Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

01G-09-64

May 2009

ACLURM008087

Scnsiti'/c Security Information

Role of the No Fly and Selectee. Lists i.n Securing Commercial Aviation

VVarRIA!l This reesra s8AtaiAS SeAsitive 8eS!:lFity In~rmation that is senlr:elled !:lnaer 49 CFR parts 16 ana 113:20. ~la

J3aFt af U'lis FeesrB fflay Be Eiieeleses te J39FSens '.·.·itAo!:lt a "need Ie Ime,.· ... " as seHRed iA 49 CFR ",aFts 16 aAS 1132Q el(eeJ3l ' .... itA Ihe wRite A J3erFRissien ef tAe AeimiAi&iFater af the TFaAsl3eFl:atien SssI:IFii)' AeA'linistFatien SF tAe SesFetaf)' ef TFaASJ3ertatioR. UnautAsFizeei €Iiselosl;IFO FRay resl;Ill in si'/il ",eRalpt SF stAer aetien. Fer bI.S. geveFAFRenl a€lensise, !'luells release is E/svsrneE!sy 9 Y.KC. aa2 ana 49 CFR l3aFts 16 aA8 1929.

Sensiti\'c Security Information

Office alinspectar General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528

Homeland Security

May 7, 2009

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department.

This report is in response to a congressional mandate in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Division E). It addresses whether potential vulnerabilities to commercial aviation exist as a result of the Transportation Security Administration's use of a subset of the federal consolidated Terrorist Screening Database in conducting commercial air carrier passenger prescreening instead of screening against all records in the database. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, a review of applicable documents, and data analysis.

The recommendation herein has been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and has been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Richard L. Skinner Inspector General

public dioalo3urc 13 goycmcd by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parI3 15 and 1520.

ACLURM008088

SENSITIVJii SECumTY l=NFGmMTION

Office o/Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Securily Washington, DC 20528

.~ •• r ... ~i>.. HId "_ omean '" .1-) . • ~ SecurIty

May 7, 2009

Preface

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OlG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107.296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department.

This report is in response to a congressional mandate in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008 (Public Law 110·161, Division E). It addresses whether potential vulnerabilities to commercial aviation exist as a result of the Transportation Security Administration's use ofa subset of the federal consolidated Terrorist Screening Database in conducting commercial air carrier passenger prescreening instead of screening against all records in the database. It is based on interviews with employees and officials ofre1evant agencies and institutions, direct observations, a review of applicable documents, and data analysis.

The recommendation herein has been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and has been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Richard L. Skinner Inspector General

. 8ENsmVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Wl\R~HNG: This feeeffl e6fflllms Sensitwe Seeltfity IllfefBIllliElft Iftftl is eelllffllleo lHIder ~9 C¥R rlH'ls 13 !HtiIIS29. Ne port at !his reearomaybe l:!iseleged te PefS6BS wilheut II "neel:! tEllmw"," 8sl:!efinefl in 49 GFRrMts 15 liftS 1529, ~eept ,ril:h lila "rittefll'emlisSleH ef IDe AclJBiHisErHt6l' Elf the nllH~6I'I!tIiflft Seeeffiy !.:flreiBisffHtisn flY 1Iie SeeJel~' sf 'fflIMp SNti Elft. U1l8I:Il:heriF:ed fe!eM e lflfIy re 9\:111 ill eivill'eftllily ElF e they H ea 6ft. Fffl' U. 8. l!:8' _I IIl!:Mleies, J!IIblie disele91tfe is ge\'etBefl loy S U.S.c. S521lftti 19 CFR pllfls 15 fHldlS29.

Table of Contents/Abbreviations

Executive Summary 1 Background 3

Secure Flight Program Implementation 3 Terrorist Screening Database 5 No Fly and Selectee Lists 9 Other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database 14

Results of Review 17 No Fly and Selectee Lists Reduce Vulnerabilities to Commercial Aviation

Security, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist 17 An Analysis of Encounter Records Demonstrates Watch List Effectiveness 24 Interagency Approach to Commercial Aviation Security Helps to Mitigate

Potential Vulnerabilities and Address Potential Gaps 27 Conclusion 37

Appendices

Appendix A: Appendix B: Appendix C: Appendix D:

Appendix E: Appendix F:

Appendix G: Appendix H:

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 38 TSA Management Comments to the Draft Report 40 NCTC Management Comments to the Draft Report 44 No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance June 2008 46 No Fly and Selectee List Nomination Process 54 Securing Commercial Aviation Through Intelligence Gathering, Watch List Screening, Law Enforcement, and Other Programmatic and Operational Efforts 55 Major Contributors to this Report 56 Report Distribution 57

No part of this record may bo disclosed to parsons without a "need to know" as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520,

public disclosure is govcmcd by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 19 CFR-parts 15 and 1520

ACLURM008089

SENSHIYE SJ<.CffiUTY INFORMATION


Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1 Background ......................................................................................................................... .3

Secure Flight Program Implementation ............................................... : ........................ .3 Terrorist Screening Database ......................................................................................... 5 No Fly and Selectee Lists .............. __ ............................................................................... 9· Other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database ............................. 14

Results of Review .............................................................................................................. 17 No Fly and Selectee Lists Reduce Vulnerabilities to Commercial Aviation

Security, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist .................................................. 17 An Analysis of Encounter Records Demonstrates Watch List Effectiveness .............. 24 Interagency Approach to Commercial Aviation Security Helps to Mitigate

Potential Vulnerabilities and Address Potential Gaps .............................................. 27 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ .37

Appendices

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...................................................... .38 AppendixB: TSA Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................ ..40 AppendixC: NCTC Management Comments to the Draft Report ......................... ..44 AppendixD: No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance

June 2008 ............................................................................................. 46 AppendixE: No Fly and Selectee List Nomination Process ..................................... 54 AppendixF: Securing Commercial Aviation Through Intelligence

Gathering, Watch List Screening, Law Enforcement, and Oilier Programmatic and Operational Efforts ...................................... 55

AppendixG: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................ 56 AppendixH: Report Distribution .............................................................................. 57

SENSlTIVB SECURITY INFORMATION

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Abbreviations

APIS Advance Passenger Information System

CAPPS Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System

CSP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support-System

DHS Department of Homelan.d Security

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GAO Government Accountability Office

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NTC—P National Targeting Center—Passenger

OIG Office of Inspector General

SME subject matter expert

TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

TSDB Terrorist Screening Database

TSO Transportation Security Officer

VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

VWP Visa Waiver Program

WARITRIG: Tim-record eth.tni.s Sensitive Security Inform:Ilion that is controlled under 19 CFR pub 1-5-and-1-32-07

ACLURM008090

SR~'SITIVJ!l SBCUR-I'I'¥ HIFOR\4h'TION


Abbreviations

APIS

CAPPS

CBP

CLASS

DHS

FAMS

FBI GAO

NCTC

NTC-P

010

SME

TIDE

TSA

TSC

TSDB

TSO

VGTOF

VWP

Advance Passenger Infonnation System

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Consular Lookout and Support System

Department of Homeland Security

Federal Air Marshal Service

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Government Accountability Office

National Counterterrorism Center

National Targeting Center-Passenger

Office of Inspector General

subject matter expert

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

Transportation Security Administration

Terrorist Screening Center

Terrorist Screening Database

Transportation Security Officer

Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

Visa Waiver Program

s.EN5Im'£ SBCURITY INFORMATION

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The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the federal government's consolidated watch list, the Terrorist Screem Database.

OIG Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General

Executive Summary

At the direction of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Homeland Security, we reviewed whether potential vulnerabilities existin commercial air carrier passenger screening. Specifically, we were asked to review the Transportation Security Administration Secure Flight program's intention to screen passenger information against only the No Fly and Selectee lists, rather than the entire government terrorist watch list database. We analyzed: (1) the watch list criteria and compositions of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full consolidated Terrorist Screening Database; and (2) the differences between the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full database. Our objective was to determine whether potential vulnerabilities to the aviation system exist as a result of screening commercial air carrier passenger names against the No Fly and Selectee lists, instead of the full database.

b3 per ODNI b7E per FBI b3 , 7E per TSA

Although the use of the No Fly and Selectee lists is largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present vulnerabilities to aviation security. However, passenger prescreening against terrorist watch lists proposed by the Secure Flight program is only one component of a larger security cycle that protects the nation's commercial aviation system. International and domestic security activities within and outside of

N. e

g„v....-cd by 5 U.S.C. 552-end CFR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 1

ACLURM008091

OIG Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General

Executive Summary

b3 per ODNI

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

At the direction of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Homeland Security, we reviewed whether potential vulnerabilities exist-in commercial air carrier passenger screening. Specifically, we were asked to review the Tiansportation Security Administration Secure Flight program's intention to screen passenger infonnation against only the No Fly and Selectee lists, rather than the entire government terrorist watch list database. We analyzed: (1) the watch list criteria and compositions of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full consolidated Terrorist Screening Database; and (2) the differences between the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full database. Our objective was to determine whether potential vulnerabilities to the aviation system exist as a result of screening commercial air carrier passenger names against the No Fly and Selectee lists, instead of the full database.

The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the federal government's consolidated watch the Terrorist S"·TP,p.n·m

Database.

Although the use of the No Fly and Selectee lists is largely . successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten

commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present vulnerabilities to aviation security. However, passenger prescreening against terrorist watch lists proposed by the Secure Flight program is only one component of a larger security cycle that protects the nation's commercial aviation system. International and domestic security activities within and outside of

SENSITIVE SBCURlT¥ INFORMtrllON

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Role oftbe No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Pagel

b3,b5(DP) per ODNI

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

the Department of Homeland Security, such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement investigations, visa issuance, and border protection, mitigate potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Secure Flight program and enhance commercial aviation security overall.

We are making one recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Securi Administration to determine whether it is a ro riate to

The Transportation county Administration concture s in part with the recommendation.

A

No part of this record may he disclosed to persons without a "aced to know" ,s defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520,

public &admire-is-governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 mid 49 CFR parts 15-and 1520.


Page 2

ACLURM008092

b3,b5(DP) per ODNI

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

gE~'SITIVE 8ECYRlT¥ H;FOm<l"ATiON

the Department of Homeland Security, such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement investigations, visa issuance, and border protection, mitigate potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Secure Flight program and enhance commercial aviation security overall

We are making one recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation to determine whether it

-SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Seenring Commercial Aviation

Page 2

Background

Securing the commercial aviation sector has been a major priority of the federal government since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and tasked it with securing all modes of transportation, including commercial aviation.' TSA is responsible for ensuring that all commercial air carrier passengers are prescreened against government terrorist watch lists prior to boarding an aircraft. Specifically, TSA uses the No Fly and Selectee lists, subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government's consolidated watch list of all known or reasonably suspected terrorists—to identify individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft or who are to receive additional physical screening prior to boarding an aircraft.

Currently, the majority of commercial air carriers, under the direction of TSA, perform passenger prescreening by comparing passenger names to records on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Although commercial air carriers are required to adhere to TSA guidelines that mandate how commercial air carriers conduct watch list screening, air carriers perform this function inconsistently. As a result, The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 recommended that TSA, instead of commercial air carriers, should perform passenger prescreening.2 In doing so, TSA should also use the larger set of terrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government, rather than only the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were solely . maintained by TSA at the time.3

Secure Flight Program Implementation

To address federalizing commercial air carrier passenger prescreening as recommended in The 9/11 Commission Report and mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA introduced the concept of the Secure Flight program in August 2004.4 In

Public Law 107-71 (November 19, 2001). 2 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (issued July 22, 2004), page 393. 3 Ibid. 4 Public Law 108-458 (December 17, 2004).

public dr-elosurc is govcmcd by 5 1.1.S.C. 552 mid 49 CFR path 15 and 1520.


Page 3

ACLURM008093

SEPrSITP')I; SECwrr¥ B'lFOmMTION

Background

Securing the commercial aviation sector has been a major priority of the federal government since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and tasked it with securing all modes of transportation, including commercial aviation. I TSA i~ responsible for ensuring that all commercial air carrier passengers are prescreened against government terrorist watch lists prior t6 boarding an aircraft. Specifically, TSA uses the No Fly and Selectee lists, subsets of

, the Terrorist Screening Database (fSDB)--the U.S. government's consolidated watch list of all known or reasonably suspected terrorists-to identifY individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft or who are to receive additional physical screening prior to boarding an aircraft.

Currently, the majority of commercial air carriers, under the direction of TSA, perform passenger prescreening by comparing passenger names to records on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Although commercial air carriers are required to adhere to TSA guidelines that mandate how commercial air carriers conduct watch list screening, air carriers perform this function inconsistently. As a result, The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 recommended that TSA, instead of commercial au carriers, should perform passenger prescreening.2 In doing so, TSA should also use the larger set ofterrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government, rather than only the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were solely maintained by TSA at thetime.3

Secure Flight Program Implementation

To address federalizing commercial air carrier passenger prescreening as recommended in The 9/11 Commission Report and mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Ten-orism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA introduced the concept of the Secure Flight program in August 2004.4 In

I Public Law 107-71 (November 19,2001). 2 FInal Report a/the National Commission on Terrorist Attach Upon the United Slafes (issued July 22,2004). page 393. 3 Ibid.

4 Public Law 108-458 (December 17,2004).

gENBffJ'VI; 8BCUR-lTY IPoWOHMiiFlON

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Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Avlal10n

Page 3

4f

making passenger prescreening an inherently governmental function, TSA, not commercial air carriers, will bear the responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening. From a policy standpoint, the Secure Flight program will match the full name, date of birth, and gender of passengers against the No Fly and Selectee lists, instead of the current requirement, which is for commercial air carriers to screen only a passenger's name against the No Fly and Selectee lists. In addition, with the Secure Flight program, in cases where certain yet-to-be-defined security considerations exist, TSA could screen against the federal government's entire consolidated terrorist watch list for particular flights or routes.

Concern regarding TSA's decision to screen against only the No Fly and Selectee lists prompted Congress, in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008, to mandate that we report on any potential vulnerabilities to the nation's aviation system should the Secure Flight program not screen against the full TSDB.5 As an additional provision of the 2008 appropriation, should TSA decide that the Secure Flight program does not need to check commercial air carrier passenger names against the full TSDB, Congress required TSA to certify "that no significant security risks are raised by screening airline passenger names only against a subset of the full terrorist watch list."6 Congress further stipulated that funding for the implementation of the Secure Flight program would not become available until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on TSA's success in meeting the conditions specified in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005.7

5 Division E —Department of Hourelemd Security Appropriations Act of 2008, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-161 (December 26, 2007). 6 Public Law 110-161, Division E, 121 STAT. 2053. 7 Department ofHomeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, Public Law 108-334 (October 18, 2004), Sec. 522(a).


Page 4

ACLURM008094

SENSITIVE SgCm:HT¥ !=NFOR!IA:ATION

making passenger prescreeningan inherently governmental function, TSA, not commercial air carriers, will bear the responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening. From a policy standpoint, the Secure Flight program will match the full name, date of birth, and gender of passengers against the No Fly and Selectee lists, instead of the current requirement, which is for commercial air carriers to screen only a passenger's name against the No Fly and Selectee lists. In addition, 'with the Secure Flight program, in cases where certain yet-to-be-defmed security considerations exist, TSA could screen against the federal government's entire consolidated terrorist watch list for particular flights or routes.

Concern regarding TSA's decision to screen against only the No Fly and Selectee lists prompted Congress. in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008, to mandate th<1.t we report on any potential vulnerabilities to the nation's aviation system should the Secure Flight program not screen against the full TSDB.5 As an additional provision of the 2008 appropriation. should TSA decide that the Secure Flight program does not need to check commercial air carrier passenger names against the full TSDB, Congress required TSA to certify "that no significant security risks are raised by screening airline passenger names only against a subset of the full terrorist watch list.,,6 Congress further stipulated that funding for the implementation of the Secure Flight program would not become available until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on TSA's success in meeting the conditions specified in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of2005.7

5 Division E - Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 0/2008, Consolidated Appropriations Act ojl008,Public Law 110-161 (December 26,2007).

6 Public Law 110-161, Division E, 121 STAT. 2053.

7 Department a/Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, Public Law 108-334 (October 18,2004), Sec. 522(a). .

StlNSITJ\t8 SECURITY INFOllMwFJ9"

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Role 01 the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviatinn

Page 4

SENSI fIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

TSA management said that after GAO reported on TSA's fulfillment of the ten congressional conditions, the Secure Flight program began to assume domestic No Fly and Selectee watch list matching responsibilities from commercial air carriers in January 2009, and will begin to assume international watch list screening at some point thereafter. The program's intended outcome is to:

b7E per F331

b3 per ODNI

b3 7E per TSA

• Prohibit terrorists to harm the Unite tates from boarding an aircr ; an

•

Once Secure Flight is fully operational, commercial air carriers will be required to submit the full name, date of birth, and gender of passengers to the Secure Flight program at approximately 72 hours before a flight. For reservations made within 72 hours of a flight, aircraft operators must submit the required information as soon as feasible after the reservation is made. Secure Flight will then vet names using automated search protocols to clear as many passengers as possible. Any potential matches to individuals on the No Fly and Selectee lists will then go through a manual review process conducted by Secure Flight, TSA's Office of Intelligence, and the Department of Justice's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) analysts, to make identity determinations and to resolve potential matches. The TSC maintains the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch list. Using a similar process, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also leverages its Advance Passenger Information System—which requires commercial air carriers to submit certain passenger manifest information to CBP—for vetting passengers prior to securing an aircraft for departure to or from the United States. CBP continues to provide assistance to TSA's Office of Intelligence as an additional layer of security to its screening of possible international No Fly matches.


In September 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 mandated that the "Attorney General shall establish an organization to consolidate the Government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening

Role of the No Fly and Selectee List9 in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 5

ACLURM008095

r

SEJ>fSlTIVE SECHIHTY J:NFOIl''J'bHIOl'l

TSA management said that after GAO reported on TSA's fulfillment of the ten congressional conditions, the Secure Flight program began to assume domestic No Fly and Selectee watch list matching responsibilities

. from commercial air carriers in January 2009, and will begin to assume international watch list screening at some point thereafter, The program's intended outcome is to:

• b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E • per TSA

L Once Secure Flight is fully operational, commercial air carners will be required to submit the full name, date of birth, and gender of passengers to the Secure Flight program at approximately 72 hours before a flight. For reservations made within 72 hours of a flight, aircraft operators must submit the required information as soon as feasible after the reservation is made, Secure Flight will then vet names using automated search protocols to clear as many passengers as possible. Any potential matches to individuals on the No Fly and Selectee lists will then go through a manual review process conducted by Secure Flight, TSA's Office of Intelligence, and the Department of Justice's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) analysts, to make identity determinations and to resolve potential matches. The TSC maintains the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch list. Using a similar process, U.S, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also leverages its Advance Passenger Information System-which requires commercial air carriers to submit certain passenger manifest information to CBP-for vetting passengers prior to securing an aircraft for departure to or from the United States. CBP continues to provide assistance to TSA's Office of Intelligence as an additional layer of security to its screening of possible international No Fly matches.


In September 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Dir.ective-6 mandated that the "Attorney General shall establish an organization to consolidate the Government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening

SEN51TPlE S};CURlT¥ HIFOIlMATION

WiWlHKi: This reeMd e1ffl16:itts SeHsiB. e Seellri~ IMafftl6Rtm flwt i3 "' .... Erl'lHet!: "'Mer 49 CIZRJlftfffi IS flBt!: IS2Q. Na P6Ft at liM reflapft fBIIj be t!:iselaset!: 18 peffi8ftS .. ilhat!11L 'beet!: "" ""'Will" I'IS deftheS is 49 CPR PElHS IS afltll'S2€1, e![eepl ,Rill tHe \vflHeft )"IeHBissi8f1 af I'he A,SH!iftislP8tM at !he 'Ff1Hl9)"laFtttBBft 8eellHI>} A.emimsEr!tEtoo "",lIIe !>".,..,IEI" Bf 'FHms)"lBRBHOO. Uoaillharizes reIeP s e ffift) l'est:HI jft ei ffl remtll) tJf "llier a el:i,,". ¥lor U 8. 1:'" E>HJtHeftt fI~tcifl9, fl\l8lie disei6!1l1ftl js !;6"'el'l\ed b, S U.S,C. SS2 tift€! 49 CIZR Jlart9 15 ond IS2e,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee List~ in Securiug Commercial Aviation

Page 5

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

processes."8 In fulfilling this mandate, the Department of Justice established the TSC. Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, and further clarified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-11, the TSDB is to contain information about "individuals known or reasonably suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism."9 Within the watch-listing community, such individuals are referred to as "known or reasonably suspected terrorists."

Sources for the Terrorist Screenina Database

The TSDB is populated with biographic and biometric identity information on individuals reasonably suspected of engaging in either international or domestic terrorism. All information contained within the TSDB is sensitive but unclassified, so the broadest range of federal, state, local, and international terrorist screening partners can benefit from using various watch lists derived from the TSDB and exported by the TSC. The term export describes the transfer of record information from one database to another. Although the TSDB serves as the central clearinghouse for all terrorist screening information, all information in the TSDB is derived from two sources, which contain supporting information on each individual who is known or reasonably suspected to be connected to terrorism.

The primary source for all information relating to international terrorist identities in the TSDB is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). The NCTC, established by Executive Order 13354 and codified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, "serve[s] as the primary organisation in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively

8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, "Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism" (September 16, 2003).

9 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-11, "Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures" (August 27, 2004).

3i1,111a14144Cv±-12his-reeard-eenntin-, Sourinv- Seethity-inf.hmati,,. thet-is eo..trolicd undlr 19-C7Fititorts-1-5-and-1-520- .


Page 6

ACLURM008096

.5EPISlTIVE SECunlTY IPlFQRMATlON

processes. ,,8 In fu1filling this mandate, the Department of Justice established the TSC. Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive--6, and further clarified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-II, the TSDB is to contain information about "individuals known or reasonably suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.,,9 Within the watch-listing community, such individuals are referred to as ''known or reasonably suspected terrorists."

Sources for the Terrorist Screening Database

The TSDB is populated with hiographic and biometric identity information on individuals reasonably suspected of engaging in either international or domestic terrorism. All information contained within the TSDB is sensitive but uncbssified, so the broadest range of federal, state, local, and international terrorist screening partners can benefit from using various watch lists derived from the TSDB and exported by the TSC. The term export describes the transfer of record information from one database to another. Although the TSDB Serves as the central clearinghouse for all terrorist screening information, all infonnation in the TSDB is derived from two sources, which contain supporting information on each individual who is known or reasonably suspected to be connected to terrorism.

The primary source for all information relating to international terrorist identities in the TSDB is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). The NCTC, established by Executive Order 13354 and codified in the Intelligence Refonn and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, "serve[s] as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively

8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, "Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism" (September 16,2003). 9 Homeland Security PreSidential Directive-11, "Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures" (August 27,2004).

SENSITJ\!E s:ECURlTY PIF'9Q]I,MTION

W}'~H>lH'tG. 'fflis fl!eeffl e8fthtifls Sett(I.It." Se~ lftfOHllllBOfl i'luttia elmlfell:ealtfttiiJr 19 CFRPHI'I:3 IS fl1IfI1S29. ~18 plll'i af lftis 1'ee6F!l ma) "" m!ltJit.." d. t6 ref.allS "i tho'tol !I • 'need. III lMe,," as 8eHfted: ifl 49 CFR plHts IS IIftd 1529, elteepl wiift lite wl-I E!ett rel'Hli "'8ft IIf lite l.8ffii n:i simitit' !If Ifle 'Fnlll~BflB !dell See ttri t, IdinrHtis IflI Haf! af Nte See"" l'ftf) afTF!lHspaFllHien. UftHlllftllfW:ee Tele"s" m", fetruolt iB: eio il peDal f') BT ether ttetief!. FOf U. S. ga, _ent Itgeneies, pft~l:ie d.isel8stife is g8'1eRle6 by S U.S.G. SS21H1d. 49 CIlR .I'm IS IItld IS1il.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee List. in Securing Commer-cial Aviation

Page 6

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism."1° TIDE, a classified system, contains both the identifying and substantive derogatory information on known or reasonably suspected international terrorists. This information is provided to the NCTC through nominations of individuals made by federal agencies, often with the explicit intent for the record to then be exported to the TSDB for watch-listing. Additionally, TIDE contains

records for spouses and children of known or reasonably suspecte terrorists, as well as other individuals who have a close relationship with those terrorists. To populate the TSDB, the NCTC exports biographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE records to the TSC on a daily basis. Of the non-terrorist associates contained in TIDE, only data on spouses and children who are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents are exported to the TSDB, in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act of _1952, which deems spouses and children meeting certain criteria excludable from admission into the United States."

The remaining information in the TSDB pertains solely to domestic terrorism information. This information is provided to the TSC directly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI's Automated Case Support system contains additional supporting information on domestic terrorists, beyond any biometric and biographic identifiers, which are exported to the TSDB.

