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A term paper presented at the Institute of Islamic Studies, Mc. Gill University, Montreal, December 16, 1974
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PROF. T. IZUTSU
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (397-703 A)
Term-Paper
By
Muhammad Amin A. Samad
*
*
Montreal, December 16, 1974
*
*
INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
McGILL UNIVERSITY
1
C O N T E N T S
Page
I. DEFINITION AND AREAS OF ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPY …………………………………. 2
II. EXISTING THINGS ………………………….. 2-8
a. Substance and Accident ……………………. 2
b. , , and ……. 7
c. Sensible and Known by Reason ……………. 8
d. General and Particular ……………………… 9
e. and ………………………………… 9
III. WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM ….. 10-13
a. (Word or Term) …………………………. 10
b. (Concept) …………………………… 10
c. (Denotatum) …………………………. 10
d. (Univocal) and (Analogos) ……. 11
e. (Scepticism) ……………………………. 12
f. and ………………………………. 13
ENDTNOTES …………………………………………… 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………. 18
2
I. THE DEFINITION AND THE AREAS OF ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy is acting to bringing the human soul to
perfection through the knowledge of realities of the existing
things as they are according to the degree of human ability.
Philosophy, then, is the study of the realities of existing things
as they are (not as they should be) as much as human possibility. Its goal is to bring the human soul to perfection.
Islamic Philosophy is divided into three areas:
a. Logical matters, logica ( or which is a
means (a tool) to obtain the other areas of philosophy.
b. Physical matters, phisica or
c. Divine science or divine matters or . It is
the knowledge of what is beyond nature. It is divided into
two categories:
1. , divine matters in more general meaning
which is also called (general matters), i.e.,
metaphysics, ontology, and science of existence.
2. , divine matters in the more particular
meaning, theology. In Islam it is called , “the
knowledge of argumentation”. It is the study of the existence of God and what we call His “attributes”. It does not discuss
the Essence of God , but it discusses the Essence of
God as qualified with , (e.g., , ), and
(e.g., , , and ( . So, is also called
“the science of and ”.1
II. EXISTING THINGS
Existing things can be divided into many categories,
among which are as follows:
A. Substance and Accident
i. Substance
3
Al-Sāwī gives the definition of substance as follows:
He puts (“in the concrete world”) to exclude God as
substance. Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī gives the following
definition: (“Substance is something which is
standing by its own self).
There are peculiarities of substance, i.e.:
a. It has no opposite , e.g., Socrates is not an
opposite of Plato.
b. It has no difference in degree and gradation
, e.g., a man is not more or less human than another
man.
c. It can be pointed with physical pointing , e.g.,
this is a chair.
d. It has substantial movement according to
Mulla S.adra, e.g., the apple was a seed, then it became a
green apple, then a red apple. According to other
philosophers there is no substantial movement and there is no gradual process. At the stage of seed it is a seed and
nothing but a seed.
Substance can be divided into (material or physical) and
(non material).
a. Material substance is divided into: , ,
and .
b. Non-material substance is divided into:
1. . It needs (matter) in its function. It can
manifest its activity only through the body.
2. . it does not need in its activity.
Both and belong to the highest genera .
Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī divided substance into:
4
a. (the very essence)
b. which is divided into: , , and .
c.
d.
Descartes divided substance into:
a. Divine Essence distinguished in His absolute perfection
.
b. . Its distinguishing mark is the extension .
c. , either or .
The sequence of substance according to al-Ghazālī is:
, then , then , and then .2
ii. Accident
According to Aristotle there are nine categories of
accident. They are:
1. or (quantity). It is an accident which accepts
equality and non-equality by nature. In other words it is dividable. There are two types of this category:
a. (continuous quantity). If we divide it into two
parts we shall find (the common limit), e.g.,
g 1 A 2 . A is (the common limit), the end
and the beginning of the segment g1 and g2 respectively.
It has two types:
1. (fixed), e.g., ____.____.____.____.____
2. (unfixed), e.g., the division of time into past
and future. We only know and can actualize the
past, while the other part (future) is unknown. past . future
5
b. (separable quantity), where there is no
common limit between them, e.g., o o o o . o o o o o
2. or (quantity). It is immovable state of substance
which does not accept equality or non-equality essentially.
