Danish Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration1

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1976 11: 259Cooperation and ConflictCarsten Lehmann Sørensen

Danish Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration1

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Danish Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration1CARSTEN LEHMANN SØRENSENInstitute of Political Science, University of Aarhus

Sørensen, C. L. Danish Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration. Cooperationand Conflict, XI, 1976, 259-278.

During the months preceding the Danish EC referendum in 1972, 90 persons consti-tuting the very top of the political elite were interviewed. Categorized in four sub-elites - the parliamentary, administrative, organization and communications elites -this highest layer of the Danish political system is portrayed with respect to socialbackground and other potentially important characteristics. Elite attitudes towardsEC membership and European integration in general showed a pro-European con-

sensus motivated by economic considerations. Social and political integration werealso viewed with sympathy, provided the extent of social integration remained limited,and provided political integration excluded security policy. Only elite attitudes towardsthe supranational EC institutions revealed cleavages and ambiguity. More than anythingelse, Danish elite attitudes seemed to be determined by a small state’s overall depen-dence on the surrounding European system both in an economic and political sense.

Carsten Lehmann Sørensen, Institute of Political Science, University of Aarhus.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the Danish referendum on 2 October1972 no less than 90 per cent of all voters

participated; 63 per cent said ’yes’ to

Danish membership of the EuropeanCommunities (EC), and 37 per cent wereagainst. During the months preceding thereferendum 90 persons constituting the

very top of the Danish political elite wereinterviewed. The intention was to get adetailed picture of elite attitudes towardsEuropean integration in general as wellas towards various aspects of economic,social, political and institutional integra-tion then and in the future. The homo-

geneity of attitudes was apparent fromthe very beginning, as 90 per cent ofthose interviewed were in favour of Dan-ish EC membership and only 10 per centagainst or still in doubt.

This article is a study of elite attitudesonly, the relevance of which is based onthe assumption of a strong correlationbetween the EC policy of a small statelike Denmark and the corresponding eliteattitudes.2 If the main theme were theformulation of Danish EC policy and

especially the decision to joint the EC,elite attitudes would of course be moreof an intervening variable.One group of independent or deter-

mining variables normally used in elitestudies is social background and relatedcharacteristics, because we can infer fromsuch variables a good deal about the

homogeneity and dominant values of apolitical system, about elite-elite relation-ships and about elite-mass relationships.3In this article background variables willbe used to characterize the Danish elite,and the assumption that elite attitudesare related to social background andsuch other factors will be tested. Ofcourse, cleavages or consensus in eliteattitudes can never fully be explained byreference to an arbitrary number ofbackground variables.4 The political con-text at home and abroad must also beconsidered and, as this article is not astudy of foreign policy making, only themain problems and trends in Danish ECpolicy will be discussed.

Since the fifties the main characteristicof Denmark’s EC policy has been the

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260

very prominent status given to the eco-nomic aspects.5 Danish politicians haveattempted to obtain the greatest possibleeconomic advantages, whilst at the sametime preserving as much freedom ofaction as possible. The strong emphasison economic elements is due to severalfactors.

First, the commercial and export struc-tures have created complicated problemsfor Danish market policy, given that themost important export markets for agri-culture are in Great Britain and on theContinent, while those for industry arein the other Scandinavian countries. Inaddition, strong Anglo-Scandinavian tiesand affinities made EC membership con-tingent upon several conditions. Eversince the first Danish application for

membership in 1961, it was a clear con-dition that Denmark should only becomea member concurrently with Britain, andthat the relationship of the Scandinaviancountries with the EC was to be solvedin a satisfactory manner, either by mem-bership or by special free trade agree-ments. This solution would mean maxi-mum economic advantages for Denmarkas an EC member, and not least it wouldmake membership politically more ac-

ceptable.6Second, the dominant feature of the

national economy has been a constant

struggle to achieve or maintain full em-ployment and economic growth on theone hand and a favourable balance of

payments on external trade on the other.As the pro-marketeers saw it, EC mem-bership and the ensuing economic ad-

vantages could provide a solution to theinternal economic problems. During theincreasingly intense campaign leading upto the referendum the pro-marketeerstherefore stressed the economic benefits,while the discussion of the political per-spectives of joining the EC was held onthe premises of the anti-marketeers.

Third, the small state aspect is a sig-nificant element in, the making of Danish

EC policy. Denmark is economically veryvulnerable because of highly specializedtrade in both products and markets, andbecause foreign trade plays an excep-tionally important role in the total econ-omy. In a small country like Denmark,which has reached high levels of indus-trialization, per capita income, socialwelfare, etc., elite attitudes in generalwould tend to be gradualistic, moderateand pragmatic.’ On issues such as marketpolicy, foreign policy and especiallymembership of the EC, we may thereforeexpect to find a high degree of consensusand open-mindedness in view of Den-mark’s dependence on the surroundinginternational system.8

II. DEFINITION OF THE DANISHFOREIGN POLICY ELITEThe problem of defining the Danish for-eign policy elite for purpose of the

present study had for a variety of reasonsto be solved in a very pragmatic manner.Until the start of data collection for this

project, no other research had beenundertaken as to the structure and be-haviour of the Danish political elite. Theonly exception from this general state ofaffairs was some research on parliamen-tary behaviour and patterns of recruit-ment to the Folketing, but this researchhad only limited relevance to the study.9Therefore, there was no support to befound in previous research and in factalso very little in studies of politicalelites in other European countries.10

However, after the Government hadannounced its intention to organize areferendum, the problem of joining theEC could no longer be categorized as anormal foreign policy issue. The generalpolitical, social and economic importanceof _ the European issue took on suchdimensions that it ceased to be an issuehandled functionally by the specialized- but probably politically peripheral -circles of the Folketing and the Ministry



261

Table 1. The Danish political elite, sub-categories, and response rates.

of Foreign Affairs. During the year afterAutumn 1971, the European issue wasthe dominant and all-embracing one

facing the general political elite as wellas the electorate.

For these reasons the problem of

defining our elite was tantamount to theproblem of defining the highest layers ofthe general political elite. However, atthe point of departure very little wasknown about this elite, and there was nopossibility of basing selection of the

sample on solid findings on decision-

making in the Danish political system.Under these circumstances it was decidedthat a definition making use of positionaland formal-institutional criteria wouldconstitute the most acceptable samplingprocedure.On this general basis the Danish polit-

ical elite was divided into four function-

ally defined sub-categories (cf. Table 1).In deciding the size of the elite sampleit was necessary to accept a generalmaximum of about 100 persons, becauseof the fact that all interviews had to beconducted by one person during a periodof 6-7 weeks in the spring of 1972.11 Thereason for the relatively short interview-ing period was partly the desirability tocollect data under as near identical con-ditions as possible, and partly the needto finish data collection before the endof the 1971-72 parliamentary session.Within this general limitation, the fourelite categories were operationally definedin the following way.