Minimum Database Inclusion Criteria

Before a record can be exported to the TSDB, it must meet certain minimum biographic and substantive derogatory criteria requirements. The current criteria requirements are derived from the broad Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-11 standard, which stipulates that only known or reasonably suspected terrorists may be included in the TSDB.

Current TSC guidance on nominating individuals to the TSDB further defines the reasonable suspicion standard, by stating that

I° Public Law 108-458 (December 17, 2004).

11 Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as amended; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(1X).

I. .11 Ir l• I. nt

public diacloaure 13 governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CPR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 7

ACLURM008097

b7E per FBI b3,7E per TSA

BEN!'lITIV£ SBCURI'1'¥ Do{FOIl""~ATI(»oI

to domestic terrorists and domestic countertenorism.,,10 TIDE, a classified system, contains both the identifYing and substantive derogatory information on known or reasonably suspected international terrorists. This information is provided to the NCTC through nominations of individuals made by federal agencies, often with the explicit intent for the record to then be exported to the TSDB for watch-listing. Additionally, TIDE contains_ _ records for spouses and children of known or reasonably

_ ~terrorists, as well as other individuals who have a close relationship with those terrorists. To populate the TSDB, the NCTC exports biographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE records to the TSC on a daily basis. Of the non-terrorist associates contained in TIDE, only data on spouses and children who are not u.s. citizens or lawful pennanent residents are exported to the TSDB, in accordance with· the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which deems spouses and children meeting certain criteria excludable from admission into the United States.11

The remaining infonnation in the TSDB pertains solely to domestic terrorism information. This information is provided to the TSC directly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI's Automated Case Support system contains additional supporting information on domestic terrorists, beyond any biometric and biographic identifiers, which are exported to the TSDB.

Minimum Database Inclusion Criteria

Before a record can be exported to the TSDB, it must meet certain minimum biographic and substantive derogatory criteria requirements. The current criteria requirements are derived from the broad Homeland Security Presidential Directive--6 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-II standard, which stipulates that only known or reasonably suspected terrorists may be included in the TSDB.

Current TSC guidance on nominating individuals to the TSDB further defines the reasonable suspicion standard, by stating that

JO Public Law 108-458 (December 17,2004).

11 Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as !I1l1ended; 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 82(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX).

BEN~ITnrE ~ECURITY HIFORMIiHON

WAlGml'G: Thineeaffi eaftltlift:l SeBsia.ve Seetffit)' ffir-tiaft thalia eBft!f6HeE! untIef 49 GFR l'W ] 5 anE! 1520. NB f'aRafthis ree6fd HIllY be disel.ssetlte f'efS8ftS ·,yj!h6llIa "ReeE! te !mew" as tlefuted JfI 49 CFRpam IS MitlIS2fJ, e~ept wi:fu !he Iffltteit permissiem: 6f the ,Ylflffiislmter 6f the TrMti!pBrillij_ SeeM!) AflmiffislfflJ;tan ay fue Seetel'fty)' Bf l'mnspaootien. UHli\:ttlllffi~etl rel.ellse HlftY reMiit ift e¥jil PeHll-lty af Bthef aeliaft. Faf U.S. gtt'<'etlIIfteIlt agencies, . ptlBHe 8tl!eiaslH'e is ga.eftlell ~ 5 U.S.C. SS2 ltIltI 49 CRlflW'l:s IS !1M 1S29.

Role of the No Fly lind Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page?

The minimum biographic identifier requirements necessary for a record to export to the TSDB were revised by the TSC's Polic Board Working Grout) in June 2008.

In contrast, ormation originating from an unre table source might cause a trained reviewer to discount the information as too tenuous.


b3,7E per TSA

the

Terrorist Screening Database Composition

As of May 2008, just prior to implementing the revised minimum biographic inclusion criteria, the TSDB included approximately 1,005,000 records. Each alias, including reversed names, nicknames, modified birth dates, or other variations of a single identity or individual, has a separate TSDB record. As a result, TSC

(1= officials are not able to pinpoint the precise number of unique persons in the TSDB, but estimate there are approximately

b3 per ODNI

L

b5 (DP)

per ODNI


b7E per CBP b3 per ODNI

public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR ports 15 and 1520.


Page 8

ACLURM008098

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

r b3 per ODNI

L

r b5 (DP)

per ODNI

L .

b7E per CBP b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

SENS1HV£ ggCt-Jn(TY IMFGRM,',:T:ION

Terrorist Screening Database Composition

As of May 2008, just prior to implementing the revised minimum biographic inclusion Criteria, the TSDB included approximately 1,005,000 records. Each alias, including reversed names, nicknames, modified birth dates, or other variations of a single identity or individual, has a separate TSDB record. As a result, TSC officials are riot able to pinpoint the precise number ofuni,=-persons in the TSDB, but estimate there are approximate1y_

SEJllSlm'E SECURITY HIFORM:tiHON

'NAIDHUG. This :ree6ff1 e6BJtliBS SeasitPfe Seettrily Iftfal'lllftli6n iIlll:l is eefttfeHed tinder 49 CFRpllPlS IS &ftd 1§29. ~Ie pffi Bf thi5 feeM m&y ee tliselesed Ie pel'l!6!!:l fl'lIIiBUt a "Heed Ie 1mB' ..... ' II' def_1I. Hi 49 Gf'R ,,!tItS I § ltfi8 1329, ~[e ef! I "i Ih!fie ,I'fi lIetl pemti ssifflt 6f the AclmHHslflttaf af the TflHI9PertllEi6ft Seetffity AElmifiislfa tieB 8f lite S eefeEtKy efTfflH9Pof'llitiffll l1!iaHth6ri?:ed feleltse ftlftY fe:llll:t ill civil peasll} Ell' alfiet' aeftOO:: Fer U.s. ga~emmeHt er;elleies, ptiblie mseiMtll'e is ge ,emef'l B:. 5 U.S.c. 552 lIBel 49 CFR fJluis IS and lS29.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commenial AViation

PageD

b3 7E per TSA distinct identities. Of the distinct identities, are citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.

No Fly and Selectee Lists

The No Fly and Selectee lists, two TSDB derivative watch lists, are unique among all watch lists derived from the TSDB. They are the only derivative watch lists that have their own minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements. These requirements are considerably more stringent than the TSDB' s known or reasonably suspected standard. Additionally, the No Fly and Selectee lists have the narrowest minimum biographic inclusion criteria of all TSDB watch lists.

Minimum Inclusion Criteria

The No Fly and Selectee inclusion criteria were initially established in October 2004 by the Homeland Security Council. This council is a cabinet-level body that coordinates homeland security—related activities and promotes effective homeland security policy development and implementation. The No Fly and Selectee Lists Implementation Guidance accompanying the inclusion criteria was released in January 2005. When establishing the initial criteria, responsibility for maintenance and export of the lists was transferred to the TSC. Prior to this time, TSA maintained the No Fly and Selectee lists, The lists were created in September 2001, before TSA was established, when the Federal Aviation Administration received 125 names from the FBI for inclusion on a No Fly list.

No Fly List Criteria

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

63,7E per TSA

The TSC updated and supplemented the implementation idance in Jul 2006. Recentl the Homeland Security Council

to allow for me usion of more individuals on the No Fly list. The TSC's Policy Board Working Group followed suit with new implementation &dance, all of which went into effect in June 2008. Appendix D provides more detail on the No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance.


Page 9

ACLURM008099

SENSlTIV:E SECURITY -g.IFOR!~YJION

b3 J 7E per TSA distinct identities. Of the_ distinct identities,. are citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.

No Fly and Selectee Lists

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

The No Fly and Selectee lists; two TSDB derivative watch lists, are unique among all watch lists derived from the TSDB. They are the only derivative watch lists that have their own minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements. These requirements are considerably more stringent than the TSDB 's known or reasonably suspected standard. Additionally, the No Fly and Selectee lists have the narrowest minimum biographic Inclusion criteria of all TSDB watch lists.

Minimum Inclusion Criteria

The No Fly and Selectee Inclusion criteria were initially established in October 2004 by the Homeland Security Council. This council is a cabinet-level body that coordlnates homeland security-related activities and promotes effective homeland securi ty policy development and implementation. The No Fly and Selectee Lists Implementation Guidance accompanying the inclusion criteria was released in January 2005. When establishing the initial criteria, responsibility for maintenance and export of the lists was transferred to the TSC. Prior to this time, TSA maintained the No Fly and Selectee lists. The lists were created in September 2001, before TSA was established, when the Federal Aviation Administration received 125 names from the FBI for inclusion on a No Fly list.

No Fly List Criteria

The TSC updated and supplemented the imPlementation.· dance in ecuri~ Council

to allow for more on st. The TSC's Policy

Board Working Group followed suit with new implementation gUidance, all of which went into effect in June 2008. Appendix D provides more detail on the No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance.

SENSITIVE SECURITY JNFORI\iATIOI'l

Wl\IG!INC: Tltiue e afEi eBfttaift9 SeMfli'Ye Seeurily Infarmn nOlI tiltH III etlnffflHed l;jH!I er 4 9 CFR plU'b! J 5 DHd 1529. No part of this reeMd lBft'}' Be disel.B<loEl Ie p8flJOfl!j ll'ilhllll! 8: "Heed ffi lffiw •• " as defffleEl in 49 en plftt3 13 IlHd 15211, ffifeep! "lilt the "filteR pennissiem: 6f!he AlimitHslHf6r of lite 'fffifflpeftfttieft See\!f'ily A6reiaislHlfeft er lite SeetelHf)' ef'FHtHspMtftneft. lffilll:illteri~ed rel.elt8e Hlft) rellllit it! eivti peft9Hy or oilier aeliall. Far U.S. go. emmen! agencies, p~l:ie disel.l'IMlfe is ge .ef'ftei!! e, 5 U.RC. ';52 lIBEl 49 cn parts 15 IlJtti IS211,

Role of the No Fly Qnd Selectee Lish in Securing CommerciQI Aviation

Page 9

•

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA •

Selectee List Criteria

The derogatory information criteria for including an individual on the Selectee list require that an individual who is ineligible for inclusion on the No Fly list meet the Selectee list criteria. Specifically, the Selectee list show inc ude any person, regardless of citizenship, who is:

•

public discloouro u governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 19 CPR porta 15 and 1520.


Page 10

ACLURM008100

b7E per FBI b3 per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

8ENoSnH'E 8ECUlUTV INFORM ATION

•

•

•

•

Selectee List Criteria

The derogatory information criteria for including an individual on the Selectee list require that an individlUll who is ineligible for inclusion on the No Fly list meet_ the Selectee list criteria. Specifically, the Selectee list sho~ude any person, regardless of citizenship, who is:

•

•

§ENSITI"E SECURITY ~F{)Rl\r.\TIO\lol

WARNING: This reeeffi eenl'ftifts SSBsia"s Seellt91y klfemlEllietllflal is eeBlfslles 1l00eF 49 CPRplH'."'3 1 S aBo:! 1529. I'Jo pal'! of this reeMd IBftY ae tliseltlsed 16 jl8P.lOHS withelil II "ReetlI6IEBsw" as o:Ie1l00ti ill 19 CHt PIIJ'I9 15 PH6 1529, e3<tlopl wilh the wri!letl peflftissiet\ tlf!he Aammilllroffif afdis TftlMjll'lftoli8fl Seellrily A.lmiftistralietl er ifle Seerelary of TrollspORftlieft. Uttali!heril!!otl release ££lIlY £estill in aPril petlal", ef sifter aelien. Fer Y.!;\. gl'l'/el'RlBent ageneies, public tlisclesllfe is g,l'Iemetl by S U.S.c. 552111\8 q9 GFRjlafis U enElIj29.

Role ofthe No Fly lind Selectee Lillts in Seeming Commefcial Av1atioD

Page 10

b3 per ODNI

hi applying more narrow requirements than the TSDB' s minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements, the No Fly and Selectee lists are intended to prevent specific categories of terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft or subject these terrorists to secondary screening prior to boarding, and are not for use as law enforcement or intelligence-gathering tools. Past and present implementation 'dance em hasizes that the criteria for the No Fly list require a and that the Selectee list is not a default for those who o not qualify for inclusion on the No Fly list,


The current minimum biographic inclusion criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were not chanted durin the June 2008 oh revisions, require a

for a TSDB record to ex s sort to er st.

Given the restrictive s erogatory and biographic criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists, these lists combined comprise the smallest exported subset of the TSDB. As of May 2008, the No Fly list contained approximately records, and the Selectee list contained approximate) records, collectively comprising of the TSDB 's records. Additionally, the combined number o No Fly and Selectee records represents approximately distinct identities, of which are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.

b3, 7E

per ODNI

L

Process for Inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee Lists

Redundancies in the process through which individuals are added to the No Fly or Selectee list ensure that the proper individuals are watch-listed. For international terrorists, this process starts with a federal agency, usually a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, nominating an individual for inclusion in TIDE. The


Page 11

ACLURM008101

b7E per FB! b3,7E per TSA

b3 per ODNI'

. I b3,7E

per ODNI

L

SEiNSlTlVE S8CuaIT¥ INF'ORM,t,:TIml

In applying more narrow requirements than the TSDB's minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements, the No Fly and Selectee lists are intended to prevent specific categories of terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft or subject these terrorists to secondary screening prior to boarding, and are not for use as law enforcement or intelligence-gathering tools. Past and present imPlementation~' dance em hasizes that the criteria for the No Fly list require a and that the Selectee list is not a default for those who 0 not qualify for inclusion on the No Fly li.st.

The current minimum biographic inclusion criteria for the No Fly and Selectee lists, which were not . the June

LLL" .... .,.CV .. on the No Fly and Selectee lists, these lists combined comprise the smallest exported subset of the TSDB. 2008, the No Fly list contained

records, and the Selectee list contained collectively comprising. of

the TSDB's ....... ,," ...... «cu ,the combinednurnb~No Fly and Selectee records represents approximately. distinct identities, of which_are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.

Process for Inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee Lists

Redundancies in the process through which individuals are added to the No Fly or Selectee list ensure that the proper individuals are watch-listed. For international terrorists, this process starts with a federal agency, usually a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, nominating an individual for inclusion in TIDE. The

SENSITIVE SECURITY lNFOHJ\fATIO:I'(

Ji'/AIH'HNG. Thi~ l'el'leM: l'l6HhlHtS Settlffli>.'Il Seellrily InfeffiitlHea IMt is eentftlHed lHHIer 19 CFR parts IS 600 1 S29. 11ft plH'laHhis xeeftM BUIY he diselesed te JlefSens witlietlt 6 "Reed to !mew" 6~ fie&tefi ill ~9 CFR pllri~ IS IHlfil!H9, eneept "itlllhe .Il'itteft peffElissi611 ef the AdJfliBi~mtler ef the 1fiHt8Pftftttti611 8eetlHly Atbninf9lffitien &f tile Se_Kay ef ff6l1spcirlttliftft. Un8111h~ed 1'cleH~e ~ le~lIlt iH ei\ II penalty &f etfter lIeHen. Fer U.S. government o!1;encies, 1'1lblie diseiftslll'eis gtI.ef'ftedh, S V.KG. 5§21Jf1d 49CFRlIlIfls IS IIftd 1529. '

Role of the No Fly and Selectee List5 in Securipg Commercial Aviation

Page 11

SENSITIVE SECURITY LNFORMATION

177E per ODNI

b3 , 7E per TSA

NCTC's Terrorist Identities Group reviews nominations for the reliability of derogatory information and the sufficiency of biographic identifying information.

Nominating agencies can recommend an individual for inclusion on specific TSDB derivative watch lists, such as the No Fly and Selectee lists. Additionally, although the NCTC is not a nominator, its Terrorist Identities Group analysts, after reviewing all source intelligence information, may identify eligible individuals for watch-listing and contact the originator of the intelligence to request that the individual be nominated for inclusion in TIDE with specific watch list recommendations. Domestic terrorists are nominated to the TSDB via the FBI's Terrorist Review and Examination Unit, by FBI case agents, and by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division; also, each of these can make specific watch list recommendations.

the NCTC.transmits to the TSC an export of additions and modifications of biographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE, resulting in additions, modifications, and deletions to the TSDB. These transmissions are collectively referred to as nominations. Analysts in the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of each nomination for inclusion eligibility in the TSDB and for appropriateness of export to the various watch lists. As part of this review, TSC analysts review specific recommendations for initial No Fly or Selectee watch-listing, as well as follow-up recommendations for changes to an individual's No Fly or Selectee status. This review ensures that recommendations are consistent with the biographic and derogatory inclusion criteria. Appendix E provides a graphic representation of the No Fly and Selectee list nomination process.

When TSC analysts recommend a change to an individual's No Fly or Selectee status, the nomination is forwarded to. TSA subject matter experts (SME), who are detailed to the TSC from TSA's Office of Intelligence and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The SMEs review the previous analyst's notes and all accessible derogatory information associated with the nomination. When SMEs determine that a change to the No Fly or Selectee status is warranted, TSA coordinates the change with the FBI's Terrorist

Role of the No lily and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 12

ACLURM008102

b7E per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

SEPISHp,t,E SECUR±fY ~FOR:l\i"'TION

NCTC's Terrorist Identities Group reviews nominations for the reliability of derogatory information and the sufficiency of biographic identifying information.

Nominating agencies can recommend an individual for inclusion on specific TSDB derivative watch lists, such as the No Fly and Selectee lists. Additionally, although the NCTC is not a nominator, its Terrorist Identities Group analysts, after reviewing all source intelligence information, may identify eligible individuals for watch-listing and contact the originator of the intelligence to request that the individual be nominated for inclusion in TIDE-with specific watch list recommendations. Domestic terrorists are nominated to the TSDB via the FBI's Terrorist Review and Examination Unit, by FBI case agent", and by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division; also, each of these can make specific watch list recommendations.

_ the NCTCtransmits to the TSC an export of additions and modifications ofbiographic and biometric identifiers from TIDE, resulting in additions, modifications, and deletions to the TSDB. These transmissions are collectively referred to as nominations. Analysts in the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit at the TSC perform a comprehensive review of each nomination for inclusion eligibility in the TSDB and for appropriateness of export to the various watch lists. As part of this review, TSC analysts review specific recommendations for initial No Fly or Selectee watchlisting, as well as follow-up recommendations for changes to an individual's No Fly or Selectee status. This review ensures that recommendations are consistent with the biographic and derogatory inclusion criteria Appendix E provides a graphic representation of the No Fly and Selectee list nomination process.

When TSC analysts recommend a change to an individual's No Fly or Selectee status, the nomination is forwarded tei TSA subject matter experts (SMB), who are detailed to the TSC from TSA's Office of Intelligence and Federal Air Marshal Service (F AMS). The SMEs review the previous analyst's notes and all accessible derogatory information associated with the nomination. When SMEs determine that a change to the No Fly or Selectee status is warranted, TSA coordinates the change with the FBI's Terrorist

SENSITJVE !iffiCUDl1'¥ II'lromMTION

WAilllHKl. 'Fflis 'ftle6ffl ,,6ftt_ SBlISia,e See\tl'it, Ittft:IJ'HIII!ttJn tlHtt is "mtMtlle~ IiAfief 49 GFR"lIfflI15 Ilflti1528. lIe tlllft €If !fits :fee6flfma, lI6 eigelos"tile ""..""ft. ,tilftMll flo "n""~ t6 Itr.e 0\" tiS lIeBftBe in 19 C¥R pllfl. IS 11M I 5211, e!!BE!f'1 wdlt the wri!!eB tlel"lfti99Hl8 €If !he AfllBiI'lislftl!6f of tfte 'ffitft!lf!sfllllieft Seemit, Ao:!miffl.ffitI;eft M the See.etaf) 6f'H!m!lfl6flfttimt. Uiit!tiI:heF.li!"~ Felellse mil) result iI'l <:Ii ,iI penoll) 81' sifter ".,liefl. Fllf U.S. tl;IMlmmeftt Iltlffieies, f!ttBlie 819"18_,, is gev"effiefl By g y.S.C. 552 800 49 CRll"1Ifl9 15 Iffi~ 15211.

Role oftbe No Fly and Selectee Lists In Securing Commer-cilll Aviation

Page 12

Review and Examination Unit and case agents for FBI investigative subjects, or with the NCTC for nominations from other federal agencies.

Domestic terrorism nominations go through a similar process. TSC domestic terrorism SMEs also review nominations for TSDB inclusion eligibility and for appropriateness to export to various watch lists, including the No Fly and Selectee lists. The SMEs coordinate with the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit to resolve any issues with a nomination or its watch-listing recommendation.

TSC quality assurance measures ensure that the correct individuals are on the appropriate watch lists. In addition to the process of determining the No Fly- and Selectee status of original and follow-up nominations, the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit conducts periodic reviews of the No Fly and Selectee lists, known as Quality Assurance Special Projects. In 2006, the TSC initiated a comprehensive review of the No Fly list. That review resulted in some individuals being downgraded to the Selectee list while others were removed from both lists because then did not have the

were removed from the No Fly list because they were neither a threat to the United States nor to commercial aviation. The TSC subsequently conducted a review of the Selectee list with the intent of removin individuals who no longer had

Periodic list review ensures that individuals on the No Fly or Selectee lists meet s ecific nomination and inclusion criteria thus

b3,7E

per ODNI


b3 per ODNI

Th.nak,nrinti,Al. U...nuthoriya.I.N.lca„e ...ay AMR in ciNii-pe..nity or othcr action. For U.S. government

Role of the No Ely and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 13

ACLURM008103


b3 per ODNI

L

r b3,7E

per ODNI

SENSHI'I '6 SEGIJRlTY fNFGal't4ATION

Review and Examination Unit and case agents for FBI investigative subjects, or with the NCTC for nominations from other federal agencies.

Domestic terrorism nominations go through a similar process. TSC domestic terrorism S:MEs also review nominations for TSDB inclusion eligibility and for appropriateness to export to various watch lists, including the No Fly and Selectee lists. The S:MEs coordinate with the Terrorist Review and Examination Unit to resolve any issues with a nomination or its watch-listing recommendation.

TSC quality assurance measures ensure that the correct individuals are on the appropriate watch lists. In addition to the process of detennining the No Fly- and Selectee status of originll and followup nominations, the Nominations and Data Integrity Unit conducts periodic reviews of the No Fly and Selectee lists, known as Quality Assurance Special Proj ects. In 2006, the TSC initiated a comprehensive review of the No Fly list. That review resulted in some individuals being downgraded to the Selectee list while others were removed from both lists because did not have the

were TPT .. ",,,,,,r! -nPl't-h,·,. a threat to the United States nor to

commercial aviation. The TSC subsequently conducted a review of the Selectee list with the intent of individuals who no longer had

Periodic list review ensures that individuals on the No Fly or Qn'~(,1't1('~ nomination and inclusion thus

SENSITJVE SECURITY HWOHMIiTION

V~lG: 1'1tis J'eeoffl e6l!taffis Seftsi1:i.e Seetlfi~ lffiiHtHoHefi that is eOH~elledo ttnder 49 CFR plfri:! IS _do IS29. }la pMt €If IIHs peeoffl HIll) he diseiesee ffil'eJ'so)'l;! ,,.; Il: U"'I til' 'tteedo te J..m. II " lIS eefltted in 49 CPfl fl8rts ] S fmfi 1 S21l , elteept"",1:h Eke • ..,.;th""l'e ...... s,.._"ftlte ArI ........ l:rtt1:Hf ,,(!:he TffiBspflflfltiOft Seel:lA~ Aliffiitti.1f81;6ft 6f!he Seefelflf) !If TftmropoftDti ..... Unlttilh.,.-i"erl feleR,e fflft) feSltlt -iH ei til pe8ltlt) Elf ether aeBeft. FHf U.S. go, emHleftt flgetteies, pt! II He B i.effi.1If6 i. !l8, eHied II, S U, S. C. 3S2 _IJ 49 CFR flfll'ls 1 S Me 1 S21l.

Role oftbe No Fly and Selectee List.. in Secnring Commerclal Aviation

Pllge 13

Other Watch Lists Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database

In addition to the No Fly and Selectee lists, the TSDB exports daily to three other federal watch lists that are also used to conduct terrorism screening. Although none of these databases has its own minimum substantive derogatory criteria beyond the known or reasonably suspected standard, each has minimum biographic criteria requirements and some have additional restrictions.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's TECS Database

TECS serves as DHS' primary lookout system and receives. exports of TSDB records from the TSC. TECS receives subject records from more than 20 federal agencies, includes a wide spectrum of data, and provides alerts for a variety of law enforcement needs. CBP, the principal owner and primary user of TECS, employs the system to screen individuals at land, sea, and air ports of entry, as well as other locations worldwide where CBP may have a presence. A number of other federal law enforcement agencies within and outside of DHS also use TECS as a screening and case management system.

Of the federal watch lists that accept records from the TSDB, TECS has the most expansive minimum biographic inclusion

from the TSDB. Similar to ort to TECS it must on1.3,

As of May 2008, TECS contain approximate y TSDB records comprising• of all records in the TSDB. The records re resent approximately distinct identities, of which

are U.S. citizens or a l permanent residents.

Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System

The Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name-checking system used to screen visa applications for travel to the United States. A visa allows a foreign national to travel to a U.S. port of entry to request admittance into the country. Administered by the Visa Office within the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, CLASS is used

b7E per CBP/FBI/ODNI b3,7E per TSA

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lids in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 14

ACLURM008104

SENSITJV£ SEClJR-lTY fNFORI\4ATKJ~

Other Watch Lists-Derived From the Terrorist Screening Database

In addition to the No Fly and Selecte~ lists, the TSDB exports daily to three other federal watch lists that are also used to conduct terrorism screening. Although none of these databases has its own minimum substantive derogatory criteria beyond the known or reasonably suspected standard, each has minimum biographic criteria requirements and some have additional restrictions.

b7E per CBP/FBI/ODNI b3,7E per TSA

u.s. Customs and Border Protection's TEeS Database

TECS serves as DRS' primary lookout system and receives II exports of TSDB records from the TSC. TECS receives subject records from more than 20 federal agencies, includes a wide spectrum of data, and provides alerts for a variety of law enforcement needs_ CBP, the principal owner and primary user of TEeS, employs the system to screen individuals at land, sea, and air ports of entry, as well as other locations worldwide where CBP may have a presence. A number of other federal law enforcement agencies within and outside ofDHS also use TECS as a screening and case management system.

Dfthe federal watch lists that accept records from the TSDB, TEes has the most minimum biographic inclusion

from the TSDB. Simi1arto onl~

As of May 2008, records

ofal1 records in . Thelilliilill records

•

e resent approximately_ distinct identitie~ch are u.s. citizens ~l permanent residents.

Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System

The Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name-checking system used to screen visa applications for travel to the United States. A visa allows a foreign national to travel to a U.S. port- of entry to request admittance into the country. Administered by the Visa Office within the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, CLASS is used

SENBITIV:E SECURITY IPfFORMATION

WARNING: This Feeeftl eeflJmflS Seasili'ie Seeuri!)'l:ftfermaIi6llIliatis eooErelle6t111cler ~9 CFRI'6m IS lind 1529. }fe plll't eHlHs reeerdJfl6) be disclosed foPefSOOS l'>illt6tlt 6 "Heed te lfliol'>'·IlS deflfte6 ill ~9 eFRplH'ts JS HHd 1529, eneepl "illt the wrifteH:perH'li.SSi{l8 {lfthe AdmHHslftter eethe 1'rIHt!lp6Hllli811 Seelil"ity AdlfliBislffllieft 6f tile SeeFetiH'y of TfllJIlIpllItatian. UlittttIJiemed fflleese HlftY fllrmlt in civil "elltlily er ether at BOn. Fer U. S. govemmen I IIgeneies. ptlbl-ie dise-l6MH'e is ge.emed e, S U.s.€. 5S2 IIftt149 em pMts 15 and 1529.


Pllge 14

b3.7E per TSA L

b7E per, FBI/ODNI

r b7E per CBP

L

by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants against a number of government watch lists, including an exported subset of the TSDB. Once a CLASS name search identifies an individual, and that identity is verified, Department of State consular officers make a determination of visa eligibility according to federal law.

Similar to TECS, CLASS has very expansive minimum biographic inclusion criteria, and accents nearly all records from the TSDB.

However, because CLASS is used for visa applicant screening, TSDB records for U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents do not export to CLASS. Additionally, individuals

s of May 2008, CLASS contained approximately TSDB records, comprising. of all TSDB records. The records represent approximately distinct identities. The TSDB also exports records, base on ifferent criteria, to another version of CLASS used to screen passport applicants and includes data on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, a system that is not addressed in our report, because it does not substantively contribute to aviation security.

Federal Bureau of Investigation's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

The FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is a subset of the National Crime Information Center database used for screening by federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and other criminal justice agencies. VGTOF contains information on known or reasonably suspected terrorists exported from the TSDB, as well as information on gang groups and members from other sources. Each VGTOF terror record has a handling code assigned by the TSDB. For some individuals, the code notifies law enforcement ncrsonnel that a valid arrest warrant or detainer ma exist.


Page 15

ACLURM008105

b7E per, FBI/ODNI

1-b3 f 7E per TSA

L

r b7E per CBP

L

SE'P1SITPlE SECORH¥ I:NFOR:P.MTlON

by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants against a number of government watch lists, including an exported subset of the TSDB. Once a CLASS name search identifies an individual, and that identity is verified, Department of State consular officers make a determination of visa eligibility according to federal law .

Similar to TECS, CLASS has very expansive minimum biographic inclusion and all the

Visa screerung, _ TSDB recordS: for U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents do

ortto .

records, comprising II of all TSDB records, records represent approximately_ distinct The TSDB also exports records, base~erent criteria, to another version of CLASS used to screen passport applicants and includes data on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, a system that is not addressed in our report, because it does not substantively contribute to aviation security.

Federal Bureau of Investigation's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

The FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is a subset of the National Crime Infonnation Center database used for screening by federal, state, and 10cal1aw enforcement officers and other criminal justice agencies. VGTOF contains infonnation on known or reasonably suspected terrorists exported from the TSDB, -as well as information on gang groups and members from other sources, Each VGTOF terror record has a handling code assigned by the TSDB. For some individuals, the code notifies law enforcement that a warrant or detainer

'N-A:R}HNG: T1Hs reeOftl €6ftwiU:l Sell~ilhe Seetll'ii::; Infaffiltl~8slhatis eoolietleBlHlfter 19 ("';¥R"ltf'l:lll§ Itftfl H2Q, -N6 1'6" 6f th13 reeerd me, he diseles ed te II efS eBS 'o';ii'lleti t a "seed te b6~" !IS aeflRed ift 49 CFR fllIfl!j 13 !Ifill 1529. ~teept "il:h the wHiteR "eHHissisfl ef!he ,\:ftmiB:iSifllle!' ef!;he 1'r!tn~Elftit~eft SeelHil::;' frliEB:ia.islfftlies 61' !he SeerelMy sf Tfftfl>'ltlsftfttian. UIltlIl therizcd releasc may YC3Iti1 :in eh II "eHltII:!' af ather aclies, Fer U S, ga, el'lHHellt IIgetleies, jttIlMie 6tseiestlftl is ~emed h) S U,S,C, SS211M119 CFRIlltfts is end 1529,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Avtolton

Pagc 15

b7E per CBP

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

The minimum biographic inclusion criteria for VGTOF are the most restrictive of all federal watch lists, apart from the No Fly and Selectee lists. For a record to export to VGTOF, it must contain a first name, a last name, and a circa year of birth

As of May 2008, VGTOF contame approximate y TSDB records, comprising- of all records in the TSDB. T e records re resent approximately distinct i entities, of which are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. Most terrorism-re ated identities in VGTOF do not have handling codes that indicate a silent hit or a need for arrest or detention.

Additional Non-Federal Watch List Terrorist Screening Database Exports

b7E per ODNI

b3 per 7D per

hi addition to the No Fly and Selectee lists, TECS, CLASS, and VGTOF, the TSDB exports to several non-federal government watch lists on a regular basis. In accordance with Information

ODNI Sharia of Understanding with in 1997, and

FBI with in 2000, the United States shares terrorist watch list information with those governments on a reciprocal basis, excluding information on U.S citizens or lawful permanent residents. As directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, the TSC, at present, also shares a subset of the TSDB with 13 other foreign countries. Additionally, the entire TSDB is exported daily to the FBI's Automated Case Support system to alert FBI personnel who are using the system that an individual connected with an investigation is associated with terrorism.


Page 16

ACLURM008106

b7E per FBI

b7E per ODNI

!"iE/>.ISlTlVE 8£CURITV INFORIIIATJON

b7E per CBP

The minimum biograpbic inclusion criteria for VGTOF are the most restrictive of all federal watch lists, apart from the No Fly and Selectee lists. For a record to to VGTOF, it must contain a fIrst circa year of birth_

of May 2008, VGTOF records, comprising. records reilesent

distinct of which are U.S.

b3,7E per TSA

citizens or pennanent residents. Most terronsm-re ated identities in VGTOF do not have handling codes that indicate a silent bit or a need for arrest or detention.

b3 per 7D per

Additional Non-Federal Watch List Terrorist Screening Database Exports

In addition to the No Fly and Selectee lists, TECS, CLASS, and VGTOF, the TSDB exports to several non-federal government watch lists on a regular basis, In accordance with Information

ODNI Sha~oranda ofUriderstanding with_ in 1997, and FBI with_ in 2000, the United States shares terrorist watch list

informatJon with those governments on a reciprocal basis, excluding information on U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. As directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, the TSC, at present, also shares a subset of the TSDB with 13 other foreign countries. Additionally, the entire TSDB is exported daily to the FBI's Automated Case Support system to alert FBI personnel who are using the system that an individual connected with an investigation is associated with terrorism.

SEN8ITIYI!: 8ECliRlTV INFORMATION

'i'/A:.'U'mrc. This Feeaffl ea81!1i8s Se8silive Seeafi~f klteFfH£lhaJl that is eallffal1ed HildeF ~9 GFR Ilarts 15600 152{). J>iapEttt 6f1his !'eeafti HI~ 6e dis&l6sed ffi llefS8IIS "ilhallt 0 ''tieea (a kfl6W" liS tleliflefl in 49 CFRP0r13 15 08a1520, eneefjt v. itli the "Fi!taH peFHIissiaH a£ llIe Mmim31fular aHhe Tftn~flElliail SeeliFity AdmiHlSffoH6n or the Seeretllry af TftlftSllaFllltiaH. Uno tHfttlfized «lIeD 3e HID)' «l~1t in ei I iI Iletlttlty aF ather II e I,j tm. Far U. S. go ... efllflle81 ageneies, pHillie dlse\ali\lfe is go I emeE! Il) S U.S,C. !iS2 Ilf!d 49 CFR PllftS IS olul I S2Q.

Role or the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Secoring Commercial Aviation

Page 16

Individuals A?iMII. Terrorist Acts Are t e ocus o o v and Se ectee Lists

to Commit

Results of Review

No Fly and Selectee Lists Reduce Vulnerabilities to Commercial Aviation Security, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist

The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the TSDB, the federal government's consolidated watch list. The name inclusion criteria for these two lists are more narrowly focused and restrictive than the inclusion criteria for the entire TSDB. Specifically, the No Fly and Selectee lists focus on aviation security and concentrate on

ough the No Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present threats to aviation security.

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA Not all known or reasonably suspected terrorists are prohibited from boarding an aircraft, or are subject to additional security screening prior to boarding an aircraft. This is reflected in the number of records and identities in the TSDB that are not included on the No Fly and Selectee lists. As of May 2008, approximately records, or of the TSDB did not ex s ort to the No Fl or

b7E per Selectee list. ODNI

Figure 1 re own i e TSDB recor s an identities that export to the No Fly and Selectee lists.


public diacloaurc is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 17

b3 per ODNI

ACLURM008107

SENSITIVE SECYa:J:TY ~FQR.l\fATIO:N

Results of Review

No Fly and Selectee Lists Reduce Vulnerabilities to Commercial Aviation Security, but Additional Vulnerabilities May Exist

The No Fly and Selectee lists are subsets of the TSDB, the federal government's consolidated watch list. The name inclusion criteria for these two lists are more narrowly focused and restrictive than the inclusion criteria for the entire TSDB. Specifically, the No and Selectee lists

b3 per

ODNI

are success ill potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals not included on the lists may also present threats to aviation security.

b7E per FBI

b3, 7E per TSA

b7E per ODNI

L

Not all known or reasonably suspected terrorists are prohibited from boarding an aircraft, or are subj ect to additional security screening prior to boarding an aircraft. This is reflected in the number of records and identities in the TsnB that are not included on Fly and Selectee lists. As of May 2008, annroxima records, or of the TSDB did not Selectee

8EN5frrv£ 5ECURITY lNFOmMTION

WAERIDJC: This teeM eaBwfIS SeBsitive Seelffily ffifafftltlH6f1lhftt is e6ft!ftllletillfitlet' 49 CFRprtfts Hi lIfl!llS29. We pai'l af Iftis J66afEl may hB tlfseieses te flet'SetlS \,~Bllt Ii "f!eeEl te It8ew" liS flefifleEi if! 49 Cm. flllAS g: IlfttIlS2{J. e1ffiept "itft the .. l'il:len permissietl of !he AEiministffll6J of the Trettsp6flIiHoll Seeurity ,'\dminisiffiIi etl OJ the ~eerelafY sf 'ffttespeffiltian. Utilllltftemed relellse fIifI:l reMtlt in oi , 11 peBHlt) a!' a titer Ileliflft. For U. s. ~ , e_ t It geneies. ~l:ie tHSeiSSIlf6 is gS'IeHIoetilry S U.S.C. SS21if1t1 49 CFRprttts IS 8M lS28.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lillts ill Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 17

Figure 1: Breakdown of Records and Identities That Export to the No Fly and

Source: TSC

b7E per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

Known or reasonably suspected terrorists included in the TSDB are not included on the No Fly or Selectee lists if the TIDE information does not meet the minimum standards for sufficient derogatory information. of all TSDB records are also not eligible for inc usion on the No ly or Selectee lists because the records do not meet the biographic data requirement of a . Although a review of the

o y an Se ectee ists' minimum iographic inclusion, standard is outside our scope, the Secure Flight program plans to screen against passenger information that includes a full name, complete date of birth, and gender, to ensure accurate name matching to individuals listed on the No Fly and Selectee lists. According to Secure Flight program officials and members of the federal watch-listing community, this plan will reduce the high incidence of individuals mistaken for being on the No Fly or Selectee lists, which is a persistent roblem in the passenger prescreening process. Currently, are used to conduct passenger

watch list matching.

b7E per FBI

No Fly- and Selectee Lists Inclusion Criteria and Guidance in More Detail

The No Fly and Selectee minimum derogatory inclusion criteria and the TSC's No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance

Id ft • .1111 Id


Page 18

ACLURM008108

SHISITf"E SEClmITY INFORMATION

Figure 1: Breakdown of Records and Identities That Export to the No Fly and

b7E per ODNI

b3 , 7E per TSA

b7E per

Source: 1St;

Known or reasonably suspected terrorists included in the TSDB are not included on the No Fly or Selectee lists if the TIDE information does not meet the minimum standards for sufficient derogatory information. _ of all TSDB records are also not eligible for i~ly or Selectee lists because the do not meet the biographic data requirement of

Although a review of the mllllmum . inclusion-standard

is outside our scope, the Secure Flight program plans to screen FBI against passenger information that includes a full name, complete

date of birth, and gender, to ensure accurate name matching to individuals listed on the No Fly and Selectee lists. According to Secure Flight p.rogram officials and members of the federal watchlisting community, this plan will reduce the high incidence of individuals mistaken for being on the No Fly or Selectee lists, which is a passenger plescreenmg process. Currently, are used to conduct passengeI watch list matching.

No Fly and Selectee Lists Inclusion Criteria and Guidance in More Detail

The No Fly and Selectee minimum derogatory inclusion criteria and the TSC's No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance

BENSIID'E BEaJR-ITY JNFOII:MATI~f

~HNG _ TIHnee6ftl eClftIHiIIs Setlsilive Seeuril.y InJemlHlieB ElIot is eeftEfeHe6'11116er N CFR flPfis 15 ptul 1529. lIe pMt ahhis teeM ffiRY he !Ioiselasellols I'et"S8ftS wiEh_t lit "Beello tslme,," liS lloeliBeIlo ill f9 GFRfllIl'h 13 IItHft H28, e!le~1 willi t;he wf'itt:eft l'eftIl:issian efthe AamiHiSffitt6f ef the TffinspeHaliellt Seet!rity AtimifHsIfliRBft Sf the Seereillf)

. ('If 'ffmISflerilltliall. Thtlltlllflarizetl rcleo 9 e ffiHY reslilt io civil peftftl~ M ethef IIel iBft: Far U. 8. g6'.'emmeDt Ilgefteies, flHhlie tlisele9!1re is gSiel'l!efi b) 5U.S.C. 552 Hlld 49 CFRpllft3 15 Ilftd 1529.

Role of tbe No Fly and Selectee Lillts in Secnring Commercial Avjation

Page 18

" 2 .

reflect the principles of aviation-focused security. To keep the No Fly and Selectee lists relevant and manageable, the TSC requires that all the information available about an individual should he considered when making No Fly and Selectee watch-listing decisions. Some factors that merit consideration and might mitigate the decision to place an individual on the No Fly or Selectee list are:

•

•

•

Further, to identify potential threats posed by known or reasonably suspected terrorists who do not meet the No Fly or Selectee minimum derogatory inclusion, criteria, individuals are categorized by their relationship to terrorism or the types of terrorist activities they are known or reasonably suspected to be engaging in. The TSC's implementation guidance provides an explicit list of categories of individuals who are not suitable for watch-listing on either the No Fly or the Selectee list. These categories are:

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

•

•

MI • .11b. 1., • 11.1, ••


Page 19

ACLURM008109

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI b3,7E per TSA

s:el8ITPi'E 8ECUR-lTY @lFORMATION

reflect the principles of aviation-focused security. To keep the No Fly and Selectee lists relevant and manageable, the TSC requires that all the infonnation available about an individual should be considered when making No Fly and Selectee watch-listing decisions. Some factors that merit consideration and might mitigate the decision to place an individual on the No Fly or Selectee list are:

•

•

•

•

•

Further, to identify potential threats posed by known or reasonably suspected terrorists who do not meet the No Fly or Selectee minimum derogatory inclusion criteria, individuals are categorized by their relationship to terrorism or the types ofterrorist activities they are known or reasonably suspected to be engaging in. The TSC's implementation guidance provides an explicit list of categories of individuals who are not suitable for watch -listing on either the No Fly or the Selectee list. These categories are:

•

•

•

SENSITIYE SECURITY HIFOR,"tlATJON

WAIUffilG: This reeMtl e6:ftHHIl:J Seooiti'/6 Seellf'ifylftf_tieB that is eBntrellee tilltIet' 49 CFRpftrt3 IS IIHd 1529. Ne p&Ft of IBis feeaffi HIfI) be diselased 16 persBfts withool B ''need 16 mel .. " os defined in 49 CFR fleHs 15 aft6IS29, excep! with the wfitlea. fI~si8:8 af the AdfHiffislMI6r 6f the 'Fftm~artHti6H SeeHrit, Admil)iSlritfi61l !;If ths 8eere~ 6fTI'!Ift~Bl'lBIi_. Unalillwrizcd relcase may ftlsttlt is civil !leBElIt,' SI' ether aelisD: FBI' U.S. g6'1effiHle:11:t ageneies. ptlblie eisele_eis ge. emed try 3U.S.C. 55ZIIftd ~9Cf.Rpltfts is Itftd (S29.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lists in ~ecuring Commerciai Avialion

Page 19

b3 per ODNI

b7E per FBI b3,7E per TSA These exclusions further confirm that the focus of the No Fl list

should be on individuals who demonstrate the . Similarly, the

Selectee list covers individuals who do not meet the threshold for inclusion on the No Fly list but nonetheless are

Excluding Some Individuals From the No Fly and Selectee Lists MiEbt Present a Vulnerability to Aviation Security

Despite the TSC's 'dance and the watch-listing community's focus on , excluding some individuals could present a threat to aviation security.

There is consensus among the watch-listin communi that individuals who have been identified as

b5 (DP)per ODNI

■

Role of the No 1•ly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 20

b3 per OD I

ACLURM008110

SENSITIVE 8ECUR:lT¥ INFOR"AATION

•

•

•

•

• b3 per ODNI

b7E per FBI

b3, 7E per TSA These exclusions further confirm that the focu~ should be on individuals who . te the_

b3 per OD I

r b5(DP)per ODNI

L .

. Smularly. the meet the threshold for

Excluding Some Individuals From the No Fly and Selectee Lists Might Present a Vulnerability to Aviation Security


listing community's excluding some

security.

WAffiHNG : TIlis feeeft! eefltams 8 eHsilive 8eetffit, lHfeHHft!iaH Iilttt is elffllffi IletllHlBe!' ~ 9 ern fJHri3 15 IIJId 1529. }O~B flaH 8fthis ree6fd fflllyha dise/ases ta j'let'SBM wilMlit II ''Beed tekBew" 8ssefuleel iB 49 CPRp/H'ls 15 11M 1S29, e-eept with tile IffltieH fltlmUssiaA at the Admiflis!f8iw af the ffaHSflafl8liaA BBeIH'i~' AllmiAisliatiBft 8f the Beete!1HJ ef Tfimspelt8ti6ll. UHlttllhefiEed :re!ellljtl may :rerm\t iB ei. il fJeHIIll:) Bf' (I tfter aetuffl. For U. S. gtlvemmen I agencies,

,puhlie Ii isele91lfB is @;tl'iet'lled hy S U. B. C. 552 find 49 CPR fl8fls IS IIHt! IS 2e.

Role of the No l<'iy and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviatlon

Page 20

, as it would seem to present an unaddressed vulnerability to e aviation security system. scenarios exist with respect to these individuals:

1)

2)

3)

4)

t t •

b3,b5 (DP)

per ODNI

b5 per CBP

b7E per FBI

b3 , 7E per TSA

b3 per ODNI

ores

•

gobbt diselogurc is governed by 5 552 and 49 CFR ports 15 and 1520.


Page 21

ACLURM008111

r b3, bs (DP)

per ODNI

bS per CBP

L

b7E per FBI

b3, 7E per TSA

SE~(SITIVE SECURITY fNFOJUf.ATION

as It seeOltopresent an aviation security systeOl .• scenarios exist with respect to these individuals:

1)

2)

3)

4) b3 per ODNI

SEN5ITn'E SECURITY PIFOru'MTlON

JHARJHnc. TItiuee6M eflftl'fltfllj SeH~ili Ie SelMf'tt, 1fIffi1'mftti6ft !hill ts fl6ftll'6HeEI HMIer 49 CFR plll"ffi 15 ftflfllS2E1. ~r8 Ililfl af lffis feeaM BIlly he ffi9elasea ffi peffi8ftS witflaflt II "neeEl ta 1I11S'''''' 119 fleMeEi ift 19 C¥R pllft9 1 S aMI 529, 8A6apl wi!h Ehe 'oVfl!t1lft Ilel'Bli;;si6ft af the f.Hmil!islflll6f fir IftB Tfltnsjl6ftlltislI Seeltfit'j AdmH!t9tfIl~6ft Sf !he SeefetHfy af Tl'8ft8l'6rif1 lien. UnauEherized relellse may re8llit :ill civil peualty or ol:he;r II etiffll: Far U. S. gS' .. emmen t II geneies. puhhe mseioSlirel9 ge,e:rnediry 5U.S.C. SS211ftEl49 CFRpllft91S IHidIS29.


Page2!

Recommendation

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration:

b5 (DP) per ODNI Recommendation #1: Determine whether it is appropriate to b7E per FBI

b3 7E per TSA to No Fly restrictions or a itional screening prior to oar mg an aircraft.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We evaluated TSA's written comments and have made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of TSA's written response to the report's recommendation and our analysis of the response follows the recommendation. A copy of TSA's response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B.

We also received written comments from the NCTC and have made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A copy of the NCTC's response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix C. In addition, we received technical comments from TSA, CBP, the TSC, the NCTC, and the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, and have incorporated these changes into the report where appropriate. We appreciate the comments and contributions made by each entity.

TSA Response: TSA concurred in part with this recommendation. In its response, TSA management said the nomination criteria for each list produced from the TSDB are developed and approved by a multiagency working group overseen by the Homeland Security Council. Each individual nominated to a terrorist watch list must independent) meet the nomination criteria in order to be watch-

b5 (DP) , 7E listed. per ODNI would require an amendment to

b7E per FBI

the nommation cnteria_

h3, 7E per TSA b5 (DP) on the No Fly and

per ODNI Se ectee ists, TSA sai e only apparent and effective way to ensure that these individuals are restricted from boarding an


Page 22

ACLURM008112

SENSITIVE SECURITY EPIFORMATlml

Recommendation

b5(DP) per ODNI

b7E per FBI

b3,7E per TSA

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration:

an aircraft.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We evaluated TSA' s written comments and have made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary ofTSA's written response to the report's recommendation and our analysis of the response follows the recommendation. A copy ofTSA's response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B.

We also received written comments from the NCTC and have made changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A copy of the NCTC's response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix C. In addition, we received technical comments from TSA, CBP, the TSC, the NCTC, and the State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs, and have incorporated these changes into the report where appropriate. We appreciate the comments and contributions made by each entity.

