorities supportfor its activities and reinforcing its own legitimacy through this association. In its narrative, the chiefs


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of Goro and Unia had initiated the groups creation. At the groups inception, its leaders forged abroader base of legitimacy by involving as many customary authorities as possible in a publiccustomary ceremony. Somewhat ironically, the chiefs had chosen as Rhb Ns main leaderGabriel, a charismatic figure who had recently ended a political career but was from a clan low on thelocal customary hierarchy. As members of recently-arrivedclans, Gabriel and his co-leader had noauthority over land-use issues, except as spokespersons for landowner clans. After the chiefs died,then, Rhb N continued to position itselfin fact, defined its very identityas representing thecustomary authorities of the far south of New Caledonia. Customary authorities and other localresidents expressed confidence that Rhb N was fighting for the interests of the Kanak people(see Horowitz 2009).

By mid-2006, however, that support was eroding. Customary authorities began to expressmixed feelings about the protest group, viewing it not as the activist arm addressing their concerns butas an independent and increasingly unruly entity. Without the chiefs as figureheads, Rhb Nscustomary legitimacy became less clear, and customary authorities began to complain that it no longerrespected them: At first we started off well, but today they say they speak in the name of customaryauthorities, but the customary authorities havent given them leave to speak (Dominique, pers.comm. 10 July 2006). In part, this dissatisfaction stemmed from the violence which Rhb N

members, acting independently, had begun to perform against not only the company but also fellowvillagerssometimes the deceased chiefs families2who did not support their protest activities.Explaining why he had never joined Rhb N, one customary authority voted yes to theirdemands, no to their methods (Guy, pers. comm. 14 September 2010).

Notably, several customary authorities expressed resentment at becoming pawns in RhbNs game, as the protest group attempted to claim a customary legitimacy which its main leaderslacked: On the hierarchical scale they are the lowest. [...] They arent customary authorities but theyalways use the customary authorities (Jean-Claude, pers. comm. 20 July 2011). With no customaryclaims to local lands, Rhb Ns leaders needed to provide some weight [...]. Thats why theyalways bring elders [customary authorities] with them [...] to support them (Loc, pers. comm. 26July 2011). However, the main leader, Gabriel, had kept all power for himself: He said we have toinclude the customary authorities; as soon as he did, he asked to be president (Loc, pers. comm. 26

July 2011). Meanwhile, Vale was doing its best to position Rhb N as a fringe element thatrepresented neither customary authorities nor the general population (Horowitz 2012).Six weeks after the episode of April 2006 described above, Rhb N, company

representatives, non-indigenous environmental groups, and government officials sat down for a seriesof closed-door Round Table discussions organized by the Southern Province. Eventually, thegovernment excluded the environmentalists and then found itself excluded as the discussions evolvedinto two-way talks between Vale and Rhb N. The talks persisted but did not bring the partiesany closer to a resolution, even with the 2007 intervention of an international NGO specializing inmediation. In early 2008, the company began laying the pipeline that would dump effluent into themarine environment, sparking fresh protests and blockades. In the midst of this turmoil, Rhb Nwas swept into office at the municipal level, reinforcing many customary authorities perception ofthe group as political, not customary, and therefore not authorized to speak on behalf of the

chiefs (Flix, pers. comm. 11 August 2010). However, the group vehemently denied that it hadbecome a political party and continued to base its identity in customary legitimacy; a 2008 brochureproclaimed, Rhb N is the word [mouthpiece] of the chieftainships, the clans, and theindigenous Kanak of the South!

Round two: Vale discovers cultural articulationAt this point, Vale flew in a legal specialist from Brazil as the new lead negotiator. He took a differenttactical approach, recognizing that Vales attempts to avoid informal regulation by local protestorsneeded to articulate with the local culture. Executives had been trying to adhere to a tight scheduleand begin production as planned, in line with their own culturally-based ideologies of efficient profit-making. However, this apparent rush created friction and distrust as community members interpretedthe haste as a sign that the MNC had only short-term interests in New Caledonia, whereas localresidents needed to ensure long-term health of their natural resources (Horowitz 2010). Interpreting


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this as tension between an operational drive to move forward and the local absence of the sameconcept of deadlines culturally speaking, the new negotiator convinced senior management toproceed instead in a manner much more typical to how the indigenous communities operate moreorganic [...] more laborious, more time-consuming, but more legitimate and probably moresustainable (Benke 2010).

