Democratic Policymaking - beck-shop.de · PDF file · 2017-03-17978-0-521-19287-3 — Democratic Policymaking Charles Barrilleaux , ... lcc JK 468.P 64 B 36 2016 | ddc 320. ... Perceiving

Cambridge University Press978-0-521-19287-3 — Democratic Policymaking

Charles Barrilleaux , Christopher Reenock , Mark Souva

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www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press

Democratic Policymaking

An Analytic Approach

This introduction applies analytic models to policymaking challenges, equipping

students with tools to evaluate core policymaking dilemmas. Students are

introduced to the approaches of game theory, social choice theory, research

design, and causal inference. Key terms, along with current research, are

highlighted to build an understanding of public policy study. Exercises and

thought questions enable students to develop skills to assess public policy

dilemmas. The analytically rigorous style of the text is accessible and avoids

lengthy descriptions. Supplementary resources for instructors include extensive

notes, ancillaries, and online resources, including a test bank, quizzes, and

editable lecture slides for all chapters that can be modified to fit particular

courses. This textbook is suitable for introductory public policy and public

administration courses at both undergraduate and postgraduate level.

Charles Barrilleaux is LeRoy Collins Professor and Chair in the Department of

Political Science at Florida State University. His research and teaching focus on

public policy and US state and local government and politics. He is the author or

co-author of numerous articles, most recently in journals including Economic

Inquiry, Political Research Quarterly, Social Science Quarterly, and State Politics

and Policy Quarterly.

Christopher Reenock is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political

Science at Florida State University. His research interests include comparative

public policy, environmental regulatory policy, and regime dynamics. His articles

have appeared most recently in journals including Journal of Politics, Journal of

Public Administration Research and Theory, and Political Research Quarterly.

Mark Souva is Professor of Political Science at Florida State University. His

research interests include the causes of interstate conflict, military spending, and

economic sanctions. His most recent publications include articles in journals such

as the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Peace Research, International

Studies Quarterly, and International Interactions.

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DemocraticPolicymakingAn Analytic Approach

Charles BarrilleauxFlorida State University

Christopher ReenockFlorida State University

Mark A. SouvaFlorida State University


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University Printing House, Cambridge cb2 8bs, United Kingdom

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Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit ofeducation, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.orgInformation on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521122764

© Charles Barrilleaux, Christopher Reenock, and Mark A. Souva 2016

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place without the writtenpermission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2017

Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Datanames: Barrilleaux, Charles, author. | Reenock, Christopher, author. | Souva, Mark A., author.title: Democratic policymaking : an analytic approach / Charles Barrilleaux, Florida State University ;Christopher Reenock, Florida State University ; Mark A. Souva, Florida State University.

Description: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical referencesand index.

identifiers: lccn 2016015780| isbn 9780521192873 (Hardback) | isbn 9780521122764 (Paperback)subjects: lcsh: Political planning–United States. | Public administration–United States. | United States–Politicsand government–Decision making | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / General.

classification: lcc JK468.P64 B36 2016 | ddc 320.60973–dc23 LC record available athttps://lccn.loc.gov/2016015780

isbn 978-0-521-19287-3 Hardbackisbn 978-0-521-12276-4 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracyof URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publicationand does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain,accurate or appropriate.


