St Maximus on IIci90<; and KivTJO"t<; in Ambiguum 7

Vladimir CVETKOVIC, St Andrews

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate St Maximus' doctrine of movement.It is well known that the doctrine of movement in Ambiguum 7 was developedin the course of Maximus' refutation of Origenism. However, this doctrine isnot something produced ad hoc for this purpose; rather, it represents the coreof his theological and philosophical insight. Almost every student of St Maxi­mus knows his reversal of the Origen's triad 0'1"6.0'1.<; - K1VTJcnc; - yEvEcnc; intothe triad rEvEalS - KivllmC; - IT-ra.cnc;. By this reversal, the concept of movementfrom the cause of the Fall in Origenism becomes an intrinsic characteristic ofthe created being. Therefore, exploring this concept in a broader perspectivewill certainly show that movement occupies the supreme place in the cosmo­logical and ontological framework of St Maximus. The scope of our researchwill be mainly focused on Ambiguum 7, but for a better understanding of thisconcept we will extend our analysis to the whole Ambigua and St Maximus'opera. The aim is to show how the concept of movement employed in St Maxi­mus teleology, cosmology and psychology gathers all the parts of his diverseteaching in one inseparable unity.

St Maximus' concept of movement can be divided into three aspects. Thefirst is according to the goal or the end of movement; the second is the natureof moved being; and the third is the simplicity of movement and a geometricalmode or type of movement.

1. Movement according to goal

Before we begin explaining the goal-related aspect it is necessary to show thatthe ontological distinction between God and creation is made on the basis ofmovement. The movement is driven by desire to attain the object of desire andto find rest in it. St Maximus introduces the Aristotelian view of movement assomething incomplete. Thus, movement refers to imperfection and a being gainsfulfillment and perfection only by achieving the cessation of movement.}

A desire, and consequently also movement, should be directed toward some­thing that is perfect. The perfect being which satisfies the desires of others

, Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).

Studia Patristica XLVIII. 95-lO4.

96 V. CVETKOVIC 8t Maximus on TIueoS and KivTjcrlS in Ambiguum 7 97

should not desire something else than itself. The being that is perfect by nature,according to Maximus,2 is uncaused. The perfect being possesses its caUse andpresumably its end in itself and has no desire for anything else. Only God iswithout desire for anything because He fills all the things3 and consequentlyHe is unmoved. God is one, infinite and uncircumscribed.4 Therefore, God isfor St Maximus 'unmoved and complete and impassible'.s

A created being is endowed with movement and movement is therefore intrin­sic to the nature of being. However, every m~ement is directed toward an endand we can define every movement in accordance with the goal of movement.St Maximus teaches that from God 'come both our moving in whatever wayfrom a beginning and our moving in a certain way toward him as an end'.6Therefore, the rational being by its faculty of reason can choose in general twoways to move. The first way has the end (rEAo~) of movement in God, a~d thesecond way has the end of its movement in everything else, namely creatiOn.

In both cases the movement of rational beings is driven by desire to reachan end, but every end does not bring the movement to rest, because the desireis not always satisfied. St Maximus claims that what is intrinsically good andlovable draws all movement toward itself and it satisfies 'the desire of thosewho find delight in i('7

The divine being is simultaneously the cause of everything because it isuncaused, and the goal of everything because it is the fountain of perfectionfor caused beings. Therefore, St Maximus claims that 'God is the beginningand the end'.s The goal of our movement is then identical with the cause of ourbeginning, which precedes our movement.9 God, as our creator, has alreadydetermined that the proper end of our being is toward Him as the end in whichour movement will be completed. Thus, God, as the ultimate end of movementcauses the energy of the being which is driven to find rest in its cause.JO Thisenergy, which St Maximus calls passion or passibility (1taeo~), causes themovement toward its proper end. Passion or desire directed toward being's firstand only cause or toward the ultimately desirable.ll St Maximus defines passion

2 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lOnC).3 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).4 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lOnC).5 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073B).6 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073B). See the English translation in: 5t Maximus the Confessor, On the

Cosmic Mystery ofChrist, translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (Crestwood,

NY, 2003), 50,7 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069BC); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 46.

8 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073C).9 5t Maximus claims this also in Amb. 23 (PG 91, 1257C): 'Everything that by nature is

moving, necessary moves for the reason of a cause; and everything that moves from the reasonof a cause, necessarily also exists because of a cause'.