1. The parliamentary elite was definedas the combined membership of the

parliamentary Foreign Relations Com-mittee (Det udenrigspolitiske N &oelig;vn) andthe parallel Market Relations Committee(Markedsudvalget), another standingcommittee set up in the beginning of thesixties with the purpose of followingEuropean affairs in an EC-EFTA per-spective. Due to overlapping member-ships of the two 17-member committees,this part of the parliamentary elite wasreduced to 25 persons. In addition 5ministers, all of them M.P.s as well andassumed to be central figures in theGovernment, were included in this eliteof politicians.

2. It posed a lot of problems to definethe administrative elite in operationalterms using formal and positional criteria.First, it seemed relevant to assume thatthis sub-elite was rather specialized, butto what degree and on which lines? Sec-ond, the central administration is a veryclosed and anonymous community ac-

cording to Danish bureaucratic tradition.This created serious problems, both withrespect to defining the relevant elite andto persuading the persons selected for

interviewing to answer questions on theirpersonal attitudes towards a very con-troversial political issue.

In total, 32 persons were selected ac-cording to two criteria. The first criterionwas membership of the interdepartmentaldelegation, which had responsibility atthe administrative level to negotiate theterms of Danish EC membership. Thesecond criterion led to the selection ofall government officials at the level ofassistant secretary (kontorchef) who had



262

formal responsibility for foreign policy,foreign economic policy, general eco-

nomic policy and defence policy, i.e.those areas of competence which wereseen as the relevant issue areas in the

public debate on EC membership. Thelevel of assistant secretary was chosenin preference to the higher levels of

permanent secretary (departementschef)and assistant permanent secretary (afdel-ingschef) for two reasons: the problem ofaccess and actual involvement. The prob-lem of access was probably of minor

importance, while actual involvement inthe European issue was expected to bemuch more direct and intense at thismore specialized level than at higherlevels in the hierarchy. 12

3. The organization elite included 29

representatives of what was supposed tobe the dominant interest groups in theDanish political system in relation to theEC issue: (a) The trade union movementas represented by the LO, the top-organization which coordinates and rep-resents the interests of all major tradeunions; (b) industry as represented bythe Federation of Industries (Industri-rddet), which mainly represents the in-terests of the larger industrial firms; (c)commerce as represented by the Mer-chants Guild (Grosserersocietetet), a fed-eration of all important and exportorganizations (except the cooperativeorganizations of agriculture and the

consumers); and (d) agriculture as rep-resented by Landbrugsrddet and De sam-virkende danske Husmandsforeninger, thegeneral federations of larger and smallerfarmers, respectively.The organizational structure of the

trade union movement on the one handand the interest groups of industry, com-merce and agriculture on the other is

fundamentally different. In Danish tradeunions all decision-making competenceseems to be concentrated in the handsof democratically elected leaders, whileleadership in other economic interest

groups is divided between a small nucleusof elected leaders (often full time) andbroader groups of career ’civil servants’

working in the organization secretariats.In view of this difference, the trade

union leaders included in the samplewere defined as the leaders of the 12

largest trade unions represented in the

governing board of the LO. For the otherinterest groups selected, the respondentswere divided evenly between the presi-dents and vice-presidents of the organiza-tions on the one hand, and the managingdirectors and the functionally specializedchiefs of international economic or ECaffairs in the secretariats on the other. Itshould be mentioned that there were afew examples of overlapping membershipbetween this elite category and the parlia-mentary elite as defined above.

4. The inclusion of the communica-tions elite in the sample may be regardedas disputable. While the first three elite

categories are supposed to include at

least some of the top decision-makers inEC affairs, as well as in a more generalsense, the communications elite cannot

normally aspire to such prominence inthe Danish political system. However,the public importance of the EC issueand the decision to let the Danish votershave the final word in a referendum

produced a rather unique situation. Itseemed therefore logical to include the

persons primarily responsible for the

organized and institutionalized flow ofinformation produced by electronic andprinted mass media during the periodleading up to October 1972.13A total of 20 editors and reporters

dealing with European affairs were

selected from radio/TV and the majorquality as well as popular newspapersincluding three large press corporations:Politiken, Berlingske Tidende and theSocial Democratic Press.When the sample of 111 persons had

been constructed according to the criteriadiscussed above, social background data



263

were compiled from a number of officialsources. Each person was contacted and90 persons were interviewed. The inter-views lasted from one to two hours andtook place in the office of the respondent.All interviews were recorded on tapeand later transcribed. A rather detailed

questionnaire (and a corresponding codescheme) was constructed beforehand, butafter only two or three interviews it be-came apparent that it was not possibleto let interviews on the complicated sub-ject of European integration be con-

strained by a detailed and rigorousquestionnaire. The procedure thereforebecame one of extensive interviews whereas many essential questions as possiblewere asked. Most of the respoidents alsoanswered questions about their politicalparty preferences, and about their use

and evaluation of electronic mass mediaand of the press, Danish as well as for-

eign.

A final word on the character of theelite selected. In the discussion above,the term sample has generally been usedto characterize the group of respondents.Of course, this phraseology is in no wayprecise. As it has no meaning to definea general universe from which a randomsample could be drawn, the use of theterm has no statistically technical signi-ficance. The term is used in this studyonly to indicate an attempt to define theDanish political elite in such a way thatwe have approximated - as closely as

possible within the limits of this study -the nucleus of the relevant political elite.

III. THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDAND OTHER CHARACTERISTICSOF THE ELITE

Of 111 persons belonging to the highestlayers of the general political elite inDenmark in the year of grace, 1972, only

Table 2. The social background of the Danish political elite (percentages down).



264

three were women; 74 per cent were bornbetween 1911 and 1930; 39 per centwere bom in the Copenhagen area andanother 26 per cent in other cities; only12 per cent had fathers belonging to theworking class; 78 per cent had gymna-sium education (12 years) compared to amere 6 per cent of the total Danish

population, and 77 per cent had a

university degree or a degree from tech-nical colleges, teacher’s colleges, etc. So,the typical member of the Danish polit-ical elite is a highly educated man in hisforties or fifties, bom in an urban area,and whose father used to be upper whitecollar or self-employed.

