CHAPTER 5

Defense

PURPOSE

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS are undertaken to:

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Cause an enemy attack to fail.

Preserve forces, facilities, installations, activities.

Retain tactical, strategic, or political objectives.

Gain time.

Concentrate forces elsewhere.

� W dear own enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations.

a Control essential terrain.

� Force the enemy to mass so that he is more vulnerable to

our firepower.

CONTENTSPAGE

PURPOSE 5-1

WHEN TO DEFEND 5-2

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE 5-2

ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE 5-1o

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WHEN TO DEFEND

While it is generally true that the outcomeof combat derives from the results ofoffensive operations, it may frequently benecessary, even advisable, to defend. Indeed,the defender enjoys many advantages.Among these are the opportunity to know theterrain, to site and carefully emplaceweapons and units so as to minimize theirvulnerabilities and maximize theircapabilities, and to reconnoiter and preparethe defensive area in depth. In fact, thedefender has every advantage but one—hedoes not have the initiative. To gain theinitiative he must attack. Therefore, attacki8 a vital part of all defen8iveoperation.

0 Understand the enemy.

@See the battlefield.

eConcentrate at the critical timesand places.

o~Fight as a combined arms team.

9 Exploit the advantages of thedefender.

Understand the Enemy. h Euro~e.Army forces, together with the NATO all~es;face the combined armies of the WarsawPact. Elsewhere in the world, we may faceforces organized, trained, and equipped bythe Warsaw Pact countries. Every Armycommander must study those weapons andthe tactics and techniques for using them.The Soviet Army, for example, attacks onvery narrow fronts in great depth, withartillery massed at 70 to 100 tubes perkilometer in the breakthrough sector.Against a US division in Europe, WarsawPact forces might throw as many as 600

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tanks into the leading echelon, followed byan equal number shortly thereafter. Thisdoctrine had its origins in World War II. It isdeeply ingrained in the Soviet Army and if weshould go to war in Europe, those are exactlythe tactics we would face. Based on thebattles of Kursk and Kharkov, the SovietArmy prefers deep converging penetrationsto cut off and destroy large opposing forces.In any event, the enemy in battle is alwaysworth studying. His strengths as well as hisweaknesses must be known. Army forces,fighting outnumbered, cannot afford to learnthese things after the battle starts. The timeto study and think is now.

see the Battlefield. The outnumbereddefender must know where to concentrate. Ifhe does not—if he is surprised-he may beoverwhelmed. In order to offset the numericalsuperiority of the attacker, our Army mustsee the whole battlefield more accuratelythan the enemy and see it continuously frombefore the attack starts until the attack is ~defeated. Smaller unit commanders do nothave the capability to see far in front of theline of contact nor do they have the sensorsand platforms necessary to do the whole job.However, each commander must do all he canand report promptly all he knows. The highercommanders—division and corps—have thechief responsibility, for it is they who mustorder the concentration of forces and order itin time. These commanders have a variety ofsensors at their disposal and can call on evenmore from the USAF and from national levelagencies and assets.

COMMANDERS MUST BE ABLETO MAKE CRITICAL DECISIONS

BASED ON INCOMPLETE EVIDENCEIdeally, the intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance operation would be in fulloperation long before the enemy started hisconcentration of force. His radio nets wouldbe continuously monitored. His electronicemitters identified and located, his move-ments monitored and recorded, his logistic

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actions followed, and his posture kept underclose scrutiny. In the real world of deception,countermeasures, and inadequate resources,only part of this program can be undertakenand only part of that will be successful. Thus,the corps and division commanders mustmake tough critical decisions based onincomplete evidence. The more thecommander knows about enemy weapons,tactics, psychology, and the more he hasstudied the terrain, the better his decisionswill be. Bad or slow decisions at this stage ofthe battle can be fataLThe staff can help, butthe commander decides.

Concentrate at the Critical Timesand places. Generalsmust&i& exactlywhen and where they will concentrate theirforces based upon the results of theirintelligence operations and their analysis ofthat information. They must also decide howmuch force will be ‘required to cope with theenemy attack within the terrain and space—limitations of the defensive area. As a rule ofthumb, they should seek not to be outweighedmore than 3:1 in terms ofcombatpower. Withvery heavy air and field artillery support onfavorable terrain, it maybe possible to defendat a numerical disadvantage of somethinglike 5:1 for short periods of time. In any event,the purpose of the defense must be toconcentrate enough force, and the right kindof force, to destroy the masses of enemyarmored vehicles in the assault.

BE WILLING TO TAKE RISKSON THE FLANKS

To defend against breakthrough tactics,division commanders must not onlyconcentrate at the right time and place, butthey also must take risks on the flanks. Adefense which spreads two brigades thinlyacross a wide area and holds one brigade inreserve for counterattack will be defeated bya breakthrough attack. It will in effect bedefeated piecemeal because everywhere itwill be too weak and thus overwhelmed.

Thus, for example, division commanders inEurope must be willing to concentratefirepower and up to six to eight of theirmaneuver battalions on one-fifth of theirfront to meet breakthrough forces of 20-25battalions. They must cover the remainingground with air and ground cavalry,remaining battalions, and attack helicopterunits. If the forces and firepower areinadequate to achieve these combat powerratios, then an effective defense is notpossible, and division commanders musttrade space for time by going to the delay.Corps commanders can assist divisioncommanders who face a main thrust byreducing the division’s area of operation orproviding more fire support and air support.

THE DECISION TOCONCENTRATE MUST BE

TIMELY

The high mobility of armored andmechanized forces allows the divisioncommander to reinforce rapidly, by usingreserves from the rear and by moving unitsfkom less threatened flanks-if he decidesearly enough. The high mobility of attackhelicopters and airmobile antitank teamspermits the commander to move boldly. If hemakes a mistake and starts to concentrate atthe wrong place, he can countermarch hismobile elements quickly and rectifi the error.In fast-moving mounted warfare, the require-ment for continuous, reliable, securecommunications is absolute.

Concentration of field artillery is equallyimportant. Unlike tanks and infantry, fieldartillery fire can often be concentratedwithout moving batteries. In extended areas,however, field artillery also must be moved topositions within range of the enemy’s maineffort. Division commanders would certainlyconcentrate the fires of at least three of theirfour battalions and would expect to bereinforced by the bulk of the corps artillery.

Air defense batteries and platoons pose aspecial problem of judgment. Soviet doctrinegenerally calls for the use of front aviation(fighters and light bombers) beyond the area

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AIR DEFENSE PRIORITY SHOULDBE TO RESERVES, COMMAND

AND CONTROL, AND SUPPORTFACILITIES

PROVIDE MASSIVE CLOSEAIR SUPPORT

covered by Soviet artillery. Thus, the firstpriority for deployment of divisional <Chaparral/Vulcan in the defense should bethe division command and control and thedivision support area, plus any reserves thatmay be held back. However, Soviet fighterscan be used against forward forces, and theiraircraft are now being equipped with guidedmunitions which presumably will increasesuch use. Additionally, armed helicopterswill operate in forward areas. Therefore,some coverage of forward brigade areas byVulcan units will be necessary. Air defenseweapons must be echeloned forward to matchthe enemy’s actual use of his close supportaviation.

Under certain operational circumstancesat the outset of hostilities, short range airdefense systems (SHORAD), such asChaparral/Vulcan, might be deployed tocomplement high and medium altitude(HIMAD) systems, such as Hercules/HAWK,defending the highest priority theater targetsin the rear area.

Close air support will be required forforward engaged elements in the area of thebreakthrough attack. It must be providedmassively, in time, at the critical point. Thedecision to provide massive close air support <must be taken jointl y by Army and Air Forcecommanders or by the Joint Forcecommander, and must include a jointlyplanned and conducted air defensesuppression operation.

Fight As A Combined Arms Team.Colonels must organize their forces forcombat according to the size and density ofthe enemy attack, the characteristics of theterrain to be defended, and the mix of thedefending units. Generally, tanks and long-range antitank guided missiles (ATGM) areemployed in the more open terrain;mechanized infantry in urban, wooded or lesstrafflcable areas. However, the decision onhow to cross-reinforce, or even whether to doso, depends upon how the commanderdecides to fight the battle. The defendingcommander organizes the area to be defended

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into a series of battle positions. Battlepositions, selected as a result of terrain andweapon analysis, are locations from which,or in which, units can defend, block, orattack. They may or may not be mutuallysupporting. They can be selected foroccupation by units as large as battalion taskforces and as small as platoons. Thedefending commander thus directs the fightby specifying which battle position his unitswill occupy and what they will do there—defend, support, attack.

As friendly units converge on the critical UNITS ARE EMpLOyED BASED

battle site, the battahon and brigade OIUTHEIR WEAPONScommanders commit them to combat CAPABILITIES AND THEaccording to their weapons capabilities and ENEMY’S MOVEMENTthe movement of the enemy force.

The first increment of combat poweravailable is usually the massed fires of allfield artillery in range. Even if artillery firedoes not destroy large numbers of armoredvehicles, it buttons up tanks and reducestheir effectiveness greatly (as much as 50%);thus the tanks cannot maneuver as easily oruse the terrain as well, nor can they seedefending weapons as well and thus cannotengage or suppress them as effectively.Artillery can prevent enemy infantry from

‘~ dismounting to attack our dismountedantitank weapons. Artillery can also smokethe overmatching positions covering theenemy attack.

The second increment of combatpower available to the defending Colonelscould be attack helicopters. Reinforcing fromdivision and corps level at speeds up to 125knots, attack helicopters have a highprobability of killing enemy tanks at rangesbevond 3000 meters. The helicopters will bem&t useful when the enemy ha~ moved out INCREASE COMBAT POWERfrom under at least part of his air defense WITH FIELD ARTILLERY ANDumbrella and bevond his preplanned ‘nAcK ‘E L[cO~ERsartillery fires. Att~ck helicop-tirs shouldoperat6 under the control of engaged brigadeor battalion commanders and be committedin relays on a sustained and concentratedbasis.

If dismounted antitank guided missileteams can be moved into the battle byhelicopter, they represent a valuablereinforcement, but one which must be

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employed carefully. Because the airmobile

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TOW teams (from light infantry units ordismounted from mech units) are vulnerableto massed artillery, they should not beemployed in the forefront of the initialdefense. They should be kept out of areaswhich will probably be subjected topreplanned massive artillery fires. Theyshould normally be employed on the flanks ofpenetrations and be separated fromattacking armor by terrain obstacles such asrivers, woods, or steep embankments.

Whenever possible, they should be sited todeliver surprise attacks—crossing shots fromreverse slopes or through saddles or frombuilt-up areas so they will be protected tosome extent from frontal suppressive fire.These ATGM teams must also be withdrawn,repositioned, and resupplied by helicopter.They must occupy positions which affordterrain cover to the helicopters which supportthem. They must not be expected to moveabout the mechanized battlefield on foot.

Close air support of engaged forces atcritical times and places provides a quick andmajor increase in combat power. However,close air support requires air defensesuppression which will involve many supportaircraft, coordinated joint electronic warfare,utilization of Army firepower and jointplanning.

As tank and mechanized battalions beginto arrive, the brigade and battalioncommanders must organize them for combatand assign battle positions and missions.The brigade commander may decide to retainwhole tank and mechanized infantrybattalions under his direct control, withoutcross-reinforcing. When he does so, he mustprovide for the necessary coordinationbetween battalions.

However, the repeated requirement forclose interaction of tanks and mechanizedinfantry will normally lead the brigadecommander to organize and employ cross-reinforced battalion task forces. The tank-heavy task forces are organized andemployed in the best tank terrain; themechanized heavy task forces on the flanksor more difficult terrain.

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This same consideration repeats itself atthe battalion level. The battalion task forcecommander may decide to retain pureseparate tank and mechanized infantrycompanies, and to provide for tank/infantrycoordination between companies. But if hevisualizes companies moving independentlyfrom position to position within his overalldefense plan, then he should cross-reinforceat company level. Cross-reinforcement belowcompany level should generally not takeplace.

THE COMMANDER BASES HISDECISION TO CROSS-

REINFORCE ON HOW HEDECIDES TO FIGHT THE BATTLE

It is, of course, possible to cross-reinforcesome elements and not others. For example, ifthe brigade commander plans to occupy aseries of mutually supporting battle positionsin depth to wear down the enemy, he maywish to do so by employing independentlyoperating cross-reinforced companies. If hethen plans to counterattack and destroyexposed or weakened elements, he could do sowith cross-reinforced battalions under thetactical control of the battalion commanders,or even pure battalions under his ownpersonal and direct control.

As the battle develops, the brigadecommander must move his defending forcesfrom one battle position to another so as totake maximum advantage of his weapons,the terrain, and such mines or obstacles thathe has been able to employ. His defense mustbe elastic—must absorb the shock—slow theattack—weaken it—and then destroy it.Some enemy forces will penetrate thedefenses and burst through ‘into the rear.Every element on the battlefield must beprepared to engage and destroy these smalladvance elements and not give-way to panicwhen they appear. For this purpose, theDragon ATGM, along with the LAW must beplentiful in the rear areas.

The Colonel must resupply his forces withfuel and ammunition and provide forbattlefield repair as far forward as possible.

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Exploiting the Advantages of theDefender. The success of the defense willultimately depend greatly on how well thecompanies, platoons, tank crews, and squads EXPLOIT THE ADVANTAGESexploit all the built-in advantages of the OF THE DEFENDERdefender. We depend on the Captain for thispurpose.

He must see to it that each weapon is sitedto take advantage of its range and specialpurpose and to minimize its vulnerability tocounterfire or suppressive fire. His fightingvehicles must be covered and concealed, or atleast be hull down. They must fire first. Theterrain must be exploited and reinforcedwhen necessary with mines and obstacles toslow down the enemy and improve theeffectiveness of the defending weapons.

Each battle position must combine thecharacteristics of a defense and an ambush.Several battle positions in mutual supportshould multiply the strength and value ofeach. The combination of all theseadvantages repeated in each set of positionsin depth, supported by field artillery, close airsupport and attack helicopters, should easilyL inflict very high losses on an attackingenemy.

Combined with stroig, short counter-strokes against exposed and weakenedenemy elements, this defense can and willsucceed. Sweeping counterattacks whichexpose our forces to heavy losses as theysurrender the advantages of the defendermust be the exception. Such counterattacksare allowable only if terrain key to thedefense must be regained. Even then, it maybe possible to control such terrain by firealone.

Although the active defense involves theutilization of successive battle positions indepth, to wear down and weaken the enemy,followed by counterattacks, it is necessary tomaintain the coherence of the overalldefense, including coordination on brigadeand division flanks. To the extent that thedefense can be conducted well forward in themain battle area, to that same extent will theproblems of flank coordination be easier. Inthe best of all situations, the general line of

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the FEBA can be maintained throughout the defensive system, then brigade and division ~battle. If it cannot be maintained and the commanders must exercise continuous activebattle takes place in the depth of the coordination with adjacent units.

TAN KS. Tanks engage enemy tanks, � Protecting tanks and antitank teams fromATGM, armored vehicles, and dismounted advancing enemy infantry.

infantry from covered and concealed� Conducting patrols and manning outposts

positions. Tanks provide the combat powerto move the team from one position to

to gain information about enemy activities

another in the face of enemy opposition or inon and behind the forward edge of thebattle area (FEBA).

counterattack. Tanks and A TGM are thebackbone of the defense.