TSA Response: TSA concurred in part with this recommendation. In its response, TSA management said the nomination criteria for each list produced from the TSDB are developed and approved by a mUltiagency working group overseen by the Homeland Security Council. Each individual nominated to a terrorist watch list must independ

b5 (DP) f 7E listed. per ODNI

b7E per FBI b3 f 7E per TSA

1_ b5 (DP)

per ODNI on the No Fly and

apparent and effective way to ensure that these individuals are restricted from boarding an

SlSNSITI¥E Sl5CURlTY INFORMATION

VlARI'IINC: This reesre eSllwiffl Sea:lili'.'e SeetJfity IlIfflfm!lliea ~ltt is eSlllfslle1l -eel' ~9 CPR ptlfts IS ftIIfI 1520. Pi6I'iH't eflms pee8l'fi fH8, be diselssed t'sl'el'SsBfJ ... itftettlo "Heed Is ltr:twt'i' 8S lleffiltl6 ill 49 CFRpafls 15 aRd 1520, eJteept wi~ ~e wriMefll'ermissisfi sf lite Admifllsi'I'HISf stlile TmBfJPSftOH8fl: SeettHt, A~lfslisfl Sf ~ Seepetary" sf 'ffaIlSPSrtaMtm. UMuilierized relettle may {estill in efvil peflftHy sr sther aeti8ft. F6!' U.S. ga'leHlmetlt ftgBfteies, public diseisstll'e is I!:6"'t'Cme6 by 5 U.S.C. 552 Mtl19 GFR p&rel IS IIBd 152f)'

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercilll Aviation

Page 22

b3,b5(DP)per ODNI b3,7E plr TSA

aircraft or undergo additional screening would be to add them to the No Fl or Selectee list. TSA mana ernent said this would

and raises rivac and other concerns.

listed on the No Fly or Selectee •st meet the criteria for nomination to either list, these individuals will be placed on the list.

TSA management responded further that it will need to explore this issue with other interested a encies to determine whether

on the No Fly and Selectee lists to these ists is a p nt step at would enhance security. However, given the privacy and rights issues involved in this recommendation, TSA management said that it is highly unlikely the lists would be in this manner.

b3 per ODNI

L b5 (DP) per ODNI

MG Analysis: We consider TSA's proposed actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. However, we believe that TSA's initial approach to address the recommendation may not be feasible, given that the TSC's implementation guidance provides an explicit list of categories of individuals who are not suitable for watch-listinl on either the No Fl or the Selectee list,

The intent of our recommendation is for TSA to determine whether it is appropriate on the No Fly or Selectee ists to o F y restrictions or additional screening rior to boarding an aircraft. TSA already requires

Should TSA determine there is a otential vulnerabili t commercial aviation caused b

, TSA could address e vu i era ility through the use of a security directive. We are not suggesting that TSA take this


b5 (DP) per ODNI

public discloaure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CPR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 23

ACLURM008113

r b3,b5(DP)per ODNI

b3,7E PL TSA

b7E per FBI b3 f 7E per TSA

bS (DP)

per ODNI

r b3 per ODNI

L b5 (DP)

per ODNI

SENSITIVE 8BCUR-lTY INFORMATION

aircraft or undergo additional screening would be to add .-them to the No or Selectee list. TSA said this would

and

on oru~,~~.~v

meet nommation to either list, these individuals will be placed on the list.

TSA management responded further that it will need to explore this issue with other interested to determine whether

on the No Fly and Selectee to IS a would enhance security.

However, given the privacy and rights issues involved in this recommendation, TSA management said that it is highly unlikely the lists would be_ in this mfl.nner.

OIG Analysis: We consider TSA's proposed actions responsive to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. However, we believe that TSA' s initial approach to address the recommendation may not be feasible, given that the TSC's implementation guidance provides an explicit list of categories of individuals who are not suitable for on either the No or the Selectee list,

The intent of our "","r·nn~""",,,.r it is appropriate No Fly or "'~""'''''J~

use We are not suggesting that TSA take this

SENSnA'E SECUIUTY INFORMATION

WARNING. TIHs flleeffl eaHlflillfi SeBsH¥/e Seettrity InfefftltltiaR that is eSRtroHed lIfHie:r ~9 CFRPHt+.; 15 alid 1529. ~ffi pBft eftftis flleaffl HIif)' he ffiseleses te peffi6ftS withBe! a "f\eed ta kite .. " u defiftes 1ft '9 CFR parts 1 S liftS H20, tlllet'lf't .fitft the ~ffi"eft pemHSSiafl ef the ASl'lrillisHH i'6r ef the 'f'nffi:sperillliflft Seetlrify l'i£lmiaisffilH6ft ae the Seefllllif)' flf'I'mMplWlfttiElll:. lJnmIthBMed :felellse HIlt) reSttlI itt eivil peftliity M ether aeLiaR. Far U.S. !1,fI"t'enmJeftl a!1,efteies, pl'tblie tlisel6Mtfe is g6.eHled II) 5 U.S.C. S52lUlIi ~9 CFRplifts IS IIfttl1529.

Role of the No Fly lind Selectee Lists in Secnring Commercial Aviation

PageZ3

action, but provide it as an example of how TSA could address the potential vulnerability.

b7E per FBI

Major Security Gaps Have Been Addressed by Adding No Fly Criteria

Prior to adding the No Fly criteria in June 2008, a critical at existed in aviation securi

b3 per ODNI b3, 7E per TSA

b7E per FBI

An Analysis of Encounter Records Demonstrates Watch List Effectiveness

We analyzed terrorism related encounter records provided by CBP's National Targeting Center—Passenger and the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs from June to August 2007. This timeframe


Page 24

ACLURM008114

SEN8JTlV£ SECUIIIT¥ FNFORMATION

action, but provide it as an example of how TSA could address the potential vulnerability.

~rity Gaps Have Been Addressed by Adding. b7E per FBI ___ No Fly Criteria

b3 per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

b7E per FBI

An Analysis of Encounter Records Demonstrates Watch List Effectiveness

We analyzed terrorism related encounter records provided by CBP's . National Targeting Center-Passenger and the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs from June to August 2007. This timeframe

SENSITI¥E SEC{ffiITY j:pIF9RlVfATIOI'I

WARi>lDIC: ThiSl'ee6rti tl61itmm! 8eflSiH'. e See\H'ily ffif6)"111fttieft AIM is eSfiltelletl ~H6:eP 19 CFRJlltf'ts H ftftElIH9. Ne flPrt 6f Htisl'eeMfi HillY Be t1iselesed Ie 1l8ffi611S .o'ilft61:11 !l"fteeEi Ie li:ssw" sHleiHteEl Hi 19 C¥Rj'lIlft.'l IS s8tI lS29, =epl "ilh the wHiteD IlefmissiBfl sf Ihe AtlmitHslft\IEff at ilie 'fflIflsp8FloHsl't See'dri~ A&nHftislfBlian Sf lite Seereltlfj efTflIl1fIjloftftli6l1. UllDuther~ed release Hilly te:mlt ifl ei' .. il fleflftlty BI' 8t:He¥ flelisfi. F8f U.s. ge\eJ'!lHielit ~eies, Illihlie t1iseklsure I:iI ge,emetl b:I S U.S.C. S§211flt1 49 CFRplli't9 IS ftfttIlS2Q. .

Role of the No Fly Qnd Selectee Usts in Securing Commercial Aviation

PQge24

was selected as representative of the highest volume months for international travel to the United States.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the No Fly and Selectee lists in identifying threats to commercial aviation, we reviewed a series of known or reasonably suspected terrorist encounters that were not on either list. Our list was generated from a sample of Department of State visa refusals and revocations and CBP encounters at ports of entry. The intent of the comparison was to examine the effectiveness of the No Fly and Selectee lists in determining potential threats to aviation security by reviewing the TIDE records of individuals encountered by CBP and Department of State.

We examined the derogatory information in each TIDE record to determine the appropriateness of each individual's watch list status. We used the 2006 criteria to determine whether the individual, should have been on the No Fly or Selectee lists at the time of the encounter. We then used the revised 2008 criteria to determine whether the individual would now be on the No Fly or Selectee list. As of September 2008, for the 156 individuals we reviewed:

• had no TIDE records, or we were unable to match an existm TIDE record to the available information.

• were watch-listed at one time, but the records were owngraded based on insufficient derogatory information,

mistaken matches, or acquisition of clarifying intelligence. • were

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA • were in TIDE as the result of an FBI watch list request,

an er details regarding the subjects were unavailable. • were in TIDE for criminal behavior (e.g., drug or

wea ons snitt lin as a result of a lost or stolen ass ort or for

• were in TIDE for or as a potential threat. However, after we reviewed the derogatory information, we concluded that the intelligence reporting was questionable, generally due to the reliability of the reporting. This

public diacIosure ia-gov...m.el by 5 U.R.C. 552 and 19 CFR park 15 ta.d 1520.


Page 25

ACLURM008115

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

Sf!;I'ISITPI 'E SEClJIHT¥ INFQRl\f,W'IOPI

was selected as representative of the highest volume months for international travel to the United States,

To evaluate the effectiveness of the No Fly and Selectee lists in identifying threats to commercial aviation, we reviewed a series of known or reasonably suspected terrorist encounteIS that were not on either list. Our list was generated from a sample of Department of State visa refusals and revocations and CBP encounteIS at ports of entry, ' The intent of the comparison was to examine the effectiveness of the No Fly and Selectee lists in determining potential threats to aviation security by reviewmg the TIDE records of individuals encountered by CBP and Department of State.

We examined the derogatory information in each TIDE record to determine the appropriateness of each individual's watch list status, We used the 2006 criteria to detennine whether the individu(ll should have been on the No Fly or Selectee lists at the time of the encounter. We then used the revised 2008 criteria to determine whether the individual would now be on the No Fly or Selectee list. As of September 2008, for the 156 individuals we reviewed:

• _ had no TIDE records, or we were unable to match an -

i!!iXIStin TIDE record to the available information,

• were watch-listed at one time, but the records were owngraded based on insufficient derogatory information,

mistaken uisition of

•

• as the an watch list request, nlT1"h"r details regarding the subj ects were unavailable.

• _ were in TIDE for criminal behavior (e.g., drug or . as a result of a lost or stolen or for

• threat. However, we

information, we concluded that the intelligence reporting was questionable, generally due to the reliability ofthe reporting, This -

SENSITIVE SECURITY HlFom4ATlON

WAlftHNC: Tffis ftle8re eElftIHlm! Seft~ili'e S_i" Irtf'e!'Ifm:lien ihflhs eafltffllled under 49 CFRplH'ts IS fIfttI152Q, N6 pltF! ee this reeertl 'IftII') be fli~elagetl ttl pef9811!1 .fiih6Ht It 'beet! ta MaY/" as defiftet! ift 19 CFR paRS 1 S alld 1529, 5I{e6l!1 wilb !be .... i!teft l'etttdSSiBfI £If !he ,o!dlmitH~lfflhlr 8£ !he 'Ftllftsp6f'tltlieft Setffif'ity l.amiflisIfIl1;i8f1 er lhe Seerelary' tlf TI'Ht",1' sttaftdll. Ufllllllllfmzetl relene mil) f'e!IUit in ei,ilpeflllII) ell" <lifter lIehell. F"rUB. ge'enHHell:tagetl~s, I'Htitie flis~BS11i'6 i!i gB.emefl '" S u.s.c. ;S2 flftf! 19 CFR I'llfflI IS IIftl'll529.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Cominercial AvIation

Page 25

!- •

category includes three individuals who were in TIDE as the result of an anonymous, malicious information source.

• had been added to the No Fly or Selectee list subsequent to eir encounter with CBP or the Department of State.

• were assessed as y i e Department of State, an

were not eons' u ere eats to 1.S. interests.

We questioned whether two individuals should have been placed on the Selectee list, particularly when the revised 2008 criteria were applied:

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

•

•

We coordinated with senior TSC officials and discussed these initial findings. The TSC conducted multiple and comprehensive reviews of the two cases. Their exhaustive reviews determined that the

After receiving clarification from the TSC regarding the two individuals whose status we questioned, we determined that all of the known or reasonably suspected terrorists on our list, who could be matched to a TIDE record, did not meet either the 2006 or revised 2008 criteria for No Fly or Selectee list inclusion. This success rate indicates that the No Fly and Selectee lists are successful in identifying individuals who could threaten aviation security. Beyond these individuals not meeting the No Fly and Selectee criteria, none posed a threat to aviation security. This indicates that the use of the No Fly and Selectee lists as prescribed by the implementation guidance is appropriate in identifying individuals who pose threats to aviation security.

No part of this record may be disclosed to poraoria without a "nccd to know" as dofincd in 19 CFR porta 15 and 1520,


Page 26

ACLURM008116

SENSlTI\'E SECURITY mpOR-M,,'\TlON

category includes three individuals who were in TIDE as the result of an anonymous, malicious information source.

• _ had been added to the No Fly or Selectee list subsequent to = encounter with CBP or the of State.

•

We questioned whether two individuals should have been placed on the Selectee list, particularly when the revised 2008 criteria were applied:

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

•

•

We coordinated with senior TSC officials and discussed these initial fmdings. The TSC conducted multiple and comprehensive reviews of the

Their exhaustive· . that

After receiving clarification from the TSC regarding the two individuals whose status we questioned, we determined that all of the known or reasonablysuspected terrorists on our list, who could be matched to a TIDE record, did not meet either the 2006 or revised 2008 criteria for No Fly or Selectee list inclusion. This success rate indicates that the No Fly and Selectee lists are successful in identifying individuals who could threaten aviation security. Beyond these individuals not meeting the No Fly and Selectee criteria, none posed a threat to aviation security. This indicates that the use of the No Fly and Selectee lists as prescribed by the implementation guidance is appropriate in identifying individuals who pose threats to aviation security.

SENSITIVE SECURITY lNFORNlt.TJON

W:MGHHC. This reeewd eeftlaitts SeflfliH'/e Seetlfily Infurmutien thel is eeBtfeHea lifIfler ~9 CPR piH+.J IS 11M 1§2Q. Htl purl ef litis reee!'tl ~ he flise!esefiltl pW961lS .. ihtlt ft "_C6 Ie itft8W" liS l:I~efl ill: 19 CFR: IIl!Hs IS II:8Ei H2Q, el'teBflI "lib tfte .rfflteft petmis 918ft sf Ibe Admiftislmttlr ef tile TfflllStl8Ft8 HSft Seetlftt:J lulmffiislfElHSft 8f t;he S eereto,,sf'Fl'ftflSf'Mlfttlon: Unfltlllwmefi rdease HIllY felllJ!t itt eivi! penulty OJ' 6t/Jer Heli6H. F6f'U.S. gSYefllmetlt 8J!:eHeies, tltlBHe tlisole:rure i3 gtheme~ S, § U.S.C. SS2 11:81:1 ~9 CFR port~ IS oftfilSbII.

Role of the No Fly and Sdedee Lists in SecurIng Commercial Aviation

Page 26

Interagency Approach to Commercial Aviation Security Helps to Mitigate Potential Vulnerabilities and Address Potential Gaps

Although the No Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, passenger prescreening against terrorist watch lists proposed by the Secure Flight program is only one component of a larger security cycle that protects the commercial aviation system. International and domestic security activities within and outside DHS, such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement investigations, visa issuance, and border protection, mitigate potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Secure Flight program and enhance commercial aviation security overall.

b7E per FBI-

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

Some security activities, such as law enforcement investigations and intelligence collection take lace well before a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, , attempts to board a commercial aircraft. 0 er agencies use the intelligence gathered for various terrorist watch-listing activities; each agency has a different focus and set of data tailored specifically for its mission. For example, CBP uses the TSDB-derived portion of TECS to assist in making admissibility decisions for foreign nationals at ports of entry, and the Department of State uses the TSDB-derived portion of CLASS to determine visa eligibility.

Regardless of the primary purpose for each agency's watch list screening activities, these activities function in parallel, and significantly contribute to multiple layers of aviation security. When combined with other security measures that are not based on watch-listing, such as passenger security screening conducted by TSA and law enforcement operations conducted by the FAMS, the multiple, overlapping components of the security cycle assist in mitigating potential aviation security vulnerabilities. Appendix F provides a graphic representation of the way in which comprehensive, multiagency watch list screening, along with other security activities, enhances aviation security.

International and Domestic Intelligence Gathering Is a Key Element of Aviation Security

One foundation of a cross-cutting approach to aviation security is the international and domestic intelligence gathering activities


Page 27

ACLURM008117

S9lSITA':E SECURITY :9lFORMATION

Interagency Approach to Commercial Aviation Security Helps to Mitigate Potential Vulnerabilities and Address Potential Gaps

b7E per FBI b3 per ODNI b3,7E per TSA

Although the No Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorists who could threaten commercial aviation, passenger prescreening against terrorist watch lists proposed by the Secure Flight program is only one component of a larger security cycle that protects the commercial avi~tion system, International and domestic security activities within and outside DRS, such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement investigations, visa issuance, and border protection, mitigate potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Secure Flight program and enhance commercial aviation security overall,

Some security actiVities, such as law enforcement investigations and intelligence COllecti~' on take lace well before a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, , attempts to board a commercial aircraft 0 er agencIes use the intelligence gathered for various terrorist watch-listing activities; each agency has a different focus and set of data tailored specifically for its mission. For example, CBP uses the TSDB-derived portion of TECS to assist in making admissibility decisions for foreign nationals at ports of entry, and the Department of State uses the TSDB-derived portion of CLASS to determine visa eligibility.

Regardless of the primary purpose for each agency's watch list screening activities, these activities function in parallel, and significantly contribute to multiple layers of aviation security. When combined. with other security measures that are not based on watch-listing, such as passenger security screening conducted by TSA and law enforcement operations conducted by the F AMS, the multiple, overlapping components of the security cycle assist in mitigating potential aviation security vulnerabilities, Appendix F provides a graphic representation of the way in which comprehensive, multi agency watch list screening, along with other security actiVities, enhances aviation security.

International and Domestic Intelligence Gathering Is a Key Elemenfof Aviation Security

One foundation of a cross-cutting approach to aviation security is the international and domestic intelligence gathering activities

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORM'"t:nON

w,\lI}mfC, This reear6 effllioms Soositi Ie SeetH"i1) lH~li611: lfillt is efflllfaHeflttlltiet' 49 CFR pftffJ IS ftft€IIS2Q. Nil p8l'! af H:tis :reeaM. HlIt) be ffiseffised to Pe!'30ftS "ilfiattl It "fteellie \ffi&lf" liS tleliftetl il! 49 CFR "MIs 15 Me 1520, fllteepl II ilft Ifte liI"l"ifteft pefftlissiBfl efIBe flfhtlfftiSlfl'ltflf efthe ffll!tlpBffPHell Seffllri~ Atimifl'istl'otitm or the Seeretlil') efTftmSfleflttlitm, Uaftlllherized releose IDII) restllt in ei.ilpefl!ll~ ef ether fleHaH, FarU,g, !;6"emmeftlagetleies, fltIblie lIiselesliffl is ga .emed b, 5 U,g,C. 552 000 49 C¥.R p!Ht9 15 find 1529,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists In Secnring Commercial Aviation

Page 27

•

conducted, recorded, and shared among the members of the Intelligence Community. These activities, such as the collection and analysis of human intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency or intelligence-gathering by interception of electronic signals by the National Security Agency, identify individuals known or reasonably suspected to be associated with international terrorism prior to their travel to, and potential entry into, the United States.

Domestically, the FBI is the lead agency responsible for collecting information on international terrorists. The FBI's collection activities are not limited to known or reasonably suspected terrorists on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Individuals of interest can be investigated and surveilled up to and including when they fly domestically. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which were established in the 1980s and have grown significantly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, consist primarily of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers who identify and investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals operating within the United States.

Additionally, FBI Field Intelligence Groups combine FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, linguists, and surveillance specialists who provide a channel for information to feed through the intelligence community. Other intelligence collection activities include the FBI-led Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, established by Himeland Security Presidential Directive-2. This task force is an interagency group that collects and analyzes a wide range of government and publicly available data on suspected terrorists who are not in the United States. The ultimate aim is to collect sufficient information on suspected terrorists that will prevent them from entering the United States. When necessary, the task force locates, detains, removes, or prosecutes these individuals. The FBI is also responsible for intelligence collection on and investigation of purely domestic terrorist organizations and identities.

International and domestic intelligence gathered on a known or reasonably suspected international terrorist is then provided to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's NCTC, which


Page 28

ACLURM008118

SI9IS1TIVE S~CumTY @fFQR4\M'RQN

conducted, recorded, and shared among the members of the Intelligence Community. These activities, such as the collection and analysis of human intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency or intelligence-gathering by interception of electronic sig:tials by the National Security Agency, identify individuals known or reasonably suspected to be associated with international terrorism prior to their travel to, and potential entry into, the United States.

Domestically, the FBI is the lead agency responsible for collecting information on international terrorists. The FBI's collection activities are not limited to known or reasonably suspected terrorists on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Individuals of interest can be investigated and surveilled up to and including when they fly domestically. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which were established in the 1980s and have grown significantly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, consist primarily of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers who identify and investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals operating within the United States.

Additionally, FBI Field Intelligence Groups combine FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, linguists, and surveillance specialists who provide a channel for information to feed through the intelligence community. Other intelligence collection activities include the FBI-led Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-I This task force is an interagency group that collects and analyzes a wide range of government and publicly available data on suspected terrorists who are not in the United States. The ultimate aim is to collect sufficient information on suspected terrorists that will prevent them from entering the United States. When necessary, the task force locates, detains, removes, or prosecutes these individuals. The FBI is also responsible for intelligence collection on and investigation of purely domestic terrorist organizations and identities.

International and domestic intelligence gathered on a known or reasonably suspected international terrorist is then provided to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's NCTC, which

ffiilNSITJ\Q; SBCURlTY INFORMiif1ON

W}dGHNC: Tftjs ree8!'tl ellf!loillS Soosil:i, e Seeuril) mfeftl'lllll6l1 Ibot l:!I eflf!tNlHed Hilder 49 CFR flltfIs g ttftd lS29. Nt' !'U>f 1 of !his l'!'Je6l'd • ."., be '" selflgeti ffi per""". "'lbrlt'lt II "need ItJ lffi8 .. " liS tl:efifted itt 49 CPR J'l1If'fs 1:S Mil I 520 , ""~"" t ''; tit tfte ,,";1:Iel1 P""""99iflfl flf the A-tlmimslfltt6f 8f tfte 'FHtASfi flHll1:i6fl S tllllff'il} Admmi.M 1 lOll: fir the Seeretm j IlfTfllOOflllfltlftElft. Uttlllll:lt6riilell release mol' fe:ffiH ill ei"l J'leBollJI flf flther 11,,1.&1'0. FflI'U.S. gil .eH!Biet'lt Hgooeies, flHelie tHse!6'l:Iffl is gthemell b) S U.S.C. 552 Hutl49 CFR: pOfls 15 !1M ]529.

Role of the No Fly and Seledee Lists in Securing Commel'ciEll Aviation

Page 28

centralizes terrorism-related intelligence through its administration of TIDE. The NCTC then exports terrorist identity information from TIDE to the Department of Justice's TSC, which serves as a central repository for this information through its administration of the TSDB. Terrorist identifiers based purely on domestic terrorism information gathered by the FBI are directly nominated to the TSDB, with the primary purpose of disseminating terrorist identity information to support the terrorist watch-listing needs of federal, state, local, and international agencies.

Department of State Visa Refusals and Revocations Block Forein Terrorists From Boarding International FliEhts

Department of State nonimmigrant visa issuance overseas, informed by terrorism-related intelligence collection, is one of the first operational components in the broader aviation security cycle. Consular officers in the field who process visa applications conduct name checks using CLASS. When CLASS indicates a terrorism-related lookout based on exported TSDB records, it signals the consular officers to contact the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Visa Office to obtain a Security Advisory Opinion regarding the visa applicant.

Security Advisory Opinions Confirm Identity and Anv Possible Derogatory Information

When the Visa Office receives a request for a Security Advisory Opinion, two determinations are made. First, the Visa Office, in conjunction with the TSC, confirms that the identity of the applicant matches the TSDB and underlying TIDE record. Second, when the individual's identity is confirmed, the Visa Office reviews the derogatory information on the individual, if any, and advises the consular officer regarding visa eligibility based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of1.952, as it relates to terrorism.14

Additionally, when the Department of State discovers derogatory information on an individual after a visa has been issued, such as the creation of a new TIDE record or an update to an existing

14 Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as amended; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(1X).

Rale of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 29

ACLURM008119

S~ISlTIVE SECQRITY lNFORMATlON

centralizes terrorism-related intelligence through its administration of TIDE. The NCTC then exports terrorist identity infonnation from TIDE to the Department of Justice's TSC, which serves as a central repository for this infonnation through its administration of the TSDB. Terrorist identifiers based purely on domestic terrorism information gathered by the FBI are directly nominated to the TSDB, with the primary purpose of disseminating terrorist identity information to support the terrorist watch-listing needs of federal, state, local, and international agencies.

Department of State Visa Refusals and Revocations Block Foreign Terrorists From Boarding International Flights

Department of State nonimmigrant visa issuance overseas, infonned by terrorism-related intelligence collection, is one of the first operational components in the broader aviation security cycle. Consular officers in the field who process visa applications conduct name checks using CLASS. When CLASS indicates a terrorism-related lookout based on exported TSDB records, it signals the consular officers to contact the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Visa Office to obtain a Security Advisory Opinion regarding the visa applicant.

