Demonsant ERSA Workshop

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Family Prestige as Old-Age Security:

Evidence from Rural Senegal

Jean-Luc Demonsant1

ABSTRACT

This paper aims at studying the self-enforcing family contract between a migrant

son and his ageing father who remained in the village and expects to receive

support. In 2004, a household survey conducted in the Senegal River Valley was

especially designed to account for the complex socio-political structure of the

local institutions, which dates back to pre-colonial times. The empirical results

suggest that the social rank of the family within the village, defined with respect

to the former caste system is a key to the enforcement mechanisms at work.Indeed, while belonging to a prestigious family linked to an aristocratic lineage

lowers the probability of migrating, it raises the probability of frequently

remitting to the patriarch. Conversely, sons from historically disadvantagedgroups (e.g. slaves and artisans) are more likely to both migrate and cut ties with

their village of origin, including their family. Additional qualitative evidence is

rather suggestive that despite their economic success, low status migrants keep

being stigmatized in their village of origin. Hence, inheriting his father's

dominant position in the village represents a strong incentive for a migrant sonfrom a high-ranked family to remit. Under such circumstances, patriarchs from

prestigious families only, can actually rely on their migrating sons as old-age

security.


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INTRODUCTION

Few years ago, working on old-age support in Africa sounded rather strange. This is mainly

due to two preconceived ideas: first the continent is not concerned with ageing issues,

second the myth of the vieux sage still pervasive, and has prevented thorough scientific

studies on their actual situation. In 1994, the World Bank sent a warning about global

ageing: Africa was no exception as the share of people over 60 year old was forecasted to

double in the next 25 years. On the other hand, respect towards elders is believed to be

working well in Africa, though there is a greater awareness about cases of elderly abuse.

Miguel (2003), for instance, analyzed the extreme situation in which elderly widows of

Tanzania were either killed or expelled in times of hardships. In a poor agrarian economy,

food scarcity tends to favor most productive members over young children or elders.

Whereas children will soon become productive, elders do not seem to be in a position toreciprocate. Nonetheless the livelihoods of the elderly mainly rely on the support of the

kinship group, and more likely the children in most developing countries.

From an economist point of view, there is an informal familial contract between the

migrant adult son and his father. Though not denied to play a role, love and sense of duty

alone do not provide credible enough incentives for the contract to be self-enforcing. This

paper aims at finding out what enforcement mechanisms exist to make them abide by this


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the sustainability of the reciprocity without any commitment. Facing the same ex-ante

idiosyncratic risks, villagers help each other today, keeping in mind that it could well be the

other way around tomorrow. In comparison, economic theory does not provide a unified

framework regarding the enforcement mechanisms in the case of children providing

support to their elderly parents. Indeed, the reciprocity vanishes, as old parents are not in a

position to reciprocate, yet some commitment exists. Laferrre and Wolff (2006) present a

great variety of both theoretical and empirical microeconomic models on family transfers in

general and the children as old-age security model in particular. In reality many

mechanisms come into play at the same time, depending on the physical constraints as well

as the cultural context.

Ex-ante, economies of scales at the household level suggest that ageing parents should co-

reside with their children, and indeed, intergenerational coresidence is quite common in

developing countries.3

However, low-income rural areas are risky environments, and once

this feature is taken into account, sending a family member away in order to provide

support for the family in times of hardships seems a much better response. The new

economics of migration lead by Oded Stark (1990) views migration as one of family

strategies to cope with a risky environment. This has been well documented in theoretical

and empirical literature on the economics of migration and remittances.4

Nonetheless, there remains an unsolved rationality problem: if the gains are obvious from


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in terms of cattle ownership receive more remittances. Hoddinott (1994) tested this model

on rural Kenyan data, and found remittances responsive to bequeathable lands. What

happens then in a changing society when land or cattle ownership are no longer sought

after? Furthermore, in most countries, inheritance division is settled by law. Under such

circumstances, this mechanism doesnt seem credible anymore.

Since my first field trip in rural Senegal, I have had the opportunity to witness the influence

that the former caste system still has in the decision-making process of any villager in both

public and private spheres. However economic studies in Africa have usually put the

emphasis on ethnic diversity, rarely incorporating social divisions within ethnic groups.

Rephrasing Christopher Udry, I decided mixing methods confronting economic theory to

other social sciences and direct observations from repeated fieldworks in Senegal, and

among the Senegalese migrants here in France.6

Having control over the whole data

collection process from the questionnaire design to the choice of trusted enumerators, gives

precise knowledge of the reliability of such sensitive variables as caste status.

