Dan Gray University of San Diego Master of Arts in ...2Ibid 3Due to a variety of different methodologies and primary sources, anexact success rate is difficult to assess. The range

On a Mission from God: Do Religious Insurgents Have a Special Advantage?

Dan Gray

University of San Diego Master of Arts in International Relations

Spring 2016

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Abstract: Insurgencies are historically predisposed to fail. There are, however, some characteristics that can increase the likelihood of their success. The presence of these characteristics does not ensure an insurgency’s success, but one or more must be present for an insurgency to succeed. The four requisite characteristics are 1) Will/determination 2) Local support 3) External assistance 4) Flexible strategic and tactical organization. Given a perceived rise in religiously based insurgencies, this paper examines religion’s role in outcomes. By quantitatively analyzing 106 insurgencies, it is determined that religion does not have a noteworthy impact on an insurgency’s outcome. This paper then focuses on the probable outcome of the ongoing Islamic State (IS) insurgency. The IS has some degree of each characteristic for a successful insurgency, but appears to be slowly declining in all four categories. Continuing along its current trajectory, all indicators suggest that IS will not have a successful outcome. In order to hasten the decline of IS, this paper provides policy recommendations to serve as the starting point for future operations.

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Table of Contents

Introduction.........................................................................................................................3

Definitions............................................................................................................................5Insurgency.......................................................................................................................................5Winning (Succeeding)/Losing (Failing)....................................................................................6

Methodology......................................................................................................................7

Areas for improvement.....................................................................................................8

Results...................................................................................................................................9Characteristics................................................................................................................................9Religion...........................................................................................................................................11

Islamic State......................................................................................................................13Background...................................................................................................................................13Characteristics..............................................................................................................................13

Anticipated Trend of IS Success Indicators.................................................................16

Where to go from here?..................................................................................................16Policy Recommendations.........................................................................................................16

Conclusion........................................................................................................................19

Bibliography......................................................................................................................21

Appendix 1: Insurgency Data........................................................................................23

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Introduction Political systems and regimes are dynamic institutions, constantly reorganizing and reprioritizing to meet the demands of their constituencies. These changes are normally incurred through the already established processes within a given political system. However, if a party or groups feel as though they are inadequately represented, or they disagree with the existing structure, they can resort to methods outside the established political process. One common method of attempting to change the existing political system is through an insurgency. Regardless of its recent ubiquity in the media, which predominantly focuses on Islamist extremism, insurgency is not a new tactic. Although it is impossible to place an exact date on the first insurgency, it is well documented that the concept, albeit unlikely to be labeled insurgency, reaches back as far as the year 73 BC.1 It was then, that well-known Thracian leader, Spartacus, allied with a group of like-minded individuals to fight the Roman Republic.2 Much has changed in the last 2,000 years, but violent uprising in an attempt to change an established government (i.e. insurgency) has endured the test of time. Unfortunately for insurgents, the two millennia of existence do not directly correlate to any increase in success rates over time. Depending on the source and the number of insurgencies examined, insurgents only succeed 33-41% of the time3. The definitional section of this paper will more closely examine what it means to “win” or “lose,” but the central concept remains the same: insurgencies fail (lose) more frequently than they succeed (win). Despite their relatively low success rate, the fact remains that insurgencies can, and do, succeed in meeting their objectives. To this end, there is a great deal of academic, political and military research aimed at determining why some groups succeed and others fail. The first section of this paper will examine various characteristics of insurgencies, attempting to distill the common characteristics among successful insurgent groups. This section will address the following research question:

Following the second World War, are there any essential characteristics that, when present, increase an insurgency’s likelihood of success?

1 Strauss, B. S. (2009). The Spartacus War. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2 Ibid 3 Due to a variety of different methodologies and primary sources, an exact success rate is difficult to assess. The range of success here was established through the 196 cases examined for this article, as well as from research from U.S. Naval War College Professor, Donald Stoker, PhD.

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After identifying the key characteristics of successful insurgencies I will then examine a final variable: religion. The objective of identifying religious influence on the outcome of insurgencies is largely motivated by the apparent increase in religiously motivated insurgencies in the Middle East. For nearly two decades, Americans (and arguably the entire world) have been bombarded with accounts of Islamic radicals fighting under the banner of religious righteousness. Most specifically and recently, the Islamic State (IS) is fighting a multi-front, religiously motivated insurgency. My research question, as it relates to IS and religion is:

Does religious motivation in the rhetoric of an insurgency have any impact on the likely success of the insurgency?

In answering the question above, I will attempt to prove one of the following hypotheses: H1: Religion will have a negative impact on the probability of insurgency success. H2: Religion will have a positive impact on the probability of insurgency success. H3: Religion will have neither a positive, nor a negative impact on the probability of insurgency success. A great deal of research is dedicated to the study of past insurgencies; an equal amount is dedicated to ongoing insurgencies. Yet, despite the breadth of research in both areas, only a select few articles address the probable outcome of ongoing insurgencies based on historical trends. Those articles that do address a correlation between past and ongoing insurgencies rarely use a large data set; they more commonly address similarities between well-known insurgent battles (e.g. Vietnam and Iraq). The importance of this research is principally due to the uniqueness of examining past insurgencies to help determine the probable outcome with the current IS insurgency. Yet another contribution of this article comes in the form of policy recommendations for future dealings with IS. It should be understood that all recommendations will be made for the advancement of American foreign and military policy. While assisting the global community as a whole is part of this article’s endeavor, any policy recommendations that are offered will be suggested with the best interests of the United States in mind. While not all policy recommendations will be immediately attainable, they will serve as a starting point to further develop strategic interests and points for negotiation. One of the most fundamental requirements for an article of this nature is to provide a clear definitional grounding for all elements. There are a wide variety of definitions for each of the variables in this paper. Hence, without a

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clear definition, the data (and therefore the conclusion) may be called into question. If a definition is not provided, it can be assumed that a commonly agreed upon definition exists (e.g. for the term “duration”).

Definitions

Insurgency In contemporary journalism, the term ‘insurgency’ is used routinely. Average citizens are made more and more aware of the nature of inter and intra state relations. Nonetheless, seldom is the term ‘insurgency’ clearly defined. Below are some of the regularly referenced definitions for insurgency:

“A protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”4 “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)”5 “The actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.”6 “An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”7

By contrasting only a few of the existing definitions, it is clear to see that there are common elements. The fundamental characteristics of an insurgency are that it is an organized method of attempting to overthrow the existing government structure. Below is the general definition that I will adopt for this article:

4 Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New York: Praeger. p 4. 5 United States., Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2010). Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. 6 NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency | Public Intelligence. (2011, February). Retrieved April 13, 2016, from https://publicintelligence.net/nato-allied-joint-doctrine-for-counterinsurgency/ 7 United States, Department of the Army, Department of Defense. (2006). Counterinsurgency. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army.

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An insurgency is an organized, sometimes violent, attempt to secede from or take over an existing political organization.

Because of the asymmetry of strength (in most insurgencies the government starts with more ‘power’) insurgencies are usually protracted. For this reason, some have chosen to qualify revolutions as a separate incident than insurgencies. The idea of a revolution may be associated with “an explosive upheaval – sudden, brief, spontaneous, unplanned…it is an accident which can be explained afterward but not predicted other than to note the existence of a revolutionary situation.”8 However, revolutions are not always immediate, and insurgencies are not always protracted; this paper will not distinguish the two as separate entities. Although duration will be examined, the case studies used in this paper will include insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions and intrastate political conflicts alike.

Winning (Succeeding)/Losing (Failing)

“The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” - Henry Kissinger, 1969

In most political organizations, as well as most conventional wars, there is a clearly defined winner and loser, the winners and losers in insurgencies are not always as clear. Existing research has already determined that “quantitative analysis alone cannot untangle the web of cause and effect intrinsic to insurgency,”9 that is to say, some level of qualitative analysis is necessary to declare the victor. Because the primary source of data for insurgency outcomes was derived from the Correlates of War (COW) data set, this article will follow their classifications. In this case, to be deemed a war, a violent conflict needed to have incurred at least 1,000 battle deaths, military action internal to the state, and effective resistance by both sides.10 The COW uses “judgment of historians as to which side “won” the war in terms of their objectives. For civil wars, we generally classify them according to only two types or goals – for control of the central government, or for local issues (including secession) – so the “win” would be defined in those terms. There is no time period for retaining the objectives – the rebels can win in one war – and then lose in another soon thereafter.”11 8 Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New York: Praeger. p 4. 9 Connable, B., & Libicki, M. C. (2010). How Insurgencies End. RAND National Defense Research Institute, 13. 10 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press 11 Sarkees, M. (2016, April 6). COW data set (intra state wars) definitional question [E-mail to the author].