For example, the redness of a piece of paper does not
admit being divided by dividing the paper. There are four types of this category:
a. (sensible quality), which is grasped by any
of the five senses. It is either (deep-rooted,
solidly established), e.g., the sweetness of sugar, the
hotness of fire, or , (easily disappeared),
like the redness of face in anger.
b. (mental quality), either (disappears
easily) like a sudden burst of anger, or a which is
deeply rooted, like knowledge, and envy to whom who
was born envious.
c. or (natural proneness), i.e., inborn
quality of something by which one strongly resists to be
affected, e.g., illness or easily affected .
d. . It deals with quantity, e.g., the
straightness and the bend of something.
3. (where). A physical body needs a certain quality
which is called . This body occupying a certain place is
called . It is either:
a. where there is no room for the other body ,
e.g., water in the cup (full of water), or
b. where the body occupies only a small room,
e.g., I live in Canada.
4 (when). It is something occupying a certain point of
time. It is called . It is either:
6
a. , i.e., a portion of timed whose both ends exactly
coincide with the appearance and disappearance of something,
e.g., one’s span of life: time . span of life . , or
b. , i.e., larger portion of time which comprises
a small portion of time which is in question, e.g., He lived in the
10th century: time . 10
th century ._______
He lived
5. (position), i.e., the internal relation between the
component parts, also in term of positional relationship of
the components with the outside of the body, e.g., laying down, standing, leaning, upside down, facing something
else, etc.
6. or (possession). This is still ambiguous for Ibn Sīnā,
but he gives his definition: “Possession is being of a
substance (A) which covers it (B), and moves (A) with its (B’s) moving, like somebody being clothed.” It may be
partial, e.g., ….. or impartial, e.g., …………..
7. (action), i.e., an action of influence of something upon
something else, e.g., fire exercises influence upon water
until it boils.
8. (passion), i.e., action of influence upon something
from something else, e.g., water receives influence from fire
until it boils (the opposite of ( .
9. (relation), i.e., if we have something in our mind we
have to produce something else which is essential and
related to it. It has two types:
a. (bilateral relation), e.g., if A resembles B, B
also resembles A. Therefore, it applies to mutual
resemblance , opposition , and facing one
another
7
b. (unilateral relation). It is the relation between
(cause) and (effect), e.g., relationship between father
and son.3
In order to apply these accidents in one substance, if we
take as our substance, his being grown up is , his
being darker or the change of his figure is , having a
father and he might have a son is , being in his house
is , his working today or he worked yesterday is
being standing or sitting is , being armed to the teeth
and wearing his clothes is , being reading or writing is
, and his being slapped or beaten is .4
Sahrfawardi reduced this nine categories into four: 1. 2.
3. (including , , , and ( , and
(including and (.
B. , and
1. is whose existence is necessary and
whose non-existence is absurd Plato called it
. According to al-Kindi the existence of is a
decided matter outside reason and imagination.5
There are two kinds of :
a. ,i.e., an existence exists by itself
(essence), ens per se.
b. , ens per aliut, an existence exists by
other than itself. Since its existence depends upon other
than itself it is also called , e.g., the world.6
2. . It is divided into 2 categories:
8
a. which is also called , since
here means .7
b. which is also called .8
Al-Ghazālī gives four meanings of as
follows:
a. i.e., what is not , which includes
.
b. , i.e., what is equal in both non-impossibility
and unnecessary of its existence or non-existence.
c. i.e., its existence is not necessary
, e.g., writing with regard to man.
d. It is applied to the present non-existence, whose
presence is not impossible in the future. Its existence is
e.g., the existence of the world before it exists.9
3. . It is divided into two categories:
a. , e.g., the impossibility of the union of
blackness and whiteness in something.
b. , e.g., the supposition of the occurrence of
the day of resurrection today which is impossible not be its essence, but because God knew that He would not
make it happen today. If God wanted to happen (which
is ( it would happen, and it would become .
So, every will become with the
presence of .10
C. (sensible) and (known by reason)
are things known through our five senses.
are things known through reason, e.g., the existence of
ability, knowledge, willingness, fear, shame, love and anger.