It seems reasonable to conclude thatthe Danish political elite is extremelyatypical in comparison with the Danishpopulation as such with respect to thosesocial background characteristic where

comparison is meaningful. It is a privi-leged group from high status homes, menin their best years, having spent con-

siderable time being educated and mak-

ing a career. Details are presented inTable 2.

However, when the political elite isdivided into four sub-categories, differ-ences with regard to social backgroundare revealed which seem to cluster in twodistinct patterns. The first pattern tendsto combine relatively young age, birthin urban area, especially the Copenhagenarea, high status homes and an extremelyhigh level of education. These character-istics seem to distinguish the administra-tive and communications elites from theparliamentary and organization elites, asthe latter tend to be relatively older, moreoften bom in rural areas as the sons of

self-employed fathers and without easyaccess to higher education. If we acceptas part of the democratic ideology thatpoliticians and interest group leadersshould reflect the social background ofthe people they represent, i.e. that theyought to be ’representative’ in the narrowsense of the word then the two elites are

obviously not fully ’representative’; on

Table 3. Other characteristics of the Danish political elite (percentages down).

* Figures in parentheses show the results of the parliamentary elections of September 1971,in which the five parties together got 93 per cent (= 100 per cent) of the vote.



265

the other hand, they are more ’represent-ative’ than the administrative and com-munications elites.

In Table 3 some other characteristicsof the political elite are listed, and theimpression is confirmed that there existtwo distinct patterns of elite background.The administrative and communicationselites are at opposite poles from oneanother only in terms of seniority. As ageneral rule, no civil servant will reachtop positions in the state bureaucracywith less than 15 years of seniority. Re-cruitment procedures for the communica-tions elite may be very similar to thoseof the administrative elite as far as

education is concerned, but with respectto internal mobility the communicationselite has a much more flexible and fluidhierarchical structure.

Nearly half the communications eliteand nearly three fourths of the adminis-trative elite have had the opportunity tostudy or work abroad as part of their

career, e.g. as a diplomat or as a foreigncorrespondent. Of course, persons mayhave stayed abroad without taking upactual residence abroad; as an exampleit can be mentioned that one third of the

parliamentary elite have been membersof the Danish UN delegation and/ormembers of the European Council As-sembly and/or the NATO Assembly.A comparison of political party pref-

erences of the political elite with theresults of the general election of 1971shows that Sovial Democrate are under-

represented and Agrarian-Liberals over-represented in the elite. Of course, the

parliamentary elite should reflect the

composition of the Folketnng, but alsothe party preferences of the organizationelite were very much in harmony withthose of the general electorate apart fromthe apparent ’over-representation’ of theAgrarian Liberal Party. The administra-tive and communications elites on theother hand are both atypical: The Agrar-ian Liberal Party had 40 per cent or

Co-Co - 5

more and the Social Democratic Partyless than 20 per cent.

During the interviews people were

asked which Danish and foreign news-papers - dailies and weeklies - theynormally read and which they consideredthe most valued source of information onEuropean affairs. From the answers ’topfive’ lists of the most widely read andmost valued Danish and foreign news-papers have been derived (cf. Table 4).The similarity between the ’top five’ listson foreign press is a natural consequenceof the language-barrier: A Dane will notnormally read foreign newspapers justfor fun, but precisely because he expectsto find valuable information. The fiveDanish newspapers given highest priorityas sources of information very accuratelyrepresent what is normally considered &dquo;

the Danish ’quality press’. In fact, noneof those interviewed ever mentioned themost circulated Danish dailies, Ekstra-bladet and BT, but included Worsen,Kristeligt Dagblad and Weekendavisen -all poorly circulated - among the nextfive on the list of ’quality press’.

It seems that the Danish political eliteconsists of ardent consumers of news-

papers, Danish as well as foreign. Gener-ally, newspapers are widely read and

highly regarded. As many as 84 per centread no less than three Danish news-

papers normally and regularly, and 82per cent read at least one foreign news-paper regularly. If it can be assumed thatthe level of information is primarily afunction of the quantity of dailies andweeklies regularly read, then the Danishpolitical elite’s level of information ishigh, indeed. 14

’

When asked about the role of theelectronic mass media - radio and TV -nearly all agreed that orientation given byradio/TV on the EC issue would havesome effect on the Danish voters byincreasing the general level of informa-tion, by influencing people’s attitudes,and by mobilizing political activity. In



266

Table 4. Danish and foreign press read by Danish political elite.

contrast to this near-total agreement, onlyone third found the information on EC

questions given by the electronic massmedia valuable and satisfactory, whileone third were highly critical and anotherthird avoided the question by claimingthat they hardly ever had the opportunityto listen to the radio or look at TV.

IV. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDSEUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Given that 90 per cent of the elite were

positive towards Denmark’s membershipof the European Communities, it is not

very fruiful just to compare pro- and

anti-European attitudes. As shown inTable 5, it is possible to distinguish be-tween two patterns of pro-Europeanattitudes. The first pattern is character-istic of those interviewed, who were

absolutely positive about Danish EC

membership and accepted it uncondi-

tionally. This may be termed a strongpro-European attitude to be distinguishedfrom a pragmatic pro-European attitudewhich is characteristic of persons who

accepted EC membership due to lack ofalternatives or who rejected such alterna-tives as not being feasible or realistic.The 90 per cent pro-Europeans split in

two halves with 47 per cent strongly infavour of EC membership and 43 percent in favour for more pragmatic rea-sons. This difference in pro-Europeanattitudes also appeared when the elitewere asked about possible alternatives toEC membership. 52 per cent flatlyrejected the question as absolutely hypo-thetical and irrelevant to the actual polit-ical and economic situation. The remain-

ing 48 per cent mentioned alternativessuch as Nordic cooperation, a West Eu-ropean free trade area, etc., but only very

Table 5. Elite attitudes towards European integration in general (percentagesacross).

--- - - -



267

few considered these alternatives realistic.In the Danish debate, EC member-

ship was often described as joining a

’bloc’ or ’club’ of rich Western Europeancountries unwilling to contribute to thedevelopment of international cooperationof today. The Customs Union, the Com-mon Agricultural Policy, the CommonTrade Policy were regarded as variousmeans to increasing trade and welfare

among ’club-members’ at the expense ofother European countries and the ThirdWorld. Only 17 per cent of the Danishelite - and among them all the anti-Eu-

ropeans - agreed more or less with thisperception of European integration, while83 per cent rejected it as false.