FIELD ARTILLERY. Fie/d arti//ery

MECHANIZED INFANTRY. Mechanizedsupports and assists the defense by:

infantry supports and assists the defense by: .Destroying, smoking, or suppressing

. Destroying enemy tanks and armoredATGM and enemy tanks in overwatch

vehicles at long ranges with TOWpositions.

(3000m) and Dragon (1000m). .Disrupting continuity of enemy combined

�0verwatching tank movement andarms formations by separating infantryfrom tanks.

counterattacks with ATGM.

. Suppressing enemy antitank weapons.Destroying the momentum of assaulting

forces by planned massed fires.while friendly tanks are moving on thedefensive battlefield. .! Suppressing enemy tanks by causing

. Conducting dismounted attacks againstthem to button up, to get off roads, to slowdown, and to lose their ability to bring fire

enemy infantry antitank weapons if theycannot be suppressed and it is necessary

rapidly on defenders.

to move defending tanks in counterattack .Suppressing or destroying enemy artilleryor to new battle positions. and mortars by counterfire.

� Blocking covered and concealed routes .Destroying or suppressing forward areaof enemy attack or infiltration. enemy air defense weapons so that

� Patrolling and reconnoitering difficultdefending Army forces can utilize close

terrain day and night.air support.

.Securing tanks and ATGM at night..Scattering mines in the path of attacking

forces to stop them where our fires can

.Holding wide frontages, in economy of destroy them.force missions, and defending in terrain � isolating parts of the battlefield with aunsuitable for tanks, such as forestsand cities.

variety of munitions so that counter-attacks may be mounted against exposedand weakened attacking forces.

INFANTRY. Airmobile, airborne and otherlight infantry support and assist the defense AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY. Air defenseby: artillery supports and assists the defense by:

�Defending forest, mountain, and urban � Destroying or driving off close supportareas. aircraft and helicopters.

�Reinforcing threatened sectors with � Causing enemy aircraft to lose effective-airmobile antitank teams. ness (releasing ordnance at other than

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optimum altitudes, ranges, speeds, and USAF AIRCRAFT. USAF aircraft supportattitudes. ) and assist the defense by:

.Denying or limiting aerial recon - .Providing intelligence on enemy

naissance. concentrations through reconnaissance.

� Providing air defense protection for small � Providing close air support at the critical

unit lateral movement in the main battle times and places of enemy breakthrough

area. attacks.

�Providing convoy security for maneuver, � Destroying enemy second and third

combat support, and service support echelon forces before they are committed.

elements. .Interdicting enemy supplies of

.Providing, on order, suppressive fires ammunition, POL, and replacement

against ground targets in the main battle fighting vehicles.

area.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE. Electronic

COMBAT ENGINEERS. Combatwarfare (EW) forces support and assist the

engineers support and assist the defense by: defense by:

.Creating obstacles and minefield to.Jamming enemy command and control.

reinforce the defensive advantages of the .Jamming enemy air defense radars.terrain. �Jamming enemy weapons systems which

�0pening and closing lateral tactical rely on electronic guidance or control.routes.

� Blocking avenues of approach.

� Stopping enemy forces in the fields offire of defending weapons.

NIGHT OPERATIONS. Night vision andthermal imagery devices enable tank

.Undertaking combat construction to mechanized infantry, and attack helicopter

harden critical command, control and units to conduct the defense at night and

logistic elements. under conditions of reduced visibility similar

.Operating as infantry, if required.to the conduct of daylight operations. Withthese devices, units will be able to.”

.Concentrate forces at speeds approaching

ATTACK HE LlCOPTERS. Attackthose of daylight speeds.

helicopters support and assist the defense .Move on or between battle positions.by:

.Engage enemy targets at ranges near the.Overwatching armored counterattacks. full weapon capability.

.Guarding open flanks. .Provide mutual support between battle

.Reinforcing thinly held sectors.positions.

�Raiding enemy rear areas when�Fight at night as an integrated,

opportunities occur.coordinated combined arms team.

.1310 eking, reinforcing, and counter- Light infantry will be able to exploit theirattacking. weapons’ range capability at night, but will

.Containing and destroying enemy continue to be restricted in movement andelements that have broken through or maneuver within and between battle

bypassed the defense. positions.

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The shift of night defensive operationsfrom the more static employment of weaponsto the employment of a fully integratedmaneuverable team provides the commandernew advantages. An enemy force of lessernight capability may be able to attack atnight, but must do so at slower speeds andwith limited maneuver and weapons range.The defender with full night capabilitymultiplies his weapons effectiveness and,therefore, can defend against combat powerratios which otherwise might be greater than3:1. He can also continue his active daylightdefense into the night as he maneuvers hisforces from battle positions to battlepositions as the situation requires. Quickshort counterattacks against weakenedexposed enemy forces can be conducted atnight before enemy forces can consolidate orbe reinforced.

CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE ASSOON AS THE ENEMY ENTERS

THE COVERING FORCE AREA

ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE

The commander assigned a defensive 4mission usually organizes his forces foroperations in three areas:

Oh Covering force area

o�. Main battle area

@Rear area

The Covering Force Area. Thecovering force ha; four basic tasks:

uForce the enemy into revealing thestrength, location, and general direction ofhis main attack.’ To ~o this, it will benecessary to strip away enemyreconnaissance and advance guardelements. Contact with the enemy main bodyis sought; a fight is started with enoughintensity to force the enemy to deploymaneuver and fire support units and beginhis main attack.

uDeceive the enemy, or prevent theenemy from determining the strength.dispositions, and locations ~f friendly fo~ces:especially those in the main battle area.

H Divest the enemy of his air defenseumbrella, or require him to displace his airdefenses before- attacking the ‘main battlearea.

��‘ Gain time for the main body, enabling itto deploy, move, or prepare defenses withinthe main battle area.

IJnits of the covering force should makecontact as soon as the enemy advances intothe covering force area, and fight there anaction in depth which will draw the enemyout from under his forward air defenses andaway from his forward artillery. This shouldbe done in such a way that when the enemystrikes into the main battle area, his airdefense and artillery support is significantlydiminished.

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Although any mobile force may bedeployed and fight in the covering force area,it will be normal for covering forces to bepredominantly armored cavalry and aircavalry, reinforced with sufficient tank,antitank, mechanized infantry, fieldartillery, air defense, artillery, engineer, andattack helicopter forces for the mission. Forexample, a reinforced armored cavalryregiment could expect to be employed as acorps covering force; or in the absence of acorps covering force, a division might use itsorganic cavalry squadron reinforced as adivisional covering force. As a deceptionmeasure, the covering force should alwayshave field artillery fires available which arerepresentative of the artillery supporting theforce as a whole. Tactical air should also beused since it can increase the survivabilityand augment the destructive power of thecovering force by attacking massed armor atcritical points. As the enemy moves forward,his air defenses lose some effectiveness andfriendly air attack is somewhat moreeffective.

The covering force may be under thecommand of the force commander whoinitially ordered the deployment. Areinforced cavalry regiment might becontrolled by the corps commander eventhough it might not be deployed across a two-division front. The covering force could alsobe controlled by commanders subordinate tothe one who initially ordered its deployment.Or, control of parts of a covering forcespanning two units could be vested in thecommander most directly affected; i.e., onepart controlled by one division commander,the other part by another divisioncommander. In some circumstances, brigadecommanders in the main battle area couldcontrol all or part of a covering force.

Whatever the command relationships maybe at the outset, as the battle progresses andthe covering force closes on the main battlearea, some or all covering force units willcome under control of the brigades chargedwith defense of the main battle area. Tankand mechanized infantry task forcesdeployed to reinforce the covering forcewill probably take up positions in the main

FOR DECEPTION, ARTILLERYREPRESENTATIVE OF THEWHOLE FORCE SHOULDSUPPORT THE COVERING FORCE

ARMORED AND MECHANIZEDUNITS USED TO REINFORCE THECOVERING FORCE WILLNORMALLY BE INTEGRATEDINTO THE DEFENSE OF THE MAINBATTLE AREA

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battle area, and prepare to fight there.Cavalry squadrons from the covering force ~may be used as flank or rear security forces,to maintain contact between brigades, toreconnoiter, to locate and follow themovement of second and third echelons of theattacking enemy, or to take up battlepositions in the main battle area. Theconsiderable long-range antitank combatpower of cavalry units, coupled with theirflexibility, make them an attractive force tohave for the fight in the main battle area.

The commander assigning a mission to acovering force will normally tell the coveringforce to fight in a specified area for a specifiedperiod of time. For example, the coveringforce commander might be told he is tooperate in the covering force area for 72

THE COVERING FORCE TRADES hours, for seven days, or until. some actionSPACE FOR TIME has been Completed by the mam body. The

covering force must find ways not only todeceive the enemy as to main battle areadispositions, but also trade space for time—time for the main battle area force to get set todefend. Therefore, the covering force missionmay be a delay which could be terrain-specific, time-specific, or both.

Even though the time specified for the ,+delay has been achieved, the covering forcemust not automatically retire from thecovering force area. Sufficient resistancemust be presented to the enemy to force himto deploy his main forces. The covering forcecommander may be instructed not to allowhimself to be so decisively engaged as to riskthe destruction of his force. The main bodycommander may be willing to accept a lesserdelay in order to preserve his covering forcefor later use.

Care must be exercised, however, in issuingorders within the covering force.Commanders at each echelon will have adifferent perspective on the battle. While thisis always true, it is perhaps nowhere moretrue than in a covering force action. While thecovering force commander may be told todelay forward of a river line for 72 hours, hemay elect to tell his task force commanders todefend in certain battle positions—perhapsfor a specified period of time, perhaps not.Judgment must be made at each level as tohow the mission is to be described to

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subordinate commanders. All too often asmall unit commander, when told to delay,yields to an understandable urge to shoot toolittle, pull back too early, and move back toofar. Thus it is imperative that eachcommander insure he has conveyed to each ofhis subordinates precisely what it is that he isto do in the context of the overall mission. Atlevels below battalion or squadron task force,the covering force fight is mainly a series ofdefensive battles, and is so described inorders and instructions.

The Main Battle Area. Behind thecovering force lies the area in which the mainbattle will be fought. Terrain advantagesmay be used repeatedly in the forward zone toinflict casualties on a stronger attackingenemy force, and mounted elements can MAINTAIN COHERENCE ALONGexploit their mobility to fight a succession of THE FEBA OR IN THE ZONE

advantageous actions. However, the farther JUST BEHIND IT

forward ~he battle can be fought, the better.The more the enemy is permitted to penetrate,the greater the chance of breakthrough, andthe more difiicult the coordination between

b“ adjacent units, including units of differentnations, will be. If the active defense canmaintain coherence along the line of theFEBA or in the tactical zone just behind it,the easier coordination on the flanks will be,and the more successful the total defensewill be.

Nonetheless, the defense must be elastic—not brittle. Because the attacker will attemptto overwhelm the defense with ‘aconcentrated mass of tanks and armored DEFENDERS MUST DESTROY

MANY TARGETS IN A SHORTvehicles supported by very heavy artillery PER ,OD o F TIM Efires, the success of the defense depends uponthe destruction of enemy armor. The problemwill be to destroy many targets in a shortperiod of time. Thus the defense must be builtaround tanks and antitank guided missiles.These are the backbone of the defense. Inorder to cope with large numbers of targetsthe tanks and A TGMs must be sited so thatthey can engage at maximum effectiveranges and begin the attrition of the enemyearly. The use of mines or obstacles to slowdown the enemy will afford more time forengagement.

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Defenders must be prepared to createstrongpoints which are prepared to with-stand a direct assault. These strong-points can be established with reinforcedcompanies or battalions when a particularpiece of terrain is key to the defense or to theaccomplishment of the mission. Sometimes astrong point must be established to set up afire trap or ambush, or to provide a base orpivot around which other forces canmaneuver or counterattack. Strong pointsare the exception, because they may be lost ifbypassed or fixed by enemy attack.Nevertheless, there are times when they mustbe established to fight and win.

In the defense against the enemy’s maineffort, the battalion commanders becomecentral to the conduct of the battle. Frontagesor sectors are smaller. Forces are larger.Battle positions are often occupied by wholebattalions. Battalion commanders exertcontinuous positive control over companiesand often personally control tank infantrycoordination. Cross-reinforcement atcompany level may or may not take place.The rapid pace of the battle—the constantrequirement for suppression—thecoordination of engineers, artillery, attackhelicopters, and close air support all point tothe necessity of battalion control and supportof companies. In the economy-of-force

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sectors, the companies will operate moreindependently on wider fronts with morecross-reinforcement.

Counterattack in the Defense. Counter-attacks should be conducted only when thegains to be achieved are worth the risksinvolved in surrendering the innateadvantages of the defender. Because counter-attacking forces give up most advantages ofthe defense, they must protect themselvesfrom enemy observation and fires byjudicious use of terrain, smoke, night, andbad weather and they must be supported bydirect and indirect suppressive fires on everyweapon system that can bring fire on them.Reverse slope and limited objective attacksshould be the rule rather than the exception.Often, counterattacks will consist of movingtanks and ATGM to the flanks or even to therear of exposed enemy elements. From thesepositions, enemy armored vehicles can bedestroyed by long range fires alone. If it isnecessary to close with the enemy position,the counterattack force should move byroutes which protect it from the enemy’sovermatching elements. Sometimes it will benecessary to counterattack to recapturecritical terrain. In these cases all theprinciples of the attack should be broughtinto play.

The Rear Area. Behind the main battlearea, there is an area from which supply andmaintenance support must be projectedforward. Here too are administrativeechelons and communication centers. Thisarea must be defended from air attack andfrom airmobile or airborne attacks. Aircavalry units, if available, can provide widearea surveillance of rear areas to detect theseattacks. As enemy airmobile or airborneforces are detected, airmobile infantry orother available mobile forces can quicklyconcentrate to contain and destroy them.

Additionally, attack helicopters can attackand destroy enemy armored elements thathave broken through the defense. However,large forces cannot be reserved for thesepurposes and thus support elements must betrained and prepared for self-defense,including defense against armored forces. Allrear echelon elements must use everypossible measure of defense against detectionfrom the air. Where possible, they should behidden primarily in cities, towns andvillages.

CHAPTER 6

Retrograde Operations

PURPOSE

RETROGRADE operations are undertaken to:

� Trade space for time–llE”A Y.

� Disengage from enemy contact– WITH.RA WAL.

� Move away from an area without enemy pressure—RETIREMENT.

WHEN TO CONDUCT RETROGRADE

At times, a command may have to move tothe rear, or away from the enemy. Thisretrograde movement may be necessarywhen:

� There are insuffkient forces to attack ordefend, making it necessary to exchangespace for time.

. The command is to be employed else-where or in a better position.

. Continuation of an operation no longerpromises success.

� The purpose of the ongoing operationhas been achieved.

The type of retrograde operation—delay,withdrawal, retirement—depends on thepurpose of the rearward movement.