After briefly describing the cultural context of the fieldwork, i.e. the Haalpulaaren of the

Senegal River Middle Valley, I will describe the theoretical framework placing the role of

family prestige as a central enforcement device for the old-age support arrangements. The

next section exposes the empirical strategy - from the data collection process to the

econometric specification - developed to highlight the relevance of this hypothesis. After


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MATAM AND THE HAALPULAAR SOCIETY7

Constraints from the physical environment on one hand, and the cultural context of the area

on the other hand, make the strategic bequest motive not relevant. I collected data on

remittance behavior in the Senegal middle valley where migration has long been considered

a better strategy than working in the local agriculture sector. In this context, the return of

physical bequests has become close to insignificant for a migrant son.

A non-profitable environment

Less than a century ago, the middle valley was relatively prosperous and therefore

economically attractive. The keys to success were the navigability of the river, the cattle

breeding and fishing activities along with the existence of two harvest seasons in October

and in March. Rain-fed agriculture in the semi-arid highlands combined with the flood-fed

culture by the river banks allowed such prosperity.

Several factors contributed to render any agricultural activity very risky and almost not

profitable at all. Since World War II, the region has a long tradition of migration: repeated

droughts in the seventies and eighties accelerated the phenomenon. To curb rural exodus,


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impossible to make a self-sustainable business out of it. As a consequence, nowadays, there

are many schemes and water supplies that are badly-kept. In fact, conventional wisdom

admits that it is rather difficult to make a decent living out of agricultural activities in the

valley. In the meantime, migrants engage in conspicuous consumption either for religious

celebrations or in housing, after just a few years abroad.

The cultural context: a pervading caste system

Some historical background on the Haalpulaaren, who represent the majority of the

population of the area, formerly known as Fuuta Tooro, can be found in Wane (1969). The

Haalpulaaren are responsible for spreading Islam all over West-Africa, and are highly

respected for that in the country and the sub-region. They are rigorous Muslim followers.This gives an additional argument against the strategic bequestmotive, as Islam has very

precise inheritance sharing rules: a son gets one share and a daughter gets half a share.

At the political level, if the administrative system is inherited from the French one, villages

have remained in the hand of the traditional chiefs. Descending from religious or political

figureheads of the Fuuta is the most sought-after social recognition. Another very importantaspect of the family prestige is determined by which social category the family belongs to.

Traditional Haalpulaar society, like many Sahelian societies, (see Tamari, 1991) is based on


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controversial, as it usually refers to the different artisan social sub-categories: les casts in

French. In this paper, I refer to the caste system as the whole stratified social organization.

It is clear that all these social categories were not fixed, but that they evolved as some

commoners have strategically been conferred a title of nobility as a reward for good

services, or new warriors recruited among former slaves8. It is important to keep in mind

that these categories corresponded to a genuine need for a specific job allocation during the

former era. The official abolition of slavery along with the emergence of the modern

market economy render this classification outdated on practical grounds. Likewise, artisans

do not necessarily work in the branch of their groups specialization, though both the

artisans and the descendants of slaves still suffer from discriminations nowadays. They

mainly consist of marriage constraints, as well as denied access to land, and to political and

religious leadership.9

Indeed at the political level, if the administrative system is absolutely

similar to the French one, villages have remained in the hand of the traditional chiefs. It is

really striking how relevant this classification remains in contemporary Haalpulaar culture.

In this traditional view, your birth determines your personality (cf. Wane 1969 who depicts

each caste with a specific personal trait). It is said for instance that one should not trust an

artisan because he may just be trying to seduce oneself in order to receive gifts. Not

knowing the whole genealogy of ones family is also a problem: it is the case that former

slaves in particular have lost track of their ancestors... The role played by this caste system

i d lif h i f i li i l h h f ll


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have economic difficulties. There are great pressures to display generous behavior.

Maintaining a high social status is expensive as it means giving to their griots and many

clients (former slaves, artisans...). The size of the clientele represents the power of the

family. Along with the warm-glow effect of giving, griots directly raise the utility of the

giver by advertising his generosity, which directly improves his reputation12

. Aristocratic

families still ought to give to their former clientele during baptisms, weddings and religious

events.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:THE SYMBOLICBARAKAMOTIVE

In a stratified society ruled as a gerontocracy, an old man may benefit from an

advantageous position in local politics if and only if he belongs to a high ranked family.

