Defining Democracy in Islamic Polity

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Defining Democracy in Islamic PolityMuhammad Khalid Masud

(Draft paper for discussion in the International Conference on “The Future of Islam,

Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Era of Globalization”, 5-6 December 2004,

organized by the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, Jakarta .)

Whether democracy is compatible with Islam or not has been under discussion for more

than a century. The issue has again come into focus in the wake of the war on terrorism.

The assumption is that terrorism is a consequence of undemocratic and authoritarian

polities. Broadly speaking, three views have emerged in this regard. One view, often

favored by the Western media, holds that Muslim societies are unable to develop a

liberal culture and hence Muslim countries have not been able to achieve democracy.

Another, although a majority view among Muslim intellectuals, and not generally

supported by the political practice, claims that democracy is not only compatible with

Islamic teachings but also that Islamic polities in history have been more democratic

than any other system in the world. The third view maintains that democracy is a

foreign Western concept and does not go along with Islamic teachings. Islamic

democracy, i.e. a democracy defined from the perspective, differs from “Western”

democracy in form as well as in objectives. Whatever the perspective, studies on Islam

and democracy never fail to stress the point that building democracy in Muslim

countries is a formidable task. United States Institute of Peace Report on this subject

opens with the following statement: “Democracy building remains an uphill struggle in

most Muslim countries” (Special Report 93, 2002).

The present essay analyzes the following four texts that illustrate these three views.

1. Martin Kramer, “Islam vs. Democracy” (1996),

2. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, The Prophet and his Message (1987)

3. Amin Ahsan Islahi, Islami Riyasat (1977), and

4. Qari Tayyib, Fitri Hukumat (1963).

The analysis explores the question: why building democracy is such a formidable task.

Martin Kramer

Martin Kramer is a senior associate (and past director) of the Moshe Dayan Center for

Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University . He is also the Wexler-

Fromer Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy . Graduate from

Princeton and Columbia , Dr. Kramer has been a visiting professor at Brandeis

University , the University of Chicago , Cornell University , and Georgetown University .

His authored and edited books include Islam Assembled ; Shi‘ism, Resistance and

Revolution; Middle Eastern Lives ; Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival ; The Islamism

Debate ; The Jewish Discovery of Islam ; and Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of

Middle Eastern Studies in America .

Islam is not campatible with democracy

Martin Kramer (1996) argues that Islam is the reason that so many Muslim countries

are not democratic. Contrary to the various writings of the Western scholars on Islam,

Kramer insists that Muslim communities have been authoritarian and have resisted any

idea opposite to authoritarianism. Islamic countries have produced no democratic

movement. The various Islamic movements that have emerged during the last century

are entirely opposed to democracy. They have rejected democracy as part of

Westernism. He also disagrees with the scholars of Middle East who view that since

1979 a number of Islamic movements transformed themselves into populist movements

against state. Kramer explains that it was so because these movements mainly arose in

opposition to the ruling parties. The discontent with the states which were unable to

provide solutions made them popular among the masses. The movements remained

fundamentalist and violent. They participated in the political system and won elections

in Egypt in 1987, in Tunisia in 1989, in Jordon in 1989 and in Algeria in 1990. Because

these political parties faired well in electoral politics, Western scholars treated them as

democratic movements and predicted that they will pave the way for fuller democracy.

These scholars were not happy at the victory of fundamentalism but they interpreted

this victory in the light of what they called ‘theory of initial advantage’. They argued

that for the reason that the Muslim communities are not used to democracy and

electoral politics, the fundamentalist groups naturally take advantage of the situation.

The scholars, however, believed that eventually the fundamentalists will lose and real

democracy of the masses and majority will prevail. Some political scientists also

described FIS victory in Algeria as a protest vote, and hence not really significant.

According to Kramer these predictions and theories are a blind spot and a self

deception. In fact fundamentalism is neither a fad nor a temporary phenomenon. This is

something very basic to Islamic thinking and culture. Consequently free elections will

always strengthen fundamentalism and give them victory. In Kramer’s view, the Islamic

fundamentalism is full of paradoxes and contradictions. Firstly Islamic fundamentalism

is not reconciling with democratic values. Secondly the fundamentalists believe in the

authority of Shari’a, which is a divine and immutable. Furthermore, Shari’a law

supports inequality of women and non-Muslims and contravenes human rights. In this

sense, rule of law, as preached by Muslim fundamentalist is not a democratic value but

an authoritarian principle. Thirdly, the Islamists also speak of the principle of Shura,

consultation, which they claim defines Islamic democracy. However, this Shura is

subjected to the authority of Shari’a, and not binding. Kramer also rejects the idea of

the western scholars that fundamentalism is not real threat to the west. He argues that

in the Islamist thinking west stands as an enemy of Islam, an enmity which can never be

reconciled.