I CONTENTS

PURPOSE

PAGE

6-1

I WHEN TO CONDUCT RETROGRADE 6-1

I DELAY 6-2

I WITHDRAWAL 6-4

I RETIREMENT 6-4

6-1

–FM 100-5

d

DELAY

In a delay mission, a force conducts any orall types of combat operations in order to gaintime for something else to happen—reinforce-ments to arrive, or forces to concentrateelsewhere. Combat operations executed inthe delay mission may include attack,defense, ambush, raid, feint, or any othersappropriate to mission accomplishment.

Normally a delay mission will be aneconomy of force operation so the delayingforce may expect to fight outnumbered. If theforce cannot defend successfully in place, itmust trade space for time. Nonetheless, acommander assigned a delay mission should

INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES not assume that his force will always beON THE ENEMY defending or withdrawing. Indeed, the

advantages of surprising the enemy, seizingthe initiative, and generating uncertaintiesin the mind of enemy commanders may wellindicate the desirability of attacking. Theenemy generally is delayed the most whenhis losses are high, so the delaying forceseeks by whatever means possible to inflictmaximum casualties on the enemy.

For larger forces (brigades and divisions) adelay is usually a time-limited or terrain-limited (or both) series of defensive actions. Adelay operation denies the enemy access to aspecified area for a specified time, inflictingon him the maximum possible casualties thatcan be expected given the strength of thedelay force. Thus, a covering force might beordered to fight the enemy forward of aspecified obstacle (perhaps a river line) for aspecified time (perhaps 72 hours).

Further, the commander imposing timelimits on the delay must carefu~y weigh therisks involved in setting the times. This isespecially so for battalions and smaller units.

THE DELAY DEMANDS THE A bfigade commander tasked with delayingUTMOST IN PLANNING AND foward of a fiver line for 24 hours must

EXECUTION deploy sufficient force to have a reasonablechance of carrying out his task. If he deploysa company team where a battalion task forceis a better choice, he must do so fullycognizant of the risks he is taking. He isprobably trading combat losses for time. Thedelay is the most demanding of all ground

6-2

FM 100-5—

~

combat operations. It requires highlycompetent, well-trained small units, andskillful small unit leaders.

The concept of the delay is to force theenemy to take the time to concentrate enoughcombat power again and again, againstsuccessive battle positions to overcome each

FORCE THE ENEMY TO SLOWDOWN AND TO CONCENTRATECOMBAT POWER AGAINSTSUCCESSIVE BATTLE POSITIONS

in turn. The delaying commander placesplatoons or companies in battle positionswhich optimize their weapons effectivenesswhile at the same time minimizing theirvulnerability to enemy long-rangeobservation and fires. The commanderselects terrain which requires the enemy totravel along exposed approaches. When timepermits, he reinforces natural terrainobstacles, creates new obstacles, and placesmines to hold up enemy forces in the field offire of defensive weapons. A platoon in acarefully selected and prepared battleposition should be able to hold off at least anenemy company. This means the enemy mustexpend time to deploy the major elements of abattalion. Just when the battalion has beenbrought fully to bear, the delay force leaves,

— and the enemy must repeat the time-consuming process at the next delay position.

Obviously, a commander can trade spacefor time by occupying succeeding battlepositions until he runs out of space. But hecan do more; he can trade time for risk. Hecan fight harder at each position and holdeach longer, thus gaining more time byaccepting a greater risk of increased combatlosses to each element of his force.

If a commander’s orders require that hedelay the enemy forward of a certain lineuntil a certain time, he may be forced to standand fight on key te~ain—even beyond the A COMMANDER CAN TRADEpoint of prudent risk-to accomphsh hls SpACE FOR TIME, OR HE CANmission. He may lose some elements of his TRADE TIME FOR RISKforce in such a situation. In these cases, whilethe overall mission of the force is to delay,smaller units missions are often told todefend until ordered to withdraw. Everycommander must be sensitive to hisresponsibility in these cases—his

6-3

‘b-’

-FM 100-5

responsibility to his troops and to hismission.

Delay is also a mission frequently assignedunits in a flank or rear guard or in a coveringforce.

WITHDRAWAL

Withdrawal is a disengagement from theenemy. Disengagement is a difficult task; itstiming is critical. Waiting too long may makedisengagement most difficult, evenimpossible. It is desirable to break awayquickly and with as little notice as possible.Sometimes, however, feints, diversions, andeven attacks may be necessary to effectdisengagement. Night and bad weather helpthe disengaging force to get away unnoticed,but at the same time make control of thedisengaging force more difficult. Armor andmechanized units may be able to break awayrapidly, quickly putting distance betweenthemselves and the enemy before the enemycan react. Unarmored units, however, mustusually depend on smoke, night, deception,clever use of terrain, or even attack to achievea clean break. The routes of withdrawal mustbe kept clear of obstacles or congestion thatwould hinder movement of the units.

Normally radio silence should be imposedon units which have disengaged. Untildisengagement is complete, the remainingforces should simulate, as nearly as possible,continued presence of the main body. Theymay do this by stepping up combat activity,electronic transmissions, other activitylevels, or by attacking. This force must havespecific instructions about what to do whenthe enemy attacks, and when and under whatcircumstances to withdraw. An armored unitmay wait for the next enemy attack, thenconduct a delay to facilitate withdrawal ofthe main body.

Army aviation is especially valuable insupport of disengagement and the ensuingwithdrawal. Air cavalry and attackhelicopters can be used in feints, diversions,raids, on flanks, and to hold up attackingarmored forces. Lift helicopters can assist inany or all of the disengagement phases.

RETIREMENT

Since, by definition, a retirement isconducted in the absence of enemy pressure,it is therefore a battlefield movement whichshould be conducted according to techniquesof movement appropriate to the level ofcommand.

Disengagement generally takes place in several overlapping phases:.

6-4

EAI%LV EVAWATloftl W CASUALTIES.%’

R LY EV4&CWW’tOPIJOF ftECOVERAOLECOMBAT EQUIPMENT. -+

d OF SUPP&l& AND J.OGISTICSJPPORT OPE41ATIONS. 0-+

TACLES ‘Ml lWWUIT BY\13&&O#TACLES

TQ=+.)

MAIN f3012Y. E3”-f-Qw+

CHAPTER 7

Intelligence

—

A PREREQUISITE TO WINNING THE FIRST BA’ITLE

THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES and assets of the United

States constitute one of our main equalizers—one means of

offsetting superior numbers of enemy forces and weapons. US

Army commanders must understand that intelligence training

and practice at all levels in peacetime is the price of success on

the future battlefield. The commander must plan and execute

intelligence operations just as he does tactical operations. He

must also prevent the enemy from determining fiendly

intentions by maximizing the operations security (OPSEC)

of US forces.

CONTENTS

A PREREQUISITE TO WINNING THE FIRST BATTLE

lNTELLIGENcE FOR THE NiODERN BATTLEFIELD

THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AS A PART OF THE TOTAL

COMBAT SYSTEM

TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE TO FIGHT THE BAITLE

INTELLIGENCE TEMPLATING

THE COMMANDER’S ROLE

PAGE

7-1

7-2

7-4

7-11

7-12

7-14

7-17

7-1

—FM 100-5

In earlier chapters we discussed thelethality of the modem battlefield and thetactics needed by the US Army commanderto win when outnumbered and outgunned.The first step in winning is seeing thebattlefield. The commander requiresintelligence to concentrate combat power at

THE COMMANDER MUST BE ~ritical Places and times. Concurrent withABLE TO “SEE” THE Increased lethalltY in weaPons, there has

BATTLE FIELD been a commensurate increase in intelligenceacquisition capability. The commander mustdemand that all sources of intelligence,strategic or tactical, be orchestrate tosupport his mission.

As we can sense the enemy, he can senseus. Counterintelligence and OPSEC must becoordinated and executed concurrently withcombat operations. Intelligence issequential, time-critical, and event-oriented.Intelligence is the commander’sresponsibility and provides the basis fortactical decision.

INTELLIGENCE FOR THEMODERN BATTLEFIELD

Intelligence has three distinct disciplines.As the commander can mold infantry, armor,and artillery into a combined arms team, socan he weld his intelligence assets into asystem derived from the Oelectro-magnetic 8pectrum;Qimagery fromoverhead platforms; and @humanintelligence (HUMINT) which includesdirect observation.

Commanders recommend specific tasks forstrategic systems, and control tacticalsystems organic or attached to theircommand.

oElectromagnetic intelligence isderived from electronic detection andexploitation of enemy emissions; i.e.,signal intelligence (SIGINT) or enemyphysical activity. Examples ofprocesses providing intelligence derived

7-2t.

-.

FM 100-5—

through detection and exploitation ofenemy electronic emitters are:

�Cryptanalysts

�Signal and communication analysis

�Direction finding

�Traffic analysis

Examples of systems providingintelligence by detection of physicalactivity are ground surveillance radar(GSR) and remote sensors (REMS).Electromagnetic intelligence isgenerally timely, and has a 24-hour, all-weather capability. It is generallylimited in its ability to define, classify,and accurately locate targets, and it isvulnerable to enemy deception andjamming. The same units which provideSIGINT now provide most of theoffensive EW capability discussed inChapter 9.

~ 9 Imagery intelligence is derivedprimarily from radar, infrared. andphotogr-aphic sensors carried byoverhead platforms. To assuretimeliness, intelligence derived fromimagery must be disseminated tocommanders electronically as opposedto photographically. Imagery data canbe the most accurate for the productionof intelligence, but it is limited byweather, hostile countermeasures, and,frequently, lack of timeliness.

Q Human intelligence encompassesthe remainder of collection activitv.Tactically, it is represented by the dire~tobservation of forces in contact;multiple counterintelligence operations;deception; exploitation of prisoners,documents, and equipment; long rangepatrols; listening and observation posts;interface with local military orparamilitary forces; and, mostimportant, reports of frontline friendlytroops.

These three distinct disciplines provideunique types of intelligence. One source maytip off another source. Accordingly, thecommander must insure that all three arefused and integrated to provide the best basisfor tactical decisions.

The USAF has additional ~capabilitiesprimarily in the categories of tacticalimagery and electromagnetic detection. TheUSAF reinforcement is provided by tacticalreconnaissance elements using high-performance aircraft and drones. Thesevehicles (manned and unmanned) havegreaterrange,speed,and penetrationdepththan Army assets. Strategic systemsreinforce by providing greater area coveragefrom overhead collection.

The Army intelligence system is a part ofthe national strategic intelligence systemcomprising government agencies and themilitary services. The national system is an~ultiple collection effort which uses a varietyof platforms including aircraft, ships, andground stations. It produces intelligenceunder three politico-military conditions:

1. Static (peace)

2. Tension (increased threat)

3. Combat

Under static conditions, national systemsfocus on peacetime concerns of nationaldecision makers. Their most importanttactical function is the development of an. ---accurate intelligence data base whichidentifies the military potential in areaswhere US forces are likely to be committed.Management of national intelligenceresources is centralized, and securityrestraints limit access to some of its products.Strategic collection resources supportdemands of major commanders. Duringperiods of increased tension, securityrestrictions on dissemination and use arerelaxed.

In combat, centralized control is retainedbut commanders’ demands receive a higher

7-3

—

—FM 100-5

priority. Senior tactical commanders areauthorized to use the intelligence as they seefit with minimum security constraints.Intelligence from national systems and thoseof other services is integrated withintelligence from organic Army resources.

The USAF role is critical in meetingdemands of commanders. For example, someintelligence problems require joint Army-AirForce effort. Air defense suppression requiressuch joint intelligence planning. Corps andUSAF collection platforms can locate enemyair defense radars and communications.Strategic systems can locate components ofenemy systems in those areas denied totactical assets. Long-range patrols can locateelements which present no electronicsignature. The composite is fused into anintegrated, all-source product. The corpsbattlefield information coordination center(BICC) is the fusion point for the integrationof intelligence data from all sources,including allied forces.

Commanders initiate the intelligencepreparation of the battlefield prior to combat.Detailed knowledge of the enemy, terrain,and weather is mandatory. Included are suchfundamental tasks as:

� Identifying obstacles

�Identifying main avenues of approach

� Identi&ing battle positions

� Identifying possible assembly areas

� Insuring the accuracy of map grids.Preparing detailed radar coverage

charts

OPreparing trafficability studies

� Determining the most likely positionsfor artillery, air defense, and antitankelements

These data are reduced to overlays for usein planning prior to the battle. They can alsobe stored in a data base for rapid retrievaland dissemination.

Weather and terrain, althoughuncontrollable, must be used to our

7-4

advantage. Weather factors must beconsidered and worked into tactical ~operation plans. Commanders whounderstand the limitations and advantagesof weather and terrain can combine this withtheir knowledge of the enemy to tilt relativecombat power in their favor. Intelligencepreparation of the battlefield enhancescommand and control, and multiplies ourcapability to defeat the enemy with fewercasualties.

INTELLIGENCE MUST BEEVENT-ORIENTED AND

TIMELY

Intelligence must support thecommander’s requirements, and must beevent-oriented. Intelligence summaries(INTSUM), periodic intelligence reports(PERINTREP), and schedule-drivenbriefings as we have known them cannotserve modern commanders who must haveintelligence keyed to events in a rapidlychanging situation.

THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ASA PART OF THE TOTAL COMBAT ~

SYSTEM

In order to understand the interaction ofintelligence with operations, it is necessaryto understand the difference betweenINTELLIGENCE and COMBAT INFOR-MA TION. If raw data can be used for fire ormaneuver as received, with no interpretationor integration with other data, it isCOMBAT INFORMATION. If the rawdata requires validation, integration,comparison, or any other form of analysis, nomatter how rudimentary, it becomesINTELLIGENCE. In other words, thedefinition depends on how the information ishandled and how it is used.

Once the combat engagement begins,nearly all of the intelligence acquired bymodern armies is a by-product of combatoperations. Much of the data can be usedimmediately by combat operations elementsto bring combat power to bear against theenemy. Data so used is COMBATINFORMATION. If the data cannot be used

—

FM loo-5—

immediately, but requires processing for use,~ it may then become INTELLIGENCE.

COMBAT INFORMATION, even thoughused, may still be of vital importance asintelligence. In such a case, the same datacan be both, but in sequence. Intelligencecollection systems acquire a great deal ofCOMBAT INFORMATION. The systemsmust provide for immediate access to suchdata by commanders for combat action.Commanders must insure that linkages existwhereby intelligence collecting systems willrapidly feed COMBAT INFORMATION tothe Captains and Colonels who need it. At thesame time it is sent upward for processing.

Let us examine some of the many systemsU,hich collect and use combat information:

Basically, we start with the riflemen orweapons commander who sees enemypersonnel, tanks, or other targets andengages them by fire. This sighting is combatinformation. When reported up the line, it canenter the intelligences ystem as information.

The artillery generates combatinformation through its target acquisitionsystem. Data that can be fired upon is combatinformation. On the other hand, data that isnot used for immediate firing is passed overto the intelligence/operations fusion centerto be processed into intelligence. Data used

for firing may also be processed intointelligen~e for ‘use by a senior commander.The artillery counterfire system is asubelement of target acquisition specializingin locating and engaging enem y batteries. Itsdata follows the same pattern.

The air defense system finds and identifiesenemy aircraft, and engages them with gunsand missiles. The immediate data, cominglargely from their radars, is combatinformation. The intelligence picture is filledwhen such data is passed for integration andprocessing within the intelligence/opera-tions fusion center.

