Professor Daya Krishna: Beyond the Tradition from Within*

Dr. S. Lourdunathan**

A philosophy beyond philosophy is the thesis addressed in this paper. Daya Krishna in his

work entitled, „Indian philosophy, A Counter perspective‟, engages in deconstructing the

established conceptual foundations of Indian Philosophy. The paper relies upon his article

on the „The Three Myths of Indian Philosophy alone in this work. This paper attempts

study and clarify the philosophical sense with which Daya Krishna establishes his critique

of Indian Philosophy and tries to find out a philosophical response, if any, to Daya

Krishna‟s criticism of Indian philosophy.

I attempt to do this by (i) high lighting a set of selected issues identified by Daya Krishna

with a view of establishing his critique of Indian philosophy. And (ii) alternatively I make

an attempt a critical analysis of the philosophical content of DK itself with reference to his

counter perspective in Indian Philosophy. In other words, countering the counter

perspectives is the philosophical sense of this paper. The related issues of such concern

that this paper attempts to clarify are - What are the concepts that Daya Krishna counters

in his counter perspective? What is the philosophical sense with which such a counter

perspective is articulated? Lastly, how to encounter the counter perspective of Daya

Krishna and what is the significance of such an endeavor?

The three Myths about Indian Philosophy

In his essay on „Three myths about Indian Philosophy‟, Daya Krishna identifies three

vital issues with reference to Indian philosophy that needs to be critiqued upon. They

include: (A) The common claim that Indian philosophy is spiritual

(B) The orthodox Vs heterodox cleavage on the basis of

Vedic textual Authority

(C) The problem of „philosophical school‟ in Indian

Philosophy (essentialism)

(A) The problem of Spiritual in Indian Philosophy Is Indian Philosophy spiritual as it is commonly alleged to, is the foremost questions that

Daya Krishna puts to test.

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* A paper presented at the Regional Seminar on „Contemporary Indian Philosophers‟

sponsored by ICPR org. by the Department of Philosophy, Madura College, Madurai, on

7-8 August 2001

* * Dr. S. Lourdunathan, Head, Department of Philosophy, Arul Anandar (Autonomous)

College, Karumathur-625 514, Madurai Dt, Tamilnadu.

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Indian philosophy considered spiritual in nature and on that ground distinguishable from western

philosophy is almost a legion and treated as a self-evident truth. Such a claim Daya Krishna

observes that “ is never put to the test... Yet the moment we begin to doubt the claim and

examine it for what it is worth, we find it (to be) spurious and mythical (legion)” 1.

True to the spirit of philosophy that seeks rational explanation (rational justification for any

claims, Daya Krishna rises the doubt of „what exactly is meant by describing the entire

philosophical tradition as „spiritual‟. Moreover, what is the sense and reference of such

attribution that is spiritual or What is the sense in which the term spiritual is employed in Indian

philosophy traditions? Is the connotation of „spiritual‟ common to all schools irrespective of

orthodoxy and heterodoxy division or is it restricted to the adjudication to only some systems of

Indian thought? These are some of the critical questions that Daya Krishna clarifies in his

discussion of the notion considering Indian philosophy as spiritual.

Employing a specific method of doubt for conceptual clarity like Descartes, DK explores the

different senses in which the meaning of the term „spirituality‟ is employed in philosophy. He

identifies two vital ways by which the meaning of „spirituality‟ may be claimed. They include

(a) the ontological sense of the term spiritual and (b) the moral sense of the term spiritual.

(a) The Ontological sense of Spirituality: some questions

The term in the ontological sense (according to Daya Krishna) means that „the nature of ultimate

reality is held to be that of mind or spirit. Its distinctive feature lies in the assertion of the

primacy of consciousness as opposed to the inertness associated with (material) ... objects. In this

sense of philosophy, the nature of spirit is opposed to the nature of matter. And the spiritualistic

metaphysics implies the assertion that spirit alone is real and what appears as matter is only an

appearance, something illusory, something unreal. Here the qualifications such as „alone‟ „only,

contribute to the characterization of what is called spiritual. This is the ontological sense of the

tern spiritual‟ 2.

Having set a criterion for considering something spiritual, Daya Krishna proceeds to analyze

whether Indian philosophy is spiritual in the above-said ontological sense. His response remains

to be negative. The rational for such counter perspective Daya Krishna are as follows:

(i) „Though most of the schools of Indian philosophy recognize the primacy of spirit

as ultimate reality, simultaneously they as well recognize that matter to be

ultimate reality. For examples, The Jainas, the Vaisesikas and the samkhyas

vividly hold such a position.

