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Dan Boneh [email protected] with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010 POMI 2020

Dan Boneh [email protected] with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

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Page 1: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Dan [email protected]

with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students.

Security for Mobile Devices

NSF Site Visit, June 2010

POMI2020

Page 2: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

POMI Research Agenda

Applications

Data & Computing SubstratePrPl, Junction and Concierge

Radio technology

Econom

icsCinder: Energy aware, secure OS

secure apps

UI

HW Platform

Network SubstrateSoftware Defined Network & OpenFlow

Handheld

Infrastructure

Page 3: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

platformsecurity

secureapps

POMI mobile security work

• Snap2Pass and Snap2Pay [DSBL’10]

• A password manager for mobile devices [BBBB’09]

• Android security: ASLR on Android [BB’10]

• Unlocking phones using cheap tokens [BB’10]

• Preventing tap-Jacking attacks on mobile web sites [RBB’10]

Page 4: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Joint work with Arvind Narayanan, Narendran Thiagarajan, and Mugdha Lakhani

Location services without big brother

Page 5: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Location-based social networking

Finally taking off?

Page 6: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Proximity Alerts

Detect when friends are nearby (e.g. Loopt)• Today: 24/7 user tracking by server

Our privacy goals:• When not nearby, friends don’t see your location• Server never sees your location

Building block for more complex functionality

Page 7: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Proximity alerts: applications

Granularity must be user-configurable

Page 8: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

How we arrived at this problem

• POMI barrier #1: reliance on big brother• PrPl effort: social networks with privacy

• Many discussions with PrPl participants:• Can we make location-based services private?• Similarly, can we do private targeted advertising? (NDSS’10)

• Other results from the interaction:• QR codes for better user authentication [DSBL’10]

• Unlocking a phone using cheap tokens [BB’10]

Page 9: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Reducing proximity test to equality test

Page 10: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Equality testing

Space of possible locations is small! (32 bits)

Method 1: protocol based on public-key encryption (Lipmaa)

• Heavy computation: impractical for proximity of all friends

x y=?

Requires shared secret keys between pairs of friends

Page 11: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Our approach

An efficient protocol with server participation

Trust assumption: server does not collude with your friends

x y

r ( x – y )

Total traffic: 24 bytes, easy computation

?? ??

no one knows r

Page 12: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Problem: online brute-force attack

If only there were a way to verify that a user really is where they claim to be…

Solution: location tags (for small granularity)

Page 13: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Properties of location tags

Location tag = vector + matching functioni.e., space-time fingerprint

Unpredictability cannot produce matching tag unless nearby

Reproducibility two devices at same place & time produce matching

tags (not necessarily identical)

Page 14: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Location tags using WiFi packets

Discard packets like TCP that may originate outside local network• DHCP, ARP, Samba etc. are local• 15 packets/sec on CS/EE VLAN

Two different devices see about 90% of packets in common

Comparing location tags: privately test if intersection > 90%

Page 15: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Android implementation

Page 16: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Android implementation

Page 17: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Android implementation

Page 18: Dan Boneh dabo@cs.stanford.edu with Monica Lam, David Mazieres, John Mitchell, and many students. Security for Mobile Devices NSF Site Visit, June 2010

Future work

Many location privacy questions:

• Private location based advertising

• Private location based search

• Private location statistics