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"Decentralization of Industrial Relations in Australia"
Paper prepared for the International Political Science Association
(IPSA) Conference, Montreal, July 19-24, 2014.
Dr.Tatsuhiko Yamabe
Graduate School of Political Science
Waseda University
Session: CS04 Comparative Politics and Institutions
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Research Question
This paper will explore the reasons why divergence of decentralization of
industrial relations in democracies occurs since 1980s. Due to the first and
second oil crisis, advanced countries during 1970s faced wage explosion, high
inflation, and high unemployment. In order to inhibit these factors from growing,
policy makers in those countries adopted centralized industrial relations so that
industrial relations in those countries tended to converge to centralization(Treu
1987; 148). But since 1980s, the centralized industrial relations of those
countries has an inclination to decentralize to company or individual level(Katz
1993). The significant change of the world political economy has an influence on
decentralization of industrial relations in advanced countries. Capital market
developed mainly within a country from Great Depression to the oil
crisis(Simmons 1999; 36). But, technological revolution accelerated
liberalization of international economy. As transportation and
telecommunication cost was reduced, free trade and financial regime brought
about the strong flow of goods and capital across the border. Capital control
weakened because of the development of Eurodollar market and so on.
Because US banks and multinationals participated in this offshore market, it
developed into international capital market. Intense international competition
caused many companies to bring about innovation in technology. The
companies went abroad to get cheap labor cost. The pressure that the
companies may transfer their factories into foreign countries forced the
government to reduce the domestic labor cost, to lower the tax rate, and to
expand the domestic market through deregulation(Hall and Soskice 2001;55).
It was said that employers decentralize wage bargaining into company or
individual level(Thelen2001). Indeed the neoliberal economic policy called
Thatcherism was adopted in United Kingdom during 1980s, and that policy
promoted the demise of the centralized industrial relations. The neoliberal policy
was more or less pursed by the economic policy of each country and by the
principle of IMF or World Bank. There is, however, diversity of decentralization
level. Some countries including advanced ones remain relatively centralized
industrial relations systems. Others decentralize them into company or individual
level. Why does this difference occur? This paper will search for the cause of
3
that variance.
1.2 Previous studies
The first representative approach explaining the cause of diversity of
decentralization is Neo-Corporatism. This approach focuses on the centralized
structure or the policy coordination of interest groups(mainly trade unions). For
example, Schmitter ranked advanced countries to combine the monopolistic
power over other trade unions with the degree of the organizational
centralization(Schmitter1981:293-4). Cameron ordered advanced countries to
define neo-corporatism as follows: (the organizational integration of the trade
union+ the number of national trade unions)×trade density(Cameron 1984).
Lehmbruch and Schmit ordered developed countries to define neo-corporatism
as the tripartite policy concertation (Lehmbruch 1984, Schmit 1983). These
neo-corporatism studies imply that collective bargaining will not decentralize if
the labor movement is strong and centralized and if government, labor, and
management are cooperative.
The second representative approach about decentralization of industrial
relations is Varieties of Capitalism(VOC). This approach sees firms as the
determinant actors in capitalist economy(Hall and Soskice 2001;6). Soskice
pointed out the significance of the wage coordination based on consideration of
labor and management, concerning influence on the national economy as a
whole(Soskice1990). The wage coordination differs from the direct wage
bargaining between labor and management(Soskice1990). Hall and Soskice
stated that the relationship which firms developed in order to resolve the
coordination problem in significant areas of the economy conditioned the
economic system(Hall and Soskice 2001;7). The advanced capitalist economies
are classified into two groups. One group is liberal market economies(LMEs).
The representative countries belonging to the group are United Kingdom, United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland. Employers in LMEs prefer
fragmented industrial relations. Each employer tries to guard himself or herself
from competition for labor by isolating external labor market(Thelen,2001;77).
He (or she) does not often allow his or her employees to have their trade union,
and often encourages local unions to depart from their national union(Thelen
2001;78). As a result, trade unions are likely to be weakened because they lose
their solidarity. The other group is coordinated market economies(CMEs). The
4
representative countries belonging to the group is Germany. Employers in CMEs
prefer collective industrial relations. Employers form highly organized employer
groups and centrally coordinated wage market. This VOC approach implies that
collective bargaining will not decentralize if the ability for employers to
coordinate is high.