Security Advisory Opinions Confirm Identitv and Any Possible Dero&atory Illformation

When the Visa Office receives a request for a Security Advisory Opinion, two determinations are made. First, the Visa Office, in conjunction with the TSC, confirms that the identity of the applicant matches the TSDB and underlying TIDE record. Second, when the individual's identity is confirmed, the Visa Office reviews the derogatory information on the individual, if any, and advises the consular officer regarding visa eligibility based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of1952, as it relates to terrorism.14

Additionally, when the Department of State discovers derogatory information on an individual after a visa has been issued, such as the creation of a new TIDE record or an update to an existing

14 Public Law 82-414 (June 27,1952), as amended; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX).

SENSITIY£ SECURITY INFOMfATIOJI'f

Vh'YH-ffiKl. This feeMB eooloHts SensiEi ,e Seem" ltt:MH'fIltlioo l:llIM is e",i'M6lieflttftElet 49 CFRl'urls 15 Qftd 1520. No p....t ",f YH3 "".II....!: mil') I!e ms.,ffi •• " 1<11'''''3 ..... i\ ilftffitt 8 "Bee!!'", 19'18 .. " 00 cletifteB in 49 CFR pBrio [5 !mft 1529, "'''''''I'I 1\ i ifi the h tiMen pe.....i. :tielt ef!:he i.flre.iftis tffttef 8i till! fflflSlloftft ti:Oft SeeM 1;') Adntinisifttti:6ft In lite Se efe~ of fflflSf\8ftlLEion. UttEllllhtlfizefi releose "'0)1 re.elt 1ft ei,'iI JlenM" I'lf stfter oetien. Fel U.S. 1!;6.emmellt lI:geaeies, ptffil:ie dis&le3lfft1 is g6.emefl "" 5 U.S.C SS2 8M 19 CFR I'tIfts 15 EIIl'" IS29.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commer'cial Aviation

Page 29

TIDE record, the Bureau of Consular Affairs can prudentially revoke the visa, forcing the individual to reapply and submit to another full review process. Although the Department of State's focus regarding visa issuance is on admissibility into the United States, its comprehensive visa refusal and revocation procedures also keeps individuals denied visas for terrorism-related reasons from boarding aircraft bound for the United States.

Efforts to Address Potential Visa Waiver Program Security Gaps

One potential security gap not addressed in the visa process stems from foreign nationals eligible for participation in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP enables foreign nationals from 35 designated countries to apply for admission to the United States for 90 or fewer days as nonimmigrant visitors, for business or pleasure, without first obtaining a visa. In response to this risk, CBP implemented the Internet-based Electronic System for Travel Authorization program to screen VWP applicants before they travel to the United States. This process became mandatory in January 2009, pursuant to Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Section 711 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which required DES to implement an electronic travel authorization system and other measures to enhance the security of the VWP.15 These travelers are required to apply for and receive an approved travel authorization via the Electronic System for Travel Authorization to board a commercial aircraft or vessel bound for the United States. Applications are preferred within 72 hours prior to intended travel, although immediate eligibility determinations can be made in most cases.

Once an Electronic System for Travel Authorization application has been successfully completed and submitted online, the application is vetted against appropriate law enforcement and terrorism databases. Individuals who are denied travel authorization for any reason will not be allowed to board and will subsequently be funneled back into the visa process, where they will have to apply to the Department of State for a nonimmigrant

15 'Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as amended, and Public Law 110-53 (August 3, 2007), respectively.

except with the written pormiddion of the Admini3trator of the Tranaparkition-SeeaFity-istfatrien-or-the4eereta

public diactcraure is governed by 5 15.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR part3 15 and 1520.


Page 30

ACLURM008120

SENSITIVE SECmuTY INFOlli\MTION

TIDE record, the Bureau of Consular Affairs can prudentially revoke the visa, forcing the individual to reapply and submit to another full review process. Although the Department of State's focus regarding visa issuance is on admissibility into the United States, its comprehensive visa refusal and revocation procedures also keeps individuals denied visas for terrorism-related reasons from boarding aircraft bound for the United States.

Efforts to Address Potential Visa Waiver Program Security Gaps

One potential security gap not addressed in the visa process stems from foreign nationals eligible for participation in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP enables foreign nationals from 35 designated countries to apply for admission to the United States for 90 or fewer days as nonimmigrant visitors, for business or pleasure, without flIst obtaining a visa. In response to this risk, CBP implemented the Internet-based Electronic System for Travel Authorization program to screen VWP applicants before they travel to the United States. This process became mandatory in January 2009, pursuant to Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended by Section 711 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/]] Commission Act of2007, which required DRS to implement an electronic travel authorization system and other measures to enhance the security of the vwp .15 These travelers are required to apply for and receive an approved travel authorization via the Electronic System for Travel Authorization to board a commercial aircraft or vessel bound for the United States. Applications are preferred within 72 hours prior to intended travel, although immediate eligibility determinations can be made in most cases.

Once an Electronic System for Travel Authorization application has been successfully completed and submitted online, the application is vetted against appropriate law enforcement and terrorism databases. Individuals who are denied travel authorization for any reason will not be allowed to board and will subsequently be funneled back into the visa process, where they will have to apply to the Department of State for a nonimmigrant

LS Public Law 82-414 (June 27,1952). as amended, and Public Law 110-53 (August 3, 2007), respectively.

WARNING. 'I1Hs reeMd eefthHn!! 8eBsitive SeeW'ily Inf_E161l IMt is 6SRB'eHed 1:Iflder 19 CFIl plH'll! I § !HIli l:S21l. Pm ",!1ft eHhis f'eeefli Hltl) he Elis&leseEl re flet'961l9 n !!fiettl fI "aeeEl t6 Hew" 89 deiHleli itt 49 CHtJl8F1s l§ IIruI 1§21l, e!teepl wi~ llie WritteR fll"fmissiell Elf Ute ,YmifHSB'fllef sf lfie 1'flHI9petlOti8ft Seet!rity AlimiBisB'IIH8Il Ilf Ille Seeretory sf TfliftSf'flftaIi8ll. Uoo.HtOOrfl'leil release HIll,. f8SI:IIt ill eivil penal", 8f elltef aeliell. Fer u.s ga', emment lI!:en8ies. pllblie disclelffife is g6', eHleli by S U.S.C. SS2 !HId 49 CHl IlM'fS IS IIflfl H21l.

Role ofthe No Fly lind Selectee Lists in Secnring Commercial AViation

1'IIge 30


visa. Additionally, an authorization from this program, which is similar to a visa, is an allowance for travel to a U.S. port of entry and not a guarantee of admission into the United States.

CBP Security Efforts Identify Potential Threats to International Aviation Prior to Departure and Other Threats Upon Arrival

Beyond the Electronic System for Travel Authorization program, CBP engages in a number of security activities that contribute to international and domestic aviation security. These activities take place before international passengers board an aircraft to travel to the United States, and after passengers arrive at U.S. ports of entry.

National Targeting Center—Passenger Assesses Risk for All International Travelers and Assists Other CBP Processes

The National Targeting Center—Passenger (NTC—P) centralizes and coordinates CBP's anti-terrorism targeting of international passengers mission. The NTC—P processes all terrorism-related encounters using automated watch list matching. The latest requirements of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) further enhance the NTC—P's capabilities. As of. December 2008, APIS requires, depending on mode of submission, that commercial air carriers, as well as private aircraft, submit certain passenger information to CBP for vetting in advance of flight departure. The modes of submission are either 30 minutes prior to securing the aircraft for departure for APIS data submitted in batches, or no later than securing the aircraft doors for departure for data submitted in real-time using APIS Quick Query. Despite these minimum requirements, CBP encourages commercial air carriers to submit APIS information up to 72 hours in advance of the flight's scheduled departure.

Overseas, CBP Representatives Use Vetting. Information to Facilitate Denial of Boarding

CBP representatives overseas, as part of the Immigration Advisory Program, use targeting information from the NTC—P' s terrorism vetting operations to assist in preventing potential terrorists from


Page 31

ACLURM008121

SelSITI"}; B};CDmTY fNFORl\IATION

visa. Additionally, an authorization from this program, which is similar to a visa, is an allowance for travel to a U.S. port of entry and not a guarantee of admission into the United States.

CBP Security Efforts Identify Potential Threats to Intermltional Aviation Prior to Departure and Other Threats Upon Arrival

Beyond the Electronic System for Travel Authorization program, CBP engages in a number of security activities that contribute to international and domestic aviation security. These activities take place before international passengers board an aircraft to travel to the United States, and after passengers arrive at U.S. ports of entry.

National Targeting Center-Passenger Assesses Risk for All International Travelers and Assists Other CBP Processes

The National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P) centralizes and coordinates CBP's anti-terrorism targeting 9finternational passengers mission. The NTC-P processes all terrorism-related encounters using automated watch list matching. The latest requirements of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) further enhance the NTC-P's capabilities, As of December 2008, APIS requires, depending on mode of submission, that commercial air carriers, as well as private aircraft, submit certain passenger information to CBP for vetting in advance of flight departure. The modes of submission are either30 minutes prior to securing the aircraft for departure for APIS data submitted in batches, or no later than securing the aircraft doors for departure for data submitted in real-time using APIS Quick Query. Despite these minimum requirements, CBP encourages commercial air carriers to submit APIS information up to 72 hours in advance of the flight's scheduled departure,

Overseas, CBP Representatives Use Vetting Infonnation to Facilitate Denial of Boarding

CBP representatives overseas, as part of the Immigration Advisory Program, use targeting information from theNTC-P's terrorism vetting operations to assi st in preventing potential terrorists from

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFOIll\iATION

W-:t"dGHNC: Thlnee6fll e8nltHm 8eHsitioeSeettri!) htfenmIti8lllhBtll! e_~eHedttMiei' 49 CFRPBfl:3IS lind IS2e. NH pBft 6f!his reetml: mtt:I he tlisel8l!efi t6 peft6ftS "ilhettt ft ''tteealelffiw#'' flslleFiftefi in 49 CPR lIans 15 fIMl 1529, eJteept "ilh the il"l'itteft p=ttiSSillll 6f the Aelmft!iMl'flt6r 6f!tie 'FrttMtl8l'1f1ti6ft 8eeltril) A8mi!!is~li8n er !he Sl!ef8~ ef TJPMfl8f1t1tiOO, UDfIlitheri:;:ed fclellS8 ffiP), fe:ruJt in ei, il peIlEtI!) IH' ether Eteliell, Fer U.S, g6'IeHlHleftt ttgeaeie9, tlllfllie disel8sllftl is ge.emt:tlll) S U,g,G. SS211f1t1 49 CFRp!lltll 15 Mid 152fl.


Page 31 .

boarding commercial aircraft destined for the United States. Under the program, officers posted at foreign airports take terrorism-related targeting results, as well as other passenger information, and determine which individuals will be ineligible to enter the United States upon arrival at a port of entry. CBP officers will make "no board" recommendations to commercial air carriers and host governments regarding these passengers. These recommendations are generally heeded by commercial air carriers and foreign governments, as the carrier may bear the cost of the return trip for an individual refused entry into the United States. The recommendations also prevent known or reasonably suspected terrorists, even those who are not on the Selectee list, from boarding an aircraft to the United States.

CBP Admissibility Determinations at U.S. Ports of Entry Prevent Potential Terrorists From Entering the United States

Under the authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, CBP uses its immigration inspection authority at U.S. ports of entry to examine foreign nationals and U.S. citizens, as well as their personal property, prior to determining admissibility.16 CBP officers are authorized to conduct a number of inspection activities, including questioning under oath and detailed examinations of individuals, luggage, vehicles, and documents. A warrant is not required to conduct these activities.

Officers rely on these physical searches, their experience in observing and assessing traveler behavior, and documents to determine, who is or is not admissible to the United States. In addition, at U.S. ports of entry CBP officers have access to CBP's system of law enforcement databases to conduct searches and obtain previously generated targeting information to determine the identity and nationality of each applicant seeking admission. Combined, these _tools prevent the entry of ineligible foreign nationals such as criminals terrorists, and dru traffickers,

b7E per CBP/FBI

7E per ODNI As sue , C P's immigration inspection authority

16 Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as amended; 8 U.S.C. § 1225_


Page 32

ACLURM008122

b7E per CBP/FBI

7E per ODNI

SelSITIVE SECURITY INFORI\IATION

boarding commercial aircraft destined for the United States. Under the program, officers posted at foreign aiIports take terrorismrelated targeting results, as well as other passenger information, and determine which individuals will be ineligible to enter the United States upon arrival at a port of entry. CBP officers will make ''no board" recommendations to commercial air carriers and host governments regarding these passengers. These recommendations are generally heeded by commercial air carriers and foreign governments, as the carrier may bear the cost of the return trip for an individual refused entry into the United States. The recommendations also prevent known or reasonably suspected terrorists, even those who are not on the Selectee list, from boarding an aircraft to the United States.

CBP Admissibility Detenninations at U.S. Ports ofETltry Prevent Potential Terrorists From Entering the United States

Under the authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act of1952, CBP uses its immigration inspection authority at U.S. ports of entry to examine foreign nationals and U.S. citizens, as well as their personal property. prior to determining admissibility.16 CBP officers are authorized to conduct a number of inspection activities, including questioning under oath 'and detailed examinations of individuals, luggage, vehicles, and documents. A warrant is not required to conduct these activities.

Officers rely on these physical searches, their experience in observing and assessing traveler behavior, and documents to determine, who is or is not admissible to the United States. In addition, at U. S. ports of entry CBP officers have access to CBP' s system of law enforcement databases to conduct searches and obtain previously generated targeting information to determine the identity and nationality of each applicant seeking admission. Combined, these -tools prevent the entry of ineligible foreign nationals such as ' . and traffickers,

I~ Public Law 82-414 (June 27, 1952), as amended; 8 U.S.C, § 1225.

SENSITIVE 8ISeURITY fPlFORPoU:nON

W}~HH(J. Thi~ reeMf'l e6n~ift'l Seft'lil;i, e Seetffl'" Infomml;i611lhat ia e6H/l'ElHeclllft6:ef ~9 CFRpMS 15 IHItIlS2Q. lI8 pM ef!IHs feesRlIl'lB) Be sis~Elsefi 16 per36ftS "il:ltEltiI!l "lIe.,1I16 bEl p\" fIS SeHnes ift 49 CPR flllI19 I S and 1520. elEeep I "i I:lt the .m ttllll Ilemtis5 itlll of !he Ammms irIttof Elf !he 'FfflftspeftllJi8ft SeeeR!) AElmill'is1rll1 j 6ft 81' the SeerehlfY Elf TtSIl!lJIIII'IIIH6II, UmmIhef'l!ll:61eiell!le HlfI) festllt ill ej.ilpefllllt) Of 6ther aeli6ll:. F8I'U.S, glh_ettt ftgeHeies, pttblie Hi. etEll'l\ffe is ge' efflecl ~ 5 U.8. C. 552 MB 49 eEl P!lri9 IS IIftft ± 529,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial A vifltioD

PageJ!


prevents foreign known or reasonably suspected terrorists who were not already barred from boarding an aircraft to the United States from entering the country, thereby precluding domestic travel.

Additional TSA and Commercial Air Carrier Security Activities Mitigate Potential Threats to Aviation Posed by Passengers, Regardless of No Fly or Selectee Status

Although TSA's Secure Flight program screens passenger information against only the No Fly and Selectee subsets of the TSDB, TSA and commercial air carriers employ various passive and active security measures that mitigate potential vulnerabilities posed by individuals, regardless of watch list status. These airport security activities include behavior detection, computer-based analysis of reservation information by commercial air carriers, passenger screening, more extensive secondary passenger screening, random and deterrent-based screening of passengers after initial screening, law enforcement operations to physically secure aircraft while in-flight, and additional watch list screening flexibility within the Secure Flight program.

Certain Security Considerations Allow Secure Flight to Screen Against Expanded Subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database

The Secure Flight program has the flexibility to screen against the full TSDB, as well as other intelligence or law enforcement databases. This capability is responsive to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that TSA use "the larger set of watch lists maintained by the federal government" for aviation screening. Implementing expanded screening would not be arbitrary; instead, it would be based on credible intelligence or law enforcement information, such as TSA learning that a flight on a particular route may be subject to an increased security risk. In this situation, TSA would have the ability to focus its expanded watch list screening on that particular route or departure and arrival airports. TSA is currently defining the mechanism and process through which it will assess security conditions where expanded watch list screening would be prudent.

Rale of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 33

ACLURM008123

8E~18ITIVE 8ECPlUT¥ RilFOmMHON

prevents foreign known or reasonably suspected terrorists who were not already barred from boarding an aircraft to the United States from entering the country, thereby precluding domestic travel.

Additional TSA and Commercial Air Carrier Security Activities Mitigate Potential Threats to Aviation Posed by Passengers, Regardless oeNo Fly or Selectee Status

Although TSA's Secure Flight program screens passenger information against only the No Fly and Selectee subsets of the TSDB, TSA and commercial air carriers employ various passive and active security measures that mitigate potential vulnerabilities posed by individuals, regardless of watch list status. These airport security activities include behavior detection, computer-based analysis of reservation information by commercial air carriers, passenger screening, more extensive secondary passenger screening, random and deterrent-based screening of passengers after initial screening, law enforcement operations to physically secure aircraft while in-flight, and additional watch list screening flexibility within the Secure Flight program.

Certain Security Considerations Allow Secure Flight to Screen Against Expanded Subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database

The Secure Flight program has the flexibility to screen against the full TSDB, as well as other intelligence or law enforcement databases. This capability is responsive to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that TSA use "the larger set of watch lists maintained by the federal government" for aviation screening, Implementing expanded screening would not be arbitrary; instead, it would be based on credible intelligence or law enforcement information, such as TSA learning that a flight on a particular route may be subject to an increased security risk. In this situation, TSA would have the ability to focus its expanded watch list screening on that particular route or departure and arrival airports. TSA is currently defining the mechanism and process through which it will assess security conditions where expai:J.ded watch list screening would be prudent.

SENSITIVE SECURITY HIFOruM.TION

'HARHINC. This reel'lrd emtftJHm Semil:iI e See_r, InMHHtiiflrt HII'd is el'lMfflHea ttMtlf 49 GFR j'lflris 15 PflalS2fI, Nfl I'M'! "Hm • ..,,,MfI mIL) be .!i.elfl.e'! Ifll'effI6S9 "ii;hBHt Ii ''fieel! tf! Hf!"" os defiHetl m '19 GFRplH't. IS fIMI1529, e.teet't "il:lt tfte Wl'il;l:etI f\e-HHi •• iflB flr th" j~ti.klilflf Bf the fflHl3f!tfflotimt Seem1E) l...dmHtiskfll:i6ft Sf !he Seeff;lfIf') ef-'FfOfl9Jl6ffl1limt. Uootllherize'! relelLge1BlL} rewlt it! ciiii peHflit, Sf elstlf ttelieH. FefU's. g'''mlmentllgeneies, ptlblie cli.el6!1t11"e i. g6\"mea b) 5 U,S,C. 552 .... .! 49 CFR: pftrt. 15 ttntI B:29.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Secnring Commercial Aviation

Page 33

b7E per FBI b3 per ODNI

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Analyzes Trends in Reservation Data and Provides Additional Screening for Potential Terrorists

Watch list screening is supplemented by the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), a computer-based system that analyzes reservation information for certain travel behaviors associated with threats to aviation security. Reservation information used for this analysis may include a passenger name,

Although TSA prove es program oversight, CAPPS is operated by individual commercial air carriers. The CAPPS program is embedded in each air carrier's reservation system.

Security Measures at Airports Contribute to Aviation Security, Irrespective of Watch List Screening

Transportation Security Officers (TSO) stationed at more than 450 airports across the United States screen more than 2 million passengers daily. Every passenger is required to be screened before entry into sterile areas of an airport—the controlled portion of an airport that is only accessible by screened or authorized individuals. Primary passenger security screening generally involves travelers, airport employees, or flight crew walking through a metal detector and having their carry-on baggage x rayed. These screening efforts apply to all who enter the sterile area, regardless of watch list status.

Secondary passenger security screening is conducted when TSOs, law enforcement officers, Behavior Detection Officers, or other TSA officials indicate that it is warranted; a passenger is a match to the Selectee watch list; or CAPPS behavioral analysis has flagged a passenger. Secondary screening may also occur as a result of random selection or detection of a suspicious object in the person's possession or in carry-on items during primary screening. Secondary passenger screening involves hand-warding with a portable metal detector, and may include a full-body pat-down inspection or voluntary whole-body imaging with newer technology that visually screens travelers. A passenger's carry-on

Role of the No FIy and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 34

ACLURM008124

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

SENSIHV:t; SIKmHTY ~IFQR,\\MTI@l

Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre screening System Analyzes Trends in Reservation Data and Provides Additional Screening for Potential Terrorists

Watch list screening is supplemented by the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), a computer-based system that analyzes reservation information for certain travel behaviors associated with threats to aviation security. Reservation

for this include a

program individual commercial air carriers. The CAPPS program is embedded in each air carrier's reservation system.

Security Measures at Airports Contribute to Aviation Security, Irrespective of Watch List Screening

Transportation Security Officers (TSO) stationed at more than 450 airports across ~e United States screen more than 2 million passengers daily. Every passenger is required to be screened before entry into sterile areas of an airport-the controlled portion of an airport that is only accessible by screened or authorized individuals. Primary passenger security screening generally involves travelers, airport employees, or flight crew walking through a metal detector and having their carry-on baggage x rayed. These screening efforts apply to all who enter the sterile area, regardless of watch list status.

Secondary passenger security screening is conducted when TSOs, law enforcement officers, Behavior Detection Officers, or other TSA officials indicate that it is warranted; a passenger is a match to the Selectee watch list; or CAPPS behavioral analysis has flagged a passenger. Secondary screening may also occur as a result of random selection or detection of a suspicious object in the person's possession or in carry-on items during primary screening. Secondary passenger screening involves hand-wanding with a portable metal detector, and may include a full-body pat-down inspection or voluntary whole-body imaging with newer technology that visually screens travelers. A passenger's carry-on

SEJo!SITPiq<; 8£CURIT¥ HfFORMATION

l'Je I'Mt Elftftis ,ecooEl HltIJ Be Eliselasell ta 1'eP.l6flS "ilfietll II "Heed EO !me,," II" defltt"tI itt 49 CWtf"lft. lS!lfllI lS2Q, Mt!etll "idi Ifte ,ffill:llfl fHlHitissi8ft af the A!lmiil:i~IfBt".. ef 1ft" tlttH"f'"flftli8ft &eeuft~ Afimiil:islfttlian SF Ift6 Seet'tltBf}' afTntttsptlffltMIt. "lfflBl;ltft"';"'"d"",le"""....., re"",* in "i,ill'etJft!~ flI' other 8eliofl. FOfU.8. gtI.cmment Bgetlei:es, p1i8lie dlsel.eslH'E is gtI.erneli ft:, 3 U.S.G. 332 IIft6 19 CPR flBHs IS 1HH11329.

Role of the No Fly and Seledee Li~ts in Secnring Commercial Aviation

Page 34

•

baggage is generally opened and examined, as well as inspected with a machine that detects traces of explosives.

Passenger security screening is further enhanced by TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program. Behavior Detection Officers are stationed near security checkpoints and trained to detect behaviors exhibited by individuals that may be indicative of a person who poses a possible threat to aviation or transportation security. Travelers are observed for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people exhibit in response to a fear of being discovered. Behavior Detection Officers may also casually speak with an individual to further ascertain possible causes for a stress reaction. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors and subconscious actions that indicate a high stress level, fear, or deception may be referred for secondary passenger screening. When warranted, law enforcement officers may also conduct more detailed questioning of passengers.

In the sterile area, random screening as part of TSA's Aviation Direct Access Screening Program occurs at gates and can include checking passenger identification and boarding passes, conducting physical searches of carry-on baggage, and using handheld explosive detection units. Since these checks are unannounced, it is more difficult for terrorists to predict the type and nature of security at any one airport. This security measure can also be adjusted to accommodate law enforcement or intelligence-based elevated threats at specific airports or to specific flights.

Federal Air Marshal Service Routine and Special Mission Coverage of Flights Mitigates Potential Threats

TSA's FAMS provides routine coverage on high-risk U.S. commercial air carrier flights, both domestic and international, which are identified using intelligence-driven and risk-based analyses. Beyond routine coverage, FAMS conducts Special Mission Coverage to support other law enforcement agencies and their activities.

. .1.11■1•


Page 35

ACLURM008125

SIi'P'ISlTIV,E SECQRlTY INFORMATION

baggage is generally opened and examined, as well as inspected with a machine that detects !races of explosives.