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Using a single-source interpretive definition for winners and losers may not be the most accurate method for determining success and failure, but because the criteria were uniformly prescribed for all insurgencies, it should be considered methodologically accurate.

Methodology The methodology used in this article can be broken into two distinct sections. The first section describes how to determine any essential characteristics for insurgency success; and the second outlines the methodology used to determine religion’s impact on outcomes. Many professional articles have already been published on essential elements for insurgency success. To recreate the level of detail needed to rival these publications is outside both the scope, and intent of this article. Instead of contesting the established elements of success, this paper will simply collate information from existing studies in order to uncover common, overlapping, ideas. The product of this distillation will be a holistic summary of academic consensus. Religion’s impact is not quite as simple. The primary method of assessing religion’s role in the outcome of insurgencies will be a quantitative analysis of insurgencies. For this analysis insurgencies that occurred between1946 until 2011 will be examined. This time period is chosen for two specific reasons. First, this timeframe provides the most access to reliable statistics and information on insurgencies. Secondly, following the Second World War, there is a global trend toward low intensity conflict and insurgency as the preeminent method of armed dispute resolution.12 The next challenge is to determine the level of religious involvement in the insurgency. According to Harvard University professor, Dr. Arreguín-Toft, “religion is one of the two most common motivation bases for social support, along with nationalism (and in most cases the two get added together).”13 Despite its ability to incite popular support (for either side), the level of religious involvement is not always consistent. One approach is to place a number value on the level of religious involvement. For example, a ‘0’ represents no influence, where a ‘4’ represents a 100% religious insurgency. The problem with this methodology is that it requires an outside source to, after the fact, place a value on the religious influence for a given insurgency. In so doing, a margin of error exists to overvalue or undervalue religion’s effect on an outcome. To avoid misclassifying

12Hegre, H., & Mokleiv Nygård, H. (2014, January). PRIO Conflict Trends. Peace on Earth? The Future of Internal Armed Conflict. 13 Arreguín-Toft, I. (2016, March 30). Re: Research question - USD Graduate Program [two cents] [E-mail to the author].

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an insurgency, a simple binary taxonomy is used. Conflicts that received a ‘0’ had no religious influence on either side’s motivation to fight, a score of ‘1’ implies that religious influence was present to some degree. A score of ‘0’ does not imply that the two sides shared a religion (e.g. Vietnam), nor does a ‘1’ imply that the religions were different (Indonesia/GAM). After establishing the method of classification, I compared 196 intrastate conflicts. Each conflict was evaluated on the following characteristics: insurgents, regulars (i.e. existing government), region, outcome, duration and religion.

Areas for improvement This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of insurgency outcomes, instead it is intended to prompt interest in a much deeper analysis of religious insurgencies, as well as policies to counter the growing IS threat. Furthermore, using historical data may provide general trend lines and probable outcomes, but it does not necessarily take into consideration the growing impact of emerging technologies; specifically, social media and the internet. The data set analyzed ends in 2011, which was during the onset of the ‘Arab Spring.’ Sweeping across the Middle East and the Maghreb, this series of insurgencies (via revolution) marked a fundamental shift in the way the international community views insurgencies. The tendency to treat the Arab Spring as an outlier of events, that it was somehow a self-contained conflagration in a specific region, underestimates a potential shift in how insurgencies begin and end. A further analysis of the Arab Spring would only help confirm the degree of influence that religion has on insurgencies.

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Results

Characteristics Although there is not a universal consensus as to the requisite attributes for insurgent success, there is a great deal of overlap and shared thought. Additionally, most publications deny the existence of a single element responsible for success; it is a mélange of contributions that culminate in the final outcome. Below are the most universally recognized attributes for insurgent success, as well as a brief explanation as to their importance. They are in no specific order:

1) Will/determination – The central idea behind an insurgency is a sense of dissatisfaction with the existing government. Either because of colonial rule, autocratic political parties, and the like, a group or groups of a state find that they have no alternative but to attempt to overthrow the existing political structure. In so doing, the insurgents create a de facto ‘total’ war for their side. By engaging in a total war, and fully committing to the conflict, “the weaker side’s will is sometimes manifested by a high threshold of pain that enables small powers to succeed against big powers.”14 Will is not restricted to the individual combatant on the battlefield, it is also applied to politics. It has been often argued that insurgencies succeed more regularly when they are opposed by democracies (not autocracies). In his article, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars, Dr. Andrew Mack suggests that democracies will not sustain a protracted war, nor accept the death of their citizens, for a war that does not represent an existential threat. As the war progresses, the incumbent government’s political constraints will reach a point of being an advantage for the insurgent. A prime example is the 2003-2011 counterinsurgency in Iraq. As the conflict continued, the US population grew weary of the toll it took on the nation; President Bush’s approval rating dropped from an unprecedented 90%, down to an all time low of 25%.15 The American political will to fight a counterinsurgency was almost non-existent. 2) Local support – “Whoever wins the people usually wins the war.”16 An insurgency cannot succeed without the support of the local population. Some argue that this is not the essential element for success, but few would argue that success could occur without it. Support can “range

14 Cassidy, R. M. (2002, September). Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly. Military Review, 47. 15 Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush. (n.d.). Retrieved April 13, 2016, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx 16 Stoker, D. (2009). Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose: A Contrarian View. Small Wars Journal, 6.

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from active participation in the struggle to passive approval.”17 The tactics used to control the population represent a delicate choice between the carrot and the stick, “they can go too far and alienate the very people they are hoping to win over.”18 Insurgents can require local support for their basic material needs (e.g. shelter, equipment, etc.) but also for concealment in the greater population from counterinsurgency forces (e.g. Viet Cong). Local support is closely tied to will/determination in the sense that the support usually comes from a common interest or bond (e.g. religion) between the insurgents and the population. 3) External (foreign) support – Documented extensively by Dr. Jeffrey Record, a foreign policy and defense analyst, external support is a historical method of contributing to insurgent success. Addressing the existing claim that will/determination is the essential element, Dr. Record states “…even the most committed and cunning insurgency cannot hope to win without material resources. A rebellion must have arms.”19 The North Vietnamese support from the Soviets and Chinese was one of the largest sources of armament in that conflict.20 External support is not limited to providing physical armament or weapons. A post-Vietnam war RAND study determined that “intangible elements of external assistance, such as psychological reinforcement, propaganda, and diplomatic advocacy, might be as important as, or more important than, material support.”21 Of course, somewhere between stinger missiles and diplomatic encouragement is one of the most universal wartime necessities: money. Financial support can come directly (e.g. US payments to the Nicaraguan Contras), or it can be filtered through a series of cut-outs, shell corporations and anonymous accounts to the point that it the original donor is virtually impossible to determine. Counterinsurgency is challenging enough for incumbent forces; the addition of external support can shift the balance of power to the degree that insurgents may prove to be an insurmountable foe. 4) Strategic and tactical flexibility – Insurgencies can range from small, disorganized groups, all the way to quasi-states within a state. Despite their breadth of structures, nearly all successful insurgencies share the common trait that they remain flexible in both their strategic mission and their tactical actions. In his analysis of asymmetric conflicts, which nearly all insurgencies are, Dr. Arreguín-Toft explains that an asymmetry of

17 Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New York: Praeger, 13. 18 Stoker, D. (2009). Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose: A Contrarian View. Small Wars Journal, 6. 19 Record, J. (2006, September 22). External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success. Parameters, 37. 20 Record, J. (2007). Beating Goliath: Why insurgencies win. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 51. 21 Zasloff, J.J. The Role of Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China’s Support to the Vietminh, 1946-1954. viii.

