Cyber Strategies of ISIS and Russia

An established and growing menace against the prosperity, security and stability of western

member states comes from cyberspace as these societies make the “digital bet”. Our life styles,

communications, the sources of our information and where we stock our retirement plans have gone

digital in the past decades. The “new economy” wave created by telecommunications and notably the

internet increased our productivity, transitioned economic growth from manufacturing towards

services1 and have had for all intents and purposes the goal of making our lives simpler. However our

growing reliance on these technologies have led to a condition of constant vulnerability, not just by

economic criminals who seek banking information or identify theft but by political actors, strong and

weak who seek to undermine our governments.

I intend to draw a portrait of the cyber capabilities of Russia and ISIS, two contrasting actors.

On one hand we have a powerful state actor and on the other a terrorist organization. Their different

natures accord them different capabilities, each adopting contrasting cyber strategies. Other threats

include western governments, insiders, allies, China’s notorious “Unit 61398”, young isolated hackers

and above all the seemingly impossible task of implementing effective jurisdiction…One of the greatest

challenges Joseph Nye alludes to is formulating international treaties to regulate the use of these

technologies. Joseph Nye refers to the frustrating efforts policymakers and academics had made

between the first Atomic detonation in 1945 and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1969, some

25 years later. Such efforts dealt with deterrence, game theory, alliance theory, balance of force.

Regarding cyberspace such treaties would seek to control the sources of major cyber threats, resolve

systemic instability and aspire to greater nation state collaboration, we hope. 1 Nordhaus, William D. “Productivity Growth and the New Economy” National Bureau of Economic Research. Jan. 2001. Web. < http://www.nber.org/papers/w8096.pdf>“…However, in the late 1990s, productivity growth rebounded sharply. Over the period from 1995 to mid-2000, productivity growth in the business sector grew at a rate close to that in the pre- 1973 period. The causes of the rebound were widely debated, but at least part was clearly due to astonishing productivity growth in the “new economy” sectors of information and communications.”

This paper shall illustrate the cyber capabilities of the Russian Federation and ISIS. Displaying the

complete spectrum of known cyber threats and their capabilities would be unfitting for an article of this

scope. At the polar opposite of the organized nation state are not lesser organized terrorist

organizations, but solitary hackers who lack any denomination. The capabilities of states, organizations

and solitary hackers and even clusters differ tremendously as well as their objectives and success. By

focusing on nation states and terrorist organizations the intent is to demonstrate the relative strengths

and weaknesses of these determined actors but also their contrasting perspectives. Russia may perceive

cyber warfare as information warfare, to control what its people are allowed to watch, hear and read.

Terrorist organizations are in the opposition position where they seek exposure. Cyberspace threats are

not limited to political considerations, in fact a great deal of malevolent activity online resorts to

counterfeit and theft of individuals. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has attempted to

quantify the extent of cyber malicious activity as well as other consultants ( Ponemon2) and federal

agencies (FBI3), claiming it to cost the global economy billions of dollars every year4. The political

considerations are alarming however, whether it be the disclosure of sensitive information or

communications.

Terrorist organizations such as ISIS have gained from cyberspace’s anonymity and open sources

but their offensive capabilities remain weak relative to nation states. It seems that they lack the abilities

to obtain high valued political stakes via cyber. This is to the contrary of well organized, well-resourced

states.

What is meant by Cyber? What seemed as science fiction a generation ago has anchored itself into the

core of modern societies. Personal computers, servers, smartphones, routers, networks are the 2 “2015 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United States” Ponemon Institute. October 2015. Web. January 2016. <http://www.ponemon.org/library/2015-cost-of-cyber-crime-united-states>3 Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). 2014. Web. January 2016. <http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx>4 "The Economic Impact of Cyber Crime and Cyber Espionnage." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://csis.org/files/publication/60396rpt_cybercrime-cost_0713_ph4_0.pdf>.

hardware components of these new information and communication technologies. Through their

Central Processing Unit’s circuits, computers can execute programs which fulfill a myriad of tasks in a

binary language. These programs become the basis of software, or the virtual component of cyber. With

greater and greater connectivity, computers separated by vast physical distances can communicate

information to each other via the internet. Some of the information kept on computers may be of a

secretive matter, of which we’d prefer not to share: intimate searches, diaries, private emails, contact

lists, patents, diplomatic cables, nuclear launch codes. Cyber security or information security is the cat

and mouse game between those who want to access information that others would rather keep secret.