10 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).II Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO72B).

as a 'natural power or movement passing from one thing to another and havingimpassibility as its end' or 'irrepressible activity that has as its end perfectfulfillment'.12 Thus, passion or passibility does not represent a corruption of thefaculties of created beings, but a constitutive or essential characteristic of thecreated order. Therefore, aspects of passion can be distinguished in accordancewith the object of desire and consequently the aim of movement. Passibility byitself is a natural capacity or faculty to execute the operation of movementtoward something in which being finds a source of its fulfillment. Thus, thegoal toward which we direct our desires determines the nature of our passions.Not every passion leads toward the proper end and not every movement isessential movement.

St Maximus warns John of Cyzicus (and indirectly warns us as well) not tomisunderstand passibility as a corruption of one's power,u This leads us to thequestion: How can passion be corrupted if it is an inherent power that directsbeing toward its end? Passion is a natural or inherent power produced not byus, but by God in us for all movement. It is in our power to choose the meansand direction of movement and our choice is either movement toward its properend, namely God, or toward the creatures or objects of our desire.

Rational beings, after coming into existence through creation, continue(continue because they were already in a transition from non-being to being)to move not only in accordance with their natural passion from the beginningtoward end, but also in accordance with their free will, which determines thedirection of the movement. We see that Maximus makes a clear distinctionbetween movement according to nature (KUTll q>6crlV) and movement accordingto will (Kena rvroJ.lllV),

The constitutive and distinctive feature of every rational creature is the facultyof reason. Reason is a source of self-determination or self-governed movement.Therefore, if reason is a constitutive faculty of rational nature then self-deter­mination, or will to move or govern one's own being, is also a faculty of nature.The will or freedom of rational beings to move in whatever way they chooseis in their nature ab initio. If they exercise their freedom to move voluntarytoward good or well-being, they are moving toward God as an end. By movingsteadfastly toward well-being, rational beings gain eternal well-being as some­thing naturally endowed to them by God. Our beginning in being and end ineternal well-being are given to our nature, and we naturally move from thebeginning in being toward the end in well-being. Nevertheless, the capacity fornatural movement is only a potential and the choice of the direction towards theend in eternal well being depends on our wilI. 14 It is necessary to pass through

12 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1072B); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 48.13 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073B).14 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073C).

98 V. CVETKOVIC St Maximus on rr6.eo~ and KivT]crtC; in Ambiguum 7 99

mere well-being in order to reach the divine eternity. Therefore, being in whichwe were brought from non-being is our natural beginning and eternity or eternalwell-being in God is the purpose of our creation and the natural end of ourbeing. The proper end as good or well-being is within the powers of our naturalwill and our nature. Reason. according to St Maximus, directs free will to choosemovement in accordance with nature. Movement toward God is thus both inaccordance with our nature and in accordanc~ with our free will.

In contrast, movement toward the creatures or objects of desire is likewisethe choice of our free will, but it is not natural because it is movement towardsomething which is less stable than we are. Therefore, the willingness to movenot toward God but toward something else corrupts our powers. Hoping to gainits stability, the rational being searches for fulfillment among created objectsthat neither satisfy its desire nor bring the movement to rest.

2. Movement according to the nature of being

The second type of movement in Ambiguum 7 is that of intellectual or sensiblemovement. It depends on the realm of created order to which being belongs.This division is basic to creation. Every created thing has its goal out of itselfand moves in harmony with nature toward its goal. Thus, the movement ofintellectual things is intellectual and the movement of sensible things is sensi­ble.15 St Maximus does not further elaborate on the movement of sensible thingshere, but he does not spare ink to describe the movement of intellectual or

reasonable beings.Let us examine the way in which intellectual beings move. Intellectual move­

ment can be divided into two kinds. The first kind can be called ecstatic movementor the movement of love; and the second kind can be called the gnostic move­ment or the movement of knowledge.

