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1
Decentralisation and Subnational Autonomy – Evidence from East and South Asia
Eunkyung Shin, University of York
PSA (Political Studies Association) Annual International Conference
21 – 23 March 2016, HiltonBrighton Metropole, Brighton, UK
Abstract
This paper aims to examine current literature on decentralisation and subnational
autonomy in East and South Asia. This systemic literature review illuminates driving forces,
actors, institutions, types, degree, and consequences of decentralisation in these nine
selected East and South Asian countries.
The main driving forces of decentralisation are political motivation (i.e. democratisation)
and managerial motivation (i.e. neoliberalism). While decentralisation China was triggered
by neoliberalism, decentralisation in Bangladesh, Taiwan and Philippines was based on
democratisation movement. In India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, both political and
managerial motivations were promoted decentralisation reforms. Ethnic and religious
conflicts also encouraged decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Philippines.
Actors are national, intermediate, and local governments, ruling and opposition parties, civil
society, and international organisations and donors. Two types of institutions are found in
the nine selected countries: political institutions (i.e. executive-legislative relations) and
historically and socially embedded institutions (i.e. Developmental State legacy, colonial
legacy, authoritarian regime legacy, centralised Kingdom legacy).
Then, the processes of decentralisation are investigated in terms of the types, the degree,
and the sequence of decentralisation by applying theories of Rondinelli (1983), Wolman
(1990), Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and Falleti (2010).
Lastly, the relation between decentralisation and subnational autonomy is investigated by
focusing on the interactions among actors, interests, ideas, and institutions.
In conclusion, this systemic literature review shows that there are relatively lesser research
about the relation between decentralisation and intergovernmental balance of power. In
particular, papers regarding Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan give lesser considerations on
interactions between agency, institutions, structure, and ideas. Therefore, comparative
study about decentralisation in these three countries, cross-national and cross-sectoral, is a
significant work to fill this research gap.
2
Introduction
Decentralisation is generally understood as transfers of (political, administrative, and fiscal)
authorities, resources, and responsibilities from a higher level government to lower levels of
governments. Political decentralisation refers to transfers of political authority and decision-
making discretion from the central to the subnational government. Administrative
decentralisation is about the degree of managerial autonomy in terms of public service
planning, administration and provisions. Fiscal decentralisation is regarding the subnational
autonomy to collect and spend fiscal resources.
The matter whether decentralisation increases local autonomy or not is an important check
point in order to understand decentralisation and its outcomes. For example, if local
autonomy did not change after decentralisation, the diverse outcomes of decentralisation
on enhancing or deteriorating efficiency and equity may not be attributed to the
decentralised feature of governance. In the same vein, political accountability of local
politicians may not increase even after the introduction of local elections, political
decentralisation, if there was no substantial administrative and fiscal authority transfers
from the national government.
Therefore, this systemic literature review aims to examine whether decentralisation
increases subnational autonomy and trace the interactions among actors, interests, ideas,
and institution in the processes of decentralisation in East and South Asia.
Methods
Selection of Data Sources
Considering the main issues of interests are decentralisation, local autonomy, and social
policy, relevant electronic databases linked to social policy and social work and politics were
identified. Five electronic databases were selected in the electronic databases for social
policy and social work including those for social policy, management, public policy, public
administration and social care, but excluding those related to psychology, criminology,
traumatic stress and statistics. Similarly, five electronic databases were selected for politics
including political science but excluding political philosophy, statistics and Yearbooks. There
3
were some duplication across social policy and politics giving a total of six databases as
detailed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The result of electronic database selection
Total (6) ProQuest Web of Science
EBSCO Scopus Social Policy Practice (Ovidsp)
Sage Journals Online
Social Policy and Social Work (5)
o o o o o
Politics (5) o o o o o
Search Mechanism
Categories of key search terms were identified ‘decentralisation’ and ‘subnational
government’ and ‘local autonomy’ reflecting the focus on the relationship between
decentralisation and local autonomy. When the electronic databases were screened,
different expressions with same meaning were used in order to embrace a variety of
terminology. If those key search terms were in title, abstract and contents of a paper, it was
identified as a potentially relevant paper through following a screening procedure (See
Figure 2).
Figure 2. Concepts and key search terms
Concepts Key search terms used when screening
Decentralisation decentralisation or decentralization or devolution or deconcentration or
delegation
and
Subnational government
local government or regional government or provincial government or municipal government or subnational government
and
Local autonomy autonomy or authority or intergovernmental power or balance of power
Study Selection
Inclusion criteria for a first screening were decided based upon period, language, and
document type. Potentially relevant papers were to be peer-reviewed journal articles
containing empirical evidence and written in English. Inclusion criteria for the first screening
are shown in Figure 3.
4
Figure 3. Inclusion criteria
Criteria Contents
Period From 2000.1.1 – 2014.3.25
Language English
Document type Published journal article
Study type Empirical study
Originality Primary and secondary data
Then, 928 potentially relevant papers were identified by screening the selected six
electronic databases. These potentially relevant papers come from different sources: 333
from ProQuest, 145 from Web of Science, 161 from EBSCO, 51 Scopus, 57 from Social Policy
Practice and 181 from Sage Journals Online. A total of 786 potentially relevant papers
remained after deleting duplicated papers (n=142).
Then, 250 from the total of 786 potentially relevant papers remained after 536 papers were
excluded based on title and abstract review. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for a second
screening stage are shown in the following Figure 4.
Figure 4. Defined as inclusion/exclusion criteria
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria
Policy area Social policy (education, health care, social care, income support, policy/services for older, disabled people and children and family)
Poverty
Energy, climate change, environmental policy
Regulation, economic policy, urban development, local enterprise partnership
Information technology, e-government
Forest management, natural resource management
Cultural policy, film and media
Foreign policy
Human rights
Decentralisation Decentralisation from public to public (i.e. from central government to local government or intermediate government)
Privatisation (decentralisation from public to private)
arms-length and agencification
Capacity building - Participation, peoples’ empowerment
National and local relations
- Nationalism, localism, regionalism
(International) municipal cooperation
Other - Ethnicity
5
186 relevant papers remained after excluding 64 papers on the basis of full text review
including a systemic review paper. Two papers were added based upon the author’s
previous reading. This gave a total 188 studies for a final systematic literature review.
This number was further reduced by a geographical focus on Asia and South-East Asia, in
order to shed light on the decentralisation in newly democratised and developing countries,
to give forty journal articles (Figure 5, flow chart).
Figure 5. Flow chart of search strategy process
Potentially relevant papers identified from electronic search;
333 from ProQuest 145 from Web of Science
161 from EBSCO 51 Scopus
57 from Social Policy Practice 181 from Sage Journals Online
(n = 928)
Duplicated papers exclusion
(n = 142)
Studies reviewed in detail (n = 786)
Papers excluded on the basis of title review and abstract review
(n = 536)
Studies reviewed in final analysis (n = 250)
Papers excluded on the basis of full text review
(n = 64)
Studies included in final analysis (n = 186)
A paper included on the basis of author’s reading
(n = 2)
Studies included in systematic literature review (n = 188)
Papers excluded on the basis of geographical location
(Other location except East and South Asia)
(n = 148)
Studies included in systematic literature review (Geographical location: East and South Asia)
(n = 40)
6
Description of Included Studies
According to above procedures, forty journal articles were selected to conduct systemic
literature review. This section presents a general overview of the selected forty papers in
terms of periodical dispersion, geographical locations, and theoretical and methodological
approaches. First, the selected papers’ periodical dispersion was relatively even from 2000
to 2013 (Table 1).
Table 1. Periodical dispersion of selected papers
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
No. 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 6 2 3 7
Second, the selected papers cover total nine countries of five in South Asia and four in East
Asia. Twelve papers investigated decentralisation in China; majority of the papers about the
change of central-local relations under asymmetric decentralisation, such as fully
decentralised administrative and fiscal authorities and centralised political powers. Papers
on decentralisation in India, Indonesia, and Philippines were found six, respectively.
Decentralisation of Japan and South Korea were discussed in three papers, respectively.
Papers about Thailand and Taiwan were two, respectively and a paper about Bangladesh
was found.
In terms of research design, four papers were cross national comparative study.
Sudhiponpracha (2013) conducted a historical comparative study about the central-local
relation in Thailand and Philippines. Chang (2010) compared the central-periphery relations
in South Korea and Russia. Bossert and Beauvais (2002) analysed decentralisation of health
care in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda, and Philippines, and explain the diverse consequences of
decentralisation by comparing local decision space. Heller (2001) conducted a comparative
study about three regional governments in South Africa, India, and Brazil. Qualitative
methods were mainly adopted in the four comparative studies.
While 28 papers were a case study for a single country by using national level as an
analytical unit, the remaining twelve papers discussed decentralisation in a region or several
regions in one country. In the case of India, five out of six selected papers were inter-
regional comparative studies (Dyer, 2005; Gaiha and Kulkarni, 2002; Heller, 2001; Imai and
7
Sato, 2012; Venugopan and Yilmaz, 2009). Three studies about Indonesia also executed in-
depth case studies or a comparative study (Firman, 2008; Hunter, 2004; Kristiansen et al.,
2006). There were three studies about decentralisation and the consequences in regional
level (Skinner et al., 2003; Wang et al, 2012; Yep, 2010). There was one in-depth case study
about Muslim Mindano Island in Philippines (Jimenez, 2009).