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strategy is the key component to insurgent success. As a universally accepted Von Clausewitz-style strategy of warfighting, the winning approach is to avoid the enemy’s surfaces (i.e. strengths) and attack their gaps (i.e. weaknesses)22 Dr. Arreguín-Toft has simply taken this tactical approach and applied it to the strategy of insurgency. The general categories of strategy are direct vs. indirect attack and defense. The claim is that, ceteris paribus, a weak actor (i.e. insurgent) cannot win against a strong actor (i.e. incumbent) when employing the same strategy.23 The insurgent’s flexibility to refrain from adhering to the Law of Armed Conflict (e.g. hiding among the civilian population, reinforcing the importance of local support) renders a significant portion of the incumbent’s combined arms ineffective. Not unlike “using a sledgehammer to crush a housefly”24 the incumbent government’s reliance on conventional war doctrine (e.g. supporting fires, air strikes, etc.) has historically been proven ineffective against insurgencies. In their article Rage Against the Machines, Lyall and Wilson suggest that a reliance on mechanized arms has an inverse relationship with success against insurgencies.25 An insurgent’s ability to dynamically flex and adapt to the ever-changing situation may be one of their greatest keys to success. Religion

After relying on professional consensus for the characteristics of winning insurgencies, the next step is to analyze the role religion has on an insurgency’s outcome. The first step is to take the 196 case studies and determine which ones resulted in a definitive outcome. Because 71 of the cases are still ongoing, and 19 ended in a draw (neither side claiming victory), there are 106 cases available for analysis.

The remaining 106 cases can be divided into four categories: winners or losers, religious or non-religious. Even with the generous binary qualification of religious involvement (as described in the definitional section) only 38 of the 22 Recommended Readings on Clausewitz. (n.d.). Retrieved April 13, 2016, from http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/readings.htm 23 Arreguín-Toft, I. (summer 2001). How the Weak Win Wars. International Security, 26(1), 108. 24 Cassidy, R. M. (2002, September). Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly. Military Review, footnote 34 Peter M. Dunn 25 Lyall, J., & Wilson, I. (2009). Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars. International Organization Int. Org., 63(01), 67. doi:10.1017/s0020818309090031

19Draws

65Losses

41Wins

71Ongoing

196Cases

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insurgencies are classified as religiously motivated. Of the 38 religiously motivated insurgencies, only 13 claimed victory Upon initial inspection, it appears that religiously motivated insurgencies have the lowest (12.3%) success rate. Even when one takes into consideration the relatively low success rate of insurgencies as a whole (39%), religious insurgencies still appear to have a comparatively low margin for success. Failure Success Total Religious 25 13 38 Non-Religious 40 28 68 Total 65 41 106 However, because the number of religious insurgencies is markedly fewer than non-religious, the initial data is misleading. If insurgencies are broken into two distinct groups, religious and non-religious, the resulting success rates are much more similar. Failure Success Religious (66%) (34%) Non-Religious (59%) (41%) When examined proportionally, the figures are not nearly as conclusive. While there is still a higher percentage of non-religious insurgencies that are successful, the difference is not so substantial as to establish a clear correlation. Admittedly, a 7% difference between the two data sets is noteworthy, but it is not significant enough to definitively state that religion has a measurable impact on the success of an insurgency. It is for this reason that I find H3, Religion will have neither a positive, nor a negative impact on the probability of IS success, as the appropriate determination for this analysis. Understanding that religion does not hold a great deal of influence on the insurgency’s outcome is telling in and of itself. First, these data reinforce the fact that insurgencies, in general, have a low rate of success. Secondly, religious insurgencies are not entirely global. With few exceptions, insurgencies with religious motivations emanated from North Africa, the Near and Middle East as well as Central Asia. Within those regions, there is no strong correlation between region and outcome (e.g. Middle Eastern religious insurgencies usually win), just that occurrence and region share a strong connection. Further investigation into the religion associated with the insurgency (e.g. Christianity, Islam, etc.) may conclude that a given belief has a higher or lower success rate, but that would require deeper analysis than is possible with a paper of this nature. For the purposes of analyzing the future of the Islamic State,

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the data are clear that religion is not likely to play a pivotal role in the outcome of that insurgency.

Islamic State

Background While it is not the intent of this paper to provide a deep historical background of the Islamic State (in Iraq and the Levant), a general outline of their emergence and ideology is necessary to frame the analysis. Tracing its roots back to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), the Islamic State is not a new organization. However, with brutal and publicized executions freely broadcasted across the Internet, IS gained a great deal of publicity in the summer of 2014. In a seemingly short timeframe, IS was able to attract disturbingly high numbers of foreign fighters, financers and international supporters to its cause.26 Through mastery of digital technology, such as videography and social media, IS quickly garnered worldwide notoriety. IS’s core mission is quite simple, they wish to establish an Islamic caliphate and hasten the return of the Mahdi. IS’s “members believed the great battle between infidels and Muslims would take place (in Dabiq) as part of the final drama preceding the Day of Judgment.”27 The first step in creating a caliphate is to control land, both physically and governmentally. Capitalizing on sectarian violence in Iraq, and a civil war in Syria, IS leadership began taking over Iraqi and Syrian cities. In so doing IS established itself as the de-facto government. Imposing a harsh Islamic regime on the growing number of cities that IS was able to capture appeared to come with relative ease. “You don’t have to overthrow Muslim countries to make a caliphate, and you don’t have to persuade them to declare one…conquer land and declare your own”28 seemed to be the modus operandi of the Islamic State. But there is much more to the IS insurgency than periodically controlling various cities. The fact that IS controls elements of governance that are usually reserved for the recognized state (e.g. tax collection, law enforcement, public health, etc.), is not an indication that the IS insurgency has ‘won’.

Characteristics To best assess the future of IS, we must first compare its current standing with the recognized elements for insurgent success. The four accepted requisites

26 McCants, W. F. (2015). The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 101. 27 Ibid, 102. 28 Ibid, 123.

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for insurgency success are listed below, followed by an analysis of how the Islamic State’s fares on each of the elements:

1) Will/determination - The Islamic State is fanatically determined to achieve its goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate. According to an IS spokesman “We will not lay down this flag until we present it to Jesus, the son of Maryam, and the last of us fights to Deceiver.”29 A strong belief and determination to achieve a goal is clearly an important attribute of a successful insurgency, however IS’s overzealous determination to achieve an internationally ‘unrealistic goal’30 may actually be the Islamic State’s biggest weakness. Many of the men (and women) who support the Islamic State are not necessarily doing so for the same reasons. The most passionate members in the organization probably believe in the central IS mission of hastening the return of the Mahdi, but others are more likely to support IS for less devout reasons. A great number of IS members levy their support under the classic ‘greed vs grievance’ paradigm that has less to do with ancient religious interpretations and more to do with current economic and political incentives.31 In other words, the will to fight may be strong in the most vocal members of IS, but it is unlikely that every supporter carries that same level of commitment.