In fine, according to Kramer Islam is not only undemocratic but also a real and constant

threat to the west and democratic institutions. Kramer seems to have taken a very

difficult position. It simply holds that Muslims cannot be democratic unless they give up

Islam. For him, majority opinion, elections, participation of the masses do not count as

ingredients of democracy.

Khalifa Abdul Hakim (d. 1959)

Khalifa Abdul Hakim received his doctorate in Philosophy from Heidelberg University ,

Germany . Having retired as Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy,

Usmania University , Hyderabad , India , he was appointed Director, Institute of Islamic

Culture , Lahore in 1950 and held that position till his death. In addition to Urdu

translations of Histories of Philosophy by Weber and Hoffdings, and William James’s

Varieties of Religious Experience , his principal works include The Metaphysics of

Rumi , Islamic Ideology , Islam and Communism , and Prophet Muhammad and his

Mission .

Democracy is Compatible with Islam

Khalifa Abdul Hakim (1987) argues that the question about the compatibility of

democracy to Islam continues to be problematic not because Islam is not favorable, but

because Democracy is not definable. Early Greek philosophers, like Socrates, Plato and

Aristotle, regarded democracy irrational, unnatural and disgraceful. Aristotle regards

the concept of equality of all human beings as unnatural. Nature has not created

humankind equal; some of them are born slaves. Plato explained that social systems

which are the foundation for a political system are hierarchical. Majority of human kind

are born to serve others. Only the elite can rule. Hence only a philosopher King is an

ideal ruler. Looking at European history also we find democracy problematic. Magna

Carta, which is often claimed to be the starting point for democracy, was in fact the

product of negotiations between the king and the landed aristocracy; it was a

declaration that limited the authority of a king and protected the rights of the elite. It

was not governed by the principle of liberty and equality.

In the nineteenth and twentieth century also, it was aristocracy who ruled in the name

of the people. Macaulay envisioned no power for the common man. “Our democracy was

from an early period the most aristocratic and our aristocracy the most democratic”,

said Macaulay.

Consequently, during the twentieth century democracy in Europe produced Nazism in

Germany and Fascism in Italy . In both systems, majority suppressed minorities. Same

was the phenomenon of communism in Europe . Communism decried capitalism as it

did not allow power to peasants and workers. However, ethnic majorities in Soviet

Union suppressed minorities. It is thus difficult to define democracy in the European

historical context. It was the elite who ruled in the name of the people.

Democracy is problematic to define in the Muslim world as well. There is no word for

democracy in Islamic languages. The various terms used to translate the idea have

semantic fields that do not correspond with the idea of democracy. The term

Jamhuriyyat, for instance, was coined in probably twentieth century to translate

democracy. The word Jamhur has an altogether different connotation in Islamic

tradition, often meaning an undefined majority. The Muslim societies have not been able

to develop an ideology or institution of democracy because democracy remains

undefined.

Traditional terms like Khalifa, Amir, Sultan and other terms do not convey a sense of

democracy. In Islamic thought sovereignty always belonged to God. There was no idea

of the sovereignty of the people. The political theorists regarded Khalifa as a deputy of

God.

Summarizing the various political theories developed by Muslim thinkers Hakim

delineates the following twelve principles in Islamic political thought.

• Sovereignty belongs to God alone.

• Human kind is given free will.

• Islam allows no compulsion; freedom is a religious right.

• State in Islam is ideological.

• Non-Muslims are full citizens. They have a choice to pay poll tax to be exempted from

military service.

• Islam allows no racial discrimination.

• Islam allows no economic exploitation.

• Women have an important role to play in society.

• Islam does not support monarchy.

• Islam allows free vote. Hence election is permissible because Islam prescribes no

specific form of voting.

• Islam allows no priesthood and no religious authority.

• Judiciary is independent from the executive.

Khalifa concludes that parliamentary form of government is un-Islamic because it gives

undue significance to political parties.