Other combat elements such as tactical airsupport, cavalry, and maneuver elements useand report data in keeping with their ownroles and missions.

Sometimes, as in the case of EW, thecollectors of data deal with both combatinformation and intelligence. Due to thetechnical nature of such data, some form ofprocessing must always take place.Electronic data must be converted intousable information. When it is highlyperishable and of immediate value, we have acase where intelligence becomes combatinformation.

This chart shows the distinction betweencombat information and intelligence.

I COMBAT INFORMATION 11 INTELLIGENCE

READILY EXPLOITABLEINFORMATION

NEAR REAL TIME 4

DIRECT FROM SOURCETO USER

USED IMMEDIATELY FOR: II1. Tactical real time

targeting

2. Maneuver

� ALL SOURCEINFORMATION

FUSION AND ANALYSIS

USED BY HIGHERCOMMANDERS FOR:

1. Planning

2. Moving/concentrating

3. Some targeting

7-5

—FM 100-5

It is obvious that combat systemsoperators, commanders, and their staffsmust interact and exchange data freely inorder to insure that combat information isnever withheld. Integration of intelligenceand operations is necessary to provide thecommander this assurance. Combatinformation is extremely perishable. Theintelligence system must be geared toimmediate response when it acquires combatinformation through its many collectionsystems.

Targeting for deep airstrikes, missiles, orlong range artillery will most often be theproduct of intelligence rather than combatinformation. Such intelligence must be afused, all-source product. The picture whichemerges is one of operating (semi-self-contained) combat systems acquiring andusing combat information from their ownsensors—eyeballs, radars, electromagneticsystems, imagery, observation devices andothers—and spilling that data into theintelligence/operations center as rapidly aspossible. It can be pictured conceptually likethis:

ADSYSTEM

EWSYSTEM

\

ARTYSYSTEM

COUNTERFIRE

/

SYSTEM

INTELLIGENCESYSTEM

7-6

MANEUVERELEMENTS

CASSYSTEM

COMMANDERSAND

PLANS

1

UI ncn IIW I EL LIUCIVb L

COLLECTORSI

I ARMY/AF/NATIONAL I

FM 100-5—

An

—

example, using organization units, might look like this:

A

AIRDEFENSE

�

\ ? b /

CEWI�

UNIT � ARTILLERY

4 v

I COMMANDER

I

/%

INTEL/OPNSFUSION IK

ACR # b WEATHER

TANKBN

fEiIllEElI NATIONAL

SYSTEMS I

Informationfulfilled with

demands which cannotorganic resources must

bebe

satisfied by thos~ of a higher commander.For exam-pie, national level collectionsupports corps requirements far beyond thescope of organic capabilities, and inputs both

\_

mALLIES

combat information and intelligence into thecorps fusion center. Division and brigadecenters similarly support their commanders’needs as well as those of subordinatecommanders which exceed their organiccapabilities.

7-7

The following chart depicts the variousintelligence assets and organizations which workto satisfy the operational requirements of theGenerals, Colonels, and Captains.

COLONELS

� Electromagnetic

SIGINT

�COMINT * * *

� ELINT * * *

REMS * * *

GSR * * *#lHf&NS LOCATING

* *I

�4MAGERY

PHOTO * *

[R * *

SLAR * *r,

�HUMAN OBSERVATION

RECONNAISSANCE UNITS * * *

TROOPS *

IPW * * *

;OMPANIE~

a1

*1mm

*1I

i11

*1

*This chart illustrates the echelons at which these assets are normally assigned, attached, or in direct support.

7-8

FM 100-5—

TACTICALCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Tactical counterintelligence exists tosupport the OPSEC effort which thwarts theenemy’s intelligence collection by denyingand shielding our intentions and actions.The counterintelligence estimate assessesthe enemy’s view of our forces, identifies ourvulnerabilities, and recommends correctivemeasures to be included in the commander’sOPSEC annex. Based upon the execution ofOPSEC, the commander can effectivelydirect measures to conduct bold andinnovative deception operations.

To deceive the enemy, the commandermust first know how the enemy collectsinformation-what systems he depends uponand trusts; which assets he neglects. Thecommander can determine how to exploitenemy vulnerabilities by deception throughthis knowledge of enemy intelligencecollection and analysis practices. Tacticalcounterintelligence and OPSEC must becoordinated, concurrent, and continuouswith all tactical operations.

~ The threat from enemy intelligence is realand must be neutralized. The Soviets alsocollect intelligence using the three primaryintelligence disciplines.

The HUMINT threat can be minimized byaggressive counterintelligence and securitypractices, assisted by territorial securityforces—local military, paramilitary, police,and intelligence organizations.

The success of imagery from hostileoverhead platform can be lessened by rigidcover, concealment, and camouflagediscipline.

It is, however, the electromagneticcollection threat that looms as the primary THE SOW ET’S PRIMARYSoviet tactical intelligence capability. This MEANS OF COLLECTINGformidable threat has developed steadily TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ISover the years. It was the Russians who were THROUGH THEdecimated by the Germans at Tannenberg ELECTROMAGNETIC THREATduring WWI due to exploitation ofcommunications intercept-a combat lessonnot forgotten. Communications disciplineand security are the basic means by which we

7-11

_ .—

—FM 100-5

shield our intentions and actions from hostileelectromagnetic observation. These actionscan help to reduce casualties.

Tactical counterintelligence operationssupported by an intelligence data base and adetailed preparation of the battlefield areprerequisites to deception. As OPSEC helpsthwart the hostile intelligence threat, aparallel effort is focused on the enemy’scollection apparatus to assist with thedeception plan. For deception, damagedequipment and weapons can be realisticallypositioned. While dummies cannot oftendeceive imagery, real inoperative equipmentcan, when placed in realistic, covered, andcamouflage positions. Operation of phantomnets by specially trained and equipped units

can deceive and mislead the enemy. Theseoperations present fictitious order of battle -and tend to overload his acquisition system.Tactical counterintelligence and OPSECoperations require central management bythe senior tactical commander and can behighly successful, cost-effective multipliersof combat power.

INTELLIGENCE TO FIGHTTHE BA’ITLE

The battlefield forward of the FEBA isviewed to different depths by differentcommanders for different purposes. Theperspective differs by echelon of commandand is discussed in terms of TacticalIntelligence Zones (TI ZONES), as shown inthis chart.

IH CAPTAINS’ AREA

O-5 KM

Izl

COLONELS’ AREA0-50 KM

ID

GENERALS’ AREA0-150 KM

Captains must “see” out to adepth of 4 or 5 km. This distancethen encompasses the firsttactical intelligence zone, or TIZONE 1. Itis the zone of directfire weapons and lineof sight. It isa zone of combat information.

Colonels must “see” from O to50 km, orTl ZONE 2. This is thezone of indirect fire weapons,count erfire, and tacticalmaneuver.

Generals must typically “see”from O to 150 km forward of theFEBA, or TlZONE3. TlZONES2and 3 are zones of support andtactical reinforcement—zones ofboth combat information andintelligence.

!’:

zoNE2

m

7-12

FM 100-5—

As the perception of the battlefield differsby echelon, it also varies according to thetactical situation. Intelligence from allsources, fused and processed, is containedwithin the data base available to thecommander. Decisions should be based on allavailable information and caution exercisedwith regard to enemy deception operations.

Captains are interested primarily in theirarea of operations projected within TI ZONE1. Within this area, they need combatinformation for direct fire weapons andtactical suppression of enemy fire andmaneuver elements. Captains need highlyaccurate and timely data for targeting. Mostof this information is derived from line ofsight, visual contact, weapons sights (bothday and night), and small tactical radars orremote sensors.

The Colonel’s area of intelligence interestincludes both TI ZONE 1 and TI ZONE 2. Inorder to direct combat operations, Colonelsneed intelligence and timely and accuratecombat information of a greater scope thanCaptains. Colonels must see enemymovement, reinforcement, artillerylocations, air defense positions, assembly~ areas, armor and other significant tacticalindicators and targets.

Generals focus their intelligencerequirements on TI ZONES 2 and 3 whileclosely following the action in ZONE 1. Inorder to concentrate forces they mustdemand intelligence and, in certaincircumstances, combat information relatingto the density of enemy forces, direction ofenemy movement, and air defensesuppression throughout their area. (See latersection on templates.) Generals control anddirect those intelligence collection assetshaving the greatest range and coverage.Generals must seek supplemental coveragefrom USAF, allied, and national systems andfocus them to fill those gaps not covered bytheir own resources.

The intelligence required by commandersdoes not vary significantly for the offense,defense, or retrograde. Such operationalvariances do, however, impact on tacticalintelligence collection capabilities. Forexample, commanders in the defense can use

more fully all of their resources. As mobilityincreases, certain types of collection systemsbecome less effective. For example, REMSand GSR become limited to flank screeningand rear area security. Those systems notcapable of realtime intelligence are of littleuse. In the retrograde, timeliness, accuracyand usability of intelligence are of extremeimportance. As movement is rearward, it ispossible to employ some collection resourcesin a “stay-behind” mode as long as theyoperate in realtime. In both offensive anddefensive operations, commanders should“leap-fi=og” or “jump” their collectionresources so that they have continuouscoverage to meet their needs.

ENEMY “INTENTIONS” MUST

BE CONSIDERED ALONG

WITH CAPABILITIES AND

PROBABLE ACTIONS

As Generals, Colonels and Captains mustcontinually be able to “see” the enemy acrosstheir areas of intelligence interest, they alsoneed to think imaginatively in terms of whatthe enemy is doing. It can be assumed that allarmies reveal activity patterns anddeployment variations tied doctrinally todifferent tactical operations. However,commanders can no longer be satisfied withconsidering enemy capabilities and probablecourses of action based on deductive analysisof past occurrences. Commanders mustalways seek the enemy’s intentions.

For example, Soviet offensive doctrinecalls for massing of up to six divisionsecheloned in depth across a 10-12 km front.At the same time the entire artillery of thisforce is normally deployed forward. Such aset clearly indicates a breakthrough attempt.Locations of certain emitters, in conjunctionwith other elements known to be organic tospecific echelons, reveal a preparedness topursue a given tactic. Templates designed toreflect enemy tactics and doctrine in avariety of situations can help commanders toestimate intentions in the context ofcapabilities.

7-13

‘---

—FM 100-5

INTELLIGENCE TEMPLATING

Intelligence templating is an analyticaltool used to relate enemy activities to terrainand weather. On the rapidly changingmodem battlefield, the commander needsmore than just raw intelligence-he needsquick answers. Therefore, he must focus onthe product of intelligence rather than on theprocess. However, while commanders are notinterested in the details of intelligenceprocessing, they should be familiar with themethodologies used in arriving at the finalproduct or intelligence estimate of enemyintentions. If the product is not credible, thecommander will not rely on it as the basis fortactical decisions.

Templating, therefore, is an integral partof the commander’s intelligence preparationof the battlefield. An attack template of acombined arms army showing frontages,depth, echelon spacing, composition,disposition and strength of subordinateelements can be prepared in graphic form, toscale, and moved about over a military map.Based on previous terrain analysis, focus canbe placed on specific areas or avenues ofapproach. Inductive judgments can be madeas to where the enemy could position hisforces, assembly areas, command posts, airdefense and artillery weapons. Enemycourses of action in executing the attack willbegin to be revealed. Below is an example of ado&-inal template depicting a motorized rifledivision in the breakthrough:

This template is provided to the commanderby hisintelligencesection. Itmay be preparedon acetateand used over an enemy situationmap or displayed on a computer assistedcathode ray tube (CRT). Doctrinal templatescan be prepared for any enemy capability;i.e., attack, defend, withdraw and reinforce,and for each specific course of actionavailableto the enemy within the constraintsof terrain and weather.

7-14

FM 100-5—

An event temphzte can serve as a modelagainst which enemy activity can becompared. The purpose is to determinewhich course of action the enemy willadopt based on an analysis of theactivity indicators. An example of anevent template is below:

EXAMPLE OF COMMANDER’S EVENT INDICATORS FOR ENEMY ATTACKAT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

(Enemy Events in Reverse Order)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Intensified Reconnaissance and Surveillance ...... ... ........................................

Replacementand Supply ............... ..... .. .. .....................................

Movement of ADA forvvard from rear TIZones . ...... ... . ...................................

Movement of 2d echelon forces forward to assembly areas in TI Zone2from TlZone30r adjacent zones ............ ........ ................................ .. ..

Lateral Movement of 1st echelon forces to concentrate for theattack .... . .. . ..... . . ............

Movement toLD. ... . . ........ .. . ........... . ...

Deploy mentintoattack formation ................ .. .............

Assault .......................

‘ Timing does not necessarily reflect Soviet doctrine.

TIME*

.......D-7

.......D-5

.......D-1

.......D-1

.. H-12

.. ...H-2

. . ..H-1

.H-hour

An event template relates an enemy processing system is not inundatedcourse of action to time and space on the with non-essential reporting.battlefield. If the commander is to“see the battlefield”, then he must An event template is similar to an IBMknow where to look, when to look, and card with pre-punched windows. Eachwhat to look for. Event templates can window is an indicator. As thebe as general or as detailed as the indicators are answered either throughcommander requires. They provide the reporting or analysis, the adoption of acommander the capability of particular course of action relative todetermining critical activity areas and other courses of action by the enemycritical activity indicators which drive becomes apparent. An event templatehis intelligence collection and concerning where the breakthroughprocessing system. He can plan the will occur, when and with what force,allocation of scarce collection might be appropriate to more than oneresources to critical areas and against course of action and sector of thecritical information requirements. The battlefield. When the enemy employscommander can determine the optimum deception as a means of confusing theresource mix that will accomplish the commander, event templating cancollection task. He can insure by assist in identifying those enemyprioritizing critical information deception activities as they relate to therequirements, that his intelligence commander’s courses of action.

7-15

-

—FM 100-5

At corps level, the General receives combatinformation and intelligence directly from “tactical and national systems. Templatescan be developed which permit the corpscommander to pass combat information tohis division commanders before the detailedinformation has been analyzed and turnedinto intelligence. For example, the General’sTactical Intelligence Zone (TI ZONE 3) canbe templated so that when actual conditionsreach a predetermined threshold (i.e.,number of emitters - number of tanks -number of vehicles in a certain area) thecorps commander can quickly inform hisdivision commanders or take action himself.The enemy’s signatures, whether electronicor physical, provide the keys for templates.

An event template of a breakthroughmight look similar to the one below:

\.

I&l, ,“;!:,$ ,

“1In this case, a breakthrough in Sector B isanticipatedwhile alternatecourses of actionmay exist for Sectors A and C, such asdeception and reinforcement, Density offorces, combat power, range of weapons,and rate of movement are importantconsiderations in using an event template asa means of reachinga commander’s decisionpoint. The intelligenceestimatemust tellthe

General: “the enemy intendsto executeabreakthroughat Sector B with five armoreddivisions within (hours or minutes).” Thecommander must insure that his intelligencesystem has the capability to determineenemy intentions in sufficient time for him toallocate his combat resources to blunt thebreakthrough.

7-16

.

