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Cyberbad Where Spam is leading to Phillip Hallam-Baker hallam@dotcrimemanifesto. com

Cyberbad Where Spam is leading to Phillip Hallam-Baker [email protected]

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CyberbadWhere Spam is leading to

Phillip [email protected]

Spam is Criminal Infrastructure

Botnets beget

• Spam– Adverts for criminal / defective products– Phishing– Advance Fee Frauds

• Denial of Service Extortion

• All Things ‘Cyber-bad’

What is Cyber-Terror?

Cyber-Bad

Lowering the barriers

Cyber-Bad for Hire

• Hacking tools (commodity ø day exploits)• Stolen credentials• Crime as Service– Spam– Botnets

• Unwitting Accomplices (mules)– Receiving stolen goods– Money laundering

Cyber-bad Purposes

VandalismVigilantism

FraudTerrorismWarfare

Criminals extend reach

• Compromise systems during manufacture– Pin Entry Devices compromised during

manufacture• Phone home with PIN data to Pakistan

• Criminal insiders– Blackmailed or bought prior to hire– US Cert: 41% incidents involve insiders

• Soc Generalé demonstrates €bn potential

Internet Crime Isn’t

The banks are still where the money is

Russian Business Network

Cyber Crime to Cyber Terror?

• RBN ‘customer’ 1488.ru

It’s not a new game…

Internet Terrorism Today

Internet = Outreach

Internet = Praxis

Realistic Future Scenarios

Internet = Research

• Open Sources– AQ manual claims 80% of information is available

• Criminal Expert Sources– Who can tell me X for $100?

• Espionage– Find an honest expert, penetrate their machine

Internet Crime = Funding

Internet Crime = Money Laundry

Internet Sabotage = Force Multiplier

Is a Hollywood Scenario likely?

Past Performance is no guarantee…

Security through obscurity works…

… until it fails

Fixing the Problem

What is the problem?

• Banks– Cost of Internet crime• Direct Losses• Customer Service• Opportunity Losses

• National Security– Potential criminal profits– Potential sabotage damage

Are there solutions?

• Chip and PIN– Eliminated Card Present Fraud in Europe• Remaining attacks exploit legacy channels

• Why not in the US?– Different market structure– Anti-trust used to block changes

Anti-Crime Solutions

• Email Authentication– SPF, DKIM, Secure Internet Letterhead

• Web Authentication– Extended Validation, Secure Internet Letterhead

• Secure Identity– SAML, WS-*, OpenID, OATH, Identity 3.0

• Data Level Security– CRM Infrastructure, Open CRM

• Network Security– Reverse Firewalls, DNSSEC, BGP Security– Domain Centric Administration, Default Deny Infrastructure

Conclusions• The threats are real– They are not necessarily Internet threats– But the Internet changes the game

• The threats are serious– They may not be “terrorism” as we know it– But they are worth caring about

• Criminal infrastructure is an ongoing threat– Some states are playing the privateer game– We cannot rely on international cooperation