DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

INDO-US TIES

Separation planCan a strategic partnership between US and Indiagrow I MANOHAR THYAGARAJ

MARITIME SECURITY

Turning pointIndian dockyards adopt global methods forshipbuilding I AJAI SHUKLA

THANK YOU

INDIAFIFTY YEARS IN EXILE -IS IT TIME TO DO MOREFOR TIBETANSArun Shourie

APRIL 2009

DSIVOLUME 1 ISSUE 5 Rs 250

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LETTER FROM THE editor

India’s securityis inextricablylinked with theexistence ofTibet as abuffer stateand to thesurvival ofTibetan cultureand religion

EDITORDefence & Security of India

his month, it has been fifty years since the Tibetan community came to live inIndia. For this they have held processions and functions to show their gratitudeto India. But DSI is exploring if India done enough to serve the cause of Tibetand to serve its own cause through the issue of Tibet. We examine how India’s security is inextricably linked with the existence and survival of

Tibet as a buffer state and to the survival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion.By giving the Dalai Lama asylum in India in 1959, India became a thorn in China’s political flesh,

and perhaps it will serve India’s cause better to capitalise on that rather than pretend otherwise.With China increasing control over Tibet by building railways, deploying its forces and even

changing the demography of the region, experts believe the resolution of the Sino-Indian border isreceding further away.

We have closely followed the fate of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and as the war in the island nationdraws to a close, DSI is keeping a close watch on how the endgame will actually end. Will theMahinda Rajapaksa regime’s ideology of majority rule, buttressed by military victory, actually translate into demonstrable political commitment to reach a settlement that will beacceptable to the Tamils?

DSI also continues to keep a watch on developments in Pakistan. Can Islamabad survive a dealwith Taliban?

We at DSI are developing a core strength area in marking trends in the Indian defence industry. Inthis issue we look at the changing mindsets in the Indian naval industry, specifically in the area of warship building. The Indian navy is concentrating on building fleet capabilities rather thancounting warship numbers but the change in thinking must translate into a real shift on the ground.Merely creating state-of-the art infrastructure will not chart the course of future warship building, itwill take effective decision-making.

As India’s relations with the United States grow, they become more complicated. We at DSI address the issue of difficulties in the defence partnership with Washington even as the strategic relationship remains on course.

Finally, to help us shape DSI into a periodical that meets your expectations, we continue to solicitthe feedback of our readers. Write to us at [email protected]. In case you are wondering how youcan subscribe, all you need to do is to send an email to [email protected] and our marketingteam will handle the rest.

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WAR ZONE 36

POST-WAR VSPOST-CONFLICTThe two-decade long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka seems to becoming to an end. But civilians arebearing the brunt of this catastrophe. While few havemanaged to escape, there are several others who are still in theclutches of the LTTE.

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COVER STORY 22

ROOF OF THE

WORLDIt’s been 50 years since the Dalai Lama lost his home and sought refuge inIndia. Over the years, Indo-Tibet relations have seen many phases. But thebig question now is should India play a more active role in helping Tibetans.

INDIA-US RELATIONS 14

SEPARATIONPLANBetween 2001 and 2008, the USsecurity relationship with India hasmoved to a new sphere, motivated bythe Bush Administration inWashington, and underpinned by thedual exigencies of US strategicplanning for the next century in Asiaand the aftermath of 9/11.

MARITIME SECURITY 06

TURNING POINTThe Indian Navy is slowlymoving towards becoming a more visible part ofIndia’s military. With agrowth in force structure,visibility and budget, thecountry’s naval force isincreasing its fleetcapabilities, both byacquiring and indigenouslybuilding warships.

NEIGHBOURWATCH 42

WARINESS INPAKISTANA young resident of the Swat Valley inPakistan shares her grief at being in the middle of a province which seemsto have lost its identity at the hands ofthe Taliban.

SPECIAL 28

PAST VSFUTURE India has been privy to the Tibetanstruggle for the past five decades. But is this past enough to create a betterIndo-Tibetan relationship in the future?

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CO

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NTS

WAR ZONE 36

POST-WAR VSPOST-CONFLICTThe two-decade long ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka seems to becoming to an end. But civilians arebearing the brunt of this catastrophe. While few havemanaged to escape, there are several others who are still in theclutches of the LTTE.

2

COVER STORY 22

ROOF OF THE

WORLDIt’s been 50 years since the Dalai Lama lost his home and sought refuge inIndia. Over the years, Indo-Tibet relations have seen many phases. But thebig question now is should India play a more active role in helping Tibetans.

INDIA-US RELATIONS 14

SEPARATIONPLANBetween 2001 and 2008, the USsecurity relationship with India hasmoved to a new sphere, motivated bythe Bush Administration inWashington, and underpinned by thedual exigencies of US strategicplanning for the next century in Asiaand the aftermath of 9/11.

MARITIME SECURITY 06

TURNING POINTThe Indian Navy is slowlymoving towards becoming a more visible part ofIndia’s military. With agrowth in force structure,visibility and budget, thecountry’s naval force isincreasing its fleetcapabilities, both byacquiring and indigenouslybuilding warships.

NEIGHBOURWATCH 42

WARINESS INPAKISTANA young resident of the Swat Valley inPakistan shares her grief at being in the middle of a province which seemsto have lost its identity at the hands ofthe Taliban.

SPECIAL 28

PAST VSFUTURE India has been privy to the Tibetanstruggle for the past five decades. But is this past enough to create a betterIndo-Tibetan relationship in the future?

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APRIL 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 5

EDITORSonia ShuklaASSISTANT EDITORRewati RauART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar Parveen KumarSubrata JanaBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONVipul JainPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil DubeyRitesh RoyDevender Pandey MEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITEDK-35, Green Park MainNew Delhi 110016. IndiaPh: +91 11 26868775/26960926Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier Collaco CHAIRMANJ S UberoiGLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESCharlton D’Silva, AustraliaStephane de Remusat, France/SpainSam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/ItalyLiat Heiblum, Israel/TurkeyMikio Tsuchiya, JapanClang Garcia, PhilippinesAlla Butova, RussiaDr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/MalaysiaYoung Seoh Chinn, South KoreaKaren Norris, Scandinavia/South AfricaDiane Obright, USA/BrazilMargie Brown, USA/CanadaDefence and Security of Indiais published and printedby Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia IndiaLimited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176,Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entirecontents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.Reproduction and translation in any language in wholeor in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.While the editors do their utmost to verify informationpublished they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost ordamaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais published once in twomonths and can be obtained by subscription.Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $40. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]


CONTRIBUTORS

French by birth, Claude Arpihas lived in India for the last34 years. He is the author of

several books on Tibet, Indiaand China and Indo-French

relations including Tibet the Lost Frontier

(Lancer Publishers). Aftergraduating as a dental

surgeon from BordeauxUniversity in 1974, he

decided to come to India. InDecember 1974, he joined

Auroville, the internationalcommunity founded by the

Mother, Sri Aurobindo’sspiritual collaborator.

CLAUDE ARPI

Working in both the visualand the print medium,

Ajai Shukla is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) for

Business Standard. He has been

Consulting Editor (StrategicAffairs) for NDTV, a reputed

news broadcaster in India,for which he anchored prime

time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

An nternational relationsexpert whose work has

appeared in USAF Air and Space Power

Journal and ORBIS. Manohar Thyagaraj is also

the founding editor ofEngagel NDUS, a journal on

US-India relations. He is currently a Director of

the US-India BusinessAlliance (USIBA), a trade

association with offices inWashington and New Delhi,

and consults with US andIndian defence companies.

Author of Crossed Swords:Pakistan, its Army, and the

Wars Within (OxfordUniversity Press 2008) and

the forthcoming FATA: AMost Dangerous Place(CSISJanuary 2009), Shuja Nawasis currently the first Director

of the South Asia Center of The Atlantic Council of

the United States inWashington DC.

A member of parliament,Arun Shourie has been

minister in the Union Cabinetin the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalistand an author. He has also

been an economist with theWorld Bank, a consultant to

the Planning Commission,India, and Editor of

The Indian Express.

AJAI SHUKLA

SHUJA NAWAZ

ARUNSHOURIE

MANOHARTHYAGARAJ

DSIAPRIL, 2009

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttuis the Executive Director of

the Centre for Policy

Alternatives (CPA) anindependent and non-partisan public policy

institute focusing on issuesof democratic governance

and peace throughprogrammes of

research and advocacy.

PAIKIASOTHYSARAVANAMUTTU

contributors 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 5/5/09 10:53 AM Page 1

APRIL 2009 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 5

EDITORSonia ShuklaASSISTANT EDITORRewati RauART DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNAjay Kumar Parveen KumarSubrata JanaBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERRoop Arora MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal MehtaCOORDINATORRonald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONVipul JainPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil DubeyRitesh RoyDevender Pandey MEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITEDK-35, Green Park MainNew Delhi 110016. IndiaPh: +91 11 26868775/26960926Fax: +91 11 2686741 FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda PRESIDENTXavier Collaco CHAIRMANJ S UberoiGLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESCharlton D’Silva, AustraliaStephane de Remusat, France/SpainSam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/ItalyLiat Heiblum, Israel/TurkeyMikio Tsuchiya, JapanClang Garcia, PhilippinesAlla Butova, RussiaDr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/MalaysiaYoung Seoh Chinn, South KoreaKaren Norris, Scandinavia/South AfricaDiane Obright, USA/BrazilMargie Brown, USA/CanadaDefence and Security of Indiais published and printedby Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia IndiaLimited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176,Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entirecontents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved.Reproduction and translation in any language in wholeor in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MediaTransasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.While the editors do their utmost to verify informationpublished they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost ordamaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of Indiais published once in twomonths and can be obtained by subscription.Subscription rate for 6 issues is Indian Rupees 750 and for12 issues is Rs 1500. International subscription rate is $40. For subscription enquiries, please contact:[email protected]


CONTRIBUTORS

French by birth, Claude Arpihas lived in India for the last34 years. He is the author of

several books on Tibet, Indiaand China and Indo-French

relations including Tibet the Lost Frontier

(Lancer Publishers). Aftergraduating as a dental

surgeon from BordeauxUniversity in 1974, he

decided to come to India. InDecember 1974, he joined

Auroville, the internationalcommunity founded by the

Mother, Sri Aurobindo’sspiritual collaborator.

CLAUDE ARPI

Working in both the visualand the print medium,

Ajai Shukla is ConsultingEditor (Strategic Affairs) for

Business Standard. He has been

Consulting Editor (StrategicAffairs) for NDTV, a reputed

news broadcaster in India,for which he anchored prime

time news and specialprogrammes. He is currently

working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

An nternational relationsexpert whose work has

appeared in USAF Air and Space Power

Journal and ORBIS. Manohar Thyagaraj is also

the founding editor ofEngagel NDUS, a journal on

US-India relations. He is currently a Director of

the US-India BusinessAlliance (USIBA), a trade

association with offices inWashington and New Delhi,

and consults with US andIndian defence companies.

Author of Crossed Swords:Pakistan, its Army, and the

Wars Within (OxfordUniversity Press 2008) and

the forthcoming FATA: AMost Dangerous Place(CSISJanuary 2009), Shuja Nawasis currently the first Director

of the South Asia Center of The Atlantic Council of

the United States inWashington DC.

A member of parliament,Arun Shourie has been

minister in the Union Cabinetin the NDA government.

He is a prominent journalistand an author. He has also

been an economist with theWorld Bank, a consultant to

the Planning Commission,India, and Editor of

The Indian Express.

AJAI SHUKLA

SHUJA NAWAZ

ARUNSHOURIE

MANOHARTHYAGARAJ

DSIAPRIL, 2009

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttuis the Executive Director of

the Centre for Policy

Alternatives (CPA) anindependent and non-partisan public policy

institute focusing on issuesof democratic governance

and peace throughprogrammes of

research and advocacy.


contributors 2nd time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 5/5/09 10:53 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009

6

FOR the Indian Navy these are timesof change. After decades as a nearlyinvisible part of India’s military,

the growth in the Indian Navy’s forcestructure, visibility and budget are being carefully observed by every other power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Asia-Pacific.

A significant indicator of the navy’sshift into the mainstream of Indian strate-gic planning — even more so than thegrowing number of capital warships — isthe growth in its command and adminis-trative infrastructure. The deep-waterKarwar naval base, located 34 nauticalmiles south of Goa, is nearing completion.Aimed at decongesting Mumbai, Karwarwill be home base for 42 ships includingthe aircraft carrier, Vikramaditya, when it iscommissioned. Karwar’s upgraded facili-ties include a Synchronised Ship Lift cumTransfer System that can lift more than10,000 displacement tons.

Nearing completion too is INS

Kadamba, an administrative support base,which was commissioned in 2005. Another important addition to the navy’scapabilities is the new Naval Academy atEzhimala, 280 kilometres north of Kochi,in Kerala. This year it is expected to reachits full capacity of 750 cadets a year.

The navy’s changing mindset is visiblealso in its approach to warships; it is nowconcentrating on fleet capabilities, ratherthan merely counting warship numbers.India’s growing skill in integrating disparate sensors and weapons on indige-nous warships gives them heavierpunches than many others in the sameweight class. For that reason, and becauseindigenous production costs just half toone-third the cost of procurement fromany country other than Russia, the IndianNavy is increasingly looking to its threedefence shipyards—Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL); Garden ReachShipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata(GRSE) and the smaller Goa ShipyardLimited (GSL)—to manufacture India’sentire requirement of surface combatants.

Currently only four surface warshipsare on order in foreign shipyards: Russia isbuilding the INS Vikramaditya, and threestealth frigates of the improved Krivakclass. India also looks to foreign suppliersfor auxiliary vessels like fleet tankers. And in submarine production, India is

Indian dockyards adopt global methods for shipbuilding

7

The view of the armament fromthe deck of INS Shivalik

MARITIME SECURITY

TURNINGPOINT

Ajai Shukla

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DSIAPRIL 2009

6

FOR the Indian Navy these are timesof change. After decades as a nearlyinvisible part of India’s military,

the growth in the Indian Navy’s forcestructure, visibility and budget are being carefully observed by every other power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Asia-Pacific.

A significant indicator of the navy’sshift into the mainstream of Indian strate-gic planning — even more so than thegrowing number of capital warships — isthe growth in its command and adminis-trative infrastructure. The deep-waterKarwar naval base, located 34 nauticalmiles south of Goa, is nearing completion.Aimed at decongesting Mumbai, Karwarwill be home base for 42 ships includingthe aircraft carrier, Vikramaditya, when it iscommissioned. Karwar’s upgraded facili-ties include a Synchronised Ship Lift cumTransfer System that can lift more than10,000 displacement tons.

Nearing completion too is INS

Kadamba, an administrative support base,which was commissioned in 2005. Another important addition to the navy’scapabilities is the new Naval Academy atEzhimala, 280 kilometres north of Kochi,in Kerala. This year it is expected to reachits full capacity of 750 cadets a year.

The navy’s changing mindset is visiblealso in its approach to warships; it is nowconcentrating on fleet capabilities, ratherthan merely counting warship numbers.India’s growing skill in integrating disparate sensors and weapons on indige-nous warships gives them heavierpunches than many others in the sameweight class. For that reason, and becauseindigenous production costs just half toone-third the cost of procurement fromany country other than Russia, the IndianNavy is increasingly looking to its threedefence shipyards—Mazagon Dock Limited, Mumbai (MDL); Garden ReachShipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata(GRSE) and the smaller Goa ShipyardLimited (GSL)—to manufacture India’sentire requirement of surface combatants.

Currently only four surface warshipsare on order in foreign shipyards: Russia isbuilding the INS Vikramaditya, and threestealth frigates of the improved Krivakclass. India also looks to foreign suppliersfor auxiliary vessels like fleet tankers. And in submarine production, India is

Indian dockyards adopt global methods for shipbuilding

7

The view of the armament fromthe deck of INS Shivalik

MARITIME SECURITY

TURNINGPOINT

Ajai Shukla


DSI APRIL 2009

learning to swim in the deep end:its first indigenously producedsubmarine will be the AdvancedTechnology Vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered attack submarine, currently under manufacture in Vishaka-patnam, the headquarters of India’s East-ern Navy Command.

Indigenous production THE WINDS of change are blowing moststrongly into the sails of India’s programme for designing and construct-ing surface warships. In March 2009, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC),the top acquisition body in India’s Ministryof Defence (MoD), gave the green light for Project 15-B — the construction of four destroyers of the improved Kolkataclass in MDL. These will be the last warships that MDL builds using conven-

tional methods. From mid-2011, allfrigates and destroyers will be designed and built using “modular shipbuilding” methods.

Conventional shipbuilding was relatively simple: first weld together asteel hull, put it in the water, and then fitthe engines, fitments, piping, electricalwiring, weaponry and electronics that make it a fighting platform. This wasa slow and difficult process, with shipyard workers often having to function in contorted positions in thedark, cramped confines of tiny compart-ments deep in the bowels of the vesselunder construction.

Modular shipbuilding is far more complex in design, but simpler to execute.Like a giant Lego game, the warship is builtin 300-ton blocks, each block completewith all the piping, electrical wiring

and fitments that form a part of the ship. Each of these blocks is constructed in a well-lit, spacious modular workshop.Since the blocks are open at both ends, and provide the workers with access at different levels, they can work comfortablyto fit the items that form a part of that block. Once the 300-ton blocks are ready, they are lifted out of the modularworkshop by a giant crane, carried to theslipway and joined together with its neigh-bouring blocks. A series of such blocks isthus assembled into a complete warship.

But modular construction entails an entirely different set of design challenges. Each bulkhead wall, each pipe, each cable, and each electronic component in a 300-ton block must precisely connect with its counterpart inthe neighbouring block. Each block is designed separately, but all of them must

8

The second andthird vessels ofProject 15-A



DSIAPRIL 2009

6800-ton destroyers in MDL, includinglong-term spares—is about Rs 12,000crores (US $2.4 billion). In contrast Spanishshipyard, Navantia, has charged the Australian navy almost US $6 billion forthree 3000-ton F100 frigates.

Whichever way the Indian MoD rules --- and South Block sources indicate that itis inclined to rule in favour of construct-ing at least six Project 17-A frigates in Indian yards — DCNS is well positionedto benefit. The DCNS-GRSE-Infotech JVwill have the advantage of being regis-tered as an Indian company. Furthermore,

DCNS has a comfort-able working relation-ship with both MDLand GRSE; besides theongoing Scorpene sub-marine programme inMDL, DCNS hasworked with both ship-

yards on several other projects. And fi-nally, the modular construction infra-structure coming up in MDL and GRSE isvery similar to that in DCNS’s shipyardsin France.

Admiral Malhi points out, “We alreadyhave a relationship with DCNS; we arebuilding the Scorpene together. They havethe same infrastructure as we have, whichmeans that the drawings they make can beeasily translated into warships in our yard.But we will keep our options open by asking (Italian shipyard) Fincantieri to bidas well.”