Movement requires initially the appropriate movement of intellectual beings_ that is, movement in accordance with their nature. If intellectual beings moveaccording to their nature, then their thoughts are naturally directed toward thegoal of their movement. Having an implanted desire or passion toward the goalof their movement in them, they love what they think. Therefore, movementtoward the goal is a natural consequence of this desire or passion. Thus, lovecaUses ecstasy or ecstatic movement of being toward its goal. Ecstasy meansthat the centre of the being is moved from it and placed in that towards whichit strives. It is a kind of departure from oneself. Ecstatic movement can bedescribed by two concepts introduced by St Maximus. The first concept is thatof delimitation or the perigraphic; the second concept is that of voluntary

15 Amb. 7 (PO 91, lO72A).

emigration. 5t Maximus describes the first concept in the following words: 'Itnot longer wants anything from itself, for it knows itself to be wholly embraced,and intentionally and by choice it wholly receives the life-giving delimitation'.l6

Union with the divine being supersedes the boundaries of intellectual beingnot only by centering being in the divine, but also by expanding the limits ofintellectual being through the divine embrace. Having been embraced by thedivine, the intellectual being changes its self-perception as defined by its limitsand circumscription, to being defined by what it is embraced by. Therefore, therational being no longer experiences limits because in union with the unlimitedand the uncircumscribed, the limits of its being are abolished. Therefore, therational being can participate in God without being restricted to its naturaldefinition (opOC;) and it therefore becomes 'uncontainably contained' (&xwpTj­TWS XCOPOUIlEVOU).J7 The union of intellectual being with the divine does notsuppose a mixture or confusion of the two natures. On the contrary, it fullypreserves the natural distinctions inherent in nature.

The s~cond concept important for the understanding of ecstatic movementis that of voluntary emigration. Change in the intellectual being takes place notonly on the level of definition but also on the level of will. Thus, the intellectualbeing does not only will to know and to unite itself with God, but also wills tobe known, to be embraced and circumscribed by God. Therefore, Maximus warnsthat this firm and steadfast disposition to fix our will in the divine wiII is notgiving up of our free will (Ull't£sOUcrlOV), but rather EKxmpllcnc; YV(QjltKyt,18 a'willing surrender'19 (as Blowers and Wilken translate it) or a 'voluntary outpas­sing'20 and 'a complete handing-over of our self-determination' (as Sherwoodsuggests21). It means that our will is completely subject to the divine will, as inthe Lord's Prayer where we ask of God that His will be done. Therefore, ourreliance on God is based on the fact that He gave us being and the capacity formovement toward Him.

The concept of voluntary surrender is central to understanding the differ­ence between the Neoplatonic notion of return or conversion (E1ttOTPO<pyt),and St Maximus' idea of £1ttcrTp£1tTtK~V&vu<popa. Sherwood22 suggests thatSt Maximus employs the Neoplatonic idea of the cycle of progress from a causeand return thereto, evident in PreeIus' 12th proposition.23 There is without doubt

16 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073D); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, 01'1 the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 51.17 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1076D).18 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1076B).19 See P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, Oil the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 52.20 Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua ofSaillt Maximas the Confessor (Romae, 1955),

129.21 Polycarp Sherwood, St Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries of

Charity, ACW 21 (New York, 1955), 5922 P. Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua (1955), 129, n. 723 Proclus, Elements in Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1933), 14, 198.

100 V. CVETKOVIC St Maximus on ITa8o<; and Kivllcrt<; in Ambiguum 7 101

a degree of this Neoplatonic idea in St Maximus, but the main difference inSt Maximus' is that an intellectual being does not want to attain the divinebeing by its own power. The intellectual being voluntarily surrenders itself toGod expecting God to act further in order to achieve union. Therefore, havingunconditional trust or faith in God, the intellectual being expects to be embracedby the divine being and not to actively seize Him. However, theoretically speak­ing, God is not obliged to move one step to.JYard the intellectual being and theunion might therefore never take place.

St Maximus describes the nature of the future union between God and theintellectual beings by the metaphors of air and light and iron and fire, fre­quently used in Christology. This would be a union where the distinctivenessof the natures is preserved. Thus, the illuminated air is still air, just as red-hotiron is still iron. Therefore, the divine being penetrates the intellectual beingjust as the soul penetrates the body; yet the penetration takes place the otherway around; the intellectual being penetrates the divine being to a certainextent. However, the nature of this interpenetration is asymmetrical. As we cansee in the light-air and fire-iron examples, the light and fire play an active roleof illuminating and heating while the air and the fire receive the light and theheat passively. Likewise, the intellectual nature of angels and humans alsoexperience passivity after the submission of their being to the divine being.St Maximus clearly describes the achieved state by the oxymoron ever-movingrest or ever-resting movement around the divine. The reason why rational beingcontinues to move even attaining God is due to the fact that the divine infinitycauses the desire not to perish but 'to become more intense and to have nolimit'.24

The second type of movement of intellectual and rational creatures is thegnostic movement. The provisional division between ecstatic and gnostic move­ment requires a corresponding distinction between certain faculties of the intel­lectual and rational creature. The ecstatic movement is a natural movement ofthe intellectual faculty of angels and humans, and the gnostic movement isgoverned by their faculty of reason.