(ii) The Carvakas in fact, recognize the ultimacy of matter and matter alone to be

only reality

(iii) The Naiyayikas, accepting the metaphysics of Vaisesikas, grow closer towards

rational or logical materialism. Like Carvakas, they also hold that Consciousness

is not the essential characteristic of the soul, but a quality, which arises if and

when, a collection of circumstances or aggregates accidentally happens by. In this

sense, Naiyayikas shake hand with materialism.

(iv) The Mimasakas subscribe to the metaphysical reality of all substances to be real.

(v) The Buddhist metaphysical position is denial of any substantiality whether it be

spirit or matter (anatma and Ksanica).

(vi) Vedanta is a term not only applicable to Sankara’s position alone, but to any other

philosophy based on or to Upanisadic interpretations. There is no one Vedanta but

Vedantas (plural) is possible. Sankara’s doctrine is one among many vedantic

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positions. Thus, we have, the dualism of Madva, and pluralism of Ramanuja. Both

Ramanuja and Madva assert that matter is ultimately real‟3.

(vii) The Vedanta of Sankara holds a position that “assertion of anything is in itself is

falsity or an appearance. For him, the individual soul and God are as unreal as

prakriti or matter.” 3.

(viii) Yoga allied with Samkhya remains to be practice and along with samkhya

attributes the existence of matter.

Therefore, the schools of Indian philosophy treated either in their totality or in their particularity

none seem to pass the test of ontology to be considered spiritual. He says, “viewed in this

perspective, Indian philosophy can hardly be characterized as spiritual in character”4. To consider

it spiritual is completely erroneous. Thus according to Daya Krishna, the claim that Indian

philosophy is spiritual is mythical, unrealistic, and not justified philosophically. Thus, it is false

that Indian philosophy is spiritual.

(b) The moral sense Spirituality in: some questions

Can Indian Philosophy be considered spiritual in the sense of morality (?) is the immediate issue

that occupies the mind of Daya Krishna. From the point of view of morality, the term spirituality

in the Indian tradition refers to the sense of spiritual salvation or attainment of Moksa. However,

Daya Krishna argues that

(i) The early formulations of Morality are limited to only the first threenamely dharma, artha

and kama and the notion of Moksa as a distinct separate facet of morality was only a later

addition.

(ii) The introduction of Moksa as spiritual goal to be attained was not so much of

philosophical speculation but due to the religious atmosphere of Indian culture.

(iii) In fact, the Sramana tradition of Samkhya, Buddha and the Jains is the root source of the

ideal of Moksa.‟ 5.

(iv) Therefore, the cause for the notion of Moksa is not philosophical speculation but religious

orientation.

(v) Properly speaking the ideal of Moksa belongs to the non-vedic religious and spiritual

traditions of India. However, in the course of time, through the attempt of philosophers

trying to define, redefine the notion of Moksa, it found its place in other philosophical

traditions as well.

(vi) The addition of Moksa as the fourth and final end of human seeking is not a fulfillment of

the previous three, rather, according to the sramana tradition it lies in the negation of

them. Here lies the puzzle, if the first three purusarthas need to be denied in order that one

attains Moksa, then where there is a need to affirm the first three purusarthas and vice

versa.

(vii) Both the notions of morality and spirituality in India do not necessarily related. There

could still be a dualism between them. Given to the dualistic understanding of both, This

would logically imply in India one could be „spiritual‟ with out being moral and vice

versa.

Thus by taking to (a) and (b) position Daya Krishna safely concludes that the all-encompassing

characterization of Indian Philosophy as spiritual is ill founded.

(B) Against the notion of Authority

The second important notion that Daya Krishna takes for scrutiny (testification) is the notion of

Authority. Most writers of on Indian philosophy classify the schools of thought as „orthodox Vs

heterodox on basis of the notion of authority (Vedic Authority). Agreeing ones are treated

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orthodox and the disagreeing ones are placed as heterodox. Such a claim is almost treated „self-

evident‟ with out calling for necessary justification of the rationality of classification.