So, three patterns of elite attitudes -

strongly pro-European, pragmaticallypro-European and anti-European - canclearly be distinguished in responses tosuch very general questions as whetherthe elite was for or against EC member-ship, whether it was conditionally or

unconditionally in favour, whether it wasable to imagine alternatives or not,whether these alternatives were feasibleor not, and the degree to which EC co-operation was perceived as a contributionor an obstacle to the development ofinternational cooperation. These patternsof attitudes at the general level can beexpected to crystallize in terms of atti-tudes towards economic, social, politicaland institutional integration, thereby in-dicating points or components of atti-

tudes, their relative importance, their

interdependence, etc.

V. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDSECONOMIC INTEGRATION

During the late sixties the EC countriescompleted the establishment of a CustomsUnion and a Common Market for in-dustrial products as well as agriculturalproducts. To be excluded from theseCommon Market benefits was costly, butnot disastrous for Denmark as long as

Danish farmers could rely on the Britishmarket for agricultural exports and Dan-ish industries could expand their exportsto the Scandinavian market.

With the conclusion of the treaties ofaccession for Denmark and Britain andwith the decision to maintain the indus-trial free trade area established withinthe framework of EFTA including Den-mark and Sweden (and later Norway),Denmark nearly got the best of allworlds, seen from a foreign trade point ofview. When the Danish elite were askedabout their attitudes towards increasedeconomic integration, 89 per cent werepositive. Obviously the extremely positiveattitudes towards EC membership wererelated to similar positive attitudes to-

wards economic integration.At the Hague summit of December

1969, the EC of the Six agreed to supple-ment the Customs Union and the Com-mon Market with a common monetaryand economic policy. During the seven-ties, an Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) was to be created step by step.According to the Werner Report of 1970and later decisions by the Council ofMinisters, the year 1980 was to be a

kind of deadline for the final phase in thecompletion of the EMU. 90 per cent ofthe Danish elite supported these plansand objectives, which began to material-ize in the Spring of 1972. A monetaryarrangement, often called ’the snake’,was established in addition to consulta-tion and cooperation within the frame-work of various economic and monetarycommittees.

There seemed to be no discrepancybetween these very positive elite attitudestowards an EMU and positions on thefeasibility of an EMU. 85 per cent ex-pected an EMU to be created some timein the future, but this optimism as to

plans and principles was modified by arather outspoken scepticism towards theagreed time schedule and the 1980 dead-line. The main reason for these very



268

Table 6. Elite attitudes towards economic integration (percentages across). -

positive attitudes and expectations on

an EMU, which might have meant severerestrictions on the independence of theeconomic policies of the member coun-tries, seems to have been a feeling thatmonetary and economic cooperation oneway or the other would be a simplenecessity in the future due to ever in-

creasing economic interdependence. Nine-teen of those interviewed explicitlystressed this point as a very importantone.

Table 7. Elite attitudes towards EMUand Danish economic independence (per-centages down).

It was considered of great interest toknow whether the elite expected Den-mark’s ability to conduct an independenteconomic policy to be influenced, re-

stricted or perhaps abolished by the estab-lishment of an EMU. In fact, only 36per cent of the elite expected that thecreation of an EMU would restrict Den-mark’s freedom of manoeuvre in eco-

nomic policy, while 64 per cent held theopposite view (cf. Table 7). However,

only 26 per cent stated that an EMUwould mean no change at all, while themain argument as expressed by 38 percent was to deny the existence of anactual Danish ability to formulate andcarry through an independent economicpolicy. This attitude was quite consistentwith the above mentioned perception ofincreasing global and regional economicinterdependence. It is an often stated factthat Denmark as a small state with a

large foreign trade is highly dependenton trends in the international economy.Thus it is understandable that 64 percent of the Danish elite denied that

joining an EMU would pose any parti-cular risk to Denmark. The reverse argu-ment that participation in an extended

system of monetary and economic co-

operation is particularly in the interestof smaller states with large foreign traderatios was mentioned explicitly by only12 persons.Having found that by and large the

Danish political elite had very positiveattitudes towards increased economic

integration in general and towards the

planned EMU in particular, it seemedof interest to examine perceptions of thealready established Common Market,especially the market for agriculturalproducts.

There was no doubt that the Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is basedon a system of guaranteed minimal pricesat a relatively high level, could be ex-pected to be very profitable for the gener-ally efficient Danish farmers. But in thelate sixties, EC Commissioner SiccoMansholt, the chief architect of the com-plex system of floor prices, put forward



269

a detailed proposal to change the essenceof CAP from a price or market policyinto a structural policy. The proposalcalled for a 50 per cent reduction offarmers and farms within the EC coun-tries during the seventies, leaving the ECwith fewer, but highly efficient and pro-ductive farms around 1980. Responsesand reactions to this proposal had until1972 been nothing but protest and dis-cussion.When asked about their attitudes

towards a future change of CAP fromprimarily a price policy to a structural

policy, 82 per cent of the Danish elitewere positive and only 18 per cent nega-tive or in doubt. The reasoning behindthis perhaps surprisingly positive positionwas that such a change would not sig-nificantly strip the Danish farmers oftheir benefits. It was emphasized thatstructural developments in Danish agri-culture especially during the sixties hadincreased the productivity of the averageDanish farmer so much that he wouldstill be more competitive than, e.g., the

average German or French farmer, evenshould the principles of CAP be changed.Attitudes were therefore very positiveprimarily because it was believed that achange would do no harm to Danishfarmers.

Elite attitudes towards EC member-

ship as well as perceptions of economicintegration in general and the EMU inparticular reveal a high degree of con-sensus. Even the prospect of a ratherdrastic change of CAP could not breakup the consensus. This means that wecannot trace any difference between the

strong and the pragmatic pro-Europeanson this point. Only the anti-Europeanshad markedly different attitudes fromthose of the majority.

Contrary to the majority view, the

anti-Europeans did not want economic

integration to be increased should Den-mark actually become a member-state.

They were. definitely against the planned

EMU, did not believe it feasible, but ifit were established after all, they fearedthat Denmark’s ability to conduct an

independent economic policy would beseverely restricted. This seemed to be amain reason for their opposition to

membership. Furthermore, those who

perceived the EC as a ’bloc’ or ’club’

ganging up against third countries werealso against any kind of economic inte-gration, especially an Economic and

Monetary Union.

