Deployable Forces (Air) Handbook (2003)

7/30/2019 Deployable Forces (Air) Handbook (2003)

1/110


2/110

i

FOREWORD

The Reaction Force Air Staff (RFAS) is a multinational staff whose

primary purpose is to support the Strategic Commanders with central

air expertise. The staff is responsible for deployment-related aspects

of strategic and operational air planning throughout the full range of

NATO operations.

The key elements of this mission are to provide central air planning

expertise in the fields of deployment, beddown, integration,sustainment and redeployment of NATOs High Readiness Forces

(Air) and other deploying land-based air assets.

This handbook is issued by the Reaction Force Air Staff as a reference

book based on the planning considerations for Deployable Forces

(Air). It is necessary to note that this is not a formally agreed NATO

document.

This unclassified handbook is part of our continuing efforts to provide

easily referenced information for use by educational institutions and

the Nations forces. NATO is currently undergoing significant

changes. The implementation of the new NATO Command Structure

(NCS), the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the

expansion of NATO membership, the changing relationships with

the European Union and many other factors are causing NATO

policies and programmes to evolve at an unprecedented pace andscale. These processes will continue beyond publication of this

document, which will therefore avoid speculation and concentrate

on known air power concepts.


3/110

ii

The Handbook provides a brief background on Deployable Forces

(Air). It also reviews the Operational Plan development, force

activation, and deployment processes. Finally, the Handbook outlines

command and control principles, communication and informationsystem (CIS) requirements, ground-based air defence (GBAD),

logistics support, force protection, movements, training and evaluation.

RFAS will continue to update the handbook periodically.

The handbook is also located at our CRONOS web site at

http://nww.rfas.nato.int/RFAS. We value your comments and solicit

your suggestions for improvements. Please contact the Chief of

Staff RFAS if you have any suggestions for improvements or wouldlike to request an additional copy.

Commercial: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2202

Insecure Fax: ++49 - (0) 2824 - 90 2274

Secure Fax: (ID 01967) 218 - 1215

IVSN: 234 or 239 2202

Horst Martin, Lieutenant General, GEAF

Director, Reaction Force Air Staff


4/110

iii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Foreword i

Contents iii

1. NATOs Graduated Readiness (Air) Forces 1-1

Why High Readiness Forces are needed 1-1

The High Readiness Forces 1-5

HRF Essential Parameters 1-5

GRF (Air) Packages 1-8

2. NATO Response Force (NRF) Capability 2-1

Guiding Principals 2-1

NRF Missions 2-2

NRF Structure 2-3

3. NATO Force Activation 3-1

Political/Military Decision Making 3-1

4. Operation Planning 4-1

Planning Tools 4-2

Operational Planning Principles 4-2

The Operational Planning Process (OPP) 4-5

Stages of the OPP 4-6

5. DF(A) Deployment Planning 5-1

6. DF(A) Command And Control 6-1

7. Communication And Information Systems 7-1

CIS for deployed DF(A) 7-1

DF(A) Resource Planning 7-4


5/110

iv

8. Ground Based Air Defence 8-1

SHORAD 8-3

SAM 8-3

9. Force Protection 9-1

Active Defence 9-2

Passive Defence 9-4

Recuperation 9-4

10. Logistics 10-1

Multinational Logistic Concepts 10-2

Logistics Doctrine and Procedures 10-4Logistics Command and Control 10-5

Logistic Phases 10-7

Logistic Aspects 10-8

11. Movement And Transportation(M&T) 11-1

Movement And Transportation Principles 11-2

NATO Structure for M&T 11-3

Sequence of M&T Planning 11-5Air Transport 11-8

Sea Transport 11-10

Inland Surface Transport 11-11

12. Air To Air Refuelling 12-1

13. Training, Exercise & Evaluation 13-1

Training 13-2Exercise 13-4

Evaluation 13-7

14. Reaction Force Air Staff 14-1

Background 14-1

Mission 14-1

Organisation 14-3


6/110

v

Annex:

A. Abbreviations


7/110

1-1

CHAPTER 1

NATOS GRADUATEDREADINESS (AIR) FORCES

WHY HIGH READINESS FORCES ARE NEEDED

0101. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change.

In spite of some positive developments in recent years, the security

of the Alliance remains subject to uncertainties and to a wide varietyof risks that can suddenly develop into a crisis. At present, the risks

to NATO are multifaceted and less predictable in nature and location

than previously. The use of asymmetric warfare in the form of terrorist

attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction is an

emerging risk to NATO and the rest of the world.

NATO developed and introduced the NATO Response Force to meet future mission

requirements.


8/110

1-2

0102. In order to reflect the requirements of the full spectrum of

Alliance missions, a combination of In-Place Forces (IPF) and

Headquarters (HQs), and a pool of Deployable Forces (DF) and

HQs are required. These forces and HQs must have the necessaryflexibility for effective planning and force generation/activation and

be available at graduated levels of readiness. Asymmetric threats

may require the Alliance to engage in combat operations varying in

intensity. Flexible employment of both rapidly deployable multinational

forces and reinforcement forces is necessary, to counter this type of

aggression.

0103. Following unilateral force reductions by nations, NATO nowneeds a higher degree of multinationality in order to field a balanced,

appropriate force in a crisis area that may be outside NATOs area

of responsibility. Therefore, mobile, flexible and highly responsive

multinational forces at a high readiness are required.

NATO requires mobile, flexible and highly responsive multinational forces.


9/110

1-3

0104. The guidance provided by the Military Committee foresees

that the architecture and the posture of Allies forces must be built

on the strengths of different national structures. These forces will

be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements ofcollective defence and other Alliance missions and held at appropriate

and specified graduated readiness. The aim is to achieve an optimum

balance between forces at high readiness, forces at different levels

of lower readiness and a longer-term build-up and augmentation

capability. With the introduction and development of the NATO

Response Force (NRF) following the Prague Summit in 2002, a new

higher readiness status for NATO forces was created that is evolving

to meet future mission requirements.

0105. The key to NATO mission success is force availability,

sustainability and multinationality. To ensure availability, NATO forces

must be generated quickly and be mission ready and deployable. As

part of the quick generation process, NATOs Readiness Forces

form a single set of Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF). The GRF

consists of High Readiness Forces (HRF) and Forces of Lower

Readiness (FLR). Nations allocate air assets to the different

Readiness categories. They are further categorised into Deployable

Forces (DF), capable of the entire spectrum of missions and

operations, and the In-Place Forces (IPF), designated to operate

within a specific geographical area of the Alliance predominantly

The key to NATO mission success is force availability, sustainability and multinationality.


10/110

1-4

for Article 5 operations. Longer Term Build-up Forces (LTBF)

provide an augmentation capability and a force posture to cope with

the remote scenario of large-scale air operations for Article 5 collectivedefence. Developed independently of the GRF structure, the NRF

air components will consist of designated units that meet specified

criteria similar to HRF/DF concepts during their period of NRF

service. When required for an Article 5 operation or a non-Article 5

Crisis Response Operation (CRO), the selected force structure from

the pool of HRF will be identified, tailored, packaged and made

available upon Transfer of Authority (TOA), from the Sending Nation

(SN) to the appropriate NATO commander.

0106. This handbook concentrates on how deployable HRF(Air)

(HRF(A)) are presently defined and employed in the NATO Force

Structure (NFS) and how they relate their functions to the FLR and

LTBF. First we look at the emerging NRF capability. Then we

follow with the more traditional force activation processes, operational

and deployment planning, and how NATO conducts Command and

Control of its forces to include the required Communication and

Deployable forces meet the full range of NATO missions.


11/110

1-5

Information Systems (CIS). We conclude the handbook by discussing

the specific mission capabilities of Ground Based Air Defence

(GBAD), Force Protection (FP), Logistics, Movement &

Transportation, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), and Training, Exercisesand Evaluations.