GRSE and MDL are coordinating strat-egy for winning this high-stakes game.They have joined forces, rather than competing for the order, arguing that thenavy would get their seven warshipsquickly if both shipyards worked on themconcurrently. If this were accepted, Project17-A would be the first naval project to besplit between two shipyards.

Admiral Mahli explains, “We have toensure that the navy gets all these sevenwarships by 2021. That means GRSE andMDL might both work concurrently onProject 17 A. You might have four built inMDL and three in GRSE. There is enoughwork for both shipyards.”

The two shipyards are walking the talk.In early 2009, Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister ofState for Defence Production, inauguratedGRSE’s modernisation programme. And avisit to MDL reveals hectic work inprogress on creating Rs 800 crores (US $160million) worth of infrastructure for modu-lar construction. MDL says these facilitieswill be completed by mid-2011, when

manufacture of the Project 17-A frigates isexpected to start.

Under construction at both MDL andGRSE are covered workshops largeenough for constructing 300-ton modulesinside; sliding roofs that allow for liftingout the completed modules; 300-ton Goliath cranes on rails that extend from themodular workshop, across two or threeconstruction slipways. These convey thecompleted modules to whichever frigatethey are meant for.

MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi, confirmsprogress is on schedule. “Italian company,Fagioli, in partnership with McNallyBharat Engineering (MBE), is building the300-ton Goliath crane. With a span of 138metres, it will be the longest in India,stretching across the two slipways andacross the modular workshop.”

Expanding capabilitiesEVEN as this infrastructure upgrade continues, GRSE and MDL are grapplingwith a spate of ongoing programmes. Besides six Scorpene submarines underconstruction, MDL is working on Project17 (three Shivalik class frigates) and Proj-ect 15-A (three Kolkata class destroyers);four Project 15-A destroyers will soon beadded onto MDL’s order book. MeanwhileGRSE is struggling to meet its deliveryschedule for Project 28 (four anti-subma-rine warfare, or ASW, stealth corvettes, anorder that could rise substantially). Simulta-neously, GRSE is working on ten Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and two Landing ShipsTank Large (LSTLs).

Both shipyards, located in thrivingcommercial cities, have no space for addi-tional construction slipways. Furthermore,this surge of naval orders comes at the endof a long process of downsizing shipyardworkforces. MDL, for example, has reduced its workforce from 16,000 in 1987 tojust 6000 today.

Outsourcing production bridges thisgap, between the amount of work on orderand the number of workers in the shipyard. For each warship series, targetsare laid down in terms of percentage ofwork that must be outsourced. For Project15-A, it was decided that 25% of the first ship (INS Kolkata) would be outsourced. This would be increased forsubsequent vessels: for the third vessel, thetarget was 50%.

As he takes us around the yard, the Superintendent of Project-15A, Commander HC Dhamija, points out thework that is being subcontracted. Over a

11

come together in perfect alignment.Because of these design complexities

the Indian warship-building community—- including the Ministry of Defence (MoD);the Directorate of Naval Design (DND);and the two largest defence shipyards,MDL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders andEngineers, Kolkata (GRSE) —- agree thatthe switch to modular shipbuilding will require the expertise of a foreign designpartner. Since Russian shipyards havenever done modular shipbuilding, and thebudding US-India defence relationshiphas still to generate a sufficient degree ofmutual confidence, only the Europeanshipyards are in the race to be India’s design partner for modular shipbuilding.

At pole position is French major DCNS,with a clever strategy that hinges on bidding as part of an Indian joint venture(JV). On 27th Feb 09, the DCNS boardpassed a resolution for DCNS to join athree-party design consultancy in partner-ship with GRSE and Indian IT engineeringcompany, Infotech Enterprises. The boardof Infotech Enterprises is expected to clearits participation by April, after which theJV will apply for registration in Kolkata.The JV will carry out marine engineeringtasks for clients anywhere, including backoffice work for DCNS, one of the world’sbiggest warship builders.

But the first design job that the JV iseyeing is Project 17-A, India’s biggest-

ever naval purchase, a Rs 17,000 crore (US$3.4 billion) plan for the modular construction of seven stealth frigates,which will be successors to the Project 17Shivalik Class that is nearing completionat MDL. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had earlier accorded sanc-tion for these seven frigates but the orderis pending because the Indian Navy andthe shipyards disagree on a crucial issue:the navy is insisting that the first twoProject 17-A frigates must be built abroad,with Indian dockyard workers observingand learning the process before under-taking manufacture in India. The Indianshipyards, however, say there is no needto build abroad. Confident after buildingthe Brahmaputra and Shivalik classfrigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project17-A vessels; all they need from a foreignpartner is help with the design.

Says Admiral HS Malhi, Chairman andManaging Director (CMD) of MDL, “Weneed to go abroad for the productiondrawings. But for actual modular construction, no technology is required tobe transferred”

But the Indian Navy is wary of chronicdelays in warship building in India; it believes that if MDL and GRSE try to master modular shipbuilding while actu-ally building the first Project 17-A frigates,the entire programme will be delayed unacceptably. The Director of Naval Design, Rear Admiral MK Badhwar,strongly argues that Indian shipyardworkers must learn the ropes of modularshipbuilding, while the selected foreigndesign partner builds the first two frigatesin his own shipyard.

This, points out the DND, “will alsomake the vendor demonstrate “buildabil-ity”. He must demonstrate that his designcan be actually built into a warship, usingmodular construction, in four years. Thatwill create a demonstrated benchmark forGRSE and MDL. Otherwise, if there aredelays later, our shipyards could argue thatthe foreign yard too would have taken along period to build each frigate.”

The final decision between these twoviewpoints will have a significant effect onthe cost of Project 17-A. Warship construc-tion in India has proved to be far cheaperthan building abroad, particularly in Euro-pean shipyards. The cost of Project 17—forbuilding three 4900-ton Shivalik Classstealth frigates in MDL—has come toabout Rs 7000 crores (US $1.4 billion). Thecost of Project 15-A—for building three

10

MARITIME SECURITY

The bridge (left)and the state-of-the-artCommandCentre on INSShivalik (below)

The Indian shipyards say there is no

need to build abroad.Confident after building

the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the

ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they

need from a foreign partner is help with the design

”


DSIAPRIL 2009

6800-ton destroyers in MDL, includinglong-term spares—is about Rs 12,000crores (US $2.4 billion). In contrast Spanishshipyard, Navantia, has charged the Australian navy almost US $6 billion forthree 3000-ton F100 frigates.

Whichever way the Indian MoD rules --- and South Block sources indicate that itis inclined to rule in favour of construct-ing at least six Project 17-A frigates in Indian yards — DCNS is well positionedto benefit. The DCNS-GRSE-Infotech JVwill have the advantage of being regis-tered as an Indian company. Furthermore,

DCNS has a comfort-able working relation-ship with both MDLand GRSE; besides theongoing Scorpene sub-marine programme inMDL, DCNS hasworked with both ship-

yards on several other projects. And fi-nally, the modular construction infra-structure coming up in MDL and GRSE isvery similar to that in DCNS’s shipyardsin France.

Admiral Malhi points out, “We alreadyhave a relationship with DCNS; we arebuilding the Scorpene together. They havethe same infrastructure as we have, whichmeans that the drawings they make can beeasily translated into warships in our yard.But we will keep our options open by asking (Italian shipyard) Fincantieri to bidas well.”

GRSE and MDL are coordinating strat-egy for winning this high-stakes game.They have joined forces, rather than competing for the order, arguing that thenavy would get their seven warshipsquickly if both shipyards worked on themconcurrently. If this were accepted, Project17-A would be the first naval project to besplit between two shipyards.

Admiral Mahli explains, “We have toensure that the navy gets all these sevenwarships by 2021. That means GRSE andMDL might both work concurrently onProject 17 A. You might have four built inMDL and three in GRSE. There is enoughwork for both shipyards.”

The two shipyards are walking the talk.In early 2009, Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister ofState for Defence Production, inauguratedGRSE’s modernisation programme. And avisit to MDL reveals hectic work inprogress on creating Rs 800 crores (US $160million) worth of infrastructure for modu-lar construction. MDL says these facilitieswill be completed by mid-2011, when

manufacture of the Project 17-A frigates isexpected to start.

Under construction at both MDL andGRSE are covered workshops largeenough for constructing 300-ton modulesinside; sliding roofs that allow for liftingout the completed modules; 300-ton Goliath cranes on rails that extend from themodular workshop, across two or threeconstruction slipways. These convey thecompleted modules to whichever frigatethey are meant for.

MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi, confirmsprogress is on schedule. “Italian company,Fagioli, in partnership with McNallyBharat Engineering (MBE), is building the300-ton Goliath crane. With a span of 138metres, it will be the longest in India,stretching across the two slipways andacross the modular workshop.”

Expanding capabilitiesEVEN as this infrastructure upgrade continues, GRSE and MDL are grapplingwith a spate of ongoing programmes. Besides six Scorpene submarines underconstruction, MDL is working on Project17 (three Shivalik class frigates) and Proj-ect 15-A (three Kolkata class destroyers);four Project 15-A destroyers will soon beadded onto MDL’s order book. MeanwhileGRSE is struggling to meet its deliveryschedule for Project 28 (four anti-subma-rine warfare, or ASW, stealth corvettes, anorder that could rise substantially). Simulta-neously, GRSE is working on ten Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and two Landing ShipsTank Large (LSTLs).

Both shipyards, located in thrivingcommercial cities, have no space for addi-tional construction slipways. Furthermore,this surge of naval orders comes at the endof a long process of downsizing shipyardworkforces. MDL, for example, has reduced its workforce from 16,000 in 1987 tojust 6000 today.

Outsourcing production bridges thisgap, between the amount of work on orderand the number of workers in the shipyard. For each warship series, targetsare laid down in terms of percentage ofwork that must be outsourced. For Project15-A, it was decided that 25% of the first ship (INS Kolkata) would be outsourced. This would be increased forsubsequent vessels: for the third vessel, thetarget was 50%.

As he takes us around the yard, the Superintendent of Project-15A, Commander HC Dhamija, points out thework that is being subcontracted. Over a

11

come together in perfect alignment.Because of these design complexities

the Indian warship-building community—- including the Ministry of Defence (MoD);the Directorate of Naval Design (DND);and the two largest defence shipyards,MDL and Garden Reach Shipbuilders andEngineers, Kolkata (GRSE) —- agree thatthe switch to modular shipbuilding will require the expertise of a foreign designpartner. Since Russian shipyards havenever done modular shipbuilding, and thebudding US-India defence relationshiphas still to generate a sufficient degree ofmutual confidence, only the Europeanshipyards are in the race to be India’s design partner for modular shipbuilding.

At pole position is French major DCNS,with a clever strategy that hinges on bidding as part of an Indian joint venture(JV). On 27th Feb 09, the DCNS boardpassed a resolution for DCNS to join athree-party design consultancy in partner-ship with GRSE and Indian IT engineeringcompany, Infotech Enterprises. The boardof Infotech Enterprises is expected to clearits participation by April, after which theJV will apply for registration in Kolkata.The JV will carry out marine engineeringtasks for clients anywhere, including backoffice work for DCNS, one of the world’sbiggest warship builders.

But the first design job that the JV iseyeing is Project 17-A, India’s biggest-

ever naval purchase, a Rs 17,000 crore (US$3.4 billion) plan for the modular construction of seven stealth frigates,which will be successors to the Project 17Shivalik Class that is nearing completionat MDL. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had earlier accorded sanc-tion for these seven frigates but the orderis pending because the Indian Navy andthe shipyards disagree on a crucial issue:the navy is insisting that the first twoProject 17-A frigates must be built abroad,with Indian dockyard workers observingand learning the process before under-taking manufacture in India. The Indianshipyards, however, say there is no needto build abroad. Confident after buildingthe Brahmaputra and Shivalik classfrigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the ability to build Project17-A vessels; all they need from a foreignpartner is help with the design.

Says Admiral HS Malhi, Chairman andManaging Director (CMD) of MDL, “Weneed to go abroad for the productiondrawings. But for actual modular construction, no technology is required tobe transferred”

But the Indian Navy is wary of chronicdelays in warship building in India; it believes that if MDL and GRSE try to master modular shipbuilding while actu-ally building the first Project 17-A frigates,the entire programme will be delayed unacceptably. The Director of Naval Design, Rear Admiral MK Badhwar,strongly argues that Indian shipyardworkers must learn the ropes of modularshipbuilding, while the selected foreigndesign partner builds the first two frigatesin his own shipyard.

This, points out the DND, “will alsomake the vendor demonstrate “buildabil-ity”. He must demonstrate that his designcan be actually built into a warship, usingmodular construction, in four years. Thatwill create a demonstrated benchmark forGRSE and MDL. Otherwise, if there aredelays later, our shipyards could argue thatthe foreign yard too would have taken along period to build each frigate.”

The final decision between these twoviewpoints will have a significant effect onthe cost of Project 17-A. Warship construc-tion in India has proved to be far cheaperthan building abroad, particularly in Euro-pean shipyards. The cost of Project 17—forbuilding three 4900-ton Shivalik Classstealth frigates in MDL—has come toabout Rs 7000 crores (US $1.4 billion). Thecost of Project 15-A—for building three

10

MARITIME SECURITY

The bridge (left)and the state-of-the-artCommandCentre on INSShivalik (below)

The Indian shipyards say there is no

need to build abroad.Confident after building

the Brahmaputra and Shivalik class frigates, MDL and GRSE claim they already have the

ability to build Project 17-A vessels; all they

need from a foreign partner is help with the design

”


DSI APRIL, 2009

hundred private contractors have devel-oped important sub-systems of the Kolkataclass destroyers. These include L&T (stabiliz-ers and steering gear); Kirloskar Pneumatics(air-conditioning and refrigeration systems); and Godrej (watertight doors andhatches). In addition, some 30-40 privatecontractors work inside MDL, installingequipment, preparing the warship and doing housekeeping tasks. These includecompanies like Excel Coatings, which hasbeen contracted work involving paintingand blasting.

Commander Dhamija says that this notonly increases the shipyard’s output, butallows the shipyard’s workers to focus oncore, high-end skills: “Many activities canbe outsourced because those skills areavailable out there in the market. So we areincreasing our capacity to produce warships by outsourcing many kinds of

work. This also allows us to focus on ourcore strengths like hull fabrication; welding; and propulsion and weaponssystems related equipment.”

Outsourcing, however, will only pick upreal momentum once private companiesare convinced that substantial profits lie indoing business with shipyards and in put-ting money into developing the expensive,

high-tech systems thatgo onto warships. Pri-vate contractors com-plain that the MoD orders warships inbatches of just three orfour vessels, afterwhich a new warship

series is introduced. Usually, this meansfresh expense for the contractors in devel-oping upgraded systems for the new series.

Private contractors, as well as defenceshipyards, suggest that a warship series beexpanded to at least 7-10 vessels, so that aviable Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ)is available to vendors. MDL’s CMD, Admiral Malhi holds up the example of theUS Navy’s DDG-51 destroyer project, under which 62 destroyers have alreadybeen churned out with standardised hullsand propulsion systems. He points out, “Ifyou have that kind of production line, thespeed of building and the cost of buildingcomes down dramatically.”

But change is in the air with Project 17-A.Admiral Malhi admits, “There has neverbeen an order like this, where you havehad seven ships of one class. It will giveeveryone downstream the chance to sortout their production plans… Once vendors know they are catering for a Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) ofseven ships, they will invest in R&D and in upgrading production facilities. They willhave the confidence of having orders forseveral years.”

This is why Project 17-A, and the waythe MoD decides to distribute the order—between foreign and Indian yards on theone hand, and between MDL and GRSEon the other—could be crucial in chartingthe future of warship building in India. Expect a decision soon.

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and theprint medium. He is Consulting Editor(Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard. Hehas been Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs)for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he anchored prime time newsand special programmes. He is currently work-ing on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

12

A significant indicator of the navy’s shift into

the mainstream of Indianstrategic planning —evenmore so than the growing

number of capitalwarships —is the

growth in its command and administrative

infrastructure

”

INS Kolkata under construction(top left); Asubmarine under refit atMazagon Dock



DSIAPRIL 2009

14

INDO-US TIES

BETWEEN 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with Indiaclearly moved to a new plateau,

motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia andthe aftermath of 9/11.

The path to developing defence and security-related dialogue since 2001–aprocess which pre-dated the nuclear deal- forked along two distinct, but related arcs.

The first arc deals primarily with military-to-military contacts like RedFlag, Malabar, Cope India exercise seriesand Special Forces training (India has had a large International Military Exchange and Training–IMET– programme for years) as well as

high-level exchange visitssuch as those between Indian Navy Chief AdmiralSureesh Mehta and USChief of Naval Operations(CNO) Admiral Gary Roug-head that aimed to deepenpersonal relationships between top serving officers in both countries.

This level of inter-force exchange is nec-essary from both countries’ perspectives tocreate personal linkages and comfort levels that are important for the perpetua-tion of a security relationship. Decades ofcollaboration have created such a measureof comfort between US and Pakistaniforces at an operational level.

Cope India, Red Flag and Malabar arewell known bilateral military exercises

between the US and Indiain this decade. Less knownis that the Indian Navy hassent pilots to a US Navytraining course in Pen-sacola, Florida. These pilotswill be flying the MiG-29Ks

that the Indian Navy will deploy when it finally gets its hands on the ex-Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov.Where military-to-military contacts are concerned, the two countries could nottoday be on firmer footing.

The second arc deals with the processof defence technology procurement by India from the United States to fit its military modernisation plans.

The progress here has been steady,without being spectacular, starting

15

SEPARATION PLAN

Dichotomy of the US-Indiasecurity relationship: Can astrategic partnership growwithout an avalanche of defencesystems sales?

Manohar Thyagaraj

Indian Navy Chief AdmiralSureesh Mehta (far left), USChief of Naval OperationsAdmiral Gary Roughead(above) and Indo-US ships in a joint exercise

Indo-US Change 2nd time.qxd:KARGIL.qxd 5/5/09 11:08 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009

14

INDO-US TIES

BETWEEN 2001 and 2008, the US security relationship with Indiaclearly moved to a new plateau,

motivated by the Bush Administration in Washington, and underpinned by the dual exigencies of US strategic planning for the next century in Asia andthe aftermath of 9/11.

The path to developing defence and security-related dialogue since 2001–aprocess which pre-dated the nuclear deal- forked along two distinct, but related arcs.

The first arc deals primarily with military-to-military contacts like RedFlag, Malabar, Cope India exercise seriesand Special Forces training (India has had a large International Military Exchange and Training–IMET– programme for years) as well as

high-level exchange visitssuch as those between Indian Navy Chief AdmiralSureesh Mehta and USChief of Naval Operations(CNO) Admiral Gary Roug-head that aimed to deepenpersonal relationships between top serving officers in both countries.

