St. Thomas Aquinas De Motu Cordis On the Motion of the HeartText, Translation, Supplemental Texts and Notes (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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De Motu Cordis Quia omne quod movetur, necesse est habere motorem, dubitabile videtur quid moveat cor, et qualis motus eius sit. Non enim videtur eius motus esse ab anima. Ab anima enim nutritiva non movetur, animae enim nutritivae opera sunt generare, alimento uti, et augmentum et diminutio: quorum nullum motus cordis esse videtur. Et anima quidem nutritiva etiam plantis inest; motus autem cordis animalium proprius est. Neque sensitivae animae motus esse videtur, sed nec intellectivae, intellectus enim et sensus non movent nisi mediante appetitu: motus autem cordis involuntarius est. Sed neque naturalis esse videtur. Est enim ad contrarias partes: componitur enim ex pulsu et tractu; motus autem naturalis ad unam partem est, ut ignis sursum, et terrae deorsum. Dicere autem motum cordis esse violentum, est omnino extra rationem. Manifeste enim hoc motu subtracto, moritur animal, nullum autem violentum conservat naturam. Videtur quidem igitur hic motus maxime naturalis esse, vita enim animalis et hic motus se inseparabiliter consequuntur. Dicunt autem quidam hunc motum naturalem esse non ab aliqua particulari natura intrinseca animali, sed ab aliqua natura universali, vel etiam ab intelligentia. Sed hoc ridiculum apparet. In omnibus enim rebus naturalibus propriae passiones alicuius generis vel speciei aliquod principium intrinsecum consequuntur. Naturalia enim sunt quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Nihil autem est magis proprium animalibus quam motus cordis; quo cessante, perit eorum vita. Oportet igitur inesse ipsis animalibus aliquod principium huius motus.

On the Movement of the Heart 1. Since everything that moves must have a mover, what moves the heart, and what kind of motion it has is a matter for inquiry. 2. For it does not appear to be moved by the soul. For it is not moved by the nutritive soul, for the activities of the nutritive soul are generation, the use of food, and increase and decrease, none of which appear to have anything to do with the heart. For the nutritive soul exists even in plants; but the motion of the heart is proper to animals. 3. Nor does it appear to be moved by either the sensitive or intellective souls, for the mind and sense move only by means of desire: but the motion of the heart is involuntary. 4. But neither does it appear to be natural. For it goes in different directions: for it is composed of a push and a pull; but a natural motion goes in one direction, as fire only moves upward and earth downward. 5. Now to say that the motion of the heart is violent would be completely irrational. For it is obvious that when this motion is done away with the animal dies, since nothing violent preserves a nature. It therefore seems that this motion is indeed most natural to it, since the life of the animal and this motion inseparably follow one another.1 6. Now some say that this natural motion comes not from any particular nature intrinsic to the animal, but from some universal nature, or even from an [angelic] intelligence. But this seems ridiculous. For in every natural thing the proper passions of any genus or species follow upon some intrinsic principle. For natural things are those of which the principle of motion is in them. Now nothing is more proper to animals than the motion of the heart, upon the ceasing of which their life ends. There must, then, be some principle of this motion in animals.

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That is to say, where there is life there is a heartbeat, and vice versa.

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Adhuc, si aliqui motus corporibus inferioribus ex natura universali causentur, non semper eis adsunt: sicut in fluxu et refluxu maris apparet quod consequitur motum lunae, et secundum ipsum variatur. Motus autem cordis semper adest animali. Non igitur est ab aliqua causa separata tantum, sed a principio intrinseco.

7. What is more, if any such motion in lower bodies were caused by a universal nature [alone], this motion would not always be in them: as, for instance, is clear in the ebb and flow of the sea, which is a consequence of the moons motion, and varies according to it. But the motion of an animals heart is always in it. Therefore it is not from any separated cause alone, but from some intrinsic principle. 8. Others therefore say that the principle of this motion in animals is heat itself, which being generated by spirit moves the heart. But this is irrational. For that which is most principal in a thing must be the cause. Now the most principal thing in an animal, and more contemporaneous with life, seems to be the motion of the heart rather than any alteration involving heat. Therefore an alteration involving heat is not the cause of the hearts motion; rather the hearts motion is the cause of such an alteration as involving heat. And so the Philosopher in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a 24-25) says: what is about to initiate movement, not by alteration, is of this kind. 9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of the whole universe: and so man, who is the most perfect of animals, is by some called a microcosm.2 Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which is the cause of alteration as well as the other motions, for which reason even in animals the principle of alteration appears to be local motion. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15), pursuing this resemblance, says that motion is like a kind of life existing in all things.3

Dicunt igitur alii principium huius motus in animali esse ipsum calorem, qui per spiritus generatos movet cor. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Illud enim quod est principalius in aliqua re, oportet esse causam. Principalius autem videtur esse in animali motus cordis et magis contemporaneum vitae, quam quaecumque alteratio secundum calorem. Non igitur alteratio secundum calorem est causa motus cordis, sed magis e converso motus cordis est causa alterationis secundum calorem. Unde et Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim.: oportet quod futurum est movere, non alteratione tale esse.

Item animal perfectum, quod est movens seipsum, maxime accedit ad similitudinem totius universi: unde et homo qui est perfectissimum animalium, dicitur a quibusdam minor mundus. In universo autem primus motus est motus localis, qui est causa alterationis et aliorum motuum. Unde et in animali magis videtur motus localis esse alterationis principium, quam e converso. Unde et Aristoteles in octavo Physic., hanc similitudinem sequens, dicit quod motus est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus.2 3

For further remarks on this comparison, see the supplemental texts given below. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in life. Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies.

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Adhuc, quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per accidens. Primus autem motus animalis est motus cordis; calor autem non movet localiter nisi per accidens: per se enim caloris est alterare, per accidens autem movere secundum locum. Ridiculum igitur est dicere, quod calor sit principium motus cordis, sed oportet ei assignare causam quae per se possit esse principium motus localis. Principium igitur huius considerationis hinc oportet accipere quod, sicut Aristoteles dicit in octavo Physic., [Quod enim ipsum a seipso movetur, natura movetur, ut quodlibet animalium. Movetur enim animal a seispso,] quorumcumque principium motus in seipsis est, haec natura dicimus moveri. Unde animal quidem totum natura ipsum seipsum movet; corpus tamen eius contingit et natura et extra naturam moveri. Differt enim secundum qualem motum quod movetur eveniat, et ex quali elemento constet.

10. What is more, what is per se is prior to what is per accidens.4 But the first motion of an animal is the motion of the heart; but heat does not move locally except accidentally: for it belongs to heat to alter per se, but to move something in place per accidens. It is therefore ridiculous to say that heat is the principle of the motion of the heart; rather one must assign a per se cause which can be an intrinsic cause of motion in place. 11. One must therefore accept as the principle of this inquiry that, as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 7, 254b 16-20), [a thing which is moving by itself is moving by nature, e.g. each of the animals. For an animal moves itself by itself, but] we say that whatever things have a principle of motion in themselves are moving by nature. Whence the animal as a whole by nature, moves itself by itself; nevertheless its body can be moving both by nature and beside nature. For it makes a difference what sort of motion what is moving chances [to have] and from what sort of elements it is constituted. (tr. Glen Coughlin) For when an animal moves itself downward, it is indeed a motion that is natural to the entire animal and its body, since in the body of an animal the heavier elements predominate [, the nature of which is to move down.] But when an animal moves upward, this motion is indeed natural to the animal since it comes from an intrinsic principle which is the soul; but it is nevertheless not natural to a heavy body, and so in [undergoing] this kind of motion the animal tires out more. 12. Now in animals, motion according to place is caused by desire and by a sensitive or intellective apprehension, as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima (433a 9-b 30). In other animals, to be sure, the entire process of motion is natural: for they do not act by intention but from nature: for a swallow builds its nest naturally and a spider a web. But to act intentionally and not by nature belongs solely to man.