The third approach is Small states hypothesis. This hypothesis focuses on the
international factor while neo-corporatism and VOC do on the domestic factor.
Katzenstein discussed that small open economies in Europe are likely to form
centralized industrial relations(Katzenstein 1985). Unlike large countries,
European small countries fall short of their powerful positions so that they don't
have the choice of protectionism when they are exposed to international market
competition. They therefore share the political strategy for industrial coordination,
combining international liberalization with domestic compensation. In this
process, because small European states cannot help depending on foreign
capital in order to increase their international competition potential, they tend to
have bigger current account deficits than the large industrial states. Katzenstein
said that Balance-of-Payments problems motivated interest groups to take their
cooperative action and this action contributed to the formation of the centralized
industrial relations(Katzenstein 1985; 52). This implication is that small open
economies, exposed to external economic fluctuation, are inclined to have
centralized industrial relations while large industrial economies ,not often
exposed To it, are inclined to have decentralized industrial relations.
The fourth approach explaining decentralization of industrial relations is
Foreign Direct Investment(FDI). This approach focuses on an international factor
like small states hypothesis. It is said that US multinationals are likely to choose
host countries where industrial relations are more decentralized than other
countries(Cooke1997; Cooke and Noble 1998; Bognanno, Keane, and Yang
2005; Ham and Kleiner 2002). The centralized industrial relations may limit the
ability for employers to adopt a nontraditional organization or to adopt protection
based on new technology or productivity(Cooke 1997). And it may limit the ability
for them to enhance flexibility through labor allocation corresponding to market
fluctuation or uncertainty(Cooke 1997). And it may limit the ability for them to cut
their labor costs(Cooke 1997). Cooke extended his interest into multinationals
other than US and said that the amounts of FDI of multinationals are determined
by industrial relations, domestic market, and socio-economic factors in the host
country(Cooke 2001; 702). Cooke pointed out that multinationals assessed two
5
points. The first point is the comparable labor cost in industrial relations between
the mother country and the host country. The second is flexible industrial
relations in order for multinationals to transfer their preferable human resource
management (Cooke 2001;712).
Among four approaches regarding decentralization of industrial relations,
Neo-corporatism, Varieties of Capitalism, and small states hypothesis are static
explanations. They are in a position that the transition of the international
environment since 1980s is not critical. Capital controls have been removed
since 1980 while capital had been controlled until 1970s. It was in 1990s that
Washington Consensus as a policy regime spread across the world. This
consensus was derived from the experiences of cumulated debt crises in south
American countries in 1980s which continued current account deficits. And the
financial crisis coming from Bankruptcy of Leman Brothers seriously affected the
countries ,having been characteristic of being current account deficits, such as
Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Spain, United Kingdom, Portugal, and Italy. The crisis
has promoted flexibility in the labor markets of these countries. Among advanced
countries, severe international environment seriously affected Australia. This
country is often in a mid position in the ranking of neo-corporatism(Cameron
1984;Bryth 1979; Calmfors&Driffill 1988; Schmidt1983;Lehner 1988;Dell‟Arin&
Lodovici 1992; Tarantelli 1983) and remained centralized wage bargaining level
during 1980s like CMEs(Hall and Soskice 2001). Australia pursed the small open
economy during 1980s in that that country set a high value on the export
oriented growth and the tripartite cooperation between government, labor, and
management. Although Australia had these features, the centralized collective
bargaining system in it has accelerated to decentralization since the balance of
payments crisis deepened during late 1980s. Thus the static approaches, such
as neo-corporatism, Varieties of Capitalism, and small states hypothesis, cannot
fully explain the big change of industrial relations in Australia after 1980s.