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Contents

List of Figures xv

List of Tables xvii

Preface xix

Introduction 1

Introduction 2

0.1 What Is Democratic Public Policy? 2

What Is Public Policy? 2

What Is Democracy? 3

What Is Democratic Public Policy? 4

0.2 The Opportunities and Challenges of Democratic Policymaking 4

0.3 Our Approach: Analytics and the Scientific Method 5

An Analytic Approach 6

Emphasis on the Scientific Method 8

Contemporary Scholarship 9

0.4 Textbook Overview 9

1 Public Policy Models 11

Introduction 12

1.1 Studying Public Policy 13

1.2 Why Study Public Policy? 14

Accountability 15

Efficiency Gains 16

Equitable Policy Delivery 16

Democratic Policymaking 17

1.3 The Policymaking Process 19

Problem and Solution Identification 20

Policy Demands 24

Agenda Setting 25

The Media and Agenda Setting 25

Factors That Drive Agenda Setting 26


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Policy Formulation 28

Policy Areas and Incentives for Action 28

Alternative Formulation 30

Policy Selection/Adoption 33

Policy Implementation 35

Contracting Out to the Bureaucracy 37

Why Red Tape? 38

Policy/Program Evaluation 39

Does Policy Cause Politics? 40

1.4 Models of Public Policy 41

Positing a Causal Relationship 41

And Why Is That? 42

Necessary and Sufficient Causality 44

Conditional Causality 44

Deterministic vs. Probabilistic Relationships 44

What Is a Model of Public Policy? 45

Why Do We Need Models of Public Policy? 47

Elements of a Good Model 48

Multivariate 48

Probabilistic 48

Parsimonious 49

Generalizable 49

Falsifiable 50

Clear and Logically Consistent 51

Ideologically Neutral 51

Elements of a Useful Model for Public Policy 51

Actors 52

Rules 52

Actors Interacting with Rules 53

1.5 Conclusion 53

2 Individuals and Social Dilemmas 57

Introduction: Origins of Social Problems 58

2.1 Game Theory as a Tool 59

2.2 Individual Action 60

Personal Utility Maximization 60

Challenges in Resolving Social Problems 63

2.3 Cooperation and Collective Action 64

Cooperation Dilemmas 64

Overcoming Barriers to Cooperative Behavior 67

Repeated Interaction 67

Internalized Norms/External Enforcement 71

vi � contents


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Barriers to Collective Action 74