Most of existing things belong to this category.11
The best
9
kind of existence according to al-Kindī is the existence of
God, and he believes that it is the object of absolute
knowledge and reason alone is the only way to
know God.12
D. (general) and (particular)
The existing things in their relation to each other can be
divided into four categories:
a. (more general), e.g., is than ا ………
b. (more particular), e.g., ا is than …..
c. (equal), e.g., is with .13
……….
d. (more general on one side, and
more particular on the other side), e.g., the whiteness of
animals. On one side whiteness is more general, as it
includes white paper, chalk, and many other things which are not animals. On the other side it is more particular, as
it excludes many non-white animals, e.g., black people,
black horses, crows, zebra, etc.14
E. and
Existing things can be divided into:
:which is divided into (eternally pre-existent) القديم .1
a. , i.e., there is no beginning of the time of
its existence.
b. , i.e., there is no beginning and cause ()
for its essence.
2. (incidental) which is also divided into:
a. , i.e., there is a beginning for the time of its
existence.
b. , i.e., there is a beginning for its essence by
which it is existent.
11
According to philosophers the world is and
, while God the creator of the world is
.15
III. WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM
A. (word or term)
Word or term is divided into two categories:
1. , i.e., it denotes to a single thing, e.g., Zayd, this tree,
that horse.
2. , i.e., it may denote to many things of its kind, e.g.,
man, the tree.16
B. (Concept)
It is the meaning we understand from the word. There is no word without meaning. It is also divided into:
1. , i.e., it applies to a single thing, it refuses
participation of more than one thing (denotatum, ),
e.g., Socrates, Plato.
2. , i.e., it does not refuse participation of more than
one thing, e.g., ا , it is applicable to Ali, Ahmad and
Zayd (more denoteta).
C. (denotatum)
, denotatum (pl. , denoteta) is the thing denoted
by the meaning of the word, though it does not actually exist in the external world, e.g., if we say “dragon” the denotatum
presented in our mind is a creature like a crocodile or snake,
with wings and claws, able to breathe out of fire, often guarding a treasure, as we used to read in the Eastern myth.
11
D. (univocal) and (analogos)
Considering the quality and the difference of degrees of
the denoteta of a , it is divided into two categories:
1. , i.e., it is applied to denoteta equally, without
making any discrimination, e.g., the word ا is applied
to infinite number of denoteta equally; it is applied to
Hasan, John, Ali, and none of them is more man or less man than the others. The other example is the table; there
is no table more table than other tables.
2. , i.e., it is applied to denoteta not equally, but in
various degrees, e.g., light may be attributed to the light of
the sun which is strong, and the light of the lamp which is
weak (dim).
The word means that which makes us doubtful.
It refers to the fact that which we do not know to
which degree it is being applied. The concept puts us in
doubt to the degree applied to it. This phenomenon is
called , and the phenomenon of analogical gradation
is called . Muslim philosophers give us seven
principles for the of the as follows:
a. (priority), e.g., the hotness of fire has a kind of
priority before the hotness of boiling water, because
the hotness of fire is (cause) of the hotness of
boiling water.
b. (appropriation), e.g., the existence of the Creator
is more appropriate than that of the creatures,
because the former is , while the latter is
.
c. (temporal priority), e.g., by comparing the
existence of father and son; father is , while son
is .17
12
d. (principal of being stronger). The classical
example is the concept of being white as applied to
snow and ivory. The whiteness of snow is
(stronger) than the whiteness of ivory.
e. (quantity), e.g., if A is 5 meters long, and B is 3
meters long, A is than B, and B is than A.
f. (numbers), e.g., ten is more than six.
g. (independence and lack of independence),
e.g., the existence of is than the existence of
. God is which means that He is independent
upon others, while the creatures are , as they are
dependent. The existence of depends upon the
existence of .
E. (scepticism)
It has three elements:
1. , i.e., a concept which is applied to all denoteta,
e.g., man, stone; the words share in common in the
existence.
2. , i.e., the existence of element of difference
among denoteta, e.g., father and son is different in .
3. , e.g., the of the father compared to his son.
There are three kinds of :
1. which is understandable to the common people..
2. which is understandable only to the highly
educated people (élite).
3. which is understandable only to the élite of the
elite, e.g., the mastery of the absolute reality, the essence
13
of existence, which is according to Ibn ‘Arabī is nothing
but .
F. and
Ibn Sahlan al-Sawi gives the definition of and as
follows:
Another definition is:
.
is the essential constituent element of the concept. It is
something essentially required by something else, while is
not the essential constituent element. It is not essentially required by something else.
has four basic features. The lack of any of them
will not become . They are:
1. i.e., inseparability, e.g., in ا , ا is
always ; so, is . In ا , ا is
separable from ; so, is not .