FM 100-5–

In gathering data for templates, thecommander can focus his collection assets sothey provide continuous surveillance of thoseareas of enemy activity and key terrainwhich will indicate the enemy’s intentions asto where, when, and how he will attack. Thecommander’s SIGINT assets mustcontinuously monitor the enemy’s commandand control nets, search for his radars, andmonitor logistics activity to identify andlocate major weapon systems and troopconcentrations. When they are identified andlocated, the commander can begin to assessthe enemy’s intentions. He must call in allresources available, national as well astactical. Imagery can locate tank andartillery build-ups. Imagery from overheadplatforms can search to the rear of theenemy’s area of operation to revealpreparation for an attack in depth. PWS,refugees, and other human sources canprovide information about the enemy’sintentions. Properly directing hisintelligence system, the commander can gainthe information needed in his decision-making process.

THE COMMANDER’S ROLE

Commanders must plan and controlintelligence operations with the same level ofinterest and personal involvement as theynormally devote to combat operations.Intelligence must respond to commanders.

OPSEC supported by tactical counter-intelligence is vital for economy of force andsurprise. Commanders must think of theenemy in terms of the enemy’s tactics anddoctrine, and seek to detect indicators of hisintentions as well as his capabilities. On themodern battlefield, no commander cansucceed unless he demands and receives theintelligence and combat information heneeds. He must go after it personally.

Finally, the commander is the one whomakes the ultimate decision based on the bestinformation available. He will never have allhe wants and it will seldom be unambiguous.Nonetheless, he must decide—take risks—and act decisively.

7-17

——

CHAPTER 8

Air-Land Battle

INTRODUCTION

MODERN BATTLES are fought and won by air and land forces

working together. The interaction and cooperation between air

and land forces extends

CONTENTSPAGE

INTRODUCTION 8-1

ENEMY AIR DEFENSES 8-3

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMYAIR DEFENSES 8-4

INTELLIGENCE FOR SUPPRESSION 8-4

PLANNING FOR SUPPRESSION 8-4

EXECUTION OF SUPPRESSIONOPERATIONS 8-4

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 8-5

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT 8-6

into almost every function of combat.

Both the Army and Air Force deliverfirepower against the enemy. Both can kill atank. Both can collect intelligence, conductreconnaissance, provide air defense, movetroops and supplies, and jam radios andradar. But neither the Army nor the Air Forcecan fulfill any one of those functionscompletely or by itself. Thus, the A rrnycannot win the land battle without the AirForce. In fact, the Army consciously avoidsthe development of weapons or equipment toperform functions which the Air Force canperform more effectively.

8-1

—FM 100-5

Given the complex and important interactionbetween air and land forces, the requirement forcooperation and teamwork is very great. Becausethe Army and Air Force are separate serviceswhich come together on the field of battle underjoint commanders, the requirement for an air-ground communications system and an agreedemployment concept (followed by joint training inoperation procedures and frequent exercises) isabsolutely essential.

Q4$W

THE AIR AND LAND FORCES INTERACT AND COOPERATE IN

ALMOST EVERY COMBAT FUNCTION

The Air Force contribution tothe air-land battle may bedescribed in five maincategories:

m Drive enemy air forcesfrom the battlefield so thatArmy forces can exploit theirmobility and mass at thecritical places and times.

mProvide reconnaissanceand intelligence to the Armyand the Air Force regardingenemy locations, concentra-tions and movements.

m Conduct battlefieldinterdiction operations—thatis, ground attack—againstenemy reserves, fire suppotielements, command posts,and supply points. This isprobably the most effectiveuse of tactical air forcesbecause targets are plentifuland attacks may be concen-trated and sustained. Thedefeat of second and thirdechelon attacking forcesbefore they even reach the lineof contact is a main objectiveof such operations.

m* Provide close airsupport, wherein tacticalfighter aircraft attack targetsdesignated by the groundcommanders. Close airsupport is increasinglydifficult, but when theengaged Army forces requireclose air support to accom-plish their mission, it must beprovided regardless ofdifficulty and regardless ofcost.

m Provide tactical airlift—that is, the movement oftroops and supplies on thebattlefield.

8-2

FM

The coordination of air support to Army— forces—or more accurately, the coordination

of the air-land battle-takes place throughthe Air-Ground Operations System. Thissystem is well established and has provedeffective in two wars. However, it is nowconfronted with a new and more demandingenvironment created by the growth in sizeand effectiveness of enemy air defensesystems.

ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pactnations have tried to offset or reduce our AirForce’s combat power effectiveness throughthe use of extensive and sophisticated mobileair defenses—defenses involving mixes ofguns and missiles which provide overlappingcoverage. Warsaw Pact air defenses nowprovide a mobile umbrella whichaccompanies each echelon of the PactArmies, including forward deployedbattalions. The variety and numbers of airdefense weapons accompanying a typicalWarsaw Pact Army of 4 or 5 divisions areimpressive.

-

loo-5–

4:* SAM 3 Btrys I 18$;cw I

[.

I

m,mxl

Y

90,000

SA-460,000

SA-2

---- - SJm

KILOMETERS

60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100

This figure portrays a typicalSoviet Combined Arms Armyair defense system 50kilometers wide and 100kilometers deep. Shoulder-fired SA-7 and vehicle-mounted SA-9 launcherscommon to all units are notshown, but provide a denseblanket of low altitude airdefense which complementsthe other systems.

LEGEND

0’SA-2 10SA-4

3 Batteries 9 Batteries

@-~ SA-6 10S-60

5 Batteries 23 Batteries

{

ZSU 23-4-32 Batteries� ZSU 23-2-19 Batteries

ZSU 57-2-6 Batteries

8-3

—FM 100-5

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMYAIR DEFENSES

Whenever and wherever the heavy use ofairpower is needed to win the air-land battle,the enemy air defenses must be suppressed,or losses of aircraft will be too high and theeffectiveness of air support too low.Suppression operations-may includetemporary neutralization of selectedfacilities and short-term degradation of otherinstallations, as well as the planneddestruction of critical defensive elements.The overall aim is to reduce friendly attritionto an acceptable level. The suppression ofenemy air ‘defenses requires a ‘coordinated

o Air Force/Army effort to locate the enemypositions and communications vulner-abilities, and to plan and execute asuppression operation with all availablefirepower and electronic means.

INTELLIGENCEFOR SUPPRESSION

The Army/Air Force team at eachappropriate echelon mounts a combinedintelligence campaign to locate enemy airdefense weapons, radar, communicationlinks, and control centers. All availableArmy and Air Force collection and locatorsystems will be employed.

Air Force systems include:

� Reconnaissance aircraft equippedwith infrared (IR) mapping

� Side-Looking Airborne Radar(SLAR)

� Real-time sensor and data links

� Camouflage film

� Drones with cameras and signalintelligence receivers

� Position locating systems

� Tactical electronic reconnaissanceelements

� Airborne warning and controlsystems

The Army will demand information from:

� Forward observers

� Sound and flash systems

� Locating radars

� Airborne photo and IR platforms

� Ground and airborne emitterlocators

� Remotely piloted vehicles

� Standoff target acquisition systems

Information collected from these systemsare fed into a common center which “fuses”the data into a composite picture that is asnear real-time as possible.

PLANNING FOR SUPPRESSION

Working as a team, Air Force and Armycounterparts prepare a suppression plan.This will be a comprehensive, all-out, air Vdefense suppression effort aimed atdegrading enemy air defenses to anacceptable level, and then keeping themdown. The effort goes after the air defenseweapons themselves, critical communica-tions, control links, and radars.

EXECUTION OF SUPPRESSIONOPERATIONS

The suppression plan identifies whichsegment of enemy air defenses will beattacked and suppressed, and in whatpriority. Execution of the plan requiresexplicit timing. Suppression operations alsorequire an immense application of artilleryand surface-to-surface missiles on thoseidentified targets that are within range.These ground weapons are employed at thesame time that penetrating aircraft use asophisticated array ofantiradiation missiles,standoff precision guided missiles,conventional bombs and ECM pods, as well

8-4

FM 100-5—

as supporting airborne jammers. The targetpriorities are to first destroy enemy airdefense command and control centers, thensystematically reduce the surface-to-air-missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery(AAA) sites in the vicinity of targets to bestruck by the fleets of follow-on aircraft or inthe corridors to be opened.

Electronic warfare is an essential part ofsuppression operations. The Army is wellequipped with communications jammers; theAir Force possesses the preponderance ofnon-communications jammers. Thusintegrated planning and execution of the EWcomponent of the suppression operation isessential. Generals are responsible for thedetailed plans for orchestrating thesecollection and countermeasure systemsprimarily because they originate at corps ordivision level in the Army, but the Colonelsand Captains need the products to fight thebattle.

Once the suppression operation begins, an.—obvious tactic would be to barrage jam asmuch of the enemy’s forward sector aspossible, leaving the deeper ECM targets tothe airborne suppression force. The properapplication of the time-phased attacks oneach successive, critical enemy air defensecontrol point will disorganize his carefullyplanned defenses. Signal intelligence mustconcentrate on monitoring the air defensecontrol nets, and seeking targets ofopportunity to be attacked by field artillery,air strikes, or jammers.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

During the last three wars we had at leastlocal air superiority over our battlefields.Captains, Colonels, and Generals mustunderstand that this will not automaticallybe the case on the modern battlefield. Thefirst battle of the next war will not resemble,in any fashion, what we have come to acceptas the norm—unopposed close air supportwhenever we want it.

� Enemy ground-based air defenses mayprevent our aircraft from orbiting orloitering over the main battle area (MBA).

� Enemy aircraft may challenge and engageclose air support missions.

� Airborne and forward air controllers (FAC)may have to stand-off from enemy airdefenses.

9 Strike flights will probably come in low,pop-up to attack targets, and return to verylow altitude for egress. Subsequent attackswill probably be at low altitude from adifferent direction.

The density and lethality of enemy airdefenses force us to adopt new procedures todirect close air support. The airborne FAC isstill necessary but must operate at low leveland at a safe distance from the FEBA,perhaps as far as 15 kilometers back.Obviously he must have “eyes” in the battlearea with whom he communicates and towhom he hands off the attacking aircraft forprecise target identification. It is the groundFAC or Army forward observer whoidentifies the target. The request is thentransmitted via the Air Force air request net.The observer or controller must attempt toidentify enemy air defenses that couldendanger the incoming aircraft, see that thepilot is warned, and assist in suppressingthose defenses with artillery and other fires.

Requests for and control of close airsupport will follow prescribed air-groundoperations procedures and make full use ofthe Air Force communication nets. Requestsand guidance must be complete, but concisebecause of enemy jamming potential. GroundFACS and observers provide the bombdamage assessment back to the airborneFAC, or to appropriate control facilities, sodecisions can be made to restrike or divertsorties to other targets.

8-5

—FM 100-5

Improved Air Force munitions, such as <Maverick and Rockeye, have greatlyincreased antiarmor lethality. Maverick,in conjunction with cockpit guidance

NEW AND IMPROVED AIR FORCE systems, allows strikes of close supportMUNITIONS MEAN A GREAT targets horn standoff distances up to 20 kms.

INCREASE IN ANTIARMOR In the near term, new glide bombs will beLETHALITY capable of striking targets 50 kms from the

launch point. Other aircraft will strike thetarget directly with conventional bombs andtank-piercing 30mm cannon fire.

Ground and airborne FACS, scouthelicopters, FOS, and many strike aircraftwill be equipped with target designators tomaximize our advantage in precision guidedmunitions. FAC controlled radar beaconsenable tactical fighters to strike targetsduring night and adverse weatherconditions.

In marginal weather, attack helicopterswith antitank guided missiles may providethe only quick reaction capability, while AirForce area antitank munitions will be moreeffective against larger massed enemy forces.

All commanders must integrate allavailable Army and Air Force fire supportwith the maneuver of their forces. Close airsupport is part of the inventory along withtank and artillery fire, A TGM, and attackhelicopters.

Close air support will be available to theground commander when he needs theadditional firepower:

� To defeat engaged forces.

� To achieve assigned objectives.

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

The purpose of airspace management is tomaximize joint force effectiveness withouthindering the application of combat power byeither Service. Friendly aircraft must be ableto enter, depart, and move within the area ofoperations free of undue restrictions on theirmovement, while artillery fires in support ofthe ground force continue uninterrupted. Thetempo and complexity of modern combatrules out a management system that requirescomplicated or time-consuming coordina-tion. Also, the likelihood of poor or enemy-

8-6

.—

FM 100-5—

jammed communications dictates maximumreliance on procedural arrangement. To meetthe requirements of simplicity and flexibility,our airspace management system operatesunder a concept of management byexception. Joint Air Force and Armymanagement elements at corps and divisionprovide the framework for implementing thesystem.

Each service is free to operate its aircraftwithin the theater airspace. Army aircraft atlow altitude operate under the control ofArmy commanders. Air Force aircraft atmedium and high altitude operate undercontrol of the Tactical Air Control System.The boundary between low and mediumaltitude regimes is flexible and situation-dependent. Only when aircraft pass from oneregime to another is traffic coordinationrequired. Generally, Army aircraft operatewithout restriction below coordinatingaltitudes forward of the division rearboundary. Conflicts are generally avoided bypassing information about major movementsor high concentrations of fire-but risks aretaken.

Airspace management in the forward combat area accepts:

~ The necessity for coordination being metby SOP wherever possible to reduce theneed for detailed, time-consumingcoordination and use of communications.

W That the maneuver brigade and battaliondoes not need a dedicated staff element forairspace management; they will beassigned airspace management functionsonly on a by-exception basis.

� That the maneuver unit commander isresponsible for using good judgment in theapplication of air support and otherfirepower in the same place and time.

� That weapon rounds in flight are notconsidered a significant danger to aircraft.These rounds are under control of theground commander requesting or orderingweapon fires and are coordinated throughhis fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)and air liaison officer (AL O).

� That controls of Army aircraft will also begoverned by SOP and other procedures toreduce reliance on communication andreduce interference with combatoperations.

8-7

THIS CHAPTER PROVIDES ANOVERVIEW OF EW OPERATIONS.SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THECONCEPT OF EW EMPLOYMENT,

CAPABILITIES, AND PRIORITIES ISCONTAINED IN SUPPLEMENT FM

1OO-5A (SECRET),

CHAPTER 9

Electronic Warfare Operations

THE ELECTRONIC BATI’LEFIELD-

THE COMMANDER must view the electromagnetic

environment as a battlefield extension where a different type

of combat takes place. This invisible but very real struggle is

electronic warfare (EW).

CONTENTSPAGE

THE ELECTRONIC BAITLEFIELD 9-1

WHAT IS ELECTRONIC WARFARE? 9-2

THE SOVIET EWCAPABILIW 9-3

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 9-3

DEFENSIVE EWTACTICS AN DOPSEC 9-7

9-1

—FM 100-5

WHAT IS ELECTRONIC JWARFARE?

Electronic warfare is a combat pc erelement having two facets—electroniccombat and defensive EW.

� 111.ctnwzic .ornbat is the primary roleof EW and includes:

�Electronic warfare Support Measures(ESM)–signals intercept and directionfinding to provide target acquisition data forjamming and for applying other forms of

� Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)–jamming and deceiving enemy command,control, intelligence, and weapon systemsusing electronic emitters.

� Dfe ensiue EW, also known asElectronic Counter-Countermeasures(ECCM), refers to the electronic tactics toprotect our emitters from the enemy’sjamming and target acquisition efforts.