Cum enim animal movetur deorsum, quidem est motus eius naturalis et toti animali et corpori, eo quod in corpore animalis elementum grave praedominatur. Cum autem animal movetur sursum, est quidem naturalis motus animali, quia est a principio intrinseco ipsius quod est anima; non tamen est naturale corpori gravi; unde et magis fatigatur animal in hoc motu. Motus autem secundum locum in animalibus causatur ex appetitu et apprehensione sensitiva vel intellectiva, ut Aristoteles docet in tertio de anima. In aliis quidem animalibus totus processus motus naturalis est: non enim agunt a proposito, sed a natura: naturaliter enim et hirundo facit nidum et aranea telam. Solius autem hominis est a proposito operari, et non a natura.

N.B. For St. Thomas, the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover; cf. Ia, q. 70, art. 3. 4 That is to say, the essential comes before the accidental.

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Sed tamen cuiuslibet suae operationis principium naturale est. Quamvis enim conclusiones scientiarum speculativarum et practicarum non naturaliter sciat, sed ratiocinando inveniat, prima tamen principia indemonstrabilia sunt ei naturaliter nota, ex quibus ad alia scienda procedit. Similiter ex parte appetitus, appetere ultimum finem, qui est felicitas, est homini naturale, et fugere miseriam; sed appetere alia non est naturale, sed ex appetitu ultimi finis procedit in appetitum aliorum: sic enim est finis in appetibilibus, ut principium indemonstrabile in intellectualibus, ut dicitur in secundo Physic.

Nevertheless, the principle of any of his own activities is natural. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences, but discovers them by reasoning, still, the first indemonstrable principles are known to him naturally, from which he proceeds in order to know other things. Likewise in the case of desire, to desire the last end, which is happiness, and to flee from misery, is natural to man; but to desire other things is not natural but proceeds from the desire for his last end to the desire for other things: for in this way the end in desirable things is like an indemonstrable principle in intellectual things, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Physics (ch.15, 200a 1524).5 And so therefore since the motion of all the other members of the body is caused by the motion of the heart, as the Philosopher proves in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a 703b 2), the other motions can indeed by voluntary, but the first motion which is of the heart, is natural. 13. Now we must consider that upward motion is natural to fire as a consequence of its form: and so the generator, which gives the form, is its per se mover in place. Now just as any natural motion follows the form of the element, in the same way other natural motions follow upon other forms. For we observe that iron is naturally moved toward the magnet, which motion is nevertheless not natural to it according to its character of being heavy or light, but insofar as it has such a form.6 Thus inasmuch as an animal has such a

Sic igitur et cum motus omnium aliorum membrorum causentur ex motu cordis, ut probat Aristoteles in Lib. de Mot. Anim., motus quidem alii possunt esse voluntarii, sed primus motus qui est cordis, est naturalis.

Oportet autem considerare quod motus sursum est naturalis igni eo quod consequitur formam eius: unde et generans, quod dat formam, est per se movens secundum locum. Sicut autem formam elementi consequitur aliquis motus naturalis, nihil prohibet et alias formas alios motus naturales sequi. Videmus enim quod ferrum naturaliter movetur ad magnetem, qui tamen motus non est ei naturalis secundum rationem gravis et levis, sed secundum quod habet talem formam. Sic igitur et animal inquantum habet talem formam quae est5

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 17, art. 9, ad 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called vital. For which reason Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii] says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. 6 Cf. St. Thomass opusculum, De operationibus occultis naturae, excerpts of which are given below.

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anima, nihil prohibet habere aliquem motum naturalem; et movens hunc motum est quod dat formam. Dico autem motum naturalem animalis eum qui est cordis: quia, ut Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim., existimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo, nihil opus est separato monarcho quem oporteat adesse per singula eorum quae fiunt, sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius ut ordinatum est, et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit: et quia natum est unumquodque sic constantium facere proprium opus, ut nihil opus sit in unoquoque esse animam, scilicet inquantum est principium motus, sed in quodam principio corporis existente alia quidem vivere, eo quod adnata sunt, facere autem proprium opus propter naturam. Sic igitur motus cordis est naturalis quasi consequens animam, inquantum est forma talis corporis, et principaliter cordis. Et forte secundum hunc intellectum aliqui dixerunt motum cordis esse ab intelligentia, inquantum posuerunt animam ab intelligentia esse, sicut Aristoteles dicit motum gravium et levium esse a generante, inquantum dat formam quae est principium motus. Omnis autem proprietas et motus consequitur aliquam formam secundum conditionem ipsius, sicut formam nobilissimi elementi, puta ignis, consequitur motus ad locum nobilissimum, qui est sursum.

form which is the soul, nothing prevents it from having a natural motion; and the mover [which gives it] its form gives it this motion. 14. I take the position that the natural motion of an animal is that of the heart, seeing that, as the Philosopher says in his book On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a29-b2), In a sense, an animal can be compared to a city governed by good laws. For once a stable order exists in a city, no action is performed by an individual agent that is truly separate from the monarchical rule, but everything is done by custom and in accord with due order. Now in animals this comes about by nature: and since each one is naturally constituted to perform its proper work, so that there is no need for a soul to be in each one, insofar, namely, as it is a principle of motion, but rather existing in a certain principal part of the body, the other parts live indeed because they are naturally adapted to perform their proper work according to nature. (tr. John Y. B. Hood) 15. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of such a body, and principally of the heart. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence, inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence, just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 4, 256a1), the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them, inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of motion. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its condition, just as upon the form of the noblest 7 element, for example fire, follows motion to the noblest place, which is above. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul, which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world. 16. But the motion of the heart necessarily falls

Forma autem nobilissima in inferioribus est anima, quae maxime accedit ad similitudinem principii motus caeli. Unde et motus ipsam consequens simillimus est motui caeli: sic enim est motus cordis in animali, sicut motus caeli in mundo. Sed tamen necesse est motum cordis a motu7

Noblestthat is, that which has the highest rank, so to speak.

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caeli deficere sicut et principiatum deficit a principio. Est autem motus caeli circularis et continuus, et hoc competit ei inquantum est principium omnium motuum mundi: accessu enim et recessu corpus caeleste imponit rebus principium et finem essendi, et sua continuitate conservat ordinem in motibus, qui non sunt semper.

short of the motion of the heavens, just as what is from a principle falls short of the principle. Now the motion of the heavens is circular and continuous, and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of every motion of the world: for the approach and withdrawal of a celestial body imposes upon things the beginning and end of their existence, and by its continuity preserves the order in motions, which are not always [occurring]. 17. Now the motion of the heart is the principle of all the motions that are in an animal; and so the Philosopher in the third book of On the Parts of Animals (ch. 4, 661a 13-14) says that the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there, namely, in the heart, and terminate there. And so in order for the heart to be the principle and end of every motion that exists in the animal, it has a certain motion not in fact circular, but similar to the circularone, namely, composed from a pull and a push; and so the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima (433b 20-25) what moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide [, as in a ball and socket joint]. But all things are moved by a push and a pull, on account of which there must be something remaining stationary, as in a wheel, and from that point motion begins.8

Motus autem cordis principium quidem est omnium motuum qui sunt in animali; unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Part. Anim. quod motus delectabilium et tristium et totaliter om-nis sensus hinc incipientes videntur, scilicet in corde, et ad hoc terminari. Unde ad hoc quod cor esset principium et finis omnium motuum, habet quemdam motum non quidem circularem sed similem circulari, compositum scilicet ex tractu et pulsu; unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Anim., quod movens organice est ubi est principium et finis idem. Omnia autem pulsu et tractu moventur; propter quod oportet sicut in circulo manere aliquid et hinc incipere motum.