Third, six papers approached the issue of decentralisation with theoretical frameworks
(Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Haque, 2010; Heller, 2001; Kuo and So, 2013; Sudihiponpracha,
2013; Tsai et al., 2012, Wang et al., 2012). Bossert and Beauvais (2002) used ‘decision space
analytical framework’ based on a principle agent approach in order to evaluate
decentralisation. Haque (2010: 1532) stressed to take attention on ‘county’s contextual
determinants, such as the past legacies of centralisation, configuration of local power
structure, and bureaucratic eliticism, in decentralisation analyses. Heller (2001: 135-136)
compared diverse two approaches toward decentralisation, the technocratic and the
anarcho-communitarians views, and illustrated the latter approach has more persuasive to
explicate diverse consequences of decentralisation reforms in Kerala (India), South Africa,
and Porto Alegre (Brazil). Kuo and So (2013) and Wang et al. (2013) focused on fiscal
decentralisation by introducing Fiscal Federalism (Oates, 1972), Leviathan Hypothesis
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), and Market Preserving Decentralisation (Weingast, 2009).
Sudihipongpracha (2013) challenged Riker’s Theory of Federalism (1964) and Falleti’s
Sequential Theory of Decentralisation (2010). Tsai et al. (2012) applied Down’s Median
Voters Theorem to their analysis.
Theoretical frameworks used in the six papers can be summarised into two types: rational
choice and historical institutional approaches. The theories based on the rational choice
approach which emphasize agency and externally given incentive designs are Decision Space
Analytical Frame Work (Principle-agent theory), Technocratic View, Fiscal Federalism,
Leviathan Hypothesis, Market Preserving Decentralisation, Riker’s Theory of Federalism, and
Down’s Median Voters Theorem. Contrary to the rational choice stream, the anarcho-
communitarians view and Falleti’s Sequential Theory of Decentralisation focus on the
interaction between actors and social structures, such as historical and institutional legacies,
in the process of decentralisation.
8
Selected literature about decentralisation in East and South Asia mainly analysed
decentralisation reforms in the given countries in descriptive methods. Only six papers were
adopted concrete theoretical framework in order to examine what really happen in the
process of decentralisation. Furthermore, whereas most of the theories used in the six
papers were based on the rational choice approaches, only two adopted historical
institutional approaches (Heller, 2001; Sudihipongpracha, 2013). There was no article
applied ideological approaches explicitly.
Fourth, there was a proclivity toward qualitative methods. Whereas most of the papers are
a case study for a single country, a few papers discussed decentralisation in a region or
several regions in one country. Furthermore, majority of papers contains the processes and
contents of decentralisation reforms. The fact gave methodological dominance to a
qualitative document analysis. In fact, 29 papers used qualitative approaches including
document analysis, one-to-one interview and focus group interview. However, several
quantitative approaches were also found papers about the consequence of fiscal
decentralisation in terms of equity and efficiency. Nine papers adopted quantitative
approaches, such as descriptive statistical analysis, regressions and difference-in-differences
(DID), by using secondary data. The remaining two papers used mixed methods.
The detailed information about the selected papers is in Table 2.
Table 2. Detailed information of the selected papers
Area South Asia East Asia
Country Bangladesh India Indonesia Thailand Philippines China Japan South Korea
Taiwan
No. of Paper
1 6 6 2 6 12 3 3 2
Quanti 0 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 1
Quali 1 5 4 2 6 7 2 2 1
Mixed 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Compa-rative
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Country 1 1 3 2 5 9 3 3 2
Regions 0 5 3 0 1 3 0 0 0
* Sum is more than forty due to comparative study on Thailand and Philippines.
9
Findings of Systemic Literature Review
In this section, what have been studied in the selected forty papers are investigated in terms
of driving forces, main actors, institutions, processes, and consequences of decentralisation.
The driving forces of decentralisation in East and South Asia
The decentralisation reforms which took place during the last decades came from social and
political demands which generally implemented political or managerial approaches. The
contents of social and political demands triggering decentralisation reforms are highly
related to what follows decentralisation reforms. For example, when social and political
demands emerged from the sceptics of “big government” in terms of enhancing economic
development and public service efficiency, the decentralisation reforms that followed were
highly related to administrative and fiscal reforms in order to achieve managerial efficiency
and economic competitiveness. However, if the social political demands were triggered by
corruption under centralised authoritarian government and there was a lack of democracy
and peoples’ participation, political decentralisation, such as introducing elections of Chief
Local Executive officers and Local Council, will be the subsequent decentralisation reforms.
Within the forty articles, the argument about the relations between motivations and
decentralisation reforms is well corroborated by the nine countries represented. In the
managerial perspective, neo-liberalism reinforced by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and
New Public Management reforms are the main drivers of decentralisation in six countries
(i.e. China (including Hong Kong), India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand)
(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Chang, 2010; Chien, 2010; Dyer, 2005; Jacobs, 2003;
Kang, 2006; Kim, 2012; Kuo and So, 2013; Lewis, 2005; Sudhipongpracha, 2013; Tandan,
2001). In Philippine, the Local Government Code (1991) provided subnational government
substantial administrative and fiscal authorities concerning public service provision. In the
literature of two countries (i.e. Bangladesh and Taiwan), there was no comment about
managerial motivations for decentralisation.
From the political perspective, democratisation was the strongest motivation of
decentralisation reforms. Seven out of nine countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
10
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines) implemented decentralisation reforms in
order to introduce or deepen democracy during last decades. In particular, pro-democratic
movements following strongly centralised autocratic governments led five countries (i.e.
Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Philippines) into democratic decentralisation
reform. Popular mobilisation for further democratisation, for example, the People Power
Revolution of 1986 in Philippines finished the Marcos dictatorship and the student-led
democratisation protests of the 1980s in South Korea, ended the Military dictatorships,
respectively (Langran, 2011; Kwon, 2003).
Literature concerning two further countries (i.e. China and Japan) did not mention
democratic motivations of decentralisation reforms. In the case of China (including Hong
Kong), democratic decentralisation has not yet taken place. Jacobs (2003) describes Japan as
a decentralised developmental state instead of the commonly known centralised
developmental state by elucidating the key role of prefectural government in economic and
regional development planning. Enhancing economic competitiveness is the main purpose
of decentralisation reforms implemented in Japan from the 1990s according to other
sources (Furukawa, 2003).
Another political motivation is to embrace ethnic and religious conflicts by granting local
autonomy to regional and local government in both Indonesia and Philippines. In other
words, they implemented political decentralisation reforms in order to prevent the
disintegration of the national state (Jimenez, 2009; Silver, 2001). Figure 6 summarises
motivations of decentralisation in the selected nine countries.
11
Figure 6. Political and Managerial motivations of decentralisation
Political motivations Managerial motivations
Bangladesh Launch, abolish and reform local self-governance system according to ruling party’s partisan interests (in 1976, 1982, 1991, 2001)
Not mentioned
China Not mentioned Economic development
Entrepreneurial innovation for it
(Hong Kong) Not mentioned New Public Management; globalisation
India Democratisation
Reflection of local needs
Economic restructuring
Neo-liberalism; globalisation
Indonesia Democratisation
Antipathy to centralised authoritarianism
Prevention of the disintegration of the state
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997
Japan Not mentioned Economic and spatial development planning
South Korea Antipathy to centralised autocratic government
Democratisation
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997
Neo-liberalism; globalisation
Taiwan Antipathy to centralised autocratic government
Democratisation
Not mentioned
Thailand Antipathy to centralised autocratic government
Democratisation
Neo-liberalism; globalisation
Philippines Antipathy to centralised authoritarianism
Democratisation; the People Power Revolution
National advancement
Prevention of the disintegration of the state (in the case of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)
Externally, international institutions and donor governments
National development
Market-oriented and community-oriented public service provisions
12
The actors of decentralisation
This section illustrates actors and their interactions in the process of decentralisation
reforms. In the selected literature, there were four actors, including government (national,
intermediate and local), political party (ruling and opposition), civil society and international
institutions, who played a critical role in decentralisation reforms.
First, it is useful to provide an accurate definition of each actor. In this section, government
means an organisation which functions as an executive branch. Considering the roles of
national and local bureaucratic systems which are supposed to implement decentralisation
reforms, government is an actor who operates as an intermediate variable to explicate the
process and outcomes of decentralisation. Political party refers to ruling and opposition
party which together constitute a country’s legislative body. In many cases, a political party
is another active player in decentralisation reforms because these reforms are started and
implemented in the form of Constitutions and Law. Civil society is the origin of social and
political movements from below. In the process of decentralisation reforms, the role of civil
society is important in two respects: decentralisation reforms were often triggered by the
democratisation demands from civil society, and the degree of civil society’s participation is
one of the critical variables to explain the depth and length of decentralisation reforms and
the diverse consequences. Lastly, international organisations and donors exert their (explicit
and implicit) influences on the beginning and process of decentralisation reforms.
Second, the explanations about each actor’s preference towards decentralisation in the
process of decentralisation are presented. In particular, actors’ positive and negative
attitudes towards decentralisation are discussed based on the observed discrepancies
between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence reported by the selected literature.