THE HIGH READINESS FORCES

0107. HRF are land, air and maritime forces that are designated to

be available on short notice in order to react as quickly as necessary

to a collective defence or non-Article 5 CRO.

HRF ESSENTIAL PARAMETERS

0108. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) can call

upon HRF to respond very quickly to meet an Article 5 Collective

Defence operation anywhere in the NATO area of interest. HRF

can also be tasked to support non-Article 5 CROs. The implementation

method that SACEUR would use for such activation is detailed at

Chapter 2. The three essential parameters that provide the framework

High Readiness Forces have to react and deploy quickly.


12/110

1-6

of the NFS are: Types of Forces, Readiness of Forces and

Designation of Forces.

0109. Types of Forces. Based on the requirement to conduct both

Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 CROs, High Readiness HQs/

Forces can be grouped into two types that reflect their availability to

the NATO commander and, in particular, their ability to be deployed:

a. Deployable Forces are available for the full range of NATO

missions, fully deployable throughout Alliance territory and beyond,composed of primarily multinational HQs and forces and held at the

appropriate readiness level.

b. In-Place Forces are predominantly HQs and forces required

for collective defence within or near the territory of the nation

providing them. Therefore, IPF need not be fully deployable but are

also held at appropriate readiness levels. With the acquisition of new

equipment, there will be an increase in reach-back capabilities,

Force capability packages will be developed based on mission and type of operation.


13/110

1-7

therefore the value of IPF HQs should improve for non-Article 5

out-of-area operations.

0110. Readiness of Forces. This parameter defines the period oftime measured from an initiation order to the moment when the HQ

or unit is ready to perform its task, or is ready to deploy from its

peacetime location. Readiness Levels, Ranges and Categories further

clarify Readiness of Forces. Readiness Levels were described earlier

as HRF, FLR and LTBF. The time range that all HRF, FLR or LTBF

must meet is given by Readiness Ranges. The Readiness Category

breaks down the HQs and forces into more refined time ranges for

planning purposes.

0111. Force Designation. The Force Designation Category (FDC)

is used to describe the degree of assurance with respect to the

availability that nations are willing to declare for their forces. The

FDC provides NATO commanders and planners with as much

assurance as possible of the availability of NFS HQs and forces for

any NATO operation. The FDCs are broken into four categories:

a. NATO Command Forces. Forces/HQs which nations have

already placed under operational command (OPCOM) or the

operational control (OPCON) of the NATO commander.

b. NATO Assigned Forces. Forces/HQs which nations agree

to place under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander within

an agreed readiness time.

c. NATO Earmarked Forces. Forces/HQs which nations

intend to place under OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander at

some future time.

d. Other Forces for NATO. Forces/HQs which might be

placed under the OPCOM/OPCON of a NATO commander.


14/110

1-8

GRF (AIR) PACKAGES

0112. The composition and size of force capability packages will be

variable, based on the nature of the situation creating the requirement(Article 5 or non-Article 5 CROs), and inherently the mission and

type of operation. As a reference, air packages would normally

include Command and Control (C2), Air Combat, Special Operations

Forces, Electronic Warfare (EW), Support Jamming (SJ), Suppression

of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), Reconnaissance, Surveillance

Target Acquisition (RSTA), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),

Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) and Tactical Airlift.

0113. Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)

elements, such as Logistics, Communications & Information Systems,

Medical, Security, Strategic Airlift, etc, should also be available and

be maintained on the same readiness level as their supported unit.

The arrangements for this support are generally a responsibility of

the individual Sending Nations (SN).

0114. NATOs concept for modular Response Forces will draw onthe operational capabilities provided through the GRF concept. They

also will be mission-tailored, however, due to the envisioned

deployment and employment concept, force packaging will have to

be more flexible and rapid. The NRF will consist of air, land and

maritime components brought together for a joint and combined

campaign of limited duration.

0115. Also, with the realisation of NATO out-of-area (OOA)

operations in recent years, the necessity to tailor operations to

consider concerns and participation by non-NATO members has

become more evident. Therefore, as the situation warrants, force

packages may be developed that include Partnership and other non-

NATO Nation participation.


15/110

2-1

CHAPTER 2

NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)CAPABILITY

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

0201. A key element of the NRF is the ability to move quickly to

whatever areas in the world where NATO influence may be required.

NATOs operations and interests have been continuing to extendbeyond typical Cold War era boundaries. Airpower with its rapid

response, range and diversity of capabilities, will be a crucial

component to NRF mission success. To attain the quick

responsiveness required in todays asymmetric threat environment,

projecting forces will be required on even shorter notice than ever

before. This responsiveness will be provided by the rotation of forces

to ensure the burden is shared and that forces are trained and ready

for action at a moments notice. The ability to deploy a capable NRFon short notice could act as a deterrent and aid in the quick resolution

of an emerging crisis.

NRF air missions include tactical air lift.


16/110

2-2

0202. Another key element of the NRF is its flexibility. The NRF

will be capable of performing some missions on its own as well as

participating in an operation as part of a larger force. It will be

limited in size, composition and capabilities to ensure responsiveness,but can also be tailored once a specific operation has been identified.

The NRF consists of only a limited selected group of NATO forces

and other units can be tasked to expand force packages.

0203. Command and Control of the NRF is based on the principles

and structures described in the NATO Force Structure (NFS), in the

NATO Command Structure (NCS) and in the Combined Joint Task

Force (CJTF) concept. They result in a joint NRF C2 capabilityembedded in NATOs 3-level C2 structures. When the NRF HQs

are deployed, it will be carried out in accordance with the CJTF HQ

concept.

0204. Another key contribution of the NRF concept is the influence

it will have to be a catalyst for transformation of capabilities in the

Alliance. To reach the predetermined standards of military capability

and interoperability, nations wishing to contribute forces to the NRFwill need to update their capabilities in order to efficiently integrate

their operations with the entire NRF package. In addition, it will

provide a forum for evaluation of transformational concepts.

NRF MISSIONS

0205. The NRF missions will mirror the requirements of rapid

response in the initial phase of a crisis situation. Some types ofmissions which the NRF may execute include:

a. A stand-alone force for crisis response.

b. An initial entry force into a Joint Operation Area (JOA) to

include a hostile environment without Host Nation Support (HNS).

c. A demonstrative force to show the resolve of member nations.


17/110

2-3

0206. NRF (Air) Missions. The NRF(A) component will provide

a rapidly deployable capability able to conduct the appropriate air

tasks to include the use of precision-guided munitions. NRF air

missions include Air Defence, Offensive Counter Air, AirReconnaissance, SEAD/SJ, Close Air Support, Air Interdiction,

CSAR, Airborne Early Warning, Tactical Airlift, AAR and Special

Operations.

NRF STRUCTURE

0207. The NRF HQs and forces will not be a standing force. Bothwill be periodically committed by nations during NRF Generation

Conferences to meet the Military Committee (MC) approved

Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). Once trained

and certified as combat ready and capable of deploying, HQs and

forces will be placed on Stand-by and will be ready to deploy at very

short notice. All NRF forces should be capable of operating in a

nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) environment.

Support elements should be maintained at the same readiness level as their

supported unit.


18/110

2-4

0208. Joint Force Command (JFC). The CJTF HQ capabilities are

drawn on a rotational basis from the JFC HQs/JHQ at the operational

level of command of the NCS. The rapid deployment capability

requires a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) HQ staff element.This staff element will offer a standing capability to deploy forward

on short notice and should be able to cover J1 through J9 disciplines.

It will be critical to the success of the NRF capability. Subordinate

to the DJTF, there will be component command HQs tailored to the

mission. For Air, it will be a CJFACC with an embedded Air

Operations Centre (AOC).

0209. Whilst the NRF capability is the worst-case scenario with

regard to time available to respond, other capabilities must bemaintained for those occasions where sufficient time is available to

plan a full military operation in response to an emerging threat to

NATO interests. The following chapters address the legacy

capabilities within NATO to respond to the traditional threats

envisaged throughout the recent past.