2) Local Support - The Islamic State has capitalized on the politically precarious position of governments in both Iraq and Syria. In areas where government was unable to provide basic resources to its citizens, IS “would then move into the volatile regions, provide basic security and public goods to win over the population, and establish “Shari’a justice””32 In a region all too familiar with dictatorial management and repressive regimes, the Islamic State is taking advantage of a behavior known as ‘reference dependence.’33 Essentially, IS has garnered local support by being ‘the devil you know;’ the local population may actually be more comfortable with IS’s heavy-handed, ultra-strict implementation of Shari’a than the uncertain rule that would come without IS. The tactic of reference dependence however, may not work forever. Much like the Sunni Awakening during the 2006 Iraq war, supporters can

29 Ibid, 106. 30 While the consolidation of various Muslim states into a single state is not outside the realm of possibility, the magnitude of the caliphate that IS desires to construct is unreasonable to expect in the current socio-political construct. Personal assessment is the driving factor for this statement. If there are any credible arguments to the contrary, I have not read or heard of them.31 Graham, J. (n.d.). What Drives ISIS? Retrieved April 13, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-graham/what-drives-isis_b_8678314.html 32 McCants, W. F. (2015). The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 83. 33 Mendelsohn, B., & McCants, W. (2016, January 07). Experts Weigh In: What is the future of al-Qaida and the Islamic State? [Web log post]. Released through Brookings, Markaz, Middle East Politics & Policy

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only remain passive for so long. In analyzing the future of IS, Dr. Arreguín-Toft posits that “ISIS/IL is busily destroying its own social base as it fights (cf. Taliban in Afghanistan from 1996–2001). This limits the quality and success of its operations in Syria and the surrounding region.”34 There is no doubt that IS can still rely on a great deal of local support. Partially because of its ability to provide basic services (e.g. trash collection in Mosul), and partially because of locals’ lack of viable alternatives, IS is likely to maintain this support in the short term. However, as locals become more incensed with IS’s brutal enforcement techniques, their support is unlikely to last for the duration of the insurgency. 3) External (foreign) support – The extent to which IS is directly receiving external support is difficult to measure. Certainly the flow of foreign fighters has been the most publicized element of external support, but its impact on IS’s insurgency fighting ability is up for debate. Of the (approximately) 30-50,000 IS fighters, some media outlets have reported that tens of thousands of fighters have traveled from 80 different nations.35 Without underestimating the importance of physical combatants, the number of troops is only a major factor when fighting a symmetrical attrition based war. In the asymmetrical insurgency landscape that IS is fighting in, political support is far more valuable. Some Gulf States (Qatar specifically) have been informally associated with supporting IS, but the majority of these claims have been levied against specific individuals with residency in a given state, not from the state itself. As I will expand upon in the strategic flexibility section, IS’s continued attacks against (Western) foreign states places their future external support in great peril. There may be select states that would be willing to support IS, although it is unlikely they would do so overtly. As IS continues to alienate powerful nations (especially permanent members of the UN Security Council, FR, GR, US) by conducting terrorist attacks, the likelihood of external support drops precipitously.

4) Strategic and tactical flexibility – According to existing studies, insurgents gain the advantage over incumbents when they fight their insurgency with an opposite strategy (e.g. guerrilla vs conventional). IS rose to the forefront of the international consciousness through its public displays of extreme tactics. Ignoring any shred of conventional warfighting, IS conducts torture, execution, and public mutilation without any sign of restraint. To a degree, this tactic has worked in their favor. The gruesome displays of barbarism instill fear in many among the local populations, which helps in the development of support, albeit unwillingly.

34 Arreguín-Toft, I. (2016, March 30). Re: Research question - USD Graduate Program [two cents] [E-mail to the author]. 35 Schmitt, E., & Sengupta, S. (2015). Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global Efforts. Retrieved April 14, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?_r=0

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IS’s use of terrorist tactics against stronger powers (i.e. militarily armed states) has not proven quite as successful. A fundamental flaw in IS’s strategy is their attempt to establish a state by using unconventional. Guerrilla warfare may help further a cause, and can even overthrow an existing state, but it is very unlikely to establish a state that transcends multiple borders. That requires conventional military power to create and protect such a state. No matter how sophisticated or advanced IS is claimed to be, their level of capacity is measured in relation to insurgents and terrorist groups; IS is desperately far behind being a conventional threat to any decently trained state army.

Anticipated Trend of IS Success Indicators

Where to go from here?

Policy Recommendations The following recommendations are aimed at countering the Islamic State through degradation of local support, more appropriately tailoring military operations, and focusing international relations with the Islamic State. They are intended to serve as overarching recommendations and only provide general guidance, not specific details. • Eroding the Islamic State’s public support is key to hastening their demise as

an organization. DoD and USAID should dedicate a majority of resources for developing infrastructure (public works, job development, law enforcement, etc.) to undermine IS’s influence on susceptible groups in the Iraq/Syria region.

- The American involvement of Sunni tribes during the 2006-7 era of the Iraq war was instrumental in undermining al-Qaeda’s efforts; a similar strategy is likely to succeed when applied to the ISIS paradigm. McCants notes that “The most effective weapon of (America)…were

Will/determination Local Support

External (foreign support

Strategic and tactical flexibility

Now High Medium Medium Medium

Future Medium Low Low Medium/Low

17

the Popular Committees formed of disgruntled tribesmen and some Islamist opponents of AQAP.”36

- IS, as an independent actor, cannot secure the state of Iraq or Syria; they lack even the requite support to overthrow the Shi’a capital of Baghdad. The only way that ISIS is able to control a variety of regions (i.e. different religious areas) is by “bribing tribesmen and encouraging them to support the mujahids.”37 Therefore, the US can reduce ISIS influence by “Securing the support of the tribes in the area…(because) the lack of tribal support would doom the jihadists’ efforts.”38

• Protracted military operations will be counterproductive when combating IS.

The United States should adopt a Counter Terrorism (CT), not a Counter Insurgency (COIN) military strategy.

- IS declared a party goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate and waging an apocalyptic war. A large presence of US (or any foreign) troops will only help reinforce the fantasy of an all-encompassing battle. For COIN to be effective, troops must be present for an indeterminate period, assisting in state-building and political development. COIN will expose too many troops, to unnecessary threats, for far too long.

- “So long as “crusaders” avoid placing boots on the ground in any large numbers, ISIS/IL will likely collapse of its own weight, or be destroyed by a push from the Pesh Merga, Syrian regulars, or Turkish regulars. Its current strategy seems to follow the pattern of Ali’s against Foreman in 1974: taunt the West into a real military intervention (this may be why we so often hear of “rape” and “chemical weapons:” two hot-button issues usually sufficient to provoke a larger scale intervention).”39

- Although IS is regularly viewed as an insurgent group fixated on overthrowing existing nations, they are more simply a terrorist organization; CT is a viable method of reducing IS’s influence in the region. By targeting specific leaders and organizational strongholds, CT missions will reinforce the fact that IS would be defeated in any conventional battles, thus reducing the recruiting allure of belonging to an omnipotent organization.

• Negotiation and statesmanship will not help America reduce IS’s threat on national interests. No resources should be dedicated to direct negotiation with any IS members or affiliates.

36 McCants, W. F. (2015). The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 59. 37 Ibid, 152. 38 Ibid, 83. 39 Arreguín-Toft, I. (2016, March 30). Re: Research question - USD Graduate Program [two cents] [E-mail to the author].

18

- IS is a radical group with little to no regard for public sentiment or

outsider perspective; they publicly impose corporal and capital punishment in their enforcement of hudud (Islamic punishment). Because IS does not feel there is any room for a different interpretation on the strategy to achieve their goals, negotiation would be a misallocation of resources and effort.

- Although IS sees itself as a righteous state, it has a startlingly different definition of how to define a state. The IS leadership believes that land, government and followers are the only prerequisites for statehood.40 If DoS were to engage in diplomacy with IS it would potentially undermine other legitimate diplomatic efforts and open the doors to other violent extremists declaring statehood in order to achieve a similar status.

- Diplomacy should be reserved for legitimate actors, with realistic goals, and a genuine desire to achieve an agreement. The fact that one of IS’s primary goals is to fight an apocalyptic religious battle suggests that they are not only incapable of genuine negotiation, but they may also behave irrationally to achieve that goal.

• IS’s rhetoric is laden with contradictions and self-serving interpretations of religious doctrine. Despite the fact that religion does not play an active role in the outcome of insurgencies, DoS should make every effort to publicize these inconsistencies to undermine IS’s recruiting effectiveness.

- IS receives a great deal of support from outsiders who travel to the Middle East to participate in the insurgent cause. These jihadis, as well as domestic jihadis join IS cause under the pretense that they are supporting the one, undeniably correct, interpretation of Islam. In reality, IS ‘cherrypicks’ select scriptures and misinterpretations of Islam to support its cause.

- When it comes to Islam, there are countless interpretations of the Qur’an and other religious scriptures: “Want to find passages justifying peace and concord? They’re in there. Want to find passages justifying violence? They’re in there too.”41 This deliberate selection of various interpretations is convincing enough for many of the uneducated followers to simply trust and follow their religious leaders.

- An active, multinational campaign to highlight the inconsistencies in IS’s rhetoric, both online and through local religious organizations, is likely to reduce their recruiting power, while simultaneously providing a platform to empower anti IS organizations in the region.