Multi-Person Cooperation 74

Group Organization 76

2.4 Conclusion 77

3 Public Policy as a Solution to Social Dilemmas 80

Introduction: Institutions and Social Problems 81

3.1 Institutions as Facilitators of Individual and Collective Action 81

3.2 Markets 83

Property Rights/Credible Commitment 89

Market Limitations or Market Failure 93

Rivalrous and Excludable Goods 93

Non-Competitive Markets (Monopolies) 95

Negative Externalities 96

Incomplete Information 97

Transaction Costs 99

3.3 Government: Legitimate Coercion and Institutional Collective Action 99

Response to Market Failures 100

Provision of Goods and Services 101

Taxation Subsidy 102

Regulation 103

Government Limitations 104

Social Choice and Majority Rule 105

Market Distortions 108

Principal–Agent 109

3.4 Markets and Government in Combination 109

3.5 Conclusion 111

4 Scientific Inquiry and Uncertainty 114

Introduction 115

4.1 Scientific Inquiry 117

Counterfactual Model of Causal Inference 117

Minimum Conditions for Drawing Valid Inferences 119

Internal and External Validity 122

4.2 Estimating Statistics of Interest 123

Descriptive Statistics 123

Measures of Association 125

Correlation 126

Regression 127

4.3 Estimating Scientific Uncertainty 128

Sources of Uncertainty 128

Measurement Error 129

contents � vii


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Random Error 129

Sampling Error 130

Inferential Statistics 130

The “Magic” of Statistical Inference 131

Estimating Uncertainty with Probability 133

Hypothesis Testing 135

Standard Hypotheses for Descriptive Statistics 135

Standard Hypotheses for Measures of Association 135

Why 95 Percent? 136

The Non-Uniqueness of Scientific Uncertainty 138

Medical Uncertainty 138

Physics 139

Biology 139

Engineering 139

4.4 Statistical Uncertainty vs. Ill-Informed Skepticism 140

Ill-informed Skepticism/Adherence 140

Scientific Certainty/Ill-Informed Adherence 141

Scientific Uncertainty/Ill-Informed Adherence 141

Scientific Certainty/Ill-Informed Skepticism 141

Scientific Uncertainty/Ill-Informed Skepticism 142

Skepticism as a Political Asset 142

4.5 Empirical Research and “Policy-Oriented Learning” 144

4.6 Conclusion 145

5 The Economy and Income Security 148

Introduction 149

5.1 The Political Marketplace: The Foundation of the Economy 150

5.2 Approaches to Managing the Economy 152

Economic Goals 152

Classical Economic Model 153

Keynesian Economic Model 154

5.3 Tools for Managing the Economy 156

Fiscal Policy 156

Monetary Policy 157

Regulation 158

Taxes 159

Tax Rates and Government Transfers 162

Who Pays for Government? 162

Unemployment 162

Deficits and Debts 164

5.4 How Do Societies Ensure That Their Members Have Economic Security? 165

Rawls’s “Veil of Ignorance” 165

viii � contents


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The Mixed Solution 166

5.5 How to Provide Income Security? 167

Saving 167

The Income Inequality Problem 167

Social Insurance 171

Redistribution 171

Ultimatum Game 172

Dictator Game 173

Does Our Analysis of These Games Provide Insights? 175

5.6 Programs Designed to Provide Income Security 175

Social Security 175

Unemployment Insurance 179

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 180

Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) 183

The Minimum Wage 184

Food Security 185

Housing Security 185

5.7 Individual Preferences on Taxes and Redistribution 187

5.8 Conclusion 189

6 Environmental Policy 194

Introduction 195

6.1 Environmental Policy, Market Failure, and Negative Externalities 196

6.2 Public Opinion, Political Parties, and Environmental Policy 201

Public Attitudes on the Environment 202

Perceiving Policy Differences between Parties 206

Cross-Cutting Cleavages 207

6.3 Legislative Initiatives in Environmental Policy 207

Major Legislative Initiatives 209

6.4 Implementing Environmental Policy 211

Delegation Issues and Implementation 212

Adverse Selection 213

Moral Hazard 214

How Much Discretion? 220

6.5 Evaluating Environmental Regulation: Forty Years after EPA’s Founding 221

The Benefit of Environmental Regulation: Lower Pollution and

Health Gains 221

Air Pollution 221

Water Pollution 223

Drinking Water 224

The Costs of Regulation 225

Balancing Benefits vs. Costs: Risk Assessment and Risk Management 226

contents � ix


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Remaining Challenges: Climate Change 232