Philosophical Analysis of Daya Krishna

Daya Krishna like a good philosopher, the one who questions the basis of any assumption or

presuppositions for the sake of clarity and certainty, calls into question the notion of „authority‟

(Vedas) in Indian Philosophy. He rises the issue, „of what is meant by the acceptance of the Vedas

as an authoritative basis for one‟s philosophical system?” 6. The response is that, „Vedas contain

ultimate truth and that the test of truth of any philosophical position is whether or not it is in

accordance with what is written in the Vedas‟. 7

Against this Daya Krishna holds that if one subscribes to the above mentioned response, it

logically follows that:

(i) „All schools of Indian philosophy with out any exception are varying interpretations of

Vedas

(ii) And among these, there are agreement and disagreements with reference to the exact

meaning of what the Vedas really meant; But, de facto this is not so.

(iii) There are differences opinions on what is to constitute Vedas among different schools of

Indian philosophy, for example the Mimamsa deny the Upanisads and contends that only

a pure injunction that is either of a command or prohibition be considered as Veda.

(iv) The Vedantins contrary to Mimamsa, recognize the authority of Vedas

(v) Added to that they recognize the authority of the Gita and the Brahma-sutra.

(vi) There is disagreement on to which part of the Veda be treated as authoritative for after all

Vedas is a compilation of more than thousand years

(vii) Ramanuja, Madhva and Nimbarka wrote independent commentaries on Brahma-Sutras

after Sankara, because they wanted to deviate fundamentally from Advaitic interpretation

of Brahma sutras.

(viii) Attribution of sacredness or divine origin Vedas and denial of such attribution to Jainas

and Buddhas is not founded in any ontological grounding‟.8

The above mentioned reasons of Daya Krishna may be summarized as follows: That there is

confusion prevalent even within the orthodox systems with reference to:

(i) what is exactly meant by Veda

(ii) And to which portion of Veda be treated authoritative (leaving aside some other schools

like Carvaka denying the very Vedic authority.

Given to this rational ground Daya Krishna infers that the idea of treating Vedas as authoritative is

limited only to some systems of Indian philosophy and there is not any philosophical ground that

provides justification for the basis of Vedas as the ground of orthodox vs. heterodox bifurcation.

Lack of such philosophical ground asserts that the notion of Vedic authority is then a myth

perpetuated globally.

(C) The problem of the schools of thought

When the classical division of schools of thought into orthodox vs. heterodox systems is a

traditionally accepted one, what is there a problem with it?, is the sort of issue Daya Krishna

tackles here. For Daya Krishna, a more dangerous and stronger myth that pervades the world of

Indian Philosophy is the myth of the schools of thought. The myth with reference to the schools of

thought according to Daya Krishna, is “the very stuff, out of which and around which the whole

5

story of Indian philosophy has been woven”. 9 The problem as pointed out by Daya Krishna here,

is two-fold:

(i) The problem regarding the notion of the history of schools of Indian philosophy

(ii) The problem of what is exactly meant by schools of thought. (metaphysical basis)

(i) Analysis of the notion of history Schools of Indian Philosophy

He points out that (i) The concept of „school‟ is closely connected to the concept of „authority‟ in

Indian philosophy and the problem here is that when the „authority‟ of Upanishads and Sutras

are final, then what is presumed or implied is that the system or school of thought allied to such

„authority‟ is also final and therefore „a closed school of thought‟. (ii) This mitigates against the

very notion of History (of Indian Philosophy) for history is always a flow, an issue of change and

development and not a „self closure‟. (iii) This would imply that India philosophy is either

against any sense of history or not-historical (iv) and as such ascription of a history of Indian

philosophy is false.

(ii) Analysis of the problem of (metaphysical) meaning in Indian Philosophy

Is metaphysics the foundation to the classical classification of Indian philosophy into different

schools of thought? Or is there any other basis other than metaphysics that provide the

foundation for such classification. If by scrutiny it is proved that metaphysics is not the

foundation of the classical classification of Indian schools of thought, then such a classification

is not philosophical and can only be other than what is philosophical. This exactly is the logic of

Daya Krishna ‟s criticism leveled against the most popular classification of the Indian systems of

thought.

Firstly, the Indian systems are not classified on the philosophical basis of the categories of

„empiricism, realism, or idealism like that of western metaphysics. Rather the basis for such a

division is with reference to „textual authority of Vedas‟ alone. Secondly, the traditional

presentation of the schools of Indian philosophy is treated as final and finished product. This

posits the difficulty of the emergence of newer interpretations or viewpoints in the world of Indian

philosophy. Thirdly, a school of thought is but a direction of thought shared by a stream of

thinkers with their subtle variations or interpretations that could be morphological. Such a notion

is also not applicable to Indian systems. Thus, the treatment of Indian philosophy as „schools‟ does

not share any one or all the above-propounded ways of consideration. On this ground, Daya

Krishna infers that Indian philosophy as Schools of Thought‟ is a myth‟10.