VI. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDSSOCIAL INTEGRATIONThe term social integration refers to whatis called social policy in the EC, butsocial and labour market policy in Den-mark. The existing so-called CommonSocial Policy of the EC primarily cor-responds to what in Denmark is called’labour market policy’. Based on a ’SocialFund’, the Common Social Policy islimited to financial support of nationalprojects intended to create new jobs inareas of considerable unemployment, tocreate training programmes for unem-

ployed, etc.

In Denmark social policy covers healthinstitutions, hospitals, institutions for

children, welfare institutions, old agepensions, etc. and is financed by taxes tostate and local authorities. In most of theother EC countries, however, correspond-ing social expenditures are financed byemployers’ contributions, which of courseinfluences price levels and consequentlyalso the competitiveness of most products.Thus, in a Common Market based onfree competition demands to harmonizesocial policies would not be entirelytheoretical.

63 per cent of the Danish political eliteexpected some kind of a common socialpolicy to emerge sometime in the future,while 36 per cent did not or rejected theissue as irrelevant to the issue of EC



270

Table 8. Elite attitudes towards social integration (percentages across).

membership. Asked whether they ac-

cepted some kind of harmonization ofsocial policies or not, only 37 personsresponded, but nearly all in the affirm-ative. A tentative conclusion is that theDanish elite expected the emergence ofsome kind of common social policy as aconsequence of increased economic inte-

gration, and that it was generally infavour of such developments.

In order to analyze these attitudes ina more detailed and specific way, theelite were asked whether the specialDanish principles of financing social

policy would have to be changed as a

consequence of joining a CommonMarket with some kind of social policy.88 per cent expected no changes at all.

Further, it was asked if the level ofDanish social security might have to bechanged. 79 per cent expected no changesat all, 13 per cent foresaw an increasedue to the many economic benefits stem-

ming from EC membership, while only8 per cent feared a decrease because ofharmonization.

With regard to social policy integrationin the Danish sense of the term, the eliteexpected and favoured some kind of har-monization ; on the other hand, it believedthat the extent of a common social policywould be very limited and affect neitherthe principles of financing social policy,nor the level of social security. Denmark

could join common policies without risk.As for social policy in the EC sense

of the term (labour market policy in Den-mark), one particular problem had helda central position in previous debatesand did so again in 1972: the problem offree movement of labour within theCommon Market. For years free move-ment of labour had existed between theNordic countries without causing prob-lems or concern. But in an EC context,there was some fear that EC countrieswith a huge surplus of labour and rela-tively low average wages might ’export’workers to EC countries with a shortageof labour and relatively high averagewages. This could mean a considerableincrease in the number of foreign workersor guest workers, as they are called inmore friendly official terms. Of course,such developments might in the longerterm have an impact on the level of

wages and might affect the strength ofthe Danish Labour Movement, whichexerts considerable influence politicallyand socially compared with labour move-ments in most other EC countries.

First, the political elite were askedwhether a change in the number of for-eign workers was to be expected. 68 percent expected no change at all, while 32per cent expected an increase, some amoderate increase, others a considerableone. Second, the elite were asked whether



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future trends in Danish wage levels couldbe expected to be influenced by EC mem-bership. 69 per cent thought not, 20 percent expected an increase, 11 per centthe opposite. Third, the elite were askedwhether the strength of the DanishLabour Movement would be affected bymembership. 75 per cent expected nochange or impact at all, 9 per cent ex-pected increasing strength, 16 per centdeclining strength.

These findings, which are reported inTable 8, may be summarized by statingthat elite attitudes show a consensus.

Social integration as such was welcomedby those who felt that it would not havea considerable or harmful impact on

Danish social and labour market policy.Around 70 per cent of the elite rejectedpossibilities of any impact at all. Amongthe remaining responses, at least twolines of reasoning can be found. Accord-ing to the first one, social integration wasvery closely connected with economic

integration. Denmark was expected to

gain considerable economic benefits fromjoining the Common Market. This wouldstimulate economic activity and welfareand lead to an increased level of social

security and an increased level of wages.Furthermore, a higher level of economicactivity would create more jobs whichcould be expected to be filled mainly withforeign workers, but because of bettereconomic prospects the influx of foreignworkers would not damage the strengthof the Labour Movement, quite the con-trary. Thus, 80 per cent to 90 per cent ofthe Danish elite expected that Danishsocial policy and labour market policywould not be influenced, or be influencedin a positive way by Danish EC mem-bership.The other line of argument saw the

prospect of social integration as a directthreat to the principles and standards ofDanish social and labour market policies.It was claimed that negative effects ofeconomic. integration would be felt in

social policy. Danish average wageswould be squeezed and the LabourMovement would lose part of its strengthin a Common Market where Danishborders would be open to everybody.This would be the ultimate consequenceof free competition as the guiding prin-ciple in the Common Market.

This gloomy perception of social inte-gration was found among the anti-Euro-peans. Between the strong and the prag-matic pro-Europeans it was impossibleto trace any differences. Consensus

among the pro-Europeans was funda-mental. Their ways of reasoning werevery similar, the only difference beingthat some persons did not think of social

integration as a well defined issue area,but as strongly connected and mixed upwith economic integration.

VII. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDSPOLITICAL INTEGRATION

Political integration is defined as co-

operation between the EC countries inthe areas of foreign policy and securitypolicy. At the Hague summit of Decem-ber 1969, ’the Six’ decided to includeforeign policy in the overall system ofcooperation among the EC countries, butto keep it outside the legal framework ofthe Treaties of Rome and the EC insti-tutions. On the basis of the Luxembourg(or Davignon) Report of October 1970,regular meetings between the Ministersof Foreign Affairs began to take place.The explicit idea was that the EC coun-tries should inform and consult eachother on a regular basis about foreignaffairs with the long term goal of co-ordinating foreign policies so that Europe(i.e. the EC countries) could speak with’one voice’ in international politics.

Answers to questions about politicalintegration show that no consensus ex-isted on this point in the Danish elitesimilar to the one on economic andsocial integration; on the contrary there



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Table 9. Elite attitudes towards political integration (percentages across).

were cleavages and doubt. 48 per centwere positive towards a Europe speakingwith ’one voice’, 29 per cent were against,and 23 per cent had no clearcut attitude,but seemed very much in doubt. Thishesitance was even more pronounced inthe elite’s perceptions of the feasibility of’one European voice’ in international

politics. 48 per cent expressed doubt, 37per cent thought that ’one voice’ did notbelong to the world of political realities,and only 15 per cent thought it possible.So, while the Danish elite had moderatelypositive attitudes towards foreign policycooperation, it was highly sceptical as

to the feasibility of a Europe speakingwith ’one voice’.