The distinguishing feature of this new approach, and the basis of its legitimacy, was that itwas more inclusive. Criticizing previous strategies that had focused on talking to those who weremost able to disrupt operations (Benke 2010), the negotiator realized that exclusive engagement withthe main source of trouble had allowed Rhb N to exert pressure on Vale. In attempting toachieve efficiency, the company had not seen a need to negotiate with other, less troublesome,community sectors. However, instead of the failed strategies of countering protestors with force oraddressing their demands directly, Vale could counterbalance and undermine their influence bycapturing the deeply-held cultural ideal of customary legitimacy. To do this, it needed to broaden itsengagement strategy, including not the entire community, as many women and young peoplesympathized with the protest group, but the sector most sympathetic to the project: customaryauthorities, who were also, of course, at the top of the social hierarchy.

Drawing from fashionable CSR discourses, the negotiator portrayed this strategy as

culturally sensitive. As he later noted, the fundamental flaw in the negotiation process up to thatpoint was that Rhb N was the only party at the table allegedly representingindigenouscommunity interests(Benke 2010). Against Rhb Nsclaim to have been initiated by localchiefs, in his version the group had been created by the municipal council and thus had no basis in in fact had excludedtraditional structures of representation and leadership. In contrast, in reachingout to customary authorities, he was following culturally correct protocols by understanding thecustomary leadership structures and interests and engaging directly with all legitimate customaryrepresentatives of all tribes related to the project (Benke 2010). Thus, beyond taking the focus offRhb N, the company began working to undercut the groups claims to customary/indigenouslegitimacy and instead establish Vales own claims to that powerful resource. Customary authoritiesincreasing disillusionment with the protest group, detailed above, provided just that opportunity. Thetripartite negotiations that ensued effectively marginalized Rhb N; if the group was, as it

claimed, representing the customary authorities, the presence of the latter at the table rendered theprotestors redundant, and silenced them.Sidelined at the negotiation table, Rhb Ns voice had no outlet but through their lawyer,

who co-drafted the Pact. This lawyer, however, inadvertently strengthened Valescapture ofcustomary legitimacy. Drawing upon his specialization in indigenous rights, he took literally RhbNs continued insistence that their sole purpose was as an arm of the customary authorities andinterpreted the groups demands as being primarily for recognition of the indigenous people (pers.comm. 22 September 2009), prioritizing recognition over their environmental and economic concernsand severing their ties to former allies such as urban-based environmentalists and governmentagencies (see Horowitz 2012). He drafted a long preamble(about a third of the document), whichdescribed the customary authorities demands to see recognized the legitimate place of he whooriginates from the history of this land and their ultimately successful search for anagreement thatwould take into account each actors legitimacy(Vale Inco et al. 2008). He later expressedsatisfaction that Vale had understood [...] that it was necessary to recognize the place of the firstpeople, and so not to consider them as subjects, as pawns, but rather as partners (pers. comm. 22September 2009). He thus failed to recognize that both protest group and mining company were usingthe customary authorities precisely as pawns, for the legitimacy they represented.

Meanwhile, protest group leaders were becoming anxious about their dwindling supportamongst local villagers, many of whom disapproved of the groups violent tactics and/or wereimpatient to enjoy the promised employment, despite continued environmental anxieties. If RhbN could at least engineer an agreement and convince customary authorities to sign it, the groupwould regain a little respect from local residents (Loc, pers. comm. 26 July 2011). Paradoxically,though, as customary authorities support for the mining project became highlighted through theirengagement in the Pact negotiation process, Vale finally captured customary legitimacy, wresting itaway from Rhb N and repositioning the protestors as subordinates within their social hierarchy.


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In capturing customary legitimacy, Vale also captured the ideal of indigenous legitimacy,from the international perspective. Ironically, to maintain his groups indigenous legitimacy in theeyes of the international community, Rhb Ns main leader found himselfneeding to team upwith the MNC. At a United Nations (UN) workshop, Gabriel joined Rhb Ns lawyer and Valesnegotiator in presenting a case study from New Caledonia, lauded by the UN as an exemplaryprocess that had led to a mutually acceptable result (OHCHR 2009, 5). Two years later, the UNSpecial Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also praised the Pact, which ensured Kanakoversight of the environmental impact of the project and provided economic benefits through aninnovative mechanism, the Corporate Foundation (Anaya 2011, 11).