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Sc. as with the pivots of the axle of a wagon wheel, or, to take the obvious point of comparison, as with the poles of the axis of the celestial sphere; for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles (St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P., Book III, lectio 15, n. 835). However, if we desire to apply it to the fixed stars, then we must take the word center as meaning the pole since, just as the center is to a circle on a plane surface, so is the pole in a way to a circle on a spherical surface. (St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Caelo, lect. 11, n. 400; tr. Conway & Larcher, rev. B.A.M.) It is to be understood, then, that for motion to take place, there must be a fixed point of immobility as its center, as with a fulcrum. Cf. the entire passage from the Commentary on the De Anima excerpted above, nn. 832-835: 832. Next, at Now, in short he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point, proceeding in a circle, as it were, and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity, while the expansive impulse, whence movement begins, follows a swelling out of the organ. 833. Now, granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement, it must, as starting point, be motionless, and, as term, in movement; and both these at once. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move, all movement must proceed from the motionless,as, for instance, while the hand is moving the arm is still, and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. However, these two factors in the organ, the motionless and the moved, though distinct in thought, are substantially and spatially inseparable. 834. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point, for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term, for the drawing power draws something back to itself. Thus the first organ of local motion in animals

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Est etiam motus iste continuus durante vita animalis, nisi inquantum necesse est intercidere morulam mediam inter pulsum et tractum, eo quod deficiat a motu circulari. Per hoc igitur de facili solvuntur quae in contrarium obiici possunt. Neque enim dicimus motum cordis esse naturalem cordi inquantum est grave vel leve, sed inquantum est animatum tali anima; et duo motus qui videntur contrarii sunt quasi partes unius motus compositi ex utroque, inquantum deficit a simplicitate motus circularis, quem tamen imitatur inquantum est ab eodem in idem. Et sic non est inconveniens si quodammodo sit ad diversas partes, quia et motus circularis aliqualiter sic est. Neque etiam oportet quod causetur ex apprehensione et appetitu, quamvis causetur ab anima sensitiva; non enim causatur ab anima sensitiva per operationem suam, sed inquantum est forma et natura talis corporis.

And this motion continues throughout the life of the animal, except inasmuch it is necessary for a pause to intervene between the push and the pull, by reason of which it falls short of circular motion. 18. Based on this, we can easily dispose of the objections to the contrary. For we are not saying that the motion of the heart is natural to the heart inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but inas-much as it is animated by a soul of this sort; and the two motions that appear to be contrary are like the parts of one motion composed from both, inasmuch as it falls short of the simplicity of circular motion, which it nevertheless imitates inasmuch as it returns to the same point it started from. And thus it is not inappropriate if in some way it goes in different directions, be-cause circular motion in some way is like this. Nor is it necessary that it be caused by apprehension and desire, even though it be caused by the sensitive soul; for it is not caused by the sensitive soul by its own activity, but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of such a body. 19. Now the progressive motion of an animal is caused by an operation of sense and desire, and on this account medical men distinguish vital activities from animal activities, and they say that even when animal activities cease the vital ones remain, naming vital those which accompany the motion of the heart. And they do so with good reason. For in living things, to live is to be, as is said in the second book of the De Anima (ch. 7, 415b13): but the being of each thing is from its proper form. 20. Now the soul and the principle of the motion of the heavens differ in this, that the latter principle is moved neither per se nor per accidens, but the sensitive soul, though it not be moved per se, is nevertheless moved per accidens: and so there arise in it diverse apprehensions and sensations. And so the motion of the heavens is always uniform, but the motion of the heart varies according to diverse appre-

Motus autem progressivus animalis causatur per operationem sensus et appetitus; et propter hoc medici distinguunt operationes vitales ab operationibus animalibus, et quod animalibus cessantibus remanent vitales, vitalia appellantes quae motum cordis concomitantur. Et hoc rationabiliter. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicitur in secundo de Anim.: esse autem unicuique est a propria forma.

Hoc autem differt inter animam et principium motus caeli, quod illud principium non movetur neque per se neque per accidens, anima autem sensitiva etsi non moveatur per se, movetur tamen per accidens: unde proveniunt in ipsa diversae apprehensiones et affectiones. Unde motus caeli semper est uniformis, motus autem cordis variatur secundum diversas apprehensiones et affectiones animae. Non enim affec-

must be at once both a starting point and a term. 835. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. In thought it may move as a whole, but not in reality. In reality it keeps to one place. But its parts are changing their places really, and not only in thought. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. Thus it is, in a sense, both motionless and moving.

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tiones animae causantur ab alterationibus cordis, sed potius causant eas; unde in passionibus animae, utputa in ira, formale est, quod est ex parte affectionis, scilicet quod sit appetitus vindictae; materiale autem quod pertinet ad alterationem cordis, utpote quod sit accensio sanguinis circa cor.

hensions and sensations of the soul. For the sensations of the soul are not caused by alterations of the heart, but rather they cause them; and so in passions of the soul, in anger, for example, what is formal is on the part of the sensation, namely, that it be a desire for revenge; but material which pertains to the alteration of the heart, for example that there be a boiling of blood around the heart.9 Now in natural things the form is not for the sake of the matter, but the other way around, as is clear in the second book of the Physics; but in matter there is a disposition for the form. Therefore someone desires vengeance not because blood boils around his heart, but by this one is disposed toward anger; but one is angered from a desire for vengeance. 21. Now although some variation occur in the motion of the heart from different apprehendsions and sensations, nevertheless this variation of motion is not voluntary because it does not come about through the command of the will. For Aristotle says in the book On the Cause of the Motion of Animals (ch. 10, 703b 7-8, 1121), that oftentimes upon something appearing, and not by the intellect commanding, the heart and private parts are moved, and he assigns the cause of this, since it is necessary for the animal to be altered by a natural alteration;

Non autem in rebus naturalibus forma est propter materiam, sed e converso, ut probatur in secundo Physic., sed in materia est dispositio ad formam. Non igitur propter hoc aliquis appetit vindictam quia sanguis accenditur circa cor, sed ex hoc aliquis est dispositus ad iram; irascitur autem ex appetitu vindictae. Quamvis autem aliqua variatio accidat in motu cordis ex apprehensione diversa et affectione, non tamen ista variatio motus est voluntaria, sed involuntaria, quia non fit per imperium voluntatis. Dicit enim Aristoteles in Lib. de causa Mot. Anim., quod multoties apparente aliquo, non tamen iubente intellectu, movetur cor et pudendum, et huius causam assignat quoniam necesse est alterari naturali alteratione animalia;

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Cf. Commentary on the De Anima, op. cit., lectio 2, n. 22: 22. Next, when he says Now all the souls, he draws out what had been presupposed above, namely that certain modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone. And this he shows by one argument in two parts; which runs as follows. Whenever the physical constitution of the body contributes to a vital activity, the latter pertains to the body as well as the soul; but this happens in the case of all the modifications of the soul, such as anger, meekness, fear, confidence, pity and so forth, hence all these modifications would seem to belong partly to the body. And to show that the physical constitution plays a part in them he uses two arguments. (1) We sometimes see a man beset by obvious and severe afflictions without being provoked or frightened, whereas when he is already excited by violent passions arising from his bodily disposition, he is disturbed by mere trifles and behaves as though he were really angry. (2) At This is still more evident: what makes this point even clearer is that we see in some people, even when there is no danger present, passions arising that resemble one such modification of the soul; for instance melancholy people, simply as a result of their physical state, are often timid when there is no real cause to be. Obviously then, if the bodily constitution has this effect on the passions, the latter must be material principles, i.e. must exist in matter. This is why such terms, i.e. the definitions of these passions, are not to be predicated without reference to matter; so that if anger is being defined, let it be called a movement of some body such as the heart, or of some part or power of the body. Saying this he refers to the subject or material cause of the passion; whereas proceeding from refers to the efficient cause; and existing for to the final cause.