According to extant literature about decentralisation, social and political actors form their
own preferences toward decentralisation based on their interests in the case of the post-
developmental state (Falleti, 2010). Generally, whereas national government and the ruling
party adopt reluctant attitudes toward active decentralisation reforms, subnational
governments and opposition party hold positive preferences. Falleti (2010) argues that
national actors’ preferences for decentralisation are the order of administrative, fiscal, and
political decentralisation while subnational actors’ preferences are the order of political,
fiscal, and administrative decentralisation. Of course, what sorts of authorities, resources
13
and responsibilities are decentralised can affect actors’ preferences about decentralisation.
Subnational governments welcome decentralisation not because of an increase of their
responsibility but of their authority and resources. In the same vein, national government is
reluctant to decentralise authority and resources, however, favours decentralisation of
responsibilities. Civil society and International institutions espouse decentralisation reforms
based upon their ideas and preferences about democratisation and good governance.
Unlike established predictions, government and political party are not always clearly divided.
For example, China has less developed democratic political systems, both national
government and ruling party are de facto the same body and an opposition party do not
exist. To effectively manage the breadth and depth of decentralisation reforms by personnel
and fiscal resources management systems, the Chinese Central Government favoured
decentralisation as a national reform strategy in order to obtain economic development and
macroeconomic stability.
When it comes to countries which have separate executive and legislative bodies, six
national governments (i.e. India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines)
responded more or less negatively against decentralisation reforms in implicit and explicit
ways. In these cases, national bureaucracies attempted to stall decentralisation reforms
which sometimes resulted in substantial planning and implementation deficits of
decentralisation reforms.
In the case of Bangladesh, the contents and degree of decentralisation reforms have been
influenced by who took office in the presidential and general elections. In other words,
decentralisation reforms have been used for promoting the ruling party’s partisan interests
in local governments rather than developing local self-governance (Panday, 2011).
Decentralisation in Indonesia presents an extraordinary case of decentralisation reforms.
The Indonesian national government, which was led by Habibie in the transition
government after Suharto's resignation, actively embraced decentralisation reforms
because of several reasons such as the transition government faced public discontent about
the centralised authoritarian regime, the Asian Fiscal Crisis in 1997, and extreme
secessionist movements (Jammenez, 2009; Langran, 2011; Sudhipongpracha, 2013).
14
To summarize, empirical evidence provided from this systemic literature review reaffirms
the established argument that national government is inclined to oppose and local
governments to support decentralisation reforms in six countries (i.e. India, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines). National government favours decentralisation
reforms only under extraordinary contexts, such as one party politics (i.e. China), the
transitional government (i.e. Indonesia), and huge discretion on decentralisation was given
to national government (i.e. Bangladesh).
In analysis of political parties, the ruling party in six out of nine countries had positive
attitudes towards decentralisation reforms. As aforementioned, the ruling party of China
supported decentralisation reforms under the strong personnel and fiscal restraints. The
ruling parties of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines favoured
decentralisation in political reasons such as making political bedrocks in regional
governments (i.e. Bangladesh) and accepting democratisation demands from below (i.e.
India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines). In the case of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
which are going through post-developmental transitions, the ruling party was reluctant to
introduce, and often procrastinated, decentralisation reforms.
Interestingly, opposition parties, when they exist, supported decentralisation reforms in all
countries. It is not surprising given that decentralisation is usually used as a strategy of
those less advantaged to establish regional supporting basis, and national government
responds by granting power to local rather than intermediate government (Falleti, 2010;
Ayee, 2013).
In summary, in East and South Asian countries, only three countries (i.e. Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan) are in accordance with the established arguments that a ruling party resists and
opposition party favours decentralisation reforms. Contrary to Falleti’s arguments (2010),
ruling parties in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines support
decentralisation reforms for their political interests (i.e. Bangladesh) and ideas (i.e. national
democratisation). China, which has only one party, cannot be explained by Falleti’s
framework.
Both civil society and international institutions favour decentralisation reforms. In the
selected literature, the strong civil societies were not evident in Bangladesh, China, and
15
Japan. In contrast, democratisation from the civil society in India, Indonesia, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand and Philippines demands were the initiators and impetus of
decentralisation reforms. In particular, the Philippine government acknowledge the NGOs’
role in the democratisation process by stipulating NGOs as ‘Partners of Government’ in the
1987 Constitution, which was amended after the People Power Revolution in 1986.
Lastly, international institutions play a substantial role in South Asian countries (i.e.
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines). There was little influence from
international institutions in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In the selected literature, the
influence of international institutions was not reported in China (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Actors in decentralisation reforms
Government (Executives) Political party Civil society
International institutions
National Intermediate Local Ruling Opposition
Bangladesh N - * P/N P/N * P
China P * * P - * *
India * * * * * P P
Indonesia P P P P * P P
Japan N * * N P * -
South
Korea
N P P N P P -
Taiwan N * * N P P -
Thailand N P P N P P P
Philippines * * * * * P P
Note: P (Positive attitude), N (Negative attitude), - (non-existing), * (not mentioned)
16
Institutions of nine selected countries
Campbell (2004) defines institutions as ‘formal and informal rules, monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which
individuals, corporations, labour unions, nation-states, and other organizations operate and
interact with each other’. Drawing on this definition, this section discusses nine selected
countries’ institutions, as facilitators and obstacles, of institutional changes of
decentralisation.
Political institutions and historically and socially embedded institutions were found in the
selected studies. As a political institution, the relation between executive and legislative
which is important in terms of veto points due to no matter what initiated decentralisation
reforms, decentralisation reforms are finalised in forms of acts by legislative bodies and
implemented by executive counterparts. While five (i.e. Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, and
Thailand) out of nine countries have legislative dominated systems, four (i.e. Indonesia,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines) countries have executive dominance systems. Given
that the legislative and the executive body have more cooperative relations in legislative-
dominant systems, due to the executives being selected not by voters but legislative
members, an executive-dominance system tends to induce planning and implementation
deficits derived from more veto points and more often occurred coordination problems.
Four types of historically and socially embedded institutions were found in the selected
literature. The first historical and social institution is the Developmental State legacy.
Developmental State refers to a state that its bureaucracy takes a key role in planning and
implementing for economic development (Johnson, 1999). The developmental state legacy
of strong centralised bureaucracy state was found in seven countries except Bangladesh and
Philippines.
The second historical institution is the colonisation experience. Six out of nine (i.e.
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines) have experienced
colonial rule at least once. For Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Philippines, the
decentralised institutions established in the colonisation era facilitate the decentralisation
reforms after their independence. For instance, the local self-governance in India and
Bangladesh started from the Bangal Local Self-Government Act passed in 1885 under the
17
British Colonial rule (Panday, 2011). In the case of Philippines, two different perspectives
were found; Legaspi (2001: 132) argued that ‘Philippines have a long history of
centralisation from the colonial Spanish regime to the recent Marcos era’; however,
Sudhipongpracha (2013) maintained that colonial legacies in Philippines favoured the
implementation of decentralisation reforms by giving opportunities to strengthen local
taxing power under the Spanish colonial rules and to experience municipal elections, prior
to national elections, under the American colonial regime (Sudhipongpracha, 2013).
Furthermore, Sudhipongpracha (2013) argued that the colonial rule of Philippines left the
legacy of the spoils system in their bureaucracy. On the other hand, Japanese colonisation
experience resulted in rules encapsulating centralised planned state management for
military purposes, thereby leading South Korea and Taiwan in the opposite direction toward
centralised bureaucracy.
Authoritarian governance legacies, defined as a state system which privileges and enforces
strict obedience to authority at the expense of individual freedom, are the third type of
institutions which were found. Authoritarian regimes are divided into two types: military-
based and bureaucracy-based dictatorship. Authoritarian legacies were found in all eight
countries, except India. Whereas Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand had military
based authoritarian governments in the 1900s, Philippines had bureaucracy-based
authoritarian government. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, their authoritarian
governments started from a military basis and moved to a bureaucratic one.
Lastly, centralised Kingdom legacies were found in five countries of China, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Among these five, only two (i.e. Japan and Thailand)
developed as constitutional monarchy systems and the remaining three transformed into
republic countries. In the case of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Philippines, long
colonisation legacies attenuated the effects of centralised Kingdom legacies (Figure 8).
18
Figure 8. Institutions in decentralisation reforms
Political institutions
Historically and socially embedded institutions
Executive-legislative relation 1
Developmental state legacies 2
Colonial legacies 3
Authoritarian regime
legacies 4
Centralised Kingdom legacies 5
Bangladesh L - Y, F Y, M (1982-90)
-
China L Y - Y, B (1949- present)
Y
India L Y Y, F - -
Indonesia E Y Y, F Y, M (in 1967-97)
-
Japan L Y - Y, M (in 1930s-45)
Y (Constitutional
monarchy)
South Korea
E Y Y, U Y, M+B (in 1961-87)
Y
Taiwan E Y Y, U Y, M+B (in 1949-86)
Y
Thailand L Y - Y, M (in 1932-73)
Y (Constitutional
monarchy)
Philippines E - Y, F Y, B (in 1965-86)
Y or -
Note: 1. The classification of executive-legislative relation is taken from Lijphart (2012).
Executive dominance (E) when the executives (i.e. president) selected by voters
and not dependent on legislative confidence.