Passenger security screening is further enhanced by TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program. Behavior Detection Officers are stationed near security checkpoints and trained to detect behaviors exhibited by individuals that may be indicative of a person who poses a possible threat to aviation or transportation security. Travelers are observed for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people . exhibit in response to a fear of being discovered. Behavior Detection Officers may also casually speak: with an individual to further ascertain possible causes for a stress reaction. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors 'and subconscious actions that indicate a high stress level, fear, or deception may be referred for secondary passenger screening. When warranted, law enforcement officers may also conduct more detailed questioning of passengers.

In the sterile area, random screening as part of TSA's Aviation Direct Access Screening Program occurs at gates and caninclude checking passenger identification and boarding passes, condUcting physical searches of carry-on baggage, and using handheld explosive detection units. Since these checks are unannounced, it is more difficult for terrorists to predict the type and nature of security at anyone airport. This security measure can also be adjusted to accommodate law enforcement or intelligence-based elevated threats at specific airports or to specific flights.

Federal Air Marshal Service Routine and Special Mission Coverage of Flights Mitigates Potential Threats

TSA's FAMS provides routine coverage on high-risk D.S. commercial air carrier flights, both domestic and international, which are identified using intelligence-driven and risk-based analyses. Beyond routirie coverage, FAMS conducts Special Mission Coverage to support other law enforcement agencies and their activities.

SMsiTIV£ SECURITY INFORMATION

WARl'HNC. Tlris reeore e6fltBHtS Setl~jt:j.e s,,"""!) IHf"rtflftl:ioll tfiftt is eOBffOHe,hlftElef ~9 CPR fldHs 15 MEl 1529. "Nt! ,,!Ift t!Bm. re""rd....., he di.eJ:...es it! ".,.,"tIft. ,.itftoHt It "flees 101<116 i'F" ItS defittefJ: itt 49 CRt I'M. 15 8t'lft 1329, elteept ,lith the ffiMeIlJlefffli~MBfI of the }rllmint~ffBIOf s[tHe '&BfI~t!rtutit! .. 8eeHl'i:r, }'rtlmitti.IHlli"" ".1:Ite S"efel.." of TtampsJtatioli. UHButlterizecl release ruB)' -.e....It ill ej ,iI peHl'llr, Of etftef HeHen. FOf U.S. ~OHIftHHOOI Bgtlooies, l'aillio disele9lll'e is go.emedby ~ U.Se. 552 !lful q9 CF-Rpltfts ]§ IIBS 1529.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing ComlDe.-cial Aviation

Page 35

Special Mission Coverage is sometimes based on intelligence information not specific to an individual, which results in coverage for a specific flight or route. Although the first priority of FAMS is the security of the aircraft, passengers, and crew, Special Mission Coverage is also used for surveillance as a collateral law enforcement function, with most surveillance requests coming from the FBI. Surveillance contributes to tracking the movements of criminals and subjects of interest.

Use of the FBI's National Crime Information Center Database Provides Additional Intellitence on Potential Terrorists

If a known or reasonably suspected terrorist gains entry to the United States, domestic terrorist watch list screening contributes to domestic investigative and intelligence activities, even when individuals are not on the No Fly or Selectee list. One watch-listing mechanism is the VGTOF subset of the National Crime Information Center database. Anytime a National Crime Information Center database search results in a match to a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, this information is relayed to the TSC. This is also true for encounters as a result of any watch list screening activity, such as a TECS or CLASS match. When the individual is the subject of a terrorism investigation, units within, the FBI coordinate with the case agent in charge of the investigation. Encounter information is also added to TIDE records. The intelligence gathering cycle and its feedback into the national watch-listing architecture ensures that individuals are correctly watch-listed, which reflexively secures our commercial aviation system.


.Page 36

ACLURM008126

SEPISlTIVE SECURITY INFORM',j.TlON

Special Mission Coverage is sometimes based on intelligence information not specific to an individual, which results in coverage for a specific flight or route. Although the fITst priority ofF AMS is the security of the aircraft, passengers, and crew, Special Mission Coverage is also used for surveillance as a collateral law enforcement function, with most surveillance requests coming from the FBI. Surveillance contributes to tracking the movements of criminals and subj ects of interest.

Use of the FBrs National Crime Information' Center Database Provides Additional Intelligence on Potential Terrorists

If a known or reasonably suspected terrorist gains entry to the United States, domestic terrorist watch list screening contributes to domestic investigative and intelligence activities, even when individuals are not on the No Fly or Selectee list. One watch-listing mechanism is the VGTOF subset of the National Crime Information Center database. Anytime a National Crime Information Center database search results in a match to a known or reasonably suspected terrorist, this information is relayed to the TSC. This is also true for encounters as a result of any watch list screening activity, such as a TECS or CLASS match. When the individual is the subject of a terrorism investigation; units within the FBI coordinate with the case agent in charge of the investigation. Encounter information is also added to TIDE records. The intelligence gathering cycle and its feedback into the national watchlisting architecture ensures that individuals are correctly watchlisted, which reflexively secures our commercial aviation system.

SENSITFi"E SECIJR.ITY HfFOID.{'moN

WAlUHNC. TMue""...! ""..tams StlIISiEi, e Scettr"it, ktffll'l'ftlHieft IMI i9 e6fltr"lled_def 49 CFRJlans 15 arid IS2e. }I" pllri "i Ih:.s ree8ffl l'fttI) I:oe Eliselosea ffi p"I'll""" .. Hlis~t B "need I" 1m",," II::! deflBell ill 19 GFRpftrt3 IS ftflIl152e, aleept ,,,jl:h H1e .HHM J3etmis~"" "flit" I"ffffiittistfotttr "fllte TrttMp"fl:MieR Seetlfi" AmffiniSfrBI:i_ "f lite Seetehlry ef TfllftspHfffiIiElII. UlllItlth..medl e!eo s e Iftft) result ill ei. it fJ e!lBII',I sf 6!lief IIcliaB:: FBf U.8. @6'femmeft! Il gene1CS, f!lIaliollisel6!M'e is gH.eHleti ~ 3 U.S.C. SS21tftd 49 C}2R plllts 13 and 1529,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing CommerciwAvilltioD

,Page 36

Conclusion

Potential threats to aviation security will always exist, regardless of efforts taken to eliminate all possible sources of risk. However, comprehensive, interagency security measures, which form the components of a larger aviation security cycle, help mitigate potential vulnerabilities to commercial aviation. The No Fl list is successful in ensurin that

b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA are su ject to additional physica screenui

Additionally, individuals listed in the consolidated TSDB who were encountered but not included on the No Fly and Selectee lists were not a threat to commercial aviation, and appropriately were not included on the watch lists according to existing criteria. Furthermore, although TSA uses only a limited subset of the TSDB to prescreen passengers, collateral security measures by the Department of State and CBP ensure that all known and reasonably suspected terrorists are screened prior to boarding an aircraft bound for or departing from the United States. These foreign passengers may be denied admission into the country, but CBP cannot prevent the entry of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents into the United States. Various TSA security measures also contribute to aviation security, regardless of an individual's watch list status. Lastly, although domestic watch list screening associated with commercial aviation only occurs for individuals on the No Fly and Selectee lists, law enforcement efforts till this gap by investigating potential terrorists. These efforts further protect aviation security by feeding valuable intelligence and information on the domestic activities of potential terrorists back into the watch-listing process.

p.LL, d....1„3dr., :a govocd by 5 U.E.C. 552 and 19 CFR porta 15 and 1520.


Page 37

ACLURM008127

8EN8ITI\'E SECHmT¥ INFOR-MATlON

Conclusion

b7E per FBI


Potential threats to aviation security will always exist, regardless of efforts taken to eliminate all possible sources of risk. However, comprehensive, interagency security measures, which form the components of a larger aviation security cycle, help mitigate potential vulnerabilities to fQ1m!~:&al aviation. . that

Additionally, individuals listed in the consolidated TSDB who were encountered but not included on the No Fly and Selectee lists were not a threat to commercial aviation, and appropriately were not included on the watch lists according to existing criteria. Furthermore, although TSA uses oilly a limited subset of the TSDB to prescreen passengers, collaterai security measures by the DepartInent of State and CBP ensure that all known and reasonably suspected terrorists are screened prior to boarding an aircraft bound for of departing from the United States. These foreign passengers may be denied admission into the country, but CBP cannot prevent the entry of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents into the United States. Various TSA security measures also contribute to aviation security, regardless of an individual's watch list status. Lastly. although domestic watch list screening associated with commercial aviation only occurs for individuals on the No Fly and Selectee lists, law enforcement efforts fill this gap by investigating potential terrorists. These efforts further protect aviation security by feeding valuable intelligence and information on the domestic activities of potential terrorists back into the watch-listing process.


JNAIDHNC: TMs reeafa e6:fttfti1l:l Seflfjia:'1e Seeurily 1nf_!;ieft!hM is e6llifeHeli l:IfItIer 49 GFRpflrh IS 11M ISilll. ~ta ,,11ft eftIHs feeaI'tl:lfttty ee dise-iased Ie pel':!eftS .. ilhettlli ullccdlaltttaw" as deIined itt 19 CHl,,1IttS Hi 81\/1 H2!9, elteepl • ..tlh the ,,,,,iltell penffl9siaft sf !he Admiflislffitsf af Ike fflfh'!fl6f!ftliaft Seelffit, AflmiHislffiti8B Sf i'lle Seersl!try ef TrtmsplfflB Baft. l:lfl:lftilhefl~ed 'felellse mIIY result in eivil penalty e1 a!har !Ie !;iell. Fel U. S. g&,'emmeftt Ii I!:~, Jlttblie diselS!ltlfe is ge .SftleB ~ § U.S.C. 552 IIHd 49 CFR "liftS IS _Ii lSilll.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists In Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 37

•

Appendix A Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

In response to a congressional mandate in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Division E), we assessed whether potential vulnerabilities exist to the commercial aviation system, as the Secure Flight program screens passenger names against only the No Fly and Selectee subsets of the TSDB, rather than the entire TSDB. Specifically, our objective was to determine whether potential vulnerabilities to the aviation system exist as a result of screening commercial air carrier passenger names against a subset of the TSDB, instead of the entire database.

We reviewed the watch list criteria and compositions of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full consolidated TSDB. We also reviewed the difference between the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists and criteria for inclusion in the full TSDB.

We interviewed representatives from federal agencies involved specifically in aviation security and watch list maintenance, including TSA, DV, FAMS, DHS' Screening Coordination Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, TSC, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NCTC.

Additionally, we analyzed terrorism-related encounter data provided by CRP's NTC—P and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, from June to August 2007, which was selected as representative of the highest volume months for international travel to the United States. We refined the data by removing duplicate encounter records and encounters not associated with a TIDE record. We then matched the encounters against the No Fly and Selectee lists for the same period, provided by TSA's Office of Intelligence, to identify individuals on those lists at the time of their encounter. Any individuals identified on the No Fly or Selectee list were removed from the sample. We further eliminated the bulk of CBP records representing individuals admitted without incidence and certain other records not related to immigration inspection activities. With this sample of individuals who had TIDE records, but were not on the No Fly or Selectee list, we examined each TIDE record to determine whether:

pubic disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 38

ACLURM008128

SI':~181TI\1'i SECUR-ITY H>lFORI\{ATION


In response to a congressional mandate in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2008 (public Law 110-161, Division E), we assessed whether potential vulnerabilities exist to the commercial aviation system, as the Secure Flight program screens passenger names against only the No Fly and Selectee subsets of the TSDB, rather than the entire TSDB. Specifically, our objective was to determine whether potential vulnerabilities to the aviation system exist as a resnlt of screening commercial air carrier passenger names against a subset of the TSDB, instead of the entire database.

We reviewed the watch list criteria and compositions of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full consolidated TSDB. We also reviewed th.e difference between the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists and criteria for inclusion in the full TSDB.

We interviewed representatives from federal agencies involved specifically in aviation security and watch list maintenance, including TSA, CBP, FAMS, DHS' Screening Coordination Office, U.S. hnmigration and Customs Enforcement, U. S. Deparbnent of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, TSC, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NCTC.·

Additionally, we analyzed terrorism-related encounter data provided by CBP's NTC-P and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, from June to August 2007, which was selected as representative ofllie highest volume months for international travel to the United States. We refined the data by removing duplicate encounter records and encounters not associated with a TIDE record. We then matched the encounters against the No Fly and Selectee lists for the same period, provided by TSA's Office of Intelligence, to identify individuals on those lists at the time oftheii- encounter. Any individuals identified on the No Fly or Selectee list were removed from the sample. We further eliminated the bulk of CBP records representing individuals admitted without incidence and certain other records not related to immigratioo inspection activities. With this sample of individuals who had TIDE records, but were not on the No Fly or Selectee list, we examined each TIDE record to detennine whether:

SENSlm'£ SBCUlWFY JNFOIUIiATION

WARNR1G. This reC6rft e6flffiin~ SeHljjij,e Seem!) Inf_Ii6fll:ftotls e611ErBl:led Illlfler 49 CFRp81'ts 15 fIIId iSle. ~f6 Jlllt'lBfthis l'Cemd III~ he maelBsed to JleJ1'!I6fllI "i!ft6Ht II "_ea161ffi6'il' 09 8eHMEi ill 49 GFRpOJts ]§ &ntII 329, elte ept witli !fie 'rVril;!eB peHflisM6H aHIle fdlminis tfft taf af tile TraMp am 1i6fl Seellfi!y AdmiHis Eraliaft 6f Ille SeeretMy of Tfllll:ipol'tali(lli. Utwu!fiomed Tcieilli e JII£Iy result ill eivil penally (IF (lIfter lIetiBII: Far U. S. g6'i eHIfHool lI~i ea, ptthlie dlsel6!JlH'e is gtI.flffledb) SU.s.c. 552 Mtd 49 CFRpftl'l:llS IlllalSlB.

Role of tbe No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 38


• The individual should have been on the No Fly or Selectee list, based on the July 2006 No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance at the time of the encounter;

• The individual would be on the No Fly or Selectee list now, based on the revised June 2008 No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance; and

• The individual should be on the No Fly or Selectee list for any reason, but is excluded from those lists due to insufficiencies in the No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance.

We also reviewed applicable legislation, regulations, directives, policies, operating procedures, and official guidance documents and manuals. In addition, we studied work previously performed by our office in this and associated areas, as well as the work conducted by GAO, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of Inspector General.

Although we focused on the potential vulnerabilities to the commercial aviation system caused by the Secure Flight program's intention to screen commercial air carrier passenger names against a subset of the consolidated terrorist watch list, GAO has conducted other reviews of the program. In the past, GAO highlighted numerous problems with the development of Secure Flight and identified challenges that TSA continues to face in implementing the program. Our report does not duplicate GAO's previous work.

Our fieldwork began in March 2008 and concluded in September 2008. We initiated this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections, issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

public duelonire is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 crit parts 15 and--1-5207


Page 39

ACLURM008129

SEMSITIVE SECURH'¥ fNFORl'sIATION


• The individual should have been on the No Fly or Selectee list, based on the July 2006 No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance at the time of the encounter;

• The individual wouldbe on the No Fly or Selectee list now, based on the revised June 2008 No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance; and

• The individual should be on the No Fly or Selectee list for any reason, but is excluded from those lists due to insufficiencies in the No Fly and Selectee criteria and implementation guidance.

We also reviewed applicable legislation, regulations, directives, policies, operating procedures, and official guidance documents and manuals. In addition, we studied work previously performed by our office in this and associated areas, as well as the work conducted by GAO, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of Inspector General.

Although we focused on the potential vulnerabilities to the commercial aviation system caused by the Secure Flight program's intention to screen commercial air carrier passenger names against a subset of the consolidated terrorist watch list, GAO has conducted other reviews of the program. In the past, GAO highlighted numerous problems with the development of Secure Flight and identified challenges that TSA continues to face in implementing the program. Our report does not duplicate GAO's previous work.

Our fieldwork hegan in March 2008 and concluded in Septemher 2008. We initiated this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections, issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

SENSITIV:E SECURITY HIFOR,",ftiFION

WARl'lINC. 'Tht:! :reetffll eBftlfttm SeH!IlIH e Seett:rity llIfefffifttiea Ihftl is eeHtl'eHefll!oaller 49 C¥R J'lIH'IB IS flftfll§2B, Pkl J'lliri eftbis leeeHl Bltty -ee fliselesefl te lleffi6BS witfietll II "Heed: te 1Hte .. ,. tiS IIefi~B iB 49 CPR ~ftft8 IS 8:II:IIlSi!9, e!feepl willi the Wf'i!left peflll:issiea ef (;Be lrlkHilHslfttttlr 8C iii!! tlllll9j'!Mtflti6a Seellfi~' AElmiBislfllli6a 6F the 8eeretllry of Tn!!5peRolioB. UnlRliliol12ea feielt.'le Bltty resttlt iB ei-vil fleBaHyer allier astian. Fa, y.8. ge''eHHHeBt egeaeies,

publ:ie cklel6SlfI'e i:l! gthemefl B) S U.s,C. StH IHtfl 49 CPR fllIlts IS Pnd 1520.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in SC(;Dring Commercial Aviation

Page 39

Appendix B TSA Management Comments to the Draft Report

Ofiricr of the riArianr Seradare

319. boorinam of tlevretsod Bradt/ 601 Soak 1/rA Sem Arbeftre, VA 2L,01,411e

MAR 1 7 2009 Transportation Security Admittistra don

INFORMATW

MEMORANDUM FOR: Riebard L. Skinner Inspector General fiepartment of Homeland

•IV; u ;4°1 FROM: Gale D. Roaside 5

Acting Admin.

SUBJECT:

Purpose

Transportation Security Administration's Response to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security CDFISI Office of Inspector General (010) Draft Region "Rale of TV '4 No My and Selectee Lists in Securing Cant/meet& Avita fon — Sensitive .VectIrin• Information fSSI), " January 2009

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response to. die DHS 010 draft report "Role orTSA' s No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation — Sensitive Security Information (SS1)," January 2009. TSA appreciates the opportunity to review and provide eumnicnis to your draft report.

Background

At the request ofthe Fiouse and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security, DIG reviewed whether potential vulnerabilities exist in commercial air carrier passenger prescreening. Specifically, 010 was asked to review the TSA's Secure Flight program's intention to prescreen passenger names against only the No Fly and Selectee lists, rather than the erotic Government terrorist watch list database, 01Cr determined the: (1) watch list criteria and compositions of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB),, (2) differences between the criteria for inclusion on the No Fly and Selectee lists and the full ISIS; and (3) potential vulnerabilities to the aviation system caused by prescreening commercial air carrier passenger names against the Na Ply and Selectee lids. instead of the full TSDB.



Page 40

Of

ACLURM008130

8E~!SITIVE SECURI'I'Y INFOOUA'I'ION

AppendixB TSA Management Comments to the Draft Report

SENSf'fI'/E SECURITY INPORftbt'flON U.s. ~1.lfrUIIIHII' .10 ...... 4 SttllrlJy 601 ..... 1""_

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PROM:

SUBJECT:

MAR 1 7 zoog

II#'ORMA TlON

Richard L. Sklnne, T n!qleclOr Genernl

·Arhnfmll.. VA mOl...u..Hl

.• l'riImporGition Security

• Admittlstration

DepanmcDI of Homelund Sc:curi~' • I? )

Gale D. RossideA.4JJ. ~ Actjnlll\dh1in~

Trllmportalron Secm-ity Adm;lIiSlralion's Response 10 the U.S, lftpilltJnl!n( of HomellUld Security (DHSj om"" IIf Inspeclor Gwcrol (Ol.O) Drufl Rcporl "Roft- (JlrsA:~ No Fly (Jnd Stlej;fe;o USia In SecwJng CortlmtTcial AV/fJlrOn - Sl!ruilNtlScCl(riO' III!OrmflIJO/1 (SSI), " JIlIIIlIfJ)' .1009

This memonmdum conslilUtes the T nmsportl'llion Secllrity Administration' s (TSA) n:.spll/lge 1o, lhe DHS 010 dnlft repOrt HRoie ofTSA' s' No Fly ami Selectee Lists in SecurirlS Comm=illl Mistior! - SMsili¥E! SI!C1lI"II}' lnrormlll.lon (5SI)," January 2009. TSA appreciates the oppomurily (0 mj"w 3l1d ""'''''de t;Qmm"ll11I to yotlI drafl report.

Background

AI \be request oftbe House and .~rul.le Approprilld()l\$ Subc:ornmitteet on Honlehu:u) Security, ora Il""k:wed whether pOlentiai vulm:IIIhiliiie, exi51 iii commercial air ClUTier passenger pw;creenin~ Specifically, 010 Willi askl,d 10 review the TSA'5 Secure flight program's illtention ICJ pIC!CKCii J)M5Cngcrnames IIogNl1lIl c[]ly !he Nc Fly IJIld Selectee hslS. miher thtllllhc entim Government 1I:lWrlsl WtIlch lisl dlillllbue. DIG- dclCnnined the: (I) walch lis\ crjteria and composilion!! oflht No Fly and Selecl~ lislS emt Ihe full «lnoolidated Terrorist Scrttmlng DabJba.lle (TSDB); (2) diffen:n~ belween the crilelia ror lllciusion on the Nil Ply allli Selectee li815 and Ihe full l'SOB; ILJIIi (3) potential villnc:rnhllities to the avllltioD system CilUSOO by pn:scrceoing cummercin\lilr cllma passenger IlIIm;)S 8,$8iru'lllhe No Fly-and Seleciee lists, inslUd oftlu: full TSI)B.

IiIoItU"IIi"JI!U ............ 1Iii lit 11).... III I I 'At (pcrA, 11' 'Ull " r 1 fl'· 'II t !krllrt 'P,. ,"1"1~' i'M ,',' ,,,, da db,g(FPpn '£ "flO p "La rl pnsd=h' nf'h t 1 _aW,cet 'M Tctnpnrt'fim SuN IQ' 613'2';[7"99 - (be '=""Q' tf Ia IX" '*an "tMtt'Dclw' p'·tz .,., nM,lt I, ""I •• 'trll[ 114W,.sdgg fer I~'" enttt,CP' MeeW' whllcdi"mpu "wnnrd bY, '1 sr ."r,ed.,· ~pc_.r4"'U;11'

SENSITIVE SECURITY HI-FOIlMATION

WARNH~G. 'Thi~ reeoM eetilaiB:<J SeHtIiEi, e Seetlfity lHfatmatiBft that is eefttfBllethtMet' 49 CFRpMS IS lIfle!lS21:l. ~ffi flaM BHflis ree8ffl 1H8:Y he diselased te peffi6ftS 'ilithalit 1\ "Reee! ffi l!flaW"!l9 tleliftetl ill 49 GFRflf1ft9 15 aM 1529, ~eeflt "ith !he .. fitter! fleffflissiElIi af the l<Elmill:isffiltBf ef the ffll!!lf)OfttlEieIl SeelHil) AflmiBisffitEitm 6f the Seere~ Bf'TflmspBrtaEiBIl. U'IllIllthtffized releue IHff) ftlswt Hi ei <'il fleflftll) BY 8!her tleEiell. Fe! U.8. gS¥efMIi:eB t ageBeies, pttbbedl~ele9t1t'el9 gB.eme!l:h) 5U,S.G 5S21Hld 49CFRpilftslS I'IIId lS21:l.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercilll. Aviution

Page 40

I• Y I. I el


Page 41


SE-NSIT/V-E-SEetlitfra4NFORM-A-T-113N-

As a result of its review, 016 found that although the use of the Mo Fly and Selectee lists are largely successful in identifying potential terrorises that could threaten commercial aviation, some individuals are not included on the lists who may also present.vulnerabilities to aviation security, However, the passenger prescreening against terrorist watch lists proposed by I he Secure Plight program is only one component ofa larger security cycle that protects the Nation's commercial aviation system. International and domestic security activities within and outside DHS, such as intelligenr.e gathering, law enforcement investigati❑ns. vim issuance, and border protection, mitigate potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Secure Flight program and enhance commercial aviation security overall.

Disogsion

TSA appreciates the work 010 has done in this review and agrees with OIG's analysis and conclusion that the No Fly and Selectee Lists successfully identify terrorists who pose a threat to aviation security. TSA also agrees with 010 that other security measures address potential vulnerabilities not addressed by the Seem Flight program and that these security measures enhance aviation security.

The Role of Terrorist Watch Lists in Aviation Security

TSA's aviation security strategy relics upon an overlapping system of multiple layers of security. Key to this system is the use of intelligence to both develop countermeasures against terrorist threats and to intervene directly when threats become apparent. One of the most important tools in the fight against terrorism is the U.S. Government's consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).

Prior to 9/11, infomedion about known or suspected tertorists was dispersed throughout the U.S. GONEM115611/. and no single Agency wag charged with consolidating IL and making it available for use in terrorist screening. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6, the TSC now provides "one-stop shopping" so that every Government agency is using the saniCTSDB—whether it is TSA, a U.S. consular official issuing visas overseas. ora State or local law enforcement dams on the street. The consolidated system allows Government agencies te run name checks against one comprehensive database with the most accurate. up-to-date information about knovrii and suspected terrorists.

