Deepta Chopra (IDS) and Kunal Sen (ESID – University of Manchester) Paper presented at DSA Annual Conference, Birmingham 16 th November 2013

Deepta Chopra (IDS) and Kunal Sen (ESID – University of Manchester)

Paper presented at DSA Annual Conference, Birmingham16th November 2013

Provides 100 days of employment a year To every rural household that demands work At state minimum wages Rights based welfare measure Livelihoods + asset creation objectives

Budget of 8.91 billion USD (1.3 per cent of total central government spending)

World’s largest social security intervention in terms of household coverage (about 50 million households in 2012-2013)

Centrally financed (90%) and monitored through the Ministry of Rural Development

Implemented by State Departments of Rural Development

Involvement of administration at various levels – state, district and block

At village level, implementation happens through Gram Panchayats

Team of technical experts (engineers, accountants, data entry operators, MIS experts) at all levels.

Same design; same implementation structures

Varying implementation performance (outcomes) across states and within states (district, block and GP level variation)

(Implementation Performance measured by the proportion of person days generated in each state out of the number of rural poor)

Four ‘high implementation’ states: Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Chhatisgarh

Four ‘low implementation’ states: Orissa, Bihar, Maharashtra and Assam

The role of the sub national state is critical in explaining variations across states

Two ways in which implementation can be affected:◦ Capacity for implementation

◦ Political will or commitment towards the Act

Desk based literature and statistical analysis

Elite interviewing with sub national and provincial bureaucrats and other state-level personnel

Elite interviewing with political party leaders

Selected field visits to worksites and interactions with front line staff and workers

Path dependency

Extractive capacity

Physical and Organisational Competence

Relational Capacity

Territorial reach

Existing structures and experience in similar programmes can signal existing capacity to implement employment programmes

Rajasthan Assam Andhra Pradesh

Bihar

History of implementing PWPs

Long and established history of PWPs

Low level of experience in implementing PWPs

Long history of PWPs

Long history of PWPs

Required for initial investment in administrative capacity

Required for co-financing 10% contribution from states (25% of material costs)

Disbursements from centre (based on MIS) required for implementation


Bihar

State-fiscal capacity

Poor state but some reserves

Very poor state

Rich state with reserves

Very poor state

Centre – State disbursement

Some delays

Very delayed

Regular with some delays

Delayed

Good physical and organizational infrastructure implies good state capacity for implementation

Integration possibilities ensure maximising resources and positive spill-overs

Ability of bureaucrats to resist pressures from political and local elites is important, yet complete autonomy may be counter productive too. ‘Inverted U-shaped relation’ between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy (Fukuyama 2013)


Bihar

Physical infrastructure

poor Very poor Poor but improving

Very poor

Organisational infrastructure – staff deployment

Medium (some recruitments)

Quite poor Good Poor

Organisational Infrastructure – Human resource development

good poor Very good Improving but generally low

Inter-agency coordination and integration

Weak Weak/ non existent

Very weak, especially with PRI and state departments

Weak but growing

Bureaucratic autonomy

High Very Low Medium - optimal

Low

Civil society assisting implementation, generating awareness, ensuring accountability; M&E

Capacity to deal with criticism shows constructive engagement for improving the programme and positive learning capacity


Bihar

State – civil society relations

Initially strong but civil society marginalised over time

Minimum/ no involvement of civil society with state; independent but scattered working

Good engagement with some specific actors only, through formalised arrangements of APSSAT

Hardly any engagement, civil society feels state does not listen/ want them involved

State’s response to criticism

Poor Not much criticism

Responsive Poor

Capacity of the state to provide information to the poorest and most marginalised is critical for generating demand and fulfilling the rights based ethos of the MGNREGA


Bihar

Awareness provision

Poor Very poor Very good, mainly through social audits

poor

Locus of Initiative

Degree of analytical rigour

Mobilisation of support

Application of credible sanctions

Continuity of effort

Political feedback and legitimacy

The extent to which sub national actors take initiative over MGNREGA indicates their willingness to adapt/ change/ use


Bihar

Degree of initiative

Low – central orders followed

Very Low – only orders from centre followed

High number and quality of innovations

Variable – person dependent

Reflects the extent to which MGNREGA is taken seriously

Can be seen from the analytical steps taken to resolve problems, preparation for implementation, changes in administrative structure, trainings etc


Bihar

Initial preparation

Good Very minimal

Extensive Minimal

Changes in admin structure

Some None Extensive Minimal

Problem solving

Minimal Minimal Extensive Extensive

From within the state governments (politicians/ state structures); within department; from civil society and local power holders (Sarpanches)


Bihar

Within government

Low High High Low

Within DoRD staff

Low/ Variable

Low High (mix of forced and voluntary)

Variable

From civil society

Decreasing/ negative

Very Low Very low/ negligible

Very Low/ negative

From local power holders

Positive but as negative force

Low/ ignored

Very Low/ excluded

Low/ ignored

Recognition of positive actions, punishing negative actions can send strong signals and motivate

The role of social audits in identifying actions is critical


Bihar

Social audits Initially valued, now shunned

Not implemented

Yes but state-run/ directed, also weak follow up/ action

Some but not many

Recognition of positive actions

None at state level

None at state level

Yes through promotions

Some being developed

Negative sanctions

None None Low, but being developed

None

Personnel continuity and regular financial resources can be critical for ensuring continuity of initiatives and actions


Bihar

Personnel at state level

Low continuity

Very low continuity

High continuity & hand-overs

Low but being maintained (externally)

Personnel at sub-state level

Low but being improved

Very low Low but being improved

Low

Financial systems

Minimal systems, low continuity

Low Continuity

Strong systems, good continuity

Systems being developed to improve

Extent of political competition – higher the competition, more the responsiveness

Perceptions about political feedback from good implementation


Bihar

Political competition

High – two strong parties

Low – single party dominance

Medium, with Congress dominance

Medium, with stable government

Perceptions about feedback

? High Very high Not much

State Capacity Commitment Implementation performance

Rajasthan Medium Low High but decreasing sharply

Assam Low Low Low

Andhra Pradesh

High High High

Bihar Low Medium Low

Sub national state as a critical actor influencing implementation performance and outcomes – this influence operates through variations in capacity and commitment

Commitment and Capacity are interlinked and feed into each other

Political economy aspects play a major role in the ways in which welfare policies are implemented◦ Actors◦ Interests and motivations – commitment◦ Resources

Documents

Deepta Chopra (IDS) and Kunal Sen (ESID – University of Manchester) Paper presented at DSA Annual Conference, Birmingham 16 th November 2013