Although FDI theories about decentralization of industrial relations can explain
about the change of industrial relations since 1980s when each country
abolished capital control, those approaches cannot explain that some countries
receive a large amount of FDI and others don't. According to the FDI theories, it
is necessarily for a host country to demise centralized industrial relations in order
to receive foreign investment. But the national trade unions and the social
democratic party in the host country may be resistant against decentralization of
industrial relations, especially to company or individual level, because that
6
decentralization will damage solidarity of domestic trade unions. In New
Zealand, the government during the early 1990s carried out a reform
decentralizing collective bargaining into company or individual level . Just after
the reform, inward FDI in New Zealand rapidly increased while collective
agreement coverage and union density seriously withdrew (Barry and Wails
2004;439, Blumenfeld, Crawford, and Walsh, 2001). In Australia, the labor
government from1983 to 1996 and the national trade union(ACTU) formed the
centralized industrial relations(Accord). Both the government and the trade
union did not pursue decentralization of labor market soon after that government
was established. They withdrew from it during the balance of payments crisis in
late1980s. Thus it is costly for domestic actors to receive FDI. FDI theories do
not shed light on the reason why a host country receives a large amount of FDI.
Chapter 2 Hypothesis
In consideration of points of previous studies, we focus on international
balance of payments in order to explain a divergence between the group of
countries with decentralization of industrial relations and that with
centralization. The incentive for a state to decentralize industrial relations under
a current account deficit comes from the domestic and the external factors.
The domestic factor would mean that a current account deficit forces a state to
adopt a fiscal austerity. This expectation comes from the following twin deficits
hypothesis.
Y=C+I+G+NX …①
Y=C+S+T …②
⇔(S-I)+(T-G)=NX …③
(Y=gross domestic product; C=consumption; I=investment; G=all government
expenditure; NX=current account balance; S= private sector savings; T=tax
revenue )
According to this hypothesis, a government must reduce investment(I) and all
government expenditure(G) and must raise tax revenue(T). The current account
7
deficits are the foundation bringing about the financial and the currency
crisis(Aytül Ganioğlu 2013, Edwards 2002). In order to avoid these crises, the
government may choose to take a high interest rate policy and an fiscal strain
policy. The high interest rate policy means to reduce I ,and the fiscal strain policy
means to reduce G and to increase T. Under these austerity conditions,
domestic interest actors, especially trade unions and employer groups, may
boost incentives to prefer more decentralized industrial relations. The trade
unions may raise incentives to pursue wage bargaining at company level
because the fiscal strain leads to cutting social wage which is an indispensable
condition for social corporatism. The employer groups may regard centralized
industrial relations as too rigid under the recession by the high interest rate policy.
The above is the domestic incentive for a state to decentralize industrial relations
under the situation of continuing current account deficits.
The external factor means that a state has to depend on Foreign Direct
Investment(FDI) under the current account deficit. According to Balance of
Payments Manual by International Monetary Fund, the components of balance
of payments are as follows.
Balance of payments = 0 = current account balance+ capital account balance
+foreign exchange reserve change …④
Current account balance = trade account balance+ service account balance+
income account balance+ current account transfer error
Capital account = investment account balance(outward FDI+ inward FDI+
portfolio investment+ etc)+asset transfer + etc …⑤
As shown in the equation ④, the current account deficit leads to capital account
surplus. Judging from the equation ⑤, it is possible for us to explain that a
current account deficit encourages a state to receive more lots of FDI. It is clear
that current account balance and FDI have positive correlation as shown in
Figure 1. Thus, a host country will be more influenced by the preference of
foreign multinationals if it continues current account deficits for a long period.
Multinationals may demand flexibility in industrial relations in a host country in
order to transfer their preferable human resource management(Cooke
2001;712). A host country may try to decentralize industrial relations to predict
8
the demand. The above is the external incentive for the state to decentralize
industrial relations under the environment of current account deficits. We
summarize our hypothesis in Figure 2.
Figure 1 the correlation between FDI(the percentage of GDP) and the current
account (CA= the median per ten years of the current account , Source: IMF and
UNCTAD)
Figure 2 The process in which current account deficits decentralize industrial relations
・domestic factor
・government: austerity
・ trade union and
employer group:
opposition to centralized
industrial relations
more
decentralized
industrial
relations
Current account
deficits
・external factor
・government: reception of
FDI
9
Chapter 3 The multiple regression analysis for the impact of the current
account balance on wage coordination level
In this chapter, the impact of the current account deficit on decentralization of
industrial relations is explored in 38 democracies. The period is from 1980s
when globalization accelerated to 2011 in Bankruptcy of Leman Brothers. New
democracies are dealt with from the year when they democratized up to 2011.
We use the multiple regression analysis.