Speaking on equality, Khalifa defines it as equality before law, which does not recognize

equality of wisdom. People have different intellectual levels. Shura therefore cannot be

assigned as a right to illiterate masses. Adult franchise serves one purpose: it elects

people of wisdom who are knowledgeable, men of integrity and are wealthy. They form

the Shura. Democracy to Khalifa means protection of the rights of the people and

extinction of all privileged classes.

Democracy, Hakim concludes, is compatible with Islam because according to the Qur’an

all men are created equal. However, they have some rights which are natural which

must be protected and in that sense they are all equal. The principle of equality

guarantees that right. Only a theistic religion can provide that protection. Islam’s

original vision calls for democracy.

Qari Tayyib (d. 1983)

Qari Thayyib was a grandson of Mawlana Nanautawi, the founder of the well-known

Deoband seminary in India . Born in 1897, he studied at Darul Ulum Deoband.

After graduation he started teaching in Darul Ulum. In 1924 he was appointed pro-vice-

chancellor of the Darul Ulum and in 1929, vice chancellor.

He was a very popular speaker and educationist. He took interest in philosophical issues

and modernity. Some of his popular works include the following.

Attashabbuh fiI-lslam, Mashahir-e Ummat, Kalimat-e Tayyibat, Atyabus-Thamar fi

Mas’alatil-Qaza wal-Qadar, Science Awr Islam, Ta’limat-e Islam Awr Masihi Aqwam,

Mas’ala-e Zuban-e Urdu Hindustan Men, Din-o-Siyasat, Asbab-e Urooj-o Zawal-e

Aqwam, Islami Azadi ka Mukammal Program, AI-Ijtehad wal-Taqlid, Usool-e Da’wat-e

Islam, Islami Masawat, Tafsir-e Sura-e FiI, Fitri Hukumat, etc.

Natural state

In his book “ Natural State ”, Qari Tayyib states that Nature symbolizes Divine kingdom,

which is the best example of a balanced system. The government on earth is Khilafat

(deputy of God), which establishes a system of government on the pattern of the Divine

natural state. Islamic caliphate is distinct from all other systems because in these

systems humans assume the Divine authority. Islamic system of government also differs

from others in the following aspects.

• God alone is the legislator.

• The ruler is bound to consult and is bound to abide by the consultation.

• Majority does not constitute a binding advice; the binding advice is the one that is the

most reasonable.

• Majority view is decisive only to settle a point where opinions are divided.

• Khilafat does not work for material objectives.

• Khilafat system does not allow party system.

Having summarized Tayyib’s discussion of an Islamic system of government, let me

quote an extract from this book (English translation is mine).

Imaret (leadership, government), without Shura is tyranny (istibdad) and dictatorship,

and Shura without Amir is anarchy (fawdawiyyat) and de-centrism (la markaziyyat). In

its most excellent form of a comprehensive and moderate religion, Islam combines

autocracy and democracy. Calling for obligatory obedience to an Amir Islam has

prevented disorder so that the divine vice-regency (Khilafat Ilahi) is secure from chaos

of the selfish opinions and form the interference of the masses (awamm). Constituting

an influential Shura, Islam has abolished the possibility of the tyranny and absolutism of

the Amir, in order that Umma as a whole may not suffer from the individualism,

selfishness and chaos. Consequently, an Islamic government combines autocracy and

democracy, neither is autocracy independent of democracy, nor is democracy

independent of autocracy” (Tayyib 1963, 220).

Majority opinion has no legal ( shar‘i ) value except that this principle can be employed

to settle an issue where an issue is equivocal and both of its sides are equally

permissible…provided this majority consists of honest people. Certainly, the minority of

trustworthy and honest people whose wisdom and taste is well-known is preferable than

the majority of those who are dishonest and unscrupulous. .. The opinion of the people

(Awamm) also does not qualify as ‘majority opinion’ that can validly decide between

equivocal issues; it is the opinion of the scholars (ahl-i ilm o fadl) who possess the

legislative sense (dhawq tashri‘) and are well versed in the philosophy of law (hikmat

shari’at). On the other hand, the opinion of the ordinary people (awamm al-nas) has no

value, even if they have total consensus about a certain matter (Tayyib 1963, 219).

Amin Ahsan Islahi (d. 1997)

Born in 1904 at Bhamhur, a village in Azamgarh, UP, India , Amin Ahsan Islahi was an

eminent Islamic scholar of the Qur’an. A student of Hamiduddin Farahi, Islahi was

appointed a principal of Madrasah Al-Islah, in India . His monumental nine volume Urdu

Tafsir, Tadabbur-i-Qur’an .