Vale simultaneously managed to capture the protest group itself. In part, it achieved thisdirectly, by providing Gabriel with official recognition: presidency of the CCCE, largely a figureheadrole. Both main leaders also received lucrative contracts to provide seedlings for reforestation.However, Vales capture of Rhb N also occurred through indirect pressure, as a logical outcomeof its capture of customary and indigenous legitimacy. When Vale began successfully to highlight itsrelationship to customary authorities, Rhb N was implicitly faced with a choice: Adopt a newidentity not based in customary or indigenous legitimacyand face accusations, locally andinternationally, that its leaders had no customary right to speak about land mattersor renounce the

struggle. Several other factors were also at stake. Leaders expressed concerns about the violenceoccasioned by the blockade in April 2006 and worried that another such event might result in loss oflife. They also noted the intracommunity and even intrafamilial tensions between proponents andopponents of the mining projectchurch windows smashed, stones and insults hurled at cars, housesburned downand the need to restore community harmony. Also, Rhb N had been finedheavily for destruction of mining company equipment during the 2006 blockade; the Pact droppedthose charges, specifying, All contestations between the Rhb N Committee and Goro Nickelare irrevocably extinguished by the present transaction (Vale Inco et al. 2008). Meanwhile, given itsleaders previous political roles, some community members cynically speculated that in being electedto municipal office in 2008, the group had achieved its true purpose. That same year, UNESCOinscribed sections of New Caledonias coral reef onits World Heritage list, further undercutting theprotest movements environmental arguments. Faced with all these factors, the leaders chose to cease

their protest activities and sign the Pact.

Captured and cooptedIn allowing itself to be captured, Rhb N abandoned its original goals; it had become coopted.On the environmental front, the group had earlier made significant gains through the courts, such asthe revocation in June 2006 of the MNCs permit to operate its refinery due to an insufficientenvironmental impact assessment, forcing Vale to invest significant time and money in a new study. Ithad also, aided by media attention, pressured the company into reducing the effluents 100 mg/lmanganese concentrations to European standards of 1mg/l, a tenth of limits the local government hadimposed in response to public concern, costing Vale $60 million (Marcuson et al. 2009). In contrast,the Pact did not reduce the projects environmental impacts. One component of its Environmental

Program was the reforestation of areas affected by projects prior to Vales. While seemingly positive,this activity served to distract attention from the projects own impacts (e.g., its effluent, the potentiallater realizedof acid spills, carbon emissions from its coal-fired power plant, etc.), displacingblame for ecological damage onto Vales predecessors. Additionally, the eight environmentaltechnicians (who received a one-year training program organized by Vale through the localuniversity) and the CCCE (10 customary authorities and five Rhb N representatives) could onlyrecommend environmental studies, provide opinions on project activities, and elaborate astrategy for showcasing Kanak traditional knowledge within the operations (Vale Inco et al. 2008).The only other environmental provision was a commitment to maintain conformity with theenvironmental standards applicable to the project already legally required. While providing a falsesense of participation in environmental decision-making, the Pact left the community without thepower to effect real change.

Nor had Rhb N achieved its original economic goals. The Heritage Fund that the grouphad initially demanded, to be supported by a percentage of mining profits from all companies


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operating in New Caledonia, came no closer to realization. Nor did the Pact commit Vale to greateremployment for local residents, or training for more highly-skilled jobs. No profit-sharing or royaltieswere envisaged. Instead, Vales Corporate Foundation provided funding for locally-initiated small-scale development projects, committing approximately US$6.9 million over the first five years and$1.7 million annually for the next 30 years. While this sum, unprecedented in New Caledonia,favorably impressed local residents, it pales in comparison to examples from neighboring Australia,where a recent IBA provided royalties of 2% of gross revenues and entitlement to 5% of projectequity without cost, or a gold mine in Papua New Guinea where, in 2008 alone, community royaltiesamounted to $9.2 million in addition to landowner contracts and local salaries worth 10 times thisamount (O'Faircheallaigh 2012, 8).