Few families have a say in choosing the village leader, and even less have a chance to

become one. Hence, the family name becomes a valuable symbolic bequest for such

important families. At the same time, it is well known that nowadays, many former slaves,

or bards take advantage of their position too, and like to remind their former masters of

their duty to provide them with gifts. Thus respecting this social pressure to give requires

high income. Migration appears as a solution to finance these conspicuous expenses.

Conducting focus groups and individual interviews, I was told many times during my

investigations - both in France among the Diaspora, and in Senegal - that a very strong


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blessing: the duhahu - in Pulaar - which transmits barka - in Pulaar. This Islamic word

could roughly be translated as Allahs blessing, and it has strong influence throughout the

whole Islamic world. It is important to bear in mind that it is strongly linked to good luck,

wealth, happiness, health, fertility, and social success. Baraka can be acquired hereditarily

through genealogical link to saints, or their contacts (see Schmitz, 2000), but also by a strict

observance of the five pillars of Islam. It can be transmitted by blessings. Being old and a

well known good Muslim puts oneself in a good position to have some.

Since living abroad makes it rather difficult to be physically near your dying parents,

sending money appears as one practical alternative. Of course, the value of this baraka in

the eyes of the migrant strongly depends on the notability of his patriarch and consequently

on the status of the family. Obviously belonging to a prestigious family yields considerable

returns in terms of prospects for marriage and political position in the village. While on

migration, he could also benefit from the status of the family to rely on migrants from the

same village. Besides, migrants from the same village usually live in neighboring rooms in

workers hostels -foyers de travailleurs in French - reconstituting the village society. It has

been repeatedly suggested that this is a way of reproducing hierarchic village society (e.g.

see Ba 1996: 207). In other geographic areas, Whitehouse (1994) describes baraka as one

motive for returning migrants among Soninke in Mali. Again, remitting can be a way for

the migrant to pay tribute to the village stratified socio-political structure.


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religious grounds. Many migrants associations were indeed created in order to collect

money for the repatriation of dead bodies.14

Aware that it may not be the only mechanism at work, I will emphasize here the role of

social status. In a patriarchal stratified society. Within the family the patriarch is the

decision-maker. At the village level, there are two groups of families: the nobles and the

others (non-nobles). Only the patriarchs from noble families can accede to influential

positions. To deserve their advantageous dominant position, the nobles must pay non-

nobles substantial gifts in monetary terms. The non-nobles who benefit from these transfers

must in return renounce basic human rights: not choose a spouse among the nobles, give up

their political ambitions, and admit the superiority of the nobles in community decision-

making. There is an implicit family contract between the patriarch and his adult sons. The

patriarch sends his most promising sons on migration, expecting them to remit. The

motivation of migrant sons is to obtain the fathers position on their return. In this view,

remittances should be observed for high ranked migrants only. The migration of the lower

status migrants relates to other motivations: trading monetary gifts for social mobility. They

will loosen ties with their community, and make their new life abroad, taking advantage of

the anonymity of city life.

Let us now turn to the data collected to test this scenario.

DATA


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The survey was conducted just before the rainy season from April to June 2004, when

weather conditions are particularly tough. It is a time of drought and food scarcity as the

granaries are empty. The good thing is that since peasants are preparing the fields for the

rain cultivations, all members of the household who are away, but within reach, come back

to give a hand.

The survey covers 149 patriarchs over six villages randomly chosen around Matam.16 Three

are located by the Senegal river, in the so-called waalo region, the other three are located

approximately 10 km away from the river, in the jeeri region, one of them being right by

the highway (the others being 4km away on a dirt track). Waalo villages are isolated (at

least) 3 months a year during the rainy season as roads become unfit for vehicles, which

can only be reached by pirogues (2-3 hour instead of 20 minute ride during the dry season).

Jeeri villagers do not own irrigated lands which are located near the river, but some noble

families do own waalo lands by the river.

It is an exhaustive survey, as all the men of the selected villages who met chosen criteria

were selected. The criteria are that they must be born before 1939, and that their eldest

living son should have been born before 1979. Information was gathered at three levels:

The patriarch level: Information on both his social status and his living conditionswere gathered. To measure social status information on the family background were

gathered such as which caste it belongs to, the family tenure in the village, the


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links between household members, and some basic information on each one, such

as: education level, economic activity, sources of revenue...

Finally, information on each child has been collected. Special attention was given to

children living outside the household, for which I gathered indirect information with

spouses, mother, siblings, or the father. The main focus was on remittances sent by

migrant sons to their old father, and the rest of the family. Information on news and

visits given to the family were also collected.