Like many of his scholarly contemporaries, Islahi was also influenced by the Indian

freedom movement and, for some time, he acted as the president of the local Congress

party. Freedom of India , and by implication of the Muslims, from the British

imperialism, was of paramount importance to him, as it indeed was in the eyes of other

‘ulama. In the early 1930s, when Mawlana Mawdudi called for the formation of an

Islamic party dedicated to presenting and projecting Islam as a complete way of life and

founded Jama’at-e-Islami in 1941 Islahi was one of its founding members.

In the Jama’at, Islahi occupied a position, second only to Mawdudi. Islahi actively

worked in the election campaigns of the Jama’at, but his heart was never in politics. He

left the Jama’at in 1958 over some policy differences.

He considered electioneering a useless exercise for the purposes of bringing about an

Islamic change. According to him the politicians cannot establish Islam: their sole aim is

to gain power, by whatsoever means possible.

In his view, the Pakistani society was a broken and disintegrated one, afflicted with a

most dangerous malaise: hypocrisy. As such he differed with the view that if free and

fair elections were held the masses would vote for Islam and Islamic parties.

In 1956, the government of Pakistan appointed Mawlana Islahi a member of the Islamic

Law Commission, which was abolished in 1958.

Islahi also wrote frequently on political issues. His book on Islamic state (1977) provides

an insight into Islahi’s political thought. The following is a summary of his main points.

Concept of Islamic State:

• Natural (Fitri) human beings are naturally conscious of its presence

• Human beings are not absolutely independent, they are deputies of God (Na’ib)

• Sovereignty belongs to God

• Khilafat is by choice, every human being is neither capable nor obliged to be a Khalifa

• The duties and functions of Khilafa defined by God

• Shari’at, revealed is the basis of Islamic state

• Khilafat is not nation, but principle and universal.

To Islahi, an Islamic state (Khilafat) does not differ much from an ordinary state in its

formal and material structure (population, territory, internal independence, political

institution); it differs in principles and objectives. Khilafat means complete equality;

Khilafat is not limited to a class or person. He, however, regards both parliamentary

and presidential systems, as currently in vogue, against Islam. Muslims have a limited

right to legislate, in such matters which are not clearly given in the Qur’an and Sunna.

Distinction between state and government, Khilafat (state), Government (Imamate,

Amarat).

Defining sovereignty, Islahi classifies it into two types: takwini, and tashri’i. Tashri’i

(legislative) sovereignty belongs to God who revealed His laws through the Prophets.

Ulu’l Amr (the rulers) are executors of Tashri’i hakimiyyat (legislative sovereignty).

Having summarized the main points, let me quote an extract from his book (English

translation is mine).

The Position of People in an Islamic State

In a secular (la dini) democratic state (Jamhuri riyasat), sovereignty (hakimiyyat)

belongs to the people. But as we have explained, in an Islamic state sovereignty belongs

to God. Islamic state is not a democratic nation-state (qawmi riyasat) in which every

inhabitant in the country is assumed to be a partner in the sovereignty. It is rather an

ideological (usuli) state in which only those are responsible for the formation and

administration of the state that believe in Islam and abide by the Islamic code of life.

Sovereignty does not belong to even these Muslim people (Jamhur Muslimin). They have

authority only to apply the Divine law (Shari’a), and to form a political system within the

laws and the limits prescribed by God. They have no authority more or less than that.

They have no right to legislate disregarding the laws of God, nor have they authority to

establish a political system beyond the boundaries fixed by God and His Prophet. If they

do so, it amounts to treason against God.

The real religious and legal status of the Muslim people (Jamhur Muslimin) is that they

are servants (slaves) of God (ibad Allah). God has given them the choice (ikhtiyar) to

establish a certain type of political system n order to perform their duties as slaves of

God, and to appoint a head (sar barah) from amongst you a slave who is the most

committed to my obedience. Sovereignty in Islam nevertheless is concentrated in God.

As to the choice that people are free to obey or disobey God, there is no doubt that God

has established His Legal government (tashri’i hukumat) on the basis of choice

(ikhtiyar), not coercion (jabr). But this choice does not mean that God has entrusted

sovereignty to the people (Islahi 1977, 21).