6.6 Conclusion 235

7 Health Policy 240

Introduction 241

7.1 Health Policy, Risk Pools, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard 243

Moral Hazard 245

Policy Solutions 247

7.2 Principal–Agent Problems and Health Care Markets 248

7.3 Health Outcomes in the United States and the World 249

7.4 American Health Policy and US National Health Care Programs 251

Obamacare 256

7.5 US Health National Government Health Care Programs 258

Medicaid 260

Child Health Insurance Program 261

Department of Defense and Veterans Administration 262

Indian Health Service 262

7.6 The Search for Health Care Price and Access 262

Taiwan’s Reforms 263

Oregon’s Medicaid Experiment 264

7.7 The Health Information Explosion 266

Digital Records 267

Medical Corporatization 267

7.8 Should We Ration Health Care? 268

7.9 Conclusion 269

8 Education 273

Introduction: Education Choices, Reforms, and Persistent Problems 274

8.1 Why Public Education? 275

The Value of Public Education and an Enlightened Citizenry 276

8.2 The Governance Structure of Education in the United States 276

Traditionally a State and Local Function 276

Variations in School Governance Finance 278

8.3 Education Quality in the United States 280

US Scores Rising 281

8.4 Federal Education Policy after Sputnik 282

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) 283

No Child Left Behind 284

The Race to the Top 287

8.5 The Battle over Educational Content 289

The Anti-Evolution Movement 289

The Dover, PA Case 290

x � contents


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Pressures on Teachers 292

8.6 Delegation Problems in Public Schools 293

The Demand to Fulfill Multiple Roles 293

Principal–Agent Problems in Educational Performance 294

8.7 The Push for Early Childhood Education 299

Pre-kindergarten Expansions 300

8.8 Education Reforms 301

School Choice 301

Charter Schools 303

Charter Schools and the Harlem Children’s Zone 304

8.9 Higher Education in the United States 306

Concerns with Prices and Debt 307

Student Loan Debt and Higher Education: A Crisis? 307

Online Education 310

Affirmative Action in College Admissions 311

8.10 Conclusion 311

9 Crime and Punishment 316

Introduction 317

9.1 What Is Crime? 318

Measuring Crime 319

General Demographic Characteristics of Victims and Criminals of

Homicide 320

9.2 Why Do Individuals Engage in Crime? 321

An Expected Utility Model of Crime 322

Prospect Theory and Crime 324

Benefits and Costs of Criminal Success 325

Utility of Being Caught: Cost of Crime 328

Probability of Conviction 329

9.3 Strategies to Reduce Crime 330

Strategies that Reduce the Benefits of Crime 330

Economy 331

Education 332

Strategies that Decrease the Probability of Attaining Criminal Benefits 332

Strategies That Increase the Cost of Crime 333

Tough-on-Crime Policies 333

Public Education Programs 336

Strategies That Increase the Probability of Experiencing the Cost of Crime 338

Policing Strategies: Fixing Broken Windows 338

More Police 340

Who Gets Punished? 342

contents � xi


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9.4 Abortion and Crime Rates 343

9.5 Capital Punishment 344

Punishment 345

Public Opinion and Capital Punishment 346

Principals, Agents, and Capital Punishment 348

9.6 Should Municipalities Increase Restrictions on Owning a Firearm? 348

9.7 Conclusion 350

10 Civil Rights 355

Introduction 356

10.1 Rights: Natural, Civil, and Human 356

10.2 Commitment Problems and Rights 358

Solutions to Commitment Problems 359

Civil Rights as a Commitment Problem 361

10.3 Political Speech 366

Campaign speech 367

The Fairness Doctrine 367

National Security and Free Speech 369

10.4 The Right to Privacy 371

Medical Records Privacy 372

Behavioral Targeting 374

10.5 The Right to Due Process of the Law 375

The Expansion of Marriage Rights 376

Due Process for People with Disabilities 379

10.6 Gender and the Right to Equal Pay for Equal Work 382

10.7 Conclusion 383

11 Homeland Security 387

Introduction 388

11.1 The Department of Homeland Security: An Example of Bureaucratic

Change 389

What Is Homeland Security? 389

What Is Bureaucracy? 390

Understanding Bureaucratic Change: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols 391

11.2 Homeland Security and Resource Allocation 395

Homeland Security as a Colonel Blotto Game 397

Security vs. Civil Liberties 399

Public Opinion on the Civil Liberties vs. Security Trade-Off 401

11.3 Principal–Agent Problems and Warrantless Wiretapping 403

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 404

PRISM 405

USA Freedom Act 407

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11.4 Disaster Response as a Coordination Problem 407

11.5 Conclusion 411

12 Immigration Policy 415

Introduction 416

12.1 How Legal Immigration Works 417

Becoming a Legal Immigrant 418

Immigration and Citizenship 419

Non-Immigrant Visas 420

12.2 History of Immigration Policy 422

12.3 Why Do People Immigrate? 425

12.4 Economics of Immigration: Wages, Welfare, and Taxes 427

12.5 Immigrants and Assimilation 430

12.6 Illegal Immigration 432

Becoming an Illegal Immigrant 432

Why Is There Illegal immigration? 433

Addressing Illegal Immigration 434

New Requirements to Enter the Country 434

Border Fence 435

Work Force Audits 435

12.7 Immigration and Public Opinion 436

12.8 Collective Action, Credible Commitment Problems, and the Immigration

Reform Debate 439

12.9 Should the United States Repeal the Fourteenth Amendment? 441

12.10 Conclusion 442

13 Foreign and Defense Policy 446

Introduction 447

13.1 Principal–Agent Theory 449

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Problems 450

Standard Operating Procedures, Screening, and Outcome-Based

Incentives 451

13.2 Principal–Agent Problems and Foreign Policy 452

Gambling for Resurrection 452

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 453

Public Opinion and Defense Spending 454

13.3 Principal–Agent Theory and the Iraq War 456

13.4 Diversionary Foreign Policy 458

13.5 Bargaining Failure and War 460

Strategies for Promoting Peace 463

Crisis Bargaining 465

contents � xiii


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13.6 International Trade 469