2. or , i.e., there is no particular cause, as
cannot be causally explained, e.g., there is no cause why
. ا is in ا
3. , i.e., self-evidence, where proof is not needed, as it is
self-evident that ا is . The other example is that
the triangle has three lines is self-evident.
4. (rational precedence), i.e., precedes
rationally, e.g., if we say ا the rational concept
of ا precedes rationally the concept of .
There are two technical terms for , i.e.,:
14
1. , i.e., as explained in the Eisagogé,
2. ( , Introduction to Theory of Logic), and we call it
“ in the first system.”
3. , i.e., as explained in the
which contains analytica priore (theory of syllogism
without reference to its contents), and analytica posteriora
which deals with contents of reasoning.
According to this system (which we call the second
system) some in the first system is . It is, in fact,
or , i.e., inseparable proportion of .
If we way “four is an even number”, being even is
according to the first system (as we can think of number
four without thinking of its evenness), but it is
according to the second system, as it belongs to
or (the evenness if four is inseparable from four).
The same case is with regard to the .
As there are two kinds of (i.e., the first and the
second system), there are also two kinds of :
a. which is according to the first system,
and according to the second system.
b. which is according to both the first
and the second system.
According to the Theory of Predicables there are five
in the sense of , i.e., (the five
15
predicables). Three of them belong to , i.e., , , and
; the other two belong to , i.e., and .
1. (genus). It is also called (natural universal). Its
denoteta are not individual things, but (species). It
does not represent , but , i.e., the
whole body has common elements in the denoteta,
e.g.,
( ) ( ) ()
2. (species). It represents of individual things, e.g.,
3. . It represents . It must fulfil two
conditions:
a. It must be a distinguishing factor.
b. It must be , e.g., with regard to ا .
4. (general or common accident). It is which
is not peculiar to a single denotatum, but it is common to some
others, e.g., with regard to ا , as there are many other
white thing are not ا . Another example is in regard to
ا
5. or . It is which is peculiar to only
one which is usually or , e.g., in regard to
.18
Al-ūsī divided into two categories:
a. , e.g., which is common to all mankind.
b. , e.g., actually ( ) with regard to
) . ا belongs to ).
16
ENDNOTES
1Ibn Sīnā gives more details in the categories of philosophy:
1
2
See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed
(Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967), pp. 184-185. 2 Ibid., pp. 179-182
3 Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah (Cairo, 1936), 2
nd ed., pp. 23-
5; idem, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif,
1961), pp. 312-313. 4 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.178-9.
5 , see Muammad
al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī, (Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-
H.alabī, 1951), 2nd
ed., p. 71. 6 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.210-212; al-Ghazālī,
Maqās.id al-Falāsifah, pp. 53ff; al-Ghazālī gives us the argument why
is equal to as follows:
See al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp.
345-346. 7Ibn Sīnā gives us two examples for this. He says:
. See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal,
pp. 210-1. 8 Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arfabīya (Beirut: Dār al-
Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970), 1st ed., p. 221.
9Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp. 343-4.
10 Ibid., p. 34.
17
11
Ibid., pp. 89-90. 12
Muhammad al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī, pp. 79-80. 13
By giving this example plants are considered having no sense at
all, though it is said that certain plants have no sense of feeling. 14
Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm., p. 92. 15
Ibid., pp. 334-335. 16
Ibid., p. 73. 17
Many philosophers believe in the which is one of the
three views which, according to al-Ghazālī lead to their believer to
infidelity, see al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-D.alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl S.alība
and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyā, 5th
ed. ([Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah al-Sūriyyah,
1956), p. 79; Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah, p. 365 ff. 18
For al-Ghazālī’s definition of each of , see al-Ghazālī,
Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, pp. 106-107.
18
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bahī, Muh.ammad al-. Al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī.
2nd
ed. Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-alabī, 1951.
Ghazālī, Abū āmid al-, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah. 2nd
ed. Cairo,
1936.
_______, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961.
________, al-Munqidh min al-alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl alība and
Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyād., 5th ed. [Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah
al-Sūrīyah, 1956.
alībā, Dr. Jamīl, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arabīyah. 1st ed.
Beirut: Dār al-Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970. Shaykh al-Ard., Taysīr. Al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1
st
ed. Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967.