Much effort was put on making sure to have at hand the most precise and reliable

information on the social status of the families. For double-checking purposes, the status of

the family was gathered twice. First, I obtained the information directly by asking the

patriarch, then indirectly, on a second round, asking informants (mainly the village chief).

As it can be a very sensitive subject, the question was asked towards the end of the survey,

in order to prevent the patriarch from being offended or upset, or even from refusing to be

surveyed. The question was asked among a series of question on historical background of

the family, to make it sound like the family social origin. For the same reasons, I dared to

ask the village chief about the status of my surveyed families, on a second round in

September, so that we had already got to know each other better.


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belong to free- born families, whereas they represent 71% of the remitters. Table 1

displays the caste composition of the different samples studied:


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Table 1: Caste composition of samples of interest

Categories Patriarchs (%) All sons Migrants (%) Remitters (%)

(N=147) (N=470) (N=213) (N=133)

Free Men 70.1 72.1 65.7 70.7

Artisans 12.9 11.7 16.9 15.8

Slaves 17.0 16.2 17.4 13.5

As mentioned earlier, the largest caste is the free men category, which encompasses

aristocrats as well as commoners. To differentiate them, the list of notables was collected

from our informants. As le conseil des sages is supposed to be composed of the elderly men

of the village, barely 40% of them were designed as notables. They represent the actual

and only decision-makers in the village.

Migrants destinations

The destination distribution is very similar to previous studies of Haalpulaar migration:

mainly domestic, the international migration is mainly African, and very few have left the

continent. 44% of all migrations are domestic migrations, or migrations to the neighboring

countries, i.e. Mauritania, Mali, Gambia and Guinea. Dakar concentrates 77% of these

domestic (Senegal or neighboring countries) destinations. However, the capital city is


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destination, but this is still a recent phenomenon, so that the network is still weak, not to

mention the cost of migration. During my field investigations, I met returning or visiting

migrants from Germany and Denmark, and also surprisingly distant destinations like

Australia and even China! Even if this is not statistically significant, it indicates that

diversification of destinations is used to circumvent tough migration policies.

It is important to bear in mind that information about migrants is only second hand. I

assumed the best information I could collect about them would be from the mother or the

wife of the migrant. I also asked the brothers and the father if necessary. As a consequence,

one common criticism to my findings is that low-rank migrants are simply not in a position

to remit as they could not benefit from the network. This is rather difficult to find out from

the data at hand. At the same time, a recent popular saying circulates in the villages:

Migrations are blind to castes. Indeed, among migrants outside the continent (mainly

Europe-US), where expected earnings are higher, the proportion of non-notables is greater

than the one of notables, and yet the proportion of notables is higher than non-notables to

regularly remit. Figure 1 gives a more detailed picture of this phenomenon:

Figure 1: Migrants distribution of destinations, and propensity to remit according to their notability

50%

60%

70%

80%


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Empirical Strategy

The descriptive statistics evidence found in the previous section need to be checked all

things being equal. Hence, let us now turn to the regression results.

Since only those who have migrated can make transfers, a two-step Heckman model

generalized for probit models was used to take into account the selection bias.19 The

question is: do the ones with a higher probability of being on migration have a higher or

lower probability of remitting? As pointed out in the appendix, no such effects are found:

both decisions to migrate and then to remit are not correlated, which implies that these two

regressions can be studied separately.

Furthermore, since there are migrants from the same families (up to 7 brothers), the

correlation within the family was accounted for using a robust estimator of standard errors

with family clusters.

Regressions with different model specifications are displayed to show the robustness of the

results, putting much effort on the specification of the family social status and wealth.

RESULTS


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Table 2: Probability of being on migration (marginal effects)

On migration 1 2 3 4

(adult son)

age 0.065 0.073 0.074 0.072

(2.94)*** (3.69)*** (3.61)*** (3.54)***

(age) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001

(-2.51)** (-2.98)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.90)***

Birth order -0.003

(-0.13)=1 if married 0.02

(0.32)

=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.033

(0.48)

(patriarch)

Age 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006

(1.23) (1.14) (0.9) (1.16)

Size of the household 0.008

(0.72)

Years spent on migration 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008

(2.39)** (3.00)*** (2.76)*** (2.91)***

=1 if receives a pension 0.025

(0.28)

=1 if has received bequeathable wealth 0.013

(0.67)=1 if landless -0.118

(-1.02)

=1 if doesnt possess any cattle -0 157 -0 177 -0 173


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Overall this model correctly predicts 74% of migrating behavior. In contrast to previous

studies, the number of migrating brothers appears not to be significant. In reality, there are

two opposite effects: a network and a saturation effect. Having a brother can facilitate

migration: older brothers can finance their cadets, creating shifts of migrants.20

On the other

hand, when there are already migrants in the family, the patriarch may require other sons to

stay to help him manage the household. Here it seems that both effects are neutralized.