9

alteratis autem partibus, haec quidem augeri, haec autem detrimentum pati, ut iam moveantur et permutentur natis haberi permutationibus invicem. Causae autem motuum caliditas et frigiditas, quae de foris et intus existentes naturales. Et praeter rationem utique facti motus dictarum partium, idest cordis et pudendi, alteratione incidente fiunt. Intellectus enim et phantasia factiva passionum afferunt, ut concupiscentiae, irae et huiusmodi, ex quibus cor calescit et infrigidatur.

but upon the parts being altered, one part will grow larger, but another suffer decrease, such that they are immediately moved and changed by the influences they are naturally apt to have upon each other. 22. Now the causes of the motions [are] warmth and coldness, whether from without or occurring naturally within. And motions of the aforesaid parts, i.e. of the heart and private parts, [of those] at any rate produced against reason, come about by an incidental alteration. For the mind and the imagination are productive of the passions, such as concupiscence, anger and the like, by reason of which the heart is heated or cooled.

Et haec de motu cordis ad praesens dicta suf- 23. And let these things said about the motion ficiant. of the heart suffice for the present.

N.B. For an additional witness on the movement of the heart, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee, 1949), art. 2, c. (excerpt):It must be said that the truth of this question depends to some extent on the preceding one. For if the rational soul is united to the body only through virtual contact, like a mover, as some have asserted, nothing would prevent us from saying that there are many intermediates between the soul and the body, and more so between the soul and prime matter. But if it be asserted that the soul is united to the body as a form, it must be said that it is united to the body immediately. For every form, whether substantial or accidental, is united to matter or to a subject. For each individual thing is one on the same basis on which it is a being. Now, each individual thing is actually a being through a form, whether in the case of actual substantial being or in the case of actual accidental being. And hence every form is an act, and as a consequence it is the reason for the unity whereby a given thing is one. Therefore, just as we cannot say that there is any other medium whereby matter has actual being through its own form, so it cannot be said that there is any other medium uniting a form to matter or to a subject. In consequence of the fact that the soul, then, is the form of the body, there cannot be any medium between the soul and the body. But in consequence of the fact that it is a mover, from this point of view nothing prevents our asserting many media there: for obviously the soul moves the other members of the body through the heart, and also moves the body through the spirit.77

Cf. Q. De An.. (9 ad 13): It must be said that the heart is the primary instrument by means of which the soul moves the other parts of the body; and therefore through it as a medium the soul is united to the other parts of the body as mover; ibid., ad 7: although the same effect is partly produced by the dissolution, caused by the blood, of those humors, whereby the heart is dilated and contracted. Perhaps then our text ought to read: and also moves the heart and the spirit. (emphasis added)

10

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the HeartVINCENT R. LARKIN* Introduction

The letter

De Motu Cordis, which is here translated, is regarded as an authentic work of Thomas Aquinas by Mandonnet and Grabmann.a The letter is addressed to a Master Philip. Mandonnet says he was a professor of medicine in Bologna and afterwards in Naples, b but, as Eschmann observes, this has not been established by Mandonnet. c We conclude that nothing definite is known about Master Philip. Mandonnet sets the date of composition at 1273, but Eschmann prefers 1270/1. The opusculumd is found in the following editions of Thomas works: Opera Omnia, Rome, 1570-71, vol. XVII, p. 24. Piana edition. Opera Omnia, Parma, 1852-73, vol. XVI, p. 358. Parma edition. Opera Omnia, Rome, 1889, vol. XVII, p. 508. Vives edition. Opuscula Omnia, Paris, 1927, vol. I, p. 28, ed. Mandonnet. Opuscula Omnia, Paris, 1949, vol. I, p. 62, ed. Perrier. Opuscula Philosophica, Turin, 1954, p. 165, ed. Marietti edition. The present translation has been made from the Marietti text edited by R. M. Spiazzi, O.P.e Because the argument of this opusculum is not easy to follow, I have numbered the paragraphs. It is hoped the following outline will be helpful: * Immaculate Heart College, Los Angeles. a P. Mandonnet, O.P., Des crits authentiques de St. Thomas dAquin. ed. II, Fribourg. 1910, p. 104, n. 18, M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin , Munster, 1949, pp. 347-348. b Opuscula omnia, Paris, 1927, vol. I, pp. xxv, xxvi. c I. T. Eschmann, O.P., A Catalogue of St. Thomas works in E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York, 1956, p. 419. d For a summary of the contents of this work, see Walter Pagel, The philosophy of circlesCesalpinoHarvey, a penultimate assessment, J. Hist. Med., 1957, 12, 141-143. e The translation of Thomas in the footnotes were made from the Summa theologiae, Ottawa, 1941 and from Summa contra gentiles in Opera Omnia, Rome, 1888-1906. The Aristotelian references are to the Greek text, Aristotelis opera, ed. Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1831; the Platonic ones to the Greek text, Platonis opera, John Burnet, Ed., Oxford, 1899-1906. [ 22 ] PART I I. THE PROBLEM The Movement of the Heart 11

A. What is its origin? (par. 1) B. What is its nature? (par. 1) II. OPINIONS As to origin The principle of heart movement is A. not the soul: neither 1) the nutritive soul (par. 2) nor 2) the sensitive soul (par. 3) Refutation (par. 23) nor 3) the intellectual soul (par. 3) B. an intelligence (par. 5) Refutation (par. 22) C. heat (par. 8) Refutation (par. 9, 10) As to nature Heart movement is not natural because it is A. in opposite directions (par. 4) Refutation (par. 22) B. violent (par. 4) Refutation (par. 4) SOLUTION As to origin The principle of heart movement is the soul As to nature Heart movement is natural because the soul is the form of the body (par. 15, 16, 17) PART II I. HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF Cardiac cycle consists of a push and a pull with a rest period in between (par. 19, 20) HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EMOTION Emotions cause modification of cardiac rhythm (par. 25, 27) TEXT 1. Because everything that is moved must have a mover, 1 we can pose the problem: what is it that moves the heart and what is the nature of its movement?2 2. Now its movement does not seem to proceed from the soul. 3 The heart is not moved by the nutritive soul, for the functions of the nutritiveCf. Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. VII, ch. 1, 241 b 24. Also Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 2, art. 3, p. 13 b. 2 Aquinas, ibid., vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 37, art. 4, c. p. 918b: Mans life consists in a certain movement which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body. 3 Plato defines the soul as the self-moving source of motion in Laws, vol. V, Bk. X, 896 a 1-2. Aristotle says in De anima, vol. I., Bk. I, ch. 3, 406 a 2 that the soul is not self-moving, though it is the principle of living things. His definition of the soul as the first act of a physically organized body having life in potency is found in De anima, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 1, 412 a 27, 412 b 5.1

III.

II.