40 McCants, W. F. (2015). The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy, and doomsday vision of the Islamic State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 122. 41 Ibid, 150.

19

Conclusion

Insurgencies are historically predisposed to fail. There are, however, some characteristics that can increase the likelihood of their success. The presence of these characteristics does not ensure an insurgency’s success, but one or more must be present for an insurgency to succeed. Will/determination underscore the fact that insurgencies are fighting for a cause with deep rooted motivation and central necessity. By provoking an insurgency, a group indicates their ultimate commitment to a protracted, often bloody conflict. This unwavering commitment to a cause can often prove stronger than their adversary. In addition to will, local support assists insurgencies camouflage their actions and blur the distinction between sides. This support can be either coerced or voluntary. External assistance, everything from arms to political support, strengthens an otherwise mismatched conflict. External support can level the playing field between insurgents and incumbents, significantly increasing the probability of an insurgent success. Finally, a flexible strategic and tactical organization within an insurgency severely limits the advantages of the incumbent. By fighting an asymmetrical battle, insurgents can minimize COIN doctrine and, similarly to external assistance, reduce the incumbent’s advantage. Given a perceived rise in religiously based insurgencies, this paper accepted the existing characteristics for insurgent success, but further examined religion’s role in outcomes. By examining the outcome of 106 insurgencies, it is determined that religion does not have a noteworthy impact on the conflict’s outcome. Understanding that religion does not have an active role in the outcomes, this paper focuses on the probable outcome of the ongoing Islamic State (IS) insurgency. The IS has some degree of each characteristic for a successful insurgency, but appears to be slowly declining in all four categories. Continuing along its current trajectory, all indicators suggest that IS will not have a successful outcome. In order to hasten the decline of the IS, the final section of this paper provides policy recommendations to serve as the starting point for future operations. DanGray’spapertakesonaninterestingpuzzle,namely,thelikelihoodofsuccessorfailureofinsurgencies.Basedonaclosehistoricalreadingofcharacteristicsofinsurgencies,hedistillsfourelementsfromtheliteraturethatareidentifiedaselementslikelytospellsuccessforaninsurgentmovement:willordetermination,localsupport,externalassistance,andaflexiblestrategy.Danfurtheraskswhathappenswhenonethrowsreligiousfervorintothemix.ForthoseofusworriedaboutthebrutalityofISILwithrecentattacksagainstwhatOsamabinLadencalledthe“farenemy”,Dan’spointthatinsurgencieshavealowrateofsuccessandthat

20

thisisastrueofreligiousasofsecularinsurgenciesisahopefulmessage.HethenmovesontoexaminingeachoftheseindependentvariablestotheISISinsurgency.Overall,thispaperaddressesanimportantsubjectandoffersusefulpolicyrecommendations.IhavesomemethodologicalandsubstantivequestionsforDantoconsider.Firstthemethodologicalquestions:

1. Howwasinformationonthefourcharacteristicsofinsurgenciescoded?Inotherwordshowwerethesecharacteristicsoperationalized?

2. Howwerereligiousinsurgenciesdistinguishedfromsecularinsurgencies?Howwasthenumbervalueplacedonlevelofreligiousinfluence?Howmuchconfidencecanwehaveonthereliabilityofthecoding?

3. Whatwasthestatisticalsignificanceofthecorrelations?Now,forthesubstantivequestions:

1. WhichIRtheoreticaltraditioninyourviewalignswiththelistofpolicyrecommendationsyouofferandwhy?

2. InviewofthelackofpopularsupportforgreaterUSmilitaryinvolvementintheMiddleEast,howlikelyisitthattheUnitedStateswillbeabletosustainapolicyofdeepinvolvementintheregion?Howstrongisourintelligencecapabilityandhowwelldoweunderstandtheculturalandethnicdivisionstobeabletoelicittribalcooperationforourgoals?

3. Yousuggestinyourrecommendationsthatdiplomacyshouldbereservedforlegitimateactors.Thequestionhereiswhodecidesonthelegitimacyofactors?AsRonaldReaganoncestatedinresponsetothecontras—oneman’sfreedomfighterisanotherman’sterrorist.

4. IsUSpromotionofacampaigntohighlightinconsistenciesinthereligiousrhetoricofISlikelytobesuccessful?Mightitbackfire?

Finally,IthinkoneofthemoreinterestingstatementsinthepaperisthatISILaroseamidsttheinstabilityinIraqandSyria.Mayoneconcludefromthisthatpowerfulcountriesshouldtakegreatcarenottodestabilizestateswhethertopromotedemocracyorforanyothermilieugoal?ISILwasabletogainafootholdinanIraqdestabilizedaftertheUSinvasionof2003andinaSyriawrackedbycivilwar.So,shouldwegobacktoatimewhenasJohnQuincyAdamsdeclared:“Americadoesnotgoabroadinsearchofmonsterstodestroy.Sheisthewell-wishertofreedomandindependenceofall.Sheisthechampionandvindicatoronlyofher

21

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Appendix 1: Insurgency Data Country Insurgents RegionCode Region Regulars Outcome Coded StartDate EndDate Days Years Religion Motivation

Algeria CNDR/FFS(Kabylie) 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Algeria

IncumbentWon 1 9/29/63 4/1/65 550.00 1.51 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Algeria OAS 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Algeria/France


Angola UNITA 5 Africa AngolaIncumbentWon 1 8/9/75 8/2/02 9855.00 27.00 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Brazil ALN,VPR 7 LatinAmerica BrazilIncumbentWon 1 2/1/68 9/1/71 1308.00 3.58 0.0 Political

Burundi HutuRebels 5 Africa BurundiIncumbentWon 1 4/29/72 7/31/72 93.00 0.25 0.0 Ethnic

Burundi HutuRebels 5 Africa BurundiIncumbentWon 1 8/18/88 8/22/88 4.00 0.01 0.0 Ethnic

CanadaFrontdeLiberationduQuebec 1 NorthAmerica Canada

IncumbentWon 1 3/1/63 1/1/71 2863.00 7.84 0.0 Political

CentralAfricanRepublic MLPC 5 Africa

CentralAfricanRepublic


DominicanRepublic Constitutionalists 7 LatinAmerica DominicanRepublic


DRC Katanga 5 Africa DRCIncumbentWon 1 7/11/60 1/15/63 918.00 2.52 0.0 Political

DRC EasternCongo 5 Africa DRCIncumbentWon 1 9/1/64 11/5/67 1160.00 3.18 0.0 Political

DRC FLNC 5 Africa DRCIncumbentWon 1 3/8/77 5/31/77 84.00 0.23 0.0 Political/Independence

ElSalvador FMLN 7 LatinAmerica ElSalvadorIncumbentWon 1 10/10/80 1/1/92 4100.00 11.23 0.0 Political/Economic

France ActionDirecte 3 Europe FranceIncumbentWon 1 5/1/79 2/21/87 2853.00 7.82 0.0 Political

GermanyRedArmyFaction(Baader-Meinhof) 3 Europe Germany

IncumbentWon 1 6/5/70 3/1/98 10131.00 27.76 0.0 Political/Socialism

Greece

RevolutionaryOrganization17November 3 Europe Greece

IncumbentWon 1 12/23/75 9/5/02 9753.00 26.72 0.0 Political/Socialism/Anti-West

24

GuatemalaEGP,ORPA,FAR,PGT,URNG 7 LatinAmerica Guatemala

IncumbentWon 1 11/1/60 12/1/96 13179.00 36.11 0.0 Political/Socialism/Indegenous

Hungary Hungary 3 Europe SovietUnionIncumbentWon 1 10/23/56 11/30/56 38.00 0.10 0.0 IndependenceRevolution

Italy RedBrigades 3 Europe ItalyIncumbentWon 1 8/1/70 12/1/88 6697.00 18.35 0.0 Political/Socialism

Kenya MauMau(Kenya) 5 Africa UKIncumbentWon 1 10/20/52 5/9/05 1351.50 3.70 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Madagascar Madagascar 5 Africa FranceIncumbentWon 1 3/29/47 12/1/48 613.00 1.68 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Malaysia MRLA(Malaya) 6 Asia UKIncumbentWon 1 2/1/48 7/31/60 4564.00 12.50 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Morocco Polisario 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Morocco