Legislative dominance (L) when the executives are selected by legislative and
dependent on legislative confidence.
2. Developmental state (Jonson, 1982; 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999): Y (Yes), - (No)
3. Colonial legacies: Y (Yes), F (Legacies favourable for decentralisation), U (Legacies
unfavourable for decentralisation), - (No)
4. Authoritarian government legacies: Y (Yes), - (No), M (Military based
dictatorship), B (Bureaucratic based dictatorship)
5. Centralisation Kingdom exist before modern state building: Y (Yes), - (No)
19
The processes of decentralisation reforms
It is important, theoretically and empirically, to identify processes of the actual
decentralisation reforms in order to obtain a clearer picture about the dynamics of
decentralisation as an institutional change (Pierson, 2004). In analysing institutional changes
toward decentralisation in the given nine countries, this paper adopts several theoretical
building blocks from extant literature: types of decentralisation (Falleti 2010:34-39; Wolman
1990), degrees of decentralisation (Rondinelli et al. 1983), and typical processes of an
institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 15-16).
According to Falleti (2010) and Wolman (1990), decentralisation means transfers of
authorities, responsibilities, and resources in political, administrative, and fiscal terms from
national to subnational government. Political decentralisation is concerned with the degree
of democratic representation by elected and non-elected representatives as well as direct
and non-direct decision making autonomy. Administrative decentralisation is about the
degree of managerial autonomy in terms of public service planning, administration and
provisions. Fiscal decentralisation is regarding the degree of resource autonomy in the base
and rate of resource raising and spending (Dubois and Fattore, 2009).
Rondinelli’s (1983) well utilised typology which classified decentralisation into four
categories, deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation, by the degree of
transferred authorities. Deconcentration refers to dispersing administrative power and
responsibility from higher to lower administrative authority within an organisation. The
higher government holds authority over lower administrative authority and exerts
hierarchical administrative power on deconcentrated tasks. Delegation means that to some
extent autonomy such as responsibility for decision making and administration of public
functions is given to subnational governments or semiautonomous organisations.
Devolution means that authority for decision-making, finance, and management transfers to
legally separate organisations. Devolution usually happens between the central government
and politically decentralised subnational government or quasi-autonomous entity.
Privatisation refers to the transfer of public service provision responsibility from public to
private sector which including both profit and non-profit organisations (Rondinelli, 1983;
Bahl, 1999; Schneider, 2003; Saltman et al., 2007; Dubois and Fattore, 2009).
20
Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 15-16) presented four concepts based on how new institutions
coexist or replace the existing institutions in the processes of institutional changes. While
Layering refers to adoption of some new components into the current institutional settings,
Conversion means an institution changes its role by taking new roles different to the present
one. Replacement refers that the existing rules are eliminated and new rules are introduced.
Drift is the regulatory power of the existing rules are diminished or removed due to the
social and political environments are changed. Another concept to explain causal
mechanisms of institutional changes is ‘diffusion’ which means institutions and ideas which
adopted in one organisation and country transfer to another place (Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996).
Based on these three theoretical frameworks, the processes of decentralisation reforms are
investigated in terms of the type, the degree, and the sequence in nine East and South Asian
countries.
The types of decentralisation
In terms of Wolman’s typology, the East and South Asian cases of decentralisation showed a
clear predilection for political decentralisation but retained a relative degree of
administrative and fiscal decentralisation. That administrative and fiscal decentralisation
reforms in East and South Asia are retarded compared to political decentralisation is
explained by the interactions between interests, ideas, and institutions. Each actor exerts
his/her agency based upon territorial (i.e. national and subnational) and partisan (i.e., ruling
and opposition) interests and ideas (i.e. conservative, liberal, deepening democracy, and
enhancing efficiency) under constraints such as institutions and (social) structures (Bevir and
Rhodes, 2004; Campbell 2004; Falleti, 2010).
Political Decentralisation. In the selected literature, decentralisation reforms in all the
countries except China and Japan were triggered by political eagerness towards
democratisation and deepening democracy. It means that all the selected countries’
incumbent governments had to accept political decentralisation gladly (i.e. Indonesia) or
reluctantly (i.e. the remaining countries) in order to increase the legitimacy of their regimes.
Five countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines) implemented
21
political decentralisation, including direct elections for executives and legislative members
of all the layers of local governments, as the first type of decentralisation reforms in the
1990s. It is noteworthy that Japan implemented the same types of political decentralisation
in the 1940s which was driven by political motivations of democratisation, notwithstanding
due to pressures from the US and Allied government, after the Second World War and its
long military authoritarian regime.
In the case of the Indonesia after stepping down of Suharto, the transition government of
Habibie had no option except to implement extensive levels of administrative, fiscal and
political decentralisation in order to prevent the disintegration of the state.
Taiwan and Thailand adopted partial political decentralisation. Taiwan has executive and
legislative elections in each local level (i.e. County, Town, City, Direct-controlled municipality)
including executive and legislative bodies except districts in direct-controlled municipality.
In Thailand, governors, the executive head of provinces, have been appointed by an elected
Prime Minister, except directly elected executives in special self-governing cities such as the
governor of Bangkok and the mayor of Pattaya. In the self-governing city of Bangkok, district
heads of Bangkok are appointed by the governor of Bangkok, but the district council
members in Bangkok are elected by the citizens. The legislative body of both intermediate
and local government are elected by the people and mayors in local governments are
directly elected.
Among the East and South Asian countries, decentralisation of China is unique regarding its
political dimension. Under the communist regime, there has been little progress in political
decentralisation despite extensive democratisation movements, such as the Beijing Spring in
1978 and the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989. Until 2014, China had direct elections for
only the lowest legislative members. All the legislative members in other levels of
governments are elected indirectly by the lower governments’ legislative members. This
indirect election system is linked to the election for the national leader. The chancellor of
the Chinese National People’s Congress is elected through indirect election of its members.
The chancellor retains the authority to appoint governors of provinces and the appointed
governor has the right to appoint mayors in his/her province. Therefore, the Chinese central
government holds a strong reign on their provincial and local government by exerting power
to appoint the executives in provincial and local governments. Executives at all levels of
22
local governments in China adopt an upwards accountability toward the central authority
but neglect downward accountability toward the people (Lam, 2010).
Administrative Decentralisation. The selected literature rarely mentioned administrative
decentralisation in Bangladesh and Taiwan. There are a few pieces of information about the
remaining seven countries (i.e. China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and
Philippines). China has implemented an extensive level of administrative decentralisation
from investment decisions, land-use planning to health, education and social services after
1978 (Chien, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). Concerning India, there were two case studies about
the process and results of administrative decentralisation in Kerala and one case study
about decentralisation of India (Heller, 2001; Tandon, 2001; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009).
However, they did not investigate what kind of administrative functions were devolved but
how the devolved administrative functions worked in terms of citizen participation and
accountability.
Studies about Indonesia and Philippines contains detailed explanations about the processes
of administrative and fiscal decentralisation and the lists of decentralised administrative
authority (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Langran, 2011; Sudhipongpracha, 2013; Yu,
2013). The Indonesian central government granted extensive administrative authorities to
local governments in public works, health management, education and cultural affairs,
agricultural development, transportation, the management of manufacturing and trading
activities, the management of investment, environmental matters, land management, the
matters relating to cooperatives, and manpower management. Philippines also devolved
the administrative authorities concerning health, agriculture, social services, environmental
protection, and specified public works functions.
According to Jacobs (2003), prefectural governments in Japan have substantial authority in
economic and spatial development planning although subnational autonomy varied upon a
prefectural government’s population size, employment base, and fiscal capacity.
In South Korea, there was an attempt to devolve extensive administrative authority in terms
of public security, education, and social services (Kang, 2006). However, the achievement of
decentralisation differs across sectors. As of 2014, subnational governments of South Korea
do not have any authority for national security, have moderate powers for social policy, and
23
extensive power for education. The status of administrative decentralisation in Thailand is
described as implemented with considerable restraints, including supervision and audit
authorities of the Central Government (Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013).
Fiscal Decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation was implemented in three countries (i.e.
China, Indonesia, and Thailand). Several articles acknowledged the managerial motivation of
the Chinese Central government to achieve better economic outcomes through fiscal
decentralisation (Skinner et al., 2003; Tsui and Wang, 2004; Sheng, 2007; Chien, 2010). In
the case of Indonesia and Thailand, fiscal decentralisation took place in tandem with
administrative and political decentralisation after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997
(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Silver, 2001; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). However, both of
the two countries adopted fiscal decentralisation in the form of revenue equalisation
transfers from central government rather than devolving revenue raising power and shared
tax. This method of fiscal decentralisation via revenue equalisation system increased local
governments’ reliance on the central government in Indonesia after decentralisation (Silver,
2001). The Thai national government still hold a strong influence on the allocation of fiscal
resources to local government (Haque, 2010).
Fiscal decentralisation in Philippines was implemented in 1991 after its political
decentralisation in 1987. Researches on Philippines showed that their local governments
achieved high levels of fiscal autonomy (Yu, 2013). Fiscal decentralisation in South Korea
was implemented in the 1980s, 1995, and 2004 (Kang, 2006; Kim, 2012). In Philippines and
South Korea, fiscal decentralisation reforms increased local governments’ fiscal autonomy.