Airpower with its rapid response is a crucial component to NRF mission success.


19/110

3-1

CHAPTER 3

NATO FORCE ACTIVATION

POLITICAL/MILITARY DECISION MAKING

0301. In order to set the stage for NATO involvement in military

action, NATO must activate the military forces provided by the

nations. Three different Directives from the political level are required

at three critical stages:

a. Initiating Directive. The Initiating Directive is issued by

the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to SACEUR. It contains planning

guidance and initiates the process leading to the analysis of several

response options, until one or more of them is chosen in response to

the situation. Once an option is chosen, it will normally be refined

into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

The Initiating Directive issued by the NAC will lead to the development of a Concept of

Operations.


20/110

3-2

b. Force Activation Directive. Once the CONOPS is

approved, the NAC issues the Force Activation Directive (FAD),

which directs SACEUR to conduct the force activation process.

Upon receipt of the FAD, SACEUR commences the activationprocess through an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) to JFCs/JHQ

and the Nations informing them that a force is required. The type

and scale of forces and capabilities required are provided in the

form of a provisional Statement of Requirements (SOR) issued

together with the ACTWARN. The nations respond to these

requirements with informal force offers. These offers will be properly

discussed and balanced at a Force Generation Conference

culminating in the development of a draft SOR. After completion ofthe draft SOR, SACEUR issues the Activation Request (ACTREQ)

to nations, asking for the formal commitment of forces, which nations

will confirm in the Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) message.

Eventual force shortfalls or excesses are detected and corrected in

a Force Balancing Conference, until a final set of forces is decided.

c. Execution Directive. Once the Operation Plan (OPLAN)

is approved by the NAC and the final force list is released, the NACwill release the Execution Directive. Based on that Directive,

SACEUR issues the Activation Order (ACTORD) to all participating

nations, which initiates the movement of the national forces to the

Theatre of Operations. To ensure the properly co-ordinated intra-

theatre movement of forces, including their transit to designated

staging or beddown locations, nations will normally authorise TOA

of these forces to SACEUR when operationally ready in theatre.

0302. In order for NATO to get to the force activation stage,

however, much preparation is required. Operational Planning for

NATO military action is one of the key initial functions that must be

carried out to ensure successful mission accomplishment.


21/110

4-1

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

0401. Operational Planning is conducted for a wide variety of

reasons, ranging from routine training and exercises to an actual

aggression on NATO territory. Although military commanders are

expected to develop prudent military planning in response to possible

situations, the ultimate responsibility for initiating planning within

NATO rests with NATOs political leadership, the NAC. Even though

the Operational Planning Process in NATO is based upon the sameconcepts as found in national doctrines, certain aspects of it are

different since NATO is an Alliance of nations, and military forces

are made available to NATO through the contributions by the nations

in the force generation and activation process. In addition, current

changes in the NCS and creation of the NRF may alter command

relationships and provide new states of readiness factors for selected

forces, but the basics of operational planning remain valid.

Operational Planning will focus on the mission, the desired end states and the criteria

for success.


22/110

4-2

PLANNING TOOLS

0402. The NATO military commanders planning tools include the

following:

a. Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The

GOP is the basic reference document for NATO military planning

staffs to assist in the development of all operational plans: Contingency

Plans (COPs), Standing Defence Plans (SDPs), Operation Plans

(OPLANs) and Support Plans (SUPLANs). It addresses all aspects

of an operational plan and provides guidance on the planning factors

to be taken into consideration during the development of a plan. Italso specifies the standard structure and content of an operational

plan.

b. Functional Planning Guides (FPG). The FPG provide

specific guidance to air, land and maritime NATO military planning

staffs on the planning factors to be taken into consideration during

the development of a joint operational plan to optimise the synergistic

effects of the synchronised application of the combined capabilitiesinherent in a joint force. FPG also provide function-specific guidance

on matters such as airspace and waterspace management, etc.

c. Regional Planning Guides (RPG). The RPG provide

specific guidance to NATO military planning staffs on particular

regional planning factors to be taken into consideration during the

development of an operational plan. This includes factors such as

climate, geography, oceanography, terrain, etc.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES

0403. The Bi-SC GOP provides Commanders and their staffs with

the framework for Operational Planning. The broad principles guiding

planning within ACO are set out below.


23/110

4-3

0404. General. Operational planning demands that a commander

and his staff answer four questions:

a. Which military conditions must be attained to achieve thestrategic and operational objectives?

b. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these

conditions?

c. How should military resources be applied to best accomplish

that sequence of actions?

d. Are the associated risks acceptable?

0405. Planning Focus. Planners should focus on:

a. The mission.

b. Desired end states and the criteria for success.

The Planning process enables the staff to translate strategic political objectives into an

appropriate military plan.


24/110


25/110

4-5

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

0407. The Operational Planning Process (OPP) is a co-ordinated

staff process to determine the best method of accomplishing assignedtasks or of planning for possible future tasks. The OPP is applicable

to any Strategic, Operational or Tactical HQ conducting planning

for any theatre, for any kind of plan and with any size of force.

Whereas the OPP is applicable for both Advanced and Crisis

Response Planning, Advance Planning is usually conducted with

more time available to complete the process. Crisis Response

Planning, due to time constraints, normally demands an accelerated

use of the process.

0408. The OPP is used to produce plans to reach the desired end-

state and to achieve the mission that has been assigned to a

commander. The objectives of the OPP are to:

a. Standardise the planning process within the Alliance.

The emerging situation may demand an accelerated Crisis Response Plan.


26/110

4-6

b. Ensure strategic/political control is effected during the

development of the plan.

c. Enable the staff to translate strategic political objectives,provided in an Initiating Directive, into appropriate

military objectives.

d. Enable commanders to guide the development of the

plan.

e. Maximise the staffs creative thinking and associated

thought processes.

f. Evaluate the products of the planning process.

STAGES OF THE OPP

0409. The OPP consists of five stages, leading from the initiation of

planning through to plan review. The process is essentially the

responsibility of the commander and his planning team and consists

of a deductive reasoning process, starting from the known facts and

moving to specific options.

STAGE I - OPP INITIATION

0410. Operational Planning may be initiated at varying levels in

response to either political or military events. In addition, commandersmay initiate the planning process in recognition of changing

circumstances. The initiation phase begins when the task is received

and, as the name implies, initiates the planning. Normally it starts

with the Initiating Directive. During this stage of the process, the

Initiating Directive is received, the Operations Planning Group (OPG)

is formed and the necessary information is gathered.


27/110

4-7

STAGE II - OPP ORIENTATION

0411. On receipt of the Initiating Directive, the Commander will

determine exactly what has to be accomplished. Depending on thesituation, the initiation may result from a directive or a verbal briefing

from the command group anticipating a future requirement.

Regardless, the end-state(s) must be clearly expressed and the higher

commanders intent must be clearly understood for effective planning

to commence. The Orientation Stage is summarised in Figure 4-1.

0412. The product of the Orientation Stage is the Commanders

Planning Guidance, a formal document, which may serve as anInitiating Directive to start further planning by his staff and subordinate

HQ(s).

STAGE III - CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

0413. Concept Development begins with a review of the

Commanders Planning Guidance, produced in the previous stage.This provides the necessary direction and guidance to the planning

staff to conduct a staff analysis and subsequently shapes the

development of the Courses of Action (COAs).

A COA is a possible option open to the commander that would

accomplish the mission. It is initially stated in broad terms, with further

details determined during the actual COA analysis. Additionally, it

provides a framework for the necessary staff analysis that must

consider all factors and deductions to determine the viability of the

various options. The final product of this planning stage is a Concept

of Operations (CONOPS) based on a single COA chosen by the

Commander. The Concept Development Stage is summarised in

Figure 4-2.