The age of the father has no significant effect, but the older the son is, the higher the

probability of being on migration, though with a decreasing effect, as the significantly

negative squared age variable indicates.

The fact that the having attended formal schooling is not significant is relevant to the fact

that migrants do not need to hold literacy skills for the job they will find in migration. One

must keep in mind that most migrants work in the informal sector, in Dakar and Africa, and

in unskilled jobs in industrialized countries (mainly in the hotel or catering trades).

Turning to variables capturing wealth of the family, they all seem to be not significant, but

two. Firstly, the fact of owning cattle increases the chance of being on migration. Second,

the fact that his father spent many years on migration increases the chance of the son

migrating. There are here 2 intertwined positive effects: a wealth and a network effect. Allmigrations are costly but especially for distant destinations: fares, bribing to get documents,

or to get across the border safely. It usually represents far more than what a basic rural


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airport, then in France. Or even working as boy or cook for French colonizers who then

took them to France to work for them. This result is in line with other studies.

Finally, sons of families belonging to the higher castes are less inclined to migrate. This

result contradicts Guberts (2000) findings among Soninke: she found that only aristocrats

migrate. It is necessary to turn to migrants remitting behavior to understand if migrants

from high and low status have the same behavior once in migration.

Probability of remitting

Among the migrants, I turn now to their probability of frequently remitting. This model has

a good predictive power as overall nearly 77% of migrants are properly predicted to remit

or not. Table 3 displays five different model specifications.


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Table 3: Probability of remitting among migrants (marginal effects are displayed)

Remitting 1 2 3 4 5

(adult son)

Ages -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005

(0.55) (0.55) (0.59) (0.71) (0.81)

Borders 0.002

(0.07)

=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.223 -0.244 -0.244 -0.192 -0.198

(2.46)** (2.55)** (2.55)** (2.07)** (2.17)**Years spent on migration 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.018

(1.90)* (1.63) (1.68)* (1.76)* (2.00)**

=1 if lives outside the African continent 0.361 0.371 0.372 0.378 0.377

(3.48)*** (3.84)*** (3.90)*** (4.34)*** (4.20)***

# of brothers on migration -0.004

(0.13)

=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch 0.16 0.146 0.147 0.194 0.181

(1.72)* (1.68)* (1.69)* (2.22)** (2.05)**(patriarch)

Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.018 0.017

(2.10)** (2.60)*** (2.60)*** (2.45)** (2.36)**

Household size 0.001

(0.06)

Years spent on migration 0.006

(1.54)

=1 if has received bequeathable wealth -0.018

(0.61)

=1 if landless -0.288 -0.291 -0.28 -0.281

(1.93)* (1.95)* (1.90)* (1.94)*

1 if d t ttl 0 026


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significantly positive, which reflects the idea that it usually takes time for a migrant to

obtain a secure earning, i.e. regular wages. Similarly, living in a developed country

positively affects his probability of remitting. This is obviously linked to the higher

earnings available there: he earns more than his own living expenses and can accordingly

send back a part of his earning.

Naturally, having a spouse who remained in the fathers household increases significantly

the probability of remitting. When turning to the strategic bequest motive, results similar to

Hoddinott (1994) are found: if the father owns land, it increases the probability of

remitting.

Surprisingly, no monitoring effects are found here: having brothers living in the same place

of migration has no significant effect on his remitting behaviour. More surprising still, the

number of years of completed formal schooling decreases the probability of remitting. This

is not due to sons studying abroad, as only seven migrants are actually finishing their

studies, which represents less than 3% of migrants. As shown in the appendix table A-2, the

average years of schooling is very low: around two. But still, few years of formal schooling

could be enough to acquire such basic skills as reading and writing, and lead to better job

opportunity. This could in turn give the migrant more incentive to settle in the host

destination, and cut ties with the hierarchical village society.