For the remaining countries (i.e. Bangladesh, Japan, and Taiwan), no clear time table for
fiscal decentralisation presented but fiscal decentralisation were discussed in terms of local
autonomy and equity. Panday (2011) argued that local governments retains inadequate
financial resources generated from their revenue sources in Bangladesh. Several literatures
about China dealt with the consequences of the 1994 recentralisation tax reforms (Niu,
2013; Nui, 2013). The relation between fiscal resources and intergovernmental politics is the
main focus of writing studies about Japan (Jacobs, 2003; Sheiner, 2005). The relation
between soft-budget constraint problems and local autonomy is at the centre of
intergovernmental relations in South Korea and Taiwan (Kim, 2012; Kuo and So, 2013).
24
In sum, grassroots democratisation movements are the major driving forces of political
decentralisation in East and Asia countries. All the countries except China implemented
political decentralisation in order to meet the demand for initiating and deepening
democracy from the civil society. In particular, it can also be argued that neo-liberal ideas of
enhancing efficiency and achieving economic growth drove the administrative and fiscal
decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Thailand which gained their reform impetus from
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Financial crisis challenged their incumbent governments
directly and called the end of long authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and Philippines. As a
result, administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms were implemented at almost the
same time with political decentralisation.
On the other hand, in the case of India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan political
decentralisation took place in advance of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, it is clear that
the Crisis advanced the speed and the depth of the following administrative and financial
decentralisation reforms, while the central governments sought efficiency enhancement.
China has implemented extensive administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms in order
to accomplish economic development by promoting local governments’ entrepreneurial
innovations from the late 1970s even though the Chinese Central government recentralised
its fiscal authority in 1994 (Chien, 2010). However, arguably, there is less evidence of neo-
liberal influence on the administrative and fiscal decentralisation of Philippines (Langran,
2011, Yu, 2013).
Figure 9. The types of decentralisation
Administrative Fiscal Political
Bangladesh
(Panday, 2011)
Not mentioned Not mentioned □1 1976; the Local
Government Ordinance
□2 From 1980,
establishment and abolition of local self-governing system repeated according to who the Ruling Party
China
(Lam, 2010) □1 1984
□1 In the middle of
1980s
□2 Decentralisation
reform in 1994
(Partially) For the lowest level
of government
25
Administrative Fiscal Political
India
(Tandon, 2001)
Not mentioned Not mentioned □1 1993
Indonesia
(Brodjonegoro and
Asanuma, 2000)
□1 1999
Public works, health
management, education,
and cultural affairs,
agricultural development.
□1 1999 □1 1999
Japan Not mentioned
Not mentioned □1 In the 1940s
South Korea
(Kim, 2013) □3 1990s
□5 2004
□1 1981
□4 1999
□6 2006
1951, stop 1961
□2 Resume, 1991 - (local
legislative body)
□3 1995 - (local
executive body)
Taiwan
(Kuo and So, 2013)
Not mentioned
Not mentioned 1950, stop
□1 Resume, 1994
Thailand
(Haque, 2010;
Sudhipongpracha,
2013)
□1 The 1997 decentralisation
reform with substantial restraints (regulations and auditing)
□1 The 1997
decentralisation reform (revenue equalisation transfer)
□1 The 1997
decentralisation reform (the direct election of local councillors, the direct or indirect election of mayors)
Philippines
(Langran, 2011;
Sudhipongpracha,
2013; Yu, 2013)
□1 The decentralisation Act of
1967 (deconcentration)
□3 The Local Government
Code of 1991 (devolution);
Health, agriculture, social
services, environmental
protection, specified public
works function including
personnel management
□3 The Local
Government Code of 1991 (shared tax)
□2 Local and municipal
official election in 1988 under the new Constitution of Philippines which was ratified in 1987
The degree of decentralisation
While the prevailing motivation, either political or managerial ideas, drives different types of
decentralisation, the interactions between agency and institutions engender diverse
outcomes in terms of the degree of decentralisation. When decentralisation is understood
as an example of institutional changes, the degrees of decentralised authorities and
26
responsibilities (i.e., deconcentration, delegation, and devolution) are identified by typical
processes of institutional changes (i.e., replacement, layering, drift, conversion and diffusion)
(Pierson, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This approach is
useful to understand the roles of ideas and institutions as facilitators and constraints of
institutional changes in the selected East and South Asian countries.
In the administrative dimension, diverse processes of decentralisation were found. India,
Indonesia, and Philippines grant significant administrative authorities to their local
government. The degree of decentralisation in these three countries is understood as
devolution which means the subject of administrative responsibilities is replaced from
national to subnational governments. In China, substantial level of administrative authority
and responsibility, in particular, economic policy, are transferred to subnational government
though the executives of prefectures are appointed by Chinese national government.
However, in the remaining countries, the status of administrative decentralisation looks
more complex than that of political one. In Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, administrative
decentralisation reforms were layered devolved functions on the top of the existing
deconcentrated and delegated functions. Finally, Bangladeshi national government rarely
transferred administrative authority and responsibility to subnational governments
(deconcentration).
Alongside administrative decentralisation, the degree of fiscal decentralisation also shows a
complex picture. Most of the countries operate intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems
after fiscal decentralisation in order to equalise fiscal disparity resulting from the insufficient
local revenue. In the selected studies, fiscal decentralisation reforms in Bangladesh, India,
Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand are not mentioned. Instead of decentralisation, in 1994, a fiscal
recentralisation reform took place in China. In Indonesia, South Korea, and Philippines fiscal
decentralisation of increasing intergovernmental fiscal transfers took place alongside with
administrative decentralisation. Therefore, in Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and
Philippines, revenue sharing systems which favour to subnational government are layered
to the existing intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems.
Though political decentralisation in Bangladesh since 1982 shows instable status according
to the national administration changes, seven out of nine selected countries except China
27
and Thailand took devolution as their political decentralisation reform. Devolution is the
highest degree of decentralisation which means transfer of authority for decision-making,
finance, and management transfers to legally separate organisations. By introducing elected
legislative and executive bodies in subnational government, national government of seven
countries (i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Philippines)
devolved their political authorities to subnational government. Furthermore, their
subnational counterparts take accountability towards their own citizens about their political
decisions. This political devolution of in the seven countries demonstrates a causal
mechanism of replacement by adopting new elected system for governors and mayors from
the appointing system. However, China and Thailand did not introduce a full-fledged direct
election system in subnational levels and their degree of political decentralisation still
remained in the stage of either deconcentration or delegation.
In all countries except China, decentralisation reforms aim to replace the old centralised
government institutions into new decentralised ones. The firm support from below enables
seven countries except Thailand to implement full-fledged political decentralisation
(devolution) by displacing local executive appointment systems into direct election system
and by introducing local legislative bodies. Absent or weak public mobilisation to
democratisation and political decentralisation constrains further administrative and fiscal
decentralisation. For example, in Bangladesh and Thailand, national governments who
promoted decentralisation reforms retained robust controls over the delegated or devolved
administrative and fiscal affairs due to decentralisation was promoted in order to
strengthen the incumbent administrations democratic legitimacy. Less developed
subnational interests, as the case of Taiwan shows, subnational governments are reluctant
to exert the devolved fiscal power due to the elected governors and mayors concern their
political risks.
Institutional factors, such as the solid national bureaucratic power derived from the
centralised developmental state legacy and executive dominant political institution,
embedded constrain East and South Asian countries from reaching fully-fledged subnational
self-governance and led the nine selected countries to layered type of decentralisation
reforms. For example, solid executive power, backed up strong developmental centralised
bureaucratic legacy, deterred and minimised the degree of administrative and fiscal
28
decentralisation, followed by political decentralisation in the case of South Korea and
Taiwan. In the same vein, the solid national bureaucratic power derived from the centralised
developmental state legacy prevents Thailand from political decentralisation in spite of the
Constitutional Reform toward Decentralisation in 1997. On the other hand, it is observed
that Indonesia and Philippines achieved an extensive degree of administrative and fiscal
decentralisation when their executive favourable political institutions are not bolstered by
strong centralised bureaucracy. All the cases show how effectively the strong centralised
bureaucratic legacy combined with unstable political situations hinders the realisation of
decentralisation reforms.
Furthermore, the existence of fiscal disparity between subnational governments gives
national government more political and logical leeway to avoid further fiscal
decentralisation. With the excuse of regional fiscal disparity, fiscal decentralisation often
implements in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfer system reforms such as Local
Shared Tax or revenue sharing system. Therefore, administrative and fiscal institutions have
not changed entirely, unlike their counterpart political institutions. Institutions regarding
administrative and fiscal decentralisation were rarely replaced by the new ones but layered,
which refers to new elements being attached to existing institutions. On the other hand,
the actual practices of administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms are implemented
gradually and the actual practices sometimes head to recentralised direction implicitly (i.e.
expansion of ear-marked transfers in South Korea) or explicitly (i.e. the 1994 tax reforms in
China).
China still remains as an outlier of this trend. From the late 1970s, China has driven
administrative decentralisation as a means of it economic development by promoting
entrepreneurial leadership at provincial level. In its fiscal dimension, China recentralised its
decentralised fiscal system to some extent in 1994 in order to stabilise its macro economy
and increase the Chinese central government revenue (Chien, 2010; Li, 2010).