Security policy cooperation among theEC countries seems to be largely a hypo-thetical proposition. Denmark has beena member of NATO since the very be-

ginning in 1949, and attempts in thefifties and sixties to discuss alternativesto membership of the Atlantic Alliancehave been few and scattered. When askedabout their attitudes towards a common

European security policy without speci-fying its framework or substance, 53 percent of the Danish elite flatly rejected theidea, which won support from only a

tiny minority of 18 per cent.It is rather obvious that the presence

of several hundred thousand US troopsin Europe, mainly in West Germany, isthe very crux of the credibility and valueof the Atlantic Alliance as seen from aDanish point of view. Any change in thissituation would affect Denmark’s securityimmediately and directly. From time to

time there had been indications that

mounting political pressures on the USAdministration might lead to a partialor full withdrawal of US forces from

Europe. The Danish elite were askedabout attitudes towards European secur-ity policy cooperation if this hypotheticalsituation were to become a reality oneday. Now as many as 67 per cent ex-pressed positive attitudes, only 23 percent were still against and very fewseemed to be in doubt.

Unfortunately, it is not possible toelucidate attitudes towards the more

detailed character of a European securitypolicy, because as few as 20 personsresponded to questions concerning the

possible framework and substance. Shouldit be an EC army, a European ’force defrappe’ or just a bilateral French-Britisharrangement, an intensified Euro-groupcooperation within the framework ofNATO or the creation of a new Euro-

pean alliance replacing NATO? The fewanswers were too scattered for anythingto be inferred.

Among the strong pro-Europeans near-ly half favoured a common Europeansecurity policy and 29 per cent were

doubtful. If US forces were to be with-drawn from Europe as many as 80 percent were positive. The attitudes of thepragmatic pro-Europeans were muchmore reserved or even negative. As manyas 70 per cent were negative towards acommon European security policy, andeven if US forces were withdrawn onlya slight majority would be in favour ofa common European security policy.



273

VIII. ELITE ATTITUDES TOWARDSINSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION

Institutional integration means the estab-lishment of common institutions, the

widening of the authority and capacity ofsuch institutions, an increase in their

power and influence in political decision-making processes, etc. Questions to theDanish elite about institutional integra-tion focused on the two EC institutionsoften labelled the genuine Communityinstitutions: the Commission and theEuropean Parliament (EP).

Within the constitutional frameworkof the Treaties of Rome, decision-makingauthority rests with the Council of Min-isters acting gradually on the principle ofqualified majority decisions. Opposite tothe Council is an institution, the Com-mission, which is fully independent of themember states and empowered with amonopoly to initiate the decision-makingprocess. This relationship between an

initiating Commission which is supposedto represent the interests of the Commu-nity as such and a decision-makingCouncil of Ministers representing nation-al governmental interests, was conceivedas a ’Community Dialogue’ constitutingthe original element in European integra-tion.l5 A strong Commission aggressivelypromoting Community interests at the

expense of narrowminded national inter-ests, which had produced one catastropheafter another during the last centuries,was seen as a very dynamic element in

the European process of integration, as

a motor in decision-making processesand as a European Government in em-bryo. This is the key to comprehend theideology of the founders of the EC, firstof all Jean Monnet. 27 per cent of theDanish elite agreed with this ideology orvalued it positively. Only 16 per cent

expressed negative attitudes towards thefounding ideology, but as many as 57per cent considered it irrelevant or out-dated in the year 1972 (cf. Table 10).Formal and constitutional rules about

voting procedures in the Council not

only tend to favour the political power ofthe Commission, but also to institution-alize a guaranteed influence for smallerEC countries in the decision-makingprocesses. Introduction and actual useof the principle of majority decisionswould probably have given the Commis-sion power enough to engage all memberstates in a continuously expanding andlegally binding kind of international co-operation. This process towards some

future federal Europe was brought to astandstill by President de Gaulle duringthe great constitutional crisis in the mid-sixties. The result in January 1966, theLuxembourg Agreement, stressed andunderlined the confederative character ofEC cooperation. The continued practisingof the principle of unanimity at all levelsin EC decision-making has crippled thepolitical authority of the Commission,which in the seventies has been more

Table 10. Elite attitudes towards institutional integration (percentages across).



274

similar to that of an international secre-tariat as seen in other international orga-nizations than anything else. 16

Seen in this perspective, it is rather

surprising that 58 per cent of the Danishelite expressed positive attitudes and only42 per cent negative attitudes towards theidea of a strong Commission as the bestprotection of smaller member states,because a strong Commission is part ofthe founding ideology which a majorityof the elite rejected as outdated or irrele-vant. Furthermore, some persons who

agreed with the original ideology rejectedthe perception of a strong Commissionas the best protection of smaller coun-tries. Thus, attitudes towards the role ofthe Commission seemed rather confusedand self-contradictory.

Constitutionally the Commission andthe European Parliament (EP) are inter-dependent, e.g. expressed in the largelysymbolic rule that the EP can dismissthe Commission by a two-thirds majorityvote of no confidence. Empirically this

interdependence has been verified by thehistorical development: The increasinglydominant role of the Council and theever declining authority of the Commis-sion has affected the EP so that it hasbeen completely unsuccessful in nearlyall attempts to obtain any resemblancewhatsoever with a proper parliament.Ever since the establishment of the EP,its strengthening one way or the otherhas been an issue in the ongoing debateabout decision-making in the EC.When the Danish elite were asked

about their attitudes towards this issue,71 per cent of the respondents were

positive and 29 per cent negative. Twoexplanations seem to be possible: First,a majority of the respondents who wishedto increase the strength of the EP appar-ently failed to take into account the im-plications for the strength of the Com-mission towards which attitudes were

ambiguous or less positive. Secondly, afavourable consensus attitude towards

strengthening the EP was expressed bypaying lip-service to a more democraticelement in the decision-making process;the Commission on the other hand, wasperceived as a kind of bureaucraticmonster.