28/110

4-8

STAGE IV - PLAN DEVELOPMENT

0414. An approved plan will be the final product of the OPP. The

development of the plan is based on the approved CONOPS. Ifmajor changes to the CONOPS are introduced during Plan

Development, it may be necessary for planners to return to an earlier

stage of the OPP. There must be a continuous exchange of information

between the various staff branches subordinate commands. It is

important at the Plan Development Stage to ensure that potential

shortfalls are identified and that the plan addresses their resolution.

The Plan Development Stage is summarised in Figure 4-3.

Changes in the situation may result in the revision of the plans at all levels.


29/110

4-9

STAGE V - PLAN REVIEW

0415. During an operation there will often be changes in the situation,

which may necessitate the review of a plan, or higher authority maydirect it. The review should focus on the new threat, availability/

flow of forces, suitability of contingency plans, requirement for

additional branch plans, etc. Once the review is complete, the

Commander should be briefed, along with any recommendations for

action, to deal with the changed situation. The Plan Review Stage is

summarised in Figure 4-4.

0416. Review of a COP or OPLAN must occur whenever a majorchange has occurred. It must be kept in mind that any major changes

or amendments to the plan will require renewed approval.


30/110

4-

10

Figur

e4-1


31/110

4-11

Figure4-2


32/110

4-1

2

Figur

e4-3


33/110

4-13

Figure4-4


34/110

5-1

CHAPTER 5

DF(A) DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

0501. The Air Component Commanders (ACC) CONOPS is

paramount for DF(A) deployment planning. Thereafter, the Plan

Development stage of the Operational Planning Process takes

consideration of:

a. Base Availability. Host Nation (HN) or other nation basing,

Main Operating Bases (MOB), Deployment Operating Bases (DOB)or civil airfields, en-route bases, and Ports of Debarkation (POD).

b. Agreements. Bi-lateral basing and HN support agreements.

c. Contingency Operation Plan Basing. Other COP basing

or historical deployments.

Ports of debarkation options must be considered during the Operational Planning

Process.


35/110

5-2

d. Restrictions. National constraints and national peacetime

restrictions.

e. Collocation. Collocation of national assets, if possible; ifnot, basing of similar assets together.

f. Air and Sea Ports of Debarkation (APODs/SPODs).

Minimising the number of Ports of Debarkation (PODs) a single

nation must use.

g. Infrastructure. Avoid a basing requirement that could cause

a heavy infrastructure build-up.

0502. DF(A) units will be planned for deployment to the most suitable

locations. For potential crises in NATOs area of interest, basing

options may be limited in choice and lacking in facilities.

0503. As a quick reference for the screening of DF(A) basing during

operational planning, RFAS has developed special criteria to

standardize the assets basing requirements for Initial Operational

Capability. Because of the high readinessof NRF and HRF(A) units,

some requirements have to be met by facilities that are in place or

During Out-of-Area missions basing options may be limited in choice and less suitable.


36/110

5-3

that are readily available from local sources, while others may be

met by assets that are deployed into theatre. These criteria, coupled

with the associated basing considerations, provide a 90% deployment

solution.


37/110

6-1

CHAPTER 6

DF(A) COMMAND AND CONTROL

0601. Deployed air units will be integrated into either the

in-place NATO regional command and control structure at the

Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) level or into the CJTF/

NRF structure at the Combined Joint Forces Air Component

Command (CJFACC) level, for non-Article 5 Crisis Response

Operations. Figure 6-1 compares the operational relationships

between the NATO Command structure and the CJTF/NRFstructure used for non-Article 5 operations.

0602. Upon arrival of air assets in-theatre and when operationally

ready, TOA will occur and Operational Command (OPCOM) and/

or Operational Control (OPCON) will be transferred to SACEUR

by the nations. SACEUR will then delegate OPCON of these assets

to the deployed Joint Force Commander (JFC), who in turn will decide

on further delegations of C2 to the appropriate CJFACC.

Deployed units will be integrated into the existing command and control structure.


38/110

6-2

0603. The CJFACC will employ the deployed air assets, exercising

command and control over them via the C2 structure. If considered

necessary, liaison elements of nations providing air units can be

established at appropriate command levels. If the in-place C2 facilitiesare inadequate in the crisis area, enhancement using deployable

facilities may be appropriate. Following the introduction of the Air

Command and Control System (ACCS) (scheduled for 2007), a

Deployable ACCS Component (DAC) comprised of a Deployable

Combined Air Operations Centre (DCAOC) and supporting elements

will be made available. The CONOPS for the DCAOC is under

development.

0604. Deployable air C2 facilities are required to meet air asset C2

requirements prior to the implementation of ACCS. Therefore a DAC

Working Group was created with the support of nations and the

ACCs. It was tasked to identify available deployable elements and

to define the policy for their use. The resulting SHAPE Operational

Employment Sub-Concept for the SACEUR-Assigned Deployable

ACCS defines the need for the four building blocks equating to

elements of the ACCS structure. This policy identifies potential assetsavailable from NATO and national resources including, for example,

the HRF(A) Tactical Air Control Squadrons (TACSs).

Deployable air C2 facilities include assets from NATO and national resources.


39/110

6-3

0605. Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of

reliable, secure Communications and Information Systems (CIS).

The next chapter deals with CIS for C2 and supporting functions.

Effective C2 of deployed air units depends on the provision of reliable and secure CIS.


40/110

6-4

Figure6-1


41/110

6-5

Fig

ure6-2


42/110

7-1

CHAPTER 7

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATIONSYSTEMS

CIS FOR DF(A)

0701. Provision of appropriate CIS for deployed air units is a mission

critical area. The NATO Deployable CIS Concept (DCC) identifies

the NATO information transfer requirement for deployed air elements.This includes the need for access to the NATO Wide Area Network

core services, and air command and control and other functional

services. Deployed air elements may also require CIS access back

to their parent nations for the purposes of national command, logistics

or administration.

Provision of appropriate CIS is mission critical for deployed air units.


43/110

7-2

0702. Responsibility for the provision of the CIS for deployed air

elements falls to the following three agencies:

a. NATO. NATO is responsible for the provision of the CIS requiredto support the NATO C2 of deployed air elements down to the highest

national or multinational HQ, which will normally be the Combined

Air Operations Centre. Wherever possible, existing NATO and

national CIS infrastructure will be used, but where this is inadequate,

system enhancement may be achieved using NATO or national

deployable assets. The provision of CIS services from the CAOC

to the Deployed Operating Base (DOB) will normally also be provided

by NATO.

b. Sending Nations. The SN are responsible for the provision of

internal CIS within the deployed element and for any required rear-

link communications to the parent nation. To eliminate overlap/

duplication, sharing of connectivity to meet NATO and national

requirements will be co-ordinated wherever possible.

c. Host Nation. The HN is responsible for providing access tolocal commercial tele-communications facilities and to their national

military systems in order to facilitate the provision of NATO CIS

services. The Host Nation may also provide CIS services for their

use or other Sending Nations use under a bilateral or multinational

Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU).

0703. As noted in Chapter 6, additional deployable air C2 elements

may be required to support deployed air units. NATO is responsiblefor providing CIS services to these deployed elements in accordance

with STANAG 5048 where higher formations provide connectivity

to the lower formation.

0704. Common NATO-wide distributed CIS are required by deployed

air elements to meet the needs of C2, battle management and

Intelligence, as well as for a number of support areas. Such elements

will, in due course, be provided under the ACCS and ACE AutomatedCommand, Control and Information System (ACCIS) programmes.


44/110

7-3

In the interim, a variety of prototype systems will be used on an

ad hoc basis.

0705. Improvements to the static infrastructure to meet DF

requirements are being implemented by NATO. Prior to project

completion, increased reliance on the use of deployable CIS facilities

will be necessary for in-area as well as OOA applications. Some

deployable NATO CIS equipment is currently available, and further

packages are in the procurement process. Their usage will be in

accordance with the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). To

meet specific deployment needs, particularly during the build-up ofthe Force Goals, nations have been requested through the DPQ

process to assign deployable CIS facilities to deployable air units.