Taking to the above points of arguments Daya Krishna establishes that the classical notion that

Indian philosophy is spiritual is not exclusively true. The claim that the orthodoxy is based on the

unquestionable authority of Vedas is a circumscribed version. The different schools of orthodoxy

in Indian philosophy remain to be rigidly self en-closed and therefore bound to be deterministic of

the very thought process and against the spirit of any serious philosophical inquiry.

A response to Daya Krishna ’s counter perspective

His criticisms that the all-encompassing characterization to Indian philosophy as spiritual brings

out the argument that there is a distinguishing mark for considering something (say P) to be

philosophical in differentia of what is spiritual (Q). If Q is more or less than P, then P can not be

characterized as Q in the fullest sense of Q and vice versa. That is to say, What is spiritual cannot

be called philosophical and what is philosophical can not be deemed spiritual. Indian philosophy

6

can be either P or Q and can not be both at the same time in the same manner. If it is claimed that

Indian philosophy is both P and Q, then such a claim refutes the very foundations of logic of

identity. For, according to the principle of identity, a thing is P or not P or it is either P or Q and

not both. One can also point to the fact that there is a possibility of something to be Philosophical

with out being characterized as spiritual. On this stroke, Daya Krishna holds to a very sound

logical grounding in his argument against the „spiritual‟ in favour of philosophical. However,

Daya Krishna ‟s criticism does not only rely on logic alone, it is as well founded upon the

ontology of dualism.

The thesis that Indian Philosophy is not spiritual of Daya Krishna relies heavily on to the

ontological foundations of western dualism. The problem of dualism lies in its bifurcation of

reality in to irreconcilable facets of reality namely the material and spirit-ual. According to such

notion, the spiritual is affirmed through a systematic denial of what is called material. Daya

Krishna does not seem to provide any sufficient reason or rationale of his relying on to the

dualistic ontology. Instead he seems to assume or take for granted that the spirit–matter dualism as

right kind of foundation on the base of which some thing may be identified as spiritual or not.

Such a counter perspective of Daya Krishna, when it is founded on dualistic ontology, it has to

explain or justify why dualism is preferred to vindicate the myth of spirituality in Indian

philosophy. Dualistic foundation itself is problematic on the grounds of „category mistake‟ 11

(Gilbert Ryle). That is to say, having habituated\framed to a „schooled way of looking at‟ DK

scrutinizes meaning. Say for example, the ontological sense on the base of which DK analyses is

itself based on ontology of dualism of spirit vs. matter. He seems to presuppose or take for granted

that the dualistic way of perception is the „right way‟ to designate spirituality as distinquised from

materiality. The question here is, Why should DK presuppose the sense of dualism in order to

analyze „spirituality‟. Should spiritual be constrained or understood only on the touchstone of

dualism. Here again arises yet another important issue. Is the base on which DK criticizes

justified. How far the rational ground of dualistic perception is justifiable? Should one necessarily

understand „spirituality‟ from straightjacket point of view dualism. Is it not true that Dualism as

way of thinking itself conceives a sense of bifurcation of reality into two opposed substanstialities.

Consequently contributes to a justification polarization of reality to a kind of Value-dualism and

Value-hierarchy. Should „spirituality‟ be confined to the relegated realm of ontological

bifurcationism alone? Much of the modernism is plagued by the formation of the opposites and

polarities.

One of the possible dangers in such an analysis is that, one tends to engage into a kind verbal-

cognitive analysis while ignoring the „context‟ in which the use of the term spirituality may be

hermeneutically understood. Should we not analysis the meaning of the term „spiritual‟ with

reference to or rooted in, Indian cultural tradition. Perhaps, such an analysis should take into

account, the meaning spiritual, from the point of view of the diversified cultures of India. Western

paradigm though employable, one should take into account the very context from which „spiritual‟

arises.