The relationship is shown in this chart:combat power.

EWMILITARY ACTION INVOLVING THE USE OFELECTROMAGNETIC ENERGY TO DETERMINE, EXPLOIT,REDUCE, OR PREVENT HOSTILE USE OF THEELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM AND ACTION WHICHRETAINS FRIENDLY USE OF THE ELECTROMAGNETICSPECTRUM. EW IS DIVIDED INTO THE THREECATEGORIES–ESM, ECM, ECCM.

ESMELECTRONIC

WARFARE SUPPORTMEASURES

ACTIONS TAKEN TO SEARCHFOR, INTERCEPT, LOCATE,AND IMMEDIATELY lDEN-TIFY RADIATED ELECTRO-MAGNETIC ENERGY FOR THEPURPOSE OF IMMEDIATETHREAT RECOGNITION ANDTHE TACTICAL EMPLOY-MENT OF FORCES. DIREC-TION FINDING OF RADIOSAND RADARS IS AN ESMTECHNIQUE.

INTERCEPTING

IDENTIFYING

ANALYZING

LOCATING

ECM

ELECTRONICCOUNTERMEASURESACTIONS TAKEN TO PRE-VENT OR REDUCE THEENEMY’S EFFECTIVE USE OFTHE ELECTROMAGNETICSPECTRUM. ECM INCLUDESJAMMING AND ELECTRONICDECEPTION.

JAMMING

DISRUPTING

DECEIVING

LECCM

ELECTRONICCOUNTER-

COUNTERMEASURESACTIONS TAKEN TO INSUREFRIENDLY USE OF THEELECTROMAGNETIC SPEC-TRUM AGAINST ELEC-TRONIC WARFARE.

PROTECTING

These functions are thoroughlyinterwoven to provide the EW f=brii.Electronic warfare units are assigned todivisions and corps.

9-2

FM 100-5—

THE SOVIET EW CAPABILITY

The Soviet army, or armies based on theSoviet model, applying radio-electroniccombat can selectively deprive adversaries ofcontrol of the electromagnetic environment.These forces will first analyzecommunications with signals intelligenceand select key communication terminals,links, and relays which serve as keystonesupon which the command and control oftactical forces depend. They assign prioritiesand attempt to destroy or disrupt our COMMUNICATIONS CAN BE

DESTROYED OR DISRUPTED ONcommunications accordingly. Targets which A TARGETED BASISare not fired upon may be selected for intensespot and ‘barrage jamming. Theelectromagnetic signatures of command postelements provide very lucrative targets forthese tactics.

Soviet-type emitters may lacksophistication-by US standards, but they willbe- present in adequate numbers and-withconsiderable redundancy. Their emitters aresimple, reliable, rugged, and highly effective.

IJS commanders who understand theenemy’s capability and tactics, and who

— emphasize countertactics can effectivelycope with the Soviet-type EW capability.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The commander must understand theenemy’s use of electronic systems. He mustsee these systems as a target array in whicheach enemy net or weapon system usingelectronic emitters has a relative importance. THE COMMANDER MUST

He then evaluates each with respect to its EVALUATE THE RELATIVEIMPORTANCE OF ENEMY

value to the enemy or its contribution to his ELECTRONIC EMITTERScombat power.

At corps and division, the commander isconfronted with an enemy electronic arraycomprised of thousands of emitters andhundreds of communication nets. Emittersshould be sorted by their function, position ina net, and capability to affect the combatplan. Nets must be further sorted to show thecommander those options which may beeffectively employed to destroy or disruptthem.

9-3

‘\ –

_..

—FM 100-5

Conceptually the EWsystematcor~s and -division looks like this:

.

I DECISION REQUIREDI

T-

LCOORDINATION IA

wi I OPERATIONS I III Ew III [ INTELLIGENCE I I

.4

@. -v

I

As can be seen, once the enemy emitter isfound, identified and located, thisinformation flows to the coordination centerat division or corps where an interface occursbetween intelligence, operations, and EW.Here a decision is made whether to jam,destroy, or exploit for intelligence. If the

DECIDE TO JAM OR EXPLOIT, decision is to listen for intelligence purposes,AND THEN, CONTINUOUSLY

REEVALUATE DECISION at some point this decision must bereevaluated—that is to continue listening orjam. Commanders should identify ceti-ainnets that have high tactical value to theenemy but have little or no intelligence value.Enemy fire direction nets usually meet thiscriteria and should be jammed per SOP. Assuch, when these nets are identified andlocated, they are automatically jammed andthe coordination center is so informed. Inother cases, the commander may direct thatcertain targets, such as enemy jammers, befired on by SOP once identified and located.

9-4

FM 100-5—

When making these decisions,~ commanders must understand that certain

communications cannot be jammed or ifjammed require an inordinate amount ofpower. For example:

---

INEF

UNJAMMED

FECTIVE JAMMING

JAMMED

LIN

AREA ~

LINK

\

\\ /’‘\

FEBA

Here the signals within the enemy Jamming assets are used to:battalion are b~ing transmitted over shofidistances at relatively high power, thus

� Disrupt key command and control nets,thus reducing the enemy’s combat power

making jamming very difficult if notOn the other hand, the

in critical sectors.impossible.communications links between battalion and . Provide deception.regiment or regiment to division extend overlonger distances and are weaker, permittingthem to be jammed.

The commander must continually keep inmind that jamming must complement hisconcept of operations. Jamming will only beeffective for short periods of time until theenemy takes evasive action or executescountermeasures.

� Deny the enemy the ability to react tochange on the battlefield; i.e., commitreserves—change direction.

� Reduce the effectiveness of enemy firesupport.

� Deny the enemy use of his air controlnets.

� Disrupt the enemy’s flow of criticalsupplies—(ammunition and POL).

9-G

...

—FM 100-5

Direction Finding and Target Acquisition ~are also components of EW and are applied todetermine the approximate location ofemitters. These locations provide valuableinformation for targeting command posts,key control points, and weapon systems.They assist in determining enemy intentionsby providing a picture of the battlefield.Direction finding may also be used to helplocate friendly units which have becomeisolated from command and control. Due tovulnerability factors, ground vehicle radiodirection finding will be the nucleus ofdivisional electronic combat. At corps anddivision level, airborne direction finders areimportant for locating enemy radios andbattlefield radars.

The corps commander allocates corps-levelEW and intelligence resources to support thebattle plan. He is concerned with severing orexploiting enemy command and control

COORDINATION OF between division and higher echelons. TheOVERLAPPING TARGET” AREAS division commander severs or exploits

IS A CORPS-LEVEL enemy command and control betweenRESPONSIBILITY division level and lower echelons.

Coordination of corps and divisional EWassets is especially important, however,because EW is dependent on radiated power -and distance. It is the responsibility of thecorps fusion center to coordinate overlappingtarget areas.

The division commander focuses onbattlefield EW operations. To accomplishthis, he is supported by a staff and organicEW resources. He selects EW target prioritiesin accordance with the threat to his

TARGET PRIORITY SELECTION command and with regard to the t=get’sON THE BAITLE FIELD IS vulnerable@ to Ew. Enemy communication

DETERMINED AT DIVISION- links that connect regiments to divisions,LEVEL and forward operations posts to regimental

and division command posts are of particularimportance because these links control theenemy’s scheme of fire and maneuver.

The enemy’s use of low power, highfrequency and very high frequency, tacticalcommunications may dictate the deploymentof ground-based, high frequency EW assetsin the division forward area. EW units musttherefore accompany brigades andbattalions, and be equipped and trained todeploy within sight of the line of contact.

9-6

FM 100-5–

~Brigade and battalion commanders, in

coordination with the G3, are responsible forthe positioning of EW assets within theirareas. They should not preoccupy themselveswith the execution of EW operations exceptfor those times when EW elements operatingin their sectors have combat informationthat directly affects their direction of thebattle.

Commanders of battalions and companiesuse defensive EW for protection.

DEFENSIVE EW TACTICSAND OPSEC

A command post or weapon system cannotsurvive on the modem battlefield ifit is easilyidentified and located by the characteristicsof its electronic emitters. Their survival isdependent on good defensive EW tacticswhich conceal emitters or deceive the enemyas to their identity and location.

The commander has several meansavailable to manage the electromagneticspectrum.

The Communications-Electronics a specific period and eliminates theOperating Instructions (CEOI) are probability of unintentionalused to assign specific frequencies tospecific elements of a command, Afrequently changing CEOI is highlyeffective In defeating hostile ESMactivities by Increasing the difficulty InIdentifying targets for exploitation,

Emission Control (EMCON) IS used bythe commander to restrict use of theelectromagnetic spectrum to certaincritical systems or prohibit usealtogether (partial or complete s}lence).This tactic prevents the enemy fromcollecting data on our emlsslons during

Interference by friendly emissions withthose from critically important systems.

� Manipulative Electronic Deception(MED) is employed to alter anelectromagnetic profile of a unit orweapon system or to simulate anotional one to support a commander’scount ersurveillance or operationssecurity (O PSEC) plan.

The commander should also considerlocating hls elements so as to provideshorter communications links, thusmaking jamming more dlfflcult.

Jammers are also very high power radiosand, in exceptional circumstances,commanders may be required to use jammersto ram critical communications to unitsisolated by enemy electromagneticinterference.

There is also a potential for tacticaljammers to be used to protect friendly

9-7

—FM 100-5

emitters from being heard, seenelectronically, and located by enemy J

radioelectronic combat units. A well-designed jammer with a highly efficient anddirectional antenna may operate in the samefrequencies as our own communicationsystems and still protect them from enemyintercept by providing signal maskings. Todo this, jammers are located very near theforward battle positions between the friendlyemitters and the enemy EW units, where theycarefully direct high intensity signals towardthe enemy while allowing friendly emitters tocommunicate effectively. This tactic isdependent on both ingenuity and theavailability of special antennas.

Ground mobile EW elements must bemounted in highly protected vehicles that arecompatible with and of equal mobility to theother elements of the combined arms team—they must be able to survive on themodern battlefield.

EW is perhaps the only element of combatpower that, subject to the constraints ofsecurity and governmental regulations, canbe used in peacetime for training exactly as itwould be used in war, without causingcasualties to personnel or damage toequipment. Commanders must conduct

ON THE USE OF JAMMERS

Commanders must also rememberthat jammers are targets. Because of thelarge amount of power and heat theyradiate, jammers are easily identified byenemy intercept and locatingequipment. If jammers are to operateeffectively and survive, they must beprotected, highly mobile, and theirmissions must be capable of beingshifted from jammer to jammer.

Jamming units must be able toperform electronic combat missionswhile deploying and when in contactwith the enemy. Antennas must be ableto be raisedand lowered in seconds, notminutes. All equipment must be simpleto operate and to maintain.

tac{ical exercises in the sameenvironment that they can expect in

EWwar.

9-8

CHAPTER 10

Tactical Nuclear Operations

INTRODUCTION

FOR NEARLY 25 YEARS the US Army has had nuclear

weapons deployed as an integral part of the weapons

inventory, and such weapons are also deployed to support

allied nations. The Soviet Union and other countries have also

fielded a nuclear capability for battlefield use. The use orthreatened use of nuclear weapons will have a profound effect

on the modern battlefield. The combat power provided by

nuclear weapons could mean the difference between victory or

defeat, or could cause an enemy to terminate his attack by

,~ltering his perception of an easy victory.

CHAPTERPAGE

INTRODUCTION 1o-1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS 10-2

THE NUCLEAR BATTLE 10-5

CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR RELEASE 10-6

NUCLEAR PLANNING 10-7

EMPLOYMENT 10-8

1o-1

—FM 100-5

Even when used in low yields, nuclearweapons can quickly and decisively altercombat power ratios and change the course ofthe battle. They can help counter anoverwhelming conventional attack, rupturetough defenses, or be used to respond to anenemy’s nuclear attack. However, since thestrategies of major nuclear powers imply thatthreats of escalation to general nuclear warcould be associated with the limited use ofnuclear weapons, employment of theseweapons must be selective and restrained.

In any battle, we must have the capabilityto use nuclear weapons effectively, alongwith our conventional weapons, in support ofthe land battle. We must be properly trainedand equipped to survive an enemy nuclearattack—to minimize the disruption, tomaintain effective command and control,and to continue the execution of the assignedmission. This level of training is enhancedthrough combined conventional-nuclearoperational training exercises.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

r-

Nuclear detonation effects present newphenomena and increased destructiveness on

the battlefield when compared to conventionalfirepower. Blast effect is vastly increased, and,in the smaller yields, radiation has the most

significant effect on troops in the open, inarmored vehicles, or in foxholes. Thermalradiation is an added danger to unprotectedsoldiers.Thee/ectromagnetk puke (EM P) which

emanates from a nuclear burst can damageradios and other electronic equipment, seriouslyinterfering with command and control

communications and target acquisitionsystems. Fallout can also produce casualties,

delay movements, and deny terrain to units thatare unprepared to detect residual radiation and

protect themselves from its effects.

10-2

FM 100-5—

DIVISION SLICE ARTILLERY CAPABILITY vs. 1 KT NUCLEAR WEAPONIMMEDIATE LETHALITY

A nuclear weapon with a yield of 1Kiloton [KT) (2,000,000 Ibs) hasapproximately the same lethalityagainst troops in the open as

18,000

8,000

3,000

650

450

200

~“”’A’”’”Aa&AAA!3PERMA ENT Y

INCAPACI TION \

I RISK OF LETHALITY I

3 MIN 1 HR 1 DAY

The immediate incapacitation radiationlevel is 8,000-18,000 rads (unit of measure forradiation) but, an active soldier suddenlyexposed to 3,000 rads could becomeincapacitated within 3-5 minutes. He mayrecover to some degree in about 45 minutes,but due to vomiting, diarrhea, and otherradiation sickness symptoms, he would beonly partially effective until he dies within aweek. A soldier exposed to 650 rads initiallyshows no symptoms, but loses some of his

Although thermal effects begin todominate troop safety at about 3KT, for the yields of most intereston the battlefield (1 to 10Kilotons), radiation is the mainkiller. This figure shows how adose of radiation affects soldiersperforming typical combat tasks.

24 DAYS

effectiveness in about two hours and can beexpected to die in a few weeks underbattlefield conditions. Exposure in the 100rad region usually has little effect.Accordingly, in conventional-nuclearcombat it would be prudent to subject frontline enemy to 3,000-8,000 rads or more, enemyto the rear to 650-3,000 rads, and avoidsubjecting friendly forces and civilians to anunacceptable dose level (100 or more rads).

10“3

=--

—FM 100-5

EXPOSED PERSONNEL

8000RADS

3000RADS

650RADS

100RADS

{

VERY SMALL AMOUNT OF VOMITING AND NAUSEAOTHERWISE–NO EFFECTS

1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I

The intensityof initialradiationisreducedby theprotection provided by tanksand foxholes, andalso by each 100 meters of distance from theburst. For example, this figure shows thata 1 KT

burst incapacitatesexposed soldiers(within fiveminutes) out to 600 meters. It only does so outto 500 meters for troops in tanks or foxholes.The 1 KT nuclear weapon causes reduced

effectiveness to exposed soldiers (after twohours) out to about 800 meters. Soldiers in

tanks or foxholes are usually safe beyond about1,100 or 1,200 meters. Ten-KT weapons are

about 50 percent more effective than 1 KTweapons; however, the safe distance increases

to about 5,500 meters due to the thermaleffects coming from larger weapons.