In addition, NATO is working with Partnership nations to enhance

their CIS interoperability with NATO for improving operations in a

wide spectrum of contingencies.

NATO is responsible for the provision of CIS required to support the C2 of

deployed forces.


45/110

7-4

DF(A) RESOURCE PLANNING

0706. DF(A) CIS planning is co-ordinated at a variety of levels.

The design and provision of CIS facilities within NATO is a jointservice function, and hence the prime co-ordinating and controlling

staff for the development of an operational or exercise CIS plan is

that of the JFC or CJTF Commander. Air CIS requirements will be

identified by the staff of the Air Component Commander, in association

with RFAS and the deploying nations. Any CIS shortfalls will be

identified in the plan and passed through the chain of command to

SHAPE J6 and the NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency

(NACOSA). Provision of additional resources in support ofdeployed units will be co-ordinated with SHAPE

J5/Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) and, for deployable air

aspects with RFAS. CIS resources can be made available either by

re-allocation of existing assets, by allocation of deployable NATO

CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP), by the use of national

deployable assets (e.g. DF(A) assigned equipment), by renting

commercial facilities on an ad hoc basis, or by NATO emergency or

urgent procurement. Use of NCCAP facilities will be co-ordinated/de-conflicted by SHAPE J6/NACOSA in association with J5 / CJPS

and RFAS. NACOSA will co-ordinate the use of, and access to, the

NATO CIS infrastructure.

0707. The use of common CIS standards by NATO and the nations

is of paramount importance if the required flexible usage of DF(A)

elements is to be achieved. Nations should utilise NATO

recommended digital standards as laid down by the Consultative

Committee on International Telephone and Telegraphy (CCITT) and

in accordance with International Standards Organisation/Open

System Interconnection principles for their internal CIS. Where

this is not possible, SN and HN are responsible for providing

interfaces to NATO systems in accordance with NATO

Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs).


46/110

8-1

CHAPTER 8

GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE

0801. To support a JFC or a CJTF Commander in the completion of

his mission, it may be necessary to reinforce a Region or Theatre

with Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD). The spectrum of NATO

GBAD systems varies from basic Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)

and Manual Portable Air Defence (MANPAD) through modern

Radar Guided and Controlled Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD)

systems. In order to be able to defend DF and high value assets orpopulated areas against ballistic or aerodynamic missile threats,

sophisticated Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems capable of

Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) are in the inventory of some NATO

nations. When special system expertise is not available within the

region/theatre or when deploying OOA, the deployment of GBAD

units requires particularly careful planning and co-ordination.

The different roles of GBAD in the Integrated Extended Air Defence

Structure (IEADS) and the demanding requirements for automated

Some surface to air missile systems are capable of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).


47/110

8-2

C2/EW for these systems must be taken into consideration.

0802. The receiving Air Component Commander is responsible to

integrate deployed GBAD reinforcements into an Integrated ExtendedAir Defence System. GBAD units can be deployed either to augment

and enhance the existing Regional Air Defence (AD) (Article 5) or

to build, together with other systems, a constructive Air Defence

Capability to fulfil the CJTF Commanders mission for OOA

operations. They will be employed to defend high-value military and

civil assets at specific geographic locations against air attacks, or

attacks with ballistic or aerodynamic missiles. The introduction of

modern GBAD units has reduced the clear distinction between thesystems with regard to range and altitude and their specific role.

In addition it provides a capability against specific ballistic/

aerodynamic missile threats.

SHORAD units will protect specific high value locations or assets.


48/110

8-3

GBAD roles can be identified as follows:

a. SHORAD. Due to the nature of their task, these units will

normally be employed in a point defence role to protect specific highvalue locations or assets under local command and adhere to regional

standard airspace co-ordination rules. SHORAD units can also be

employed within a GBAD cluster and be used as gap fillers to

enhance the overall capability of the AD.

b. SAM. SAM units, being an integral part of the IEADS, are

primarily employed in an area defence role and are mostly structured

in clusters. They contribute to regional AD in order to provide generaltheatre low/medium to high altitude coverage, and protection to

designated high-risk areas. Under exceptional circumstances, SAM

units can be employed in a Point Defence Role.

SAM units can be included in the main body of DF(A). In those

circumstances where a ballistic missile threat exists, deployment of

TMD-capable GBAD units, as part of the deployed forces, will be

required.

SAM units are primarily employed in an area defence role.


49/110

8-4

When possible, GBAD units in an Area Defence and/or TMD Role

are to be supplemented by ground-based, airborne and space-based

sensors and additional Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence (C3I) facilities. Developments in TMD and continuing

interconnectivity improvements will, however, allow for stand-alone

employments.

0803. GBAD units, especially SAM systems in an AD Role, must

also be able to operate in close co-ordination with ground /

sea-based forces when employed in a multi-service environment.

C2 arrangements are developed to maximise effectiveness of IEADS

and safety to allied forces.

GBAD units will be deployed to build, with other systems, a constructive Air Defence

Capability.


50/110

9-1

CHAPTER 9

FORCE PROTECTION0901. Force Protection (FP) is defined as all measures taken and

means used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities,

equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, so as to

preserve the freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a

force. The generic title of FP covers the functions of Active Defence,

Passive Defence and Recuperation in both conventional and NBC

environments. For DF(A), the increased possibility of rapiddeployment to forward bases in much more volatile threat/risk areas

only serves to reinforce the continued importance of protecting air

forces on the ground.

0902. This chapter gives an outline of FP arrangements for DF units

to ensure that the FP dimension to deployed operations is properly

considered, prior to and in the planning phase, thus allowing FP

requirements and capabilities to be assessed and fully satisfied.

DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed operations.


51/110

9-2

As FP facilities may be provided by IPF, by one or more of the

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), or by a combination of both,

contributions must be carefully coordinated to ensure comprehensive

provision without duplication of effort.

ACTIVE DEFENCE

0903. Active Defence comprises the measures necessary to prevent

an enemy from successfully attacking a unit; it includes the physical

defence of a unit against ground and low-level air attack.

a. Active Ground Defence. The active ground defence

concept seeks to counter the threat of terrorist and conventional

(including Special Forces) attack by a layered defence which includes

control of entry measures, point defence of vital assets, on- and off-

base patrolling and the domination of vital ground thus denying a

potential enemy the freedom of movement required to operate

successfully. Active ground defence encompasses protection from

Active Defence forces protect deployed air forces against ground and low-level airattacks.


52/110

9-3

close (i.e., direct attack by small arms, grenade or improvised

explosive device) and stand-off attack (i.e., mortar, sniper, heavy

machine gun or MANPAD) and thus needs to extend beyond the

perimeter of an airbase into the area from which attacks could bemounted. This area is deemed the Ground Defence Area. A high

degree of coordination and cooperation is required between the

airbase ground defence commander and the local military

commander, who will normally have primacy for defence

arrangements of the whole area in which the airbase is located.

b. Low Level Air Defence. Low level air defence will be

deployed to engage targets at distances beyond their effective rangeof weapon release; these targets may include manned aircraft,

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and missiles.

Active Defence prevents an enemy from successfully attacking a unit.


53/110


54/110


55/110

9-6

b. EOD encompasses the detection, identification, on-site

evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of Unexploded

Ordnance (UXO).

c. ADR comprises the measures necessary to restore an airfield

operational flying support capability including the Repair of Aircraft

Operating Surfaces (RAOS) and the Restoration of Essential Services

and Facilities (RESF).