The latter explanation seems most

plausible in view of the attitudes ex-

pressed on the question of direct electionsto the EP. As the establishment of a

procedure of direct elections is normallyregarded as the most rapid and effectiveway of strengthening the EP, the Danishpolitical elite were asked about theirpositions on this subject. 34 per cent

flatly refused to support the introductionof direct elections, while 66 per cent werepositive. But as many as 44 per cent ortwo thirds of this group were positive inprinciple only, stressing that direct elec-tions as a way to strengthen the EP

belonged to the future - the far distantfuture. Only 22 per cent or one thirdwould like to see direct elections intro-duced as soon as possible. So, the elite

expressed a consensus attitude towards

strengthening the Parliament, but was

divided on questions of how and when.Inconsistencies in attitudes seem more

frequent with regard to institutional inte-gration than in other issue areas. It hasbeen pointed out that some personsseemed inconsistent in their attitudestowards the original ideology of a strongCommission and a strong Commissionas the best protection for smallerstates. Furthermore, persons supportinga strengthened EP must be expected tosupport direct elections, but it was notalways so; likewise supporters of a strongCommission could be expected to be

supporters of a directly elected Parlia-ment, but the opposite was the case fora number of persons, enough to blur anyclear-cut explanation of elite attitudestowards institutional integration.



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Table 11. Elite attitudes towards EC membership: sub-elites and political partypreferences. (Abs. Fig.)

~..._-- _1_- n_- -- _...~-

IX. CONCLUSIONS

A detailed analysis of background varia-bles led to the conclusion that the ad-ministrative and communications eliteswere somewhat different from the more

(representative’ parliamentary and orga-nization elites; but compared with theDanish population as a whole, the polit-ical elite was extremely atypical in all

respects.It has been pointed out that (1) some

background variables are considerablybetter predictors of attitudes within a

single national political system than

others; (2) some elite attitudes in a par-ticular national polity are more frequentlyrelated to background variables thanothers; and (3) relationships betweensocial background and attitude vary fromone national political system to anothereven within the same cultural area. 17

Differences in social and politicalbackground may be of explanatory or

predictive value with regard to other

political issue areas than ’European inte-gration’,. where no social background

variables were considerably better pre-dictors than others. Even differences ineducation, political party affiliation, levelof information, etc., had little or no sig-nificant explanatory value.

In order to demonstrate this point ina more elaborate way, pro- and anti-

European elite attitudes are related to

sub-categories and political party prefer-ences in Table 11. First, the table showsthat the organization and communicationselites were more strongly pro-Europeanthan the parliamentary and administrativeelites. This combination is contrary tothe patterns of social background vari-ables and other characteristics. Further-more, the table shows that even when

political party preferences were known,very little could be inferred about eliteattitudes towards EC membership. Anti-European attitudes could not be foundamong persons preferring the Conserva-tives or the Agrarian Liberals, while

nobody preferring the Socialist People’sParty held strongly pro-European atti-tudes. However, pragmatic pro-European



276

attitudes seemed to exist in defiance of

party preferences.’European integration’ had been an

issue in Danish politics for many yearsprior to 1972 and had been subject to anintensive and lasting public debate. Con-sequently, elite attitudes were only slightlyrelated to background variables and

corresponding characteristics, but were

likely to show a high degree of unity oreven consensus due to various processesof consensus-building mechanisms suchas communication and socialization. 18

In order to summarize illustratively theattitudes of the Danish elite, ’Europeanintegration’ may be defined in a two-

dimensional way.19 By ’integration’ of anumber of nation-states is meant that thestates develop a form of cooperationincorporating more and more spheressuch as agricultural policy, monetarypolicy, foreign policy, etc. as well as

ceding more and more sovereignty to

supranational bodies within certain areasof cooperation. In Fig. 1 a visualizinggraph is set forth. The horizontal axis isdefined by the issue areas with which theEC institutions are permitted to deal, andthe vertical axis is defined by the degreeof decisional authority conceded to theseEC institutions.The scope of integration or the hori-

zontal dimension has two aspects: the

type of issue areas included and theextent of cooperation. Danish elite atti-tudes were very favourable or positive

Fig. 1. Illustration of Danish elite attitudestowards European integration.

towards European integration in general,but the analysis of attitudes towardsvarious types of integration showed thatvery positive attitudes were expressedtowards economic integration only, Atti-tudes towards social integration were

generally positive with the qualificationthat the extent of EC cooperation wouldremain limited. As for political integra-tion, attitudes were negative towards

security policy as part of EC cooperation,while attitudes towards the extent of

foreign policy cooperation were generallypositive, but sceptical as to its feasibility.The level of integration or the vertical

dimension includes the strength of ECinstitutions such as the Commission andthe European Parliament (EP). Eliteattitudes towards strengthening theseinstitutions were rather ambigous. How-ever, there seemed to be rather negativeattitudes towards the Commission as a

bureaucratic institution, and rather posi-tive attitudes towards the EP as a par-liamentary institution. But the elite wouldnot support the immediate creation of adirectly elected Parliament, and the origi-nal ideology about a strong Commissionwas considered irrelevant or out of date.The conclusion must be that elite atti-tudes towards the level of authority werestatus quo minded, if anything.

In other words, it can be concludedthat the Danish political elite were fa-vourable towards increasing the scope ofEuropean integration, provided that theextent of social integration would remainlimited and that political integrationwould not include security policy. On theother hand, the elite were not positivetowards any considerable change of theexisting level of European integration.Of course, it is hazardous to construct ascale of saliency, but nevertheless it hasbeen done tentatively.2° By using thisscale, it can be concluded that the lesssalient the issue area, the more positivewere Danish elite attitudes towards

increasing the scope of European inte-



277

gration and vice versa. The graph in Fig.1 illustrates this point, and it has muchresemblance with the kind of conceptionof European integration that has beencalled spill-around.21 According to this,the essence of EC cooperation lies in theintensive and continuous liaison workbetween the governments and administra-tions of the EC countries, i.e. interna-tional cooperation of a confederal nature.

This ’profile’ of Danish elite attitudesleads to the final point, namely, the veryprominent status of the economic aspectsof European integration in elite attitudes.This is obvious when focusing on atti-tudes towards economic integration, butis also evident when dealing with socialintegration. The correspondence betweenvery favourable attitudes towards Euro-pean integration in general and economicand social integration was remarkableand showed a consensus to exist. Therewas no difference between strong andpragmatic pro-European positions on

economic and social integration, whilethese two patterns of pro-European atti-tudes seemed of relevance with respectto political integration. When attitudestowards political and institutional inte-

gration were marked by cleavages andambiguity, it can safely be concluded thatthe very positive Danish elite attitudestowards EC membership and Europeanintegration in general were motivated byeconomic considerations more than any-thing else. This statement can be ex-

plained perfectly, fully and rationally byreference to Denmark’s position in inter-national and European politics as thecrucial determinant.