IncumbentWon 1 2/27/76 9/1/91 5665.00 15.52 0.0 Political/BorderDispute

MoroccoMorocco/SahrawiRebel(IfniWar) 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Spain


Mozambique RENAMO 5 Africa MozambiqueIncumbentWon 1 12/1/76 10/4/92 5786.00 15.85 0.0 ColonialIndependence

PanamaPanama(OperationJustCause) 7 LatinAmerica USA

IncumbentWon 1 12/20/89 12/24/89 4.00 0.01 0.0 Political/Strategic

PeruRevolutionaryLeftMovement 7 LatinAmerica Peru

IncumbentWon 1 6/9/65 10/23/65 136.00 0.37 0.0 Political/Socialism

PortugalForçasPopulares25deAbril 3 Europe Portugal


SierraLeone RUF,AFRC 5 Africa SierraLeoneIncumbentWon 1 3/1/91 1/2/16 3959.00 10.85 0.0 Political/Economic

Spain ETA 3 Europe SpainIncumbentWon 1 7/1/59 10/20/11 19104.00 52.34 0.0 Linguistic/Cultural

SriLanka JVP 6 Asia SriLankaIncumbentWon 1 4/5/71 6/9/71 65.00 0.18 0.0 Socialist

SriLanka TamilTigers 6 Asia SriLankaIncumbentWon 1 7/1/83 5/9/16 9436.00 25.85 0.0 Ethnic/Cultural

TaiwanTaiwaneseInsurgents 6 Asia China

IncumbentWon 1 2/28/47 3/21/47 21.00 0.06 0.0 Communism

Thailand CommunistParty 6 Asia ThailandIncumbentWon 1 11/1/65 1/1/83 6270.00 17.18 0.0 Communism

Uganda UPA/UFM 5 Africa UgandaIncumbentWon 1 1/1/86 6/15/05 2556.75 7.00 0.0 Economic/Political

UnitedStatesWhiteSegregationists 1 NorthAmerica USA

IncumbentWon 1 1/1/55 5/21/05 4748.25 13.00 0.0 Racial

UnitedStates Weathermen 1 NorthAmerica USAIncumbentWon 1 6/20/69 11/1/77 3056.00 8.37 0.0 Raceequality/antiwar

UnitedStatesSymbioneseLiberationArmy 1 NorthAmerica USA

IncumbentWon 1 3/1/73 9/18/75 931.00 2.55 0.0 Equality/Socialism

Uruguay Tupamaros 7 LatinAmerica UruguayIncumbentWon 1 7/31/63 6/1/73 3593.00 9.84 0.0 Communism

VenezuelaRevolutionaryLeftMovement,FALN 7 LatinAmerica Venezuela

IncumbentWon 1 4/1/60 12/1/63 1339.00 3.67 0.0 Communism

Algeria FLN(Algeria) 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica France

InsurgentWon 2 11/1/54 7/1/62 2799.00 7.67 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Angola Angola 5 Africa PortugalInsurgentWon 2 2/3/61 11/11/75 5394.00 14.78 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Bolivia MNR 7 LatinAmerica BoliviaInsurgentWon 2 4/8/52 4/11/52 3.00 0.01 0.0 Political

Burundi CivilWar 5 Africa BurundiInsurgentWon 2 10/1/93 4/12/05 4211.00 11.54 0.0 Ethnic

Cambodia KhmerRouge 6 Asia CambodiaInsurgentWon 2 1/1/68 4/16/75 2662.00 7.29 0.0 Political/Genocide

Cameroon Cameroon(UPC) 5 Africa FranceInsurgentWon 2 1/1/55 5/13/05 1827.50 5.01 0.0 ColonialIndependence

China PLA(Communists) 6 Asia China(KMT)InsurgentWon 2 8/1/45 12/7/49 1589.00 4.35 0.0 Political/Socialism

Cuba26thofJulyMovement(Castro) 7 LatinAmerica Cuba

InsurgentWon 2 7/26/53 1/1/59 1985.00 5.44 0.0 Political

DRCDemocraticForcesCongo-Zaire 5 Africa DRC

InsurgentWon 2 10/1/96 5/1/97 212.00 0.58 0.0 Political

EastTimor EastTimor 6 Asia IndonesiaInsurgentWon 2 11/29/75 8/30/99 8675.00 23.77 0.0 Political/Independence

Ethiopia Anti-DergMilitias 5 Africa EthiopiaInsurgentWon 2 11/1/74 5/1/91 6025.00 16.51 0.0 Political

GeorgiaAbkhazSecessionists 6 Asia Georgia

InsurgentWon 2 8/14/92 12/1/93 474.00 1.30 0.0 Political/Ethnic

GuineaBissau GuineaBissau 5 Africa PortugalInsurgentWon 2 12/1/62 12/1/74 4384.00 12.01 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Laos PathetLao 6 Asia Laos/USAInsurgentWon 2 4/1/53 12/2/75 8280.00 22.68 0.0 Political/Socialism

Moldova DniestrSeparatists 3 Europe MoldovaInsurgentWon 2 9/1/90 7/21/92 689.00 1.89 0.0 Political/BorderDispute

Mozambique Mozambique 5 Africa PortugalInsurgentWon 2 6/1/62 6/25/75 4772.00 13.07 0.0 ColonialIndependence

Namibia SWAPO 5 Africa NamibiaInsurgentWon 2 4/19/60 3/21/90 10928.00 29.94 0.0 Political/Socialism

Nicaragua Sandinistas 7 LatinAmerica NicaraguaInsurgentWon 2 7/1/61 7/19/79 6592.00 18.06 0.0 Political/Socialism/Indegenous

25

PapuaNewGuinea

BougainvilleRevolutionaryArmy 8 Oceania PapuaNewGuinea

InsurgentWon 2 12/1/88 4/1/98 3408.00 9.34 0.0 Ethnic/Economic

Rwanda RPF 5 Africa RwandaInsurgentWon 2 10/1/90 7/18/94 1386.00 3.80 0.0 Political/Ethnic

Rwanda Hutus 5 Africa Rwanda/BelgiumInsurgentWon 2 11/1/59 9/1/61 670.00 1.84 0.0 Ethnic

Somalia

Anti-BarreClans(SSDF,SNM,Isaaqs) 5 Africa Somalia

InsurgentWon 2 7/1/80 1/29/91 3864.00 10.59 0.0 Ethnic/Clan

SouthAfrica ANC,PAC,Azapo 5 Africa SouthAfricaInsurgentWon 2 12/16/61 8/1/90 10455.00 28.64 0.0 Ethnic/Freedom

Tunisia Tunisia 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica France


Uganda NRA 5 Africa UgandaInsurgentWon 2 1/1/81 1/19/86 1844.00 5.05 0.0 Ethnic/Clan

VietnamVietMinh(Indochina) 6 Asia France


Vietnam VietCong/PAVN 6 Asia SouthVietnam/USAInsurgentWon 2 10/26/55 4/30/75 7126.00 19.52 0.0

Communism/WesternInfluence

ZimbabweZANU-PF(BushWar) 5 Africa Rhodesia

InsurgentWon 2 7/1/64 12/1/79 5631.00 15.43 0.0 Ethnic/Cultural

Algeria MIA/FIS/AIS,GIA 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Algeria

IncumbentWon 1 1/1/92 2/2/16 3684.00 10.09 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

China Tibet 6 Asia ChinaIncumbentWon 1 10/1/50 8/1/54 1400.00 3.84 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

China Tibet 6 Asia ChinaIncumbentWon 1 3/1/56 3/22/59 1117.00 3.06 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

CroatiaRepublicofSerbianKrajina 3 Europe Croatia

IncumbentWon 1 4/1/90 8/1/95 1948.00 5.34 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

India Naga 6 Asia IndiaIncumbentWon 1 10/1/55 11/1/75 7336.00 20.10 1.0 EthnicIndependence