12

[23-24] soul4 are reproduction, nutrition, growth, and decay. None of these seems to account for the movement of the heart. The soul is found also in plants; the movement of the heart, however, is characteristic of animals. 3. The movement does not seem to belong to either the sensitive or the intellectual soul because the intellect and the senses move only by means of desire, while the movement of the heart is involuntary.5 4. This movement does not seem to be a natural 6 one either, since it goes now in this direction, now in that, for it consists of a push and a pull, whereas natural movement extends in one direction, as fire tends only upwards and earth downwards. It is, however, completely unreasonable to say that the movement of the heart is a violent 7 one, for it is plain that when this movement ceases, the animal ceases or dies, whereas nothing that is contrary to a things nature preserves it. Indeed, it appears that this movement is entirely natural, for the life of the animal and this movement are inseparably related to one another. 5. But some say that this natural movement flows not from some determinate nature within the animal, but from some universal nature, or from an intelligence.8 6. But this is ridiculous. In all natural things the attributes characteristic of any genus or species depend on some intrinsic principle. Those things are natural whose principle of movement resides in them. But nothing is more characteristic of animals than the movement of the heart, for when it ceases, their life perishes. It follows then that a principle of this motion resides in animals themselves. 7. Further, if some movements were produced in earthly bodies by a universal nature, they would not remain always in them, as we observe in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea which depend on the movement of the moon and vary in accord with it. But the movement of the heartPlato speaks of three parts or functions of the soul in Republic, vol. IV, Bk. IV, 435 c 5 and in Phaedrus, vol. II, 246 a 6257 a 2. He identifies them in Republic, Bk. IV, 439 d 5, 439 d 8 & 439 e 3 as the rational part, the striving part, and the desiring part. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of soul, namely, the nutritive, the sensitive, and the rational in the Nicomachean ethics, vol. II, Bk. I, ch. 13. 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, vol. II, Bk. III, ch. 1, 1109 b 35, 1110 a 1: Those things are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance. For Aristotles distinction between voluntary, nonvoluntary, involuntary and violent, vide: loc. cit. 6 For the various meanings of the word natural in Aquinas, vide: Deferarri and Barry, A lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas, Baltimore, 1949, Fascicle IV, p. 724. 7 Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 6, art. 5, p. 756 b: Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as well as to the natural. The voluntary and the natural have this in common, that each proceeds from an intrinsic principle, but the violent proceeds from an extrinsic principle. 8 I.e., an immaterial substance. The use of the word intelligence is explained in Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 79, art. 10 c. p. 491 b: In some works translated from Arabic, the separate substances, which we call angels, are called intelligences, perhaps because such substances are always exercising the act of understanding. The medical opinion referred to in Thomas De motu cordis depends perhaps on the philosophical doctrine of Avicenna. Thomas says, ibid., vol. I, Pars I, q. 65, art. 4, c, p. 399 b: Avicenna and certain others did not hold that the forms of corporeal things subsist essentially in matter, but in the intellect only.4

13

is always present in the animal. It does not then depend on a separated cause but on an intrinsic principle. 8. Others say that the principle of this movement in the animal is heat which, generated through a spirit, moves the heart. But this is unreasonable. That which is prior in a thing must be the cause. Now the movement of the heart seems to be prior in the animal and more closely related to life than any alteration in heat. Therefore alteration in heat is not the cause of the movement of the heart, but on the contrary the movement of the heart is rather the cause of this alteration. Hence the Philosopher says in his book, The Movement of Animals:9 Movement must come first, not such and such an alteration. 9. Likewise, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, resembles most of all the entire universe. Hence man, who is the most perfect of animals, is called by some a world in miniature.10 Now the first movement in the universe is local movement, 11 which is the cause of alteration and of the other movements. Hence in the animal also local movement seems more the principle of alteration than the converse. Hence the Philosopher, pursuing this analogy, says in the eighth book of the Physics12 that movement is, as it were, a kind of life that is naturally present in everything that exists. 10. Further, that which exists essentially is prior to that which exists accidentally. Now the first movement of an animal is the movement of the heart; heat, however, causes local movement only in an accidental way; for it is of the essence of heat that it alter, but it is accidental to it that it cause local movement. It is then ridiculous to say that heat is the principle of the movement of the heart, but we must assign to it a cause which can be essentially the principle of local movement. 11. Therefore let us take as the principle of our contemplation what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics,13 We say that those things that have a principle of movement within them are moved naturally. Hence an animal as a whole moves itself in a natural way, but it happens that its body can be moved both naturally or in a way that is contrary to its nature. It depends on the nature of the movement and the nature of the elements of which the body is composed. For when an animal is moved downwards, its movement is natural both to the whole animal and to its body by the fact that in the body of the animal the heavy element, which by nature moves downwards, is predominant. But when an animal is moved upwards, the movement is natural to the animal because it proceedsAristotle, The movement of animals, vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 2 24-25. Cf. Democritus, fragment 34, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, H. Diehls, Ed., vol. II, Berlin, 1956, p. 153. Also Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 2, 252 b 26. Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 91, art. 1 c, p. 563 a: Man is called a little world, because all the creatures of the world are in some way found in him. 11 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, vol. II, Bk. XII, ch. 7, 1072 b 9, 1073 a 12. 12 Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, 250 b 14-15. 13 Ibid., vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, 254 b 16-20.10 9

[25-26] from its intrinsic principle, which is the soul; but it is not natural to a heavy body; hence in this movement the animal becomes more tired. 12. Local movement in animals is caused by desire and by sensitive or intellectual cognizance, as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima.14 14

13. In other animals, then, the entire process of movement is natural; for they do not act by purpose, but by nature; for the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web in a way that is natural.16 It is characteristic of man alone to act by will, and not by nature. 14. Nevertheless the principle of any of his acts is a natural one. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences, but discovers them by reasoning, the first indemonstrable principles, from which he goes on to knowledge of other things, are naturally known to him. Likewise, it is natural for man, led by desire, to seek the ultimate end,16 which is happiness, and to flee misery. It is not natural for him to seek other things, but because of his desire for the last end, he goes on to desire other things. Thus the end is related to things desirable as the indemonstrable principle is to things intellectual, as is said in the second book of the Physics.17 Since then the movement of the all the other members is caused by the movement of the heart, as the Philosopher shows in the book, The Movement of Animals,18 other movements can be voluntary, but the first movement, which is that of the heart, is natural.19 15. Now let us take into consideration that upward movement is natural to fire because it results from its form; hence also the efficient cause, which produces the form, is essentially one that causes local movement. Just as any natural movement results from the form of the element, so also nothing keeps other natural movements from proceeding from other forms. We see that iron naturally is moved towards a magnet, although this is not a movement natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but inasmuch as it has such and such a form. Therefore nothing keeps an animal, inasmuch as it has certain kind of form which is the soul, from having a natural movement; and that which is causing this movement is that which accounts for the form. 16. Now I say that the natural movement of the animal is that of the heart because, as the Philosopher says in the book, The Movement ofAristotle, De Anima, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 10, 433 a 9-b 30. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 8, 190 a 26. 16 Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 18, art. 3 c, p. 128 b: Although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied to it by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot not will. 17 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 9, 200 a 15-25. 18 Cf. Aristotle, The movement of animals, vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 14. 19 Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 17, art. 9. ad 2, p. 809 a: In bodily movement the principle is according to nature. But the principle of bodily movement proceeds from the movement of the heart. Therefore the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to will.15 14

[26-27] Animals,20 an animal must be regarded as resembling a state that is well and lawfully governed. For when order is once established in a state, there is no need for a special overseer to supervise every activity, but each man does the work assigned him, and one task succeeds another in an accustomed order. In animals this same thing takes place by nature, and because each of the organs is naturally suited to execute its own function, there is no need for the soul to be in each part as the principle of movement but it is in some principal part21 such as the heart which gives life to the other parts, for they execute naturally their own functions. 15

17. Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul, inasmuch as it is the form of one particular body22 and primarily of the heart.23 18. And perchance because of this notion some have said that the movement of the heart comes from an intelligence, as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics24 that the movement of heavy and light bodies comes from an efficient cause inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of movement. Now every property and movement proceeds from some form according to its rank, as movement to the noblest place which is above results from the form of the noblest element, namely, fire. But the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies is the soul, which resembles most of all the principle of the movement of the heavens. Hence the movement that results from it is most like the movement of the heavens. Thus the movement of the heart in the animal is like the movement of the heavens in the world.Cf. Aristotle, The movement of animals, vol. I, ch. 10, 703 a 14. Thomas does not oppose Aristotle on this point for he interprets him as referring here not to the essence of the soul but merely to its power of originating movement. Cf. Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 8, ad 1. p. 462 a. Also Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 72, vol. XIII, p. 457. 22 Thomas argues in Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 1 c., p. 447 b that the soul is the form of the body. As a consequence of this, man has but one soul. Cf. ibid., vol. I, Pars I. q. 76, art. 3 c, p. 453 b. 23 Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart as its domicilium. Its being the form of the body precludes this. Because the soul is not united to the body as its mover, as in Platonic psychology, it does not act on the body through an organ, but is whole and entire in each and every part of the body. Vide: Summa theologiae, vol. I, Pars I, q. 76, art. 8 c, p. 461b. Thomas thinking is in accord with St. Augustine who says in the De trinitate, Bk. VI, 6, 8 that the soul is wholly in the whole body, and whole in each part of it. Migne, Patrologia latina, t. XLII, Paris, 1841, p. 929. However, Thomas departs from the teaching of his master, St. Albert Magnus, who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshel. Alfred in his De motu cordis written about 1210 says: The heart is the dwelling place (domicitium) of the soul. Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift de Motu Cordis von Clemens Bauemker in Bitrage zur Geschicte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band XXIII, Munster i. W., 1923, ch. VIII, p. 33. Albert in De anima, II, tract. I, ch. 7, says: The soul is in the heart, and from there it pours out its powers on the whole body, and so it is not wholly in the whole body, in such a way that it would be whole in each part, but it is in each part by some of its powers. . . . And this is the opinion of the Peripatetics. But there were and are certain men who say that the soul is wholly in the whole body, but this was not the opinion of a certain Philosopher. Opera omnia, A. Borgnet, Ed. Paris, 1890. vol. 5, pp/ 204-205. By a certain philosopher Albert indicates his debt to Alfred. 24 Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, 255 b 31256a 3.21 20

[27-28] 19. But the movement of the heart necessarily falls short of the movement of the heavens as the effect falls short of the cause. The movement of the heavens is circular and continuous, and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of all the movements of the world; for by approach and recession a heavenly body confers on things the origin and end of being, and by its continuity preserves the order in the movements that are not eternal. The movement of the heart is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of The Parts of Animals25 that the movements of delight and sadness, and, in general, all the emotions seem to begin here, 16

namely, in the heart, and to end here. Therefore in order that the heart be the principle and end of all the movements in the animal, it has a certain movement, not circular but like circular movement, namely, one consisting of a push and a pull. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima26 that which moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide. All things are moved by pushing and pulling; because of this something must remain at rest, as we see in the case of the wheel, and motion must originate from this position. 20. This movement is continuous throughout the life of the animal, except that a rest period is inserted midway between the push and the pull 27 because it falls short of circular motion. 21. By this principle then we can easily solve the objections of an adversary. 22. For we do not say that the movement of the heart is natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light, but inasmuch as it is animated by a certain kind of soul; and the two movements which seem opposed are, asAristotle, The parts of animals, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 4, 666a 11-13. Aristotle, De anima, vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 10. 433b 21-22, 25-27 27 Modern physiologists do not speak of a rest period between systole and diastole, but within diastole, which is itself the resting place of the ventricle, there are periods of inactivity such as those of isometric relaxation and diastasis. Vide: Best and Taylor, The living body, New York, 1958. pp. 169-173. In Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 44, art. 1, sed contra, p. 943 b, Thomas cites the definition of fear given by St. John of Damascus (c. 674-749) in which the word systole appears. John says in De fide orthodoxa, Bk. III, ch. 23, 1088: Natural fear is a force which maintains being by means of systole. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, t. XCIV, Paris, 1964. John had taken over this definition from the work of Maximus the Confessor (580-662), Disputatio cum Pyrrho, 297 D. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, t. XCI, Paris, 1865. As used here, the word systole, which we can translated by retreat or contraction, lacks medical significance. But in the De motu cordis of Alfred of Sareshel we find specifically medical meanings attributed to systole and diastole. However, they are used only with reference to the arteries. He first gives the explanation of those who speak of a spirit flowing through the arteries: They say that diastole results when the arteries are full and stretched by spirit that flows through them; systole results when it leaves the arteries. Op. cit., ch. 11, p. 46. He then gives the explanation of those who oppose the doctrine of the flowing spirits. According to this group, Radiation causes diastole; its cessation causes systole. (op. cit., ch. 11, p. 47). Thomas in Summa theologiae (vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 24., art. 2, ad 2, p. 850 b) uses these terms in reference to cardiac activity: In every emotion of the soul there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart according as the heart is moved more or less intensely in systole or diastole.26 25

[28-29] it were, parts of a single movement composed of both, in so far as it falls short of the simplicity of circular movement, which it imitates in so far as it goes from a point back to the same point. And so it is not contradictory if it goes somehow in different directions, because circular movement also is in some respects like this. 23. Nor must it be caused by apprehension and desire, although it comes from the sensitive soul;28 for it is not caused by the sensitive soul through its own operation, but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of one particular body. 24. The locomotion of the animal is caused by the operations of the senses and the emotions; and because of this medical men distinguish vital operations from animal 17

operations, and say that when the animal ones cease, the vital ones remain. They call vital those operations which accompany the movement of the heart, for when they cease, life is at an end; and this is reasonable. For to live is the to be of living things, as is said in the second book of the De Anima:29 the to be belongs to each thing in virtue of its own form. 25. There is this difference between the principle of movement of the heavens and the soul: this principle is moved neither essentially nor accidentally; but the sensitive soul, although not moved essentially, is moved accidentally. Hence diverse cognitions and emotions arise in it. Hence the movement of the heavens is always uniform but the movement of the heart varies according to the diverse emotions and cognitions of the soul. For the emotions of the soul are not caused by the modifications of the heart but rather cause them.30 Therefore in the passions of the soul, as for example in anger, 31 the formal element is that which comes from theThomas here tacitly concedes that the heart is moved neither by the nutritive nor by the intellectual soul but maintains that its movement is caused by the sensitive soul. He is challenging the statement of an adversary as presented in paragraph 3, supra. It is easy to take paragraph 3 for Thomas own position, since this opusculum, being a letter, does not exhibit the clearly defined didactic structure of Thomas major works. Dr. Walter Pagel in his splendid article ( loc. cit. [see note d]) seems not to have avoided this snare, for he writes of Thomas: The author first analyses the relationship between the heart and the soul. To start with he rejects the possibility that individual faculties of the soul cause the movements of the heart: plants possess a nutritive, augmentative, and generative soul, but no heart. Nor are the sensitive or intellectual faculties responsible, since the heart moves involuntarily (p. 141) and The motion of the heart cannot be explained in terms of action by any force outside the organism, or even any partial faculty of the soul. 29 Aristotle, De anima, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 2, 413b 1-2. 30 Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q, 38, art. 5, obj. 3, 922 b: Sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, bring about a certain change in the heart. Also loc. cit., ad 3, p. 922 b: Every good disposition of the body reacts in some way on the heart, as on the principle and end of bodily movement.; ibid., vol. I, Pars I, q. 20, art. 1, ad 1, p. 144 a: The act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by some change in the body, especially in the heart, which . . . is the first principle of movement in animals. 31 Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q, 48, art. 2 c, 962 b: The movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and spirits about the heart, which is the instrument of the souls emotions. And hence it is that, because of the great disturbance of the heart when one is angry, certain signs are especially evident in the exterior parts of those who are angry.28