The consolidated system provides the critical nexus between the work of the intelligence and law enforcement communities and the rest of the countenerrorism community, Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly end in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuels.who pose a terror threat It would be dangerous and negligent not to use this information to our advantage. TSA is constantly adapting to the ever-changing threat en vironment and improving our people, processes, and technology to detect and deter threats. As important as it is to detect threat objects, it is imperative that we use intelligence to aid in the identification and interception of the people who would do us harm.

Terrorist watch lists keep legitimate terror threats off airplanes every day, all over the world.

ACLURM008131

SI!:J)!SHIVE SECURITY INFOmi:t.TlOPI


SENSffl¥~ SECURI'f'i' fNffORMkHON

As II resull pi iTS m'ieW, OIG fpLIIld Ihlll rJtil.ough th-: us<: of the No Fly gOO Selcc~ I iSIs are largely 5uc~ess£ul in identifying pIIt\lllliallllmlrisL~ lIlat eou]d ibrellTeJI '<>mmeNilllllvimlil'ln, some individual9 are. not includro on Ihe Jisls Who ",Il)' aloo pn:5eJllvuln"rnhililifl~ 10 "I'illiion . ~urily. HDWcvcr, Ihe ~cnger prescrecning llgainst lerrorist wlllch lists proposed by I lie Secure f1lghl program is only one component of II IIllger s«urily cycle that prulect;; Ihe Nallon'~ romm~illi Bvllllion system, intemlliiona\and domeslle !IC(!urity aClivities Wilhi nand oU1s.idi: DHS, suth lIS iJUeUigence gathering, jl!lw enforcement il')\'~tigQlions. vin jiSuance., and border proleCtian. miuaw= polllntilli vulnerabililies nol oddres:!l~d by the Se .. ure Flighl prognun IIJld cnhan'OC cammaciaiavilliion securily ovcmll.

Discussion

TSA lippr~iale~ the work 010 hIlS done in this review and agree' wiih OIG's aolllysis mnd conclusion tlmt lm, No Fly and SelecTee Lists. sw:~ssrully identify telTOnsls who pose II IhreaL to nialion !leCurity. TSA also agrees wilh OJa that olher securiTY measures addrc$s potential vulnmtbililies nol w1dro::S!OCd by Ihe SroUfe Flighl prograJl'l ond that these ~curilY meu:rures enhanceavilltion seC.IlriI),.

TSA's aviariWi !Ie~lIriIy ~tralegy relje~ llPOl111!1 overlapping ~)'stern orrnuliipJe Illyerg of :!tcm!ly. l<I:y.1O lhis $y:\C<mI is cbeuse ofinll!Wgm:e to both deVeIl'lp c;ounl<mnrlllsanlS against ~rroristthnlli.1S IIDd 10 inlCNCne direclly ..... hen Inreats become Ilppttl'enl, One orille IllQ!II imponanllOOls in the fight against teJTOrism is !he U.S. GOl/emmenl's Cl'Il1Solidaled Terrorist SClUIling Dlilabar;c (11iDB) manlljCd by lhe TcrmnS1 Screetlinl! Cl:1ller (TSC).

Prior 10 9111, information about JcilOwn or suspected knorislS WIlli dispc<5Cd \hroughoullhc U.S, Gonmlllenl. and no singlcAgeney W3I\ I;hargcd wllh oonsolidBlin!: iL om! making it avail.a.ble for use illierrorilil screening, Und~r Homeland Secllrily Pre>idenlial DiTe()livi: (HSPD) 6, me rsc now provides: ~one-sIOp Sh<>JIIIlog~ selhlll every GOllemmenl IlI!(!Tlcy Is using 1m, SlllTte'TSDB---wh"lilcr it is TSA, a U.S. wn5Uw official issuin!!. vi""" over5"(L'l. ora Slate or Jocallaw enforcemenl officer on fbI! strc:el, The IXInsolidall!d system allows Governmenl agcllcitUD run name cheeks Bp.inllL Olll: .. 'Om'Pn:hensi~ ~tllbase with Ibe mosl actUrale, uIHodate infoDllalion about known iIIld sbS)le<:ted ~risIS.

Th~ consolidated ~y~tem provides the crllkallJelius belWI:CD Ihe work afthc inlelJj~ncell'l1d low enfan:emenl communilie:s IIQd l~ rest oftht! counlcnerrorisrn communlry. Our partners i.n Ihe IQW enforecment·JUid intelllgcneecommunltJcs work lirelessly and in some cases under great pby~ cal dangl:r 10 jdcnti fy indi"iduals 'who P08C ateIT1lr threat, It wollid be d1\ns.£'rous. and . oe\digCnlllCll to usc this Inrormalion 10 our advanlage. TSA is consllLnlly adopring 10 the everchanging Iltre&t envirorUnent arid improvillg Dill' people, processes. and tectmology to dClact and deW!/m!I\U. A~ irroportant1l5 II is 10 d!!leCldm:aI. objecl!/" il is impentlive ihal We w;c intelligeoce 10 mj II in *e idenlifi ClItion und inll:l:ception or Ihl; paJPk wh!l would do us hllrm.

T~rist w'l1ch I isl9 keep legi Ii mate lerror tbrealSolf ail1llanes every da)', a 11 ol'~ the world.

JntftJi .... &"."fi-;.PdLid.UhL:bi.·Stwili (Sa: .~.,l;fIl'M'dQ, ... tA ... iJlkcI d;, "MiRp I L dL •• P-upwlaF'his '_.'l'b .cCrdtt

, __ =&')"1'''' '1mb'xt-' "d''i ... ",8CE Pp''",'Sccd '52ft pwtp'MU.lh " .... -...... 10 .r ... ''III ... ~kLl .16 T I UIiINf, If" IIRrdl. n [. "'" «X'f .... f 't I 1 .EliE» .IS ._.blell.DC.a, Li Cr\'1 4Lci:c: ... fu. ti:ttEGldhl ..... ; .... CCICI;Pdllh: :I .... ia, .. i,if#D'u.dbjJ t:Ji.f::~ .. illMll

fp c" ,. .. e-:; F~1 'va ' 2

SENSU"!}; SECURITY INFOrn.IATImf

WAJHRNG. 'FhineeoM Mn~ 8ermti,e 8etlt1flt) IMsHfIfIlieB!hftt is e6fltH'6Hedll8der 49 CFR PPM 15 PHd IS2e. no plll't IIfllHs l'eeMtllftfL) be tHselosea tEl JleffioM .. ilhEltlt II "Mea tolmo,," liS de!Utea 1ft 49 CFIl pHris IS IIftfi. 1529, e!!eEiJlt "itlt the ,ffltleH peHftissi6flt of Ifte AfhttirHsffilt6f oOke TftlMporiftlieB 8eetU".i:t, Al'imiHislf'ft!ion Of the SefLfel~ efTHIllilf'effitJwfI. UlHltllhmized ..,!efllle Hlfty re9llit in ei, i:I: peftftllj M ether oetien. Fer U.S. ge' emmelll flgeoeies, "tthlie diselos1tf'<'i is gl" erned b) S U. 8. C. 552 IHIti 49 GFR P ItI't.l H 1HIa. 1529.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lists in Secudng Commercial Aviation

Page 41


The lists are reserved for known or suspected terrorists who have reached a threshold where they should not be allowed to fly mall:mid receive additional scrutiny before boarding an aircraft. Using the No Fly and Selectee watch lists, TSA can quickly evaluate passengers to determine if they have a known or suspected link to terrorism or pose a threat to national security and 10 mevent passengers with known or suspected links to terrorism from boarding aircraft.

The Role of Watch Lige Nominating Crlieria

The No Fly and Selectee list inclusion criteria were initially established in October 2004 by the Homeland Security Council, The council is e cabinet-levet body that coordinated homeland security-related activities for the Federal Government and promotes effective homeland security policy development and Implementation. The nomination criteria were subsequently updated by the Homeland Security Council on February 8. 2008. Under this system, members of the law enforcement and intelligence community submit norninatiom to the TSC. generally through the National Counterterrorism Center. Nominations are processed and adjudicated by the TSC with support from ISA.

The nomination criteria are strictly applied to each individual nomination, M a result, only individuals with known or suspected links to terrorism or are otherwise risks to homeland or national security are plated on the No-Fly or Selectee lists. This ensures that TSA concentrates directly an known and suspected risks to aviation in passenger screening,

Conclusion

'ISA appreciates the work 010 has done in this review and agrees with 010's analysis and conclusion that the No Fly and Selectee Lists successfully identify terrorists who pose it threat to aviation security. We look forward to working with OIG in future engagements, TS A's response to 010's recommendation follows.

• 1..


Page 42

ACLURM008132

SEJ!»SJTIVE SECUR-ITY giFOlt"MlflON


SENSI'PJ'lE SEeURIlY INFORMA't'ION

The li~s Ilre reservild for kl1o\WI1ll' sU!lpected lelTOrists ",no IIav~ relKbed Ellhre$bold where lhey slKiuld not be allowed to ny or mould re~eive addlLfonal smniny be~ booming lin lIircraft. Using rhe No Fly iIIId SeleclllC WIIlch JiSIS, !SA can quickly cvalilllte ptI&Jengers to delennine if they haw &icnOWIl OT5Upd:lcd litd: to 1errori§m or pose a (brut 10 nalionai.'ll:cllrily and II) prevent passengers with lu1o'>m or !usp«ied link~ to lerrorisn1 from boarding aircml\..

TM Role o,fWQ/C'h Lisf NO/llUwling erller/a

lh1; No Fly IVid Seieeli!"e list iru:lU5ioo cOl"ria Were initially cstoblishcd in Oclober 2004 by the Homel..,..d Security COQJlCil. The. council is 0 cabll!c:t-lC'"e[ body iblll toordinated homeland secunty-rcla~d activities fOf the Federal Govemmem and promotes effacli ve homeland security pulioy dewlapmcmlllJld hnplommtation. Tho nominal ion erileria were &\lilsequrntly Updaled by tbe HODldand S~urh,. Couneil 011 F'eb11l61)' Ii. 2008. Unde-r tili. system, members of the I.", etiforcemCllI ilRd intcUig~nce oommunity submitl1omln.otlom to Ihe TSC. generally thrriuBh !he NEliiona) CoWilenerrorism emler. NomiRalioJt5 ere ~ mel adjudi~B\.:d by tbe TSC wilh suppOrt fulm TSA.

The notninaliclJI criteria ore miClly applied to each individual nominl!lion. As 8 r~sll]l. only lndivhl.uah with known or IlUSpe!:ted liflks to terror;s01 OJ are otherwise risks 10 homeland or DllliQnBl ~IlCUri1y on: pl.,w onlhe No-Fly or Selectee lists. This ensures thDt TSA tDncen.tr~IC!> direclly OIl known and &u&pCClcd riskl! to a "milon in pu;engct screening,

Condusion

''fSA app!eCilltesthe work OIG has dODI! in Ihis review III1d Qgn=e$ wllh DIG's amtIysis and conclusion thai the No Fly IUld Sdc~'""Llil:s suc(;~.!ISfuJly idenli fy u:rror/".s who paso: • threat 10

Bviallon seeurily. We look forward 10 working wi,h OIG in flllurc engallentents, TS A's respol\K to 010'$ recommendation follows. .

""'1" !I,u.&a'H:i $f,ilbi ....... &Ac,.' 'iiilkta'pi f 1, p" IE 11 Rf. ",crR, "f d'$2° Y F ttl" aI .... ;L IIIiMIMt' p J r. 1111. t L ~ d. it 'PC·sa,. ..... U 1")01'" irf''kw'F'fa

p."'''''''' Dr .... =+-j.".,."C "'ph Tan......,....?· hedtor *dniw"wW" = v .... 5-tn1mrr aJl)p-'OOI"'krD J")f.rhurlrr' , ........ -rUm ,W-r1 .... n'qorl!9M:r=""'P Ew ") man··,rudp peM'" djpwurhftD'Ua"I bY1 11, r Ma ,nd

fD "0' d' '5 I d tOD, J

SENSlHVE SECURITY INFORM:ATJON

v.r-AffiHHG. 'This feelffil e6ftwim Seasil:i, e Seetffi!) (Bfa_heft thaI i9 eentrelled tHHlef 49 ern]:lam IS lIBEl lS2Q. }ok! tlBfi flf litis ree6uill'lll') be Htsel6sed te peffleM witheet B "aeed te im6"" HS detinet! is 49 CF:R fJf1ft9 15 ftfId 1529, BitB Elf' t "jEll tbe W'f'l Hen fI ermissien ef tIte Atlmittislfltt M of the '&IIBSP6MHtffl Seeftfity Allmiftist flIl i till (lr llie S eereilft)' efTHlMtl(ll'fllhBft. U1I:!ltl!ft6f'im6 rele!ljje ~ re9li1l in ei~il tleflaity €If ather aetial!. Far U,S. g'ev_efl! egeaeies, flltbHe tHSelflslHB is ge,emeti 1') 5 U.S.C. 552 IIttd 49 Cf'-R fJaftS 15 IHII1 1529.


Page 42


Transportation Sonority Administrition'a itinponse Depariguent of Homeland Security oaten of Inverter Generate Draft Report

Rale of TSA's No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation, January 2009

ecom end : Determine whether II le appropriate to la Nu Fly restrictions or additional screening

prior to boarding an aircraft.

TSA Cancun in Part: The nomination criteria for each list produced from the T51311 arc developed and approved by a multi-agency working group M a pircess overseen by the Harneland Security Council. Each individual nominated to a terrorist watch list must

in ndentl meet the nomination criteria in order to be listed. would require an amendment to the

nomination criteria.

on the No Fly and Selectee LiSCS, it appears the only

egeelive way to ensure that they are restricted From boarding an aircraft or undergo additional screenin would be to add them to the No Ffy ur Selectee List. T

and raises privacy and other concerns. bled on the No-Fly an or Spica= Lis!

individually mod the criteria for nomination m either list. they will be placed an die list individually.

ISA wilt need to explore this issue with other interested agencies to determine wheihm= the No Fly and Selectee Lists to these lists is a modem step

that would enhance security. However, the issues involved in this recommendation, it is highly unlikely the lisis would Se in this fashion.

b7E per FBI

b5 (DP) per ODNI

b3 , 7E per TSA


Page 43

ACLURM008133

S:QoISITlVE SBCUIHTY fNForu.4;'.TIO~


b7E per FBI

b5(DP)per ODNI

b3, 7E per TSA

SENSITIVE SEClJRITY INFORMATION

TURlpoTlathJn Seeurlty Admlnistnfio,,'~ R«PDUO o..plU'hllebf of Hotne"'nd SCl.'urity Olll:e Dr IlHp"~I"r GOIJ!nl'~ Draft Report

Kelt IIfTSJr.'. No Fly lind SDl~111Ci' Llru in SlffiJrtnll ComlDen:iallbilition, Jllhuary 2009

U appropnille 'o'~IIII'''~~.''1 ••• iiji ••• iiil;; Nu 'Fly reltrlcliolll or acldillou1Jllt\Aening prior to. ~rdlng ......... .",ft.

TSA Cop~un iD hili The nl)mloation ailw for C/lcb lisl produced from the TSDB are devrlDplld and BpJlrtlved by II rnultj'ill!el\QY wmting.llJllup in • ~= Oyt=1l by ltl. Homeland S~urilyCouncjl. Bleb indjvidtl;llllominaLct:l In II

'iii I

willl owr Imer<lswd llgencies 10 d~lenninc w~ No Fl)' and SelC<:I"" Lis\.'; fq lhe.'lc Ihts is a pl1l11enl ~lIlP

, •• ,.,.i".cn the jSlll!e:s inVQI~d in this recommendalion, j( \5 'I! • in Ihi~ fash.iOll.

IUtllrt1J'r&"Rai,c_=dtuAI.,a.:, rid ci51, ... ;:"I.r. 41A~.h;: 1 • U" :k t.l:ftlip J )Ii • Inl.!II pa 14 ... , i (iL' d;1 IW I! 'II,'! J i. 11 IPII ••• ..,"; .. 1.11" ... 1 ,'CAl> 'F I'P9 I ,. 1101:" ...

. , J J Cct'" d 11l' hbt T-Qz1,.lrnl' 1M ED WI'.)' , ::I.lnl"_E·' nr-'b· 5 C:CMss PM , 'SHop ""."t -S-' tlhis _~ iiii1111:ithl.JtIL,'''''11IJ s,. n v,. 'J'. .,,. ... Jit ,tiltH In T I b"'.

. .. era.,.,p L~4d I. •• "I'L' I CPil

4

8ENBmVE SECUR:ITY IPIFORM,ATION

WAlHmKi: This record eeml!lifta SeH~ili.e 8eetlJ'i'" lBffIfBlftli6B til,,1 13 e6flft'oHea tlHfiet- 49 C¥R I'fIfIs IS and 1529. }ItS I'MI 6f Ihl::l recoM ffiIt) be .4iselosal'l1e l'ers8Ds wilMtllt a "fleed to lH'tow" 88 defines ill 19 GFRl'arls 1 S IIHtIo Hi:!9, e!teert ,nth !;he "riMeD flemHssi61i 6f!he A!lmiB:istl'llt6l' tIf the T:rftH9poftftlieD Seetffit'/ AllmiBistl'lll:,u:tft Of !he SeeretM)' 6fTI'ftIiSflefllltie:n. UftBIl~ed !elene mo) :relltflt in at ril pentll:ly Of e!her Belief!, F6I' U.8. gO'feHffileHt f!geaeies, fllt"tie fliselesttre is gtllemed by 5 U,SC, 55:! 11M 49 CPR: I'm IS and 15:!9.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lisb jn Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 43

Appendix C NCTC Management Comments to the Draft Report

PfREC NATIONAL. COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

VicAirglott DC :05M.

NCTC-2009.0039

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Carlton I. Mann Assistant Inspector General for Inspections U.S, Department of Homeland Security

SUBJECT: (tiffrou-o) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Comments on TINS Draft IG Repon

(LIfirDITID) My staff has. reviewed, with interest. your rhea's Draft Report: Rola Of

rsA s No FI.Y and Selectee. Lkty. in Securing Connnerciol Rvintion—Sensiliw Security. iqcorincnion (SSI). In addition, the NCTC officers respnnsible for managing the "ferrorist identities Datamari Environment (TME). along, tvith aPINCTC aaamey, mei with members or your inspection team recently. for a cordial and pmductivc discussion int the draft report. Their corrnnents appear in the attachment.

(U/W-(4t-1B)NCTC is comfortable with the thrust of the report and has provided several . technical recommendations. On two points.of concern raised respectively...in your letter and in the report, Invite the following:

b7E per FBI/ODNI

b5(DP)per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

• As you requested. N CTC officers arc wotking with the TSO lo review the report for sensitivity and. once that review is complete, will comment on appropriateness af public release of any infortnation contained in the report,

(U) Sharthiyan have nay questions, pleaso enniact me.

Michael E. Leiter

Date

Attachment] (11441444)NCTC Comments on OHS Draft 10 I.I.epon

gt.q./""' n"I v

• i S. 111 2


Page 44

ACLURM008134


b7E per FBI/ODNI

b5(DP)per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

DlIIECTO){ NI.TIONAL eOUNT8I.TEJ(IlORISM CENTER

Wo;~oo DC :~Y!~

MEMORANDUM FOR:. lviI. Carhon LMlIlllJ fu;sistDJli lnspet!(>f General for Inspeclions U.S. Deparlmclll of Homeland Sccuilty

SUBJEtT: . (lJifFOO€-) NlItional CountericlTorism CenlC! (NCTe) C\>mine,ns on DHS Dufl IG Repon

(Ullf'Eti-fS) My si3!1'has reviewed, with i~teresl., your office's Dwji R~p(Jfl: Ro/t af TSII. '$ No FIji ami Sdr:~{ee Li;:I.~· in &wrlng erJIIIn/udal t/virrtirm--Semilh't S~~lIri(1' JI!frlrmalian (SSJ). In add iii on. the NCTC(lffic~rs Nspo!l'iblc: for mlltlagiJlS Ih" Terr"riSl IdenliLie.; D:lL:lmlll1 Environmenl (TIOE). along \"ilh :111 NeTC ,,!tomey. mel Willi members of your inspeclinn leanl n:cenllyfor a cordi3land pmdIJdivc di~tussi\Jn "" llic draft n:P()rI Thoir comments. 9pJl"Rr in Ute "nuchmcnl.

(U/IfBi,l.G) NeTC is comfortable wilh tli~.lhrusl of lh~ rcptm 0nd Iw~ provideil .",'em! technic III recommendalions. On !WI' pojnt~orr(\ncem r~iscil nlspecllY~ly,.in yl)lJT I~fter <Iud irl the report, I Uole Ibe folio\\ing:

•

• As )OU requested. N CTC olIicCl'$ are wotking with the TSC 10 review ill(: report (or somsitivity and, 00.:<: that rel'Lew LS wmplck, wi1lcommcnl on gpproprill\eness of publicreJi!aS.:i 6f any infO,.rt,:lJioh o::tlnlained i,\ ihl) repoll,

Miclrael E, Leiler Dille

AtlaChmBnl: (LJ/~) 'NCTC COlllmcnis on DHS Drnfi 10 i{qxlrt


VlARNlNC: This reeoo-ti eflfll!UlIS Stlftsili.e 8tlooril) l!tfefflIfItifflj: tlmt is elHltffiHeli tHlliet' 49 CFRtlftfts 15 aMl152Q. N6 pllf't M!hiS reeertllt'ltry be dl~clflsed ttl pel'llefts m Iltflltt fI "'fteel'l tf! iffifYil''' M a flf_a iB 4 9 CFR pW'ls I S liftS 152!l , e!teept "jilt the MiKeft peHl'lissjetl fir !:he lrdmifljslfftter flf!he 'FflHisllflffilKBft 8f1etJri~ AdmiJtisl:mt1fflj: fir the Seerelflf) fir TrfIDStlertftfteti. Uttltlj!IiemJeti release IftIt') resmt iB ei ,il peftllit) 61' 61h~ ael:ieft. Fm U.S.)!;fI'iO eH'lffient l!f;eHeies, pt1iJlie siseleslife is gthemed.", S U,S.c. SS2 flDd 49 CFRpMls 158M! 1529.

Role oftlle No Fly and Seleclee Lhts in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 44


tiRcLAsSIFIED//ron orrICIaL 1,3r, orm

NCI'C Comments mil MIR Drell IG Report

alifFetle) PAGE 6. PARA 2. last sentence. — "Of the non-terrorist associates contained in TIDE, only spouses and children are exported In the TSC" request sentence be modified to add "non-US Person" in front of spouses and children and add an expianaloty statement, such as In accordantz with the ENA section 212 (a) (3) (B) (I) (IX) which deems spouses and children excludable from the US under certain criteria.

*(spousetchi Id is an alien - and children are under 21 and unmarried)

Miff-84031 PAGE 7, PARA 4, last sentence — We arc now sending photographs with no additional identifiers to the TSC— thus, the "oilier than photograph- no longer upplims in die sentence. Suggest u--or ding such as 'Inontetric data such as a planogtaph, Iris sena or fIngerpri n , "

(1)14‘4414) PAGE 11. PARA 3, sentence one — Recommend removing the phrase "and the NCTC" from the sentence beginning "Nominating agencies..." COMMENT: NCTC does not sell nominate to the ISA lists; however, we will coordinate with nominators endior the TSC to place iodividuals who qualify for listing lath linve not been previously nominated for the No Fly or Selectee-list.

(Ulif-elge) PAGE 11. PARA 4, sentence two— Substitute "eligibility" for

General comment On sensilivily review — NCTC is coordinating willt the TSC to provide comments,

M4CLAO1FiEDI/V9il oprItal UEC ow.;

public diaeloattro is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 19 CFR Nub 15 and 1520.


Page 45

ACLURM008135

SENSITIVE SEClIDITY INFOILW:rION

AppendixC NCTC Management Comments to the Draft Report

UNCI.ASSlFIEDIIFaR 9FPIe!iIIW 'I;lSE Oiali

:NCfC Common ... on DHS DmfllG Rwort

(U//l"'8t:!'&l PAGE 6. PARA 2. laSt sentence. - ''Of Lhe nDn'ICl'lVri~lllSrocialc:; contained In TIDE, onl~ SpoU5e.~ ond children lire expoJled In !he TSC" reque.~! sel1!enoc bemodilied!o add "!lon·US Pelllon" in fronl OfspOU8eS and childn:n and I\dd III) eJ:planalory slalemenl, ~uch as "in acmtd,oce with We rNA secliofl 212 (II) P) (8) (i) (IX) whim deems s[>Omcs WId c/1iW,..,., eXcludable Itom lhB US IJruler eenrun eriler;", ..