In conclusion, not all the nine selected countries, decentralisation resulted in extensive
changes in administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions. The degree of decentralisation in
administrative, fiscal, and political realms differs across the nine East and South Asian
countries. In spite of the centralised legacies of East and South Asia, under the strong
democratisation movements from below, the degree of political decentralisation is
29
relatively higher than that of administrative and fiscal dimensions. In fact, the idea of
deepening democracy plays a key role in the process of decentralisation in all countries
except China and Thailand. However, in administrative and fiscal dimensions, the degree of
decentralisation brought about diverse intergovernmental balance of power upon the given
institutions and (social) structures in East and South Asian countries. It is reported that
political institutions (i.e. the executive and legislative relations), historical legacies (i.e.
Developmental State legacy, strong centralised bureaucracy), social structures (i.e. inter-
local fiscal disparity) facilitated and constrained deeper degrees of administrative and fiscal
decentralisation.
Figure 10. The degrees of decentralisation
Administrative Fiscal Political
Bangladesh (Panday, 2011)
Deconcentration
Not mentioned Devolution
China Delegation Devolution
Delegation Recentralisation
Deconcentration Delegation
India (Venugopal and
Yilmaz, 2009) Devolution
Delegation Devolution
Devolution
Indonesia (Silver, 2001)
Devolution Delegation Devolution
Devolution
Japan (Jacobs, 2003; Sheiner, 2005)
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Not mentioned Devolution
South Korea (Kang, 2006; Kim,
2013)
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Devolution
Taiwan (Tsai et al., 2012; Kuo and So, 2013)
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Not mentioned Devolution
Thailand (Haque, 2010;
Sudhipongpracha, 2013)
Deconcentration Delegation
Devolution (in Bangkok and Pattaya)
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Devolution in local level
Deconcentration in intermediate level
except Bangkok and Pattaya
Philippines (Lesgapi, 2001; Yu,
2013) Devolution Devolution Devolution
30
The sequence of decentralisation
Falleti (2010) argues that the prevailing territorial interests play a crucial role to decide the
first type of decentralisation reform which has self-reinforcing or reactive power to decide
the second type of decentralisation reform. Consequently, the sequence of decentralisation
reforms has a causal power to decide the change of intergovernmental balance of power in
post-developmental decentralisation reform. Based on this Falleti’s sequential theory of
decentralisation, the sequence of decentralisation reforms in the selected nine countries is
examined. The evolving processes of decentralisation (i.e., the sequence of decentralisation
reforms) also provide insight to understand the roles of ideas and institutions as facilitators
and constraints of institutional changes in the selected East and South Asian countries.
With the reference from Figure 9, the sequence of decentralisation reforms is examined in
China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Philippines. In China, administrative and fiscal
decentralisation reforms took place in the 1980s. Then, the 1994 fiscal recentralisation
reform was implemented under deconcentrated political system. In Indonesia and Thailand,
all three types of decentralisation reforms happened at the same time according to the
Constitutional reforms in 1999 and 1997 respectively. In South Korea, the sequence of
decentralisation reforms is fiscal in the 1980s, political in 1991, administrative in the 1990s,
political in 1995, administrative in 2004, and fiscal in 2006 (Kim 2012). In Philippines, the
sequence of decentralisation reforms shows administrative in 1967, political in 1988, and
administrative and fiscal in 1991.
In conclusion, information revealed in this systemic literature review seems not enough to
investigate the causal pathway from actors, interests, and ideas to the sequence of
decentralisation reforms. Further in-depth case studies are required to trace the causal
pathways.
31
Decentralisation and subnational autonomy
Regardless of what drives decentralisation reforms, decentralisation generated significant
repercussions from resource mobilisation and allocation to intergovernmental balance of
power and the effectiveness of public service (Litvack et al., 1998). This section discusses the
change of intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation. As a consequence of
decentralisation, the change of subnational autonomy is highly related to not only the
strategic choices of actors but also the institutional arrangements such as social and
historical contexts, balance of social power and political institutions (Pierson, 2004). The
selected nine selected countries can be categorised into four groups according to the level
of subnational autonomy after decentralisation. The subnational of local autonomy was
measured by two criteria (Rondinelli et al. 1983; Wolman 1990): if decentralisation reforms
contain all of administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions; and to what extent subnational
governments became independent from central government after decentralisation.
With these two criteria, intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation was
assessed based on the selected papers. While three countries in South Asia of India,
Indonesia, and Philippines are grouped as a high subnational autonomy country, Bangladesh
and Thailand belong to a low subnational autonomy group. Three countries in East Asia of
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan show a medium level of subnational autonomy after
decentralisation reforms. In the case of China, literature about the evaluation of the
intergovernmental balance of power after decentralisation shows unequivocal conclusions.
Rarely significant changes in local autonomy were found between pre and post
decentralisation in Group 1 (Bangladesh and Thailand). Panday (2011: 217) argued that
subnational autonomy has not been improved in Bangladesh despite its several attempts for
political decentralisation. Bangladeshi decentralisation reforms were initiated by its central
government which aimed to forge a robust political basement and planned by a local
government commission which consists of appointed members by central government.
Furthermore, decentralisation reforms were implemented with neither a comprehensive
plan nor public consultations. Bangladeshi decentralisation reforms showed these defects in
planning and resulted in a large deficit in implementation due to its central government’s
inappropriate political purposes and insufficient endeavour for adjusting conflicting
interests.
32
A similar case was observed in the case of Thailand. Even though decentralisation reforms
were initiated by demands from civil society, subnational autonomy were not increased
significantly (Sudhipongpracha, 2013). According to the intent of the 1997 Constitution
Reform and Local Government Organisation Act of 1999, the National Decentralisation
Committee, which consisted of deputies from local governments, government agencies, and
experts, were established and proposed ‘Action Plan’ including specific administrative and
fiscal decentralisation reforms (Haque, 2010). However, transfers of administrative and
fiscal power to local governments were not implemented as planned. Substantial
implementation deficits in administrative and fiscal decentralisation reforms were observed
in Thailand (Haque, 2010: 682). Alongside with imperfect political decentralisation, such as
the coexistence of elected mayors in municipal level and appointed governors in provincial
level, continuing subnational governments’ financial dependency on the Thai national
government and strong central control on subnational governments were the obstacles for
advancing local autonomy (Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). Both Haque and
Sudhipongpracha attributed retarding increase of subnational autonomy after
decentralisation to the dominant legacies of centralised governance and hierarchical
central-local relations which had been formed in a long state building history of Thailand.
Also, unstable political circumstance and socially embedded feudal structure still influence
in local election and governance in forms of the feudalistic patron-client relations and family
ties (Haque, 2010).
A substantial change of subnational autonomy was found between pre and post
decentralisation, however, subnational autonomy were not fully developed for some
reasons in Group 2 (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). Hill and Fujita (2000) argued that neo-
liberal administrative decentralisation reform from the 1980s did little succeed in Japan. The
Japanese central-local relation was design to aggrandise available resource mobilisation in
all government levels under a developmental state and state-lead economy legacy.
Japanese intergovernmental systems maintained the value of equity across local
governments, such as standardisation in service provision and equity in fiscal resource
distribution even after decentralisation reforms. According to Hill and Fujita (2000), fiscal
and administrative decentralisation reforms in Japan drifted until the 1990s and there was
little change in intergovernmental balance of power.
33
However, Jacobs (2003) claimed that the level of prefectural autonomy in Japan is not
identical but diverse across regional governments even though all prefectures own the same
legal status except Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Diverse levels of subnational
autonomy were attributed to prefectures’ population size, employment induction, fiscal
capacity and historical importance. He argued that Japan is still a developmental state but
not a centralised state any more. Prefectural governments wield substantial autonomy on
the municipal governments by guiding and instructing related to national laws and
regulations. This fact implies that the intergovernmental balance of power depends not only
on the formal relation between centre and periphery but also on subnational governments’
historic, economic, and political capacities. Sheiner (2005) discussed the reasons why the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been privileged in Japanese subnational elections is
highly related to the centrally controlled financial system and strong political parties’
influence on national budget. This shows the interactions between national party politics
and the degree of subnational fiscal autonomy. To summarise, decentralisation reforms in
Japan aim to enhance subnational autonomy but there were substantial deficits in
implementation due to the certain restraints of legacies from a developmental state,
centrally controlled fiscal system, and diverse levels of local autonomy.
Whereas subnational autonomy increased significantly after its political decentralisation in
the 1990s, the central-local relation in South Korea still has a moderate level of hierarchy
(Kang, 2006). In particular, the level of administrative and fiscal decentralisation remains in
the status of deconcentration and delegation. In order to challenge the South Korean
centralised government system, the Rho MooHyun government planned and implemented
decentralisation reforms. In 2004, National Assembly of Korea passed ‘the Special Law for
Decentralisation’ and newly established ‘the Presidential Committee for Government
Innovation and Decentralisation’ suggested a comprehensive decentralisation plan including
administrative and fiscal decentralisation (Kang, 2006). However, the plan encountered a
substantial opposition from central government bureaucracy and resulted in a certain
degree of implementation deficits.
