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Defender Acts 1st
A1 A2
D1 C11 C12
D2 C21 C22
where Ci,j=Cost to defender from play (Aj|Di)
A1 A2
D1 1 12
D2 21 22
Random Cost Matrix Expected Cost Matrix
where i,j=E[Ci,j]
Minimax Strategy
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1 C11 C12 C*1
D2 C21 C22 C*2
A1 A2 Maxj i,j
D1 1 12 *1
D2 21 22 *2
Random Cost Matrix Expected Cost Matrix
Minimax Strategy
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1N(6,10) N(6,2) C*
1
D2N(6.5,3.5) N(7.5,3) C*2
A1 A2 Maxj i,j
D1 *1
D2 *2
Random Cost Matrix Expected Cost Matrix
Example: Ci,j=N(i,j, i,j)
Minimax Strategy
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1N(6,10) N(6,2) C*
1
D2N(6.5,3.5) N(7.5,3) C*2
A1 A2 Maxj i,j
D1 *1
D2 *2
Random Cost Matrix Expected Cost Matrix
Example: Ci,j=N(i,j, i,j)
Which action should Defender take?
D*=argmini maxj E[Ci,j]
=argmini *i
Banks and Anderson Strategy #1
Choose D1, but rather close to indifferent
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1N(6,10) N(6,2) C*
1
D2N(6.5,3.5) N(7.5,3) C*2
D*=argmaxi P(C*i < mink C*k)
Histogram of Dif
C*_1 - C*_2
De
nsi
ty
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
0.0
00
.02
0.0
40
.06
0.0
8
P(C*_1 < C*_2)= 0.5053
Histogram of Dif
C*_1 - C*_2
De
nsi
ty
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
0.0
00
.02
0.0
40
.06
0.0
8
P(C*_1 < C*_1)= 0.5053
Banks and Anderson Strategy #2
From this, choose D2
Score(i)=mink {C*k} / C*i
Score(i) 2 (0,1] – Larger is better
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
6
density(x = Score[, 1])
N = 10000 Bandwidth = 0.03499
De
nsi
ty
Score(1)Score(2)
E[Score(1)]=0.815
E[Score(2)]=0.822
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1N(6,10) N(6,2) C*
1
D2N(6.5,3.5) N(7.5,3) C*2
D*=argmaxi E[Score(i)]
An Alternative Approach
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
00
.05
0.1
00
.15
C*=max Cost
De
nsi
ty
f(C*_1)f(C*_2)
m*_1= 10.14
m*_2= 8.9
where m*i=E[C*i]=E[maxj Ci,j]
A1 A2 Maxj Ci,j
D1N(6,10) N(6,2) C*
1
D2N(6.5,3.5) N(7.5,3) C*2
Choose D2, since worst case has lower expected cost
D*=argmini E[maxj Ci,j]