0906. DF(A) units should have organic FP capabilities for deployed

operations to enable them to operate from their assigned functional

area on a deployment base with minimal support from IPF or otherTCN forces. They should be capable of carrying out the following

FP activities:

a. Warning, alerting and controlling all FP functions.

b. Providing point protection and control of entry to their

vital assets.

c. Concealment and dispersal of their equipment.

d. Providing immediate casualty care.

e. Fighting fires with local first aid fire fighting

extinguishers.

f. Carrying out PAR, EOR and NBCR in their designatedarea of operation.

g. Implementing individual NBC protective measures.

h. Decontaminating critical equipment unique to their unit.

Where possible, DF(A) units should deploy with infantry-trained

manpower that can be used to supplement HN defence forces.


56/110

9-7

0907. Unity of FP planning and C2 arrangements on a multinational

deployment base will be an essential element of successful

employment of DF(A). Even well developed IPF facilities may be

overwhelmed by the demands of a DF(A) operation and thus a TCNmay be required to take the lead on FP, especially in providing

integrated FP C2. Moreover, there is a high probability that DF(A)

units may have to operate from bases where existing FP measures

are inadequate, especially when operating away from NATO

infrastructure. In such cases, TCNs will be required to provide the

full range of FP measures to ensure the survivability of their deployed

units. Accordingly, nations should retain sufficient deployable FP

capability, covering the full spectrum, at the same readiness as theirDF(A) units.


57/110


58/110

10-2

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC CONCEPTS

1004. Multinational logistics is a tool, which, depending on the

operational requirements, the level of interoperability of the systems,

and the specific situation in theatre, can enhance efficiency and

effectiveness of a multinational force. More specifically, the benefits

of multinational logistics can be the following:

a. Reduction of the overall costs.

b. Reduction of the logistic footprint in theatre.

c. Increased flexibility of the force.

d. Lesser use of scarce local resources.

e. Efficient use of national expertise.

Nations must ensure the provision of logistic resources for deployed forces.


59/110

10-3

1005. Multinational logistics is not an aim in itself. During the early

stage of the Force Planning and Force Generation process, the

applicability, necessity and benefits of multinational logistics must be

considered. Unilateral national logistic decisions could adverselyimpact the effectiveness of the NATO Commanders mission.

1006. Besides national logistic arrangements to support own forces,

where ad-hoc support may be provided to other nations and /or

NATO Commanders (e.g., Logistic Time Sharing (LTIS) and Logistic

Sorties (LS)), there are three recognised levels of multinational

logistics:

a. Pre-planned mutual support, HNS and Third Party Logistic

Support Services (TPLSS) that are arranged nationally.

b. A nation formally undertakes to provide support or services

to all or part of the multinational force, but under national command

(Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistic Role Specialist Nation

(LRSN)).

c. One or more nations formally undertake to serve all or part of

the multinational force, under OPCON of the NATO Commander

(e.g. Theatre Support Unit (TSU), Multinational Integrated Logistic

Unit (MILU)).

1007. Multinational logistics can be pre-planned or introduced during

an operation as the situation evolves. Based on the mentioned levels,

NATO and nations can decide to apply multinational logistics whereit replaces less effective or efficient national solutions. As a neutral

party RFAS is uniquely well suited to act as broker between nations

to facilitate multinational logistic arrangements. This is usually

accomplished through development of appropriate Technical

Agreements (TAs) and Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs)

detailing the functional, administrative and resource-related

implications of such relationships.


60/110

10-4

1008. Multinational logistics may create opportunities for nations to

contribute their fair share to a mission especially for those nations

that cannot provide the full range of own logistic support or whose

contribution to the mission is of a size not justifying own logisticarrangements. RFAS is able to advise and assist NATO and nations

in the development of concepts and plans for multinational air logistics

for a mission.

LOGISTIC DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES

1009. Current Air Forces Logistic Doctrine and Procedures provide

NATO and national authorities the doctrine for the logistic support

of air forces, including DF(A). RFAS is the custodian for this

document, and for the document that includes the format for the JIA

template for airfield beddown. This format can be used to detail

Sending Nations Statement of Requirements and HN capabilities

(based upon site surveys).

Multinational logistics can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of a multinational

force.


61/110

10-5

LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1010. Logistic co-ordination and control arrangements are currently

being analysed and further developed within NATO, but basicconcepts will continue for DF(A), NRF, and GRF. Sending Nations,

through their unit-level logistic support elements and/or National

Support Elements (NSE), will control and co-ordinate their own

logistic activities. Where multinational air forces are collocated in

the same theatre, a Multinational Logistic Centre (Air) (MNLC(A))

may be established. Where a principle joint headquarters is

established, a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be

set up. A diagram summarising a potential Logistic Organisation isat Figure 10-1.

1011. National Support Elements (NSE). A deployed NSE in

close co-operation with the units will maintain the necessary stock

controls and consumption data to support national elements. The

NSE will provide the reports, required by national and higher

authorities, through the Air Component Commander and co-ordinate

activities with the appropriate MNLC(A)/MJLC, if established.

1012. Multinational Logistics Centre (Air). Multinational

operations may require the establishment of an MNLC(A). The

MNLC(A) will co-ordinate logistic, including movement and medical

requirements between the Sending Nations and the Host Nation.

The MNLC(A) main functions are to manage requirements for the

entire operation, to provide liaison with respect to temporary

shortages and to provide mutual assistance in resource allocation.The MNLC(A) will co-ordinate with and provide reports to the ACC,

MJLC (if established) and execute the NATO Commanders

authority to redistribute assets.

1013. Multinational Joint Logistics Centre. Where a principal

headquarters is established with representation from all Services, a

Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC) may be set up as an

executive logistic element reporting to the Force Commanders CJ4


62/110


63/110

10-7

LOGISTIC PHASES

1015. Logistics planning for DF(A) units during crisis will be

accomplished in phases. During all phases, RFAS is able to support

a standing multinational joint force headquarter by playing the role

of Broker Agent between SN, HN and force contingents. The

phases are:

a. Assessment and Preparation/Pre-deployment.

Co-ordination of multinational logistic requirements and capabilities

for multinational air forces is essential. To execute deployments of

these forces in a timely manner, to enable the best selection of forces

for a particular deployment base and to optimise the logistic support

package for that force, the logistic support will be planned on a

modular basis, with standardised pre-deployment procedures.

b. Deployment. In this phase, the initial deployment of national

air force contingents and the build-up of the initial operating stocks

take place.

c. Employment/Sustainment. During this period, the continued

deployment of additional required forces and employment of forces

in-place occur. Logistic activities like the establishment of resupply

routes and operations support services must concentrate on sustaining

on-going operations and should be adaptive to any increased level of

operations.

d. De-escalation. Throughout this phase, selected air

contingents will be re-deployed and supply pipelines will be reduced.

A re-organisation of the theatre logistics C2 structure may occur.

In some operations, the logistics architecture may transition to support

non-NATO follow-on operations.

e. Recovery/Re-deployment. In this stage, the withdrawal of

the deployed forces and operating stocks, as well as the termination


64/110

10-8

of logistic and administrative support arrangements will take place.

Special attention will be given to the requirements necessary to avoid

restricting the effectiveness of forces for either re-deployment to

another area of the operation or future operations.

Note: The timing of these phases will be dependent on many factors, including

operational requirements, timings as laid down in relevant contingency plans and

the requirements for readiness, deployability and sustainability of the units.

LOGISTIC ASPECTS

1016. Survey Teams. Each SN should form a specialist teamcomposed of a cross-section of functional skills capable of evaluating

selected deployed operating locations and preparing the location

facilities in advance of the units deployment. In addition, SN teams

must ensure adequate equipped en-route bases are established, with

capability to support both DF(A) and associated airlift as necessary.

1017. Supply Requirements. The SN, in co-ordination with the

SC, is responsible for determining supply requirements for deployedunits and for identifying sources of supply or co-ordinating HNS.

RFAS as a central air planning staff is able to assist in defining the

requirements and exploring support options.