First of all, wage coordination is observed as the operation variable of
decentralization of industrial relations. We tend to analyze the centralized
industrial relations by mixing Coordination with Centralization. Wage bargaining
may be informally coordinated in association with the whole economy even
though that bargaining seems to be dominant at company level(Radulescu and
Robson 2006;663). In order to consider such a case, we adopt Coordination
which reflects the reality of the wage bargaining system. The Coordination is
the variable which Visser collected each year until 2011(Visser 2013). The
Visser's data record the fluctuations of wage coordination level in more than 40
countries. The coordination score of the Visser index is divided into 5 stages.
The wage coordination score as the operation variable of decentralization of
industrial relations in this paper is the median per ten years in democracies in
the Visser's data.
We adopt the Current account deficit(CA) variable and the dummy variable of
CA as the independent variable. CA is the median per ten years in International
Monetary Fund(IMF) data. The CA dummy variable is as follows: the CA dummy
is 0 when the median is minus and the CA dummy is 1 when the median is plus.
Other variables are sectoral organization, inflation, unemployment, and trade
dependent. The sectoral organization from the Visser's data is as follows: score
2 shows strong institutions (both employers and unions, and some joint
institutions), score 1 is medium (only one side, no joint institutions), and score 0
is weak, or none. The variable in our paper is the median per ten years. The
sectoral organization represents Neo-corporatism and Varieties of Capitalism.
We also issue inflation and unemployment as control variables. Iversen and
Wren said that the unemployment rate in the country where labor market is
flexible is more likely to drop than in the country where it is inflexible(Iversen and
Wren 1998). Flexibilization introduced for reducing unemployment rate may
promote decentralization of centralized wage coordination. So we use IMF data
10
and the unemployment rate is the median per ten years. The important goal of
Thatcherism which promoted flexibility of labor market was to restrain
inflation(Matthews and Minford1987). The centralized industrial relations is the
foundation of the trade union power. In order to restrain inflation, the government
may try to break the power of trade union which is likely to bring about wage
inflation. This trial may lead to the deconstruction of the centralized industrial
relations. So the higher inflation rate is, the stronger the pressure for
decentralization may be. The final variable is trade dependent in order to
observe Small States Hypothesis by Katzenstein(Katzenstein 1985). Tripartite
coordination and centralized industrial relations may occur in small open
economies because they are exposed to external vulnerability. The operation
variable is the median per 10 years in each county in UNCTAD data.
Table 1 The result of the multiple regression analysis
Variable
CA
CA dummy
Sectoral
organization
Inflation
Unemployment
Trade dependent
intercept
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Model5
0.066**
(2.954)
0.069**
(3.245)
0.072**
(3.392)
0.071**
(3.393)
0.974**
(5.092)
0.901**
(7.743)
0.897**
(7.758)
0.903**
(7.827)
0.911**
(7.827)
0.845**
(7.936)
-0.008
(-0.863)
-0.009
(-0.948)
-0.011
(-0.523)
-0.003
(1.042)
0.003
(1.014)
0.003
(1.025)
1.885**
(6.980)
1.812**
(7.859)
1.756**
(7.885)
1.924**
(12.705)
1.583**
(12.740)
R2=0.6 R2=0.599 R2=0.595 R2=0.59 R2=0.64
11
The result is shown in Table 1. CA and sectoral organization are positively
correlated to wage coordination level at 1 percent significant level from model
1 to model 4. On the other hand, unemployment, inflation, and trade dependent
are not statistically significant. CA dummy and sectoral organization are
positively correlated to wage coordination at 1 percent significant level in
model 5. Just like former models, unemployment, inflation, and trade dependent
are not statistically significant . This result means that the current account has
significant influence on centralization or decentralization of industrial relations
while Neo-corporatism and Varieties of Capitalism also do.
Chapter 4 The case of industrial relations in Australia
4.1 The background of industrial relations in Australia
Industrial relations in Australia has been determined by the centralized
bargaining system which is called Award. This award is determined by the
federal and state governments. In 1904, the federal court set the high standard
of basic wage. This was defined as the socially appropriate level of living for a
family of four. The wage standard was proposed to be the same within one
occupation in any industry or company(Plowman 1980). The Award binds
workers and employers ,in an industry covered by it, who have action and don't
generally go to the federal court. On the other hand, labor movement in Australia
was divided into that of industrial unions and many small occupational ones
(Schwartz 2000).