In addition to the immediate effeti of fallout safe height (about 50 meters for a 1nuclear weapons, commanders must also be KT), passes thr&gh rain which then carriesconcerned fith residual radiation resulting radioactive par~icles to the earth. Tofrom fallout, rainout, and induced radiation. minimize fallout, fi=iendly nuclear weaponsWhen a nuclear weapon detonates too near will normally be employed as airbursts.the surface of the earth, dust debris and However, radiological monitoring isheavy particles which are sucked up into the essential to detect areas contaminated byair fall to the ground and create areas of rainout, induced radiation, or by fallout iflethal radiation. Similar results could occur enemy policy is different.when the cloud from a nuclear burst, even at a

10-4

FM 100-5—

THE NUCLEAR BATTLEThe use or threatened use of nuclear

weapons will significantly influence everyphase of the battle, to include purelyconventional operations. Planning andpreparation for their use or counteruse mustbe continuous. The use of nuclear weaDonsbegins a new phase in operation&a IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TOcombined conventional-nuclea$ phase of DISID[NGU 1SH BE~E ENuncertain length during which a clear OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE USEdistinction between offensive or defensive OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSuse of. nuclear weapons could be difficult.With nuclear strikes, either side could deliverinstantaneously crippling combat power.Depending on the deception, surprise, targetacquisition, and boldness of the user, suchweapons could change the course of battlevery quickly.

Once conventional-nuclear operationsbegin, personnel and materiel losses couldoccur more rapidly, with much highercasualty and materiel loss rates in bothforward and rear areas. If limited numbers ofweapons are used, the total losses may not gohigher than in extended periods of severefighting on the lethal conventionalbattlefield, but they would occur in a shortertime. There could be severe shortages of

— critical supplies and medical treatment,placing a severe strain on logistical supportsystems. The effects of nuclear bursts maycause temporary failure or permanentdamage to some communication and dataprocessing equipment, thus placing apremium on remaining services, unless unitspractice techniques that improve protectionand reduce vulnerability to EMP. ‘I’he timeand resources required to dig protectiveshelters, move between dispersed sites,decontaminate supplies, replace casualtiesand other related reconstitution activitieswill slow rear area operations.

Control of nuclear weapons requires swiftand reliable reconstitution of communica-tions. Time-saving procedures must bedeveloped and practiced. When enemynuclear strikes are probable, all units on thebattlefield must protect themselves byterrain shielding, digging in, and when

THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BYCOVER AND CONCEALMENT

possi~lq avo~ding easily tar~etec! massed MUST BE STRESSEDforces. Radlologlcal monitoring andreporting is required, and cover andconcealment become extremely important.

‘=.-

10-/5

—FM 100-5

CONTROLS ON NUCLEARRELEASE

Release, or the authority to use nuclearweapons, will be conveyed from theNational Command Authority (NCA)through the operational chain of command.[n order to dampen the escalator effects ofusing nuclear weapons, release will normallybe approval to employ preplanned packagesof weapons to be fired within a specified time-frame, and within specified geographicalareas according to the constraintsestablished by the releasing authority.Unwanted destruction can be minimized bycareful selection of targets, weapon yieldsaim points, and deliverys ystems. Retaliatoryattacks by the enemy are also of primaryconcern. The danger of such attacks can bereduced by a proper disposition offorces and astrong counterretaliatory capability.

HIGHER AUTHORITY WILLREQUIRE SUBMISSION OFSITUATION REPORTS AND

SPECIAL REPORTS PRIOR TOAUTHORIZING NUCLEAR

WEAPONS USE

The precise circumstances that mayrequire the use of nuclear weapons will bedetermined by the developing battle. Ideally, _normal operational reports will provide therequired current battle information. Specialreports, sent when the tactical situationindicates the need to employ nuclearweapons, will detail what has happened,what has been done to reinforce the defense,and assess the seriousness of the problems.

Situation reports and special reportscomplement one another and must providethe required information to portray acomplete picture of the situation for higherauthorities. These reports should describehow a particular package of nuclearweapons, when requested, would be used tocounter the developing threat and permitresumption of effective operations.Commanders should send request messageswhen they judge that the use of nuclearweapons will be essential for accomplish-ment of their mission. It is possible that theinformation and the situation will be suchthat a higher level of command may directthe use of nuclear weapons without a requestfrom a corps commander.

10-6

—

FM 100-5—

~

NUCLEAR PLANNING

Advanced planning for nuclear strikes orcounterstrokes is essential to timelyemployment. Training, planning, logisticsupport, and other arrangements to allowunits to use nuclear weapons must be donebefore the outbreak of hostilities, or beforedeployment. Where the use of nuclearweapons by either side is a possibility, theheadquarters of the deployed force mustdevelop, refine, and update contingencyplans for the employment of nuclear weaponsbased on guidance from higher echelons ofcommand and the battlefield situation.

At the time authorized commandersrequest the use of nuclear weapons, they mustbe able to foresee a situation developingwhich will be sufficiently grave to requiretheir use. One of the criteria to be followed inrequesting release of nuclear weapons is thatthe overall defensive capability must not beallowed to deteriorate to the point whereavailable forces cannot conduct effectiveconventional-nuclear follow-on operationsafter the strike.

Although many weapons will probably beavailable, release may be expected for onlythe numbers and types of weapons includedin planned “packages” of nuclear weapons. A PLANNING A “PACKAGE” OFpackage is a group of nuclear weapons of NUCLEAR WEApOIUSspecific yields for employment in a specifiedarea, within a limited timeframe to support atactical contingency.

Sufficient nuclear weapons should beplanned in each package to alter the tacticalsituation decisively, and to insureaccomplishment of the assigned mission.

The package will be planned foremployment in a timeframe, normallyexpressed in hours, to insure full integrationwith other military and diplomatic actions.Within the specified timeframe, all nuclearweapons will be employed as a “pulse” withina shorter timespan, normally expressed in

10-7

‘—

—FM 100-5

minutes. The timespan for the pulse ofnuclear weapons will depend on the technicalcapability for proper command and ‘control,warning, tactical flexibility, operationalnecessity, and national approval.Continuous updating and refining ofpackages is essential if they are to beemployed effectively within the timespanapproved or directed by the releasingauthority.

Planning must reflect the constraints anddirectives of higher authority, and must also

include the procedures for warning friendlyunits and the responsibilities for post strikeanalysis. Since aircraft may be designated todeliver some of the weapons, and the otherservices must arrange to warn friendlyaircraft to avoid areas scheduled for nuclearstrikes, planning and coordination will be ajoint effort. The echelon which will controlemployment of the requested package isresponsible for disseminating the warning—this requires an adequate and survivablecommand and control communicationssystem.

I?— -,, 1

EMPLOYMENT

The first use of US tactical nuclearweapons would probably be in a defensivemode based on prepared defense plans. Lateruse could include nuclear support foroffensive operations to destroy the enemy orregain lost territory. Tactical advantage maybe gained by neutralizing lead elements inthe enemy second echelon, and byeliminating his committed echelon’s supportand supporting fire systems. This can defeatthe enemy tactic of echelonment bydestroying the follow-up reserves for thebreakthrough, and by weakening enemysupport. This will reduce pressure on friendlyunits in contact so they can contain engagedforces by conventional means and control thebattle.

10-8

In general, the logical targets are:

� Committed enemy units

� Reserves

. Lead elements of second echelonforces

� Enemy nuclear systems

� Field artillery

� Air defense artillery

� Selected command and controlelements

� Support forces rearward of thecommitted elements

FM

Groups of targets on avenues of approach,along the FEBA, and in likely areas of enemybreakthrough attacks constitute the basis fora weapon package.

Plans are prepared to identify avenues ofapproach where the enemy is likely toconcentrate, and areas where breakthroughattacks are most likely to occur. Divisionstarget their weapons, including atomicdemolition munitions, in these areas,avoiding inhabited areas and public facilitieswhere civilian casualties and otherundesirable collateral damage would exceedlevels allowed in planning guidance. For thesafety of friendly forces and civilians, targetareas closest to the line of contact orpopulation centers should be targeted withlow-yield weapons. Corps will review division

loo-5—

nuclear fire plans for tactical suitability, andintegrate them into appropriate corpsweapon packages.

Commanders will make a timely requestfor approval of a nuclear weapons package,speci~ing the desired timeframe and firingtimespan. To convey to the enemy that we areusing nuclear weapons in a limited manner,all weapons in a package should be fired inthe shortest possible time. The package mustbe employed on time, in the approved areas,on high priority targets. While not asubstitute for strong conventional forces,nuclear weapons provide the commander thecapability to generate instantaneous combatpower of enormous magnitude that cannegate the enemy’s offensive advantage anddeny him his objective.

NCA

NATO MC

SHAPE

AFCENT

CENTAG

CORPS #

DIVISION

DIV ARTYFA GP

DELlVERYUNIT

DELlVERYSYSTEM

J

*

-4

KEY+ TRANsfvllsslON

TIME

_ ;~O:ESSING

* DECISION

TIME IN HOURS o 5 10 15

Erl.............-t-

11 f? E.-.

..- — ...-1

T; 1i

-. .. .4– -1! “~ ~

p+.-+--’ ~ ‘.-+-.+_~

20 25 30

Successful conventional-nuclear operations require—that

commanders understand the effects of these weapons, and plan

carefully in advance to minimize personnel and materialvulnerability.

10-9

‘._

CHAPTER 11

Chemical Warfare and Nuclear, Biological,and Chemical (NBC) Defense

INTRODUCTION

DURING WWI, the first large-scale chemical attacks were

made, achieving results that led to a major use of chemical

weapons on the battlefield. During that war, chemicalweapons proved to be four times as effective in producing

nonfatal battlefield casualties as high explosive (HE)

weapons. Although extensive protective measures were

devised, over 1,300,000 Casualties (4.6 percent of the total

casualties) resulted from chemical warfare (CW) operations.

As an example, WWI Russian fatalities horn chemical agents

exceeded US losses in Vietnam and the total Russian chemical

casualties (fatal and nonfatal) were more than the current US

force strength in Europe.

CONTENTSPAGE

INTRODUCTION 11-1

US POLICY 11-2

THREAT 11-3

US FORCE SURVIVABILITY 11-6

FUN OAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT 11-7

OFFENSE 11-11

DEFENSE 11-11

RETROGRADE 11-12

Since 1918, however, toxic chemicalweapons have not been used on a WWI scale.The use of chemical weapons since WWI hasessentially been restrained by the threat ofretaliation in kind. Many nations, however,now possess the capability to employ theseweapons.

11-1

—

—FM 100-5

US POLICY

There is a commonly held misconceptionthat ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocolcompletely removes the chemical warfarethreat to the Army. This is not the case. TheProtocol limits the “first use” of lethalchemicals, but does not address theproduction and stockpiling of such weapons.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits theuse in war of asphyxiating, poisonous orother gases. It does not prohibit theproduction of chemical warfare agents, thedevelopment of weapons that deliverchemical agents, the stockpiling ofchemical munitions, or the development ofchemical warfare protective materiel anddecontamination equipment.

The US did not ratify the Geneva Protocoluntil 22 January 1975, and, like othersignatories to the treaty, reserves the right toretaliate with chemical agents shouldchemical warfare be initiated against ournation and its armed forces.

The current IJS national policy onchemical warfare is based on the Presidentialdecisions of 25 November 1969. Specifically,the President reaffirmed the long standingunilateral US position of no first use of lethalchemical weapons; extended this no first usepolicy to include incapacitating chemicalagents; and renounced the use of biologicalagents and weapons, and all other methodsof biological warfare. In February 1970, thisrenouncement was extended to includebiological toxins, which are chemicalsubstances.

Consistent with the President’srenunciation of the “first use” of lethaland incapacitating chemical agents, theobjective of the United States chemicalwarfare program will be to deter the use ofchemical agents by other nations and toprovide a retaliatory capability shoulddeterrence fail.

The above instructions were promulgatedby the Department of the Army in July 1970

11-2

FM 100-5—

~

to implement the President’s decision.Inherent in these implementing instructionsare two basic requirements:

US forces must be organized, trainedand equipped to survive and operateeffectively in a c,hemical warfareenvironment.

US forces must have the capability toretaliate in kind and scope sufficient, atleast, to balance a like capability of theenemy.

Commanders must be prepared to supportand execute our national chemical warfarepolicy. This can be done best by maintaininga visible, responsive capability to fight andwin the firstenvironment.

Soviet and

battle in ‘a chemical warfare

THREAT

Warsaw Pact forces are welltrained and equipped for both the offensiveand defensive aspects of chemical warfare,

L and for nuclear and biological defense.

Soviet military doctrine describes chemicalagents as “weapons of mass destruction”and treats their use as an integral part ofwarfare. The Soviet Army is well organizedand equipoped . for .chemi~al warfare SOVIET AND WARSAW pACToperations either m toxic areas imposed upon FORCES TRAIN AND EQUIP FORthem, or to exploit their own use of chemical CHEMICAL WARFARE AS IF ITagents. As an example, the latest Soviet WERE INEVITABLEtanks and APCS have built-in air filtrationsystems, while the majority of otherequipment has, as a minimum, partialprotection. Soviet commanders at all levelslearn how to conduct their missions underchemical warfare conditions. CW agentdetection is a routine part of unitreconnaissance training and large-scalechemical agent decontamination exercisesare regularly conducted. In addition,chemical staff personnel are assigned downto battalion level, and organic chemicaldecontamination units are assigned at allmilitary command levels from Front down totactical company.

11-3

—

—FM 100-5

Soviet tactical doctrine stressesthe following:

—I 1 ISURPRISE

—

12JSECURITY

—I3 IRECONNAISSANCE

~SUPERIOR FIREPOVUER

.-..=”

II1Surprise

%prise denies the enemy time to react.Nuclear, chemical, and/or conventional fireswould be employed with surprise to increasetheir shock effect. Surprise- is achieved bysecrecy in planning, camouflage, deception,rapid combat preparation, the execution ofdecisive and unexpected maneuvers, andrapid delivery through adequate andeffective weapons systems.

�2 Security

Security against a chemical or nuclearcounters troke is achieved throughdispersion, careful selection of assault areas,and in-depth organization of defense forcesand fires. - -

u3Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance for exploitation of Qchemical strikes is employed well forward ofthe FEBA to acquire enemy nuclear weaponsites, airfields, depots, and troop assemblyareas. Soviet ground troops are extensivelyrehearsed in reconnaissance of andmovement through contaminated areas.During a high-speed advance, contaminatedareas are by-passed or traversed in sealedtanks and ‘a~ored personnel carriers tomaintain the momentum of the attack.

I 4 I SU~eriorFire~O~er

~erio~ firepower & reflected in theorganization of chemical weapons in a Sovietdivision and stressed in their militarydoctrine. Soviet tactics have been geared tothe nuclear as well as chemical battlefield.An initial massive nuclear and/or chemicalstrike in great depth has been viewed by theSoviets as a means to gain surprise, achieve amajor penetration, and destroy effectiveresistance.