1018. Service Support. Service Support will be a composite of

individual SN, mutual support and HN responsibilities.

RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of arrangements for Service

Support. An example of a table summarising service supportresponsibilities is at Figure 10-2.

1019. HNS. Responsive and flexible HNS is a vital supplement to

the organic support of a deployed unit. HNS will be provided to the

greatest extent possible, taking into account national legislation,

national priorities and the actual capabilities of the Host Nation.

HNS reduces the need for SN to deploy equipment or people,

although it is not a mechanism to offset deficiencies or shortfalls


65/110

10-9

from each SN contribution. HN should provide the maximum possible

support for deployed forces, but not to the extent that it reduces a

HN operational capability. RFAS is able to assist in the brokerage of

arrangements for HNS.

Note:RFAS is involved in the development of a concept that supports bare base

operations. Bare base modules are intended to provide the necessary non-organic

support to DF (A) units when they deploy to bases with no or limited Host Nation

Support. The aim of the process is to include the Deployable Operations Capabilities

for DF (A) units in the Force Proposal.

1020. Initial Operating Stocks. Logistic assets needed to provide

initial operating stocks, pending establishment of the resupply pipeline,will be to a large extent defined by the SN. Deployment stocks

need to be readily available and stored in air-transportable packs.

The required weapons and equipment, as well as the declared missile

loads and supplies, must be collocated with the deployed air

unit or suitably positioned.

Host Nation support reduces the need to deploy equipment or people.


66/110

10-10

1021. Resupply. DF(A) units stocks are required initial

sustainment after deployment and a resupply logistics support system

for these forces is to be established within prescribed timelines.

Theatre stock levels will normally be crisis/Operation Plans

(OPLAN) specific.

1022. Unit logistics. DF(A) units should be equipped with a Mission

Support Kit in which vital mission operating assets are assembledand maintained at a high readiness level. Units should maximise the

use of containerisation for the aggregation of spares, material, and

weapons. Units should develop deployment listings that provide the

framework of their logistic requirements and availability of deployable

logistic assets.

1023. Maintenance. Deployable forces must be able to repair or

replace mission essential equipment and weapons under deployed

Sending nations are responsible for identifying logistic assets required to support a

deployed unit.


67/110

10-11

conditions. Shared or co-use of support equipment resources must

be planned. First line preventive maintenance, battle damage repair,

and corrective maintenance should be organic to the DF(A) unit and

deployable. Second line preventive maintenance will normally be a

DF(A) unit main operating base responsibility, while national third

line organisations should be prepared to support national and deployed

units.

1024. Reporting. Logistic reporting will follow the requirements of

the Bi-SC Reporting Directive, as amended and amplified by specific

instructions issued by the directing NATO authority.

1025. Deployability. Deployable tactical/mobile combat logistics

systems have great benefits such as: flexibility for rapid deployment,

the ability to augment existing fixed systems or to compensate for

the lack of infrastructure provided by the HN. Although the

deployment of these systems will compete for scarce airlift assets,

non-Article 5 deployments to austere locations may require their

use to enhance the deployed unit support capability.

Deployable forces must be able

to repair mission essential

equipment under deployed

conditions.


68/110

10-12

Examples of these assets are:

a. Operations Support Services. Where HN are unable to

provide all essential operational support services (such as arrestergear, runway or airfield lighting, sweepers, cranes, navigation aids

etc.), nations with spare capacity, or those not committed to deploy,

could offer available services to support deployed air operations.

b. Fuel Capacity Enhancement. SN should be prepared to

provide tactical fuel storage and handling facilities to meet any

shortfalls at deployment bases. This could include fabric bladder

tanks - and the necessary pumping equipment to enable emergencyinstallations - and the creation of additional pipelines.

c. Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid Nitrogen (LIN) Capacity

Enhancement. SN should be prepared to provide deployable LOX/

LIN tanks or a manufacturing plant to meet shortfalls.

d. Field Accommodation Modules. In the event that

accommodation at a deployment location is insufficient or unsuitableand the HN is unable to provide any alternative, the SN should be

prepared to deploy with a full range of field accommodation to support

its force.

e. Field Catering (Messing) Modules. SN should be prepared

to deploy catering support for its forces, where necessary.

f. Deployable Base Medical Facility. SN should be preparedto provide fully equipped medical facilities, with a limited hospital

capability, where necessary, to supplement HN base medical

capability at the Role 2 level. Additionally, a field hospital facility

may be required to supplement local hospitals at the Role 3 level.

g. Maintenance. Consists of deployable engineering and/or

avionics workshops and test facilities for repairs beyond First Line,

including Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR). This aspect alsoincludes hangarage, protection and handling facilities.


69/110

10-13

Figure10-1


70/110

10-

14

Figure10-2


71/110

11-1

CHAPTER 11

MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION

1101. The NATO principles and policies for movement and

transportation document reflects the need of the nations and the

Alliance to provide flexible support to NATO operations. Military

Movement and Transport resources will always be limited. National

M&T resources are likely to be tailored to meet the rapid strategic

deployment of key elements of the force and to provide operationaland tactical mobility. The greater the scope and the size of the

operation, the greater will be the reliance on civil M&T resources.

Military planners must appreciate that civil M&T resources are

also limited, are not specifically designed for military use, and

might therefore be neither available, nor capable of meeting the

military requirements.

NATO and nations have collective responsibility for M&T support to NATO operations.


72/110


73/110

11-3

(2) The HN has the ultimate authority to approve, coordinate and

control all movements, including RSOM related activity, on its

sovereign territory in accordance with the NATO commanders

priorities.

NATO STRUCTURE FOR M&T

1103. The M&T Architecture in the integrated NATO Command

Structure and during a CJTF is shown at Figures 11-1 and 11-2.

a. NATO HQ. NATO HQ provides the political and military

guidance through consultation with Nations for overall M&T

aspects and by obtaining timely agreements for the transit of

deploying forces through national territory when necessary.

b. The Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC).

The AMCC is the SHAPE agency for the overall management of

strategic movements. In this respect, the AMCC in cooperation with

Nations constructs the Multi-National Detailed Deployment Plan

(MNDDP) and addresses strategic lift shortfalls.

The Nations are responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain

and redeploy their forces.


74/110

11-4

c. The Joint Force Command CJ4 M&T Staff. The Staff

is to develop and to implement movement and transportation plans

and directives and to prioritise movement requirements as they

apply to the JFC tasks. The M&T Staff is the focus for all aspectsof operational movements within the region in co-ordination with

the HN.

d. National Movements Control Centre (NMCC). The

NMCC is the agency provided by the HN to approve, control and

co-ordinate air, sea and inland surface movements on its own territory,

in support of NATO operations.

e. Joint Theatre Movement Staff (JTMS). The JTMS is the

Commander Combined Joint Task Forces (COMCJTFs) primary

focus for Deployment and Movement matters. Its role is to monitor,

evaluate and provide continuous assessment of strategic and

operational deployments. It is part of the CJTF HQ and is the focus

for co-ordination and consultation between the SN, HN and the

Component Commanders.

f. Joint Transportation Co-ordination Centre (JTCC). The

JTCC is a cell established on an as-required basis to co-ordinate the

employment of any transportation assets, which may be assigned to

COMCJTF for an operation at the theatre level.

g. National Support Element (NSE). The NSE is a national

organisation positioned in theatre when required by a nation. The

NSE supports reception, onward movement, re-supply andredeployment of national forces. The NSE will interface with the

NMCC or Theatre Movements Control Centre (TMCC) as

applicable.


75/110

11-5

h. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Centre (AECC). The

AECC element is established by the designated NATO Commander

to co-ordinate aeromedical evacuation. The AECC monitors patient

movements and coordinates strategic aeromedical evacuation withthe AMCC.

i. Regional Air Lift Control Centre (RALCC). The RALCC

is an agency within the CJTF structure (Air Component Command)

and will plan, co-ordinate, execute and control the air transport

operations within the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

SEQUENCE OF M&T PLANNING

1104. The development of M&T plans in support of NATO

operations requires close coordination between NATO Commands,

SN and HN. This process is supported by the Allied Deployment

and Movement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is used for planning,

evaluating and monitoring (tracking and tracing) M&T operations in

support of NATO missions.