[29-30] will. namely, the desire for vengeance; but the material element 32 is what pertains to the movement of the heart, namely, excitement of blood about the heart. 26. In natural things the form does not exist for the sake of the matter, but conversely, as is made clear in the second book of the Physics,33 but in matter there is disposition for form. Therefore it is not because the blood about the heart is excited that someone seeks vengeance, but because of this someone is inclined to anger.34 He becomes angry, however, out of desire for vengeance. 27. Although some variation in the rhythm of the heart occurs due to diverse apprehensions and emotions, this variation of rhythm is not voluntary but involuntary, 18

because it does not take place at the command of the will. For the philosopher says in the book, The Cause of the Movement of Animals,35 that often at the sight of something the heart and genitals are moved without a command of the intellect, and he gives this reason: that animals necessarily are affected by physical changes; but when the parts are affected, one undergoes increase, and another decrease, so that each is moved and modified by natural changes that are related to one another. 28. The causes of the movements of the animal are warmth and cold, 36 which, naturally present internally and externally, make the movements of the aforementioned parts, the heart and genitals, take place in any case independently of reason when an alteration occurs.37 The intellect and imagination cause emotion, such as concupiscence, anger, and the like on account of which the heart grows warm or becomes chilled.38 29. Let these words on the movement of the heart suffice.Ibid., vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 22, art. 2, ad 3, p. 843 b: In the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part some natural change of an organ is found from the standpoint of matter; as it is said that anger is the excitement of blood about the heart. Also, ibid., vol. I, Pars I, q. 20, art. 1, ad 2, p. 144 a: Let us distinguish in the emotions of the sense appetite a certain material element, namely, the bodily change, and a certain formal element, which belongs to appetite. Thus in anger . . . the material element is the excitement of blood about the heart, or something like this; but the formal element is the desire for revenge. 33 Aristotle, Physics, vol. I, Bk. II, ch. 9, 200 a 30-34. 34 Summa contra Gentiles, vol. XIII, Bk. I, ch. 89, p. 240: Every emotion comes about concomitantly with some bodily changes: for example, concomitantly with the contraction or dilation of the heart, or something like this. 35 Aristotle, The movement of animals, vol. I, ch. 11, 703b 7-20. 36 This is explained in Summa theologiae, vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 6, art. 1, ad 2, p. 753a. 37 A discussion of this is found in ibid., vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 17, art. 9, ad, p. 809 b. 38 Cf. ibid., vol. II, Pars I-II, q. 44, art. 3, ad 3, p. 945 b, where Thomas illustrates the chilling effects of fear: Because in fear heat leaves the heart, and goes from the higher parts to the lower, the heart especially trembles in those who are afraid, and the members which are connected to the chest, where the heart resides, also tremble. Hence the fearful tremble especially in their speech, because the artery of speech is near the heart. The lower lip, and the entire lower jaw, because of their connection with the heart, also tremble. Because of this, the teeth chatter. For the same reason, the arms and hands tremble.32

Source: Vincent R. Larkin, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart, Journal of the History of Medicine, xv, 1 (January 1960), 22-30. Transcribed from: Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1960 XV(1):2230; doi:10.1093/jhmas/XV.1.22 1960 by Oxford University Press [N.B. I have silently corrected a few typographical errors in the text.]

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1. ON THE DATE OF THE WORK. Cf. Friar Thomas DAquino. His Life, Thought, and Works: With Corrigenda and Addenda. By James A. Weisheipl (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1983), pp. 394-395:A Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works 73. De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum de Castrocaeli (Paris 1270-71). Extant MSS: 119. According to the catalogue of Bartholomew of Capua, this letter and another on the mixture of the elements (n. 74) were both addressed to a certain master Philip of Castrocaeli, who is otherwise unknown. Mandonnet suggested that master Philip may have been a physician, professor first at Bologna and later at Naples; but no evidence is given. The purpose of this letter is to show that the motion of the blood 10 and heart is produced by nature and not by soul or any outside forces. Both Mandonnet and Walz give the date as Naples 1273; Eschmann suggests Paris 1270-71. This is one of the treatises preserved by Godfrey of [394-395] Fontaines (Paris MS Bibl. Nat. lat. 14546) as a topic of special current interest. * EDITIONS Perrier, Opuscula, I, 63-93 (basic text: Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14546); Parma v, *16, 358-60; Vivs v. 27, 507-11; Marietti 1954, Opuscula Phil., 165-68. No English translation. *

Cf. ibid., p. 485:CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA 395.1 395.3 395.6 Bibl.Nat. lat. 14546: Bible Nat. lat. 16297; EDITIONS: add: Leonine ed., v.43 (Rome 1976), preface 95-122; text 127130; No English translation: English trans.: St. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart, Vincent R. Larkin, Journal of the History of Medicine, 25 (1960), 22-30.

2. DE MOTU CORDIS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW. Cf. Walter Pagel, William Harveys Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background. (Basel/New York, 1967), Circular Symbolism, Heart and Blood Before Harvey, pp. 90-93:(b) St Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart (pl. 5, 6) The Opusculum or rather Letter de motu cordis of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 10 has occasionally been looked upon as a work on the motion of the bloodan appraisal that was largely due to a misunderstanding of the term circular. 11 The latter does occur in this Opusculum, but appertains to the motion of the heart and not of the blood. It is, however, a work that displays interesting aspects and deserves a short discussion in the present context,10

Contrary to what is here asserted, the word blood nowhere appears in the letter; cf. the next excerpt.

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if only to the show the variety of meanings attaching to circular and circulatio and for the influence it exerted in the era of the Renaissance. It is regarded as a genuine work and has been translated and commented upon in recent times.12 Ever since the reception of the philosophy of Aristotle and the acceptance of his psychophysical ideas in the early thirteenth century, the heart had formed the central focus of biological speculation. This is seen in the role which it played in Alfred of Sareshals De motu cordis, written before the death, in 1217, of Alexander Neckham to whom it is dedicated.13 Some of St Thomas statements seem to be directed against Alfred. 14 St Thomas speculation is mainly concerned with the soul as the vital principle causing and directing the motion of the heart, its character as a natural motion and its analogy with the motion of the heavensits circularity. Its result is that the movement of the heart is due to the soul as the form of the body and primarily of the heart. With this St Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart. Differing from Alfredus who made it the dwellingplace ( domicilium) of the10

De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum , Opusculum Omnia, Antwerp 1612 opus XXXV, p. 214. First ed. (folio) Milan, Beninus et Joh. Ant. de Honate. Edition also used by the present writer: Venetiis 1490 (ed. with a life of St Thomas by Anton Pizamanus) published in 4o by Herman Liechenstein Coloniensis, sig. J verso to J 2 verso = a separate edition with another opusculum Libelli doctoris Sancti Thomae aquinatis occultorum naturae effectum Et proprii cordis motus causas declarantes studentibus phusice summe necessari appeared at Leipzigper Jacobum Thaner of Wrzburg1499. 11 BAYON, H. P. William Harvey, Physician and Biologist: His precursors, opponents, and successors Part III, Annals of Sci. 1958, III, 445. 12 LARKIN, VINCENT R. St Thomas Aquinas on the movement of the heart. J. Hist. Med. 1960, XV, 22-30. See also idem, St Thomas Aquinas on the combining of the elements . Isis 1960, LI 67-72a translation of St. Thomas De mixtione elementorum, like De motu cordis, a letter addressed to a Master Philip (ab. 1270). 13 Excerpta a libro Alfredi Anglici de motu cordis item Costar-ben-Lucae de differentia animas et spiritas liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi. ed. C.S. BARACH Innsbruck 1878. C. BAEUMKER, C. Des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift De motu cordis , Mnster 1923. Idem, Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfred Anglicus) und seiner beginnenden XIII. Jarhunderts. Sitzber, Kgl. Bayer, Akad. d. Wiss. Philos-hist. Kl. 1915, IX Mnchen 1913. 14 See below. [90-91] soul,15 St Thomas regarded the latter as the form of the body as a whole. In this he followed Plotinus and St Augustine who regarded the soul as wholly in the whole body, and whole in each of its parts.16 The movement of the heart that appears first in the developing organism is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal, and under this aspect is linked with the soul, the vital principle of the organism as a whole. 17 Secondly, the motion of the heart is natural. It is so, however, not in the ordinary sense of motus naturalis, predicated of a body because it is heavy or light and thus follows one direction, but because movement is immanent to the heart that is animated by a certain kind of soul18 and not due to external force causing the so called motus violentus.19 Nor finally is it caused by such external force as heatfor it is the very movement of the heart that engenders heat.20 In all these points opposition to Alfreds stipulations is recognisable. The latter had denied the intimate connexion of the motion of the heart with the soul: it is not a motus animalis as it is independent of appetitus and intelligentia practica. Alfredus refutes its natural