Hackers have many ways to infiltrate computer networks to gain stored information. They can attempt

to break passwords (cryptography), or intercept transmitting information (sniffing) or resort to more

malicious ways such as SQL injections which exploit security vulnerabilities in the databases of programs

themselves. Beyond infiltration, Cyber-attacks are attempts to damage or destroy a targeted computer

network. We can imagine the chaos that would ensue when a compromised electrical grid is hacked

such as the recent case in the Ukraine5. The “digital bet” our societies have make this cat and mouse

game all the more severe. Attributing intrusion and attackers has proven to be one of the most difficult

technical problems in cyber security.

ISIS CAPABILITIES

Terrorist organizations do not seek cooperation but attention. In the Middle East, the terrorist

organization known as ISIS has gained notoriety through social media where it must compete for

allegiance from willing fighters. Contrary to powerful states, ISIS has sought recognition for its acts in

cyberspace, not anonymity. The organization must compete to “outbid” other terrorist organizations by

flaunting its prowess online via Facebook, Youtube and other social media outlets. The brutality and

5 Nakashima, Ellen. “Russian hackers suspected in attack that blacked out parts of Ukraine” The Washington Post. 2016. Web January 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-suspected-in-attack-that-blacked-out-parts-of-ukraine/2016/01/05/4056a4dc-b3de-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html>

quality of its “marketing” campaigns are a success insofar that the organization has gained a reputation.

The accessible nature of cyberspace allows greater exposure to ideas and media content to anyone but

attention is sparse and maintaining an audience is difficult in this burgeoning space. The propaganda

aspect of cyberspace is at the heart of Joseph Nye’s eloquent concept of power diffusion. “States will

remain the dominant actor on the world stage, but they will find the stage far more crowded and

difficult to control. A much larger part of the population both within and among countries has access to

the power that comes from information.” 6

The sheer brutality and carnage made by ISIS thrives through social media, in other words: its

propaganda is working. Viewers are fascinated, horrified, obsessed to watch executions and/or

explosions and ISIS thus crowds our attention bandwidth. This exposure emboldens the organization as

it seeks to intimidate opponents and recruit committed fighters. It is also very creative, compelling for

certain susceptible viewers who become convinced by its narrative. The narrative for Jihadism is one of

victimhood and humiliation, whereby the faithful Muslims must defend their holy lands and beliefs

against a cowardly and technologically superior Zionist/Crusader axis against them. Once the beacon of

civilization, when Islam was closer to the ways of the prophet (7th century) the Muslim world has

devolved to a marginalized and impotent region due to supposed internal decay and foreign instigation.

Actions against these westerners in defense of Islam are just and offer martyrdom. The reason I focus on

ISIS for the cyber capabilities of terrorist organizations is because they have best met their strategic

objective: gaining attention. Their goal to restore some sort of caliphate and revitalize an authentic Islam

plays best with the master Jihadi narrative. They are a successful terrorist organization of the 21 st

century by using 21st century technology. The caveat of this cyber strategy however is that once they’ve

received sufficient momentum, the surveillance agencies of western governments can monitor their

publications, track their traffic and pinpoint IP addresses. Mishaps on behalf of ISIS insiders risk divulging

6 Nye, Joseph. "Cyber Power." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Press, 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf>.

too much information about the internal workings of the terrorist organization and thus compromise

plots and/or individuals, in sum by being too loud they expose themselves against their own benefit.