Australia adopted Scandinavian EFO inflation model. This model has the
system which stimulates the level of wage in international competitive sectors to
spread to that in domestic sectors. Australia mainly exported primary products
and imported industrial products. The percentage of exported industrial
products consistently remained low in Australia while the percentage of them in
European countries was already high in the period after WW2 and continued to
become higher since it (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). The Australian
manufacturing sector was externally protected by high tariffs because it played a
role as the domestic sector employing workers.
12
Figure 3 The percentage of industrial products in export goods from 1956 to
1982(Australia and New Zealand)
(Source: Yearbook of international trade statistics and International trade
statistics yearbook)
Figure 4 The percentage of exported industrial products from 1957 to
1982(European countries, mainly CMEs )
(Source: Yearbook of international trade statistics and International trade
statistics yearbook)
4.2 Current account deficits in Australia
During most of the twentieth century, Australia suffered current account
deficits. The first reason is that the export of the primary products is not enough
to make up for current account deficits(Schwartz 2000). In addition, because
0
20
40
60
80
1001956
1957
1958
1959
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1973
1974
1975
1976
1979
1980
1981
1982
AUS
NZ
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1957
1958
1959
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1973
1974
1975
1976
1979
1980
1981
1982
AUT
BEL
LUXDEN
FIN
FRA
GER
IRE
ITA
JAP
NE
13
there were many industrial products not only for consumption but also for capital
investment in terms of imports, the ratio of imports was more and more
increasing. The second reason is that the income account deficit seriously
continued to deteriorate the current account balance. United Kingdom, the
former colonizing nation, historically made enormous sum of investments in
Australia so that it had to continue to pay the interests to UK(森健 1969;20).
Australia had to continue to receive new foreign capital in order to make up for
current account deficits. This new foreign investment means capital account
surplus including FDI. The third reason is that transport item in the income
balance is in deficit, which came from the fact that Australia depended on British
merchant ships for the export(森健 1969;20-21). This item continued in deficit
during most of the time and the sum of deficits amounted to about 7.5 billion
dollars from 1970-1971 to 1980-1981(クロウ and ホイールライト 1987;277).
It took a high cost to rely on United Kingdom with transport means for export
because Australia is the country on the island continent distant from the
international main production base regions(クロウ and ホイールライト 1987;
282). The fourth reason is that Australia continued to add up the trade balance
and the current balance deficit to United Kingdom and United States. Australia
was the very important client for UK exporters since the colonial period and
played a role in compensating for the shrinkage of other markets to the UK
traditional industrial area(ケイン&ホプキンス 1997;65).As shown in Figure 5,
the current balance of Australia continues to mark deficits by the huge income
deficits.
Figure 5 The breakdown of current account balance (Australia)
-45000-40000-35000-30000-25000-20000-15000-10000
-50000
500010000
Goods account
service account
income account
current transfer
account
14
Vertical axis: US dollar Horizontal axis: year
(source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook)
4.3 Hawke labor government from 1983 to 1987
The Accord Mark 1 was concluded by labor party and ACTU(Australian
national trade union) . However it became unstable by external pressure of
current account deficits. The Accord Mark 1 was a highly centralized wage
bargaining by the active industry policy and by the social wage policy in
exchange for wage restraint(Higgins 1980,1985; Jackson 2006;262-263,
John Quiggin 2001). The important goal of the Accord Mark1 was inflation
control and economic growth, and the increase in wages was based on CPI
growth per 6 months. A few weeks ago before 1983 national election, 27
million dollars flowed out of Australia when foreign investors responded to
the regulation of foreign investment by the new labor government. The
government responded to this situation by devaluating Australia dollar
(Jackson 2006;265). The expansionary fiscal policy that the labor party
pledged in the 1983 national election campaign was abolished soon after
the election(Kelly1992; 57). While currency devaluation may have been
advantageous to the export oriented industries, it increased the foreign
debts to be repaid. Tripartite national economic summit(NES) in1983 was
dominated by the concern about the unstable status of Australian economy
(Jackson 2006;266). The greatest cause for concern of Hawke was the
foreign debts(Hawke 1994;174). In order to tackle the current account
deficit, it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit. Thus it was the most
economic priority in 1983/1984 that the government cut the budget deficit
and tackled the increasing foreign debts (Edwards 1996;197). The Accord
Mark 1 was concluded under such serious circumstance.