Signatories were largely unaware of the Pacts comparative context, and often of its verycontents; some explained they hadnt had time to read it (Albert, pers. comm. 11 August 2010), orhadnt been to school and the explanations provided were difficult to understand (Benot, pers.comm. 28 October 2009); they had simply trusted protest group leaders to negotiate and inform usafterward (Albert, pers. comm. 11 August 2010). Others refused to sign the Pact, expressingdisappointment at its failure to address employment issues and noting that it did not allay theirenvironmental concerns: Its incoherent; you think that youve reforested, that that will diminish the

rate of marine pollution? (Loc, pers. comm. 21 July 2011). Several customary authorities describedinternecine quarrels, including an all-night debate the eve of the signature, or their own inner turmoilbefore signing, often reluctantly (Eugne, pers. comm. 7 August 2010). Many who signed had feltpressured to do so by Vale, or by Rhb N who forced people tosay yes (Oscar, pers. comm. 24October 2009). Others had felt they had no choice. Still anxious about impacts, many had signed in adesperate attempt to restore harmony to the families and villages that had been broken, dividedbetween project supporters and opponents (Bastien, pers. comm. 15 August 2010). Moreover, as apowerful multinational, Vale could send anyone to attack them if they tried to protest (Martin, pers.comm. 29 October 2009); recalling the events of April 2006, customary authorities noted that theState was on Vales side and had sent police to break up their calm demonstration (Albert, pers.comm. 11 August 2010). They worried that, had the protests continued, there would have beenvictims protestor deathsas local youths were highly motivated [...], determined to stop the

refinery; averse to this risk, and feeling that attempts to stop the project were futile, they reasoned,Its better to sign so as to have something than not to gain anything at all (Martin, pers. comm. 29October 2009).

Some customary authorities worried that they had been coopted, assimilated into company-created structures while their demands, [...] grievances that were formulated since the beginning ofthe project had never been really responded [to], listened to (Loc, pers. comm. 21 July 2011).Furthermore, they wondered whether they could remain independent critics of Vales activitiesthrough structures such as the CCCE, or lIL, an observatory charged with monitoring the project,both funded by the MNC (and both presided by Gabriel): I wonder if we can go against Vale even ifits Vale that pays for everything (Oscar, pers. comm. 13 July 2012). In any case, they were acutelyconscious of having been manipulated in order to build local support for the Pact: Both partiesneeded us [...] vis--vis the community (Loc, pers. comm. 21 July 2011). Later, some expressed

regret and wondered whether they had signed too quickly (Guy, pers. comm. 14 September 2010),especially after recurrent acid spills in subsequent years. Many also noted the fury of othercommunity members, particularly women and youth who had participated in blockades, upon learningof the signature. However, they felt that the Pact had negated their ability to protest; they had pledgedno more actions against Vale (Eugne, pers. comm. 7 August 2010).

ConclusionThis study of the demise of an indigenous protest movement has shown how processes ofneoliberalization must articulate not only with specific politico-economic conditions but also withcultural ideologies and local hegemonic relationships. Vale, already benefitting from NewCaledonias neoliberalized regulatory and fiscal policy environments, key ingredients of socialregularization, faced informal regulatory challenges from Rhb N. These protestors based theiridentity in customary legitimacy through ties to customary authority. However, protest actions


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became more extreme, and more violent, than customary authorities felt comfortable supporting.Seizing this opportunity, the MNC switched tactics; rather than engaging directly with Rhb N,the company sought to undermine the groups claims to customary legitimacy and hence its ability,culturally speaking, to say anything about land use. By bringing customary authorities to thenegotiating table, Vale destabilized the protest groups claims to represent them and effectivelycaptured customary legitimacy for itself, repositioning Rhb N leaders within localizedhegemonic structures, as members of socially subordinate clans. To maintain its customary legitimacyvis--vis fellow Kanak, Rhb N found itself needing to promote the Pactthat its lawyer, andVales team of lawyers, had negotiated; to continue to claim indigenous legitimacy in the eyes of theinternational community, it needed to ally itself with Vale. Vale further captured these informalregulators by coopting the groups main leader, providing him official recognition through structuresit had created and/or funded, and personal economic benefits. Meanwhile, the Pact did not furtherRhb Ns and customary authorities original economic goals of a Heritage Fund or increasedtraining and employment, nor their environmental goals of eliminating the refinery or reducing itspollution, instead only providing a sense of participationwith no real power. Complaining about thecompromisesit had made, the company pledged relatively small economic and environmentalbenefits and otherwise proceeded, unencumbered, with its original plans. While some customary

authorities were content with this situation, others worried that they had been coopted and continuedto express anxieties about environmental impacts and disappointment with the limited economicbenefits offered.