Propaganda:

The SITE intelligence Group Enterprise has a decade long experience of data mining Jihadist

groups and other extremists. A few examples would be Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Al-Nusra, Ansar al-Shariah

in Libya7. ISIS possesses affiliates such as al-Furat Media Foundation which produce multimedia material

to incite youths across the globe to organize jihadist operations against western governments and their

citizenry. They possess the capital and savoir faire to produce quality footage. In these videos they

praise the actions of Mohammed Merah in Toulouse in 20128 as he reached martyrdom, the highest

prestige for any zealot. Videos such as these and instruction manuals for CBRN (Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear) weapons are distributed across websites such as Inspire Magazine and

Facebook or Twitter where they have encountered foreclosure. Through this open source capacity, ISIS

hopes to multiply the number of lone wolf martyrs by providing the inspiration and the tools all under

the libertarian (not the party but the philosophic) character of the World Wide Web. What is odd about

this relationship is that the lone wolves by definition do not cooperate, are not members of the terrorist

organization yet are becoming radicalized not by imams or trips to Afghanistan but through the internet.

The RAND Corporation and other institutes have collected empirical data on this phenomena which has

been outpacing all other forms of terrorism9. These lone wolves are rapidly becoming the aces of

terrorism because of their growing numbers and stealth. They require no leaders, and are difficult to

7 "Jihadist Groups." SITE Enterprise Intelligence Group. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/jihadist-groups-2.html>8 Zelin, Aaron. "Al-Furāt Media Foundation." JIHADOLOGY A Clearinghouse for Jihd Primary Source Material Original Analysis and Translation Service. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://jihadology.net/category/al-furat-media-foundation/>.9 Weimann, Gabriel. "Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation." Woodrow Wilson Center Press., 2015. Web. Page 64-65

trace. Whatever interactions they do have with fellow “extremists” take place on the deep web

provided their resolve is strong enough, at which point it becomes virtually impossible to track them.

The website Jihadology by Aaron Y. Zelin provides a fantastic source for jihadist cyber activity

through which one can find videos, magazines, articles of remarkable quality, translated into multiple

languages10. No doubt a strong effort is made by jihadi enthusiasts to produce, edit and translate these

works and such results require some degree of organization and skill. These organizations need not to

be large. Indeed, what may seem as a myriad of websites, videos, scripts and reports by ISIS may be the

workings of only a few hundred individuals such as Ahmad Abousamra who received his degree in

computer science with mention at Northeastern University11. To overrun these bans on mainstream

media outlets, jihadists online will promote the use of third party applications with strong encryption

among each other to disrupt surveillance and facilitate propaganda distribution. Telegram is an example

of an application with strong encryption. The value of privacy held by these software developers provide

the safe space terrorists need to communicate freely12.

How organized is ISIS around cyberspace? As far as an organization exists to fulfill a purpose, in

our case: terrorize, it’s difficult to determine to what extent cyberspace precedes planning and when it

does at all. When a terror attack is launched we find a short moment of hesitation before ISIS claims

responsibility during which I assume ISIS is internally debating whether or not to take claim for the

attack. Although this moment is relatively short, this lapse leads me to believe the organization permits

a great deal of discretion for whoever wants to join its cause. Lone wolves can jumpstart their short but

10 Zelin, Aaron. "About me." JIHADOLOGY A Clearinghouse for Jihd Primary Source Material Original Analysis and Translation Service. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://jihadology.net/about/about-me/>11 Gunnoe, Brandon. "FBI Says Stoughton Grad May Be Working for ISIS." FBI Says Ahmad Abousamra May Be Working for ISIS. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.whdh.com/story/26452995/fbi-says-northeastern-university-grad-may-be-working-for-isis>.12 Arici, Alexandra. "Telegram CEO Admits ISIS Is Using the App, but Says Privacy Is More Important." Softpedia. 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://news.softpedia.com/news/telegram-ceo-admits-isis-is-using-the-app-but-privacy-is-more-important-492479.shtml>

violent campaign with as little communications with ISIS leaders as necessary. If the attack is a failure,

ISIS could or would deny responsibility according to the context. To quote Joshua Keating for Slate

magazine, “responsibility is a bit murky in the age of internet-inspired terror” 13. This downplays the

enabling role of cyberspace.