This level of inter-force exchange is nec-essary from both countries’ perspectives tocreate personal linkages and comfort levels that are important for the perpetua-tion of a security relationship. Decades ofcollaboration have created such a measureof comfort between US and Pakistaniforces at an operational level.

Cope India, Red Flag and Malabar arewell known bilateral military exercises

between the US and Indiain this decade. Less knownis that the Indian Navy hassent pilots to a US Navytraining course in Pen-sacola, Florida. These pilotswill be flying the MiG-29Ks

that the Indian Navy will deploy when it finally gets its hands on the ex-Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov.Where military-to-military contacts are concerned, the two countries could nottoday be on firmer footing.

The second arc deals with the processof defence technology procurement by India from the United States to fit its military modernisation plans.

The progress here has been steady,without being spectacular, starting

15

SEPARATION PLAN

Dichotomy of the US-Indiasecurity relationship: Can astrategic partnership growwithout an avalanche of defencesystems sales?

Manohar Thyagaraj

Indian Navy Chief AdmiralSureesh Mehta (far left), USChief of Naval OperationsAdmiral Gary Roughead(above) and Indo-US ships in a joint exercise


DSIAPRIL, 2009

16 17

with the IndianArmy’s purchase of AN/TPQ-37 Fire-finder radars in 2001.In 2007, the IndianNavy took possessionof the USS Trenton, a Landing PlatformDock, which was re-named the INSJalashva.

In early 2008, the Indian Air Forcesigned a contract for C-130Js for SpecialOperations use. On 1st January 2009, the Indian Navy signed on the dotted linefor the purchase of 8 P-8Is for maritime patrol purposes.

Yet - and this is a big yet - over the lastfew months of 2008, US industry decidedto no-bid on several programme in India,including an Indian Army contract for 197 light helicopters, an Indian Army programme to procure 22 attack helicop-ters, and the Indian Army’s Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile programme.

The reasons for each of these withdrawals or decisions not to competewere varied: from evaluation by companies of the financial implicationsof India’s offset policy to procedural delays on both sides.

US industry, unlike the relationship between some of their global competitorsand their respective governments, cannotcount on the US government for financialsupport in the process of internationalbusiness development. As publicly listedcompanies, they ultimately answer to thestock market.

For each company’s financial handlers,the annualised number of collective US‘successes’, when compared to the totalnumber of projects in which US companiesare involved or express interest in, is stillconsidered small.

It is almost certain, transfers of equip-ment out of US military stock, such as the AN/TPQ-37s and the USS Trenton,would have limited commercial impact forUS companies.

Further, the margin that companiesmake on defence projects in the US itself isfairly small (sources suggest 10-12% is common). International business develop-ment in any country, not just India, withthe attendant market-entry obligations,will further affect the likely profit that UScompanies forecast.

In short, an increasing view among theUS industry and US government is that themarket opportunities in India for US

technology to support the US-India strate-gic and defence relationship may be outweighed by market risks.

The question that industry observersand strategic analysts must ask is: can theUS-India strategic partnership be separated from the pipeline of defencetechnology transfer between the US andIndia? Could the two arcs continue to function as separate?

Difficulties in US-India defenceprocurement dialogueAS MAY be expected, the perspectivesfrom both sides are different.

In part, the problems identified by USindustry and policymakers stem from theprocurement process in India itself, andfrom the requirements spawned by thenew offset policy. When Bell Helicopterwithdrew from the Light Helicopter programme, they cited the 50% offset

requirement as a chief reason, believingthat they would not be able to satisfy itgiven the policy’s strictures and their perception of the capacity of the Indianaerospace industry.

In addition, several sources suggest thatIndia has proven unwilling to sign Techni-cal Assistance Agreements, which wouldlimit how much pre-RFP informationcould be provided to India and also potentially limit the execution of offsetprojects. TAAs essentially function as Non-Disclosure Agreements that must beapproved by the State Department.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that India has been reluctant to approve the useof FMS (Foreign Military Sales) cases, a key factor in one of the US industry withdrawals. In theory, there is no bar to an FMS case being used in a competitive, tendered programme. Manysensitive US military technologies can

only be sold to foreign governments underthe FMS programme.

Indian decision-makers and industryfrequently still cite US delays in process-ing license applications. Further, US industry themselves cite occasionallylukewarm support from certain US government agencies in processing casesrelated to India.

US technology transfer policy(grounded in law written by the US Congress) requires the Administration tohave certain inter-governmental agree-ments signed between the US and recipi-ent countries of US defence technology.

The most important of these are an End-Use Monitoring (EUM) agreement anda Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CIS-MOA) to ensure the security of US defence-related equipment transferred overseas.

India, so far, has not agreed to an

umbrella EUM agreement with the US, despite signing case-by-case EUM texts forpast contracts. The reasons for prolongingof assent on EUM text are many – politicaland procedural – but they are under-pinned by an apprehension in India aboutallowing the US unfettered and at-will access for ‘inspection’.

US interlocutors frequently assert thisis an unfounded apprehension as they are not insisting on unannounced inspec-tions, but do need to satisfy reporting requirements as mandated by law. US law requires verification to this end, not inspections, which is a key differencein perception.

Although objections have been raisedto EUM on grounds that it infringes on Indian national sovereignty, there is precedent for the US and India reachingsuch an agreement. The US and India exchanged diplomatic notes between Under Secretary of State James Webb andAmbassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit on the7th and 16th March 1951. In the note fromAmbassador Pandit, concerning the termsand conditions that would be attached tosale of US defence items to India, includ-ing EUM, the government of India wasclearly “in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed.”

Well into 2009, it is thus a common view

in US government and defence industrycircles that unless some progress is madeon EUM and CISMOA, US industry wouldnot be able to deliver sensitive technolo-gies which fall under the purview of EUM.This includes technologies in which the Indian armed forces have expressed greatinterest, and which the US is fully willing torelease, provided an EUM agreement is in place.

Separation of a strategic partner-ship from defence sales to IndiaIN 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singhalluded to the notion that India shouldseek to leverage its significant externalarms purchases for strategic advantage.

Certainly, the national treasure thatany major importer of defence systemsspends on the global market is a driver forexacting or cementing strategic gains. Theglobal defence market is a driver for security dependencies: buyer states needto maximize their security; seller statesneed the additional economic security fortheir defence-industrial complexes, in order to provide for their own security.

To normalise this argument, the US as acountry is not a defence exporter in themould of states such as Israel or France, inthat exports are not essential to sustain itsdomestic defence industry. The US domestic market is large enough that USindustry could continue to provide adequately for US security without an avalanche of exports.

In states where defence-industrialcomplexes have limited domestic markets, companies need exports to survive, in order to be able to consistentlyprovide for the home state’s own security.

The ‘security’ that defence exporterstates seek, excluding the US, thus hasboth physical and economic dimensions.On the other hand, defence exports forthe US are primarily driven by calcula-tions that focus on expanding its ownphysical security.

One hastens to add that the global eco-nomic meltdown has altered this dynamicto some degree for the US, but the argu-ment still holds as a general pattern, and isreflected in the exhaustive export controlprocess. Industry and government in theUS do not necessarily have their play-books synchronised on the subject.

It is important to note a general trendhere: the US is used to providing defenceequipment to allies and countries that arewholly dependent on the US for their

INDO-US TIES

In short, an increasingview among the US

industry and USgovernment is that the

market opportunities inIndia for US technology to support the US-India

strategic and defencerelationship may

be outweighed by market risks

”

Two F-15 Eagles from ElmendorfAir Force Base,Alaska, fly with

two Indian airforce SU-30K

Flankers and twoMirage 2000

aircraft during Cope India’ 04


DSIAPRIL, 2009

16 17

with the IndianArmy’s purchase of AN/TPQ-37 Fire-finder radars in 2001.In 2007, the IndianNavy took possessionof the USS Trenton, a Landing PlatformDock, which was re-named the INSJalashva.

In early 2008, the Indian Air Forcesigned a contract for C-130Js for SpecialOperations use. On 1st January 2009, the Indian Navy signed on the dotted linefor the purchase of 8 P-8Is for maritime patrol purposes.

Yet - and this is a big yet - over the lastfew months of 2008, US industry decidedto no-bid on several programme in India,including an Indian Army contract for 197 light helicopters, an Indian Army programme to procure 22 attack helicop-ters, and the Indian Army’s Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile programme.

The reasons for each of these withdrawals or decisions not to competewere varied: from evaluation by companies of the financial implicationsof India’s offset policy to procedural delays on both sides.

US industry, unlike the relationship between some of their global competitorsand their respective governments, cannotcount on the US government for financialsupport in the process of internationalbusiness development. As publicly listedcompanies, they ultimately answer to thestock market.

For each company’s financial handlers,the annualised number of collective US‘successes’, when compared to the totalnumber of projects in which US companiesare involved or express interest in, is stillconsidered small.

It is almost certain, transfers of equip-ment out of US military stock, such as the AN/TPQ-37s and the USS Trenton,would have limited commercial impact forUS companies.

Further, the margin that companiesmake on defence projects in the US itself isfairly small (sources suggest 10-12% is common). International business develop-ment in any country, not just India, withthe attendant market-entry obligations,will further affect the likely profit that UScompanies forecast.

In short, an increasing view among theUS industry and US government is that themarket opportunities in India for US

technology to support the US-India strate-gic and defence relationship may be outweighed by market risks.

The question that industry observersand strategic analysts must ask is: can theUS-India strategic partnership be separated from the pipeline of defencetechnology transfer between the US andIndia? Could the two arcs continue to function as separate?

Difficulties in US-India defenceprocurement dialogueAS MAY be expected, the perspectivesfrom both sides are different.

In part, the problems identified by USindustry and policymakers stem from theprocurement process in India itself, andfrom the requirements spawned by thenew offset policy. When Bell Helicopterwithdrew from the Light Helicopter programme, they cited the 50% offset

requirement as a chief reason, believingthat they would not be able to satisfy itgiven the policy’s strictures and their perception of the capacity of the Indianaerospace industry.

In addition, several sources suggest thatIndia has proven unwilling to sign Techni-cal Assistance Agreements, which wouldlimit how much pre-RFP informationcould be provided to India and also potentially limit the execution of offsetprojects. TAAs essentially function as Non-Disclosure Agreements that must beapproved by the State Department.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that India has been reluctant to approve the useof FMS (Foreign Military Sales) cases, a key factor in one of the US industry withdrawals. In theory, there is no bar to an FMS case being used in a competitive, tendered programme. Manysensitive US military technologies can

only be sold to foreign governments underthe FMS programme.

Indian decision-makers and industryfrequently still cite US delays in process-ing license applications. Further, US industry themselves cite occasionallylukewarm support from certain US government agencies in processing casesrelated to India.

US technology transfer policy(grounded in law written by the US Congress) requires the Administration tohave certain inter-governmental agree-ments signed between the US and recipi-ent countries of US defence technology.

The most important of these are an End-Use Monitoring (EUM) agreement anda Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CIS-MOA) to ensure the security of US defence-related equipment transferred overseas.

India, so far, has not agreed to an

umbrella EUM agreement with the US, despite signing case-by-case EUM texts forpast contracts. The reasons for prolongingof assent on EUM text are many – politicaland procedural – but they are under-pinned by an apprehension in India aboutallowing the US unfettered and at-will access for ‘inspection’.

US interlocutors frequently assert thisis an unfounded apprehension as they are not insisting on unannounced inspec-tions, but do need to satisfy reporting requirements as mandated by law. US law requires verification to this end, not inspections, which is a key differencein perception.

Although objections have been raisedto EUM on grounds that it infringes on Indian national sovereignty, there is precedent for the US and India reachingsuch an agreement. The US and India exchanged diplomatic notes between Under Secretary of State James Webb andAmbassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit on the7th and 16th March 1951. In the note fromAmbassador Pandit, concerning the termsand conditions that would be attached tosale of US defence items to India, includ-ing EUM, the government of India wasclearly “in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed.”

Well into 2009, it is thus a common view

in US government and defence industrycircles that unless some progress is madeon EUM and CISMOA, US industry wouldnot be able to deliver sensitive technolo-gies which fall under the purview of EUM.This includes technologies in which the Indian armed forces have expressed greatinterest, and which the US is fully willing torelease, provided an EUM agreement is in place.

Separation of a strategic partner-ship from defence sales to IndiaIN 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singhalluded to the notion that India shouldseek to leverage its significant externalarms purchases for strategic advantage.

Certainly, the national treasure thatany major importer of defence systemsspends on the global market is a driver forexacting or cementing strategic gains. Theglobal defence market is a driver for security dependencies: buyer states needto maximize their security; seller statesneed the additional economic security fortheir defence-industrial complexes, in order to provide for their own security.

To normalise this argument, the US as acountry is not a defence exporter in themould of states such as Israel or France, inthat exports are not essential to sustain itsdomestic defence industry. The US domestic market is large enough that USindustry could continue to provide adequately for US security without an avalanche of exports.

In states where defence-industrialcomplexes have limited domestic markets, companies need exports to survive, in order to be able to consistentlyprovide for the home state’s own security.

The ‘security’ that defence exporterstates seek, excluding the US, thus hasboth physical and economic dimensions.On the other hand, defence exports forthe US are primarily driven by calcula-tions that focus on expanding its ownphysical security.

One hastens to add that the global eco-nomic meltdown has altered this dynamicto some degree for the US, but the argu-ment still holds as a general pattern, and isreflected in the exhaustive export controlprocess. Industry and government in theUS do not necessarily have their play-books synchronised on the subject.

It is important to note a general trendhere: the US is used to providing defenceequipment to allies and countries that arewholly dependent on the US for their

INDO-US TIES

In short, an increasingview among the US

industry and USgovernment is that the

market opportunities inIndia for US technology to support the US-India

strategic and defencerelationship may

be outweighed by market risks

”

Two F-15 Eagles from ElmendorfAir Force Base,Alaska, fly with

two Indian airforce SU-30K

Flankers and twoMirage 2000

aircraft during Cope India’ 04


the term ‘strategic partnership’ denotes apathway to strategic autonomy more thanoperational congruence. While for the US,the term is used more regularly to denote apathway to operational congruence withstrategic partners.

This divergence in basic assumptiongoes still deeper. For India, the term ‘strate-gic partnership’ lacks uniform definitionand is fungible based on the partner inquestion. This allows India flexibility in creating a multitude of such partnerships.

As evidenced by its moves toward thenuclear deal, the 2005 ‘New Frameworkfor the US-India Defence Relationship’,and subsequent actions, India clearly believes that engaging the US is a contrib-utor to its goal of strategic autonomy.

If policymakers in both countries believe that ad hoc congruence of state interests can drive operational congru-ence, then any divergence in perceptionof this strategic partnership can be managed by making sure the Indian andUS militaries have the option to operatetogether as situations require.

However, this line of thinking suggestsa ‘strategic partnership’ in a new para-digm from those the US and India havebeen accustomed to working with. The

19

security, including democracies and statesthat could be deemed authoritarian.

India is an outlier in this framework, as acountry that is a democracy, but will neverdepend totally on the US for its physical security needs. Security ‘dependency’ isthus seen differently by India as comparedto the US’ other strategic partners.

India will seek to maximize its strate-gic ‘autonomy’, meaning a broad-basingof defence imports as much as possible.

It is an article of faith in India’s foreignpolicy to maintain relationships with allmajor powers for the purposes of flexibil-ity. History and current trends show thisextends to defence procurement as well.

For India, this pattern could imply thatthe leveraging of arms purchases forstrategic advantage equates to the devel-opment of new relationships rather thanthe simple extension of existing ones.

The obvious ‘new’ strategic relation-ship is with the US. But, one must keep inmind that a traditional perception of anystrategic relationship of this kind in Indiawould emphasize defence-economiclevers, when these levers are not as important to the US as they are to India.

Thus, to decipher whether the US-India strategic partnership can be sepa-

rated from a defence relationship, several factorshave to be kept in mind:

First: is US power waning? On the globalstage, the US is no longerthe pre-eminent power inall the domains that an international political economist would identify ascharacterizing a hegemonic power. For instance, the US no longer controls thelion’s share of global productivity.

However, the argument could be madethat the US will remain the world’s pre-eminent military power well into the21st century, as no other state will be in aposition or inclined to challenge it. Annual US defence spending exceeds thatof all other nations combined.

The emphasis on EUM must thus beseen in this light as well. It’s likely that theUS will take extra steps to safeguard its intellectual property (and minimize thechance of leakage to potential adversaries)while the major powers jockey for alignment in the latter part of the century.

And, even while the US economy ischallenged by the global economicdownturn, defence spending is likely toremain high while the US has ongoing

global commitments.What could suffer arelarge-ticket future pro-curements such as FutureCombat Systems and theF-22. Despite this, the USdefence industry is un-

likely to see, or be allowed to see by theUS government, exports as an existentialneed to the degree that other defence-industrial complexes do.

Second: in the context of major powerre-alignment, what does this strategicpartnership mean from the perspective ofeither country?

An important point needs to be made:it is impossible to separate security (andthe tools of security co-operation) fromthe definition of a strategic partnershipbetween any two countries.

Both countries inescapably haveshared security interests such as: regionalstability; securing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for flow of goods, especiallyenergy; countering threats from radical Islamist non-state actors; interdiction ofWMD-related shipments and perhapsmost pertinently the prevention of a singlepower from dominating Asia.

It is reasonable to assert that for India,

18

INDO-US TIES DSIAPRIL 2009

Su-30MKI conducts post-flight maintenance forRed Flag 2008 (above); TheUSS Trenton becomes INSJalashva as the Indian flag israised on the ship (right)

An argument could bemade that the US will

remain the world’s pre-eminent military

power well into the 21stcentury, as no other state

will be in a position orinclined to challenge it.

Annual US defencespending exceeds

that of all other nations combined

”


the term ‘strategic partnership’ denotes apathway to strategic autonomy more thanoperational congruence. While for the US,the term is used more regularly to denote apathway to operational congruence withstrategic partners.

This divergence in basic assumptiongoes still deeper. For India, the term ‘strate-gic partnership’ lacks uniform definitionand is fungible based on the partner inquestion. This allows India flexibility in creating a multitude of such partnerships.

As evidenced by its moves toward thenuclear deal, the 2005 ‘New Frameworkfor the US-India Defence Relationship’,and subsequent actions, India clearly believes that engaging the US is a contrib-utor to its goal of strategic autonomy.

If policymakers in both countries believe that ad hoc congruence of state interests can drive operational congru-ence, then any divergence in perceptionof this strategic partnership can be managed by making sure the Indian andUS militaries have the option to operatetogether as situations require.