However, YVcOcr1C; or knowledge of created things is attainable by reason,wisdom25 and appropriate movement. The appropriate movement is actually'naturally wise and reasonable movement' (cbC; Ka-rCt q>ucrtv croq>mc; n: KaiABAOytcrJ..l,6VroC; 01' dm:pB1tOUC; KtvT]crBCOC;)26 toward the object of knowledge.Thus, the soul's faculty of reasoning is naturally oriented toward beings, inorder to learn the essential nature of beings. Knowing the essential nature ofbeings means to know their causes and distinctive principles (AOyot) of theirbeings according to which every being is 'unmistakably unique in itself' and

24 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1089B); P.M, Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 65,25 Amb.7 (PO 91, lO77C).26 Amh 7 (PO 91, 108DC).

distinct from others. 27 The striving for knowledge about created beings leadsreason to acknowledge that the distinctive principles of beings (MyOl) are onedlv~ne Logos. Therefore, St Maximus maintains that if SOmeone is 'moved bydeSIre and wants to attain nothing else than its own beginning, he does not flowaway from God'.28

Consequently, not only the intellectual but also the rational faculty leads toknowledge of God, who is the source of all life and knowledge. Rational beingsgain perfect knowledge of the created world through knowledge of God,because t~e A,6ym of beings preexisted in the Logos as divine wills. Therefore,the ecstatIc movement, which is directly oriented toward God, apart from theknowledge of divine brings is the perfect knowledge of creation. The gnosticmovement or the movement of reason, which is oriented toward any object ofknowledge, leads us toward the principle of every created being and through itto the sum of all principles (A6yot) of beings, the divine Logos.

3, Movement according to simplicity or geometrical lype

The third type of movement, the geometrical type, shows once more the distinc­tion between ecstatic and gnostic movement or the movement of mind and themovement of reason. Following Dionysius the Areopagite, St Maximus teachesabout three types of movement: linear, circular and spiral. These types of move­ment can also be delineated on the basis of their complexity; whereas the linearmovement is presumably simple, and the other two are complex.29 AndrewLouth

30suggests that these three types of movement can be identified with three

kind~ of movement in the soul exposed in Ambiguum 10, namely the movementof mInd, reason and senses. St Maximus obviously follows his great teacherDionysius the Areopagite who has a similar division of the soul's faculties.31

As we can see from the above, mind causes the ecstatic movement that issimple and oriented directly toward the object of its ultimate desire, the divine.St Maximus repeats this in Ambiguum 10, claiming that the movement of~ind is a 'simple and explicable motion, according to which the soul, movedIII unknowable way close to God, knows Him in a transcendent way that hasnothing to do with any of the things that exist'.32 It is easy to conclude fromthis that the mind moves in a straight line or linearly.

27 Amb.7 (PO 91, 1077C).

:8 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1080C); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003). 56.29 Amb. 7 (PO 91, lO72A).

:~ Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (.Lon~on and New York 1996), 205.DN 4.8-10 (PO 3, 704D-705C); PSfudo-DlonyslUs: The Complete Works, trans. C. Luibheid

(New York, 1987), 78~9.