However is cyber communications used for recruitment, and if so, how effective do we believe it

to be? According to Brigadier General John Custer at the time (2007), head of intelligence responsible

for Iraq and Afghanistan at the time “Without a doubt, the Internet is the single most important venue

for the radicalization of Islamic youth”14. Recruitment opportunities are wedged between two factors:

the appeal of propaganda being distributed online and the anonymity that permits wannabe jihadists to

slowly enter the circle at any given moment. Yet, according to Pantucci15, the social component of

recruitment cannot be omitted. The internet is the common theme along with real life social alienation

for these candidates. Online material, propaganda inspire but the added experience of community

found online with like-minded others truly put the internet as incubator for lone wolf phenomenon. The

Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service report goes further by saying that “The AIVD is aware of

the fact that lone wolves often plot and carry out a (violent) act on their own, but has found that they

rarely radicalize in complete isolation…The AIVD argues that radicalization is a social phenomenon”16.

ISIS’s cyber capabilities rest upon the confidentiality of communications. Encrypted messages,

whether it be emails or private messages have enhanced the organization’s logistic capabilities in as

much that operations can be commanded from abroad and instantaneously. In response states have

13Keating, Joshua. "The Texas Attack Was a Failure, but It Shows That ISIS’s Influence Is Growing." Slate. 2015. Web. 16 Dec.2015. <http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/05/05/the_texas_attack_was_a_failure_but_it_shows_that_isis_s_influence_is_growing.html>14 Pelley, Scott. "Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 2007. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/terrorists-take-recruitment-efforts-online/>.15 Weimann, Gabriel. "Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation." Woodrow Wilson Center Press., 2015. Web. Page 67-6816 Weimann, Gabriel. "Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation." Woodrow Wilson Center Press., 2015. Web. Excerpt from AIVD report. Page 67-68

sought to oversee these communications, to discover patterns and hopefully jeopardize terror plots.

Creating national agencies to monitor suspects domestically and abroad through mass surveillance has

stirred intense controversy within western societies however. The US is at the forefront of this with the

National Security Agency whilst European members have somewhat abstained to implement such

unpopular policies17. This is where the tradeoff between security and private freedoms lie. Citizens have

grown warry of their governments and legitimate endeavors to guarantee security must confront these

obstacles whereby the victim defends the potential aggressor. As long as privacy is valued over security,

the implied resultant is enabled terrorism.

ISIS’s cyber capabilities remain relatively weak, merely harvesting the innate characteristics of

cyberspace but no more. ISIS has yet to formulate offensive capabilities online. At best, ISIS hackers have

succeeded in vandalizing some of the twitter accounts of US government officials, such as CENTCOM, in

the name of the “cyber caliphate” for a few moments. These acts of vandalism have not impacted

military operability in the US, nor have they disclosed sensitive information. I doubt terrorist

organizations will reach the technicity to inflict more than just harassment against well-organized

military and state institutions through such tactics.

Harvesting the open source nature of cyberspace, ISIS’s capabilities and hence its strategy differs

drastically from state actors such as Russia. From recruitment, propaganda, publications, funding, and

extortion, ISIS’s strategy demonstrates the asymmetries that prevail between states and non-state

actors as it relies on technologies to crowd in. These terrorists neither have the skills nor the resources

to create cyber weapons by themselves. Large impact “cyber pearl harbor”esque attacks require labs,

servers, networks, testing grounds, engineers, hackers and developpers. These resources have to be

located somewhere physically, either through mainframes, cables, satellites or computers. These can be

17 Stelzenmuller, Constanze, and Josh Raisher. "Transatlantic Majorities Oppose Domestic Surveillance." The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 2013. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/11/TTBrief_DomesticSurveillance_Nov13.pdf>.

traced, and once established, these can easily become the “high value” targets western militaries

destroy via drones and the likes. The dominant strategy for terrorist organizations can only go so far, it is

about crowding the internet for attention, distributing manuals and communicating anonymously.

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES

The eventual collapse of the USSR led to a breakdown of law and institutions leading to a surge

in crime, including cybercrime for unemployed “patriot” hackers. However, even today the penetration

rate of internet users in Russia is dramatically low.

In a country with low penetration rates, adept hackers are easily spotted, and their training

backgrounds known by authorities thanks to their tightly monitored internet. These patriot hackers can

be called upon as contractors for cyber operations against foreign targets in case of cyber escalation.

This allows for plausible deniability. But first and foremost, what does cyber conflict mean for Russians?