Collective Action, Institutions, and Protectionism 472

13.7 Conclusion 474

Index 478

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Figures

2.1 Possible Outcomes in a Simple Resource Allocation Game page 65

2.2 Choice Values in a Resource Allocation Game 66

2.3 Player Responses in a Resource Allocation Game 66

2.4 Resource Allocation Game with Defection Costs 71

2.5 Other Members Participating 75

3.1 Supply Curve 84

3.2 Supply Shift 85

3.3 Demand Curve 86

3.4 Supply and Demand Curves 87

3.5 Surplus and Shortage 88

3.6 Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Scores 90

3.7 Goods Characteristics 94

3.8 Nutrition Facts 104

3.9 Ranked Funding Preferences by Legislator 106

3.10 Probabilities of a Cyclical Majority 107

4.1 Central Tendency and Dispersion 125

4.2 Inferential Statistics and Sampling Bias 131

4.3 Inferential Statistics 132

5.1 Laffer Curve 160

5.2 Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment 164

5.3 Satisfaction with Americans’ Opportunities to Get Ahead by Working Hard,

2001–14 Trend 170

5.4 Ultimatum Game 172

6.1 Negative Externalities and Dead Weight Loss 197

6.2 Salience of Environmental Regulation Relative to Other Issues 203

6.3 Effect of Information and Discussion on Citizen Support for Environmental

Policy 206

6.4 Trends in Air Pollution for Components Regulated by the Clean Air Act

(1980–2013) 222

6.5 Weather Variations vs. Climate Change 232


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6.6 Human vs. Natural Sources of Global Temperature Increases 234

8.1 The Education Funding Pie, 2010 279

8.2 A Single Dimension in Policy Space 296

8.3 A Model of Legislator and Teacher Preferences with Uncertainty 298

8.4 Distribution of Student Loan Amounts 308

9.1 Homicide Rate Per 100,000 Population 319

9.2 Support for the Death Penalty, 1937–2009 346

9.3 Support for Death Penalty vs. Life Imprisonment 347

10.1 Civil Rights as a Credible Commitment Problem 362

10.2 Civil Rights as a Credible Commitment Problem 364

11.1 Major Functions in Homeland Security 390

11.2 Coordination Game on Which Movie to See 409

13.1 Support for President Bush’s Handling of the Iraq War 456

13.2 Crisis Bargaining Game 465

13.3 Scenario 1: Crisis Bargaining Game with Player Choices Highlighted 466

13.4 Scenario 2: Crisis Bargaining Game with Choices Highlighted 467

xvi � list of figures


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Tables

0.1 Areas of Opportunity for Making Public Policy page 5

0.2 Core Social Interaction Challenges 6

1.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis 34

5.1 Who Pays for Government? 163

5.2 Household Incomes in the United States 168

5.3 Factors Affecting Whether a Person Believes the Government Should Reduce Income

Differences between the Rich and the Poor 188

7.1 Oregon Health Insurance Experiment Treatment Effects 265

8.1 Number of Educational Institutions 1980–81, 1990–91, 2009–10 278

8.2 Effects on Math Scores and Absences for Charter vs. non-Charter Students 306

9.1 Who is Killed? Average Homicide Rates Per 100,000 People, By Age, Race, and

Gender, 1970s–2000s 321

9.2 Who Kills? Average Percentage of Homicides, By Age, Race, and Gender 321

9.3 The Impact on Violent and Property Crime of Imprisoning Drug Offenders Versus

Those Committing Other Types of Crimes 335

9.4 Changes in Crime as a Function of Abortion Rates 344

10.1 Should the Government require all radio and television stations to offer equal

amounts of liberal and conservative radio and television stations to offer equal

amounts of liberal and conservative political commentary? 368

10.2 Americans’ Opinions Regarding Surveillance 370

10.3 Practices with Electronic Health Records 373

10.4 Public Opinion Toward Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage 376

10.5 Public Opinion Toward Gay and Lesbian Rights and Public Policy 378

10.6 Diagnoses of College Students with Disabilities, 2008-09 381

11.1 Multiple Regression Estimates on Pro-Civil Liberties Responses 402

12.1 Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Type and Major Class of