However, this line of thinking suggestsa ‘strategic partnership’ in a new para-digm from those the US and India havebeen accustomed to working with. The

19

security, including democracies and statesthat could be deemed authoritarian.

India is an outlier in this framework, as acountry that is a democracy, but will neverdepend totally on the US for its physical security needs. Security ‘dependency’ isthus seen differently by India as comparedto the US’ other strategic partners.

India will seek to maximize its strate-gic ‘autonomy’, meaning a broad-basingof defence imports as much as possible.

It is an article of faith in India’s foreignpolicy to maintain relationships with allmajor powers for the purposes of flexibil-ity. History and current trends show thisextends to defence procurement as well.

For India, this pattern could imply thatthe leveraging of arms purchases forstrategic advantage equates to the devel-opment of new relationships rather thanthe simple extension of existing ones.

The obvious ‘new’ strategic relation-ship is with the US. But, one must keep inmind that a traditional perception of anystrategic relationship of this kind in Indiawould emphasize defence-economiclevers, when these levers are not as important to the US as they are to India.

Thus, to decipher whether the US-India strategic partnership can be sepa-

rated from a defence relationship, several factorshave to be kept in mind:

First: is US power waning? On the globalstage, the US is no longerthe pre-eminent power inall the domains that an international political economist would identify ascharacterizing a hegemonic power. For instance, the US no longer controls thelion’s share of global productivity.

However, the argument could be madethat the US will remain the world’s pre-eminent military power well into the21st century, as no other state will be in aposition or inclined to challenge it. Annual US defence spending exceeds thatof all other nations combined.

The emphasis on EUM must thus beseen in this light as well. It’s likely that theUS will take extra steps to safeguard its intellectual property (and minimize thechance of leakage to potential adversaries)while the major powers jockey for alignment in the latter part of the century.

And, even while the US economy ischallenged by the global economicdownturn, defence spending is likely toremain high while the US has ongoing

global commitments.What could suffer arelarge-ticket future pro-curements such as FutureCombat Systems and theF-22. Despite this, the USdefence industry is un-

likely to see, or be allowed to see by theUS government, exports as an existentialneed to the degree that other defence-industrial complexes do.

Second: in the context of major powerre-alignment, what does this strategicpartnership mean from the perspective ofeither country?

An important point needs to be made:it is impossible to separate security (andthe tools of security co-operation) fromthe definition of a strategic partnershipbetween any two countries.

Both countries inescapably haveshared security interests such as: regionalstability; securing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for flow of goods, especiallyenergy; countering threats from radical Islamist non-state actors; interdiction ofWMD-related shipments and perhapsmost pertinently the prevention of a singlepower from dominating Asia.

It is reasonable to assert that for India,

18

INDO-US TIES DSIAPRIL 2009

Su-30MKI conducts post-flight maintenance forRed Flag 2008 (above); TheUSS Trenton becomes INSJalashva as the Indian flag israised on the ship (right)

An argument could bemade that the US will

remain the world’s pre-eminent military

power well into the 21stcentury, as no other state

will be in a position orinclined to challenge it.

Annual US defencespending exceeds

that of all other nations combined

”


DSI APRIL 2009

result would be a learning curve for policymakers in both countries so that expectations can be managed.

Third: from a US perspective, for Indiato become as relevant as possible in a secu-rity sense, the best capability multipliers,and certainly the tools of globally relevantinteroperability, will come from the US.Interoperability, or at least the ability tochoose it when required, would be essen-tial for India as many global militariesadopt US-led net-centric standards.

Interoperability, and the quest for itwith states that have congruent interests, isone of the tools for the US to manage themaintenance of its strategic interests when

its own relational power is changing.Fourth: Can procurements from the US

include co-developments of technologiesin strategic areas such as missile defence?India is already exploring such co-devel-opments with Israel and Russia and hasprevious experience with co-developingthe Shakti engine with France (India owns15%) and the Brahmos missile with Russia.

In the case of co-developments withthese countries, the value-addition fromIndian industry varies, but the core technologies are still sourced from thepartner. This was certainly true in the caseof the Shakti engine and is true in the caseof the Brahmos. In fact, industry expertssuggest that the Russians still do not partwith some of the core propulsion technol-ogy. The PAK-FA 5th-generation fighterdesign was also frozen by the Russians.

Since US industry would be providingcore technologies for co-development,US-India co-developments would still depend on settlement of current inter-

governmental issues, to some extent.Fifth: the Indian offset policy aims to

empower India’s previously languid de-fence industry and turn it into an exporter.

Empirical evidence suggests that USindustry does a far better job of energiz-ing local industry participation using off-sets in any country they have been engaged in. In the case of the T-50 jettrainer development with South Korea,offsets were used as a key tool. Suppliers toUS industry have been developed in sev-eral countries such as Israel using offsets.

Targeted US imports could thus be agateway to India being able to become aslarge an exporter as the government of In-

dia envisioned, since the market for the re-sulting exports from India would be larger.

But, if India chooses to broad-base itsprocurements, the impact of this variablein defence economics will be mitigated. Atthe same time, this broad-basing will likelyincrease US concerns about EUM.

In summary, whether India views thedevelopment of the US-India strategicpartnership on security through the prismof defence economics more than physicalsecurity or vice versa, the ‘funnel’ or path toconsistent de jure congruence on physicalsecurity is not yet defined.

This is a ‘new’ strategic partnership,not just in name, but in form. The top-level driver for strategic congruenceis obvious - the simple fact that both coun-tries are large, multi-ethnic democracieswith shared security interests.

In other ways, the lower-level driversfor this strategic congruence are not yetclear, and could be characterized as out-of-sync in both capitals. The immediatefuture of this partnership depends onhow quickly policymakers in either coun-try can come to terms with its evolvingdefinitions.

In the meantime, to answer the titlequestion - since the contours of this‘strategic partnership’ remain undefined,it is difficult to estimate whether it couldexist outside of a rational defence technol-ogy relationship.

As the cascade of military-to-militarycontacts has shown, this strategic partner-ship has already expressed itself. But, if oper-ational congruence isneeded at some point,it would undoubtedly be more the robust ifIndia were to adopt and adapt some coreUS technologies toward its military mod-ernization. Military-to-military contacts andexercises can only take a strategic partner-ship in security up to a point.

In bilateral actions on security,whether or not the two countries engagein ‘trivial tasks’ to keep the ‘silence at bay’,like the title characters in ‘Waiting forGodot’, will stem directly from the deep-ening of the defence sourcing relationshipto mutual benefit.

Manohar Thyagaraj is an international relations expert whose work has appeared inUSAF Air and Space Power Journal and ORBIS, and is the founding editor of EngagelNDUS, a journal on US-India relations. He iscurrently a director of the US-India BusinessAlliance (USIBA), a trade association with of-fices in Washington and New Delhi, and con-sults with US and Indian defence companies.

Can procurements fromthe US include

co-developments oftechnologies in strategic

areas such as missiledefence? India is already

exploring such co-developments with

Israel and Russia

”20

KC-130 JHercules aircraft


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DSIAPRIL 2009

THE Tibetan Government in Exile hasjust completed fifty years in India, itsbeen fifty years since its greatest

leader, the Dalai Lama, lost his home andstate and sought asylum in India. In thesefifty years, India’s policy towards Tibet hasbeen through many avatars, but everyoneseems to agree on five facts:� Tibet’s cause is just;� Tibetans have given no cause for offence� China has already reduced Tibetans to aminority, even in Lhasa. It is systematicallyobliterating the Tibetan culture and theidentity of the Tibetan people;� It has not succeeded as yet, but nor has itloosened its grip;� People across the world feel intenselyabout this injustice and oppression, butgovernments are silent.

India’s policy towards Tibet has to be assessed on the touchstone: how does it address the danger that these facts pose for India? The policy has moved from:� Viewing the Government of Tibet as the Government of an independent country; to� Viewing Tibet as an autonomous country

or region under the overall “suzerainty” ofChina; to � Viewing Tibet as an autonomous regionunder the “sovereignty” of China; to � Viewing Tibet as a region that is an integral part of China and one in whichChina can do as it pleases – what happens to Tibet and Tibetans being an internal affair of China;� To not merely viewing Tibet as such, but toaccepting the Chinese definition of Tibet– asis well known, China has hacked off halfthe area of Tibet that encompasses half thepopulation of Tibetans and submerged it inHan provinces.

From the time of Pandit Nehru, India’spolicy has been to shut its eyes to what ishappening in Tibet, to what the Chineseare doing in Tibet. In particular, to whatthey are doing to the culture and people ofTibet; and to the military buildup there.This was evident in the way in which, under Pandit Nehru’s firm hand, the Indian Government shut its eyes to theroads and other infrastructure which werebeing built in Tibet.

Indeed, the “policy” was carried further.The view was taken, and enforced, that weshould not only not ourselves raise, but weshould oppose efforts by others to raisetheir voice in fora like the United Nationson what was being done to Tibetans. This,Panditji laid down, is what would be in thebest interests of the Tibetans themselves!

Along with this shutting of eyes to Chinese buildup has gone a shutting of eyes

to the fact that India’s security is inextrica-bly intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to thesurvival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion. One reason for this, ofcourse, is that it is the representative of theGovernment of Tibet who signed the SimlaAgreement in 1914 with the British Govern-ment of India and not the representative ofthe Government of China – though, it mustbe remembered, that the objection of theChinese representative was not to the border between Tibet and India but to theborder between Tibet and China. The second reason is that unless there is an areaof peace between China and India, an areain which there is no great Chinese militarypresence, our northern borders are directlyexposed. The ecology of India is just asclosely interlinked with what happensacross the Tibetan plateau. The deforesta-tion of eastern Tibet that has already takenplace; mining and other activities thatChina is pursuing with vigour across Tibet;the diversion of Tibetan waters to the northby China engineering works for which have already begun – all these are bound to affectthe entire plain of north and east India, as, indeed, they are bound to affect thecountries all along the Mekong river delta.

In the case of China and Tibet, as theyears have gone by, we have shut our eyestighter and tighter. In the last few years, inparticular up to 2007, the Chinese attitudetowards Tibet has hardened; the buildupof infrastructure in Tibet – an infrastructure

22 23

COVER STORY

ROOF OF THE

WORLDARUN

SHOURIE

The Tibetan Government in exile has completed fifty yearsin India, but what has India done for Tibet?

Tibetan womenshouting anti-Chineseslogans in front of theUnited Nationsregional headquartersin New Delhi

Arun Shourie-2nd time.qxd:AEROINDIA.qxd 5/5/09 11:15 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009

THE Tibetan Government in Exile hasjust completed fifty years in India, itsbeen fifty years since its greatest

leader, the Dalai Lama, lost his home andstate and sought asylum in India. In thesefifty years, India’s policy towards Tibet hasbeen through many avatars, but everyoneseems to agree on five facts:� Tibet’s cause is just;� Tibetans have given no cause for offence� China has already reduced Tibetans to aminority, even in Lhasa. It is systematicallyobliterating the Tibetan culture and theidentity of the Tibetan people;� It has not succeeded as yet, but nor has itloosened its grip;� People across the world feel intenselyabout this injustice and oppression, butgovernments are silent.

India’s policy towards Tibet has to be assessed on the touchstone: how does it address the danger that these facts pose for India? The policy has moved from:� Viewing the Government of Tibet as the Government of an independent country; to� Viewing Tibet as an autonomous country

or region under the overall “suzerainty” ofChina; to � Viewing Tibet as an autonomous regionunder the “sovereignty” of China; to � Viewing Tibet as a region that is an integral part of China and one in whichChina can do as it pleases – what happens to Tibet and Tibetans being an internal affair of China;� To not merely viewing Tibet as such, but toaccepting the Chinese definition of Tibet– asis well known, China has hacked off halfthe area of Tibet that encompasses half thepopulation of Tibetans and submerged it inHan provinces.

From the time of Pandit Nehru, India’spolicy has been to shut its eyes to what ishappening in Tibet, to what the Chineseare doing in Tibet. In particular, to whatthey are doing to the culture and people ofTibet; and to the military buildup there.This was evident in the way in which, under Pandit Nehru’s firm hand, the Indian Government shut its eyes to theroads and other infrastructure which werebeing built in Tibet.

Indeed, the “policy” was carried further.The view was taken, and enforced, that weshould not only not ourselves raise, but weshould oppose efforts by others to raisetheir voice in fora like the United Nationson what was being done to Tibetans. This,Panditji laid down, is what would be in thebest interests of the Tibetans themselves!

Along with this shutting of eyes to Chinese buildup has gone a shutting of eyes

to the fact that India’s security is inextrica-bly intertwined with the existence and survival of Tibet as a buffer state and to thesurvival and strengthening of Tibetan culture and religion. One reason for this, ofcourse, is that it is the representative of theGovernment of Tibet who signed the SimlaAgreement in 1914 with the British Govern-ment of India and not the representative ofthe Government of China – though, it mustbe remembered, that the objection of theChinese representative was not to the border between Tibet and India but to theborder between Tibet and China. The second reason is that unless there is an areaof peace between China and India, an areain which there is no great Chinese militarypresence, our northern borders are directlyexposed. The ecology of India is just asclosely interlinked with what happensacross the Tibetan plateau. The deforesta-tion of eastern Tibet that has already takenplace; mining and other activities thatChina is pursuing with vigour across Tibet;the diversion of Tibetan waters to the northby China engineering works for which have already begun – all these are bound to affectthe entire plain of north and east India, as, indeed, they are bound to affect thecountries all along the Mekong river delta.

In the case of China and Tibet, as theyears have gone by, we have shut our eyestighter and tighter. In the last few years, inparticular up to 2007, the Chinese attitudetowards Tibet has hardened; the buildupof infrastructure in Tibet – an infrastructure

22 23

COVER STORY

ROOF OF THE

WORLDARUN

SHOURIE

The Tibetan Government in exile has completed fifty yearsin India, but what has India done for Tibet?

Tibetan womenshouting anti-Chineseslogans in front of theUnited Nationsregional headquartersin New Delhi


A clue to the coming years lies in thecontrasting attitudes of governments andlegislatures in the West. This very month,both the European Parliament and the USHouse of Representatives have passed res-olutions endorsing the cause of Tibet andits people. In this very month, govern-ments of those very countries have bentbackwards to assure China that they willnot inconvenience it. For two reasons, atleast, I fear things are going to get muchworse in the coming months. On the onehand, China is now in a position where noGovernment is prepared to talk the truthabout or to China: look at the turnaround inthe policy of Australia; similarly, with theUS now dependent on China for financingits bailout packages, the US will not take astand on any issue that may offend China –look at the way China has silenced the newUS Administration by reminding it of theextent to which China holds US Govern-ment paper, and what it can do to the dol-lar’s value and, even more so, to its status asan international reserve currency.

The second factor concernsus in India. It is an apprehen-sion, thus far mercifully just apossibility, but a possibilitynonetheless. Namely, that inthe coming years, we may have in Indiaeven weaker coalitions than we have hadin the last few years, that leadership in Indiamay pass into hands which will be evenmore preoccupied with its own petty cal-culations and even less concerned withwhat is happening in Tibet as in other ar-eas around India. The rationalization thatbecame so convenient an alibi when Chinainvaded Tibet will come in handy again:“When the country most affected by devel-opments in Tibet, namely India, is silent,why should we get worked up about thedevelopments?”

This goes for the border between Tibetand India. There is a unilateral objectivity,espousing which is taken as the hallmarkof “independent thinking” in India. Bookshave been put out showing how in regardto Aksai Chin, for instance, the Indian

borders were successively advanced northwards andeastwards by British surveyorsin late 19th and early 20th century. That the Chinese have

similarly enlarged the entire concept of“China” is not mentioned at all: is it not afact that the original China was only one-third of what China is today? I hearsimilar “objectivity” in regard to the eastern border, in particular in regard toTawang. This cannot but dissipate nationalresolve; it cannot but further expose Tibetans to Chinese oppression; and it cannot but ultimately endanger India.

We must bear in mind that China has aclear view of what it wants to be – the dom-inant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards Indiaas a potential nuisance, a nuisance thatmust be confined within South Asia. All itspolicies, including its policy of conqueringand suppressing Tibet, its policy of militariz-ing Tibet and stationing air and nuclearbases in Tibet, are part of this larger policy.

24

DSIAPRIL, 2009APRIL, 2009

25

that can be used for military purposes asmuch as for anything else – has becomemore intense; and the incursions and otherhostile acts towards India have becomemuch more frequent, and broader in range:to take just two examples, recall how Chinahas striven to prevent closer relations between ASEAN and India; how it hasstriven to snuff out any chance that theremight have been of India, along with coun-tries like Japan joining the Security Council.

It was only during the buildup to theOlympic Games that China felt it neces-sary to show a benign face to the world,

that these hostileacts were tempered.But, the Olympicsover, China has resumed its oppres-sion in Tibet just asit has resumed its

hard stance towards India in general andon the border issue in particular.

In India, on the other hand, we continue to shut our eyes to both – whatthe Chinese are doing in Tibet and to whatthey are doing towards India.

The net result is that the Chinese, having already swallowed Tibet, are nowmaking systematic inroads onto the south-ern slopes of the Himalayas. The pace atwhich they are extending their presenceand influence in Nepal since the MaoistGovernment took over are to be seen to bebelieved – and yet to this also India contin-ues to shut its eyes. Nor should any of itsurprise us. After all, a China that is spread-ing its influence in Latin America, CentralAsia, Africa is not going to overlook thesecountries along its southern rim.

The danger will not go away just because we refuse to see it.

We continue to shut our eyes to what the Chinese

are doing in Tibet and to

what they are doingtowards India

”

COVER STORY

Spiritual leaderDalai Lama answersquestions fromjournalists in New Delhi

Tibetans in exile inDelhi burn a Chineseflag as they take partin a protest


A clue to the coming years lies in thecontrasting attitudes of governments andlegislatures in the West. This very month,both the European Parliament and the USHouse of Representatives have passed res-olutions endorsing the cause of Tibet andits people. In this very month, govern-ments of those very countries have bentbackwards to assure China that they willnot inconvenience it. For two reasons, atleast, I fear things are going to get muchworse in the coming months. On the onehand, China is now in a position where noGovernment is prepared to talk the truthabout or to China: look at the turnaround inthe policy of Australia; similarly, with theUS now dependent on China for financingits bailout packages, the US will not take astand on any issue that may offend China –look at the way China has silenced the newUS Administration by reminding it of theextent to which China holds US Govern-ment paper, and what it can do to the dol-lar’s value and, even more so, to its status asan international reserve currency.

The second factor concernsus in India. It is an apprehen-sion, thus far mercifully just apossibility, but a possibilitynonetheless. Namely, that inthe coming years, we may have in Indiaeven weaker coalitions than we have hadin the last few years, that leadership in Indiamay pass into hands which will be evenmore preoccupied with its own petty cal-culations and even less concerned withwhat is happening in Tibet as in other ar-eas around India. The rationalization thatbecame so convenient an alibi when Chinainvaded Tibet will come in handy again:“When the country most affected by devel-opments in Tibet, namely India, is silent,why should we get worked up about thedevelopments?”