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character, as the heart does not follow its weight and move to the centre, but remains on its level; moreover it is moved by an outside force, namely the heat which distends air and blood. Its movement, therefore, belongs to the same category as the movement of smoke that moves upwards and that of a burning torch which leads the fire in a downward direction. 21 According to St Thomas the movement of the heart is a rhythmically repeated series of pushing and pulling actions. Though continuous throughout the life of the animal this movement is not strictly circular because there is a rest period inserted midway between the push and the pull. It is a movement not circular, but like circular movement ( habuit namely, corquendam motum non circularem, sed similum circulari compositum ). This circularity comes about because the heart and its movement are the principle and end of all the movements that exist in the animal. It results from the soul, the form of the body and primarily of the heartthe noblest form that exists in earthly bodiesand thus resembles the principle of the movement of the heavens. It follows that the movement of the heart must be like that of the heavens. It necessarily falls short of the latter, as the effect falls short of the cause. On the other hand, it imitates its perfect and uninterruptedsimplecircular movement in so far as it goes from the a point back to the same point (quem tamen imitator in quantum est ab eodem in idem ). Though consisting of two partssystole and diastole 22 it is15

Cor igitur domicilium est. Alfred De motu cordis, ed. Baeumker loc. cit. in note [13], p. 35, l. 18; p. 45, l. 10; p. 45, l. 20; anima igitur, quae sensus et motus et vitae principium est, arcem corporis, id est cor, inhabitat: p. 86, l. 8 and similar passages as compiled in the index to Baeumkers ed. p. 103. See also Barach loc. cit. in note [13], p. 70: [remainder of note omitted]. 16 Hoti hole en pasi kai en hotooun autou hole: Plotinus, Ennead. IV, 2, 1. ed. H.F. Mueller Berol. 1880, vol. II, p. 6. ARISTOTLE, De Anima lib. I , cap. 5; 412b. We return to this in the chapter on Marcus Marci later in this book, see p. 314. 17 Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul, in as much as it is the form of one particular body and primarily of the heart. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart 17 tr. VINCENT R. LARKIN loc. cit. in note [12]. To this [see] LARKINS long note 23 on Thomas departing from the teaching of his master Albertus Magnus who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshal. See above our footnote [25] with the passage from Baruch. The basic ref. to Aristotle is [91-92] De motu animal. cap. 10; 703 a 29 and 703 b 1 seq. and 703 a 19. really a single movement. Its composite structure does not therefore exclude it from being natural although its naturalness does not follow from this, but from its animation by a certain kind of soulthe sensitive soul as the form and nature of a particular kind of body. 23 Nor is its going in different directions a point against its circularity, also as circular movement is in some respects like this. From this short analysis of St Thomas treatise it emerges, then, that he indeed speaks of a circular movement or at least one that comes close to the simple circular motion of the heavens. It is not the movement of the blood with which he is concerned, however, but that of the heart. In this circular means that it starts from one point and returns to itso does the blood, but in quite a different way. The blood sets out from the heart and returns to it after having travelled a long distance. St. Thomas knows nothing of this or at all events does not mention it. The circularity with which he deals merely indicates the rhythmical repetition of a movement that is uniformly composed of two acts: that of pull and push, of pulsus and tractus, of systole and diastole.

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Perhaps this should be associated with a term used by theolderMaimonides (11351204). The latter speaks of the circular movement of the arteries. This is compared with the moving of a ball, since the palpitation of the artery is explained to the senses by the termination of the circuit (gemirath ha-sibbuh).24 This seems to allude to the very passage which St Thomas quotes from Aristotle, De Anima: that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide, as for example in a ball and socket joint; for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why one remains at rest while the other is moved): they are separate in definition, but not separate spatially. For everything is moved by pushing and pulling. Hence just as in the case of a wheel, so here there must be a point which remains at rest, and from that point the movement must originate.25 The similar way in which this matter is treated by Maimonides and St Thomas may justify the suggestion that the latter was influenced by Maimonides therein. An additional influence on St Thomas may be found in the use of the terms systole and diastole with regard to the arteries by Alfred of Sareshel. He stipulates that the spirit of life is not moved, but emanates from the left ventricle of the heart by irradiation. He says, the flux of the spirit through the arteries causing them to be repleted and elevated has been called diastole and its cessation systole. Alfred, then, in common with Maimonides speaks of the rhythmically repeated movement18 19

Tr. LARKIN 22. Tr. LARKIN 4. 20 Tr. LARKIN 8. 21 ALFREDUS ANGLICUS, ed. Bauemker, loc. cit. in note [13], cap. IX; De specie motus cordis, p. 35-37. 22 Tr. LARKIN 19-22, referring to Aristotle, De anima, III, 10; see below note [25] and text to this note. 23 Tr. LARKIN 22. 24 LEIBOWITZ, J.O. in Korath 1935, I, 7-8 with ref. to the IVth Particula of Maimonides, Aphorismi, which deals with the pulse. [remainder of note omitted] 25 ARISTOTLE, De anima lib.III, cap. 10; 433 b 21-22; 25-27 tr. J.A. SMITH, Oxford 1931. See also ARISTOTLE De motu animal. cap. 10; 703 a 19; see above note [22] and below p.276, note [115]. Also: GALEN, Defin. med., cxii, Khn, XIX, 377. [92-93] of the arterieshe does not mention it with reference to the heart. By contrast, St Thomas does.2626

ALFREDUS ANGLICUS, ed. Bauemker, loc. cit. in note [13], cap. XI; Quod spiritus vitae non movetur, sed fit irradiatione virtutis p. 461L diastolen igitur irraditio, sistolen spadulatio fecit, as against: repleta et elevata arteria per fluentem spiritum diastolem fieri dicunt; sistolen vero, cum arterio egressus fuerit, p. 46-47. See to this: Larkin loc. cit. in note [12], p. 28 note 27 to passage 20 of Thomas De motu cordis on the medical meanings attributed by Alfred to systole and diastole, but used exclusively with reference to the arteries. By contrast Thomas speaks of the rest period inserted midway between push and pull of the heart (paragr. 20) and the increase or decrease in its natural movement in systole and diastole in every emotion. For the latter Larkin quotes from Summa theolog. vol. II, pars I-II, q. 24, art. 2, ad 2, p. 850b, ed. Ottawa 1941.

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3. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS. a. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 17, art. 9 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey. Objection 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that the pulse is not controlled by reason. Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold. Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command. I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the souls powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason. Reply to Objection 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul. Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states ( Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called vital. For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.

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Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity. But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this particular members in submission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle ( De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary, and that the reason of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply obj. 2).

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b. On the causes of animal motion: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Book III, lectio 15:TEXT 433a9433b27 BOOK III, CHAPTER X THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED WHAT THEY ARE It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,intellect and appetency. 818-19 Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical intellect. The last end is the first principle of action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. 820-5 All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite. 826-7 For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. 828 Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent). 829 The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,but numerically there are several moving factors. 830

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Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul. 831 Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. 832-5 ST. THOMASS COMMENTARY LECTIO FIFTEEN 818. So far the Philosopher has pursued his enquiry into the principle of local movement in animals by the method of refuting unsatisfactory solutions; but now he states the positive truth on the matter: first, showing in general what that principle is; and secondly, at Generally then, how it varies in different subjects. The first point again divides into (a) a statement of the motive principle in animals; and (b), at The motive-force will therefore, an analysis of the factors at work when this principle is in action. Again (a) subdivides int