The Accord Mark 2 also continued to be exposed to the external economic
pressure. The Australian dollar was devalued by 16 percent while reflecting
the increasing current account deficit. The market participants became
concerned about inflation through this fact(Wignall, Fahrer, and Heath
1993). Kelty, the leader of ACTU, accepted to discount wage increase by 2
percent less than CPI in order not only to exchange for the comprehensive
package including the launch of the pension regime but also to prevent wage
inflation spiral(Hampson 1997;551). The Accord Mark 2 prohibited company
15
level bargaining. Efficiency and flexibility of competitiveness was not
considered by the policy marker(Jackson 2006;268).
It can be said that the political support for the Accord by domestic interest
groups was stable (Hampson 1997). The left wings did not withdraw from
their labor party while they were unsatisfied with the Accord between the
party and ACTU. And in the Accord the policy makers made much of the
goal of business maximizing profits and promoting industrial peace
(Hampson 1997;550). So far from being removed from the influence on the
Accord, Employer associations were a key force for the reform agenda by the
labor party(Hampson 1997;550). Confederation of Australian
Industry(CAI) which was the major employer group at that time ,and Metal
Trades Industry Association(MTIA) were the main bargaining players with
ACTU. These employer groups kept a lookout for growing neo liberal
employers cooperating with Liberal party during 1980s(Kelly 1992; 263) .
Until Balance of Payments crisis occurred in 1987, Business Council of
Australia(BCA), which Australian major companies participate in, was
skeptical about the idea that the centralized Accord should be demised(Kelly
1992; 264). John Howard and other members of Liberal party who pursued
decentralization of industrial relations had a meeting with BCA in February
1986 and explained about their proposal for decentralization. The BCA
chairperson, however, questioned about the feasibility of their proposal and
stated that the chaos of wage explosion might happen if the centralized
industrial relations was deconstructed(Kelly 1992: 264). It was not until the
balance of payments crisis deepened that BCA started to assert
decentralization of the centralized industrial relations. In this way, it was
until the economic crisis coming from the current account deficit deepened
that the pressure for abolishment and decentralization of the Accord was not
strong in Australia.
4.5 The balance of payments crisis and decentralization of industrial relations
from 1985 to 1991.
The increasing current account deficit in 1985 led to more serious market
turmoil. The devaluation of Australian dollar in November 1985 might be
caused mainly by news about deterioration of the current account deficit
(Wignall, Fahrer and Heath.1993). The increasing current account deficit
16
was due to the rapid decrease in domestic savings as a result of an
investment boom in 1981(Wignall, Fahrer, and Heath.1993;42). Most of
the foreign debts at that time were settled by foreign currencies, especially
US dollar. So these foreign debts rapidly increased from 25 percent of GDP in
1985 to 34 percent of GDP in 1987 by the depreciation of the exchange rate.
The Australian government bonds were downgraded by the credit rating
agencies and the Australian dollar fell from 70 US cent per Australian dollar
in March 1985 to 60 US cent per Australian dollar in June 1985. The
exchange rate continued to be unstable under condition that the financial policy
was inconsistent, the terms of trade became worse ,and the current account
deficits and foreign debts increased rapidly(Wignall, Farhrer, and Heath
1993;42). Under this situation, the MX missile crisis, the declaration regarding
the abolishment of the deduction of the withholding tax, and the rumor about the
sale of Australian government bonds to Japan all caused sharp fluctuations in
value of Australian dollar(Wignall, Farhrer, and Heath. 1993;42).