32 Amb. 10 (PO 91, 1112D-1l13A); A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor (1996),100.

102 v. CVETKOVIC St Maxirnus on f16.eoS and KivWnS in Ambiguum 7 103

The second movement is the movement of reason and it is directed towardthe object of knowledge or 'in accordance with the defining cause of somethingunknown',33 If the movement of mind is linear, which of other two types ofmovements, circular and spiral should be applied to the movement of reason?Could this movement be described as circular? In this case, reason begins itsmovement from the object of knowledge, whose natural logos investigates andnaturally moves toward the cause of it. The.refore, movement of reason can bedescribed as movement along the Porphyrian tree; first from the particularobject to its universal nature, and then back from universal nature or genericgenus, over intermediate genera, species and the most specific species to thedistinctive accidental feature of particular object. This movement looks as cir­cular, but in Dionysius34 the movement of reason is not explained as circularbut as a spiral movement. It is hard to believe that St Maximus corrects Dionysiuson this point. How then does the movement of reason gets its vertical dimensionto become spiral? As we can see from Ambiguum 7, Maximus claims that eventhe being wants to learn its beginning or cause or the causes of other beings.It does not flow away from God35 because many AOyOt of created beinginevitably lead to one divine Logos.36 Consequently, the movement of reason_ which is not like the movement of mind directed toward God, but horizon­tally toward created beings and their causes ~ gets its vertical dimension in theprocess of learning the ultimate cause of all beings. Therefore, the reason onits way toward universals does not stop on most generic genus but ascendsfurther to the ultimate cause or Logos. Thus, St Maximus claims that 'if weknow God our knowledge of each and everything will be brought to perfection'.3?However, we cannot know God because of his infmite nature and we constantlydirect our desire to know Him. Therefore, the spiral movement of reason is acombination of the linear movement toward God and the circular movementtoward creatures. Finally, the last movement of the soul (presumably the move­ment of senses) is a composite movement, 'according to which, affected by thethings outside as a certain symbols of things seen, the soul gains for itself someimpression of the meaning of things'.38 This movement could be consideredcircular because the soul moves first toward the things in the sensible world,and then moves back to itself where the impressions of the things seen aresummed up and arranged in a particular symbolic structure.

All we have noted serve to determine the particular principle ("-6'10<;) andmode (t"p6rro<;) of every being in a broader ontological framework. The different

33 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 11l3A); A. Louth, Maximu.I' the Confessor (1996),100.

" DN 4.9 (PO 3, 705A-B).35 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1080C).36 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO77C).37 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO77A); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 53.38 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 1113A); A. Louth, Maximlf5 the Confessor (1996), 100.

natural movements gather in one simple movement of rational beings. Thismovement is directed toward the divine when 'the spiritual reasons of thingsperceived through the senses, ascend by means of reason up to mind, and, in asingular way, they unite reason, which possesses the meanings of beings, tomind in accordance with one, simple and undivided sagacity'.39

We can now see that the notion of movement occupies a significant place in5t Maximus' thought. Many different teachings such as the teaching on natureand will, three facnlties of the soul, AoyoS and !cOyOl, creation (ytVE<JtS) andrest (crl'Ucr1S), being, well-being and eternal well being find their explanationthrough the teaching on movement. The movement of God toward man inChrist serves as a model for the movement of man toward God that deeplyembeds the mystery of Christ in the mystery of creation.

39 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 1113AB); A. Louth, Maximas the Confessor (1996), 100.

104 V. CVETKOVIC

Table of Contents of Vols. XLIV-XLIX

VoL XLIV

II. Tools

I. Archaeologica, Arts, Iconographica

57

63

71

James A. FRANCIS, Lexington, KentuckyBiblical not Scriptural: Perspectives on Early Christian Art fromContemporary Classical Scholarship 3

Peter WIDDICOMBE, Hamilton, OntarioThe Drunkenness of Noah and the Patristic Legacy in Text and Art 9

Lee M. JEFFERSON, Danville, KentuckySuperstition and the Significance of the Image of Christ PerformingMiracles in Early Christian Art.......................................................... 15

Rocco BORGOGNONI, FirenzeNo Animals in the New Paradise? The 'Hall of Philia' from Antiochand the Patristic Exegesis of Isaiah's 'Peaceable Kingdom' 21

Anne KARAHAN, StockholmThe Issue of 1tEPlXmpllcrlS in Byzantine Hnly Images...................... 27

Istvan M. BuaAR, DebrecenImages of Jews and Christians in the Seventh Century: The Narratiode Imagine in Beryto and its Context 35

Vladimir BARANOV, NovosibirskThe Doctrine of the Icon-Eucharist for the Byzantine Iconoclasts.... 41

Martin GEORGE, Bern & Katharina BRACHT, MunichMneme Database Church History: A Presentation 49

Ill. Histnrica

Josef RIST, BochumDas Orakel des Apollon in Daphne und das Christentum .

Thomas HEYNE, Oxford

Were Second-Century Christians 'Preoccupied' with Physical Healingand the Asclepian Cult? .

Dennis Paul QUINN, Pomona, CaliforniaRoman Household Deities in the Latin Christian Writers: Tertullian,Arnobius, and Lactantius .The divisions and subdivisions of movement in Ambiguum 7