This goes for the border between Tibetand India. There is a unilateral objectivity,espousing which is taken as the hallmarkof “independent thinking” in India. Bookshave been put out showing how in regardto Aksai Chin, for instance, the Indian

borders were successively advanced northwards andeastwards by British surveyorsin late 19th and early 20th century. That the Chinese have

similarly enlarged the entire concept of“China” is not mentioned at all: is it not afact that the original China was only one-third of what China is today? I hearsimilar “objectivity” in regard to the eastern border, in particular in regard toTawang. This cannot but dissipate nationalresolve; it cannot but further expose Tibetans to Chinese oppression; and it cannot but ultimately endanger India.

We must bear in mind that China has aclear view of what it wants to be – the dom-inant power in Asia and one of the two major powers in the world. It regards Indiaas a potential nuisance, a nuisance thatmust be confined within South Asia. All itspolicies, including its policy of conqueringand suppressing Tibet, its policy of militariz-ing Tibet and stationing air and nuclearbases in Tibet, are part of this larger policy.

24

DSIAPRIL, 2009APRIL, 2009

25

that can be used for military purposes asmuch as for anything else – has becomemore intense; and the incursions and otherhostile acts towards India have becomemuch more frequent, and broader in range:to take just two examples, recall how Chinahas striven to prevent closer relations between ASEAN and India; how it hasstriven to snuff out any chance that theremight have been of India, along with coun-tries like Japan joining the Security Council.

It was only during the buildup to theOlympic Games that China felt it neces-sary to show a benign face to the world,

that these hostileacts were tempered.But, the Olympicsover, China has resumed its oppres-sion in Tibet just asit has resumed its

hard stance towards India in general andon the border issue in particular.

In India, on the other hand, we continue to shut our eyes to both – whatthe Chinese are doing in Tibet and to whatthey are doing towards India.

The net result is that the Chinese, having already swallowed Tibet, are nowmaking systematic inroads onto the south-ern slopes of the Himalayas. The pace atwhich they are extending their presenceand influence in Nepal since the MaoistGovernment took over are to be seen to bebelieved – and yet to this also India contin-ues to shut its eyes. Nor should any of itsurprise us. After all, a China that is spread-ing its influence in Latin America, CentralAsia, Africa is not going to overlook thesecountries along its southern rim.

The danger will not go away just because we refuse to see it.

We continue to shut our eyes to what the Chinese

are doing in Tibet and to

what they are doingtowards India

”

COVER STORY

Spiritual leaderDalai Lama answersquestions fromjournalists in New Delhi

Tibetans in exile inDelhi burn a Chineseflag as they take partin a protest


26

DSIAPRIL 2009

27

We must also be clear that China is justnot going to make any conciliatory move inregard to Tibet. In fact, one sure road forChinese leadership to ascend has beenthrough Tibet: the present President ofChina won his spurs by the systematic oppression of Tibet that he directed andover which he presided. China only goesthrough the pretence of talking to the DalaiLama’s delegations from time to time – asit did, for instance, in the run-up to theOlympic Games. It is only waiting for theDalai Lama to pass away, knowing that,with this centre of gravity gone, the Tibetans will be reduced to an even morehelpless situation.

It is for this reason that we can expectthat, in the coming months, China will putthe kind of pressure on India which it hasput recently on South Africa – pressure toeither silence the Dalai Lama completely orto evict him from India. And, I’m afraid,there will be no shortage of rationalizerswho will say, “Why should we let one man,howsoever eminent and pious, come in theway of improving relations between Chinaand India, as improving those relations isrequired for India’s own security?”

There is another feature about India’sstance towards Tibet, a feature that revealsa lot about us as a people, a feature thatgoes beyond the attitude of successive Indian governments. As is well known, theBuddhist tradition was forgotten in India;in fact, the Buddha himself seems to havebeen forgotten and the Buddhist siteserased from our collective memory till a

few Britishers took it upon themselves tohunt them down and excavate them.Among the places in the world, where thisgreat heritage of mankind, and the Buddha’s doctrine and practice, were preserved has been Tibet. The great Tibetan masters have been with us andamidst us now for 50 years. It is indeed truethat Panditji helped set up institutions inwhich higher Tibetan learning and Tibetanarts and culture could be preserved andnourished. And there is no doubt that theTibetans themselves feel that these institu-tions have been instrumental in helpingsave their culture and religion. But it isequally true that, as a people, we have notthought it necessary to learn from the

Tibetan masters.In this sense, thepolicy of succes-sive governmentsof India, the pol-icy of shuttingour eyes to whatis happening inTibet and whatChina is doing

around India is representative of the waywe have shut our eyes to the presence ofTibetan masters in our midst.

As a people and as a country we will pay for this.

It is often said, “But we had no option in1949/50.” Take that to be true for a moment.The tragedy is that six long decades later,we remain a country without options.

It is weakness that lies at the root. Therest, accepting Chinese “suzerainty” oneday, “sovereignty” the next; accepting Tibet as an autonomous region withinChina one day and as an internal affair ofChina the next – these are just successivesteps to “operationalize” that weakness, soto say. Unless we acquire strength compara-ble to that of China; unless we build up analliance system with other countries thatare concerned about Chinese intentionsand might, we will be left with hope as ouronly policy: the hope that “ultimately truthtriumphs,” that “ultimately tyrannies dissolve,” the hope that like all else ultimately China too will evolve towardsfreedom and democracy.

Arun Shourie is a Member of Parliament.He has been minister in the Union Cabinet inthe NDA government. He is a prominentjournalist and an author. He has also been aneconomist with the World Bank, a consultantto the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

Tibetan monkdelegates arrive at theclosing session of theChinese People'sPolitical ConsultativeConference (CPPCC)at the Great Hall of thePeople in Beijing

We must bear in mind that China has a clear

view of what it wants to be —the dominant power

in Asia and one of the two major powers in

the world. It regards India as a potential nuisance

that must be confined within South Asia

”

COVER STORY


26

DSIAPRIL 2009

27

We must also be clear that China is justnot going to make any conciliatory move inregard to Tibet. In fact, one sure road forChinese leadership to ascend has beenthrough Tibet: the present President ofChina won his spurs by the systematic oppression of Tibet that he directed andover which he presided. China only goesthrough the pretence of talking to the DalaiLama’s delegations from time to time – asit did, for instance, in the run-up to theOlympic Games. It is only waiting for theDalai Lama to pass away, knowing that,with this centre of gravity gone, the Tibetans will be reduced to an even morehelpless situation.

It is for this reason that we can expectthat, in the coming months, China will putthe kind of pressure on India which it hasput recently on South Africa – pressure toeither silence the Dalai Lama completely orto evict him from India. And, I’m afraid,there will be no shortage of rationalizerswho will say, “Why should we let one man,howsoever eminent and pious, come in theway of improving relations between Chinaand India, as improving those relations isrequired for India’s own security?”

There is another feature about India’sstance towards Tibet, a feature that revealsa lot about us as a people, a feature thatgoes beyond the attitude of successive Indian governments. As is well known, theBuddhist tradition was forgotten in India;in fact, the Buddha himself seems to havebeen forgotten and the Buddhist siteserased from our collective memory till a

few Britishers took it upon themselves tohunt them down and excavate them.Among the places in the world, where thisgreat heritage of mankind, and the Buddha’s doctrine and practice, were preserved has been Tibet. The great Tibetan masters have been with us andamidst us now for 50 years. It is indeed truethat Panditji helped set up institutions inwhich higher Tibetan learning and Tibetanarts and culture could be preserved andnourished. And there is no doubt that theTibetans themselves feel that these institu-tions have been instrumental in helpingsave their culture and religion. But it isequally true that, as a people, we have notthought it necessary to learn from the

Tibetan masters.In this sense, thepolicy of succes-sive governmentsof India, the pol-icy of shuttingour eyes to whatis happening inTibet and whatChina is doing

around India is representative of the waywe have shut our eyes to the presence ofTibetan masters in our midst.

As a people and as a country we will pay for this.

It is often said, “But we had no option in1949/50.” Take that to be true for a moment.The tragedy is that six long decades later,we remain a country without options.

It is weakness that lies at the root. Therest, accepting Chinese “suzerainty” oneday, “sovereignty” the next; accepting Tibet as an autonomous region withinChina one day and as an internal affair ofChina the next – these are just successivesteps to “operationalize” that weakness, soto say. Unless we acquire strength compara-ble to that of China; unless we build up analliance system with other countries thatare concerned about Chinese intentionsand might, we will be left with hope as ouronly policy: the hope that “ultimately truthtriumphs,” that “ultimately tyrannies dissolve,” the hope that like all else ultimately China too will evolve towardsfreedom and democracy.

Arun Shourie is a Member of Parliament.He has been minister in the Union Cabinet inthe NDA government. He is a prominentjournalist and an author. He has also been aneconomist with the World Bank, a consultantto the Planning Commission, India, and Editor of The Indian Express.

Tibetan monkdelegates arrive at theclosing session of theChinese People'sPolitical ConsultativeConference (CPPCC)at the Great Hall of thePeople in Beijing

We must bear in mind that China has a clear

view of what it wants to be —the dominant power

in Asia and one of the two major powers in

the world. It regards India as a potential nuisance

that must be confined within South Asia

”

COVER STORY


DSIAPRIL 2009

FOR centuries, India and Tibet haveshared a common border and had acivilisational affinity. The Dalai Lama

often calls Tibet a child of India. It proba-bly started long before the 7th century AD,when the Roof of the World discoveredBuddha’s teachings, this was a crucialturning point in the history of Tibet.

The following period saw a constantflow of Tibetan lamas, pandits and yogisvisiting the great Indian universities of Nalanda, Odantapuri or Vikramasila. Thedisappearance of Buddhism from Indiaaround the 12th-13th century had graveconsequences for the subcontinent andCentral Asian politics. The Buddhadharma continued to flourish on the Roofof the World, but the interest of lamas inwhat they considered to be Aryabhumirapidly declined.

Ironically, a new era for Indo-Tibetan relations began when the British took con-trol of the Indian Peninsula. The Indo-Tibet relations which had primarily beenspiritual became strategic and economic.

The British Crown’s officials saw theLand of Snows as an opportunity to opennew markets and to create a convenientbuffer zone between India and the Russ-ian Empire. China was too weak to reactmeaningfully then but continued to pretend to be the suzerain of Tibet.

In July 1904, Francis Younghusband

28 29

SPECIAL

The Dalai Lama and his people have spent

five decades in exile in India but will the

past create a future forTibet-India relations

CLAUDEARPI

PAST VS

FUTUREA view of the PotalaPalace in Lhasa, TibetAutonomous Region

Claude new 6 2nd time.qxd 5/5/09 11:25 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009

FOR centuries, India and Tibet haveshared a common border and had acivilisational affinity. The Dalai Lama

often calls Tibet a child of India. It proba-bly started long before the 7th century AD,when the Roof of the World discoveredBuddha’s teachings, this was a crucialturning point in the history of Tibet.

The following period saw a constantflow of Tibetan lamas, pandits and yogisvisiting the great Indian universities of Nalanda, Odantapuri or Vikramasila. Thedisappearance of Buddhism from Indiaaround the 12th-13th century had graveconsequences for the subcontinent andCentral Asian politics. The Buddhadharma continued to flourish on the Roofof the World, but the interest of lamas inwhat they considered to be Aryabhumirapidly declined.

Ironically, a new era for Indo-Tibetan relations began when the British took con-trol of the Indian Peninsula. The Indo-Tibet relations which had primarily beenspiritual became strategic and economic.

The British Crown’s officials saw theLand of Snows as an opportunity to opennew markets and to create a convenientbuffer zone between India and the Russ-ian Empire. China was too weak to reactmeaningfully then but continued to pretend to be the suzerain of Tibet.

In July 1904, Francis Younghusband

28 29

SPECIAL

The Dalai Lama and his people have spent

five decades in exile in India but will the

past create a future forTibet-India relations

CLAUDEARPI

PAST VS

FUTUREA view of the PotalaPalace in Lhasa, TibetAutonomous Region


30

DSIAPRIL, 2009

31

entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At theend of his stay, the young Captain signedan Agreement with the Tibetans on behalfof the British Empire. However politicaldeals are never simple; Tibet’s westernneighbour, China, was extremely unhappyto not be a party to the accord.

Ten years later, wanting to show fairness, London called for a tripartite conference in Simla to settle the issue: thethree main protagonists sat together at anegotiation table for the first time. The result was not fully satisfactory for the Chinese who only initialled the main docu-ment and did not ratify it, though theBritish and Tibetans agreed on a common

border which they demarcated on a map:the famous McMahon Line was born. Thistreaty was still in force when India becameindependent in August 1947.

The ‘Liberation’ of TibetIn October 1950, an event changed the destiny of the Roof of World as well as therelations between India, Tibet and China:Mao’s troops marched into Tibet.

A month later, when Lhasa appealed tothe United Nations against China’s inva-sion, India which had till then acknowl-edged Tibet’s de facto independence, began to vacillate; it did not stand up to defend its militarily-weak neighbour.

In May 1951, some of the Dalai Lama’srepresentatives signed a 17-point Agree-ment with Communist China. Lhasa hadno choice but to accept to be a part ofChina, ‘their Motherland’.

Article 1 said: “The Tibetan people shallreturn to the big family of the Mother-land.” The declared objective of the Agreement was to ‘drive out imperialist aggressive force from Tibet’ and to ‘liberate’ the Roof of the World.

Who were these ‘imperialist aggressiveforces’ at China’s door? Was it India who had a few hundred jawans posted inGyantse? Delhi did not realize that it was indeed targeted.

Another article of the17-Point Agreement said:“Tibetan troops shall bereorganised step by stepinto the People’s Libera-tion Army (PLA) and become a part of the national defence forces ofthe People’s Republic of China.” It meant that the few-thousand strong Tibetan Army was to be disbanded and merged into the PLA.

The incorporation of the Tibetan nationinto Beijing’s fold was not immediately acknowledged by Delhi which continuedfor a couple of years to maintain a full-fledged mission in the Tibetan capital andhave diplomatic relations with Lhasa.

The signature of the Panchsheel Agree-ment between India and China in April1954 marked the tail-end of the events set in motion by Younghusband’s entry into Ti-bet. While the British expedition officially accepted Tibet as a separate entity, the 1954

Agreement put an end toits existence as a distinct nation. The Landof Snows became ‘Tibet’sRegion of China’. The circle was closed with incalculable consquencesfor India and Tibet. Ironi-

cally, the Tibetans themselves were not informed of the negotiations.

The Exile: Implications for IndiaFive years later, on March 10, 1959, the pop-ulation of the Tibetan capital revoltedagainst the Chinese Communist presenceon the Roof of the World. They surrounded the Dalai Lama’s palace to prevent him from attending a performancein the Chinese camp. The stalemate contin-ued for a few days and finally during thenight of March 17, the young Tibetan leadersecretly fled his palace for India.

For the following days, the world remained in the dark about his where-

abouts. On March 30, he crossed the Indianborder in Kameng Frontier Division of theNorth East Frontier Agency, now ArunachalPradesh. He was immediately granted asylum by the Nehru Government.

The arrival of the Tibetan leader in India (and the immediate grant of asylumto him and his 85,000 countrymen) triggered an increased tension between India and China and de facto, the openingof a second front for the already stretchedIndian defence forces.

The Chinese authorities in Tibet werequick to move after the Dalai Lama’s escape, they decided to create a MilitaryArea HQ on the Tibetan plateau: “Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committeemay include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various dis-tricts and various principal monasteries.”‘Patriotic elements’ was an ominous term.

On March 28, Xinhua issued a commu-niqué from Beijing giving the Chinese

SPECIAL

Dalai Lama talks to a Tibetancraftswoman at an arts andculture exhibition in New Delhi;British explorer FrancisYounghusband (far left) led themission to Tibet which opened upthis region to the Western World”

In July 1904, FrancisYounghusband entered

Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At the end of

his stay, the young Captain signed an

Agreement with theTibetans on behalf of

the British Empire


30

DSIAPRIL, 2009

31

entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At theend of his stay, the young Captain signedan Agreement with the Tibetans on behalfof the British Empire. However politicaldeals are never simple; Tibet’s westernneighbour, China, was extremely unhappyto not be a party to the accord.

Ten years later, wanting to show fairness, London called for a tripartite conference in Simla to settle the issue: thethree main protagonists sat together at anegotiation table for the first time. The result was not fully satisfactory for the Chinese who only initialled the main docu-ment and did not ratify it, though theBritish and Tibetans agreed on a common

border which they demarcated on a map:the famous McMahon Line was born. Thistreaty was still in force when India becameindependent in August 1947.

The ‘Liberation’ of TibetIn October 1950, an event changed the destiny of the Roof of World as well as therelations between India, Tibet and China:Mao’s troops marched into Tibet.

A month later, when Lhasa appealed tothe United Nations against China’s inva-sion, India which had till then acknowl-edged Tibet’s de facto independence, began to vacillate; it did not stand up to defend its militarily-weak neighbour.

In May 1951, some of the Dalai Lama’srepresentatives signed a 17-point Agree-ment with Communist China. Lhasa hadno choice but to accept to be a part ofChina, ‘their Motherland’.

Article 1 said: “The Tibetan people shallreturn to the big family of the Mother-land.” The declared objective of the Agreement was to ‘drive out imperialist aggressive force from Tibet’ and to ‘liberate’ the Roof of the World.

Who were these ‘imperialist aggressiveforces’ at China’s door? Was it India who had a few hundred jawans posted inGyantse? Delhi did not realize that it was indeed targeted.

Another article of the17-Point Agreement said:“Tibetan troops shall bereorganised step by stepinto the People’s Libera-tion Army (PLA) and become a part of the national defence forces ofthe People’s Republic of China.” It meant that the few-thousand strong Tibetan Army was to be disbanded and merged into the PLA.

The incorporation of the Tibetan nationinto Beijing’s fold was not immediately acknowledged by Delhi which continuedfor a couple of years to maintain a full-fledged mission in the Tibetan capital andhave diplomatic relations with Lhasa.

The signature of the Panchsheel Agree-ment between India and China in April1954 marked the tail-end of the events set in motion by Younghusband’s entry into Ti-bet. While the British expedition officially accepted Tibet as a separate entity, the 1954

Agreement put an end toits existence as a distinct nation. The Landof Snows became ‘Tibet’sRegion of China’. The circle was closed with incalculable consquencesfor India and Tibet. Ironi-

cally, the Tibetans themselves were not informed of the negotiations.