Admission: Fiscal Years 2000–2009 419

12.2 Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Region: 1900–2009 422


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12.3 Multiple Regression Predicting Support for H-1B Visas 438

13.1 Support for Military Spending among Party Activists and Identifiers 455

13.2 Labor Hours to Produce T-Shirts and Computers 470

13.3 Opportunity Cost of Producing T-Shirts and Computers 470

xviii � list of tables


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Preface: DemocraticPolicymaking

Public policy is the core of politics. Understanding how public policy is created is an

essential component of a liberal education. In this book we challenge students to think

critically about why policies are the way they are. Developing such an understanding

among students can help them work to demand and create better public policies.

We wrote this book as a result of our experience teaching introductory public policy

courses over the course of a decade. Our goal was to combine the dense policy

description that often is provided in undergraduate texts with the analytic rigor that

is available in more advanced policy analysis books and research that draws from

academic and scientific sources. We taught from a blend of descriptive texts and more

analytic texts and found it difficult to hit the right note: the books were typically too

much of one and too little of the other, too much of both, or too little of both. We

believe this book strikes a good balance between the descriptive and analytic. We’ve

taught versions of the book to large classes over the past four semesters and have

received positive reviews on it from students. We hope you have the same experience.

Democratic Policymaking assumes that students have a rudimentary understanding

of political systems, on the level of a good high school civics course. Students who have

completed an introductory American or comparative government course should be

able to understand the text with little difficulty. We have taught the text to under-

graduate students from a variety of majors, including the social sciences, business,

natural sciences, and liberal arts, and we have encountered little difficulty in their

ability to comprehend the materials.

We apply a broad theoretical framework that allows students to analyze core

challenges in the formation and implementation of all public policies; we apply the

scientific method to evaluate empirical evidence on public policies; and we draw on

contemporary professional public policy scholarship. We believe this distinguishes our

approach in Democratic Policymaking from that of the majority of texts that are

available for general public policy courses.


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Our analytical approach focuses on what individuals want and how institutions,

interactions with others, and the context in which individuals operate affect the

policies that are produced. We highlight the value of the scientific method, which is

critical for evaluating and improving public policy. The scientific method leads to

better policy evaluation because its process is transparent. Students who understand

the scientific method will have a better understanding of the key questions to ask when

someone presents evidence in support of a position. Those students will understand

that not all evidence or all data is equal. Discriminating between good data and bad

data is a key part of a liberal education and aids the creation and implementation of

public policy. We pursue these goals by drawing on contemporary scholarship. We

draw on recent, scientifically based works as the evidentiary base for our substantive

evaluations of policy because such research forms the foundation of public policy as an

academic field and the motivation for many real-world public policies.

The first four chapters provide the theoretical and analytic foundation for the text.

Following those chapters, instructors may choose among substantive policy topics they

wish to teach in a given semester. Each of the substantive chapters incorporates one or

more of the analytic tools, and we note which tools are being emphasized in the

beginning of each chapter, so instructors may choose based on substance or analytics

what they wish to teach, or may teach the entire text over the course of the semester.

To summarize, Democratic Policymaking

� Introduces and applies a few models that are helpful for students learning about

public policy.

� Helps students to learn by example by applying the models that are included in

substantive chapters.

� Provides a more rigorous analytic framework than most introductory texts.

� Provides students and instructors with a full set of slides for use with each chapter.

� Provides instructors with a test bank.

� Uses examples from existing scientific and public policy studies to illustrate import-

ant concepts.

� Blends elements of introductory and more advanced public policy texts so that

instructors who wish to instruct students on elements of critical thinking may do so

in a single text.

� Enables instructors to pick and choose among the substantive topics they wish to

cover in a class.

xx � preface


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Democratic Policymaking - beck-shop.de · PDF file · 2017-03-17978-0-521-19287-3 — Democratic Policymaking Charles Barrilleaux , ... lcc JK 468.P 64 B 36 2016 | ddc 320. ... Perceiving