This paper has attempted to achieve two related theoretical aims. First, it has contributed toand expanded our understandings of CSR initiatives and other roll-out neoliberalization processes aselements of a capitalist system actively working to create its own social regularizationto secure asocio-politico-economic context supporting, or at least not inhibiting, capitalist development.Contingent upon the specific contexts within which they occur, such efforts result in variegated formsof neoliberalism, through necessary articulationsmutually-shaping engagementswith not onlylocal political and economic conditions but also, as this study shows, cultural ideologies andinstitutions. Direct capture of individual regulators (formal or informal), such as through personalmaterial incentives, is inadequate in the face of widespread resistance from civil society; in these

cases, CSR initiatives may attempt to associate the corporation with, and thus capture, culturally-valued ideologies.These ideologies, in turn, are caught up in (both nurtured by and nurturing) culturally-

grounded hegemonic processes. This leads to the papers second theoretical aim, which is to explorewhat happens when different forms of hegemony, based in distinct (if intertwined) culturalformations, encounter each other as well as counter-hegemonic forces. Here, Vales neoliberalhegemony, grounded in a capitalist culture that valued efficient profit-making, was challenged by thecounter-hegemonic efforts of protestors who forcibly slowed, and added costs to, operations. Directengagement, in the form of physical battles or exclusive negotiations, proved ineffective. Therefore,the company devised a new strategy, this time in articulation with the local cultural ideology ofcustomary legitimacy. Having positioned themselves as representing, and thereby assuming, thehegemony of customary authority, Rhb N leaders had slipped from the favor of customary

authorities, who began to see the group as a threat to their own dominance. In engaging directly withthese authorities and marginalizing the protestors, Vale relegitimized itself by delegitimizing itsactivist opponents, repositioning them as subordinates within their own culturally-informed socialhierarchy, and instead underlining customary authorities privileged status. Thus, multiple, culturally-distinct hegemonic processes may co-exist and interact; here, they reinforced each other bysuppressing counter-hegemonic activities. However, some customary authorities still sympathizedwith the protestors aims and perceived potential threats from the companys expandingeconomicpower: In collaborating with Vale to suppress Rhb N, they had allowed themselves to bemanipulated and silenced too.

Nonetheless, within the very source of this hegemonic victorycultural forms ofempowermentalso lie new possibilities for transcending the risk of capture. Cultures, of course, aredynamic. Kanak culture continues, as it always has, to evolve; novel sources of status and influenceemerge outside the hereditary customary realm as women, youth, and low-status clans findopportunities within local political and economic structures. From these higher social positions, they


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are better placed to force companies to heed their voices. Meanwhile, corporations national andinternational socio-cultural contexts are evolving too, as civil society grows more aware and lesstolerant of the negative outcomes of corporate greed, resulting in perpetual creative tensions betweenhegemonic processes and counter-hegemonic opposition.

AcknowledgementsI am deeply grateful to the residents of Goro, Unia, and Waho for their hospitality and to allinterviewees for their time. I am indebted also to Ciaran OFaircheallaigh, Tom Perreault, threeanonymous reviewers and the editor for comments that significantly improved this paper. Fieldworkwas funded by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, the Centre National de RechercheTechnologique Nickel et son Environnement , the Ministre des Affaires Etrangres, the NationalEndowment for the Humanities, and the University of Leeds. Grants from Hawaii Pacific Universityfacilitated analysis and writing. Of course, any errors of fact or interpretation are solely myresponsibility.

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Figure 1: The Vale Nouvelle-Caldonie site


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Notes

1I am grateful to Ciaran OFaircheallaigh for this insight.2E.g. on 13 August 2006 one late chiefs widow awoke to find her electrical box smashed by anti-mine activists(pers. comm. 13 August 2006); earlier, protestors had visited the other late chiefs son late at night andinsultedhis family because [they were] not with Rhb N (pers. comm. 5 August 2006).

Documents

Culturally Articulated Neoliberalization