Indonesia DarulIslam 6 Asia IndonesiaIncumbentWon 1 9/20/53 11/23/53 64.00 0.18 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Indonesia GAM(Aceh) 6 Asia IndonesiaIncumbentWon 1 12/4/76 1/5/16 10255.00 28.10 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Iraq Kurds 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iraq

IncumbentWon 1 9/16/61 11/22/63 798.00 2.19 1.0 Religious(Islamist)/Ethninc

Iraq KurdishPeshmerga 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iraq

IncumbentWon 1 10/1/80 9/6/88 2897.00 7.94 1.0 Religious(Islamist)/Ethninc

Iraq ShiiitesandKurds 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iraq


Ireland ProvisionalIRA 3 Europe UKIncumbentWon 1 12/1/69 7/1/97 10074.00 27.60 1.0 Religious

Japan JapaneseRedArmy 6 Asia JapanIncumbentWon 1 8/29/69 4/14/00 11186.00 30.65 1.0 Political/Socialism

Jordan PLO 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Jordan

IncumbentWon 1 9/17/70 9/24/70 8.00 0.02 1.0 Religious(Islamist)/Samesect

KenyaNFDLM(ShiftaWar) 5 Africa Kenya

IncumbentWon 1 12/1/63 1/31/68 1522.00 4.17 1.0 Ethnic

Malaysia Borneo 6 Asia UK/MalayaIncumbentWon 1 1/1/63 8/1/66 1308.00 3.58 1.0 Political/BorderDispute

Nigeria Biafra 5 Africa NigeriaIncumbentWon 1 7/6/67 1/12/70 921.00 2.52 1.0 Political/Cessation/Ethnic

NigeriaMaitatsineSect(Kano) 5 Africa Nigeria


Oman Dhofar 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Oman/UK

IncumbentWon 1 1/1/62 6/5/05 7670.25 21.00 1.0

Religious(Islamist)/Independence

Philippines Huks 6 Asia PhilippinesIncumbentWon 1 9/1/50 5/1/54 1338.00 3.67 1.0 Political/Ethnic

Philippines MNLF 6 Asia PhilippinesIncumbentWon 1 3/18/68 9/2/96 10395.00 28.48 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Senegal MFDC 5 Africa SenegalIncumbentWon 1 12/1/82 12/4/16 8036.00 22.02 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

SyriaMuslimBrotherhood 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Syria


Tajikistan UTO 6 Asia TajikistanIncumbentWon 1 5/1/92 6/27/97 1883.00 5.16 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Uganda ADF/NALU 5 Africa UgandaIncumbentWon 1 1/1/86 6/22/05 5113.50 14.00 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Yemen CivilWar 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica SouthYemen


Afghanistan Taliban 6 Asia AfghanistanInsurgentWon 2 8/1/94 9/27/96 788.00 2.16 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

Afghanistan NorthernAlliance 6 Asia AfghanistanInsurgentWon 2 11/1/96 12/1/16 1856.00 5.08 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

Afghanistan Afghanistan 6 Asia SovietUnionInsurgentWon 2 1/1/80 2/15/89 3333.00 9.13 1.0 Political

Bangladesh Bangladesh 6 Asia PakistanInsurgentWon 2 3/26/71 12/17/71 266.00 0.73 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

Chad FROLINAT 5 Africa ChadInsurgentWon 2 11/1/65 8/1/79 5041.00 13.81 1.0 Political/Religious

Eritrea EritreanSeparatists 5 Africa EthiopiaInsurgentWon 2 9/1/61 5/24/93 11588.00 31.75 1.0 Political/Religious

26

Kosovo KLA 3 Europe SerbiaInsurgentWon 2 2/1/96 6/10/99 1225.00 3.36 1.0 Religious(Islamist)/Ethninc

Lebanon

Hezbollah(SouthernLebanon) 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel

InsurgentWon 2 6/4/82 5/25/00 6565.00 17.99 1.0 Religious/territorial

Russia Chechnya 6 Asia RussiaInsurgentWon 2 12/11/94 8/31/96 629.00 1.72 1.0 Religious(Islamist)/Ethninc

Slovenia

SlovenianNationalists/Separatists 3 Europe Yugoslavia

InsurgentWon 2 6/27/91 7/5/91 10.00 0.03 1.0 Ethnic/Religious

SouthSudan SPLM 5 Africa SudanInsurgentWon 2 8/1/83 1/5/16 7824.00 21.44 1.0 Religious/Ethnic

Yemen FLOSY/NLF(Aden) 4MiddleEast/NorthAfrica UK

InsurgentWon 2 12/1/63 11/30/67 1460.00 4.00 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

Yemen

YemeniRepublicans(NorthYemenCivilWar) 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Yemen

InsurgentWon 2 11/15/62 9/3/69 2485.00 6.81 1.0 Religious(Islamist)

ArgentinaFAR,ERP/MTP("DirtyWar") 7 LatinAmerica Argentina Draw 4 3/25/76 7/16/82 2,304 6.31

Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh 6 Asia Azerbaijan Draw 4 2/1/88 5/16/94 2,296 6.29

Bangladesh

Bangladesh-ShantiBahini 6 Asia Bangladesh Draw 4 1/7/73 12/2/97 9,095 24.92

Bosnia-Herzegovina

RepublikSrpska(Serbs) 3 Europe Bosnia Draw 4 6/6/92 12/31/94 938 2.57

Cambodia

FUNCINPEC,KPNLAF 6 Asia Cambodia Draw 4 3/1/79 May-93 5,175 14.18

Chad

MDD,FNT,CSNDP,FARF 5 Africa Chad Draw 4 10/15/91 May-98 2,390 6.55

Colombia

Liberal&CommunistParties(“LaViolencia”) 7 LatinAmerica Colombia Draw 4 9/15/45 12/31/66 4,856 13.30

Djibouti

FRUD(AfarInsurgents) 5 Africa Djibouti Draw 4 8/1/91 5/12/01 3,572 9.79

Indonesia Fretilin 6 Asia Indonesia Draw 4 9/11/74 8/30/99 9,119 24.98

Israel PalestinianIntifada 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel Draw 4 12/1/87 9/13/93 2,113 5.79

Lebanon

Sunni,Shia,andChristianmilitias(CivilWar) 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Lebanon Draw 4 4/13/75 10/13/90 5,662 15.51

Liberia NPFL 5 Africa Liberia Draw 4 12/24/89 11/22/96 2,525 6.92

Mali TuaregInsurgents 5 Africa Mali Draw 4 6/1/90 Jul-95 1,856 5.08

Nepal CPN 6 Asia Nepal Draw 4 2/13/96 4/26/06 3,725 10.21

Nicaragua Contras 7 LatinAmerica Nicaragua Draw 4 8/1/81 Apr-90 3,165 8.67

NorthIreland

UlsterVolunteerForce/LoyalistVolunteerForce 3 Europe NorthernIreland Draw 4 5/1/66 7-May 14,975 41.03

Sudan AnyaNya 5 Africa Sudan Draw 4 10/1/63 2/28/72 3,073 8.42

Cyprus EOKA(Cyprus) 3 Europe UK Draw 4 7/2/52 8/13/59 2,598 7.12

Yemen SouthYemen 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Yemen Draw 4 2/21/94 7/7/94 136 0.37

Mali

GSPC/AlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb 5 Africa Algeria Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,478.75 15.00

Algeria

GSPC/AlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Algeria Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,479 15.00

Morocco

GSPC/AlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Algeria Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,479 15.00

Angola CabindaProvince 5 Africa Angola Ongoing 3 1/1/75 Ongoing 13,880 38.00

Bangladesh

Harakatul-Jihad-i-Islami 6 Asia Bangladesh Ongoing 3 1/1/92 Ongoing 7,670 21.00

Myanmar

KachinandKaren(KNU) 6 Asia Burma Ongoing 3 8/1/48 Ongoing 23,528.00 66.04

Chile MIR 7 LatinAmerica Chile Ongoing 3 1/1/65 Ongoing 17,532.00 48.00

China Uighurs 6 Asia China Ongoing 3 1/1/96 Ongoing 6,209 17.00

Colombia

FARC,ELN,EPL,M-19 7 LatinAmerica Colombia Ongoing 3 1/1/63 Ongoing 18,263 50.00

DRC

EasternCongoMilitias 5 Africa DRC Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,478.75 15.00