The goal of the Accord changed from inflation control to business
efficiency(Jackson. 2006). Having known that increasing trade deficits recorded
1 billion, 480 million dollars, Keating ,Treasure of Australia, made "Banana
Republic" remark. This remark caused the further crash of Australian dollar. This
event strengthened the forces of neoliberal business communities which took
the standpoint of anti-trade unionism. The event prompted the employers and
the government to receive a neoliberal way of decentralizing the centralized
industrial relations(Kelly 1992; 269). BCA shifted its attention to company level
bargaining since this event (Jackson.2006;274). BCA issued its report about
rigid workplace practice in Economic Program Advisory Assembly in September
1987. After this meeting, Hawke, the Prime Minister, announced the end of wage
indexation and the onset of two tier wage bargaining system(Dabscheck
1990;31-32). ACTU also had significant influence on this announcement(Kelly
1992; 284). Kelty, the chairman of ACTU, thought that the current account crisis
dampened the wage level of workers. He was unsatisfied with the centralized
Accords because the Accord Mark1 forced ACTU to restrain wage growth and
the Accord Mark2 did it to cut wage level(Kelly 1992; 284). So the employers
and ACTU supported the announcement of Hawke. It was the economic shock in
1986 that expanded consensus on the need for the introduction of the two tier
wage system(Jackson 2006;278). Thus the balance of payments crisis in 1986
was one of the turning points in decentralization of industrial relations in
17
Australia.
Moreover, the heavy fall in stock prices in November 1987 brought pressure
to bear on the government(Jackson 2006;282). In the national wage case in
December 1987, even Ralph Willis, Minister for Employment and Industrial
Relations, who had used to be cautious of decentralization of industrial relations,
referred to the urgency for more wage flexibility and for wider range of company
level bargaining(Jackson 2006;282).
There was difference among the domestic actors on decentralized industrial
relations. Roderic Carnegy, Chairperson of BCA, researched the member
companies of the organization and concluded that the balance of payments
crisis expanded the national debts and it was necessary for industrial relations to
be reformed. Afterwards, BCA issued a short report "Toward An Enterprise
Based Industrial Relations System" in May 1987 and asserted the shift into
company or individual level bargaining. And Liberal/ National Coalition(the major
opponents at that time) introduced the Voluntary Employment Agreement at
state level in 1987 and pursued company or individual level bargaining at
national level too. On the other hand, CAI and MTIA pursued the two tier wage
bargaining system(Barnett 1987; 184). MTIA opposed the company level
bargaining and preferred industry level bargaining based on "the structural
efficiency principle". ACTU issued "Australian restructured" to pursue the new
industrial relations like Swedish model(Scott 2009). Thus, Hawke labor
government, ACTU,CAI and MTIA agreed with the introduction of the two tier
wage bargaining system. Like this, there was difference of attitudes among
domestic actors.
But, the trend toward company level bargaining further accelerated in the early
1990. The government adopted the high interest rate policy so as to respond to
the balance of payments crisis in the late 1980s so that the recession deepened
and the unemployment rate rose highly. Under this recession, the percentage
supporting Hawke labor government fell and the percentage doing the
Liberal/National Coalition rose. Because there was more and more a risk that
Hawke labor government would lose 1990 national election, that government
conceded the BCA and decided to introduce company level bargaining with
some limits in order to forestall the Coalition. ACTU predicted that the Coalition
would pass the draconian law for trade unions if it returned to power. For that
reason, ACTU approved of the proposal for more flexible industrial relations in
order to guard the labor government. In this way, the full fledged introduction of
18
the company level bargaining was determined in the Accord Mark 6 in 1990.
There was more necessity to attract foreign capital when the current account
deficit increased. Hawke labor government decided to liberalize the foreign
investment policy in the mid 1980s(Pokarier 2004; 219). The Australian- Japan
symposium substantially began with 1986. The policy maker implemented
flexibility in industrial relations in order to promote investment from
Japan(Hampson 1997;551). This trend continued after 1990s and Paul Keating,
new labor government, appealed more flexibility of industrial relations so as to
attract investment from Japan.
As stated above, it is a likely aspect that the external crisis arising from the
current account deficit during the mid 1980s prompted the trade union, the
government, and the employer groups to form the agreement on company level
bargaining.
Chapter 5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, the current account deficit as the important cause of
decentralization of industrial relations is explored. There are many domestic
approaches about industrial relations , such as Neo-Corporatism and Varieties of
Capitalism. While the number of the external approaches about industrial
relations such as FDI theories has been increasing since 1980, still it is limited.
We focus on the impact of the current account deficit on industrial relations while
we appreciate those domestic and external approaches. When globalization
advances, there have been increasing numbers of financial and currency crises
affected by international market. Under this situation, the role of the current
account deficit is more increasingly important. The goal of our study is to
research the impact of the current account deficit on industrial relations by the
multiple regression analysis and the case of industrial relations in Australia from
the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.
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