Chang (2010) argued that economic crises in 1997 and 2008 had a detriment subnational
autonomy by increasing local dependency on central government in South Korea. By
quantitative analysis, Kim (2012) illuminated that Korean subnational governments prefer
34
utilising their political capacity toward central government in order to increase
intergovernmental transfers rather than raising their own source revenues. In conclusion, in
spite of a series of decentralisation reforms from the 1990s, subnational autonomy in South
Korea increased only to a moderate level. The moderate level of local autonomy is
attributed to central bureaucracies’ implementation deficits, subnational governments’
preferences to raising intergovernmental transfers instead of increasing their own fiscal
revenues, and economic crises hit South Korea.
Subnational autonomy in Taiwan after decentralisation has been enhanced in a moderate
level. Kuo and So (2013) investigate that the subnational government behaviours induce no
substantial improvement of their revenue autonomy after fiscal decentralisation in Taiwan.
Similar to the South Korean case, Taiwanese subnational governments had a strong
incentive to ask central government to increase intergovernmental transfers and to avoid
increasing local tax and user fees under inter-jurisdictional competition. Therefore, their
revenue autonomy does not increase in spite of fiscal decentralisation.
There were huge changes of subnational autonomy after decentralisation in Group 3 (India,
Indonesia, and Philippines). The three countries implemented all three types of
decentralisation and the selected papers generally acknowledged the enhancement of local
autonomy after decentralisation in India, Indonesia, and Philippines.
The evaluation about the intergovernmental balance of power in post-decentralisation is
varied; however, political autonomy after decentralisation seems to hugely increase in India.
The local governments in Kerala Panchayat gain high degree of discretion and increased
local autonomy after decentralisation reform in 1991 (Heller, 2001; Venugopal and Yilmaz,
2009). Long historical demands for more accountable local governments in Kerala are
attributed to the advancement of local autonomy (Heller, 2001). Furthermore, Tandon
(2001) also argues that decentralisation from below is highly related to debureucratisation
and increased subnational autonomy in India. However, Gaiha and Kulkarni (2002) argue
that, in spite of decentralisation, fiscal autonomy is still limited by the Indian Central
government’s supervisions including auditing and financial reporting.
In sum, in spite of regional disparity, there was little implementation deficit in
decentralisation reforms in India due to it was initiated by civil societies, planned a standing
35
committee, and upheld by international donors (Heller. 2001; Tandon, 2001). Instead,
challenges came from weak local governance were main issues in the decentralised Indian
local governments (Tandon, 2001; Imai and Sato, 2012).
Most of literature about Indonesia illustrated that subnational autonomy increases in the
post-decentralisation period (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Firman, 2008; Hunter,
2004; Lewis, 2005). Both national level study and regional level studies in rural Lombok and
Jakarta Metropolitan Area provide evidence of the increase of subnational autonomy
(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Hunter, 2004; Firman, 2008). Evidence that fiscal
decentralisation increased local autonomy toward local tax revenue increase was also
presented (Lewis, 2005) while Silver et al. (2001) claimed that the Indonesian local
governments became more dependent to the central government under new decentralised
government allocation system (DAU) introduced in 1999 than under the previous fiscal
system.
Three out of five papers about Indonesia discussed the lack of readiness and the weak
subnational governance as a problem at the same time (Hunter, 2008; Firman, 2008; Lewis,
2005). Furthermore, more centralised planning, gradual decentralisation, and more
intervention from the central government are often suggested (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma,
2000; Firman, 2008). Notwithstanding most of the actors related to decentralisation
processes, such as government, both of the national and subnational levels, political parties,
both of ruling and opposition, and civil society, agreed and cooperated for wide transfers of
central power to subnational government. Following enactments and administrative
processes were implemented with little deficits.
Five out of six studies argued that subnational autonomy in Philippines increased after
decentralisation (Bossert and Bauvais, 2002; Jimenez, 2009; Legaspi, 2001; Sudhipongpracha,
2013; Yu, 2013). All the studies argued that Local Government Code in 1991 devolved
decision making authorities to subnational governments and, consequently, increased
subnational autonomy in Philippines. However, challenges involved in decentralisation, such
as weak governance, organisational capacity and corruption, were found in Filipino
decentralisation reforms (Jimenez, 2009; Langran, 2001; Yu, 2013). However, as powerful
mobilisation from civil society linked democratisation initiated decentralisation reforms,
parliament promoted decentralisation reforms. Then,national government ought to comply
36
with the firm demands from below. Therefore, little implementation deficits were found in
the Filipino decentralisation reforms.
In a nutshell, though there are issues concerning decentralisation such as inefficiency,
corruption, and lack of capacity of subnational government, the selected literature argued
that decentralisation granted a significant level of autonomy to local governments in India,
Indonesia, and Philippines.
Lastly, the case of China illustrated a mixed picture of decentralisation and subnational
autonomy. Whilst China was not decentralised in politically at all, China has a high level of
administrative decentralisation and a middle level of fiscal decentralisation. The Chinese
central government’s political monopoly has negative impact on the development of local
autonomy. Tsui and Wang (2004) challenged the ‘market preserving federalism’ claim,
which regards China as a de facto federal state, by illustrating the negative impact of
Chinese cadre management system toward local governments’ autonomy. Sheng (2007) also
argued how the Chinese political centre uses its personnel monopoly power in order to
control local autonomy of well-off local governments. Chien (2010) argued the Chinese local
governments were politically dominated by the Chinese Communist Party whereas they
obtained extensive administrative and fiscal autonomy. Lam (2010) acknowledged
increasing bargaining power of provincial governments based on their political and fiscal
resources as well as the centralised personnel management power of the Chinese central
government. Ghai and Woodman (2009) illuminated that less legislative power
decentralised toward the five autonomous regions in China than ordinary provinces.
However, administrative decentralisation has a positive impact on advancing subnational
autonomy. Skinner et al. (2003) also insisted that the regulatory role of Chinese local
governments increased in health care, education, and environmental protection policies
after administrative decentralisation. In the fiscal dimension, Niu (2013) argued that the
Chinese fiscal autonomy increased in sub provincial level but decreased in provincial level in
the past two decades. Song (2013) insisted that the 1994 tax reform reduced the Chinese
local governments’ fiscal autonomy sharply.
In sum, the Chinese Central government can control the timing and ranges of
decentralisation by her personnel management power. For example, In 1994, the
37
centralised political power enables the Central government to recentralise revenue
authority.
Figure 11. The level of local autonomy after decentralisation
LOW (Group 1) MEDIUM (Group 2) HIGH (Group 3)
Bangladesh o
China o (political)
o (fiscal)
o (administrative)
India o
Indonesia o
Japan o
South Korea o
Taiwan o
Thailand o
Philippines o
38
Conclusion
Summary of findings
The forty selected papers were outlined China (12 papers), India, Indonesia, and Philippines
(6 papers, respectively), Japan and South Korea (3 papers, respectively), Taiwan and
Thailand (2 papers, respectively), and Bangladesh (1 paper). Four papers were cross-country
comparative studies. While 28 papers were a single country case study, 12 papers were a
single region or cross-regional comparative studies in one country. Majority of papers
focused on the decentralisation status in descriptive ways. Six papers discussed
decentralisation with theoretical frameworks including rational choice (i.e. principle and
agent theory, fiscal federalism) and historical institutional approaches (i.e. Falleti’s
sequential theory of decentralisation). Methodologically, 29 papers took qualitative
approaches and 11 papers took quantitative.
This systemic literature review illuminated driving forces, actors, political and historical
institutions, the types and the degree, and the consequences regarding decentralisation in
these nine selected East and South Asian countries. The main driving forces of
decentralisation were political motivations (i.e. democratisation) and managerial
motivations (i.e. neoliberalism). While decentralisation China was triggered by neoliberalism,
decentralisation in Bangladesh, Taiwan and Philippines was based on democratisation
movement. In India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, both political and managerial
motivations were promoted decentralisation reforms. Ethnic and religious conflicts also
encouraged decentralisation reforms in Indonesia and Philippines.
Actors found in this systemic literature review were national, intermediate, and local
governments, ruling and opposition parties, civil society, and international organisations and
donors. There were found two types of institutions in the nine selected countries: political
institutions (i.e. executive-legislative relations) and historically and socially embedded
institutions (i.e. Developmental State legacy, colonial legacy, authoritarian regime legacy,
centralised Kingdom legacy). In the case of East and Asian countries, the influence of
Developmental State legacy and authoritarian regime legacy were left a strong path
dependency in the process of decentralisation.
39
Rather than extensive changes in administrative, fiscal, and political dimensions, differences
were found in the types and degree of decentralisation across the nine East and South Asian
countries. Though the centralised legacies of East and South Asia, the degree of political
decentralisation is relatively higher than that of administrative and fiscal dimension. The
idea of deepening democracy plays a key role in the process of decentralisation in all
countries except China.
The sequence of decentralisation is also investigated though no clear causal pathway from
actors, interests, ideas, and institutions to the sequence due to limitations of data.
Lastly, as a consequence of decentralisation, the changes of intergovernmental balance of
power were different in the nine selected countries. By analysing actors and institutions
regarding decentralisation, the level of local autonomy after decentralisation can be
predicted by the planning and implementation deficits.
Discussions
Two distinctively different research trends were found in the 40 selected papers. While
papers about South Asian countries tended to focus on the issue of ‘Good Governance’,
papers about East Asian countries discussed more current status and ideal design of
intergovernmental relations.