In the post modern era, dualism is seriously called into question of its allegiance to forms of

centrism and polarization of reality that pave way to a subtle justification of „separatism‟ in the

socio-cultural context. Taking to this spirit, it is not wrong to claim that, Daya Krishna is counter

perspective is only a categorically habituated or a „schooled way of looking at‟ reality. He looks at

„spiritual‟ from the point of view of dualism and dualism does not necessarily serve as the

criterion for truth. There could be other criterions as well.

The problem of „spiritual‟ or philosophical‟ can be also looked as problem of meaning. That

meaning can also be a matter of intentionality. Meaning as matter of intentionality calls for an

7

analysis of the „intentions‟ of treating Indian philosophy as spiritual. Though such an analysis of

the problem of meaning is not sufficiently attended by Daya Krishna, it points towards such an

endeavor as well.

On the ground of logic, Daya Krishna ‟s position is sounder than on to the ground of dualistic

ontology. What is questioned here is not the thesis (Indian Philosophy is spiritual) that is taken for

scrutiny by Daya Krishna but the ontological foundation on the base of which Daya Krishna ‟s

counter perspective is relied (presupposed) upon. However this is not to imply that the thesis,

(namely Indian Philosophy is spiritual) is conclusively true as well.

This only means that such a thesis need to be approached from a different angle altogether.

Perhaps the possible direction or condition for dispelling or upholding such a thesis needs to be

socio-philosophical and ethical. It should be treated as a problem of theory vs. practice from the

point of view of meaning and its application on basis of ethics.

The second important thesis that is taken for scrutiny by Daya Krishna is the issue of the reliability

of the authority of Vedas as the basis for classical division. The argument is that Vedas do not

either uniformly form the basis for orthodoxy or possess any philosophical foundation

(rationality) to provide the basis of schools of Indian philosophy. Such an argument implicitly

contain the truth that any authority either be textual or personal, can not be treated as a criterion of

truth for a criterion is matter of rationality and not a matter traditionality. A tradition may or may

not contain rationality but solely on the ground tradition, alone something can be claimed rational

or otherwise. In other words, the logic of Daya Krishna here is that tradition (X) and rationality

(Y) are not interchangeable concepts. A tradition can as well be mythical and what is rational can

never be mythical. In other words, Vedas as the basis for diversification of schools of Indian

Philosophy as it is commonly held to be, does not posses any rational ground and therefore such a

claim is erroneous. Moreover, with in the orthodoxy there is no uniform opinion about the exact

number or meaning of Vedas.

In the face of Vedic authority lacking any rationality for classification of Indian systems of

thought, Daya Krishna suggests that a philosophical classification need to be articulated. And

according to Daya Krishna, such a classification is to be made “in the same sense as the western

philosophical tradition is supposed to be”12. in order that Indian philosophical tradition to be

„philosophical‟ in real sense of the term. By the term „philosophical‟ Daya Krishna intends the

notions such as empiricism, rationalism, realism, or idealism on the base of which the schools of

Indian systems need to be view upon.

Agreeing to the content of Daya Krishna ‟s criticism we could only add that if Vedas can form the

basis classification of orthodoxy vs heterodoxy, in the same vain, any other text can provide a

basis for classification of Indian philosophy. If Buddhists claim that those who agree to its own

scriptural tradition be called „orthodox‟ and all the others as „heterodox‟ still such a claim be valid

if it is agreed that Vedic authority as criterion for such division. The issue here is that any textual

tradition, for that matter can not claim to provide either rationality or sole authority to

philosophical enterprise.

More importantly, if any text is treated as authoritative, it will only beg the question and begging

the question is a logical fallacy. Leaving aside the issues of rationality or traditionality on the one

side, one could still engage doubt as to the „why-ness‟ of the „intended meaning‟ of considering

Vedas as authoritative. The questions needs to be responded from a different angle altogether,

namely from the angle of „those who are either considered not or less authoritative. Such an

analysis would call for a social-ethical analysis of Vedic authority.

8

If one accepts the claim that Time and history to be relative then it would imply there is no time or

history that is absolute. If so, all time or all history or all tradition is in an important sense is „out

of time, or out of tradition or out of history. Since history or tradition is not absolute, the text the

words and the things are bound to be relative or „out of context‟. The binding of \ to authority as

well is only a matter of convention and not a matter of any absolute necessity. It is only temporary

and habitual. The signifiers are tied to what they signify. Often we forget this fact and assume or

attribute absoluteness or „revelation for eternity‟. “As our signifiers slip out of their moorings, so

the meanings of our words can not be stable or absolutely representative of the things which once

gave them anchorage.” (Post modern dissolutions p. 61) Hence, there can be no cannon of texts,

no finality or absoluteness to any text, whether it is Vedic or otherwise. Hence, a tradition can not

be held to be final or authoritative or assume any revelations, because what is final is not final in

the passage of time. Therefore, any book or text that has a sense of an eternity or an unending has

an ending and it must be closed, for it willfully asserts what it is not capable of and what it is not.