NOTES1 The author gratefully acknowledges the

financial support provided by the DanishInstitute of International Affairs. Special thanksis addressed to each of the 90 persons who sogenerously gave interviews, and who spokeabout Denmark’s European policy with suchcandour. I am especially grateful to JørgenGrønnegaard Christensen who started this elitestudy and conducted all 90 interviews. Thearticle is a revised version of a lengthy reportpresented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Work-shops in London, April 1975.

2 When referring to attitudes, both cognitiveand evaluative components are included; thequestion is one of perceiving alternatives andchoosing between them, cf. Johan Galtung,’Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of So-cial Position’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.1, 1964, p. 208. For an interesting study of

changes in these two components, see HenryH. Kerr, ’Changing Attitudes through Interna-tional Participation: European Parliamentariansand Integration’, International Organization,Vol. 27, No. 1, 1973.

3 Edinger and Searing, ’Social Backgroundin Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry’,American Political Science Review, Vol. 61,1967, p. 430.

4 By consensus is meant 70-75 per cent

agreement on a given issue; see Helge Hveem,International Relations and World Images,Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1972, p. 54.

5 In the following, quotations from SvendAuken, Jacob Buksti and Carsten LehmannSørensen, ’Denmark Joins Europe; Patterns ofAdaptation in the Danish Political and Ad-ministrative Processes as a Result of Member-ship of the European Communities’, Journalof Common Market Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1,esp. pp. 3-4.

6 See Niels Amstrup and Carsten LehmannSørensen, ’Denmark - Bridge between theNordic Countries and the European Commu-nities’, Cooperation and Conflict, Nos. 1-2,1975, pp. 21-32.

7 Helge Hveem, op. cit., Ch. 2.8 This agrees with hypotheses set forth by

James N. Rosenau, ’Pre-Theories and Theoriesof Foreign Policy’, The Scientific Study ofForeign Policy, The Free Press, New York1971, Ch. 5.

9 As examples, see Mogens N. Pedersen,’Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing andAmerican Legislatures’, in Patterson & Wahlke(Eds.), Comparative Legislative Behavior: Fron-tiers of Research, John Wiley, New York1970; Mogens N. Pedersen, Political Develop-ment and Elite Transformation, Skrifter fraInstitut for Historie og Samfundsvidenskab,



278

Odense 1974, and Erik Damgaard, Top CivilServants and Politics in Denmark, Aarhus 1972(mimeo).

10 Useful were Karl W. Deutsch et al.,France Germany and the Western Alliance,Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1967; Da-vid Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica:Changing Perspectives of the European Elites,MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1969 and HelgeHveem, op. cit., 1972. Also of some use wereGabriel Almond, The American People andForeign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, NewYork 1950, esp. Ch. 2 on elites and foreignpolicy; Erling Bjøl, La France devant l’Europe,Munksgaard, København 1966; Bernard Cohen,The Political Process and Foreign Policy,Princeton University Press, Princeton 1957;James N. Rosenau, National Leadership andForeign Policy, Princeton University Press,Princeton 1963, not to mention the many elitestudies by Bachrach, Dahl, Edinger, Lasswell,Searing, Wright Mills, etc. Two recent studieson elite attitudes towards European integrationare M. Donald Hancock, ’Swedish Elites andthe EEC: Models of the Future’, Cooperationand Conflict, No. 4, 1974, pp. 225-242, andOttar Hellevik, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Kri-sten Ringdal, ’The Common Market Issue in

Norway: A Conflict between Center andPeriphery’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.12, No. 1, 1975, pp. 37-53.

11 Lerner and Gorden, op. cit., pp. 92-93,have shown that the statistical law of largenumbers applies: the larger the N, the lesssensitive to N are the marginal distributions;but comparing 50 to 150 member panels showsthat an N of 100 persons is close to insensi-tivity, so that elite surveys require far fewer

respondents than previously considered neces-sary to achieve a reliable measure of eliteopinion.

12 Nils Ørvik et al., Departmental Decision-Making, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1972.

13 James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion andForeign Policy, Random House, New York1961; and Bernard Cohen, The Press andForeign Policy, Princeton University Press,Princeton 1963.

14 Carol H. Weiss, ’What America’s LeadersRead’, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 39, No.1 (Spring 1974), pp. 1-22. Here the same

conclusion is reached regarding the Americanelite. A recent opinion poll by the Gallupinstitute underlines that the better educated aperson is, the more highly regarded are news-papers and other mass media as sources ofinformation (cf. Berlingske Tidende, 1 April1975).

15 The most comprehensive and recent anal-yses of European integration are found in R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question, Allen &Unwin, London 1974; Roy Pryce, The Politicsof the European Communities, Butterworth,London 1973; Michael Hodges (Ed.), EuropeanIntegration, Penguin Books, London 1972; andL. N. Lindberg & S. A. Scheingold, Europe’sWould-Be Polity, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey1970. The most recent and undoubtedly themost intriguing is the Parkinson-like book byMarcel von Donat, Brüsseler Machenschaften:Auf dem Spur der Euro-Clan, Nomos Verlag,Baden-Baden 1975.

16 See David Coombes, The Politics andBureaucracy of the European Community,Allen & Unwin, London 1970; and StanleyHenig, ’The Institutional Structure of the Eu-ropean Communities’, Journal of CommonMarket Studies, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1974.

17 Edinger and Searing, op. cit., p. 445.18 For a study of aspects of this process, see

Peter Hansen, Melvin Small, and Karen Siune,The Structure of the Danish EC Debate, 1972:A Study of an Opinion-Policy Relationship,Aarhus 1974 (mimeo).

19 Developed by Philippe Schmitter amongothers, ’A Revised Theory of Regional Integra-tion’, International Organization, No. 4, 1970

(special issue on theories of regional integra-tion), and used by Lindberg and Scheingold,op. cit.

20 See comments in R. J. Harrison, op. cit.,pp. 198-199.

21 Contrary to spill-over, which requires a

corresponding strengthening of the level ofauthority, cf. Philippe Schmitter, op. cit.



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Danish Elite Attitudes Towards European Integration1