In the case of research on South Asian countries, even though majority of the selected
papers dealt with decentralisation issues rather descriptive approaches, their conclusions
were gathered to the importance of ‘Good Governance’ (Dyer, 2005; Imai and Sato, 2012;
Jimenez, 2009; Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006; Langran, 2011; Tandon, 2001). ‘Good
Governance’ refers that the process for making and implementing decision with
accountability, transparency, predictability, and public participation (UNDP, 1997). In the
countries obtained high degree of local autonomy after decentralisation(i.e. India, Indonesia,
and Philippines), often, decentralisation resulted in not the transfer of authority from
central government to local governments but the transfer of authority from central
government to local elite (Gaiha and Kulkarni, 2002; Imai and Sato, 2012). Without
40
accountability and transparency, decentralisation merely transfers the field of corruption
from the central to local governments.
In several articles, ‘Good Governance’ is closely linked to the local governments’ capacity to
manage newly decentralised political, administrative, and fiscal systems. The case of India,
Indonesia, and Philippines demonstrated that the harmful consequences, such as lack of
accountability and corruption, of autonomous local government without proper capacity in
order to execute decentralised tasks (Jimenez, 2009; Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006; Langran,
2011). In particular, Kerala in India where decentralisation was promoted by radical
democratic movement mobilised by women advocacy groups was identified to have high
degree of accountability towards citizens but need to enhancing administrative and fiscal
management capacity (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2009).
In the same vein, several papers emphasized not only the importance of decentralisation
reform design itself but also the importance of decentralisation sequences and the
surrounding contexts (Dyer, 2005; Haque, 2010; Sudhipongpracha, 2013). It is reported that
political institutions (i.e. the executive and legislative relations), historical legacies (i.e.
Developmental State legacy, strong centralised bureaucracy), intergovernmental institutions
(i.e. inter-local fiscal disparity) facilitated and constrained decentralisation reforms in East
and South Asian countries. In particular, Dyer’s (2005: 151) regional comparative study in
India argued that decentralisation reform plans should contain not only the contents of
newly introduced decentralised institutions but also the ways to rearrange components of
current institutions and to build up capacity to implement decentralisation reforms.
Compared to the studies about South Asian countries, studies about East Asian countries
adopted more descriptive approaches and focused on the design of decentralisation
reforms. The focus of the East Asian countries’ research was not ‘Good Governance’ but the
status and ideal design of intergovernmental relations. Unlike India, Indonesia, and
Philippines, which obtained a high degree of administrative, fiscal and political autonomy
after decentralisation, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan gained a medium degree of local
autonomy after decentralisation. These three East Asia countries shared common features
of high degree of political autonomy with obscure intergovernmental division of
administrative and fiscal authority. Therefore, the main issues in East Asia countries were
41
the description of current status and the outcomes of the complex intergovernmental
relations, and how to improve the intergovernmental relations.
Future research avenues
In spite of ample discussions provided in the selected papers, several missing issues can be
reviewed here. First, majority of the selected papers adopted a descriptive approach rather
than theoretical approaches in order to illuminate causal mechanisms. Future researches
can take advantages of more concrete theoretical frameworks to elucidate more detailed
causal mechanism of decentralisation.
Second, while case studies for single country were dominant in the selected papers, a few
comparative studies existed. Comparative studies own advantages to explain causal
mechanism by discovering casual similarities and differences (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer,
2003). While there were a few cross regional and cross country comparative studies, there
were no cross sectoral comparative studies in the selected papers. Given the fact that
political dynamics differ across sectors (i.e. education, healthcare, social assistance), cross
sectoral comparative studies can add more insights to understand diverse dynamics and
consequences in decentralisation reforms.
Third, abundant of papers acknowledged that institutions play a key role in the processes
and outcomes of decentralisation. Broad social contexts and historically and socially
embedded institutions (i.e. Developmental State, Strong centralised bureaucracy) were
dealt with the main example of institutions. However, political institutions (i.e. legislative-
executive relations, election systems) were not regarded as important variables.
Fourth, few paper takes the view of decentralisation as an institutional change. Only Dyer
(2005) understood decentralisation as an institutional change and underlined the
requirement of a comprehensive approach including identification of each agency’s roles,
building of agency’s capacity, and promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, there are few
studies adopted a comprehensive approach about the interaction between agency,
institutions, structures, and ideas at the same time.
42
In conclusion, this systemic literature review showed that there are relatively lesser
research about the relation between decentralisation and intergovernmental balance of
power in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. There was no empirical study neither comparing
decentralisation reforms nor applying to historical institutional theoretical framework in
these three East Asian countries. Papers regarding Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan did not
consider the interaction between agency, institutions, structure, and ideas at the same time.
Therefore, comparative study about decentralisation in these three countries, cross-national
and cross-sectoral, is a significant work to fill this research gap.
43
The list of the selected 40 papers
NO Year Author Title country
1 2000 Brodjonegoro and Asanuma
Regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation in democratic Indonesia
Indonesia
2 2000 Hill and Fujita State restructuring and local power in Japan Japan
3 2001 Heller Moving the State: the politics of Democratic decentralisation in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre
South Africa, India, Brazil
4 2001 Legaspi The changing role of local government under a decentralised state
Philippines
5 2001 Silver intergovernmental transfers and decentralisation in Indonesia
Indonesia
6 2001 Tandon Globalisation and decentralisation: emerging issues from the Indian experience
India
7 2002 Bossert and Beauvais
Decentralisation of health systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and Philippines: a comparative analysis of decision space
Ghana, Zambia, Uganda, Philippines
8 2002 Gaiha and Kulkarni
Panchayats, communities, and the rural poor in India India (regions)
9 2003 Jacobs Develving Authority and expanding Autonomy in Japanese prefectures and municipalities
Japan
10 2003 Skinner et al. social and environmental regulation in rural China: bringing the changing role of local government into focus
China
11 2004 Hunter Local issues and changes: the post-new order situation in rural Lombok
Indonesia (regions)
12 2004 Tsui and Wang Between separate stoves and a single menu: Fiscal decentralisation in China
China
13 2005 Dyer Decentralisation to improve teacher quality? District institutes of education and training in India
India (regions)
14 2005 Lewis Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: an explanation of pre- and post-decentralisation fiscal outcomes
Indonesia
15 2005 Scheiner Pipelines of pork: Japanese politics and a model of local opposition party failure
Japan
16
2006 Kang Globalisation of the economy and localisation of politics?: Restructuring of Korean Developmental State via decentralisation
South Korea
17 2006 Kristiansen and Santoso
Surviving decentralisation? Impacts of regional autonomy on health service provision in Indonesia
Indonesia (regions)
18 2007 Sheng Global market integration and central political control: Foreign trade and intergovernmental relations in China
China
19 2008 Firman In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta metropolitan area (JMA) under Indonesia's new decentralisation policy: old problems, new challenges
Indonesia (regions)
20 2009 Ghai and Woodman
Unused powers: contestation over autonomy legislation in the PRC
China
21 2009 Jimenez Anatomy of autonomy: Assessing the organisational capacity and external environment of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
Philippines (regions)
22 2009 Venugopal and Yilmaz
Decentralisation in Kerala: panchayat government discretion and accountability
India (regions)
23 2010 Chang Reforms and decentralisation in Korea and Russia: issues and research agendas in the center-periphery relations
South Korea, Russia
44
NO Year Author Title country
24 2010 Chien Economic freedom and political control in post-Mao China: a perspective of upward accountability and asymmetric decentralisation
China
25 2010 Haque Decentralising local governance in Thailand: contemporary trends and challenges
Thailand
26 2010 Lam Central-provincial relations amid greater centralisation in China
China
27 2010 Li Central-local relations in the people's republic of China: Trends, processes and impacts for policy implementation
China
28 2010 Yep Understanding the autonomy of Hong Kong from historical and comparative perspectives
China (regions)
29 2011 Langran Decentralisation, democratisation and health: the Philippine Experiment
Philippines
30 2011 Panday Local government system in Bangladesh: how far is it decentralised?
Bangladesh
31 2012 Imai and Sato Decentralisation, democracy and allocation of poverty alleviation programmes in Rural India
India (regions)
32 2012 Tsai, Hsu, and Chen
The effects of population aging, the ruling political party, and local governments on welfare spending in Taiwan: 1993-2007
Taiwan
33 2012 Wang et al. Fiscal reform and public education spending: a quasi-natural experiment of fiscal decentralisation in China
China (regions)
34 2013 Brixi et al. Engaging subnational governments in addressing health equities: challenges and opportunities in China's health system reform
China
35 2013 Kim Political decentralisation, subnational political capital, and intergovernmental transfers in Korea
Korea
36 2013 Kuo and So Pursuing revenue autonomy or playing politics? Fiscal behaviour of local governments in Taiwan
Taiwan
37 2013 Niu Fiscal decentralisation in China revisited China
38 2013 Song Rising Chinese regional income inequality: the role of fiscal decentralisation
China
39 2013 Sudhipongpracha The Specter of Leviathan in the central-local relations: a comparative historical analysis of the Decentralisation reform in Thailand and Philippines
Thailand, Philippines
40 2013 Yu Devolution: Discontinuity and dissonance Philippines
45
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