Thus, one should proclaim the closure of any text or authority if and when such a text enforces

absoluteness of authority. In the proclamation of such a closure of text, there arises a vacuum or

sort of emptiness caused by the removal of the text that claimed finality. It is the vacuum between

text provides the space for a new beginning. It is inter-textuality. It is in this „space‟, philosophy

viewed as a science of ideological criticism and ethics of relationship can occupy and play vital

role. It is this „space‟ that Daya Krishna „occupies‟ in his pilgrim towards philosophy.

The third thesis of Daya Krishna namely Indian Philosophy is not philosophy proper in the sense

of „empiricism‟ „realism‟, or „idealism‟, amounts to point out that the real basis for treating Indian

philosophy should be metaphysics and not Vedic authority. Such a thesis does not amount to

disprove the philosophical acumen of Indian philosophy rather it calls for a historical correction of

our pre-supposed ideas of Indian philosophy. It posits the fact that Indian philosophy needs to be

hermetically interpreted on the basis of perspectives of human ideas rather based on any blind

religiosity. Such a philosophical exercise according to Daya Krishna would open new horizons in

the history of Indian philosophy if history is understood not necessarily in the chronological order,

but in the sense of history of multiplicity of ideas.

Dayakrishna moves in the realm of modernism at his denial of spiritualism with reference to

Indian Philosophy. He finds crucial gains in holding on to modernism. His event in Indian

philosophy may be termed as the event of intellectual enlightenment stage in the Indian tradition.

Modernity invents system. True to the spirit of modernism that invents system of thought, DKr

seeks for a system or school of thought within Indian philosophy. But the difficulty here that there

is the problem of „system‟ itself, serving as a „grand narrative‟ on base of which, or with reference

to which (Centrex) some thing to affirmed or denied.

Between the extremes of dualism there is a „space‟, between the two extremes of rigidity there is a

space; it is a space for wandering; it is space for relationship as against any hierarchy. Within this

wandering space, everything is relative and relational. It is limitless and purposeless relationship.

Here knowledge or truth is relative. Would this space be filled by a system of Indian Philosophy

as a system of thought, is an inquiry that needs to be pondered upon. It may be called the

„intermediate‟ space, and the thing that occupies such intermediacy may be considered spiritual.

For example, Buddhism or any other frame of mind, which with out totemizing or totalizing itself

and points towards reclamation of both the absolute spiritual or absolute material, is in disposition

to occupy such a space. It should be secularization of the sacred and sacredization of the secular.

Buddhism with its assertion of „momentriness‟ (momentriness not to be reduced to sheer nihilism)

the „middle way‟ and anatmavada may be claimed to be secular-spiritual. Could we think of any

other systems or frame of mind that could be said to occupy such a space?

9

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that Daya Krishna ‟s counter perspective of Indian

philosophy though agreeable or refutable conceives ample avenues for progress in Indian

philosophy. The historical moment of Daya Krishna in the world of Indian philosophy is a

moment of disclosure as against the tradition of self-enclosure of Indian philosophy. It is a

moment of self-criticism of the tradition from within the tradition. Properly termed, it is an attempt

to go beyond the tradition from within. There is a kind of restlessness against or infavour of which

Daya Krishna ‟s philosophical venture is tied down. Daya Krishna ‟s task here is to let the fly out

of the fly bottle. Daya Krishna remains true to the tradition of philosophy by renouncing it. To

constrain Daya Krishna to a particular school or into any systems of thought or „isms‟ (though the

possibility is open-ended) is again to commit mistake of envelopment of flow of consciousness.

Reference Note:

(i) Since the paper responds specifically to Daya Krishna‟s writing on The Three Myths of

Indian Philosophy the reference numbers from 1 – 10 and 12 are taken only from „Daya

Krishna, A Counter Perspective: The Three Myths of Indian Philosophy, Oxford

University Press, Delhi, 1997, pp. 1 – 15.

(ii) For the reference no. 11, see Gilbert Ryle Criticism on dualism in his „concept of mind‟.