Egypt

Gama’aal-Islamiyya 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Egypt Ongoing 3 1/1/73 Ongoing 14,610.00 40.00

Greece

RevolutionaryStruggle 3 Europe Greece Ongoing 3 1/1/03 Ongoing 3,652.50 10.00

27

IndiaMizoNationalFront 6 Asia India Ongoing 3 1/1/66 Ongoing 17,167 47.00

India Naxalites 6 Asia India Ongoing 3 1/1/67 Ongoing 16,802 46.00

India Sikhs 6 Asia India Ongoing 3 1/1/84 Ongoing 10,592.25 29.00

India

KashmiriSeparatists 6 Asia India Ongoing 3 1/1/89 Ongoing 8,766 24.00

India LashkareTaiba 6 Asia India Ongoing 3 1/1/89 Ongoing 8,766.00 24.00

Indonesia JemaahIslamiyah 6 Asia Indonesia Ongoing 3 1/1/93 Ongoing 7,305.00 20.00

Iran

MujaheedineKhalq 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iran Ongoing 3 1/1/65 Ongoing 17,532 48.00

Iran

KurdishDemocraticPartyIran 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iran Ongoing 3 1/1/79 Ongoing 12,418.50 34.00

Iran

PRMI/Jundallah(Baluch) 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iran Ongoing 3 1/1/03 Ongoing 3,652.50 10.00

Iraq

AQI/JAM/Kata'ibHizballah 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Iraq Ongoing 3 1/1/03 Ongoing 3,652.50 10.00

Ireland

ContinuityIrishRepublicanArmy 3 Europe Ireland Ongoing 3 1/1/94 Ongoing 6,939.75 19.00

Israel PLO 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel Ongoing 3 1/1/65 Ongoing 17,532 48.00

Israel

PFLP-GeneralCommand 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel Ongoing 3 1/1/68 Ongoing 16,436.25 45.00

Israel Hamas 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel Ongoing 3 1/1/87 Ongoing 9,496.50 26.00

Israel KahaneChai 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel Ongoing 3 1/1/90 Ongoing 8,401 23.00

Israel

AbuNidalOrganization 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel/Jordan Ongoing 3 1/1/74 Ongoing 14,244.75 39.00

Jordan

AbuNidalOrganization 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Israel/Jordan Ongoing 3 1/1/74 Ongoing 14,244.75 39.00

IvoryCoast ForcesNouvelles 5 Africa IvoryCoast Ongoing 3 1/1/02 Ongoing 4,017.75 11.00

Japan AumShinrikyo 6 Asia Japan Ongoing 3 1/1/84 Ongoing 10,592.25 29.00

Kenya

AlQaedainEastAfrica 5 Africa Kenya/Tanzania Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,478.75 15.00

Tanzania

AlQaedainEastAfrica 5 Africa Kenya/Tanzania Ongoing 3 1/1/98 Ongoing 5,479 15.00

Lebanon Asbatal-Ansar 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Lebanon Ongoing 3 1/1/91 Ongoing 8,036 22.00

Libya

LibyanIslamicFightingGroup 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Libya Ongoing 3 1/1/95 Ongoing 6,575 18.00

Mexico EZLN 1 NorthAmerica Mexico Ongoing 3 1/1/94 Ongoing 6,939.75 19.00

Mexico

ZapatistaArmyofNationalLiberation 1 NorthAmerica Mexico Ongoing 3 1/1/94 Ongoing 6,939.75 19.00

Morocco

MoroccanIslamicCombatantGroup 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Morocco Ongoing 3 1/1/90 Ongoing 8,400.75 23.00

Nigeria NigerDeltaRebels 5 Africa Nigeria Ongoing 3 1/1/91 Ongoing 8,035.50 22.00

Pakistan BaluchiSeperatists 6 Asia Pakistan Ongoing 3 1/1/73 Ongoing 14,610 40.00

Pakistan Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 6 Asia Pakistan Ongoing 3 1/1/96 Ongoing 6,209 17.00

Pakistan

Jaish-e-Mohammed 6 Asia Pakistan Ongoing 3 1/1/00 Ongoing 4,748.25 13.00

Pakistan

Tehrik-eTalibanPakistan 6 Asia Pakistan Ongoing 3 1/1/07 Ongoing 2,191.50 6.00

India

Harakatul-Mujahidin 6 Asia Pakistan/Kashmir Ongoing 3 1/1/89 Ongoing 8,766 24.00

Peru

ShiningPath,MRTA 7 LatinAmerica Peru Ongoing 3 1/1/80 Ongoing 12,053.25 33.00

Philippines

CommunistPartyofthePhilippines 6 Asia Philippines Ongoing 3 1/1/69 Ongoing 16,071 44.00

Philippines MILF 6 Asia Philippines Ongoing 3 1/1/77 Ongoing 13,149 36.00

Philippines AbuSayyaf 6 Asia Philippines Ongoing 3 1/1/91 Ongoing 8,035.50 22.00

Russia

Chechnya/NorthCaucasus 6 Asia Russia Ongoing 3 1/1/99 Ongoing 5,113.50 14.00

Rwanda Interahamwe 5 Africa Rwanda Ongoing 3 7/18/94 Ongoing 6,741 18.46

SaudiArabia

alQaedainSaudiArabiaAQAP 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica SaudiArabia/Yemen Ongoing 3 1/1/00 Ongoing 4,748.25 13.00

Yemen

alQaedainSaudiArabiaAQAP 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica SaudiArabia/Yemen Ongoing 3 1/1/00 Ongoing 4,748 13.00

Somalia Various 5 Africa Somalia Ongoing 3 1/1/91 Ongoing 8,035.50 22.00

28

Chad DarfuriRebels 5 Africa Sudan/Chad Ongoing 3 1/1/03 Ongoing 3,652.50 10.00

Sudan DarfuriRebels 5 Africa Sudan/Chad Ongoing 3 1/1/03 Ongoing 3,652.50 10.00

Syria

FreeSyrianArmy/Anti-AssadRebels 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Syria Ongoing 3 1/26/11 Ongoing 730.50 2.00

Thailand

SouthThailandrebels 6 Asia Thailand Ongoing 3 1/1/04 Ongoing 3,287.25 9.00

Turkey

RevolutionaryPeople’sLiberationParty 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Turkey Ongoing 3 1/1/78 Ongoing 12,783.75 35.00

Turkey PKK 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Turkey Ongoing 3 1/1/83 Ongoing 10,957.50 30.00

CentralAfricanRepublic

Lord'sResistanceArmy 5 Africa

CentralAfricanRepublic Ongoing 3 1/1/86 Ongoing 9,861.75 27.00

DRC



SouthSudan



Uganda



Afghanistan AlQaeda 6 Asia UnitedStates/Allies Ongoing 3 1/1/88 Ongoing 9,131.25 25.00

Pakistan AlQaeda 6 Asia UnitedStates/Allies Ongoing 3 1/1/88 Ongoing 9,131.25 25.00

Afghanistan

Taliban/HaqqaniNetwork 6 Asia USA/Afghanistan Ongoing 3 1/1/01 Ongoing 4,383.00 12.00

Iraq Ansaral-Islam 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica

USA/Iraq/WesternEurope Ongoing 3 1/1/01 Ongoing 4,383.00 12.00

Uzbekistan

IslamistMovementofUzbekistan 6 Asia Uzbekistan Ongoing 3 1/1/91 Ongoing 8,036 22.00

Uzbekistan IslamicJihadUnion 6 Asia Uzbekistan Ongoing 3 1/1/04 Ongoing 3,287.25 9.00

SaudiArabia HouthiRebels 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Yemen/KSA Ongoing 3 1/1/04 Ongoing 3,287.25 9.00

Yemen HouthiRebels 4

MiddleEast/NorthAfrica Yemen/KSA Ongoing 3 1/1/04 Ongoing 3,287.25 9.00

Documents

Dan Gray University of San Diego Master of Arts in ...2Ibid 3Due to a variety of different methodologies and primary sources, anexact success rate is difficult to assess. The range