The Exile: Implications for IndiaFive years later, on March 10, 1959, the pop-ulation of the Tibetan capital revoltedagainst the Chinese Communist presenceon the Roof of the World. They surrounded the Dalai Lama’s palace to prevent him from attending a performancein the Chinese camp. The stalemate contin-ued for a few days and finally during thenight of March 17, the young Tibetan leadersecretly fled his palace for India.

For the following days, the world remained in the dark about his where-

abouts. On March 30, he crossed the Indianborder in Kameng Frontier Division of theNorth East Frontier Agency, now ArunachalPradesh. He was immediately granted asylum by the Nehru Government.

The arrival of the Tibetan leader in India (and the immediate grant of asylumto him and his 85,000 countrymen) triggered an increased tension between India and China and de facto, the openingof a second front for the already stretchedIndian defence forces.

The Chinese authorities in Tibet werequick to move after the Dalai Lama’s escape, they decided to create a MilitaryArea HQ on the Tibetan plateau: “Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committeemay include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various dis-tricts and various principal monasteries.”‘Patriotic elements’ was an ominous term.

On March 28, Xinhua issued a commu-niqué from Beijing giving the Chinese

SPECIAL

Dalai Lama talks to a Tibetancraftswoman at an arts andculture exhibition in New Delhi;British explorer FrancisYounghusband (far left) led themission to Tibet which opened upthis region to the Western World”

In July 1904, FrancisYounghusband entered

Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. At the end of

his stay, the young Captain signed an

Agreement with theTibetans on behalf of

the British Empire


32

DSIAPRIL, 2009

version of the uprising: “the Tibetan Local Government and the upper-stratareactionary clique colluded with imperi-alism-assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against thePLA.” Xinhua added that the valiant unitsof the PLA stationed in Tibet had completely smashed the ‘rebellious bandits’. Prime Minister JawaharlalNehru was deeply hurt by the tone usedby Beijing. During a debate in the Parlia-ment, he said that the Xinhua statementwas written in a 'cold-war language'.

The Nehru-Dalai Lama encounterOn April 29 1959, the Indian Prime Minis-ter visited the hill station of Mussoorie where the Dalai Lama had been given atemporary residence. During their four-hour long encounter, Nehru told theDalai Lama that he would not politicallyhelp the Tibetan cause, but he would support the rehabilitation of the refugeeswho had started pouring into India; he also promised to educate the next generation of Tibetans.

For the past 50 years, the successivegovernments in Delhi have stuck to thispolicy. Recently during a five-day func-tion held in Delhi, the Tibetans expressedtheir deep gratitude to the Governmentand people of India in rehabilitating morethan 100,000 refugees as well as supportto reestablishing several religious institu-tions such as some of the most importantmonasteries. On March 31, 2009, the DalaiLama said: “We shall be very happy if weare able to contribute to restoring India'srich Buddhist heritage. In order to fulfillthis dream, Pandit Nehru established theSikkim Research Institute of Tibetology,Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, Leh,Ladakh, and the Central University of Tibetan Studies in Varanasi. In theseplaces, initiatives have b een taken totranslate important texts, whose originalsonce existed in Indian languages but havesince been lost, from Tibetan back into Indian languages such as Sanskrit. This significant project has been both success-ful and satisfying.”

Politically, though Delhi has followedNehru’s policy to not take an active role in solving the Tibetan issue, the mere presence of the Dalai Lama and his coun-trymen in India, is considered by Beijing tobe a political statement in itself.

The Border IssueAs early as September 1951, some 20,000troops began to occupy the most strategic

points on the Tibetan Plateau. The first sur-veys to build a new road on the Aksai Chinplateau of Ladakh were conducted a yearlater; Xinjiang and Tibet provinces neededto be connected.

The departure of the Dalai Lama fromthe Roof of the World remains the water-shed of Sino-Indian strategic relations. Theconsequences of the Dalai Lama’s departuredid not take long to appear: the People’s Lib-eration Army took control of the entire Ti-betan plateau and China’s aggressivenesstowards India reached new heights.

On August 27, 1959, the PLA crossed theMcMahon line and ventured onto Indianterritory in an area called Longju in NEFA.As they had done several times in the Ak-sai Chin or the central sector, before Delhicould react, the Chinese accused the Indiantroops of trespassing into Chinese territory.

The quibbling continued during the following years and despite the visit of

Zhou Enlai, the Chi-nese Premier to Indiain April 1960 — dur-ing which he pro-posed to exchangeNEFA against AskaiChin — the situationcontinued to deteriorate. It culminated in October 1962, when Chinese troops entered India through the same KamengFrontier Division of NEFA that the Dalai Lama’s party had used to escape.Was it a sign of Chinese bitterness at India for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama?

During the follow-ing years, the bridgeswere practically cut between Delhi and Bei-jing. Despite fresh con-tacts in the early 1980s,the last years of the

decade saw renewed tensions on India’s north-eastern border in 1986-87.

Delhi, however, was not ready to approach Beijing to solve the Tibetan issue which was intractably linked to the border tangle between India and China.As the Dalai Lama stated in a secret

memorandum to Prime Minister RajivGandhi on April 11, 1986: “In its continu-ing talks with the Chinese on the border,India's stand of accepting the legality ofthe McMahon Line without recognisingthe independent status of Tibet whoseparticipation in the Simla Convention andwhose acceptance of the McMahon Linegave the demarcation of this border itspresent international legitimacy is notonly illogical but is also a source of theweakness of India's stand in the bordertalks with the Chinese.”

But Delhi was not ready to take the

jump to help the Tibetan leader. As a result, the Indian stand on the border remained vulnerable.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to ChinaTwo years later, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing. It was the first time since Nehruvisit in 1954 that an Indian Prime Ministertraveled to China. The visit helped to release the tensions on the border, but no step was taken to sort out the Tibetan issue. After a meeting between RajivGandhi and Deng Xiaoping, a Joint State-ment was issued. Tibet and the refugees in

India were mentioned: “The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in In-dia. The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.”

The noted historian Parshotam Mehracommented: “An interesting facet of thejoint communiqué is a reiteration by NewDelhi of its earlier stance on Tibet: its statusas an autonomous region of China coupled

The incorporation of Tibet into Beijing’s fold

was not immediatelyacknowledged by Delhi

which continued for acouple of years to

maintain a full-fledgedmission in the Tibetan

capital and havediplomatic relations

with Lhasa

”Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lamareceive Zhou Enlai in Delhi in 1957;Tibetan monks stage a candlelight vigilas part of an anti-Chinesedemonstration in Kathmandu (right);

SPECIAL

33


32

DSIAPRIL, 2009

version of the uprising: “the Tibetan Local Government and the upper-stratareactionary clique colluded with imperi-alism-assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against thePLA.” Xinhua added that the valiant unitsof the PLA stationed in Tibet had completely smashed the ‘rebellious bandits’. Prime Minister JawaharlalNehru was deeply hurt by the tone usedby Beijing. During a debate in the Parlia-ment, he said that the Xinhua statementwas written in a 'cold-war language'.

The Nehru-Dalai Lama encounterOn April 29 1959, the Indian Prime Minis-ter visited the hill station of Mussoorie where the Dalai Lama had been given atemporary residence. During their four-hour long encounter, Nehru told theDalai Lama that he would not politicallyhelp the Tibetan cause, but he would support the rehabilitation of the refugeeswho had started pouring into India; he also promised to educate the next generation of Tibetans.

For the past 50 years, the successivegovernments in Delhi have stuck to thispolicy. Recently during a five-day func-tion held in Delhi, the Tibetans expressedtheir deep gratitude to the Governmentand people of India in rehabilitating morethan 100,000 refugees as well as supportto reestablishing several religious institu-tions such as some of the most importantmonasteries. On March 31, 2009, the DalaiLama said: “We shall be very happy if weare able to contribute to restoring India'srich Buddhist heritage. In order to fulfillthis dream, Pandit Nehru established theSikkim Research Institute of Tibetology,Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, Leh,Ladakh, and the Central University of Tibetan Studies in Varanasi. In theseplaces, initiatives have b een taken totranslate important texts, whose originalsonce existed in Indian languages but havesince been lost, from Tibetan back into Indian languages such as Sanskrit. This significant project has been both success-ful and satisfying.”

Politically, though Delhi has followedNehru’s policy to not take an active role in solving the Tibetan issue, the mere presence of the Dalai Lama and his coun-trymen in India, is considered by Beijing tobe a political statement in itself.

The Border IssueAs early as September 1951, some 20,000troops began to occupy the most strategic

points on the Tibetan Plateau. The first sur-veys to build a new road on the Aksai Chinplateau of Ladakh were conducted a yearlater; Xinjiang and Tibet provinces neededto be connected.

The departure of the Dalai Lama fromthe Roof of the World remains the water-shed of Sino-Indian strategic relations. Theconsequences of the Dalai Lama’s departuredid not take long to appear: the People’s Lib-eration Army took control of the entire Ti-betan plateau and China’s aggressivenesstowards India reached new heights.

On August 27, 1959, the PLA crossed theMcMahon line and ventured onto Indianterritory in an area called Longju in NEFA.As they had done several times in the Ak-sai Chin or the central sector, before Delhicould react, the Chinese accused the Indiantroops of trespassing into Chinese territory.

The quibbling continued during the following years and despite the visit of

Zhou Enlai, the Chi-nese Premier to Indiain April 1960 — dur-ing which he pro-posed to exchangeNEFA against AskaiChin — the situationcontinued to deteriorate. It culminated in October 1962, when Chinese troops entered India through the same KamengFrontier Division of NEFA that the Dalai Lama’s party had used to escape.Was it a sign of Chinese bitterness at India for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama?

During the follow-ing years, the bridgeswere practically cut between Delhi and Bei-jing. Despite fresh con-tacts in the early 1980s,the last years of the

decade saw renewed tensions on India’s north-eastern border in 1986-87.

Delhi, however, was not ready to approach Beijing to solve the Tibetan issue which was intractably linked to the border tangle between India and China.As the Dalai Lama stated in a secret

memorandum to Prime Minister RajivGandhi on April 11, 1986: “In its continu-ing talks with the Chinese on the border,India's stand of accepting the legality ofthe McMahon Line without recognisingthe independent status of Tibet whoseparticipation in the Simla Convention andwhose acceptance of the McMahon Linegave the demarcation of this border itspresent international legitimacy is notonly illogical but is also a source of theweakness of India's stand in the bordertalks with the Chinese.”

But Delhi was not ready to take the

jump to help the Tibetan leader. As a result, the Indian stand on the border remained vulnerable.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to ChinaTwo years later, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing. It was the first time since Nehruvisit in 1954 that an Indian Prime Ministertraveled to China. The visit helped to release the tensions on the border, but no step was taken to sort out the Tibetan issue. After a meeting between RajivGandhi and Deng Xiaoping, a Joint State-ment was issued. Tibet and the refugees in

India were mentioned: “The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in In-dia. The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil.”

The noted historian Parshotam Mehracommented: “An interesting facet of thejoint communiqué is a reiteration by NewDelhi of its earlier stance on Tibet: its statusas an autonomous region of China coupled

The incorporation of Tibet into Beijing’s fold

was not immediatelyacknowledged by Delhi

which continued for acouple of years to

maintain a full-fledgedmission in the Tibetan

capital and havediplomatic relations

with Lhasa

”Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lamareceive Zhou Enlai in Delhi in 1957;Tibetan monks stage a candlelight vigilas part of an anti-Chinesedemonstration in Kathmandu (right);

SPECIAL

33


DSI APRIL, 2009

with a refusal to allow anti-Chinese 'politi-cal activities' on Indian soil. One is not so sure as to why it was deemed necessary to do so”.

Sumit Ganguly, an analyst working as an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, HunterCollege, The City University of New York remarked: “This amounted not only to a betrayal of the Tibetan cause, but also a failure to extract similar conces-sions from the Chinese on India's disputedterritories. …Indian officials closely associated with the visit take a markedlydifferent view, contending that the prime minister's statement was the merereiteration of a long-standing Indian position that dates back to 1954 when India formally acknowledged Chinese sov-ereignty in Tibet.”

Since then, despite regular visits to In-dia of Chinese heads of State/ Governmentand Indian leaders to China, a similarphraseology is used in Joint Statements.Premier Li Peng (1991 and 2001), President

Jiang Zemin (1996), PremierZhu Rongji (2002), PremierWen Jaibao (2005) and Presi-dent Hu Jintao (2006) visitedIndia while President R.Venkataraman (1992), PrimeMinisters, P.V. Narasimha Rao (1993), A.B.Vajpayee (2003), Dr. Manmohan Singh(2008) have been to China.

Fifty years later, though the Tibetanrefugees are said to be amongst the mostsuccessful refugees in the world and underthe leadership of the Dalai Lama, theirthousand-year old culture has been preserved to a great extent in India, the Tibetan issue is far from being solved.

The latest proof is the virtual MartialLaw clamped in different regions of theplateau on the occasion of the 50 years of1959 uprising in Lhasa.

Not only are the Beijing-Dharamsalatalks goingnowhere, but it is today doubtful if any serious progress can be made on the Sino-Indian border, whichlet us not forget, had for centuries been

the Tibet-India border.For India, the strategic con-

sequences of the 1959 eventsare incalculable, whether it isthe change of demography inTibet, the arrival of the railway

line to Lhasa, Chinese control over the Hi-malayan rivers or the stationing of nuclear missiles on the plateau. It is difficult to see a way out for the Tibetan issue, especially if Delhi continues to refuse to take a more active role in the entangled situation.

Claude Arpi, french by birth, has lived in India for the last 34 years. He is he author ofseveral books on Tibet, India, China and Indo-French relations, including Tibet theLost Frontier (Lancer Publishers). After graduating as a dental surgeon from Bordeaux University in 1974, he decided tocome to India. In December 1974, he joinedAuroville, the international communityfounded by the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s spiritual collaborator.

34

Tibetans living in Indiadistribute sweets tothe locals in Delhi asthey begin the 'ThankYou India' programme



DSIAPRIL 2009

36

WAR ZONE

37

The war in Sri Lanka is winding down but nowthe country stares at a humanitarian tragedy

POST-WAR VS POST-CONFLICT

THE conventional military phaseof the two and half decades longethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is into

an end game with the Sri Lankan armysucceeding in capturing all of the territory held by the Tamil Tigersexcept for a strip of some 20 odd sq kms. It is in this territory that theremnants of the LTTE are holed up.

Trapped with them are some150,000-190,000 civilians according tothe UN and international humanitar-ian agencies, or 70,000 according to thefigures put out by the Government ofSri Lanka (GOSL). Some of them arethere by choice, in that they have familywhom they do not want to leave behind who in turn, have voluntarilyjoined the LTTE or been coerced intodoing so, others who are forcibly keptinside by the LTTE and yet others whofear what awaits them once they crossinto GOSL controlled territory. Thefear in this case is largely attributed tothe “screening” they have to undergofor security reasons and the reports ofrights violations that mar this process.

Some 40,000-50,000 civilians, however, have been able to flee to government - controlled territory andare being located in camps. Conse-quently, the apparently unending endgame in this conflict is one that couldresult in a horrific civilian catastropheas there are serious questions with regard to the adequacy and frequency

of food and medical supplies to thetrapped civilians, grave problems in respect of sanitation, credible reportsof dozens being killed and injured ona daily basis including a statement byNavneetham Pillay UN High Commis-sioner for Human Rights, that actionsof the GOSL and the Tigers couldamount to war crimes. The High Commissioner, in particular, con-demned the documented LTTE prac-tice of killing and shooting civilianswho are attempting to escape therebyconfirming the charge that they are indeed using the civilians as a humanshield. She also pointed out that theGOSL continues to fire into the “nofire” zone it has designated in 14 sqkms of this strip of territory causingcivilian deaths and injuries as well asdamage to the make shift medical facil-ities there. Given the numbers of civil-ians trapped there, any firing into thezone is by definition indiscriminate.

Sir John Holmes, the Head of UNOCHA and Chief Relief Coordinator,visited Sri Lanka in February andechoed the above concerns about thesituation there in two unofficial brief-ings to the Security Council. These con-cerns have also been raised with thePresident of Sri Lanka and the GOSLby the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the US Secretary ofState, the UN Secretary General and the European Union.


Supporters of the Tamil Tigersshout during a demonstrationin Geneva demanding peace inSri Lanka

Sri Lanka 2nd time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 5/5/09 11:32 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009

36

WAR ZONE

37

The war in Sri Lanka is winding down but nowthe country stares at a humanitarian tragedy

POST-WAR VS POST-CONFLICT

THE conventional military phaseof the two and half decades longethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is into

an end game with the Sri Lankan armysucceeding in capturing all of the territory held by the Tamil Tigersexcept for a strip of some 20 odd sq kms. It is in this territory that theremnants of the LTTE are holed up.

Trapped with them are some150,000-190,000 civilians according tothe UN and international humanitar-ian agencies, or 70,000 according to thefigures put out by the Government ofSri Lanka (GOSL). Some of them arethere by choice, in that they have familywhom they do not want to leave behind who in turn, have voluntarilyjoined the LTTE or been coerced intodoing so, others who are forcibly keptinside by the LTTE and yet others whofear what awaits them once they crossinto GOSL controlled territory. Thefear in this case is largely attributed tothe “screening” they have to undergofor security reasons and the reports ofrights violations that mar this process.

Some 40,000-50,000 civilians, however, have been able to flee to government - controlled territory andare being located in camps. Conse-quently, the apparently unending endgame in this conflict is one that couldresult in a horrific civilian catastropheas there are serious questions with regard to the adequacy and frequency

of food and medical supplies to thetrapped civilians, grave problems in respect of sanitation, credible reportsof dozens being killed and injured ona daily basis including a statement byNavneetham Pillay UN High Commis-sioner for Human Rights, that actionsof the GOSL and the Tigers couldamount to war crimes. The High Commissioner, in particular, con-demned the documented LTTE prac-tice of killing and shooting civilianswho are attempting to escape therebyconfirming the charge that they are indeed using the civilians as a humanshield. She also pointed out that theGOSL continues to fire into the “nofire” zone it has designated in 14 sqkms of this strip of territory causingcivilian deaths and injuries as well asdamage to the make shift medical facil-ities there. Given the numbers of civil-ians trapped there, any firing into thezone is by definition indiscriminate.

Sir John Holmes, the Head of UNOCHA and Chief Relief Coordinator,visited Sri Lanka in February andechoed the above concerns about thesituation there in two unofficial brief-ings to the Security Council. These con-cerns have also been raised with thePresident of Sri Lanka and the GOSLby the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the US Secretary ofState, the UN Secretary General and the European Union.


Supporters of the Tamil Tigersshout during a demonstrationin Geneva demanding peace inSri Lanka


DSIAPRIL 2009

39

The immediate, urgentand priority need is for apause in the fighting to allowfor the evacuation of thecivilians by a third party – theUN being the obvious andacceptable choice in this instance. Explorating the feasibility for such an evacuation has comeup against the positional bargaining of the two protagonists and the LTTE’s unwillingness to engage in discussions on it, clearly on account of their fear that such an evacuation would deny themtheir “human shield” and expose them tothe full wrath of the GOSL forces and certain defeat.