"'(spo\l~etchi ld is an aliel1 - lind chi lwen lire under 21 lind unrnllITicd)

(U/~1 PAGE 7, "PARA 4, IIl&I senlellCe Wc.lIJ'C now sending phOlognjIhs with no additional identlfi= 10 we TSC -lhus. the "01 her Illan photograph" nO longer Ilpplies in 11m s"n!ence. Sugge.,1 l~un1i~g sunil as "bion~{Jj" dal:l) such a. 'l plm!ogrllph, lrh SrJJl1 or t1ngorpri nl. .. "

(U/WOOO) PAGE II PARA]. ~eDlenCI! Olle ~ Re.:omrnend remOving Ihe phnlsc "nod the NCTC" from the semMec beginninL\"NominBling agencies ... " COMMENT: NCTC doe.~ nol ..ruf~nomina~" 10 Ihe TSA lim; however_ we will coordinate wI1h nominal:ors andlor the TSC w ploce iJid'vidulIhwllo quaUfy for Il~ling bllllmve nO! beell preViOlls1y IIOmlnatl:d for !he No Fly or Seleclee-lis!.

(U/~JI'AGE JLPARA 4, sentence rWQ- Sul>~lilllle "eJlJiibiIiIY" for "eligibly."

Gem:.--'" Gimunenl im .ensi!j"ilyrcYicw - NCJ'C i. l:OOrrlimili"ll wilh ihe TSC (0 proy ide comments. .

SENSITIVE SEGlIDITY FNFOIlWiTKI'f

Wl\R~~G: Thineeefti eellJIliBS SeBsilive S eooft Iy lit fefHlIIJillfl tho tis II elI>lPtllled lffifie:r 19 CFIl JI!H'fs 1 § IHift 1529. lfa raN af !lHs teeM!!: IfIH, ee tIi selese!!: [;e l'e~ 8fiS \!\ i~1 ft "Heed Ie lffte>, ., liS defil>ed il> 4 9 CtH: JlflfI!! l:§ IIfId I lng, elteepl Hilfi Ike v.ftHeftJleHflissilHl efYte AIIHtit!islflltef eftka TflIfIllfleflliotilHl Seettflly AEilfliftislflHiBB ef!lie Seerel~' afTftta.llflartfll'i8fl. YlIslI!lieri!'iea reletJse 8lII)' resalt it! civil pefWUy 8r alher oe!i6B. Far U.s. ge ... emmeat a:geHeies, fIIIelie disela911f8 is gC'I'Iemed ey S U.S.C. :§S2!ffld ~9 CHtrftl'ls IS 8nt1: ~

Role ofthe No Fly and Seleetee Lists in Secnring Commerclal Aviation

Page4S

Appendix D No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance June 2008

b7E per FBI

On October 21, 2004, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee—which serves as the senior sub-cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting homeland security—established the initial criteria for the No Fl and Selectee lists. On February 8, 2008, the same committee approved the addition

criterion to the No Fly list, as provided below.17

No Fly List:

Any person, regardless of citizenship, who represents a threat o

1.

2.

b3,7E per TSA b3 per 3. ODNI

b7E per FBI

4.

Selectee List:

Any person, regardless of citizenship, in the TSDB who does not meet the criteria to be placed on the No Fly list and who is:

1.

17 Original text of the No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance, as transmitted to OHS by the

b7E TSC in June 2008. U

- per FBI


Page 46

ACLURM008136

b7E per

FBI

b3 per

ODNI

SE~SITIVE 8ECUIlIT¥ INFOmlATION

AppendixD No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance June 2008

On October 21,2004, the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee-which serves as the senior sub-cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting homeland security---established the initial criteria for the No ~tee lists. On February 8, 2008, the same committee approved the addition __ _ criterion to the No Fly list, as provided below. 17

No Fly List:

Any person, regardless of citizenship, who represents a threat

1.

2.

b3 T 7E per TSA

3.

b7E per FBI

b7E

per

4.

Selectee List:

Any person, regardless of citizenship, in the TSDB who does not meet the criteria to be placed on the No Fly list and who is:

1.

17 Original text of the No Fly and Selectee List Implementa tion Guidance, as transmitted to DHS by the TSC in June 2008. • FBI

SENSITIVE SECURITY :INFORMATION

'NA...'{NING. This :ree6l do eenlttffl3 Sen!liH. e Seetffif) ffifafBIatieB llIat is eefttfflHed lHlder 49 em pllft:j 15 and 1529. Nil pftft Br Utis :reeflfd: HIli:) ee tHselBsed: is peffi6Bs witflellt II; "ftoed 10 know" Illl defutell tfl 49 CFR pl'lftll 1 S Mill 11529, ~e~1 "ill! !tie .I'fitten remt:issieB sf !tie !.d:rBifJ:islfllffif tlf Ifle ffuB8per"l;!lJieR SeeM" A.tlmffiisftffiiaB Of the 8eeretltrj efTraB8[l6f'lllHeft. UftlIlIlherized release HIlI) ffiltHt:itt I'll oil "eRltH), Sf at:her !WHen. Ftlf U.S. gcwemmenl egeneic:l, ptiblie di3clo~me i3 go.emee1h) 5 U.S.C. 5S2 lind 49 Cf.R [ltlfts IS HIlt! 1539. .


Page 46


I b7E per FBI


Since January 2005, the watch-listing community has gained extensive experience with all aspects of the No Fly list, to include nominations, quality assurance, encounters, downgrades, and litigation. The No Fly and Selectee list guidance set forth below is neither intended to be determinative, nor intended to serve as a checklist. Rather, it is intended to guide the watch-listing community in assessing whether the established criteria is satisfied for a specific record, based on the totality of available information.

A 2. b7E per ODN b3,7E per T

b7E per 1

FBI

4.

5.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Liuts in Securing Commercial Apia lion

Page 47

ACLURM008137

SE~ISIIIVE SBCURI'fY HIFORMhTlON


r 2. b7E per FBI

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E p'er TSA

L Since January 2005, the watch-listing community has gained extensive experience with all aspects of the No Fly list, to include nominations, quality assurance, encounters, downgrades, and litigation. The No Fly and Selectee list guidance set forth below is neither intended to be detenninative, nor intended to serve as a checklist. Rather, it is intended to guide the watch-listing community in assessing whether the established criteria is satisfied for a specific record, based on the totality of available infonnation.

b7E per ODN

b3,7E per T A

1.

2.

b7E per3. FBI

4.

5.

SENSfI1V£ S£CtffilTY IPIFOR."M..TJeJ'1

Vl:AIGffioIG: This reeoKi e6flIHm:, Setlsilive Seearity WeftBBti6fl !hat is e61iEr6lled tiMet' ~9 CFR pllAB 13 !Ifttl 1529. ~18 pm oHms reesKifHft) be diseloses te pet'S6flS witfltltlt a "flee!!: ffilfHe,." flS aefieeEl is. ~9 Gl'Rllms 15 6fla 1S29, 6lleeplwi!lt the MilleR pemHsSt88 af Ifle MIf!lJIistftlffir sflfle 'Fflrallpaflati8ft 8eellfity AdmiDiswati8ft 81' the Seef'ehuy sf TflntSp6ttt1!i6B. Umiuthe:rized releose HI~ reMtlt ffi eivil pel!tlHy 1M e!ltef aeliell: F6'I'U.S. !'l6,;eHlmeat ftgeneies, fItIhke BiseiaslH'e is gtllemed", SU.s.c. §§2ItRB ~9 CFRp!H't3 15 otId 1529.

Role of the No Fly find Selectee U9ts in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 47


•

b7E per FBI/ODNI

b3,7E per TSA •

•

•

•

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Llsts in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 48

ACLURM008138

5EPI81TIVE SECURITY INFORMATION


•

b7E per FBljODNI

b3,7E per TSA •

•

•

•

8BN5ITJV1'l SJilGIJRIT¥ JPIFORMI:rJON

WAMIING: Tltis re66fiJ ee!llltifls Setl9il;i'"e Seelll'i ". hI~li6f1 IiHtI is eBRIfl8HeEi lHlEieF 49 CPR: llBAS IS &86 IS2Q. }ffi rM'l !:If t;fti9 re8Brft HilI' h6 di.SelBllSEi 16 reHiBfIII vl'illtMll tt<'tteeEi ttl Iffi&/," 119 EleHtieEi ifI 49 CPR pMts 1.5 B!16 152e, elteeri witft the 'o',flltefl rerrrtissieB af lite AElmBHstfftlaf af IRe TffiBSflBflllli6:11 See6fliy ~91m1!:_ BP the Seerelef) afTmlls)lefIllJioo. UntltllltBf'i2ed release may teiltlH iH civil penalty 61' ether eeHaH. Far U.S. g/Yt_llIgeneies, publie diseieSllfe is gtl"t'eflled by 5 U.S.C 552 BHcl 49 CFRPIIAS IS !1m! 1529.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lists In Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 48


•

•

•

b7E per FBI •

b3 7E per ODNI/

TSA

•

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Avia lion

Page 49

ACLURM008139

SENSITIVE SECURIT¥ INFORMATION

AppendixD No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Gnidance June 2008

•

•

•

b7E per FBI •

b3,7E per ODNIj

TSA

•

S~ITIVE SECURITY IPWOID.iATION

WARNIl'1G : This ffleam BetH a ffis Se!lsilp/e SIl_itt lBfefftl&ti BBo tile I is eaftffeHetlltllflef ~ 9 CFR PMS 115 ffiltl IS2e. 1>ffi I'lII't af!his reeeM. ft'lftJ he tliselesed: lel'6fSOBoS wilheut a "Boeee I;e iffiew" as defmed ffi 49 CPR pflfls IS Me I !529, elfeept with !:he 'Nfittefl pel'fl'lisslflft eflhe A8mim~irBt6l' eOhe TntttspeffltBeft Seettcit, AflmtmslraliBII Of lite Seerektr/ at TfIlftSf'e:rtatiOfl. Uaffillhefliled reletiB lHfty FeS1±itlft eivil II e!lIIUy Sf al:fter tteti aft. Fe' U.8. go'. ermneftt Hgeneies, PlIblie disele:mftl is g6'fflftled hy S U.8.c. 552 liftS 49 CPR "lifts IS 8flEl1S29. .

Role oftheNo Fly (lnd Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviplion

Page 49


b7E per FBI 1.

b3,7E per ODNI/ TSA

2.

3.


Page 50

ACLURM008140



b7E per FBI

b3,7E per ODNI/ TSA

1.

2.

3.

SENSITIVE SJ5CVRITY JNFOR.",IATION

WARNING. This recard eoomills SeJt3ili\'~ SeOOfity ffifarmalioo thlliis eooB-alledU!lder 19 CFRpllffillS IlIlElIS29. pre pM. of Iffls ree61'tl Ilia, he tB:Seff!seel 16 persan:! "ithell:t II "lIeeel16le!t6,," 113 Elefuteel ill 19 CFRpll1'i's15 and 1529. eteept willi !he 'Wfll:l:eII peHHissiaB af Ifte AtimHtilift'IIIM af Ifte ffaMpMfatiafl SeeHrity A~lien er !he SeeretMJ af TmnSP6ltll !ian. UnautharizeEl relco se may result in ei·til pefllllty ar alfter fte lian. Fer U. S. ga't'emDlC1l1 ftgtlfteies. ~He ElisfJietlm-e is gafemed ~ 5 U.S.C. 5521l1ld 49 CFRp"fflj 15 BOO IS2e.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lishl in Securing Commercial Aviation

Pilge 50


b7E per,

b3 7E FBI

per 0DNI /

TSA

• •


Page 51

ACLURM008141

SE1>TSlffi'-:E SECURITY IlNFORPoIATJON AppendixD No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance June 2008

•

b7E per.

b3.7E FBI

per ODNI/

TSA

'lh"dINfNG , TIti~ 'PIle6M e6ftl~ S Mlsit" e SeeHl'i!'f We_liaR tB&1 i~ e 81!tfeHetllHltl et' ~ 9 GP'R f!1lflS 15 lIB!:! 1529, p.~e :!IMlef!his neeI/! IIIrty he diseleBed ta Jlet'seBB .,.,r.i!lieut a "Bee!:! klltaaw" as del'itteel ill 19 CFlll'sris IS MMl. JQ9, e!leeflt with the vlfi!teB JleflB:issieB ef!;he AElIlliBis(n~r ef the ffIIB~61'tftti6ft SeetIl'i" trllmiHislffilieR eF the Saet'etMy ef Trertijflefla!i8fl, UntIl:Itherized release ffillJ I'ellitH ift ai',il :!IaatHl) Sf 8~Bt' ae8eH, Fer U.S, ge¥efll:IHeflt Rgeneies, "tIbhe tHseiesttl'e is ge.ePBed II) 5 U,S.C, SS2 fIIltI ~9 C¥R pfffiS l§: ItfiEI 1329.


Page 51

b7E per

FBI

Not suitable for either the No Fly or the Selectee List: b 3 , 7E per TSA

b3 , 7E

per ODNI


r b7E

per

%BP

1.

2.

3.

b7E per

ODNI

4.

5.

6.

7E per CBP


Page 52

ACLURM008142

b3,7E per ODNI

SENBJTIVE SBCUIH'F¥ r:NFOIHo<f-ATION

AppendixD No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Gnidance June 2008

•

b7E per FBI

b7E per ODNI

Not suitable for either the No Fly or the Selectee List: b3,7E per TSA

r b7E 1.

per C;BP L 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

-, 7E per CBP

J SENSITIVE SBCURITY INFORMhTlON

Wt\R}!INei: This ftleero eeftl"llifts Seftf!ili'~e Seeurit"f IMefl'ftll~ft i'IltItis eBfttf"eD.ea uadeF 49 GFRpoc-!s IS IHIElI52R ~ffl pPrl6fi:hts ftle6l'd ItlB) be diseleseEi te persems l'iilhoot II "need Ie knO'H" BS defiHed in 49 CFRpalis IS aHe 1529, . elfeept wii;h the M'il:!en peHBissien ef i;he AtIItlinisErliter Bf i;he Thmtspertil!iBft SeeHriry AHminis!l'll!ien Br i;he SeeretM) BfTfftnspef!!ltKm. Unoulheril'!e6 release may I'estllt in eivil pet!EIlt)' af ethel' ReHaB_ Fal' U.S. g&/emItlent ageneleB, plIlllie E!iselestlftl is gth emilE! ll) 5 U.S.c. S52 Itft6 49 CFR: '!lOfts IS &Btl 1529.


PElge52


b7E per FBI 7.

b3 per ODNI

b3,7E per TSA

Ar 1

e .

Role or the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 53

ACLURM008143

AppenilixD No Fly and Selectee List Implementation Guidance June 2008

b7E per FBI 7.

b3 per ODNI b3 I 7E per TSA 8.

SENSITJV£ SlSCURI'FY IPIPOHPoIATION

W}dHlY'K:. Tftis f"eMII eElH!flins BeftSis.EI SeeW'i!) lftftHmrlSMt that i~ emttrelled Itftdef 49 CFR ,,1Ifls IS flDd 1529. }Je ,,11ft ef lhis reilere m.:; he eli~t>I&:!etl te l'ersElft~ "itl,., .. t", "lie".! te M'i\" ItS Ilefille.! ill 49 CFRpElm IS ftftf! 1529, &.lteEll"t with the ',.,.;tte .. l"e....,;ssi .... Elf the AMllt .... trfttef ElfH.e 'ffiHt!l[l6-FlftSEIfl SElEl\:lfll] AtlHltm;!tmSElft M th" Seeretttl') ..r '&_!I[lflflftl:iEltL lJ.Hlltlth6f;"ed ,,,Ieftse mD)' TeSillt in ei ,il pElflfllt) til' EIther lIettElft: FEif U.S. g:EI' _fIol flgeneies, pttblie lIisele!ftlFe is g:B. _II 1'1) S U.s.G. SS211ftd 49 CFR p!lt'l!t IS ftftf! IS2e.


Pllge 53

U.S. Intel' 19 once Community, Including .

the FBI

information Gathered by the, Intelligence

Community and Federal Agencies on an

International Known or Rensnnably Su spell ed

Terrorist-

r TIDE Record Exports • Ike TSthil

Information Gathered by the FBI on a Domestic Known or Reasonably Suspected Terrorist -Nominated Directly to

the TSG

TSLI13 Record Exports co DerivertiVe Retabe Ise

NotnInelton Sent to the hICTC, PctentleIfy pveiiic No Fly!

Selectee Recommendation

Appendix E No Fly and Selectee List Nomination Process

b3 per TSA

Source: OIG Analysis

pall, by 5 11.A.C. 5,2,old 49 CFR-port! 15 a.d 1520.


Page 54

ACLURM008144

b3 per TSA

8ENSHIVE SECURITY INPOR±I.MTION

AppendixE No Fly and Selectee List Nomination Process

u.s. Intelligence Community, Including

the FBI

the Intelligence Community 8lld Federal

Ager.cies on an tnlemalional KIlown or Reasonabty $usp~~

Terrorist

Gathtired by Itlll FBI on a. Dome6tic Known or Reasonably Suspected T e rroris t -Nominated DireeUy to

theTSC

SEN8ITfVE SECURITY fNFORl\iATION

Source: OIG Analysis

VI-l'dHoHNG. This reeHM el'mtllim Sensiti,e Seettrit) IMMrIlati6ft th!tt is etm~HHed tHH'ier 49 CFRpllfls l5 fffid 15211. ~tL'J pM ef II'Ifs feeSM 11'18) he fliself!sea tf! I'efS6ftS with_t 8 "!leea ffi kH6u" tiS tlefiftefl is 49 CPRpMffi IS &AS IS2e, e!leep t "i 1:h Ifle • ffl 11 ilH peHflissieB sf litH AElll'linis~tHr Hf lIIe 'FHIl!ilfllh 1ltti6ft Seeltri~ A.fIreisislfll"6ft ef the S eeret~f) ef TramI' 11M IifHl. UMHihHri:!':ea relells e II'IfI) re!HI t in ei. il fleDHI!) or ether !tel i6ft. Far U.8. gtl, emtIitlllt lIgeneies, I'ttblie diselflrmte is ge.eJlled II) S U.S.C. SS21HHl 49 CPR /torts IS tmtI. 1529.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial Aviation

Page 54

b7E

per F

BI

b3 p

er O

DN

I

AC

LUR

M008145

SENSITIVE SECUlHT\' INFORMATI9N AppendixF Securing Commercial Aviation Through Intelligence Gathering. Watch List Screening, Law Enforcement,and Other Programmatic and Operational Efforts

tr tr w ...,J

!;I:j

"d (p '0 Ii (D

'1 0

~ "Ij to

H H

fII't ef illis {eearE! May 'be Eiiselaseel Ie perssM witll6'l!1 it . .. . . . . t1tttt is eefllf6l1eti \!fteler 49 GfR pfll'ts .1 ~ 1fflE! 1529. lie Jl . SeeliL'i~' J~slft!!iell til !:he £e€l'elftl'Plf 'J,t}L.~~IG. This ne6rel e~IIli!iM Seasl~' e1 ~e~'3~=;~ifi: tl:te iI'l"ilteu 1'IIPIt!issiell ef the AEimffilS~f af ~ ::::a:e;egeffied<ey s V S.C. §§2 enE! 49 CPR ''fteeE! Ie IERew" as E!eHfieE! 1ft ~9 CPR Jl8:HS 7 .. j ~ B'!' ether aelisa Far IJ.S. ge._eft! a:gefleles,!ll:! Ie 1=fIillSfl ei'tatiefl. Un&IftHeri2ea rele as e Ill&) reSl:l4 ffi 111",'1 !'I II. .

!laRs IS lid !SilS.

Role ofthe No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial k"jation . '

Page 55

t 1 .

Appendix G Major Contributors to this Report

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

Katherine Roberts, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

Jordan Brafman, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

Michael Short, Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

public disclosure is governed by 517.S.C. 552 and 19 CFR parts 15 and 1520.


Page 56

ACLURM008146

SENSITIVE SECUDITY PlFOR'VIATION

Appendix G Major Contributors to this Report

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of In..<;pections

Katherine Roberts, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

Jordan Brafman, mspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

Michael Short, Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections

SENSITIVE SECURITY JPFFOmMT1ml

ViLAffi'fFHO. 'This reeeM e8fthlHts S~sil,j,e Seeuril) InWf'ffIIIBlIl'llliftt is eflftl:reHedtHtiler 49 CFRllafls IS ftftd 1539. }ffi Illtft eftftis 1'6eflfEi 1BfI) e6 tlis618seEll8 per!iflftB ,',ithettl H "l'leeEll8 knew" 89 EleHftlIti ift N GFR ppm 15 tlfld 1529. e!fee:l't h ilft lite ,frilleD penmssiel'l er I;fte lulmHtistrftlsf flf the 'FfllBSJlfll'llltiflfl Se8!ll'i", i\dmiuislmtiel'l er the SeefeiMY ef'FmtiSJl8ffilotl8B.· UrtftHtft8ftl'!eoB feleose ffltl) felftIll iII ei, i! j'leBIIll) al' alIter aeliell, PM U.S. geveffi:lft6ftl ageftef6S, JlHHlte rlisel.,9tlfe is go'! , 6ffleoB II) S U.S.c. 5S;! 600 49 CFR pllrffl 15 lIBel 1529,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lillts in Securing Commercial Avilltion

Pege56

Appendix H Report Distribution


Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff for Operations Chief of Staff for Policy Acting General Counsel Executive Secretariat Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security Administration Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Dixector,-National Targeting Center—Passenger Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office TSA Audit Liaison CBP GAO/OIG Liaison

U.S. Department of Justice

Director, Terrorist Screening Center FBI Inspection Division Liaison DOJ GAO/OIG Liaison

U.S. Department of State

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Director, National Counterterrorism Center Chief, Terrorist Identities Group, National Counterterrorism Center

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner

•I• u u E. •

public diselouire is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 19 CFR path 15 and 1520.


Page 57

ACLURM008147

AppenmxH Report Distribution

SBNSJTf"E SBCURITY INFORMATION


Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff for Operations Chief of Staff for Policy Acting General Counsel Executive Secretariat Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security Administration Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs COrillnissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Director,-National Targeting Center-Passenger Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office TSA Audit Liaison CBP GAO/OIG Liaison

u.s. Department of Justice

Director, Terrorist Screening Center FBI Inspection Division Liaison DO] GAO/OIG Liaison

U.s. Department of State

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence·

Director, National Counterterrorism Center Chief, Terrorist Identities Group, National Counterterrorism Center

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner

WAlGlI/>KJ: Thi9 ree~~ etlftEfti:M Sefl9ilPie S6eIIfi!'j IafefH'l!lti6fl ltiet ~ e8ftEfMleEllillfler 49 eFR fllll'b 15 eft!l IS29. l'fe I'M-! tlf tftts reetlM. HlfI) Ile !ligels seEl te llef!ltlft9 II i Ib6ttt ft "HeeEl te 191&'/ ,0 0 119 El efHlea in 19 CRl I'IIftS 13 IlflEi IS2Q. except 1\ lOt tHe wri!tefl I'eml:iSSiBfl sf the AdmHH9EfMIft' af Ote 'FfftIlSP8fUHiBft Sewri., '~Bi9tfftliBfl 8f the Se8f8lt1ry ef'FTftftSf'eflatiBII. UofltItHeFH'led relellse HUl,' feSJJlt it! eivil fJeDfIlty Bf ather tteHafl. PBfU.S. gtJ'o'emfl'lflBt ogtmeies, plIBhe Eliseiesure is go,emed 8) S U.s.C. 552 lIBEl ~9 CFR flBft~ 13 MM 1329.

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercilll Aviation

Page 57

L. . • 1

Appendix H Report Distribution

Congress,

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate

public chsclosurc is govancd by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CL•R path 15 and 1520.


Page 58

ACLURM008148

AppendixB Report Distribution

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate

SENSlTIY£ SBCUlUTY INFORMATION

WARNING, Tltiueeard etlflft!H SeMi Ii, e Seetlnt)' fufomm ti 00 fuo lis eenfl'olletlttlHler ~ 9 CFR flM'13 IS IIfttI L 1520, ~ffl pffft afthi:l! feeMd ffiHY'he diselosetllo flefSOHS M!HffiIt II ''Heefi t6 kHO'II" 119 tlefulefi in 49 CFRplUts lSfIflfil§2E1, eeept wi!H the 'o'i'fitt:eB peflBissiaBo at the AEimHHSlffttef aftlle 1'fiIBstlofttttieft 8eettrily AtlmiBoislffttiBft Of tIie 8eerelftry ofTmnspomliOll, Unautherized 'fI)leose fI)fIY 'fI)sult ill eIvii penalty er ather oetian, Fer U,S, ge'iemment agencies, puhl:ie tHse10SlH'e i~ go,emed lI} 5 U,S,C, 552 flJtCi 49 Cffipflm 15 MId lS2E1,

Role of the No Fly and Selectee Lists in Securing Commercial AviatJon

Pilge 58

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (01G) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the 010 web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG HOTLINE

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations:

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603;

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292;

• Email us at [email protected]; or

• Write to us at: DHS Office of Inspector GeneraIIMAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528.

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.

ACLURM008149

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG HOTLINE

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative 10 department programs or operations;

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603;

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292;

• Email us at [email protected]; or

• Write to us at: DHS Office of Inspector GeneralfMAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528.

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.

Documents

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General