Finally, central to the main point of this article: belonging to a politically powerful family


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Other Supportive Evidence

Unfortunately the lack of social status variables in other larger statistical surveys makes it

impossible to compare this result with other studies so far. As a complement to the

empirical evidence some other qualitative pieces of evidence which confirm the hypothesis

made in this paper: some are listed here.22

To gain respectability in the village the most efficient way is to contribute to the building of

a mosque. There are several anecdotes I heard during my stay in the valley, about the

boycott of mosques built by migrant slaves. The Imam who is necessarily a noble, simply

refused to lead the prayers... I heard a similar story about a well built by a successful slave

that the nobles boycotted, opting for the more distant well. These anecdotes show that it is

rather inefficient for a slave to invest in order to raise his respectability in the village: he

will always be considered as a slave and accordingly will be reminded to keep his low-

profile rank. The only way to get rid of these social stigmas is to migrate. In anonymous

cities or foreign countries, he will more easily merge into society and be free in his acts.

It is noticeable that during my repeated visits at different workers hostels, I met very few

descendants of slaves or artisans23. This is consistent, with reported cases of continuing

discrimination against slaves on migration. The pattern is that slaves are excluded from any

decision-making position in the migrants association. Ba (1996) reports such a case in


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migrants. The study of Delaunay (1984) goes in the same direction as my results. He finds

that any type of caste can be found among the migrants from the Senegal valley, but

recognizes that the former slaves are more likely to settle definitively, whereas the nobles

go on temporary migration returning to the village, and sending remittances.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

These empirical findings suggest that migration is available to any social category, but for

different aims: it can either be seen as an individual decision to escape from a poor socialposition with dire prospects in the village or, conversely, as a family decision to maintain

its dominant local position. As a consequence, it is obvious that the first type of migrants

will not be interested in investing in the development of the village but will benefit from the

urban melting pot to get rid of their social stigmas. The good side of this is that they are

factors of change as they move from a network-based to a modern market economy. In

order to prevent rural exodus and urban concentrations, an efficient policy would be to

invest in intensive consciousness-raising campaigns to get rid of the obsolete caste system.

This will probably take time and be hard to implement as I found out that this was still a

highly taboo subject in contemporary Senegal.

Central to political debates in France, republican values of racial integration andassimilation may differently appeal to both types of migrants previously described.

Frances model of integration aims to assimilate immigrants by instilling French cultural


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often draw conclusions from surveys that were lacking the social context. As this was a

limited study, it would be interesting to pursue on a broader range. The recent World Bank

bookCulture and Public Action (Rao & Walton, 2006) sends a good signal that things are

changing and that more and more cooperation between economists and anthropologists will

be expected in the near future.

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edited by S.C. Kolm and J.M. Ythier, ch11. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier.

Lucas, Robert and Oded Stark. 1985. Motivations to Remit. Evidence from Botswana.

Journal of Political Economy 93 (5), 901-918.

Luke, Nancy and Kaivan Munshi. 2005. Women as Agents of Change: Female Income,

Social Affiliation and Household Decisions in South India. Mimeo, Brown University.

Ly, Boubakar. 1966. Honneur et Valeurs Morales dans les Socits Ouolofs et Pular.

Ph D dissertation Universit de Paris


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Stark, Oded. 1991. The Migration of Labor. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Schmitz, Jean. 2000. Le Souffle de la Parent. Mariage et Transmission de la Baraka chezles Clercs Musulmans de la Valle du Sngal.L'Homme 154-155: 241-77.

Sy, Kalidou. 2002. Castes et droit de lhomme au Senegal. The International Dalit

Solidarity NetworkWorking globally against discrimination by work and descent

Statement to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Wane, Yaya. 1969. Les Toucouleurs du Fouta Toro: Stratification Sociale et Structure

Familiale. Dakar: IFAN.

Whitehouse, Bruce. 1994. Centripetal Forces: The Construction of Hometown Loyalty in

a West African Migrant-Sending Community. Presentation at the PPA Annual

Meeting in Boston, MA.


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APPENDIX

Document A1: More on the Haalpular Society

1. Historical background of the Haalpulaaren25

The Haalpulaaren26

make up the majority of the inhabitants in the Middle Valley. Towards

the river delta lay the former Walo empire of the Wolof whereas in the upper valley are the

Soninke. Haalpulaaren can be found on both banks of the river, further North are the Moors

and more to the South in the Ferlo Fulani nomads can be found. Indeed, Haalpulaaren are

believed to be descendant of Fulani nomads who settled in the valley and mixed with local

populations (Serer, Wolof, Moore, Soninke...). In the Xth century, the region was referred to

as Tekrur which is where the name Tukulors comes from27. It was first annexed by the

Ghana Empire, and then the Mali Empire, until Koly Tengala Ba (a Denyanke clan of

Fulani) in the XVIth century, freed the region from the Manding domination and founded

the Futa Toro28. Islamization began as early as the IX th century in the area and spread until

charismatic religious leaders took power in 1776. The Torrobe29

revolution brought an

end to two centuries ofDenyanke dynasty. In the XIXth

century, El Hajj Futyu Umar Tall

led a jihad recruiting among the Futankobe to resist the French army and founded theMacina Empire in modern Mali.