1105. Movement planning is part of the Operational Planning Process

(see Chapter 4). The development of deployment/movement plans

in support of NATO operations will be an iterative process and may

begin with limited military guidance or political clearance. Force

planning should identify all forces needed to fulfil operational

requirements that have been established in the concept of operations

in order to arrange the arrival of these forces into the area of

operations in accordance with the NATO Commanders priorities

and timelines.


76/110

11-6

The end product of deployment planning will be a Multi-National

Detailed Deployment Plan, coordinated and de-conflicted at the SC

level, to meet the NATO Commanders operational requirements.

Figure 11-3 shows the deployment planning process. Sequentially,the main deployment planning documents are:

a. Statement of Requirements (SOR). SACEUR will, with

the designated NATO Commander, provide the SOR to the nations.

The SOR lists the forces required by the NATO Commander for the

mission.

b. National Force Contribution (NFC). Based on the SOR,the Nations identify and offer forces they can provide in support of

the mission.

c. Allied Forces List (AFL). When combined at SC level, the

NFCs become the AFL. The AFL provides the information contained

in the NFCs and also includes the movement characteristics for each

unit (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support units).

The development of deployment/movement plans in support of NATO operations is

part of the Operational Planning Process.


77/110

11-7

d. Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is an expression

of the time-phased requirements for deploying the units listed in the

AFL. The ADL specifies the NATO commanders operational

requirements by listing the Commanders Required Date (CRD),Desired Order of Arrival, Ports of Debarkation (PODs), and Final

Destination (FD) for each unit.

e. Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP). Based on the ADL and

identified constraints, nations develop their national DDP considering:

(1) Force Packages;

(2) Time Phasing;

(3) Lines of Communication (LOCs);

(4) Modes of Transportation (MOTs);

(5) Assignment of Transportation Assets;

(6) Reception, Staging and Onward Movement.

National DDPs are then combined by the AMCC into a Multi-National

DDP and de-conflicted as required by the AMCC, in conjunction

with the designated NATO Commander(s), the Troop Contributing

Nation(s) (TCN(s)) and HN(s) as appropriate. Reception and onward

movement planning is an integral part of the deployment planning

process. The HN(s), in conjunction with the TCN(s) and NATOCommander, will conduct reception and onward movement planning

to maximise the throughput capacity of: PODs; reception, marshalling,

staging, and assembly areas; and routes to final destinations to meet

the CRD. In this respect, the early identification of HNs and

infrastructure capabilities is essential.


78/110

11-8

f. Sequencing. A series of Movement Planning Conferences

chaired at SHAPE by the AMCC would be held to support the

iterative process to develop a Multi-National Deconflicted

Deployment Plan. Sequential simulations and evaluations of plannednational movements using ADAMS will determine initial gross

feasibility, provide data for analysis and refinement of the movement

flow, and identify any shortfalls for resolution in subsequent planning

cycles. During execution planning and deployment, nations will

continue to provide National DDP updates to the AMCC.

AIR TRANSPORT

1106. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil lift

necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO

military operations. The procedures for requesting and providing airlift

resources for co-operative and/or shared use are found in Allied

Joint Movement and Transportation doctrine.

1107. Air Transport (AT) is relatively expensive and, in most cases,

the fastest mode of transport. However, contrary to broad thinking,

it is not in all cases the most efficient means to deploy or re-deploy

large units. AT is greatly affected by factors that can hamper the

airflow significantly (e.g. weather, throughput capacity of airports,

saturation of Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities, dependence on

onward movement, etc.).

1108. Nations retain full Command and Control of their military airlift

assets. Nations are encouraged to consider bilateral arrangements

with other nations for the use of military and civilian airlift assets,

prior to requesting NATO co-ordinated, co-operative airlift support.

In addition, nations are requested to make available their surplus

airlift assets under military control for NATO Military Command

co-ordinated, co-operative and/or shared use. Nations can also elect

to place airlift assets under operational control of a NATO

Commander in specific instances or for a particular period or task.


79/110

11-9

1109. Airlift assets placed under operational control of NATO for

co-operative and/or shared use will be managed by AMCC or, if

required, by Joint Movement Co-ordination Centre (JMCC). The

day-to-day management of these assets may be delegated tosubordinated organisations for an operation or exercise, for example,

the NMCC/JTCC or the Regional Airlift Co-ordination Centre

(RALCC). An Intra-Theatre Airlift System (ITAS) may be

established to support in-theatre airlift requirements.

1110. Military movements will rely heavily on airlift resources

chartered directly from the commercial aviation market or upon

utilisation of normal commercial services. Nations plan for use of

commercial aviation resources during operations and retain control

over their chartered airlift assets. However, they may encounter

difficulty in chartering sufficient airlift resources to meet military

requirements.

M&T resources must enable rapid strategic deployment and provide operational and

tactical mobility.


80/110

11-10

Nations may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close

co-operation with military planners of other countries within the

AMCC. Co-ordination will not increase the number of aircraft

available, but it could result in more efficient use of them and couldrestrain escalating charter hire rates.

SEA TRANSPORT

1111. Nations are responsible for providing the military or civil sealift

necessary to move and sustain the forces they contribute to NATO

military operations. All military shipping assets remain under national

control. However, it is envisaged that under certain circumstances,nations may be prepared to offer shipping assets, which are under

military control for use by other nations. The AMCC may request

nations to place available surplus shipping capacity under military

control for use by other nations.

1112. Sea Transport (ST) is a very economic mode of transport.

Although relatively slow on short distances because of the loading

and discharging time, on long distances this mode of transport canbe the only suitable way to move as quickly as possible a whole

force package. Examples of efficient usage of ST are for units with

outsized and/or heavy cargo and hazardous cargo such as fuel or

ammo. A further advantage is that there are almost no problems

with border crossings.

1113. Military movements rely heavily upon vessels chartered directly

from the commercial shipping market or upon utilisation of normal

commercial services. Nations plan for use of merchant shipping during

operations and retain control over their chartered sealift assets.

However, they may encounter difficulty in chartering sufficient

tonnage of preferred types to meet military requirements. Nations

may wish to co-ordinate their chartering activities in close co-operation

with military planners from other countries within the AMCC. Again,

co-ordination will not increase the number of ships available, but it

could result in more efficient use of ships and could restrain escalatingcharter hire rates.


81/110

11-11

INLAND SURFACE TRANSPORT

1114. Inland Surface Transport (IST) encompasses the use of ports

and beaches, road, railroad, inland waterway transport, and pipeline

modes, as well as the interrelationship between them. One or more

of these modes will be required to accomplish operational

deployments and redeployments of forces and their follow-on support.

IST resources, and planning for their use, remain fully under national

control during operations. However, planning requires co-ordination

between nations and relevant headquarters.

1115. Civil resources will be necessary to meet operational movement

requirements due to the limited availability of military IST resources.

Consequently, ready access to civil transport resources will be

beneficial. Harmonised military and civil procedures for regular use

are prerequisite for easy acquisition of HN transport support, as

well as for border crossing movements.

Sea transport is one of the most efficient means to deploy or redeploy large units.


82/110

11-12

1116. Characteristics. Selection of IST modes will take accountof the specific lift requirements. Characteristics, capabilities,

availability and cost effectiveness are factors in deciding upon which

transport mode, or combination thereof, is to be used.

a. Road Transport (RT). RT is, in general, suitable for intra-

regional deployment of forces and accompanying stocks, normally

using military organic vehicles. RT is particularly suitable as a feede

Documents

Deployable Forces (Air) Handbook (2003)