The LTTE insists on a ceasefire and unconditional negotiations. Unsurpris-ingly, it is surmised that if the LTTE wereto engage in discussions about a civilianevacuation they might also insist on aguarantee of safe passage for their leader-ship – a condition that may prove to be aninsuperable obstacle and totally unaccept-able to any potential third party. It appearsthat the grim and despicable logic of theLTTE is to provoke an egregious civilianmassacre beyond the current daily deathtoll, which they dearly wish, will turn international opinion in their favour and

against the GOSL. It is clearthat in conventional militaryterms the outcome of thehostilities is the foregoneconclusion of an LTTE defeat.Ironically, an organisationthat has founded its reputa-tion on its military prowess

and terrorist repertoire, now appears to bedepending on a political strategy of an in-ternational “bail-out” based on humanitar-ian grounds, notwithstanding the horren-dous costs to the people it claims torepresent. That this will not happen, giventhe LTTE’s record and current behaviourin respect of the civilians, does not deterthem from risking a civilian catastrophe.

The GOSL on the other hand, is agree-able to a humanitarian pause to evacuatethe civilians but not to a ceasefire and unconditional talks. It maintains that theLTTE must surrender and first lay downarms. Whilst disputing the figures of IDPsput out by the international agencies andstrenuously denying the charge of firinginto the “no-fire” zone causing civiliandeaths and injuries, the GOSL has conceded through its representative at theUN that there could be return fire by itsforces resulting in civilian casualties. It insists that there is no deliberate targeting

of civilians and points to the LTTE firingfrom the “no-fire” zone in the first place.The dispute over the figures continues, including in relation to those put out bythe UN on civilian casualties. The GOSLmaintains that these figures are unverifi-able - a claim it can make since it has severely restricted humanitarian access tothe conflict zone and denied all access tothe independent agencies.

The way in which the end game endswill have a decisive impact on theprospects for peace, unity and reconcilia-tion as well as for the political interests ofthe key protagonists. Given the current dynamics, will a post war situation also be apost –conflict one?

Current Core Interests, Dilemmasand ChallengesThe Tamil Polity: The LTTE will probablyrevert to guerilla warfare and urban terror-ism with the remnants of its cadres, to theextent possible. They could wreak consider-able damage to the Sri Lankan economyand provide the justification to the Rajapakse regime to continue to maintain asecurity establishment on high alert andexercise considerable control over the civil-ian population. But the dilemma for theLTTE, however, will be that this may not be

38

WAR ZONE

President MahindaRajapakse (above)handing over a sword tohis naval officer son, sub- Lieutenant YoshithaRajapakse, at his passingout parade

in any way sufficient to ensure recognitionof Tamil demands and aspirations within anew constitutional framework for SriLanka or result in any meaningful auton-omy for the Tamils in the north and east ofthe island under LTTE hegemony. Nor willit necessarily advance the prospects for se-cession. The LTTE will have to transformin the wake of conventional military defeatand whilst the Sri Lankan state could turnout to be in no mood to accommodate Tamil grievances in a political settlement,this may not be a sufficient catalyst for a resurgence of LTTE military and political fortunes.

This dilemma extends throughout theTamil polity and the available political representation. Anti-LTTE groups rang-ing from its erstwhile Eastern commandnow split into two parts at war with eachother - one underColonel Karuna for-mally part of the rul-ing party and theother is the politicalparty, the TMVP, un-der the recentlyelected Chief Minis-ter of the EasternProvince, Pillayan, to the EPDP of cabinetminister Douglas Devananda and to thelone voice of Anandasangaree of theTULF, lack the independence and credi-bility necessary to take the lead in a Tamil polity no longer dominated andoverpowered by the LTTE. All of themhave owed their existence to the SriLankan state and would in all likelihoodbe unable to enter into any meaningfulnegotiations with it on an accommoda-tion of Tamil political aspirations.

This leaves the Tamil National Alliance(TNA), the alliance of the traditional Tamilpolitical parties, which has the largestTamil representation in parliament.Throughout the conflict the TNA has beenthe parliamentary political mouthpiece ofthe LTTE. Notwithstanding this, it is quitepossible that the political constituencies ofthe parties that make up the alliance arestill in tact and could serve as the basis fortheir credibility and legitimacy in the eyesof the wider Tamil polity in a post war context. This no doubt will be augmented ifthe TNA sets itself on course for acquiringbroader appeal – in effect, whilst notdownplaying its Tamil nationalism,demonstrating that it is no longer in theclutches and thrall of the LTTE.

Ideological objections aside, manywould aver that this is impractical since as

long as there are even remnants of theLTTE around the risk of assassination isvery high for anyone who dares to distance themselves from the LTTE, leaveaside oppose them. This is a measure ofthe brutalisation of the Tamil politywrought by the conflict and of the distanceit will have to traverse in order to return tomainstream democratic politics. The acutedilemma and challenge confronting theTamil polity remains and it will have to re-solved in a context of probable triumphal-ism on the part of the Sri Lankan state.

The latter is the crux of the challenge topeace, unity and reconciliation for SriLanka. Will it be that the conventional military victory against the LTTE was in defence of the constitutional and political

It appears that the grim and despicable

logic of the LTTE is to provoke an egregious

civilian massacre beyond the current daily

death toll

”

Sri Lankan armymarches along

the sea-frontpromenade duringa rehearsal ahead

of the island’sindependence day


DSIAPRIL 2009

39

The immediate, urgentand priority need is for apause in the fighting to allowfor the evacuation of thecivilians by a third party – theUN being the obvious andacceptable choice in this instance. Explorating the feasibility for such an evacuation has comeup against the positional bargaining of the two protagonists and the LTTE’s unwillingness to engage in discussions on it, clearly on account of their fear that such an evacuation would deny themtheir “human shield” and expose them tothe full wrath of the GOSL forces and certain defeat.

The LTTE insists on a ceasefire and unconditional negotiations. Unsurpris-ingly, it is surmised that if the LTTE wereto engage in discussions about a civilianevacuation they might also insist on aguarantee of safe passage for their leader-ship – a condition that may prove to be aninsuperable obstacle and totally unaccept-able to any potential third party. It appearsthat the grim and despicable logic of theLTTE is to provoke an egregious civilianmassacre beyond the current daily deathtoll, which they dearly wish, will turn international opinion in their favour and

against the GOSL. It is clearthat in conventional militaryterms the outcome of thehostilities is the foregoneconclusion of an LTTE defeat.Ironically, an organisationthat has founded its reputa-tion on its military prowess

and terrorist repertoire, now appears to bedepending on a political strategy of an in-ternational “bail-out” based on humanitar-ian grounds, notwithstanding the horren-dous costs to the people it claims torepresent. That this will not happen, giventhe LTTE’s record and current behaviourin respect of the civilians, does not deterthem from risking a civilian catastrophe.

The GOSL on the other hand, is agree-able to a humanitarian pause to evacuatethe civilians but not to a ceasefire and unconditional talks. It maintains that theLTTE must surrender and first lay downarms. Whilst disputing the figures of IDPsput out by the international agencies andstrenuously denying the charge of firinginto the “no-fire” zone causing civiliandeaths and injuries, the GOSL has conceded through its representative at theUN that there could be return fire by itsforces resulting in civilian casualties. It insists that there is no deliberate targeting

of civilians and points to the LTTE firingfrom the “no-fire” zone in the first place.The dispute over the figures continues, including in relation to those put out bythe UN on civilian casualties. The GOSLmaintains that these figures are unverifi-able - a claim it can make since it has severely restricted humanitarian access tothe conflict zone and denied all access tothe independent agencies.

The way in which the end game endswill have a decisive impact on theprospects for peace, unity and reconcilia-tion as well as for the political interests ofthe key protagonists. Given the current dynamics, will a post war situation also be apost –conflict one?

Current Core Interests, Dilemmasand ChallengesThe Tamil Polity: The LTTE will probablyrevert to guerilla warfare and urban terror-ism with the remnants of its cadres, to theextent possible. They could wreak consider-able damage to the Sri Lankan economyand provide the justification to the Rajapakse regime to continue to maintain asecurity establishment on high alert andexercise considerable control over the civil-ian population. But the dilemma for theLTTE, however, will be that this may not be

38

WAR ZONE

President MahindaRajapakse (above)handing over a sword tohis naval officer son, sub- Lieutenant YoshithaRajapakse, at his passingout parade

in any way sufficient to ensure recognitionof Tamil demands and aspirations within anew constitutional framework for SriLanka or result in any meaningful auton-omy for the Tamils in the north and east ofthe island under LTTE hegemony. Nor willit necessarily advance the prospects for se-cession. The LTTE will have to transformin the wake of conventional military defeatand whilst the Sri Lankan state could turnout to be in no mood to accommodate Tamil grievances in a political settlement,this may not be a sufficient catalyst for a resurgence of LTTE military and political fortunes.

This dilemma extends throughout theTamil polity and the available political representation. Anti-LTTE groups rang-ing from its erstwhile Eastern commandnow split into two parts at war with eachother - one underColonel Karuna for-mally part of the rul-ing party and theother is the politicalparty, the TMVP, un-der the recentlyelected Chief Minis-ter of the EasternProvince, Pillayan, to the EPDP of cabinetminister Douglas Devananda and to thelone voice of Anandasangaree of theTULF, lack the independence and credi-bility necessary to take the lead in a Tamil polity no longer dominated andoverpowered by the LTTE. All of themhave owed their existence to the SriLankan state and would in all likelihoodbe unable to enter into any meaningfulnegotiations with it on an accommoda-tion of Tamil political aspirations.

This leaves the Tamil National Alliance(TNA), the alliance of the traditional Tamilpolitical parties, which has the largestTamil representation in parliament.Throughout the conflict the TNA has beenthe parliamentary political mouthpiece ofthe LTTE. Notwithstanding this, it is quitepossible that the political constituencies ofthe parties that make up the alliance arestill in tact and could serve as the basis fortheir credibility and legitimacy in the eyesof the wider Tamil polity in a post war context. This no doubt will be augmented ifthe TNA sets itself on course for acquiringbroader appeal – in effect, whilst notdownplaying its Tamil nationalism,demonstrating that it is no longer in theclutches and thrall of the LTTE.

Ideological objections aside, manywould aver that this is impractical since as

long as there are even remnants of theLTTE around the risk of assassination isvery high for anyone who dares to distance themselves from the LTTE, leaveaside oppose them. This is a measure ofthe brutalisation of the Tamil politywrought by the conflict and of the distanceit will have to traverse in order to return tomainstream democratic politics. The acutedilemma and challenge confronting theTamil polity remains and it will have to re-solved in a context of probable triumphal-ism on the part of the Sri Lankan state.

The latter is the crux of the challenge topeace, unity and reconciliation for SriLanka. Will it be that the conventional military victory against the LTTE was in defence of the constitutional and political

It appears that the grim and despicable

logic of the LTTE is to provoke an egregious

civilian massacre beyond the current daily

death toll

”

Sri Lankan armymarches along

the sea-frontpromenade duringa rehearsal ahead

of the island’sindependence day


DSIAPRIL 2009

consensual proposals for a political settle-ment of the conflict, the APRC has been atvarious times stymied by the ideologicaland political imperatives of the regime.Proposals that it came up with, along federal lines on the recommendations ofan expert panel, were jettisoned on presi-dential instruction and now the APRC isrestricted to recommending fuller imple-mentation of the provisions of the currentconstitution. This is a direct reference tothe system of Provincial Councils that

were ushered in through the ThirteenthAmendment to the Constitution in thewake of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.Two key areas of the system have yet to be implemented in full. They relate topolice powers and powers over land. Theexpectation was that the APRC would recommend Thirteenth Amendment Plus,rather than fuller, leave aside full, implementation of a system of provincialdevolution in which the balance of powersare weighted decisively in favour of thecentral government.

The current concern is that the ideolog-

ical orientation of majoritarianism of theRajapaksa regime, buttressed by conven-tional military victory, will not translateinto demonstrable commitment to arriveat a political settlement. There are concernstoo, that political settlement aside, conven-tional military victory could strengthen the case for majoritarianism and its consol-idation, even extending to “ethnic re-engineering” of the population in thenorth and east of Sri Lanka. These are fearsthat are expressed by stakeholders in theeast, despite that province having been“liberated” from LTTE control in 2006. If

the Sri Lankan state and its current stan-dard bearers, the Rajapaksa regime, was tojettison the opportunity created by thisconventional military victory for a new social contract for the country, which accommodates the aspirations of all of itspeoples, the unity of Sri Lanka and itsprospects for peace and prosperity will befurther retarded. A lot is riding on how theend game ends and on the willingness and ability of all stakeholders to transform apost-war situation into a post-conflict one.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Execu-tive Director of the Centre for Policy Alterna-tives (CPA) an independent and non-partisanpublic policy institute focusing on issues ofdemocratic governance and peace throughprogrammes of research and advocacy.

41

status quo? Was this a war against terror-ism and not a war in the context of an ethnicconflict with deep political roots that have tobe addressed if peace is to be achieved?The Rajapaksa Regime: The political ori-entation and direction of the Rajapaksaregime does not make for optimism as far asa political settlement is concerned. Capital-ising on the Bush era War on Terrorismrhetoric and on a “We versus Them” pa-triot vs traitor discourse with its attendanthuman rights violations, culture of im-

punity and crack down ondissent and the media, theRajapaksa regime has yet todemonstrate its commit-ment to a political settle-ment, beyond the rhetoricwhich many believe is forthe sole purpose of placating the interna-tional community and India in particular.The latter, as the key international actor inthe region, has gained in salience as agitation on the Sri Lanka issue in Tamil

Nadu has gained in salienceand forced Delhi to take on amore proactive role on SriLanka. The full extent of this,the unfolding humanitariancatastrophe notwithstanding,will have to await the outcome

of the Indian general election. For over two and a half years, an All

Party Representatives Conference (APRC)convened by the Rajapaksa regime hasbeen in existence. Set up to come up with

40

The acute dilemma and challenge

confronting the Tamilpolity remains and it

will have to be resolved in a context of probable

triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state

”

WAR ZONE

Sri Lankan devotees a split second after ablast at a mosque atAkuressa; (right) IndianForeign Secretary ShivShankar Menon

Sri Lanka 2nd time 6.qxd 5/5/09 12:02 PM Page 5

DSIAPRIL 2009

consensual proposals for a political settle-ment of the conflict, the APRC has been atvarious times stymied by the ideologicaland political imperatives of the regime.Proposals that it came up with, along federal lines on the recommendations ofan expert panel, were jettisoned on presi-dential instruction and now the APRC isrestricted to recommending fuller imple-mentation of the provisions of the currentconstitution. This is a direct reference tothe system of Provincial Councils that

were ushered in through the ThirteenthAmendment to the Constitution in thewake of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.Two key areas of the system have yet to be implemented in full. They relate topolice powers and powers over land. Theexpectation was that the APRC would recommend Thirteenth Amendment Plus,rather than fuller, leave aside full, implementation of a system of provincialdevolution in which the balance of powersare weighted decisively in favour of thecentral government.

The current concern is that the ideolog-

ical orientation of majoritarianism of theRajapaksa regime, buttressed by conven-tional military victory, will not translateinto demonstrable commitment to arriveat a political settlement. There are concernstoo, that political settlement aside, conven-tional military victory could strengthen the case for majoritarianism and its consol-idation, even extending to “ethnic re-engineering” of the population in thenorth and east of Sri Lanka. These are fearsthat are expressed by stakeholders in theeast, despite that province having been“liberated” from LTTE control in 2006. If

the Sri Lankan state and its current stan-dard bearers, the Rajapaksa regime, was tojettison the opportunity created by thisconventional military victory for a new social contract for the country, which accommodates the aspirations of all of itspeoples, the unity of Sri Lanka and itsprospects for peace and prosperity will befurther retarded. A lot is riding on how theend game ends and on the willingness and ability of all stakeholders to transform apost-war situation into a post-conflict one.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the Execu-tive Director of the Centre for Policy Alterna-tives (CPA) an independent and non-partisanpublic policy institute focusing on issues ofdemocratic governance and peace throughprogrammes of research and advocacy.

41

status quo? Was this a war against terror-ism and not a war in the context of an ethnicconflict with deep political roots that have tobe addressed if peace is to be achieved?The Rajapaksa Regime: The political ori-entation and direction of the Rajapaksaregime does not make for optimism as far asa political settlement is concerned. Capital-ising on the Bush era War on Terrorismrhetoric and on a “We versus Them” pa-triot vs traitor discourse with its attendanthuman rights violations, culture of im-

punity and crack down ondissent and the media, theRajapaksa regime has yet todemonstrate its commit-ment to a political settle-ment, beyond the rhetoricwhich many believe is forthe sole purpose of placating the interna-tional community and India in particular.The latter, as the key international actor inthe region, has gained in salience as agitation on the Sri Lanka issue in Tamil

Nadu has gained in salienceand forced Delhi to take on amore proactive role on SriLanka. The full extent of this,the unfolding humanitariancatastrophe notwithstanding,will have to await the outcome

of the Indian general election. For over two and a half years, an All

Party Representatives Conference (APRC)convened by the Rajapaksa regime hasbeen in existence. Set up to come up with

40

The acute dilemma and challenge

confronting the Tamilpolity remains and it

will have to be resolved in a context of probable

triumphalism on the part of the Sri Lankan state

”

WAR ZONE

Sri Lankan devotees a split second after ablast at a mosque atAkuressa; (right) IndianForeign Secretary ShivShankar Menon

Sri Lanka 2nd time 6.qxd 5/5/09 12:02 PM Page 5

DSIAPRIL 2009NEIGHBOURWATCH

PROVINCIAL authorities in the SwatValley in northwestern Pakistan havestruck a peace deal with local Taliban

franchisees, and in it the government agreedto extend Islamic law in the area. Since then,commentators around the world have pre-tended to know what the agreement means.Some suspect a “hidden hand”, whether itis the intelligence agencies or the UnitedStates. In a conspiracy-prone Pakistan, someeven talk of an inside deal between the armyand the militants - even as they ignore thehundreds of casualties that the army suffered in Swat. Never mind that facts mayinterfere with these pet theories.

In reality, only the locals know what thedeal really means. I recently received thefollowing account from a young womanfrom the area: “For months and monthsthe military has been trying to quell themilitants. Two days ago their failure wasaccepted when the provincial governmentof the North-West Frontier Province wentinto talks with Mullah Sufi Mohammadand accepted some things. We don't yetknow what those things are but the firstpromise is peace. Peace on what grounds?We don't know.

“Today the party of the Mullah announced that ‘democracy’ is un-Islamic.