Th H l l ibl f di I l ll W t Af i d hi hl


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aspect of the familys fame is determined by which social category the family belongs to.

The Haalpulaar caste system is rather complex, let us now consider its major features.

2. Social stratification

In the next section, we shall turn to a brief description of each category, and the main

subcategories.

The free-born (sometimes called nobles, Rimbe in Pulaar) make up the majority and

consequently are definitely the most heterogeneous group. The standard designation of thefree-born as nobles may seem a little misleading, since this group includes even the

most impoverished peasants. Indeed, the hereditary aristocratic lineages make up a minority

within this category: they are the only families entitled to accede to political power (village

chieftainship). Four main subgroups compose this first category depending on the main

activity they relate to. At the top of the hierarchy are the Torrobe who are the religious

leaders, along with some Fulbe traditionally cattle breeders. Usually of lesser prestige

than former sub-categories are the fishermen (Subalbe) and the warriors (Sebe).

The artisans (Nyenbe) are referred to as the casted (les cast s in French) as this group

matches best the idea of caste with job specialization (along with the usual endogamous

feature it shares with the other categories). All the traditional crafts are represented fromthe blacksmith (Waylibe) to the leather workers (Sakebe) and the wood workers (

Laobe ). Along with the craftsmen are the bards (Griots in French, Aolube in Pulaar).


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society descendants of slaves are still expected to be deferential to nobles, to cook on

festive occasions and sometimes repair their former masters house32

. They distinguish

themselves by their willingness to work hard. An illustration of their position in the society

can be found in joking relationships. Depending on ones family name, one is allowed to

tease people from another clan (ones joking kin) without offending anybody. Usually the

jokes are very humiliating and are centred on either greed for food or calling the other your

slave (and the other reciprocates) During my fieldwork, I once had the opportunity to work

with a man of slave origin who would systematically refuse to interview people belonging

to his joking kinship. No matter how bright an educated he was, he explicitly told me how

he felt uncomfortable with such jokes, and did not feel like reciprocating.

The main form of discrimination is the fact that only the free born and the most important

artisans may traditionally own the most valuable lands by the river banks (walo in

Pulaar). Nowadays, cases can be found of slaves families that now own such lands after

their former masters gave them away but it is still rather an exception. Regularly in

Senegalese newspapers, there are articles about mixed marriages (inter-castes) which

prove that it is still a scandal, even in the capital city, or abroad33

. In villages it is all the

more difficult for an artisan or the descendant of slaves to marry a noble woman. As a

consequence, before a marriage occurs, there is always a preliminary enquiry led by the in-

laws, to make sure of the compatibility between both social categories of the groom and the

b id


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It is striking how relevant this classification remains in contemporary Haalpulaar culture.

There is for instance a set of implicit rules that each group must abide by. These rules are

mainly driven by the sense ofhonour which is specific to the nobles. Let us now turn to

this aspect in details and in its implications.

3. The Nobles Code of Honour

There are many ways for higher status individuals to distinguish themselves from lower

status ones. Bodily posture, where one sits and how one addresses others in public meetings

are manners of displaying ones rank. Typically, although not specific to Haalpulaar

society, lengthy traditional greetings are relevant to the social status of protagonists. One

aspect is the repetition of the family name, which is called yetode in Pulaar and literally

means the name that honours.

Ly (1966) described the attitude of the Haalpulaar aristocrats very precisely in his thesis.

According to Ly, they are characterized by their sense of honour which does not exist in

other classes. At the core of this principle, is the importance of always being in the position

of giving and never asking. It is by giving and being publicly generous that the noble will

be able to demonstrate his worthiness. When belonging to such families it is an unbearable

shame to have economic difficulties. There are great pressures to display generous

behaviour. Maintaining a high social status is expensive as it means giving to their griots

and many clients (former slaves, artisans...). The size of the clientele represents the power


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Table A-1. The Haalpulaar complex caste system (translated from Wane 1969: 33).34

Main

Social

Categories

Strata (sub-division) Caste sub-divisions Occupation and Title

Rimbe(free men)

Rimbe ardiibe

(free)Toorobbe Lawakoobe or fileteebe Temporal power

Jangube or ardiibe diine Spiritual power : ceerno

Miiskineebe Free men, farmers: demoowo

Rimbe huunybe

(courtiers)

Sebbe

Worgankoobe Former monarchs: farba ceddo

Kolyaabe Kolys soldiers : jagaraf

Mbonaabe

Local variants of kolyaabeAwgalnaabe

Helgalagel, etc.

