Defeating Iran's Anti-Access Weapons

8/3/2019 Defeating Iran's Anti-Access Weapons

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1

Whyanewoperationalconceptis

needed

for

the

Persian

Gulf

ChallenginglegacyassumptionsforprojectingU.S.militarypower

Pacing

threat:

an

anti

access/area

denial(A2/AD)strategywithPersiancharacteristics

OutsideIn objectives&linesof

operation

Recommendedsupportinginitiatives


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Thethreathaschanged: proliferationofprecisionguidedweapons,maritime

threats,terroristproxygroups,neartermpotentialofanucleararmedIran

TheArabawakeningpresentsbothstrategicopportunitiesandchallenges

Operationalplanningassumptionsdevelopedalmostthirtyyearsagoforthe

PersianGulfmaynolongerbevalid

Aturningpoint: WiththeendofoperationsinIraq,DoDhasanopportunityto

rethinkplans,forwardposture,andcapabilitiesneededtomaintainstable

militarybalanceintheGulfoverthenext20years

2

U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf securityto prevent Irans developmentof a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies

bbbbbb Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, January 2012


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3

Todayscontingencyforceisnotwellsuitedto

manyoftheproblemsitislikelytoface

Capabilities

for

Limited

Contingencies

in

the

Persian

Gulf,

1979

Recommendations:

EstablishaforwardposturethatregularlydeploysforcesintothePersianGulfandincludesayearroundcarriertaskgroup/amphibiousreadygrouppresence

PrepositionequipmentandconsumablesinthePersianGulftosupportrapidforcedeployments

RapidlydeploylargeforcesofbombersandfighterstotheregionintheeventofanIranianinvasionorSovietadventurism

Upgradeplans

and

capabilities

to

support

operationsagainstguerillaforces

Hardenanddefendcriticaloilfacilitiesandinfrastructureagainstairandterrorattacks


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TheU.S.militaryhastraditionallyassumed:

AlthoughtheseassumptionsservedtheU.S.militarywellforthepastthirtyyears,it

shouldnotbeassumedthattheywillbesuitableforopsagainstcapableA2/ADcomplexes

Closein

bases

would

be

available

for

early

arrivingfighters,groundforces,C2elements

Navalunitscouldoperatewithinrangeoftheirtargetareas

U.S.

would

have

a

near

monopoly

on

PGMs

Norealthreatstorefuelingandlogisticsops

C4ISRnetworkswouldremainsecure

Asin1979,weareinatimeoftransitionanotherPersianGulfreviewmaybeneeded

MajorU.S. GulfOperations

EarnestWill,

1987

1988

DesertShield/Storm,19901991

SouthernWatch,19912003

DesertStrike,1996

NorthernWatch,

1997

2003

DesertFox,1998

IraqiFreedom,20032010


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BallisticMissileFlightTimes


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TheU.S.willnotinitiatearmedhostilities

Prior

intelligence

and

warning

will

be

limited

NeitherU.S.norIranianterritorywillbesanctuaries

Alloperatingdomainswillbecontested

Close

in

operating

locations

and

forces

will

be

at

risk

at

the

beginning

of

aconflictwithIran

Cannotassumeadditionalcloseinbasingwillbeimmediatelyavailable

IranwillthreatentouseWMD

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TheU.S.militarywillneedtofighttomaintainitsfreedomofaction


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Aredesignedtocreatetimeneededforanenemytoachieveitscampaignobjectives,e.g.,

PreventtheU.Sfromdeployingandemployingitsforceseffectively

CoerceU.S.partnersandalliestodenysupporttotheU.S.militaryand/ordrivethemoutofthewar

InflictsuchdamagetoU.S.forcesandbasesthattheU.S.wouldchoosetodiscontinuethefight

MaketheprospectofeventualU.S.victoryappeartooprolongedorcostly

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IranisdevelopinganA2/ADstrategywithPersiancharacteristics


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Natural channelizing effect of the Strait of Hormuzand Persian Gulf

Short-/medium-range missiles from Iran can reachcritical areas across the region

Global dependence on Gulf energy exports, most ofwhich still transit the Strait

80-90% of populations for many Persian Gulf stateslocated in coastal urban areas


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Shahab3

C802

Fateh110


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ClicktoeditMastertitlestyleIadvise,recommendandwarnthemoverthe

returnofthiscarrierto

thePersianGulfbecause

wearenotinthehabitof

warningmorethan

once


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Defendingforwardbasesandpartnerinfrastructureagainstguidedrocket,artillery,mortarand

missileattacks

Counteringwidespreadandhighlymobileirregularproxyforcesarmedwithguidedweapons

Defendingsurfacevesselsagainst

missile,

submarine,

and

swarming

boatattacks

Penetratingcontestedairspacetoconductoffensiveoperations

SecuringsafepassagethroughtheStraitofHormuzandPersianGulf

Settingconditions

for

other

campaignoperations(e.g.,counterWMD,unconventionalwarfaremissions)


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Prevent the U.S from deploying and employing its forces effectively