According to the Russian General Staff, cyber conflict is the “disruption of the key enemy military,

industrial and administrative facilities and systems, as well as bringing information-psychological

pressure to bear on the adversary’s military-political leadership, troops and population, something to be

achieved primarily through the use of state-of-the-art information technologies and assets”18.

In terms of institutions, the Federal Security Services’ (FSB) continued surveillance over Russia’s

cyberspace filters information to prevent dissidence, isolate networks from external threats and

18 Maness, Ryan and Valeriano Brandon. “Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Energy, Cyber and Maritime Policy as New Sources of Power”. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Page 87.

maintain leadership grip. “Most internet traffic coming in and out must go through the FSB’s

networks.”19 The Doctrine of Information Security gives significant important to ensuring information

security as part of the Russian Federation’s overall national security. Russia’s cyber capability is made

redundant with the assistance of the private sector. Kaspersky Labs, created by ex KGB and Putin loyalist

Eugene Kaspersky is the largest information security firm in the world, equaling the western McAfee and

Symantec’s sales combined with its 300 million plus customers. It is Kaspersky that discovered, analyzed

and suspected Stuxnet to be a US-israeli creation.

Above all cyber threats for western militaries, Russia posits as the most powerful. In 2014, NATO

had severed all but ambassadorial communications with Russia as a response to its illegal annexation of

Crimea and its activities in eastern Ukraine. The same was done in 2008 after what NATO calls “Russia’s

disproportionate military action in Georgia” where cyber weapons and kinetic forces were combined for

the first time2021. The use of cyberspace for geopolitical ends had been recognized due to their use

against Georgia. The cyber domain could no longer be disconnected from the greater political context

since then and it has been acknowledged that there are real repercussions to cyber-attacks that affect

the traditional balance of power. Cyber defense has rapidly reached the top echelon of policy priorities

for NATO and other governments. Russia has had to display restraint in its use of cyber weapons to

avoid escalation with NATO due to this newly gained sensitivity. This implies the state’s rational behavior

towards deterrence, in contrast with terrorist organizations because although plausible deniability exists

for both camps, the capabilities of each are unknown and therefore feared.

This sensibility to proportionate use of (cyber) force makes sense. No matter how difficult it may be to

attribute cyber-attacks, victims have sought to accuse those to whom the crime benefits. It is no surprise

19 Maness, Ryan and Valeriano Brandon. “Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Energy, Cyber and Maritime Policy as New Sources of Power”. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Page 88.20 Smith, David. "Russian Cyber Strategy and the War Against Georgia." Atlantic Council. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-cyber-policy-and-the-war-against-georgia>.21 "Relations with Russia." NATO. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm>.

therefore that in 2007, the Bronze soldier incident in Estonia happened in a political climate that could

only lead NATO to suspect Russian orchestration. The Soviet statue’s relocation caused riots opposing

Russian ethnics to the Estonian police22. Soon enough, waves of Denial of Service attacks paralyzed the

critical infrastructure of the highly connected nation2324. It is only after the incident that cyber forensics

analysts could estimate the true offenders to be Russian hacktivists organized on chat nets and exploited

“zombie computers” from over 50 different countries to concert the attack25.

Whereas terrorists seek to gather attention through the use of violence, propaganda and

threats, states use cyber weapons covertly to avoid attribution but also send threats. The key aspect of a

cyber strategy for a state such as Russia is to use the plausible deniability that reigns in cyberspace and

only show glimpses of its true offensive power.

As I’ve noted previously, Russia’s, or at least pro-Russian abilities were on display during 2007

and 2008. In return, Olympic Games and its famous Stuxnet showed that the US or at least, pro-US

camps could inflict severe damage as well. The sophistication of Stuxnet is such that experts agree on its

costs: to be tremendous and could only have been backed by a nation state. Once used however, these

cyber weapons are over. Once the damage they inflict is detected it becomes very clear quickly what

vulnerabilities they’ve exploited and how to remedy and the same mentality “to whom benefits the

crime” will often answer the culprit.