Jaawambe Courtiers and advisers: sooma

Subalbe Fishermen: jaaltaabe

Nyeenybe

(artisans

and

griots)

Fecciram golle

(artisans)

Maabube sanyoobe Weavers: jarno

Wayilbe Baleebe Blacksmiths: farba baylo

Sayakoobe Jewelers: farba baylo

SakkeebeAlawbe Shoemakers: foosiri

Wodeebe or garankoobe Cobblers

LawbeLaade Pirogue builders: kalmbaan

Worworbe (bobi) Kitchen tools makers: maalaw

Buurnaabe Potters and ceramicists

Griots: Naalankoobe

(entertainers) or

nyaagotoobe (praise

singers)

Wambaabe Traditional guitar playersMaabube suudu Paate

SingersMaabube jaawambe

Lawbe gumbala (kontimpaaji)
http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste2http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste3http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste4http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste6http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste7http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste9http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste9http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste3http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste8http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste8http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste3http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste9http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste9http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste7http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste6http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste5http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste4http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste3http://web.archive.org/web/20021231022603/http:/www.pulaaku.net/defte/yWane/toucouleurFT/ch01.html#caste2


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32

Table A-2 : Descriptive statistics for the initial sample, the migrants and the remitters.

Initial Adult Sons (N=470) Migrants (N=213) Remitters (N=133)

Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max.

SON

On migration 45%

Remitting 62%

Age 30.8 8.4 17 61 33.2 8.1 17 61 34.5 8.5 18 61

Age when leaving the household 27.4 8.3 3 50 27.8 8.3 11 50

Birth order 2.6 1.6 1 8 2.4 1.5 1 8 2.3 1.6 1 8

Formal schooling 36% 33% 27%

Years of (formal) schooling 2.4 3.7 0 17 2.4 4.2 0 17 1.8 3.6 0 13

Years on migration 6.1 5.7 0 25 6.9 5.8 0 25

In migration for over 3 years 54% 66%

Residing in a developed country 18% 26%

Spouse (of the son) left in the household 41% 52%# of brothers already on migration 1.0 1.3 0 7 1.0 1.3 0 6 1.0 1.4 0 5

# of brothers remitting 1.3 1.5 0 6 1.6 1.7 0 5

# of brothers who don't remit 0.8 1.0 0 4 0.4 0.9 0 4

FAMILY

Age of the patriarch 73.9 6.3 66 91 74.9 6.4 66 91 76.2 6.3 66 91

Age of the patriarch when son migrated 69.1 8.4 42 89 69.5 8.4 42 89

Number of dependants of the patriarch 7.6 3.8 2 17 7.4 3.7 2 16 7.0 3.7 2 16

Family in region of migration 33% 32%

# of years the father went on migration 10.6 12.9 0 47 13.9 14.2 0 47 15.0 15.1 0 47

Family of higher castes 72% 66% 71%

Local power of the lineage 42% 46% 56%

Valuable agric land on bequest 58% 61% 56%

VILLAGES

Thiempeng 31% 28% 31%

Bow 18% 15% 15%

Thially 5% 5% 3%

Galoyabe 14% 15% 16%

Hombo 16% 18% 18%

Thiambe 16% 18% 17%


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33

Table A-3: Probability of remitting conditional on being on migration: Heckit regression results

1st

step: On migration : cf. (5) table 2

2ndstep : Remit (conditional on being on migration)(adult son)

Age -0.008

(1.31)

=1 if has ever been to formal school -0.185

(1.93)*

Years spent on migration 0.018

(1.94)*

=1 if lives outside the African continent 0.342

(3.42)***

=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch 0.177(2.02)**

(patriarch)

Age 0.016

(2.01)**

=1 if landless -0.278

(1.96)*

=1 if belongs to Family of higher caste 0.256

(2.85)***

Rho -0.282

Wald test H0:(rho = 0) chi2(1) =0.85 p-value= 0.3561

Presenting only the most suited specification

Documents

Demonsant ERSA Workshop