Coerce U.S. partners to deny support to the U.S. military

Inflict such damage that the U.S. would choose to discontinue the fight

Make the prospect of an eventual U.S. victory appear too prolonged or costly

Freedom of action in all domains air, land, sea, space & cyberspace

Create advantages over a capable opponent Gain the initiative

Deny a quick victory

Set the conditions for effective follow-on operations

OutsideIn

encompasses

all

elements

of

the

joint

force

OutsideInproposesanenablingconcept,notatheaterwarplan

AirSeaBattlelikeconceptsarenotallaboutWESTPAC

Important

Caveats:


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ISR and C2 networks are the "Achilles heel" of A2/AD strategies

U.S. ability to sustain operations over extended distances is a key advantage

At the outset of hostilities, U.S. could use this advantage to:

FootagereportedlyfilmedbyanIranianUAV

Degrade/deny enemys ability to effectivelytarget its missiles

Regain U.S. naval maneuver and ability todeploy air forces close to an enemy,thereby increasing sortie generation

Deny enemys ability to form an accuratepicture of the battlespace or assess effects of

its strikesForce the enemy to waste its missileassets against targets of little value


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ConductlongrangeoperationsfromoutsidethereachofIransantiaccessthreatstogaintheadvantage:

DISPERSEANDDEPLOYTOSECURESTAGINGBASESavoidatrapbydeployingandoperatingfrombaseslocatedoutsidethereachofIransmissilethreats

BLIND

THE

ENEMY,

SHRINK

THE

A2/AD

THREAT

RING

fightfromrangetodominatethebattlespace killthearcher,notthearrows

CREATEENABLINGPOCKETSOFAIR&MARITIMESUPERIORITYincludesair,EW&underseawarfare,specialops,andjointtheaterentryopstocreatelodgmentsnearStrait

Counterweaponsofmassdestruction

CounterproxygroupsarmedwithGRAMM

Other Possible Theater Campaign Lines of Operation:

Imposecosts

UWtobringaboutregimechangefromwithin


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Deploy to operate from baseslocated outside the reach of

Irans missile threats Disperse steady-state

theater presence forces

Deploy initial responseforces to locations outside

of Irans threat ring

Undersea warfarefor strike & maritimedominance ops

Fight from a posture ofadvantage to complicateIrans planning and reduceits A2/AD threat


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Fight from range to dominatethe battlespace

Prevent the enemy fromdeveloping an accuratepicture of the battlespace

Attack from multiple axes tocomplicate and overwhelmIrans defenses

Force Iran to its culminatingpoint, regain the initiative forthe U.S.

Enable forces to deploycloser to the area ofoperations, increasingaircraft sortie rates / tempoof operations


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Includes air, electronicwarfare and undersea

warfare, special

operations

and potentially jointtheater entry ops tocreate lodgments to

help secure the Strait

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Counterweaponsofmassdestruction,

includingnuclear

weapons

Counterproxygroupsarmedwithguided

rockets,artillery,mortars,andmissiles

Imposecosts

on

Iran,

degrade

its

ability

to

conductoffensiveanddefensivemilitary

operations

Unconventionalwarfare

operations

that

could

leadtoaregimechangefromwithin

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Amorebalancedmixofshortrangeandlongrangecapabilitiesforsurveillance& strike

Land

andsea

based

manned

and

unmanned

penetrating,

persistent

ISR

to

supportoperationsinhighthreatareas

RobustsurfacewarfaredefensesagainstASCMs,swarmingattackcraft,UAVs

Underseawarfarepayload,UUVswithlongendurance

Landbasedmissiledefenseswithlowtheaterfootprints

Landbasedcounterfires

Offensive&defensivecyber,electronicwarfare,directedenergycapabilities

Newcapabilities

to

support

SOF

ops

in

non

permissive

areas

Forcestobuildingpartnercapacity

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Fiscal Year0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

4SSGNs

SSN

SSN

LargeBowTubesSSN

VerticalLaunchTubes

TorpedoTubes

11 12 1 3 14 15 1 6 1 7 18 19 20 2 1 2 2 23 24 25 2 6 27 28 29 30 3 1 3 2 3 3 34 35 3 6 37 38 39 4 0 41 42 43 44 45

Fiscal Year

10

2010level:1272Launchers

TotalNumberofLaunchers

564

1124

468

720VPMSSN

PayloadModules

PlannedSSGNretirementsandSSNfleetreductionwillsignificantlyreducetheunderseastandoffstrikemagazine

VirginiaPayloadModules(VPMs)onfutureVirginiaclassSSNswouldmorethantripleSSNTLAMpayloads(from12to40TLAMs)

20modifiedSSNswouldsignificantlyreducetheunderseastrikeshortfallforlesscostthanbuyingnewreplacementSSGNs


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Work with regional partners todiversify posture, harden

shelters and support facilities

Improve ability to rapidlydisperse forces across theArabian Peninsula

Hundreds of candidates for

bases located outside thePersian Gulf, includingfacilities across Europessouthern tier

Does a networked force with

reach-back need to maintainmajor C2 facilities on thewestern coastline of the Gulf?

PotentialAirbases


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Operational concepts such as AirSea BattleandOutside-Inare not all about preserving the defensebudget and buying major new weapon systems

New, innovative concepts are needed that will help:

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Provide the vital links between the Defense

Strategy and future defense spending;

Increase synergy across operating domains andthe Services;

Identify priority capabilities; and

Identify areas for reducedinvestment as DoDrebalances to support its new strategy


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Defeating Iran's Anti-Access Weapons