In Islam Shura is clearly defined (muta’ayyan) and the Amir is bound by the decision of

the majority. However, in early Islam since all the opinion leaders (ahl al-ra’y) were

living in the centre, the leaders of the groups and tribes were appointed in view of the

demands of the social system of the time, the jurisdiction of the state was very wide, the

Shura system was very simple. Today, the situation is different. Hence we may opt for

the modern method of elections with necessary modifications. We may also develop

necessary regulations to define the relationships between the Amir and the Shura. It

will not be against the view of Islam (Islahi 1977, 38).

Analysis and conclusion

Defining democracy in Islamic polity the scholars seem to focus on the following issues.

Rule of law, equality, freedom, liberty, right to vote, elections, party system,

parliamentary system, legislative authority, a state’s right to legislate, forms of

government, and sovereignty. Although most writers speak about the participation of

the people or masses in the governance, and some even speak of the sovereignty of the

people, but the real problem is the recognition of the role, place and right of a common

man in government. There is still a mistrust of a common man. Masses are not qualified

to govern themselves. They can vote to elect their representatives who then govern.

They are distinguished from the masses; the representatives are from the elite,

propertied, learned etc. They must be the wise people. This mistrust of the masses is

not peculiar to Muslim thinkers; it is also present in the Western supporters of

democracy.

The eminence of the wise and the expert is present in both Muslim and Western

thinking.

In Muslim thought the issue is debated with reference to sovereignty. Sovereignty

belongs to God alone. The complex question is who represents God? How is this

sovereignty exercised? The question is answered in a twofold formula. Sovereignty of

God is expressed through Shari’a because it is revealed by God. Since only the experts

in Islamic tradition can properly interpret Shari’a, they alone can represent the

sovereignty of God.

Islamic modernists, e.g. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, argue that sovereignty indeed belongs to

God but since Islam does not allow any priesthood or monarchy and the Khalifa

exercises a delegated authority, in fact sovereignty is delegated to the Muslim

community, or Umma as a whole.

In Islamic history, this question was first raised by the Khawarij, opponents of Caliph

Ali. They raised the slogan: La hukma illa lillah (Only God is the arbiter). The same

slogan is raised by some Muslim political groups today; they translate it as: Sovereignty

belongs to God alone. Replying to the Khawarij, Caliph Ali explained that the slogan’s

wording was pious but the intentions were wrong. One can understand Ali’s explanation

when one looks at the history of Khawarij. They were extremely pious people in their

personal life, but in their political life they resorted to intolerance and violence. Mainly,

because they confused the idea of Hukm and could not distinguish between a political

sovereignty of a state and the cosmological divine sovereignty.

The crucial question for the political theorists in Islam has been who represents God, or

who wields authority on His behalf. There is no church in Islam and hence there is no

religious authority. Islam also does not recognize monarchy and allows no landed

aristocracy the right to rule the Umma. It was during the period of Arab imperialism

that monarchical institutions were introduced. Throughout a common man had no say in

these matters.

On the other hand we find the idea of Ijma’ and Shura also shifted from community to

the elite and to the experts in Shari’a.

In my view, the real issue in defining democracy rests in the value and place assigned to

common man as an individual. This needs further investigation.

In the extracts discussed above, it is clear that the scholars are not ready to recognize

this role for the common man. Even Martin Kramer is afraid of the common man. He

fears that fair elections will bring up the common man. He is not ready to allow this

right to a common man unless he is de-Islamised.

This essay argues that in spite of emergence of democracy in the Western systems, the

concept is still in the making. The main problem is the fundamental paradigm shift in

political thinking. The emphasis on the role of masses in the present political systems is

not yet fully developed.

References

Abootalebi, Ali R. 1999. “Islam, Islamists, and democracy”, Middle East Review of

International Affairs , Vol. 3, No. 1: March.

http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a2 …

Islahi, Amin Ahsan. 1977. Islami Riyasat . Lahore : Anjuman Khuddamul Qur’an.

Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. 2001. “Islam and Democracy”.

http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2001 -11/islam.html

Hakim, Khalifa Abdul-. 1987. The Prophet and his Message. Lahore : Institute of Islamic

Culture.

Kramer, Martin. 1996. “Islam vs. Democracy”, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival.

New Brunswick , N.J. : Transaction Publishers. Pp. 265-78.

http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/IslamvsDemocracy.html

Tayyib, Qari. 1963. Fitri Hukumat . Lahore : Idara Islamiyyat.

United States Institute of Peace. 2002. Islam and Democracy . Special report 93,

September. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr93.html