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Demonstration of Wireless Insecurities
Presented by: Jason Wylie, CISM, CISSP
Demonstration of Wireless Insecurities
Presented by: Jason Wylie, CISM, CISSP
Demonstration of Wireless InsecuritiesDemonstration of Wireless Insecurities
Agenda:• Demonstrate ease of access to unprotected WLAN• Setup 802.11 standard security roll-out (SSID and MAC restrictions)• Demonstrate ability to locate an AP and spoof MAC Adresses• Set up WEP on AP and demonstrate WEP weaknesses• Discuss methods of providing security over wireless
Equipment LayoutEquipment Layout
Equipment / ToolsEquipment / Tools
Linksys Access Point
Laptop with Linksys PCMCIA Wlan Cards
Unauthorized “Hacker” Client System
NetStumbler, SMAC, WEPCrack, and Ethereal
Web Server
Rogue (unprotected) Access Rogue (unprotected) Access PointPoint
• No Security Measures in place• Access Point Advertises SSID• Casual Users can browse your network• Typical of departmental or “personal “ access points• An intruder starts with internal access to your network
Baseline 802.11Wireless SecurityBaseline 802.11Wireless Security
• Disabling SSID Broadcast– Service Set Identifier Broadcasting
• MAC Restrictions– Limit participation to only allowed MAC addresses
• WEP– Wired Equivalent Privacy
Baseline 802.11Wireless Security Baseline 802.11Wireless Security ~ Disabling SSID Broadcast ~~ Disabling SSID Broadcast ~
ADDED SECURITY:• SSID is not broadcast to unknown clients.
CONS:• Requires manual input of SSID on all client systems.• SSID information is sent in “plain-text” from the client to
the AP.
Getting past SSID ObscurityGetting past SSID Obscurity
• Sniffing traffic on the WLAN• Identify SSID broadcast from employee system during AP
association.• Configure Wireless card with discovered SSID.
Baseline 802.11Wireless Security Baseline 802.11Wireless Security
~ MAC Filtering ~~ MAC Filtering ~ADDED SECURITY:• WLAN association is restricted from unknown MAC addresses.
CONS:• Requires manual input of all client system MAC addresses into
the AP.• MAC “spoofing” is a trivial task.
Getting past MAC FilteringGetting past MAC Filtering• Sniffing traffic on the WLAN• Identify valid MAC addresses from employee WLAN
interaction.• Spoof the MAC address of the employee’s system.
Baseline 802.11Wireless SecurityBaseline 802.11Wireless Security~ WEP Encryption ~~ WEP Encryption ~
ADDED SECURITY:• Traffic is encrypted during transmission
CONS:• Requires distribution of WEP keys to employees.• WEP keys can be broken easily
Getting past WEPGetting past WEP• Sniffing traffic on the WLAN• Gather at least 500MB of traffic• Process through Wepcrack• Keys to the kingdom are revealed
AlternativesAlternatives• Limit Broadcast Range of Access Points• Put the Access Points outside the Firewall
– Use strong authentication– Encrypt traffic with IPSEC VPN (3DES or
AES)
• Use proprietary Key Rotation Methods– EAP (LEAP – Cisco, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTS)
• Manually Scan for “Rogue” Access Points• Install IDS for WLANs
– Detects MAC Spoofing– Identifies “Rogue” Access Points.
Extensible Authentication Protocol Extensible Authentication Protocol (RFC 2284)(RFC 2284)
• Provides a flexible link layer security framework• Simple encapsulation protocol
– No dependency on IP– ACK/NAK, no windowing– No fragmentation support
• Few link layer assumptions– Can run over any link layer (PPP, 802, etc.)– Does not assume physically secure link
• Assumes no re-ordering– Can run over lossy or lossless media– Retransmission responsibility of authenticator (not needed for 802.1X
or 802.11)
URLs for More InformationURLs for More Information
• IEEE 802 web page: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/dots.html
• IETF web page: http://www.ietf.org/
• The “Unofficial 802.11 Security” Web Site:http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/
• 80211 Planethttp://www.80211-planet.com