It is too late. We have lost the battle againstthe militants. We have seen day by day howgovernment and army have (been) weak-ened, how they have finally been reducedto talk and to deal. Nobody is accountablefor the thousands killed, for the closure ofschools, for the beheadings of men andwomen. Nobody. Someone said to me theother day – ‘Don't complain, because theone you complain to will be your enemy.’

“We no longer can turn (to anyone)here to complain. We now have to think about how to survive this. We nowhave to give up much of what many of usbelieve in - tolerance, peace, educatedwomen, and freedom.”

She believes the North-West FrontierProvince is lost. And she questionedwhether President Obama understandsthe extremists. “He seems to think thatthese people can be contained within theirland, or (any) land. He thinks there is ameeting point, a dialogue possibility.Those who think that giving the militantstheir haven will contain them - well, therest of the country and the world will seewhat this will lead to. This is not the end,it is only the beginning.”

I can see her point. We seem to be reviv-ing a deal that fell apart last year, a deal that

Pakistan treads a perilous path after signing a dealwith the Taliban, a deal which fell apart in days last

year. This time, the Taliban are already on the prowl

Jubiliant Pakistani police commandoschant slogans after overpoweringmasked gunmen who had besieged apolice academy last monthWARINESS IN PAKISTAN

42 43

Shuja Nawaz

Pakistan 2nd time.qxd:KARGIL.qxd 5/5/09 11:55 AM Page 1

DSIAPRIL 2009NEIGHBOURWATCH

PROVINCIAL authorities in the SwatValley in northwestern Pakistan havestruck a peace deal with local Taliban

franchisees, and in it the government agreedto extend Islamic law in the area. Since then,commentators around the world have pre-tended to know what the agreement means.Some suspect a “hidden hand”, whether itis the intelligence agencies or the UnitedStates. In a conspiracy-prone Pakistan, someeven talk of an inside deal between the armyand the militants - even as they ignore thehundreds of casualties that the army suffered in Swat. Never mind that facts mayinterfere with these pet theories.

In reality, only the locals know what thedeal really means. I recently received thefollowing account from a young womanfrom the area: “For months and monthsthe military has been trying to quell themilitants. Two days ago their failure wasaccepted when the provincial governmentof the North-West Frontier Province wentinto talks with Mullah Sufi Mohammadand accepted some things. We don't yetknow what those things are but the firstpromise is peace. Peace on what grounds?We don't know.

“Today the party of the Mullah announced that ‘democracy’ is un-Islamic.

It is too late. We have lost the battle againstthe militants. We have seen day by day howgovernment and army have (been) weak-ened, how they have finally been reducedto talk and to deal. Nobody is accountablefor the thousands killed, for the closure ofschools, for the beheadings of men andwomen. Nobody. Someone said to me theother day – ‘Don't complain, because theone you complain to will be your enemy.’

“We no longer can turn (to anyone)here to complain. We now have to think about how to survive this. We nowhave to give up much of what many of usbelieve in - tolerance, peace, educatedwomen, and freedom.”

She believes the North-West FrontierProvince is lost. And she questionedwhether President Obama understandsthe extremists. “He seems to think thatthese people can be contained within theirland, or (any) land. He thinks there is ameeting point, a dialogue possibility.Those who think that giving the militantstheir haven will contain them - well, therest of the country and the world will seewhat this will lead to. This is not the end,it is only the beginning.”

I can see her point. We seem to be reviv-ing a deal that fell apart last year, a deal that

Pakistan treads a perilous path after signing a dealwith the Taliban, a deal which fell apart in days last

year. This time, the Taliban are already on the prowl

Jubiliant Pakistani police commandoschant slogans after overpoweringmasked gunmen who had besieged apolice academy last monthWARINESS IN PAKISTAN

42 43

Shuja Nawaz


DSI APRIL 2009

the army opposed at that time. It fell apartin a matter of days, and the first army sortieresulted in some 18 dead soldiers. Will thearmy want to re-enter the fray if this dealfalls apart? Who will claim responsibilityfor the inevitable failure?

Recall that in 1994 Prime Minister BenazirBhutto's government agreed with the samemilitant leader, Mullah Sufi Mohammad, toallow him to run some districts of Swat andMalakand according to his convoluted viewof Islamic law. He thus got legitimacy andgrew into a force that now has brought anew government to the table.

Pakistan's constitution already containsprovisions protecting against un-Islamiclaws. Why then does the country need anagreement with violent extremists to ensure Islamic laws? And who will pronounce on these laws? The militants?And if the army is to remain in a reactivemode, as a government minister explained, will they stand by and watch

Taliban justice being meted out to people?Who will ensure that girls' schools will be

rebuilt? Who will protect those who refuseto wear a beard or a burqa? Who will disarmthe militants? Certainly not the Taliban.

The Swat deal gives territory in Pakistanproper to a militant minority, against thewishes of the majority of Muslims in whatwas once a valley of peace and quiet. If themilitants gain this foothold, the stain of ex-tremism will spread further into Pakistan.My young correspondent may be right:This is not the end, it is only the beginning.

Shuja Nawas is the author of CrossedSwords: Pakistan, its Army, and the WarsWithin (Oxford University Press 2008) andthe forthcoming FATA: A Most DangerousPlace (CSIS January 2009). Shuja is cur-rently the first director of the South Asia Cen-ter of The Atlantic Council of the UnitedStates in Washington DC. This article firstappeared in Boston Globe.

In a conspiracy pronePakistan, some even talk of an inside deal

between the army and the militants—even as

they ignore the hundreds of casualities that thearmy suffered in Swat

”

Pakistani fire fightersextinguish a blaze at theNATO supply trucks’ terminalon the outskirts of Peshawar

44


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DSI APRIL 2009

An update onmilitary policy

defe

ncet

alk

UPSET over problems relating to spares supply forBritish 'Hawks' Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), Indiahas shelved plans to place follow-on orders for theaircraft and instead floated new tenders to supple-ment its trainer fleet. Indian Air Force (IAF)sources said that the new tenders—Request for

Proposals (RFP) in Defence parlance — wereissued about a month ago to six global aircraftmanufacturers.

Surprisingly, UnitedKingdom-based Hawksmanufacturer BAE Sys-tems finds a place amongthe six companies which

had received the fresh tenders. But it was being approached for an upgraded version of the AJTs,sources said.

Others trainers that the IAF has shown interest inand sent the tender papers to were Italy's Alenia forthe M-346, Korean T-50s, the Chez L-159, RussianYAK-130 and MiG AT Trainer, sources said.

After a procurement process that lasted nearly20 years, India finally entered a contract for the delivery of 66 Hawks trainers with BAE in 2004. Thecontract had an in-built provision for a follow-on order for 40 more aircraft.

But the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)had been finding it difficult to maintain the produc-tion lines for the aircraft at its facility due to considerable delays in spares supplies, sourcessaid. The move of the IAF to go in for a new brandof trainer aircraft came as a surprise, as it had originally planned to have a single type of trainers inthe fleet to train future fighter pilots.

Press Trust of India

Govt cancels tendersfor 22 IAF attackhelicoptersTENDERS for purchase of 22 attack helicopters forthe Indian Air Force (IAF), issued in May last, hasbeen cancelled. Fresh tenders for the helicopterswill be issued soon, the sources said.

“The Request for Proposals (RFP) for the 22 attack helicopters have been cancelled, as the threeoffers received from foreign de-fence companies did not meet theStaff Qualitative Requirementsset by the government. We will is-sue fresh RFP for the platformsoon,” the sources said. With this,the IAF's plans to operationalisethe 22 attack helicopters beginning 2010 would be hit considerably and could be delayed beyond2012, they said.

The Defence Ministry had issued an RFP

to buy the 22 attack helicopters at acost of USD 25 million per plat-form, including weapons, to boostthe IAF's surveillance and combatcapabilities. The RFP was sent toAgusta Westland, Boeing, Euro-

copter, Kha- zan and Bell Helicopter. However, thegovernment received replies from only three com-panies for the 2.5 tonne twin-engine helicopter.

The Times of India

SPARE PROBLEMProduction line ofthe Hawk 132 atHAL, Bangalore. TheIndian Air Force(IAF) is upset overthe supply problemsof British AdvancedTrainer Jets

TECHNICAL SNAG Tenderswere cancelled by theGovernment as the offers didnot meet the staff qualitativerequirement

46

IAF plans for additional Hawks advancedjet trainers shelved

DSI Defence Talk 6 2nd time.qxd 5/5/09 11:29 AM Page 1

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48

Air MarshalPV Naik willbe the newChief of AirStaff

THE GOVERNMENT has appointedAir Marshal Pradeep Vasant NaikPVSM VSM ADC presently the ViceChief of Air Staff as the next Chiefof Air Staff with effect from the afternoon of May 31, 2009. The present Chief of Air Staff, Air ChiefMarshal Fali Homi Major PVSMAVSM SC VM ADC retires fromservice on May 31, 2009.

Born on July 22 1949, Air MarshalNaik was commissioned into the AirForce on 21 Jun 1969 as a Fighter Pilot. During his long distinguishedservice spanning nearly 40 years hehas served in a variety of CommandStaff and Instructional appoint-ments. He has 3085 hrs of flying tohis credit. The Air Officer also tookpart in 1971 war. Before taking overas VCAS, he was Air Officer Com-manding-in-Chief of the Allahabadbased Central Air Command.

Besides being a fellow of the National Defence College, New Delhi, College of DefenceManagement, Secundrabad and Defence Services Staff College,Wellington, he has attended a vari-ety of courses like flying instructorCourse, Jungle & Snow Survival,Junior Commanders Course.

India jettisonsFrench jet fromrace for fighter dealFRENCH fighter Rafale has being knocked outof the race for the “mother of all defence deals”,the Rs 42,000-crore project to acquire 126medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA)for IAF, leaving five jets in the fray now.

Defence ministry sources said Rafale had“fallen short’’ on “severalcounts’’ listed in the GSQRs(general staff qualitative requirements) drawn up by IAF. “It did not pass in thetechnical evaluation of thebids submitted by the six contenders,” said a source.

The move is sure to rile France, which likeother countries in the contention for what willbe the largest global defence contract hadmounted a high-voltage campaign for the $10.4billion MMRCA contract.

“We have no confirmation from the IndianMoD... We are surprised as there was no techni-cal lacuna in our bid,” said a French official. Indiaand France are also yet to settle their bitter

differences for theupgrade of the 51 Mi-rage-2000s in IAF’scombat fleet despitebeing locked in ne-gotiations for overtwo years.

As for MMRCA battle, India will now inviteonly American F/A-18 ‘Super Hornet’ (Boeing)and F-16 ‘Falcon’ (Lockheed Martin), RussianMiG-35 (United Aircraft Corporation), SwedishGripen (Saab) and Eurofighter Typhoon (consor-tium of British, German, Spanish and Italiancompanies) for field trials likely to begin fromJuly-August.

The Times of India

IN & OUTFrench fighter Rafale (top) has beenknocked out of the race for the acquisitionof 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft(MMRCA); American F/A-18 Super Hornet(above) is one of the five left in the fray


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DSI APRIL 2009

50

AT THE opening of the Aero India 09 defenceexposition, Defence Minister AK Antonyclearly enjoyed what must have seemed likea wild-west style shootout. One after another,four contenders for India's purchase of 126medium fighters --- the Eurofighter Typhoon,the F/A-18, the F-16 and the MiG-35 --- took tothe skies in a fiesta of aerobatics clearlyaimed at impressing the decision-makerswho must decide which aircraft will win the$12 billion contract.

But the performance that evoked MrAntony's praise was that of the Indian-builtTejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). Although more cautious than the all-out performances of the established fighters, theTejas went far beyond anything it had ever displayed before, surprising thespectators with steep climbs, an invertedpass, high-gravity turns and loops.

Addressing the press, Mr Antony remarked, “I was very excited to see the LCA.After many years we could see the LCA do-ing manoeuvres… I was excited to see the In-dian-made LCA in Indian skies.”

But even amidst success, the Tejas LCA isstruggling to overcome major developmenthurdles. Its maker, Bangalore-based Aero-nautical Development Agency (ADA) hastaken the crucial decision to bring in a design consultant, a global aerospace major

that would assist HAL to over-come persistent designglitches that dog the LCA, including fuel distribution, uneven braking, flight controls,environment controls and testing. And while US-basedBoeing has declined to supplysuch know-how, German-Spanish consortium, EADS,one of the makers of the Eu-rofighter, has aggressively pur-sued the consultancy as a wayof flying into the Indian market.

In multiple interviews withsenior Indian and EADS officials who requested anonymity, Business Standard haspieced together the EADS strategy. The com-pany has decided to supply India with hightechnology for Indian products that are not directly competing with an EADS product.The Tejas is not in the same category as theheavier Eurofighter.

Having established its presence in the Tejas programme, EADS is confident that itwould be well positioned to get its EurojetEJ200 engine accepted for the Tejas. India iscurrently deciding between the EJ200 and theGE-414 engine for powering future squadronsof the Tejas.

And EADS believes that winning

the contract for the EJ200 engine,and producing it in India, would position it perfectly for the lucrative medium fighter contract; twin EJ200 enginespower the Eurofighter.

While willing to part with thetechnology assistance needed toget the LCA over its hump,EADS worries about the possi-bility of eventually being held responsible for a possible failurein the Tejas development.

“Let's be clear that we are notunderwriting the LCA prog-

ramme”, says a senior European official re-lated with the contract. Another likens EADS'srole to helping someone in a dark room turn onthe light switch. But EADS will do no more thanindicate the direction of the switch.

The German and Spanish governmentshave already permitted EADS to part with thetechnology needed for the Tejas programme;the US government, in contrast, imposedstringent restrictions on Boeing. Explains asenior EADS official, “If we don't supply tech-nology, India will develop it anyway, perhapswith some delay. So it is better for us to estab-lish our presence here, partner India in the Te-jas, and perhaps even market it together.”

Business Standard

GROWING CONCERNSThe Tejas Light CombatAircraft (LCA) mighthave been applauded bythe Defence Minister AKAntony at the Aero India’09 defence exposition,but the aircraft is stillstruggling to overcomemajor developmentalglitches like fueldistribution, flightcontrols, environmentcontrols and testing

EADS plans to ride the LCA into Indian market



DSI APRIL 2009

Defence allocationup 35 per centCONSIDERING the changed security scenario in view of the Mumbai terror attacks, the government has allocated Rs1,41,703 crore (Rs 1,417.03 billion) for defence sector, almost a 35 per cent increase from the previous year's budgetprovisions. Last year'sallocation for Defencestood at Rs 1,05,600crore (Rs 1,056 billion)and the current in-crease amounted toRs 36,103 crore (Rs361.03 billion).

Presenting the In-terim Budget for 2009-10 in the Lok Sabha, fi-nance ministerPranab Mukherjeesaid the allocationhas been increased because of the prevail-ing security environment, which has 'deteri-orated considerably.'

Noting that the Mumbai attacks hadamounted to the threshold being crossedon the security front, Mukherjee said, “Weare going through tough times. The Mumbai terror attacks have given an entirely new dimension to cross-border terrorism.”

With the total revised expenditure for Defence last year standing at Rs 1,14,600crore (Rs 1,146 billion), he said the

increased Plan expenditure for Defencethis year would be Rs 86,879 crore (Rs 868.79billion). Last year's Plan expenditure wasonly Rs 73,600 crore (Rs 736 billion), therebyproviding an increase of Rs 13,279 crore (Rs132.79 billion) this year.

The increased allocation this year wouldinclude Rs 54,824 crore (Rs 548.24 billion) fo-capital expenditure as against Rs 41,000crore (Rs 410 billion) in the revised esti-mates for 2008-09, Mukherjee said. However,

the government wouldprovide for any addi-tional requirement forthe security of the na-tion, he added.

The increased allo-cation for defence assumes significanceas the governmenthas decided to go onfast track acquisitionof defence equip-ment. The armedforces have already

prepared a long list of equipment, mainly forits special forces commandos, to be boughtunder the fast track process.

After the Mumbai attacks, the govern-ment has initiated a massive revamp of thesecurity structure of the country, which includes creation of a Coastal Command.Despite the nearly 35 per cent increase thisyear, India's defence spending is still atabout 2 per cent of the GDP, compared toChina's 7 per cent and Pakistan's 5 per cent.

Rediff.com

52

NSG learns from 26/11, to upgrade its firepower

LEARNING from its 60-hour gun battle duringthe 26/11 Mumbai Terror attacks, the NationalSecurity Guard (NSG) is all set to upgrade itsequipment and weapon profile.

Having already moved on procuring body-worn video and audio bugs, mini-remotely operated vehicles and real time x-ray viewingsystem almost immediately after the Mumbaiattacks, this elite commando force is now inthe process of procuring night-sight equip-ment for its SIG (SWAT) assault rifles, laserlistening devices and light support weapons.

Sources said procurement of these equip-ments was at the top of the force's agenda following an in-depth analysis of the force'sstrengths and weaknesses during the "debriefing" following the Mumbai operations.While NSG officials maintained that some ofthese equipments were already available withthe force, they admitted that there was freshimpetus to plans to procure the best available,and in sufficient numbers.

TOUGH TIMESIn the wake of thecurrent securityscenario, FinanceMinister PranabMukherjee hasannounced anincreasedallocation of fundsfor the defence andsecurity of thecountry

SECURITYLESSONSAfter the 60-hour gunbattle on 26/11in Mumbai, theNationalSecurity Guardis all set toupgrade itsequipment andweapon profile

BrahMos Block-IIversion hits bulls eyeON 29th March 2009 the land attack version ofBrahMos block-II was tested from a Mobile Autonomous Launcher at Pokhran test range bythe Indian army officers. The missile took offsuccessfully at 11.15 a.m. and hit the desired tar-get at bull’s eye meeting all mission parameters.The launch was witnessed by Lt. General A.S.Sekhon DGMO , Lt. Gen. K.R. Rao , Comman-dant School of Artillery & Maj. General V.K. Tiwari ADG Artillery along with other seniorarmy officers . Dr. A. Sivathanu Pillai CEO &MD BrahMos along with Director DRDL Mr. P.Venugopalan , Project Director Mr.S. Som, Exec-utive Director (Production) Rear Admiral(Retd.) S. Mohapatra and other senior scien-tists were present during the launch.

This is the third launch in the series for theBlock-II version for the Indian Army. With thislaunch the requirement of army for the land attack version with Block-II advanced seekersoftware with target discriminating capabili-ties has been fully met and this version isready for induction. This will provide an enhanced capability to the user for selectionof a particular land target amongst group oftargets. With this success BrahMos has become the only supersonic cruise missilepossessing this advanced capability in theworld, providing an edge to the user with pre-cise hit. The Indian Army is the first army in theworld to have a regiment of supersonic cruisemissile with advanced capabilities.



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