As escalation has risen between Russia and the West recently, we have witnessed what

researchers refer to as “Hybrid Warfare”. Hybrid Warfare is the use of conventional and unconventional

22 "Tallinn Tense after Deadly Riots." BBC News. BBC, 28 Apr. 2007. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602171.stm>.23 Traynor, Ian. "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia." The Guardian. 2007. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>.24 "War in the Fifth Domain." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 3 July 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.economist.com/node/16478792>.25 Richards, Jason. "Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National Security." Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65>.

tactics to gain political-military concessions. Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy takes advantage of the

blurred lines of cyber weaponry. Interpretation on their pervasiveness lead to grey areas and debates

whereby war is never actually declared. In the case of Russia, we have witnessed the use of military

forces in Ukraine26 and Georgia as well as the deployment of troops for intensive and large scale

exercises in recent years. These displays of force have intimidated NATO and show resolve to what

Russia considers its sphere of influence. As Europe’s largest energy supplier, Russia has ceased exports

towards the EU through Ukraine on several occasions (in 2006, 2009 and 2015) hurting NATO members

economically. This unconventional tactic is a form of economic coercion meant to “punish” Europeans27.

A novel tool for coercion in the arsenal of hybrid warfare is that of cyber weapons. The intrinsic

nature of cyberspace gives states the ability to conduct malevolent attacks anonymously from small

harassment, to espionage, to massive power shut downs. Powerful states such as Russia have used

skilled hackers and Advanced Persistent Threats to gain information, deceive and even attack other

states through cyberspace. Policymakers are now left wondering what could be considered as a

declaration of war in cyberspace. This kind of brinkmanship is what we mean by “hybrid warfare”. Key

countries defined by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake for their offensive, defensive and cyber

dependence are Israel, the United States, China and Russia28, surely their ability to play with the lines of

conflict allows for such reputation. Since secrecy is paramount, It is difficult to ascertain what the full

offensive capabilities of Russia are. We scholars can only know what has happened and are left to

imagine what future possibilities lie ahead. The Atlantic Council seems to believe in the Cyber security

26 "NATO Says Russian Military Equipment Entering East Ukraine." AFP. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <https://web.archive.org/web/20141112202319/http://www.afp.com/en/node/3046366>.27 Chow, Edward, Sarah Ladislaw, and Michelle Melton. "Crisis in Ukraine: What Role Does Energy Play?" Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://csis.org/publication/crisis-ukraine-what-role-does-energy-play>.28 Richard A. Clarke. “Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It.” Harper Collins, 2010. Page 148.

command that the Russians have created, a strong indicator of offensive capabilities which inspires

fear29.

As Russia’s manpower shortage adversely affects its hard power and the increasing rate of

global energy output reduces market share and thus revenue for this energy giant, Russia's main tools

for coercion are eroding. In this context, Russia’s cyber capabilities and strategy gains salience as a mean

to affect the “balance of force” on the world stage. According to Wirtz, Russia has used its cyber power

in Ukraine not so much to counter NATO capabilities but NATO’s strategy. Through the use of cyber he

claims that Russia has created “facts on the ground” and “shifted the onus of escalation onto NATO to

reverse the fait accompli.”30 This debauches on new opportunities and since the domain of cyber is so

novel, different states with different concerns and political cultures will continue to use cyberspace in

unforeseen ways.

NATO may share strategic goals with Russia (cybercrime, cyber restraint) but it most of their

cyber interactions are a canalized form of traditional rivalry: espionage. Both sides are afraid of opening

a Pandora’s box, provoking one another to unleash their full offensive potentials. Western states or any

state for that matter cannot share any interests with terrorism if only for plausible deniability. States do

find themselves having to share a more crowded theatre and as such there is a modicum of hope for

intergovernmental cooperation against illegitimate use however that may be defined. To conclude,

terrorism seeks to gain the attention it needs by being effectively loud and possesses few resources;

states are the most resourceful actors and seek to covertly abuse cyber vulnerabilities in their rivals

whilst developing strong capabilities as tools of foreign policy.

29 Novosti, Ria. "Russian Military Creating Cyber Warfare Branch." Atlantic Council. 2013. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-military-creating-cyber-warfare-branch>.30 Wirtz, James. "Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of Cyber Power into Grand Strategy." CCDCOE. NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. <https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective_Wirtz_03.pdf>.