11-4

—-

The modem persistent and nonpersistentchemical agents used by Soviet forces can bedelivered by a variety of weapon systemsproviding great flexibility of employment:

loo-5–

SOVIET TACTICS OUTLINE IN

DETAIL THE USE OF CHEMICAL

WEAPONS ON THE MODERN

BA1’TLEFIELD

� Tactical aircraft

� Surface-to-surface tactical ballisticmissiles (SCUD)

�Free-rocket-over-ground (FROG)

� Multiple rocket launchers (MRL)

�Tube Artillery

�Mortars

\

the usedelive~

of thesesystems,

Soviet or Soviet-equipped andtrained forces could initiateand sustain large-scale CWoperations in either aconventional or conventional-nuclear conflict. Theirdoctrine emphasizes theemployment of chemicalweapons in closecoordinationwith conventional and nuclearweapons to capitalize on theattributes of each. The threatof CW is as great to the reararea as it is to forces operatingin the main battle area.

11-5

‘\

—FM 100-5

US FORCE SURVIVABILITY

The objective of US policy is to deter the useof chemical weapons by other nations. If thisdeterrence fails, and the use of chemicalweapons is authorized by national commandauthorities, the primary objective is toachieve early termination of CW operationsat the lowest possible level of intensity. IJSforces must, therefore, be prepared to:

. Detect and protect against chemical andbiological munitions and agents

� Conduct operations in an NBC environ-ment

. Use chemical weapons in retaliation

Some casualties will inevitably result fromthe employment of chemicals, even against afully protected force. Additionally, IJS forceswill suffer serious degradation ofperformance caused by the requirement tocontinuously wear chemical protectiveclothing and equipment. IJnless well-trainedand conditioned, our soldiers wiII be lesseffective during NBC operations. Theproblems associated with wearing protectiveequipment (heat stress, respiratory strain,psychological stress, reduced mobility,visual acuity, and manual dexterity) willadversely affect mission accomplishment.Soldiers wearing chemical protectiveequipment have a limited tolerance time forhard work and must be allowed to attend tobody functions. Therefore, the dualvulnerability of forces to both the effects ofthe chemical agent and the stresses from theprotective equipment can result in anunacceptable degradation of combateffectiveness and attrition of the force. Thisdegradation can be reduced throughtraining, and by use of the Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) asdescribed in FM 21-40, NBC Defense.

Chemical protective clothing andequipment provides protection frombiological attack also. There are twoadditional aspects of biological defense withwhich the commander must be continuouslyconcerned. The first is an aggressivelyenforced immunization program. Such aprogram provides immunity to a wide variety

of potential biological warfare agents, but tobe effective, it must be enforced prior to anattack. The second aspect is rigorousadherence to good field sanitation practices.This type is effective both before and afterattack in reducing losses to disease.

Effective defense against nuclear attack isdependent on the training of the individualsoldier to react properly at the time of attack.Common field fortifications provide the bestshelter available to the soldier in nuclear aswell as conventional attacks, and thepreparation of such fortifications must beroutine for soldiers in rear areas as well as forthose engaged in the battle area. Each aspectof NBC Defense is covered in detail in FM 21-40.

Training in CW and NBC defense must beintegrated into individual and unit trainingprograms and into higher echelon tacticalexercises. Training objectives m-ust bedesigned to develop and evaluate thereadiness of forces to operate in an NBCenvironment and to insure proficiency withall available offensive and protectivemateriel. Emphasis must be placed onperforming all operational missions while -using NBC detection, warning, andprotective equipment. Toward this end, agentsimulants should be used whenever possibleto provide realism.

IJnits, materiel, and supplies must also beprotected. Mobility, dispersion, and use ofterrain will minimize some of the dangersand effects of chemical attack. Detection andearly warning of such attacks will beimportant to survivability. While NBCdefense specialists will be at work at eachlevel of command, soldiers must also assist inthe overall NBC defense effort. They mustthoroughly understand decontaminationprocedures so that actions to accomplish themission continue.

Some essential military tasks cannot beperformed at all in full protective equipment;however, if the protective equipment isremoved, a force could sustain sufficientcasualties to render it ineffective in a veryshort period of time. If we lack the ability ormeans to retaliate, enemy forces need only be

11-6

FM 100-5—

—encumbered with protective equipment inareas they attack with chemicals.Conversely, without knowing where thesefirst attacks will come, our forces will have tobe encumbered everywhere.

To negate this enemy advantage, ourcountermeasures against a chemical attackmust be directed against enemy chemicaldelive~ systems and agents—prior to andfollowing the first attack. We must make amaximum effort to locate and destroy enemychemical warfare munitions and relateddelivery systems. If successful, this actioncould prevent the first attack or result inearly termination of chemical conflict.

To survive in the chemical warfareenvironment, it is essential that commandersassure that their forces are provided thehighest degree of protection against the CWthreat. While these measures will save lives,commanders must realize that as the degreeof chemical protection increases, theefficiency and endurance of their troops toaccomplish the mission decreases.

FUNDAMENTALS OFEMPLOYMENT

Only the national commandauthorities can decide when to retaliatewith lethal and incapacitating chemicalagents. That decision will be relayed, alongwith guidance and policy for the use ofchemical weapons, to field commanders.

The initial use of chemical munitionsshould comprise a retaliatory response ofsufficient magnitude to discourage thefurther use of chemicals by the enemy. Theresponse should be planned and executed toproduce casualties, impose mobilityrestrictions, and degrade enemy missioneffectiveness in an intensity sufficient to:

� Stop enemy successes and deny himmobility and combat effectivenessadvantages by forcing the same chemicalprotection restrictions on him.

DESTRUCTIONMUNITIONS IS

OF AGENTIMPERATIVE

� Convey the message of high resolve to

11-7

— .—

—FM 100-5

win, with the use of chemicals ifnecessary.

� Convince the enemy that it will be to hisadvantage to terminate chemicalwarfare.

The advantage of this concept lies in itsflexibility, wherein the level of response canbe controlled according to the prevailingmilitary and political circumstances. Thispermits a response intensity ranging fromretaliation against limited, specific targetsup to a theaterwide effort. However, the use ofchemical weapons in conjunction with eitherconventional or nuclear weapons will requiredirected or self-imposed intensity andgeographic restrictions in order to preventescalation or undesirable collateralcasualties and contamination.

(

Chemical agents used by US ~forces can be delivered by avariety of weapons systems: \

•l Tactical aircraft

•l Tube artillery

•l Mortars

11-8

loo-5—

Chemical weapons are basically area~weapons that have effects ranging from mildincapacitation to high lethality. Political andmilitary considerations may dictate suchrestrictions as:

. Types of agents that may be employed.

. Types of targets that may be attackedand areas where chemical weapons maybe employed.

. Extent of collateral effects permitted.

When selecting chemical agents,commanders must strive to cause the enemyto use protective clothing thus degrading hisperformance.

This chart shows typical US agents and their effects. Threat forces usesimilar agents with similar effects.

VERY SHORT DEATHNERVE

GBVAPOR OR A FEW LETHAL EFFECT ON MAY OCCUR WITHIN A

AGENT AEROSOL MINUTES UNMASKED TROOPS FEW MINUTES IFAGENT IS iNHALED

- LETHAL EFFECT ONNERVE

Vx LIQUID A FEW HOURS TROOPS, CONTAMINA- A FEW HOURSAGENT TO A WEEK TION OF TERRAIN AND (DELAYED CASUALTIES)

EQUIPMENT

INCAPACITATION OF’BLISTER HD &&&?s;;Ly TROOPS, CONTAMINA- A FEW HOURSAGENT LIQUID

A F& WEEKSTION OF TERRAIN AND (DELAYED CASUALTIES)

EQUIPMENT

Use of these chemicaJ agents provide commanders with the ability to:

� c ause casualties among unprotected or poorly equipped and trainedpersonnel.

,C ause decreased effectiveness by requiring enemy forces to wear

protective equipment.

� Restrict the use of terrain.

OCh annel forces into a specific area.

� Delay an advancing enemy force.

� Attack targets normally protected against conventional munitions.

9P dro uce casualties or restrict the use of equipment or real estate

through contamination without destroying structures or installations.

# 11-9

—FM 100-5

Even if an enemy force is prepared for achemical attack and sustains few casualties,it will be less effective because of the need towear protective equipment, the resultantincrease in time to complete normal tasks,and the time required for decontamination.Once chemical operations have commenced,authority to use chemical weapons isnormally decentralized to the lowest echelonthat is responsible for the area within whichthe casualty producing effects of the agentwill extend and that is capable of controlling,coordinating, and exploiting their use. Thisauthority will normally be retained atdivision level; however, in some cases, itcould be delegated as low as brigade.

When planning to employ chemicalweapons, commanders must coordinate withadjacent units over whose zone or sector toxicclouds are expected to pass. This planningrequires adherence to the same basicprinciples and procedures that apply to theemployment of other weapons systems.

PLANN 1NG FOR CH EMlcAL chemical weapons employment planning isWEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

UTILIZES THE SAME PRINCIPLESa part of fire support planning and the

AND PROCEDURES USED FOR principles and procedures of fire support

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION coordination remain unchanged. Theserequirements do, however, assume increasedimportance because of the relatively largearea covered and the wide variation of effectsthat can be achieved. When analyzingpotential targets for chemical weaponsemployment, commanders must, as aminimum, consider the:

•1

•1c1•1

•1

c1c1c1

Restrictions on use imposedHQ.

Effect on the overall mission.

Impact on future operations.

Effects desired (persistentpersistent).

by higher

or non-

Time to produce casualties (prompt ordelayed).

Influence of weather.

Collateral effects.

Safety of friendly forces.

11-10

FM 100-5—

OFFENSE

In the offense the commander wouldconsider using chemical weapons to:

� Attczck enemy first .ch.l.ndefending forces with nonpersistentagents. Nonpersistent agents will obtainrapid casualty production; cause the enemyto mask, degrading his ability to defend; andeliminate the possibility of residualcontamination through which attackingforces would have to pass.

� Attack enemy reserves withpersistent and nonpersistent agents.Engage reserves constituting an immediatethreat, or occupying an area to be used byfriendly forces with a nonpersistent agent.Reserves which are a more remote threat or inareas which friendly forces intend to by-passare engaged with a persistent agent.

QProtect the flanks of the axis ofadvance with persistent agents. Thedegree of flank protection that can beobtained is directly dependent on twofactors—first, the enemy commander’swillingness to cross a contaminated areadespite the risks involved, and second, thelevel of chemical defense preparedness of thecounterattacking force. Commanders cannot

expect absolute flank protection frompersistent agents alone.

~Attack enemy cornrncznd.ndc.ntrolfacilities with persistent andnonpersistent agents. Nonpersistentagents are employed against those facilitiesin which rapid casualty production and/orpenetration of hardened sites is desired. Theuse of persistent agents against suchfacilities may cause some casualties, butmore important, restricts the use of them andcauses the enemy to have to take time fortheir decontamination.

�Attack enemy fire support with

%ersistent and nonpersistent agents.

e principle in this case is similar to attackof command and control facilities.Counterfires to interrupt the mission of anenemy battery would use nonpersistentagents, while fires intended to add to theenemy’s logistical problems would usepersistent ones.

When using chemical weapons in the offense,the commander must consider the impact onhis operations. The weapons selected mustcomplement his plan and not cause obstaclesto his own movement.

13EFENSE

In the defense the commander wouldconsider using chemical weapons to:

�C ton aminate probable enemyavenues of approach using persistentagents. AS in the case of flank protection,the effectiveness of this measure isdependent on the determination of the enemycommander and the CW status of his troops.Nevertheless, even well-trained, well-disciplined, and well-equipped troops willlose momentum in traversing acontaminated area. The commander mustnot depend on chemical contamination toserve as a barrier to enemy movement.

� Attack enemy secondec?zelon forceswith persistent and nonpersistentagents. By so engaging the enemy secondechelon, its momentum is slowed, the enemyassault elements become “shallow”, unableto depend on the second echelon for timelyreinforcement, and the entire force is mademore vulnerable to friendly counterattack.Nonpersistent agents are used against thoseelements presenting the most immediatethreat and those occupying territory overwhich friendly forces must pass. Persistentagents are employed against those elementswhich present a lesser threat or which occupyareas to be avoided by the counterattackingforce.

11-11

.

—FM 100-5

� Attack enemy conwnczndandcontrolfacilities with persistent andnonpersistent agents. The principlesgoverning these attacks are the same asthose governing such attacks in the offense.

� Attack enemy fire support withpersistent and nonpersistent agents.The rationale for these attacks is the same as

example, a replacement facility. Persistent Jagents can be very effective in divertinglogistical effort to large-scale decontamina-tion of supplies and equipment. When suchagents are used against logistical complexes,the enemy is caused to expend a great deal ofadditional effort in attempting to sustain theforward movement of materiel.

for those conducted in the offense.

� Attack enemy logistic systems withWhen using chemical weapons in the

defense, care must be exercised to precludepersistent and nonpersistent agents. cloud drift of toxic chemicals over friendlyThe logistical momentum required for a forces. When using agents of highsuccessful offense is sensitive to chemical persistency to contaminate areas, theattack. Nonpersistent agents are employed commander must consider the impact of suchagainst targets in which tile potential for contamination on his plans forhigh casualty production is great; for counterattack.

RETROGRADE

In the retrograde, the commander wouldconsider using chemical weapons to:� sl ow the attacking enemy force

with persistent and nonpersistentagents. Nonpersistent attack is used to slowforces that constitute an immediate threat byforcing them into chemical protectiveclothing and equipment and creatingimmediate casualties. Persistent agents areused for much the same reason, but, becauseof their delayed ‘casualty production, are usedon forces constituting a lesser threat.flRestrict the use of specific terrain to

the enemy with persistent agents. Aswith flank protection and contamination ofavenues of approach, the degree of restrictiondepends on the enemy commander and thereadiness of his force. Even the best preparedforce, however, would be required to expendeffort to decontaminate an area for.

‘E:at’r”on aminate with persistent agentthose supplies or equipment that mayhave to be abandoned. Commanders mustkeep two things in mind in considering thiscourse of action—first, international lawforbids the destruction of certain types ofsupplies and equipment (most notably,medical supplies and equipment). In general,supplies, particularly foodstuffs, petroleumproducts, and textiles, should be considered

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“destroyed” when contaminated with apersistent agent. Equipment, particularlymajor end items and repair parts, can bedecontaminated and used by the enemy.Consequently, even though contamination ofsupplies and equipment to be abandoned is avalid consideration for the commander,destruction of such materiel will normally be _found more feasible using more conventionalmethods. In all cases, the commander mustconsider the collateral effects resulting fromhis use of chemical weapons and he mustinsure that these effects are consistent withhis planning guidance.

The commander must insure that his forcesare properly equipped and trained to operatein a chemical environment. If US forces areprepared for both defensive and offensivechemical warfare operations, the probabilityof an enemy using chemical weapons on themodern battlefield will be reduced.

Finally, the commander must beconstantly aware that the systems whichdeliver chemical agents are the systemswhich also deliver his conventional andnuclear fires. Fire planning must becontinuous, and must make the most efficientuse possible of all types of fires available inorder to effect the maximum sustainedimpact on the enemy’s ability to continue thebattle.